Morata vs Go

Posted on June 21, 2013

Spouses Morata vs Spouses Go

125 SCRA 444
GR No. L-62339

FACTS:
On August 25, 1982, the spouses Go filed a complaint eagainst petitioners Morata for recovery of a sum of
money plus damages amounting to P49,400.
On the basis of the allegation that the parties-litigants are all residents of Cebu City, petitioner filed a motion to
dismiss citing as grounds the failure of the complaint to allege prior availment by the plaintiffs of the barangay
conciliation process required by PD 1508, as well as the absence of certification by the Lupon or Pangkat
Secretary that no conciliation/settlement has been reached by the parties.
The motion to dismiss was denied on September 2, 1982. The petitioners' motion for reconsideration was also
denied on October 3, 1982.

ISSUE:
Whether the conciliation process at the barangay level, prescribed by PD 1508 as a precondition for filing a
complaint in court, is also compulsory for actions cognizable by the RTC.

HELD:
Yes. Sec.6, PD 1508 provides that the confrontation of the parties and conciliation before the Lupon is a
precondition for filing a complaint, except when:

1. The accused is under detention;

2. A person has otherwise been deprived of personal liberty calling for *habeas corpus* proceedings;
3. Actions coupled with privisional remedies; and
4. Where the action may be barred by the Statute of Limitations.

Sec.2 provides additional exceptions, such as when:

1. One party is the government, or any subdivision or instrumentality;

2. One party is a public officer/employee and the dispute relates to the performance of his official
functions;
3. Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding 30 days or a fine exceeding P200;
4. Where there is no private offended party; and
5. Such other classes of disputes which the Prime Minister may, in the inetrest of justice, determine upon
recommendation of the Minister of Justice and the Minister of Local Government.

Thus, except in the instances enumerated in Secs. 2 and 6 of the law, the Lupon has the authority to settle
amicably all types of disputes involving parties who actually reside in the same city or municipality.
The law makes no distinction whatsoever with respect to the classes of civil disputes that should be
compromised at the barangay level. Where the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish.
By compelling the disputants to settle their differences through the intervention of the barangay leader and
other respected members of the barangay, the animosity generated by protracted court litigations between
members of the same political unit, a disruptive factor toward unity and cooperation, is avoided. It must be
borne in mind that the conciliation process at the barangay level is also designed to discourage indiscriminate
filing of cases in court in order to decongest its clogged dockets and enhance the quality of justice dispensed by
it.
The law obviously intended to grant the Lupon as broad and comprehensive authority as possible as would
bring about the optimum realization of the aforesaid objectives. These objectives would only be half-met and
easily thwarted if the Lupon's authority is exercised only in cases falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of
inferior courts.
Jurisdiction over cases involving real property or any interest therein, except forcible entry and detainer cases,
has always been vested in the Courts of First Instance.
The authority of the Lupon is clearly established in Sec.2 of the law; whereas Secs. 11, 12 and 14 deal with the
nullification or execution of the settlement or arbitration awards obtained at the barangay level. These sections
conferred upon the city & municipal courts the jurisdiction to pass upon and resolve petitions or actions for
nullification or enforcement of settlement/arbitration awards issued by the Lupon, regardless of the amount
involved or the nature of the original dispute. But there is nothing in the context of said sections to justify the
thesis that the mandated conciliation process in other types of cases applies excluisively to said inferior courts.
Therefore, the conciliation process at the barangay level, prescribed by P.D. 1508 as a pre-condition for filing
a complaint in court, is compulsory not only for cases falling under the exclusive competence of the
metropolitan and municipal trial courts, but for actions cognizable by the regional trial courts as well.

MORATA v. GO (1983)

FACTS: Spouses Victor and Flora Go filed a complaint against spouses Julius and Ma. Luisa Morata for recovery of
a sum of money plus damages amounting to P49,400.00 in CFI Cebu. On the basis of the allegation in the
complaint that the parties-litigants are all residents of Cebu City, the Moratas filed a motion to dismiss, citing as
grounds therefor, the failure of the complaint to allege prior availment by the Gos of the barangay conciliation
process required by P.D. 1508, as well as the absence of a certification by the Lupon or Pangkat Secretary that no
conciliation or settlement had been reached by the parties. The motion was opposed by the Gos. The judge denied
the motion to dismiss, ruling that the provision of Sec 6 of the law applies only to cases cognizable by the inferior
courts mentioned in Secs 11 and 12 of the law.

ISSUE: WON the complaint should be dismissed for failure to comply with PD 1508

HELD/RATIO: YES. The nature of the case at bar does not fall under the exceptions cited in Sections 2 and 6 of
P.D. 1508. Since the law does not distinguish, this case/dispute should have been first settled amicably by the
Lupon. Furthermore, there is no showing that that the intention of the law is to restrict its coverage only to cases
cognizable by the inferior courts for it would not have included the rule on venue provided in Section 3 (pertaining to
land disputes which are traditionally cognizable by CFIs/RTCs) thereof. This is further supported by Circular No. 22
issued by then CJ Fernando which gave notice to all CFIs to recognize the Katarungang Pambarangay Law and
desist from acting upon cases falling within the authority of the Lupons. This circular was noted by President
Marcos. Hence, the Court declared that the conciliation process at the barangay level, prescribed by P.D. 1508 as a
pre-condition for filing a complaint in court, is compulsory not only for cases falling under the exclusive competence
of the metropolitan and municipal trial courts, but for actions cognizable by the regional trial courts as well.

Purpose of the Law. By compelling the disputants to settle their differences through the intervention of the
barangay leader and other respected members of the barangay, the animosity generated by protracted court
litigations between members of the same political unit, a disruptive factor toward unity and cooperation, is avoided. It
must be borne in mind that the conciliation process at the barangay level is likewise designed to discourage
indiscriminate filing of cases in court in order to decongest its clogged dockets and, in the process, enhance the
quality of justice dispensed by it. Thus, to say that the authority of the Lupon is limited to cases exclusively
cognizable by the inferior courts is to lose sight of this objective. Worse, it would make the law a self-defeating one.
For what would stop a party, say in an action for a sum of money or damages, as in the instant case, from bloating
up his claim in order to place his case beyond the jurisdiction of the inferior court and thereby avoid the mandatory
requirement of P.D. 1508? And why, indeed, should the law seek to ease the congestion of dockets only in inferior
courts and not in the regional trial courts where the log-jam of cases is much more serious? Indeed, the lawmakers
could not have intended such half-measure and self-defeating legislation.

Rosaria Lupitan Pang-et vs. Catherine Manacnes-Dao-As

1. Petitioner filed an action for recovery of possession of real property situated in Sitio Abatan, Barrio Dagdag,
Sagada before the MTC against the respondent spouses
2. During the course of the trial--- parties thru their counsels --- agreed to refer the matter to the Brgy. Lupon for
arbitration in accordance w/ the provisions of the KPL --- MTC proceedings is suspended
3. 3 days later --- Lupon issued a certification to File an Action due to the refusal of the Manacnes spouses to enter
into an agreement for arbitration and their insistence that the case should go to court
4. More than a month later --- MCTC remanded the matter for conciliation by the Lupon & ordered the Lupon to
render an Arbitration Award
5. In compliance, Lupon rendered an Arbitration Award ordering the petitioner to retrieve the land upon payment to
the respondents of PHP 8K for the improvements
6. Respondent – aggrieved --- repudiated the award but was rejected by the Lupon
7. 1 month later --- petitioner filed w/ the Lupon a Motion for Execution while respondent filed a motion for the
resumption of the proceedings in the original case & prayed that her repudiation be considered by the court
8. MTC denied respondent’s motion contending that the 10-day period for repudiation had already lapsed and the
award became final
9. Almost 2 months later – the Brgy. Chairman issued a notice of execution of the award --- but was not
implemented
 10. 6 yrs later petitioner filed w/ the MTC an action for the enforcement of the award --- respondent – argues that
the award was void for not having been personally signed by the spouses and in a language not understood by
the parties
Issue: W/N the case properly undergone the KPL Rules?
Held: NO!
1. The award was void:
a. Not personally signed by the parties --- even petitioner herself admitted that respondent was not the one
who signed the document
b. Catherine (daughter of the respondents) --- even if she signed, it will be invalid as the parents cannot be
assisted by anyone unless they are minor & incompetent
c. Written in English & not understood by the parties
d. Consent of the Spouses where vitiated by fraud
2. The respondents never really intended to submit the case for arbitration

Dante M. Pascual, represented by Reymel Sagario v Marilou M. Pascual

GR No. 157830, November 17, 2005

FACTS: Petitioner Dante, a permanent resident of USA, appointed Sagario as attorney- in- fact by an SPA. Pursuant to such SPA,
Sagario filed a complaint entitled “Dante M. Pascual v Marilou M. Pascual and Register of Deeds, Defendants for Annulment of TCT
and Deed of Absolute Sale of Registered Land and/or Reconveyance with Damages. Respondent then filed Motion to Dismiss on the
ground of non- compliance with the requirement under Sec 412 of LGC, contending that there is no showing that the dispute was
referred to the barangay court before the case was filed in court. RTC granted the motion to dismiss ruling that when real property or
any interest therein is involved, the dispute shall be filed before the barangay where the property is located regardless of the residence
of the parties. Hence, this petition where petitioner Dante argues that he, not his attorney- in – fact Sagario is the real party- in- interest
and since he actually resides abroad, the lupon would have no jurisdiction to pass upon the dispute involving real property.
Respondent, on the other hand argued that it is Sagario who is considered as the real party- in- interest, and that since Sagario is a
resident of the same barangay as that of hers, the matter shall be brought under the jurisdiction of the lupon.

ISSUE: Whether or not the lupon has authority to act upon the case (WON PD 1508 or the Katarungang Pambarangay Law applies)

HELD: Negative.

Sec 408 of LGC provides that “the lupon of each barangay shall have authority to bring together the parties actually residing in the
same city or municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes xxx”

In the case of Tavora v Veloso, SC held that where the parties are not actual residents in the same city or municipality or
adjoining barangays, there is no requirement for them to submit their dispute to the lupon as provided for in Section 6 vis a vis SEC 2
and 3 of PD 1508.

To construe the express statutory requirement of actual residency as applicable to the attorney- in- fact of the party- plaintiff,
as contended by the respondent, would abrogate the meaning of a “real party- in- interest” as defined in Sec 2 of Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court. In fine, since the plaintiff herein petitioner, the real party in interest, is not an actual resident of the barangay where the defendant
herein respondent resides, the local lupon has no jurisdiction over their dispute, hence, prior referral to it for conciliation is not a pre-
condition to its filing in court. RTC thus erred in dismissing complaint.

Atty. Evelyn Magno vs. Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba

1. Atty. Magno charged Atty. Jacoba w/ willful violation of the Sec. 415 of the LGC of 1991 &
Canon 4 of the CPR as the latter allegedly acted as the Lawyer of Lorenzo Inos for land dispute
2. Atty. Magno was the niece of Lorenzo Inos & they had a disagreement over landscaping
contract they entered into w/c was brought before the Brgy. Captain of San Pascual, Talavera,
Nueva Ecija
a. At the Brgy. Conciliation: Atty. Jacoba clothed w/ SPA from Inos appeared for the latter
accompanied by his son, Lorenzito w/c was objected by Atty. Magno
b. Respondent’s Contention: Inos is entitled to be represented by a lawyer since Atty.
Magno herself is also a lawyer w/c was rebutted that it was just incidental
c. Atty. Jacoba later responded that she is appearing as an atty-in-fact and not as a
counsel of Inos
3. Evidence against Atty. Jacoba:
a. Atty. J asked for an ocular inspection of the land and an oral argument between Magno,
Jr & Lorenzito arose w/c made Atty. J to have the incident recorded in the brgy. Blotter
 b. Inos appeared before the court on Jan 2003 w/ the assistance of Atty. J & she also
signed as a witness during the said appearance
c. Sumbong – sent to the Punong Brgy --- she signed representing herself as the Family
Legal Counsel of Inos Family

Issue: W/N respondent can validly represent the Inos in a Brgy. Conciliation?

Held: NO!

1. Sec. 415 of the LGC –KPL - appearance of parties in person is mandatory w/o the assistance
of counsel except for minors incompetent who may be assisted by their next of kin who are
not lawyers
2. Prohibition – applies to all KB proceedings === Sec. 412 (a) of the LGC clearly provides that
as a precondition to the filing of a complaint in court, the parties shall go through the
conciliation process either before the lupon chairman or the lupon/pangkat tagapamayapa