HAZOp Report - BFI PDF

Basil Read Ltd - St Helena Airport Project
Hazard Operability (HAZOP) Study: BFI Ship to Shore Operations - 21 April 2017
Basil Read Ltd

St Helena Airport Project
Hazard Operability (HAZOP) Study: BFI Ship to Shore Operations
21 April 2017
Prepared by:
Vic Esterhuizen (Technical Risk Consultant) Date
Reviewed by:
Tony le Roy (Project Manager) Date
Approved by:
Graham Temlett (Technical Director) Date
Accepted by:
St Helena FMC (Operations) Date
Revision History
B 2017-04-21 Final review (initial comments included) Vic Esterhuizen

A 2017-04-07 Initial review (new document) Vic Esterhuizen
Rev No Date Description Revised By
H354128-00000-142-066-0001, Rev. B
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© Hatch 2017 All rights reserved, including all rights relating to the use of this document or its contents.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction .....................................................................................................................................1
2. HAZOP Workshop Participants .....................................................................................................1
3. HAZOP Study Methodology...........................................................................................................2
4. Risk Criteria.....................................................................................................................................4
5. HAZOP Workshop ..........................................................................................................................5
6. HAZOP Study Nodes ......................................................................................................................7
7. Risk Review Results .......................................................................................................................8
List of Figures
Figure 3-1: Flowchart (Schematic View) of the Hazard Study Process ..................................................3
Figure 4-1: Risk Matrix used during HAZOP Study ................................................................................4
Figure 6-1: HAZOP Nodes reviewed for the SHAP project ....................................................................7
List of Tables
Table 2-1: HAZOP Attendees ................................................................................................................. 1
Table 3-1: List of Acronyms used in this report....................................................................................... 2
Appendices
Appendix A : Proposed Mitigation Actions and Responsibilities
Appendix B : Risk Matrix and Risk Criteria
Appendix C : HAZOP Study Minutes
Appendix D : Piping Instrument Diagrams (P&ID’s)
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1. Introduction
As part of the project scope and deliverables for St Helena Airport Project , located at St
Helena Island approximately 1900 km from Africa, a Hazard Operability (HAZOP) study
workshop was held on 03-06 April 2017.
The need for the HAZOP study arose through the detail evaluation and review of hazards
related to the operation and design of process systems using Piping and Instrumentation
Diagrams (P&IDs) of the Bulk Fuel Installation (BFI).
The objective further includes project gate review requirements recognizing the importance
of identifying the potential risks related to safe operation, maintainability, accessibility,
control functionality and interface plant operational issues as contemplated on engineering
drawings.
The methodology followed was to evaluate P&ID’s as well as plant layout drawings, through
a systematic and careful consideration of hazard guide words or deviations that may occur.
With the completion of this HAZOP study workshop and the completion of proposed risk
reduction or mitigation actions, the engineering and equipment drawings and the control
function specification can be finalised and issued for development of detailed operational
procedures and construction activities. This report document number H354128-00000-142-
066-0001 summarises the hazard study participants, the HAZOP methodology and
outcomes of the risk review workshop.
2. HAZOP Workshop Participants

A summary of the attendees who participated in the workshop are listed in the Table 2-1.
Name Company Position

Vic Esterhuizen Hatch Technical Risk Consultant (facilitator)
Johann Ryan Cross PE Mechanical Engineer
Francois Terblanche Cross PE Process Engineer
Marius Oberholster Cross PE Mechanical Engineer
Julian Sargent PENSPEN Principal Engineer
Andy Stevenson PENSPEN Project and HSE Manager
Mauritz Coetzee Axis Development Professional Engineer Mechanical
Rian Coetzee Axis Development Design Engineer
Join via internet (Skype call)
Tony Le Roy Basil Read Technical Manager
Ayman Azab Basil Read Commissioning Manager
Andrew Plato Solomons BFI Manager
Jason Thomas Solomons General Manager
Daniel Bowers Solomons Assistant BFI Manager
Yusuf Bakhsh PMU Deputy Resident Engineer
Table 2-1: HAZOP Attendees
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3. HAZOP Study Methodology

The HAZOP study and workshop methodology make use of acronyms and Table 3-1
contains a list of the key acronyms related to the SHAP project used in this report.
Acrony Description/definition
m
ALARP As Low As Reasonably Practicable
AFF Airport Fuel Facility
BS Bay Side
BFI Bulk Fuel
COC Certificate Of Compliance
FMC Fuel Management Contractor
HAZOP Hazard Operability
IEC International Electro-technical Commission
ISO International Organization for Standardization
NFPA National Fire Protection Association
PSSR Pre Startup Safety Review
P&ID Piping and Instrumentation Diagram
PHA Process Hazard Analysis
QA Quality Assurance
QC Quality Certification
SHAP St Helena Airport Project
SCADA Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
S2S Ship to Shore
SOP Standard Operating Procedure
SPCC Spill Prevention, Control, and Countermeasure
Table 3-1: List of Acronyms used in this report
The HAZOP workshop were conducted in accordance with the requirements of international
standards for hazard studies (e.g. IEC 61882) and Risk Management Guidance as detailed
in ISO 31000, as well as the requirements of Basil Read Ltd and St Helena Airport project
risk management system.
The HAZOP study process as shown in Figure 3-1 is a structured and systematic technique
for examining detailed P&ID’s and plant layout drawings for defined systems, operational
facilities, control functional requirements and process equipment 3D-model views.
Through systematic and careful consideration of deviations that may occur from the intended
design (as represented in the engineering drawings), the objectives of this study were:
• Identify potential hazards during the operation of the St Helena Airport bulk fuel facilities.
The hazards involved may include both those essentially relevant only to the immediate
operational area and those with a much wider influence, e.g. safety and ergonomic
hazards; and
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• Identify potential hazards related to process streams and sequencing of operational

activities, in particular identifying causes of operational disturbances and other
deviations which could lead to a non-conforming activity.
Hazards identified during the risk review workshop have been assessed on a qualitative
basis; using the agreed risk matrix and risk criteria for the St Helena Airport project (refer to
Figure 4-1). The risk ranking results determined during the HAZOP study consider the
existing controls to be in place and those included in the operational methodology and
design of the facilities.
The result of applying this methodology leads to the identification of appropriate risk
reduction, mitigation or remedial measures; through the knowledge obtained during the
HAZOP workshop. The identified mitigation actions or response plans will either eliminate
the hazard, or reduce its risk level to As Low As Reasonably Practical (ALARP).
The ALARP principle states that the residual risk of a hazard, after controls and response
plans have been implemented, shall be As Low As Reasonably Practical. ALARP is
generally achieved when a risk has been made low enough that efforts to reduce the risk
further would be grossly disproportionate to the incremental benefits gained.
Risks are usually measured in terms of likelihood and consequences, which unless a risk is
eliminated, will always be non-zero quantities. The ALARP principle dictates that if there are
simple or low-cost risk reduction options available, then they should be implemented. It must
be stressed that it is not sufficient to just reduce risks to “Tolerable” risk level. It should also
be demonstrated that it is “reasonably impracticable” to reduce them any further.
Figure 3-1: Flowchart (Schematic View) of the Hazard Study Process
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4. Risk Criteria
Risk criteria refers to standards, measures, or expectations used in assessing a given risk in
context with strategic goals, the threshold or other decision rules by which the significance of
risk is assessed, to determine whether risk treatment actions are required. Risk criteria also
relate to a quantified expression of the level of “risk” a company, Individual or a Regulating
Body is prepared to tolerate. These are normally based on regulator or corporate risk
appetite, legal or inherent safe design requirements, ethical and social considerations,
financial prudence and/or broadly acceptable risk levels within society of what can and
cannot be construed as a tolerable level of risk. A tolerable risk level does not mean an
acceptable risk level, it indicates a willingness to work/operate with the identified hazards or
risks, with the provision that the hazard/risk scenario is kept under review. The risk level
should be reduced as and when feasible and practical to ensure the risk is maintained within
the As Low as Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) ranges.
ALARP is a term used in risk management and safety engineering, which states:
 That the residual risk shall be as low as reasonably practicable
 That controls to mitigate either the consequence or probability of the risk or both have
been implemented
 That the effectiveness of the mitigation controls are monitored and maintained.
Hazards identified during the workshop have been assessed on a qualitative basis, using
the agreed risk criteria and risk matrix for the SHAP project as contained in Figure 4-1
(Note: Refer to Appendix B for an enlarge view).
Figure 4-1: Risk Matrix used during HAZOP Study
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5. HAZOP Workshop
Hazard Operability (HAZOP) workshops are considered as an enhancement using
experienced- based approaches rather than a substitute for design codes, standards and
practice approaches to ensure safe operation.
This methodology results in a systematic way to identify hazards related to a process plant,
operational facility, fuel transfer system, construction site, etc.
The steps followed during the HAZOP study process are as follows:
1. Copies of the relevant P&ID’s as well as plant layout drawings were distributed amongst
all stakeholders.
2. The drawings were then split into “HAZOP nodes” based around a consolidated
operational function, process stream or system.
3. The operational methodology of each HAZOP node as per P&ID or set of drawings was
then explained to the risk review team by an engineer or expert in any of the specific
process systems (e.g. the draining and pigging system), as required.
4. Each node was then evaluated applying the “HAZOP process” by discussing the
possible operational disturbances and production deviations that could occur.
5. Each identified potential deviation was then analysed further in order to determine what
control and/or preventative measures were currently in place in order to either reduce or
mitigate the consequence or likelihood of the potential deviation from the normal design
basis.
6. The potential deviation was then ranked based on the pre-defined probability and
consequence tables as contained in the risk matrix (refer toFigure 4-1) in order to
determine whether any additional risk reduction or mitigation actions were required for
the potential deviation.
7. Based on the risk review team evaluation, potential deviations exceeding a risk value of
17 were assigned additional risk reduction or mitigation actions if needed, which were
then assigned to a relevant stakeholder.
Note:
The initial risk assessment value can only be reduced or mitigated to a lower risk level
or ALARP level after implementation and evaluation of the effectiveness of the
proposed risk reduction or mitigation action.
8. All data captured during the risk workshop were recorded using PHA-Pro software. The
software is a comprehensive and innovative tool, developed by Dyadem, for conducting
a Process Hazard Analysis (PHA), also in this case known as Hazard/HAZOP or risk
review workshop.
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9. The following HAZOP guidewords were considered relevant for the workshop session,
according to international risk guidewords for hazard risk review studies:
 High / No / Reverse or Misdirected Flow
 High / Less or No Pressure
 High / Less Temperature
 High / Less or No Level
 Loss of Containment Hazards
 Interlocks / Alarm / Trip / Overload Protection Settings Specified
 Explosion / Fire Hazards (storage or processing of flammable material)
 Fire Protection System (passive / active)
 Electrical Area Classifications (zone requirements for equipment)
 Electrical Control Systems (power supply)
 Static Earthing / Grounding Arrangements
 Spares Availability
 Maintenance Hazards (isolation, maintenance access)
 Waste Management (ground pollution, disposal facility, legal requirements)
 Emergency Systems (emergency event at upstream/downstream unit)
 Natural Hazards (earthquake, flooding, thunder storm, lightning, high winds)
 Normal Operations Hazards (human factors, safety, start-up operation, shutdown
operation, duration, sequence, sampling)
 Vibration (mechanical fatigue, false signals instrumentation)
 Sewer Systems (oil, rain water, utility water, catchments)
 Environment (water & air pollution and consumption, legal requirements)
 Safety Hazards (PPE, safety showers, eye baths, breathing apparatus, machine
guards)
 Confined Spaces (pits, sumps, sewers, containers, vessels, etc.)
 Ergonomics (equipment accessibility)
 Piping Hazards (tie-in requirements, welding, material selection, hot-tapping)
 Civil Construction (excavation hazards)
 Health Exposure to Products (dust, fluids, gasses, fumes, etc.)
 Building and Structures (ablution facilities, office location, control rooms, etc.)
 Plant Structures (roofing, walls, grating, fixed ladders, walkways, etc.)
 Utilities Availability (air, water, steam, nitrogen, oxygen, electricity)
 Equipment Location (crane, road tanker or personnel accessibility, lay down
areas)
Note:
All the above listed guidewords were evaluated in detail and additional guidewords were
added for a specific concern or system when a team member identified a scenario for
discussion. Following an evaluation of the information available, the team decided not to
record any comments if it was found that no hazards could be identified for a specific
deviation or guideword.
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6. HAZOP Study Nodes

The following tables contain the HAZOP “nodes” based around a consolidated operational
function and process interface system for the St Helena Airport BFI facilities. These node
descriptions and node number allocations were established during a multi-disciplinary group
session attended by the risk workshop participants.
Node Node Decription Drawing Reference

Number
Node 001 Deploy of floating hose No drawing – operation activity
(Jet fuel, Gas Oil and Gasoline)
Node 002 Fuel transfer from ship to gantry interface (Jet fuel) XPE-400-PE-3010 (sheet 2 rev E3)
XPE-400-PE-3010 (sheet 1 rev 3)
Node 003 Draining and purging of floating hose (Jet fuel) XPE-400-PE-3010 (sheet 2 rev E3)
Node 004 Pigging of the floating hose (Jet fuel) XPE-400-PE-3010 (sheet 2 rev E3)
Node 005 Draining and retrieval of floating hose (Jet fuel) No drawing – operation activity
Node 006 Nitrogen purging of the Jet fuel system XPE-400-PE-3010 (sheet 2 rev E3)
(S2S including the valley pipeline) XPE-400-PE-3010 (sheet 1 rev 3)
Node 007 Fuel transfer from ship to gantry interface (Gas Oil) XPE-400-PE-3012 (sheet 2 rev E3)
Node 008 Draining and purging of floating hose (Gas Oil) XPE-400-PE-3012 (sheet 2 rev E3)
Node 009 Pigging of the floating hose (Gas Oil) XPE-400-PE-3012 (sheet 2 rev E3)
Node 010 Nitrogen purging of the Gas Oil system (S2S) XPE-400-PE-3012 (sheet 2 rev E3)
Node 011 Fuel transfer from ship to gantry interface (Gasoline) XPE-400-PE-3013 (sheet 2 rev E3)
Node 012 Draining and purging of floating hose (Gasoline) XPE-400-PE-3013 (sheet 2 rev E3)
Node 013 Pigging of the floating hose (Gasoline) XPE-400-PE-3013 (sheet 2 rev E3)
Node 014 Nitrogen purging of the Gasoline system (S2S) XPE-400-PE-3013 (sheet 2 rev E3)
Node 015 Bayside gantry No drawing – operation activity will
use 3D Models during the review
Node 016 Fast flash ST-160 via pump P-210 (Jet fuel) XPE-400-PE-3027 (sheet 1 rev 4)
Node 017 Fast flash ST-200 and ST-220 via pump P-220 XPE-400-PE-3027 (sheet 1 rev 4)
(Jet fuel) XPE-400-PE-3027 (sheet 2 rev 4)
Node 018 Fast flash ST-100/ST-120 and St-140 via pump P-110 XPE-400-PE-3019 (sheet 1 rev 4)
(Gas Oil) XPE-400-PE-3020 (sheet 1 rev 4)
Node 019 Fast flash ST-300/ST-320 via pump P-310 (Gasoline) XPE-400-PE-3030 (sheet 1 rev 4)
Figure 6-1: HAZOP Nodes reviewed for the SHAP project
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7. Risk Review Results

This HAZOP study specifically addressed the proposed operational disturbances on process
systems, equipment locations and control functional requirements as contained in the
engineering, layout and Piping and Instrument Drawings (P&IDs).
All identified hazards were assessed using the risk matrix as shown in Figure 4-1 in terms of
risk criteria. Scenarios with a business or non-safety impact, with a risk ranking from 15 to
24 are considered to fall within the ALARP range and to be considered as a tolerable risk.
ALARP stands for “As Low As Reasonably Practicable”, a acronym used in risk
management and safety engineering, which states that the residual risk shall be as low as
reasonably practicable, after controls have been implemented.
Risks within the ALARP range can be considered tolerable provided that current safeguards
and proposed mitigation measures have been put in place and are effective to ensure
compliance to the ALARP principle.
There were 204 hazards identified and recorded in the HAZOP study minutes. However, by
applying qualitative risk evaluation techniques, hazard scenarios related to human safety,
with a risk ranking of 15 to 24 may be considered as being unacceptable.
Based on the above the risk review team identified additional proposed mitigation actions for
hazards exceeding a risk level of 17, which resulted in a total of 34 recorded risk reduction
or mitigation actions.
However, all the hazards with an initial risk value of 15 or greater should be monitored by
the plant management to ensure that the current safeguards or existing risk controls,
including recommended reduction or mitigation actions, are implemented and the
effectiveness tested before the residual risk value may be accepted as a final risk value.
 Refer to Annex A for a Summary table of proposed mitigations

 Refer to Annex B for detailed Risk Criteria and Risk Matrix
 Refer to Annex C for HAZOP study minutes
 Refer to Annex D for Piping and Instrument Diagrams (P&ID’s)
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Appendix A:
Proposed Mitigation Actions and
Responsibilities
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Summary of Propose Mitigation Actions and Responsibilities

Hazard Action Action
Proposed Mitigation Action
Number Number Responsibility
H002; H020 Act 001 Ensure that a torque wrench is provided and Basil Read Project
H076; H126 calibrated to ensure that connection is done Manager
effectively
H005 Act 002 Consider the inclusion of the availability of the SHG Project team
barge or backup barge into the contractual
requirements of fuel provision to the island
H005 Act 003 Review the configuration of the floating hose to Basil Read project
include flexibility for effective deployment (e.g. manager
one 200m length to be 100m/65m/35m
sections which will be bolted)
H006 Act 004 Ensure that a detail risk review is conducted FMC Operations
before night operation is allowed which shall be Manager
the exception
H006 Act 005 Consider that a small boat is available to FMC Operations
support the execution of the night operations Manager
H007 Act 006 Operating safety training program needs to FMC Operations
include safety awareness that no operator must Manager
be unnecessarily on the seaward side of the
gantry during deployment of the hose. They
need to be at the back of the gantry.
H007 Act 007 Further to the above the procedure needs to FMC Operations
define that the bolting of 200m sections shall Manager
be carried out at back of the gantry
H010; H049 Act 008 Obtain the list of operational spares from Basil Basil Read Project
H106; H156 Read which also need to identify the stock Manager
H176; H201 levels for critical items
H010; H049 Act 009 FMC need to evaluate the spares list and FMC and Basil
H106; H156 determine the adequacy as well as the required Read
H176; H201 stock levels
H010; H049 Act 010 Develop a procedure which describes the rules Basil Read Project
H106; H156 regarding vendor and other warranties valid Manager
H176; H201 when plant becomes operational.
H013; H029 Act 011 Provide the appropriate radio which would be Basil Read Project
H053; H085 effective for safe operation in terms of Manager
H110; H160 frequency, range, etc.
H015; H070 Act 012 Confirm that the ship is provided with a over FMC Operations
H120 pressure protection to ensure that the floating Manager
hose safe operating pressure of 13bar cannot
be exceeded
H015; H070 Act 013 Ensure that the fuel transfer SOP define that FMC Operations
H120 the floating hose is kept at least 15-20m away Manager
from the wharf during fuel transfer
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H024; H080 Act 014 Include the requirement of a test cycle and Basil Read Project
H130 service interval into the maintenance Manager
philosophy of the floating hose. (note the hose
will be sent to the manufacturer for testing and
re-certification if mandatory) or tested on
island if feasible
H024; H080 Act 015 FMC to ensure that the required maintenance FMC Operations
H130 philosophy is implemented Manager
H037; H094 Act 016 Consider to have one additional set of N2 FMC Operations
H144 purge system available at the BS over and Manager
above the normal operational requirements for
the pigging operations
H040 Act 017 Inform the vendor that the maximum pressure Basil Read
of the pigging system should not exceed the Procurement team
line class limit of 15.1bar and if not possible
the vendor need to ensure that safety
protections are included into the pigging
system design
H047; H104 Act 018 Consider to have one additional set of N2 FMC Operations
H154 purge system available at the BS over and Manager
above the normal operational requirements for
the barge operations
H047; H104 Act 019 Consider to conduct a pigging trial service test Basil Read
H154 (at operating pressure) with water to ensure commissioning
effective movement of the pig. team
(Note the activity requires proper draining after
the test)
H060 Act 020 Ensure that the operating procedure define the FMC Operations
requirement to retrieve the first three rotations Manager
by hand
H062; H112 Act 021 Ensure that there is safe location for storage of Basil Read Project
H162 large quantities of N2 bottles for a three fuel Manager
transfer approximately 80-100 bottles
H062; H112 Act 022 Establish a proper procedure for handling and FMC Operations
H162 transporting of bottles and re-use by supplier Manager
H088 Act 023 Consider to add a high level alarm function to Basil Read Project
the barge container to initiate operator Manager
response.
H088 Act 024 Further to the above ensure that the barge Mauritz Coetzee
holding tanks to be approximately doubled in and Johann Ryan
size (holding volume) to ensure that once the
local alarm on the barge is initiated there will
be sufficient time (10-15min)for the operator to
act and prevent any discharge.
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H088 Act 025 Ensure that during procurement of the pigging Basil Read Project
equipment the effectives of the pigging Manager
equipment is checked with the supplier and the
design team to confirm that the holding tank
can accommodate double the volume of a 30m
floating hose as stated in action Action 024
H090; H139 Act 026 Establish a locking device and SOP for safe Basil Read Project
H175 connection of floating hoses Manager
H097; H147 Act 027 Inform the vendor that the maximum pressure Basil Read
of the pigging system should not exceed the Procurement team
line class limit of 19bar and if not possible the
vendor need to ensure that safety protections
are included into the pigging system design
H169 Act 028 Basil Read need to confirm the civil Basil Read Project
arrangements beneath the gantry and up to Manager
the sea wall. (Is it all concrete within a
‘contained area’ ?) (Will the secondary
containment of spills complies with
international guidance such as 40 CFR 112.7
requirements
H169 Act 029 Basil Read need to confirm the boundaries of Basil Read Project
the ‘contained area’ (where does it ‘drain’ to? Manager
and (What prevents the beach or any unpaved
areas receiving the discharge)
H172 Act 030 Review the storage facility and include the Basil Read Project
vendor requirements (e.g. loose fitting covers, Manager
cooled dry ventilated area, etc.)
H174 Act 031 Establish the requirement cycle for off island Basil Read Project
hose inspections and include the requirement Manager
of a test cycle and service interval into the
maintenance philosophy of the floating hose.
(note the hose will be send to the
manufacturer for testing and re-certification if
mandatory) or tested on island if feasible
H174 Act 032 FMC to ensure that the required maintenance FMC Operations
philosophy is implemented Manager
H175 Act 033 Remove the Gas Oil/Gasoline spool piece Mauritz Coetzee
sections and replace it with two independent and Johann Ryan
fixed piping connections
H181; H189 Act 034 Ensure that the SOP for the system clearly FMC Operations
H195; H201 states that the V-Jar system cannot be utilised Manager and Basil
while the fast flush pump is in operation Read Project
Manager
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Appendix B:
Risk Matrix and Risk Criteria
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Appendix C:
HAZOP Study Minutes
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Study Items/Node Initial Risk Action

Additional Controls/Actions
Reference Hazard Description of Potential Existing or Design Basis Assessment Responsibility
Drawing Number Deviation Hazard Description Cause/s
Description & Number Consequences Safeguards Action
Design Intend S L RR Proposed Mitigation Action
Number
N001 No drawing - 07 - Loss of H001 Failure of the floating 1. Weak points and 1. Delay in fuel transfer Maintenance philosophy and C4 P2 Tolerable No further mitigation action
Deploy of floating operation activity containment hose during deployment degradation of the result in demurrage integrity inspections of the 15 recommended
hose (Jet fuel, Gas (concern regarding the floating hose charges floating hose as well as
Oil and Gasoline) integrity of the hose) pressure tests in a workshop
environment
07 - Loss of H002 Possible leaks from the 1. The operator does not 1. Environmental incident Operational procedure and C5 P5 High 37 Act 001 Ensure that a torque wrench is Basil Read
containment floating hose (quality tighten the connection and loss of product or training as well as competency provided and calibrated to ensure Project
control of connections) clamp correctly or contamination of product of personnel as well as that connection is done effectively Manager
effectively or the ship hit deployment visual checks.
the rocks leading to loss Refresher training or sessions
of fuel containment for operators yearly
20 - Normal H003 Possible incorrect 1. Human error incorrect 1. Contamination of the The floating fuel hoses are C4 P3 Tolerable No further mitigation action
Operations (Are coupling of the floating connection to ship fuel product colour coded. The activity will 19 recommended
there any human hose compartment also be witness and verified by
factors, start- FMC and ship operating
up/shutdown, supervisors to ensure the
sampling hazards) correct coupling is done
2. Human error incorrect 1. Pressure increase in The PSV on the incorrectly fuel C4 P2 Tolerable No further mitigation action
connection at gantry to the gantry line due to grade line at the gantry (PSV- 15 recommended
the preferred route pump against close valve 730/830/930) will lift which will
activate a flow switch FS-
700/800/900 and consequently
shutdown the system via ESD-
999. All product in the line will
be contained in the relevant
break tank.
20 - Normal H004 Possible falling of 1. Loss of balance and 1. Possible fatality Statutory marine safety C5 P1 Tolerable No further mitigation action
Operations (Are operator into the sea from sea movement (drowning incident) equipment on the barge and 16 recommended
there any human the barge or personnel training of operators. The gantry
factors, start- falling from gantry is provided with handrails and
up/shutdown, safety belt connection points
sampling hazards)
20 - Normal H005 Unable to deploy the 1. Unavailability of the 1. Delay in fuel transfer The current operation C4 P6 High 36 Act 002 Consider the inclusion of the SHG Project
Operations (Are floating hose barge (duties or in result in demurrage methodology is to only schedule availability of the barge or backup team
there any human workshop) charges ships when the barge is barge into the contractual
factors, start- available requirements of fuel provision to the
up/shutdown, island
sampling hazards)
2. Failure barge engine 1. Delay in fuel transfer Maintenance philosophy C4 P2 Tolerable No further mitigation action
or other components result in demurrage including spares on the barge 15 recommended
during deployment charges as well as engine and components
uncontrolled hose path
3. The current design of 1. Delay in fuel transfer None C4 P7 Serious Act 003 Review the configuration of the Basil Read
the floating hose result in demurrage 40 floating hose to include flexibility for project
sections could lead to charges effective deployment (e.g. one 200m manager
practical deployment length to be 100m/65m/35m sections
operational concerns which will be bolted)
20 - Normal H006 Unable to off-load fuel 1. Insufficient lights 1. Delay in fuel transfer The barge design criteria is C4 P6 High 36 Act 004 Ensure that a detail risk review is FMC
Operations (Are during night time (visibility) and the result in demurrage such that it should be capable to conducted before night operation is Operations
there any human current design charges support the floating hose at allowed which shall be the exception Manager
factors, start- philosophy is not to night and is equipped with a
Act 005 Consider that a small boat is FMC
up/shutdown, transfer fuel at night male retention device (dry-break
sampling hazards) coupling (note the hose will be available to support the execution of Operations
disconnected from the ship). the night operations Manager
The proper planning and
execution of fuel shipments.
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Number
N001 No drawing - 20 - Normal H007 Failure of floating hose 1. Barge continue to pull 1. Floating hose or gantry The design include a total of C5 P5 High 37 Act 006 Operating safety training program FMC
Deploy of floating operation activity Operations (Are deployment the floating hose while it damage as well as a three dry-break couplings which needs to include safety awareness Operations
hose (Jet fuel, Gas there any human needs to stop or the possibility of a fatality will act as a safety devices as that no operator must be Manager
Oil and Gasoline) factors, start- hose is moved sideways (operator in line of well as communication between unnecessarily on the seaward side of
up/shutdown, by external force (stray energy) operators. However the risk is the gantry during deployment of the
sampling hazards) vessel, fish, waves, etc.) still present in terms of exposure hose. They need to be at the back of
of operators to a safety risk. the gantry.
Act 007 Further to the above the procedure FMC
needs to define that the bolting of Operations
200m sections shall be carried out at Manager
back of the gantry
20 - Normal H008 Shipping vessel moves 1. Loss of 1. Possible fatality a loose Operational procedure and C3 P5 Tolerable No further mitigation action
Operations (Are off mooring point during communication between component could hit the training as well as competency 24 recommended
there any human the off-loading cycle operators or the barge person of personnel as well as
factors, start- leading to floating hose start to move before the deployment visual checks.
up/shutdown, failure. mooring is not complete Refresher training or sessions
sampling hazards) for operators yearly
21 - Emergency H009 Unable to respond 1. The required 1. Increase in the severity The operating manual C5 P2 Tolerable No further mitigation action
Systems (Any effectively during and manpower is not of the emergency event (document XPE-400-PE-RPT- 20 recommended
operational emergency event sufficient to support 0050 revision E1) requires two
hazards during an effective response persons to be on the small boat
emergency in and the barge at all times
upstream/downstre
am unit)
25 - Spares H010 Unnecessary process 1. No operational spares 1. Operational downtime Vendor warranty as per C5 P5 High 37 Act 008 Obtain the list of operational spares Basil Read
availability (Does interruption available on plant for in fuel transfer result in manufacturers' criteria, Basil from Basil Read which also need to Project
the project scope quick response in terms demurrage charges or Read contractual identify the stock levels for critical Manager
include a list of of the floating hose, which could lead to a responsibilities, as well as Basil items
critical items and gantry components or safety hazard Read will provide operational
Act 009 FMC need to evaluate the spares list FMC and Basil
long lead items) barge equipment spares for two years. Further to
the above maintenance and determine the adequacy as well Read
philosophy and integrity as the required stock levels
inspections of the floating hose Act 010 Develop a procedure which Basil Read
as well as pressure tests in a describes the rules regarding vendor Project
workshop environment are done and other warranties valid when plant Manager
becomes operational.
26 - Natural H011 Insufficient visibility to 1. Bad weather (mist or 1. Possible damage to the Current methodology is to only C5 P3 Moderate No further mitigation action
hazards safety execute the heavy rainfall) or night hose and safety risk off load fuel in day time and the 26 recommended
(earthquake, deployment activity operations (fatality) Ship to shore procedure
flooding, thunder (document XPE-400-PE-RPT-
storm, lightning, 0085 revision P3) specify the
high winds visibility requirements. The dry-
hazards) break coupling can be released
and the floating hose can be
stabilised (tighten) to minimise
damage. The barge is also
provided with amber strobe light
to increase visibility.
26 - Natural H012 Possibility of damage to 1. High wind speed, 1. Operational delay to Ship to shore procedure C6 P2 Moderate No further mitigation action
hazards the floating hose thunder (lightning) or off-load the ship result in (document XPE-400-PE-RPT- 27 recommended
(earthquake, heavy rain fall, bad penalties 0085 revision P3), section 2.3
flooding, thunder visibility (mist), etc. which specify the weather
storm, lightning, conditions before any
high winds deployment activity is initiated.
hazards) The hose is provided with dry-
break couplings to minimise
damage. Access to weather
data and radio communication
to stop operations
H354128-00000-142-066-0001, Rev. B
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Number
N001 No drawing - 30 - H013 Ineffective communication 1. Language barriers 1. Operational cost SOP that all communications C4 P1 Low 10 No further mitigation action
Deploy of floating operation activity Communication between ship, barge impact due to delay of off- are to be in English recommended
hose (Jet fuel, Gas operator and the gantry load of ship
Oil and Gasoline) operator
2. Radio signal or 1. Operational cost None C4 P6 High 36 Act 011 Provide the appropriate radio which Basil Read
frequency loss or natural impact due to delay of off- would be effective for safe operation Project
barriers (wind, rain, etc.) load of ship in terms of frequency, range, etc. Manager
leads to ineffective
communication
3. Radio type 1. Operational cost Marine grade and intrinsic safe C4 P3 Tolerable No further mitigation action
impact due to delay of off- radios are to be used and 19 recommended
load of ship specified in the operations
manual as well as data sheet
XPE-400-DSH-00264
N002 XPE-400-PE-3010 01- High / Low / No H014 Higher flow than required 1. The discharged flow 1. Break tank V-910 will The motorised flow control valve C4 P2 Tolerable No further mitigation action
Fuel transfer from (sheet 2 rev E3) / Reverse or (95m3/hr) delivered to rate of the pump on the fill quicker than design LV-903 will limit the flow to a 15 recommended
ship to gantry XPE-400-PE-3010 Misdirected Flow break tank V-910 ship could exceed the intend resulting in risk of max of 95m3/hr. SOP for off-
interface (Jet fuel) (sheet 1 rev 3) maximum allowable flow tank overflow loading of fuel and training of
operators.
2. The fuel velocity in the The motorised flow control valve C4 P1 Low 10
line exceed the safe flow LV-903 will limit the flow to a
rate (static ignition risk) max of 95m3/hr. SOP for off-
loading of fuel and training of
operators. The floating hose is
provided with earth cable along
the hose length to minimise
ignition probability
01- High / Low / No H015 No flow of fuel from ship 1. Closure of any of 1. Pressure rise in the None (no pressure relief or PSV C5 P5 High 37 Act 012 Confirm that the ship is provided with FMC
Flow to the gantry interface valve VB- floating hose which could on the floating hose section) a over pressure protection to ensure Operations
section 1584/1585/1586 (human lead to failure of the that the floating hose safe operating Manager
error) floating hose pressure of 13bar cannot be
exceeded
2. The ship tank level is 1. Pump cavitation, Detection of no flow is via PT- C3 P3 Low 13 No further mitigation action
below the pump suction operational impact (time 912, LT-912, LV-903 as well as recommended
point or pump trip, valve loss) radio communication between
closure on the ship, etc. ship and gantry operators if the
fuel transfer is not occurring
3. Inadvertent release of 1. Operational impact SOP and Training of operators C3 P3 Low 13 No further mitigation action
the dry-coupling due to (time loss) and possible and quality control checks after recommended
hose/ship movement over pressure of maintenance and monitoring of
(external force) upstream system ship and floating hose
movements
4. Loss of power supply 1. Unable to open the Bayside facility is provided with C5 P5 High 37 Act 013 Ensure that the fuel transfer SOP FMC
on island Bayside for sea traffic due backup power (generator) to define that the floating hose is kept at Operations
to that the floating hose is retrieve the floating hose as well least 15-20m away from the wharf Manager
still filled with fuel as N2 purge to empty the hose during fuel transfer
safely
02 - High / Low or H016 Low level of fuel in ship 1. The ship tank level is 1. Pump cavitation, Detection of no flow is via PT- C3 P3 Low 13 No further mitigation action
No Level compartment below the pump suction operational impact (time 912, LT-912, LV-903 as well as recommended
H354128-00000-142-066-0001, Rev. B
Page 3

Number
N002 XPE-400-PE-3010 04 - High / Less or H017 High pressure built up in 1. Pump against a close 1. Loss of containment PSV-930 installed on the hard C4 P3 Tolerable No further mitigation action
Fuel transfer from (sheet 2 rev E3) No Pressure the floating hose valve with positive through failure of the piping with a set point of 19 recommended
ship to gantry XPE-400-PE-3010 displacement pump on floating hose 1485kPa (refer to XPE-400-
interface (Jet fuel) (sheet 1 rev 3) the ship (LV-903 will RPT-00125 rev E) which is
close on high break tank below the design of the floating
level and SDV-900 will hose. The product is directed to
close in emergency via the break tank and FS-900 will
ESD-999 signal) alarm the operator
04 - High / Less or H018 Low pressure of fuel 1. The pump capacity on 1. Operational cost A service agreement is in place C5 P3 Moderate No further mitigation action
No Pressure pump from the ship the ship does not impact due to delay of off- with the fuel supplier which 26 recommended
provide the minimum load of ship includes the requirement for a
required pressure of 400 minimum pump pressure
kPa capacity of 400 kPa for a
preferred maximum flow rate of
95m3/hr
05 - High / Low H019 High temperature of the 1. Pumping against a 1. Loss of containment Although there is no TSV on the C4 P3 Tolerable No further mitigation action
Temperature fuel in the floating hose close valve or the through failure of the floating hose, however the hard 19 recommended
pipeline is full of liquid floating hose piping is provided with TSV-900
during before entering the break tank.
PSV -930 protects the floating
hose against overpressure due
to temperature fluctuations.
containment floating hose tighten the connection and loss of product or training as well as competency provided and calibrated to ensure Project
clamp correctly or contamination of product of personnel as well as that connection is done effectively Manager
effectively deployment visual checks.
Refresher training or sessions
for operators
07 - Loss of H021 Overpressure of the line, 1. Pump against a close 1. Environmental incident The design include a pressure C4 P3 Tolerable No further mitigation action
containment coupling failure, flange valve or line blockage and loss of product safety valve PSV-930 to 19 recommended
leaks. etc. leading to pressure minimise probability of
increase overpressure and a deployable
spill kit is provided on the wharf
to support the clean up of
spillages
08 - Fire / H022 Possible fire event 1. Ignition of the fuel due 1. Damage of equipment The floating hose include an C5 P1 Tolerable No further mitigation action
Explosion hazards to static and safety risk embedded earth cable along the 16 recommended
hose length to minimise ignition
probability and the fuel transfer
rate is limited to linear velocity
less than 1.5m/s. The Bayside is
provided with electrical isolation
flanges
09 - Contamination/ H023 Possible contamination of 1. Valves VB-1587 or 1. Environmental incident The design includes end blanks C5 P2 Tolerable No further mitigation action
Corrosion / Erosion the fuel during transfer VG-1588 are left open and loss of product or on the listed valves and visual 20 recommended
activity or leak through possible fire event inspections by operators
2. The barge valve 1. Environmental incident The design includes end blanks C4 P2 Tolerable No further mitigation action
arrangement tethered to and loss of product on the listed valves and visual 15 recommended
the buoy VB-1582 or inspections by operators
VB-1883 are left open or
leak through
H354128-00000-142-066-0001, Rev. B
Page 4

Number
N002 XPE-400-PE-3010 19 - Environmental H024 Possible release of fuel 1. Incorrect removal of 1. Environmental risk The floating line is provided with C5 P4 High 32 Act 014 Include the requirement of a test Basil Read
Fuel transfer from (sheet 2 rev E3) hazards (Water from floating hose into the the pipeline or hose (spillage exceeds SPCC dry-couplings which minimise cycle and service interval into the Project
ship to gantry XPE-400-PE-3010 pollution and sea failure guidance) and financial the volume of spilled product. maintenance philosophy of the Manager
interface (Jet fuel) (sheet 1 rev 3) consumption, legal impact Thus minimal environmental floating hose. (note the hose will be
requirements) risk. The gantry design is such sent to the manufacturer for testing
that all product in the flexible and re-certification if mandatory) or
line is drained back to V-910. tested on island if feasible
Maintenance and integrity
testing of the floating hose Act 015 FMC to ensure that the required FMC
maintenance philosophy is Operations
implemented Manager
20 - Normal H026 Ship pumps or control 1. Power loss, 1. Operational cost Maintenance philosophy and C4 P2 Tolerable No further mitigation action
Operations (Are systems failure mechanical failure, etc. impact due to delay of off- integrity inspections of the 15 recommended
there any human load of ship equipment on the ship and
factors, start- inspections are done by a third
up/shutdown, party
sampling hazards)
26 - Natural H027 Change in the weather 1. Inherent hazard to the 1. Damage of equipment The transfer activities are C5 P3 Moderate No further mitigation action
hazards condition while transfer of island operation and safety or planned for periods when 26 recommended
(earthquake, product is in progress environmental risk weather changes are stable
flooding, thunder based on weather data and
storm, lightning, swell forecasts as well as
high winds procedures for safe making of
hazards) the system
(earthquake, transfer activity operations (fatality) Ship to shore procedure
30 - H029 Ineffective communication 1. Language barriers 1. Operational cost SOP that all communications C4 P1 Low 10 No further mitigation action
Communication between ship, barge impact due to delay of off- are to be in English recommended
operator and the gantry load of ship
operator
communication
XPE-400-DSH-00264
34 - Security H030 Security risk during 1. Unauthorised access 1. Damage to the floating Access control to Rupert's Bay C5 P2 Tolerable No further mitigation action
hazards transfer of product to the Rupert's Bay hose result in as well as security patrols and 20 recommended
environmental risk media announcements
H354128-00000-142-066-0001, Rev. B
Page 5

Number
N003 XPE-400-PE-3010 01- High / Low / No H031 No flow of fuel from the 1. Dry-coupling failure or 1. Unable to make the The barge holding tank is C5 P3 Moderate No further mitigation action
Draining and purging (sheet 2 rev E3) Flow 30m hose section (fuel blockage or block and line safe for full retrieval provided with sight glass which 26 recommended
of floating hose 30m left in floating hose) tackle failure which is provides visibility to operator in
section (Jet fuel) use to create a static terms of detection and draining
head of liquid
02 - High / Low or H032 High level in the holding 1. The tank was not 1. Overflow of the tank The holding tank is provided C4 P3 Tolerable No further mitigation action
No Level tank emptied after previous result in environmental with level indication (sight glass) 19 recommended
draining activity risk and delay in and SOP to ensure the tank is
operations emptied before draining activity
start
03 - Reverse or H033 Possible misdirected flow 1. Connecting the 30m 1. Contamination of the The floating hose sections C4 P3 Tolerable No further mitigation action
Misdirected Flow of Jet fuel floating section to the product between jet and ground fuel are 19 recommended
wrong holding tank uniquely colour coded to
minimise the probability of
incorrect coupling
09 - Contamination/ H034 Possible corrosion 1. Incorrect selection of 1. Loss of containment The material of construction C4 P2 Tolerable No further mitigation action
Corrosion / Erosion material of construction result in environmental complies to the required 15 recommended
(expose to chlorides in risk standard for coastal areas (refer
sea water) to document XPE-400-DSH-
00264)
10 - Safety H035 Exposure of operating 1. Inherent risk to the 1. Health hazard (no PPE, safety training and safety C4 P2 Tolerable No further mitigation action
Hazards (PPE, personnel to nitrogen use of nitrogen purging fatality due to no awareness programs and all 15 recommended
safety showers, of the line confinement) tasks are done according work
eye baths, permit system including
breathing maintenance of the N2 system
apparatus,
machine guards,
etc.)
15 - H036 Inability to connect dry- 1. The line could not be 1. Operational cost Maintenance of the dry-break C3 P3 Low 13 No further mitigation action
Egress/Access/ break coupling to the connected due to impact due to delay of coupling on the holding tank recommended
Ergonomics / holding tank connection physical damages to the retrieval of the hose and connections and
Movement and for draining and purging coupling or connection inspections before use and
equipment points equipment checklist are
accessibility completed
N004 XPE-400-PE-3010 01- High / Low / No H037 Loss of N2 feed to the 1. Unavailability of N2 1. Unable to continue with Maintenance philosophy and C4 P6 High 36 Act 016 Consider to have one additional set FMC
Pigging of the (sheet 2 rev E3) Flow pigging system cylinders or line failure the pigging activity result integrity inspections of N2 purge of N2 purge system available at the Operations
floating hose (Jet in operational upset lines. N2 cylinders are stored at BS over and above the normal Manager
fuel) (delays) the BS and ordering is aligned operational requirements for the
with the operational volume pigging operations
requirement, however there is a
risk of unavailability
03 - Reverse or H038 Misdirected flow 1. Human error operator 1. Environmental incident The design include blind flanges C5 P2 Tolerable No further mitigation action
Misdirected Flow (incorrect destination) (incorrect valve position and loss of product or of the valves and SOP in terms 20 recommended
selections) possible fire event on the of valve positions and training of
gantry operators
04 - High / Less or H039 High pressure of the N2 1. The supplier of the N2 1. Damage to the floating SOP and QA/QC of the C5 P2 Tolerable No further mitigation action
No Pressure purge exceeds the design cylinders may delivery hose result in safety risk delivering and receipt of the 20 recommended
of 15.1bar high pressure rated and environmental cylinders by operations. The
cylinders incident pigging system drawing XPE-
400-GA-4125 SHT 1 requires a
nitrogen pressure PSV on the
system to prevent against over
pressure of the upstream
sections of the floating hose
H354128-00000-142-066-0001, Rev. B
Page 6

Number
N004 XPE-400-PE-3010 04 - High / Less or H040 Exceed the hard piping 1. Unknown of what 1. Transient pressure PSV-930 is set at 14.85bar and C4 P6 High 36 Act 017 Inform the vendor that the maximum Basil Read
Pigging of the (sheet 2 rev E3) No Pressure line class A2 pressure of pressure is required by surge through the hard the design pressure is pressure of the pigging system Procurement
floating hose (Jet 15.1bar the vendor for the piping and consequently documented in data sheet XPE- should not exceed the line class limit team
fuel) pigging system damage to the line 400-DSH-00249 revP2. of 15.1bar and if not possible the
However the risk is still valid vendor need to ensure that safety
due to transient conditions protections are included into the
pigging system design
07 - Loss of H041 Possible line, coupling 1. Pump against a close 1. Environmental incident The facility have a formal C4 P2 Tolerable No further mitigation action
containment failure, flange leaks. etc. valve or line blockage and loss of product emergency response plan and a 15 recommended
leading to pressure spill kit is provided on the wharf
increase and line failure to support the clean up of
or leaks spillages
08 - Fire / H042 Possible fire during the 1. Incorrect tools used 1. Damage to equipment, SOP that non-metal tools and C5 P2 Tolerable No further mitigation action
Explosion hazards pigging activity during the connection of the hose and safety risk non-static tools are used as well 20 recommended
lines (fatality) as PPE, and training of
operators. Non sparking engine
on the barge is also used.
2. Lightning strike 1. Damage to equipment, All electrical, control C5 P2 Tolerable No further mitigation action
the hose and safety risk instrumentation 20 recommended
(fatality) (EC&I)equipment in hazardous
areas are Zone rated
08 - Fire / H043 Electrical and 1. Specification 1. No compliance to legal Hazard Area Classification C4 P3 Tolerable No further mitigation action
Explosion hazards Instrumentation requirements not requirements (Zone) study was done (refer to 19 recommended
equipment selection not included in supplier documents XPE-400-PE-RPT-
done according to British contract 00088 revP2 and XPE-400-PE-
Standard requirements RPT-00126 revE1
10 - Safety H044 Exposure of personnel to 1. Inherent risk to the 1. Health hazard PPE requirements and MSDS C3 P2 Low 9 No further mitigation action
Hazards (PPE, nitrogen (N2) use of nitrogen purging (moderate impact) documents are available recommended
safety showers, of the line including task risk analysis as
eye baths, well as tool box talks safety
breathing awareness programs)
apparatus,
machine guards,
etc.)
14 - Maintenance H045 Maintenance personnel 1. Working on process 1. Possible fatality Compliance to operational C4 P1 Low 10 No further mitigation action
and isolation could be exposed to high systems which are policy regarding stored energy recommended
hazards pressure during under pressure or where systems as well as the SOP
maintenance activities energy is stored which include the requirement
that the full system will be
isolated before working on any
equipment (e.g. the pressure
will be relieve via drain valves
venting to safe location, as part
of work permit procedure
17 - Position / H046 Possibility of damage to 1. The barge could 1. Environmental incident SOP that ensure the barge is C5 P1 Tolerable No further mitigation action
location of the floating hose move away from the and loss of product or properly positioned and 16 recommended
equipment (crane, safe pigging location possible injury to operator communication system between
ship, barge, etc.) (fatality) barge and gantry to manage
movements. The design
includes an emergency release
coupling to minimise damage
H354128-00000-142-066-0001, Rev. B
Page 7

Number
N004 XPE-400-PE-3010 20 - Normal H047 Stuck of the pig 1. Low or No flow of N2 1. Unable to continue with Maintenance philosophy and C4 P6 High 36 Act 018 Consider to have one additional set FMC
Pigging of the (sheet 2 rev E3) Operations (Are (line leaks or emptied the pigging activity result integrity inspections of N2 purge of N2 purge system available at the Operations
floating hose (Jet there any human cylinder) in operational upset lines. N2 cylinders are stored at BS over and above the normal Manager
fuel) factors, start- (delays) the BS and ordering is aligned operational requirements for the
up/shutdown, with the operational volume barge operations
sampling hazards) requirement. The design include
a soft type of pig and full bore Act 019 Consider to conduct a pigging trial Basil Read
valves. However there is a risk service test (at operating pressure) commissioning
of unavailability of nitrogen with water to ensure effective team
cylinders movement of the pig. (Note the
activity requires proper draining after
the test)
2. If one of the valves 1. Unable to continue with SOP, task checklist and training C4 P3 Tolerable No further mitigation action
are closed the pigging activity result of operators to ensure that all 19 recommended
in operational upset valves are in correct position
(delays) (open)
20 - Normal H048 Exposure of operator to 1. If the pigging 1. Possible fatality and SOP, task checklist and training C5 P3 Moderate No further mitigation action
Operations (Are fumes during the use of equipment is not operational upset of operators to ensure that all 26 recommended
there any human the pigging launcher operated according to pigging connections and task
factors, start- instructions (e.g. if the are done which include QA/QC
up/shutdown, pig lid is not effectively by supervisors
sampling hazards) connected onto the pig
launcher)
2. Inherent risk to the 1. Health hazard PPE requirements and MSDS C3 P3 Low 13 No further mitigation action
purging activity of the (moderate impact) documents are available recommended
line including task risk analysis as
well as tool box talks safety
awareness programs)
availability (Does interruption for pigging available on plant for or a safety hazard manufacturers' criteria, Basil from Basil Read which also need to Project
the project scope activity quick response in terms Read contractual identify the stock levels for critical Manager
include a list of of the pigging responsibilities, as well as Basil items
critical items and equipment Read will provide operational
long lead items) spares for two years. Further to Act 009 FMC need to evaluate the spares list FMC and Basil
inspections of the pigging
equipment are done
Act 010 Develop a procedure which Basil Read
describes the rules regarding vendor Project
and other warranties valid when plant Manager
21 - Emergency H050 Possible release of fuel 1. Incorrect execution of 1. Environmental risk SOP and training of operators C4 P2 Tolerable No further mitigation action
Systems during pigging launching pigging procedure or (spillage exceeds SPCC and quality control checks after 15 recommended
and retrieval into the sea equipment failure guidance) and financial maintenance.
impact
27 - Ventilation and H051 Insufficient ventilation 1. The pigging is not 1. Possible fatality due to SOP, task checklist and training C5 P3 Moderate No further mitigation action
lighting during pigging activity done outside the ISO exposure to N2 or of operators to ensure that 26 recommended
requirements container hydrocarbon fumes inside pigging is done according to
a confined space procedure XPE-400-PE-RPT-
0050
29 - Equipment H052 Exposure of operators to 1. Inherent hazard to the 1. Operational delays due SOP and training of operators C4 P2 Tolerable No further mitigation action
location of lifting hazards and pigging system and to difficulty to as well as rigging task 15 recommended
equipment (crane, maintenance constraint barge operations install/remove pigging assessments, as well as
road truck, lay conditions equipment or ISO statutory inspections of lifting
down areas) containers equipment.
H354128-00000-142-066-0001, Rev. B
Page 8

Number
N004 XPE-400-PE-3010 30 - H053 Ineffective communication 1. Language barriers 1. Operational cost SOP that all communications C4 P1 Low 10 No further mitigation action
Pigging of the (sheet 2 rev E3) Communication between ship, barge impact due to delay of off- are to be in English recommended
floating hose (Jet operator and the gantry load of ship
fuel) operator
communication
XPE-400-DSH-00264
33 - Area H054 Electrical and 1. Specification 1. No compliance to legal Hazard Area Classification C4 P3 Tolerable No further mitigation action
classification(Zone Instrumentation requirements not requirements (Zone) study was done (refer to 19 recommended
1,2,3 standards) equipment selection not included in supplier documents XPE-400-PE-RPT-
N005 No drawing - 01- High / Low / No H055 Unable to drain all liquid 1. Pigging activity was in 1. Liquid could be trapped The design of the pigging and C4 P2 Tolerable No further mitigation action
Draining and operation activity Flow out of the floating hose efficient or fluid did pass in the last 30m hose N2 purge system is such that 15 recommended
retrieval of floating over the pig section and pressure 99% of the liquid will be
hose (Jet fuel) could built-up resulting in removed (thus the probability of
damage of liquid been trapped to cause a
equipment/hose risk is rare.
Hazards (PPE, nitrogen (N2) purging of the floating (moderate impact) documents are available recommended
safety showers, hose with nitrogen and including task risk analysis as
eye baths, etc.) breaking of couplings well as tool box talks safety
awareness programs)
10 - Safety H057 Exposure of maintenance 1. Instrumentation and 1. Possible fatality (falling Access way provided in design C4 P2 Tolerable No further mitigation action
Hazards (PPE, person to working at gantry access at top of from heights) for safe access with fall arrest 15 recommended
safety showers, heights structure with no fall anchor points. SOP and training
eye baths, etc.) protection facility of personnel
19 - Environmental H058 Fuel spillage during 1. Incorrect draining 1. Environmental incident SOP, task checklist and training C4 P2 Tolerable No further mitigation action
hazards (Water venting of the floating procedure followed and loss of product of operators to ensure that 15 recommended
pollution and hose draining is done according to
consumption, legal procedure XPE-400-PE-RPT-
requirements) 0050
20 - Normal H059 Unable to safely vent 1. Deviation from SOP 1. Health hazard The SOP requires to connect C4 P1 Low 10 No further mitigation action
Operations (Are nitrogen from the last (moderate impact) and valve VB-1584 to VB-1586 recommended
there any human 30m floating hose environmental risk which will allow the safe
factors, start- removal of nitrogen and any
up/shutdown, possible liquid through hard
sampling hazards) piping to the break tank
20 - Normal H060 Possible damage of the 1. Stress on the hose 1. Damage to the floating None C4 P6 High 36 Act 020 Ensure that the operating procedure FMC
Operations (Are floating hose while reeling hose result in cost and define the requirement to retrieve the Operations
there any human operational delay first three rotations by hand Manager
factors, start-
up/shutdown,
sampling hazards)
20 - Normal H061 Cassette winder and/or 1. Insufficient 1. Unable to retrieve the Maintenance philosophy and C4 P3 Tolerable No further mitigation action
Operations (Are hydraulic drive trailer maintenance floating hose result in integrity inspections of the reeler 19 recommended
there any human defective operational delays as well as spares in stores
factors, start-
up/shutdown,
sampling hazards)
H354128-00000-142-066-0001, Rev. B
Page 9

Number
N006 XPE-400-PE-3010 01- High / Low / No H062 Loss of N2 feed to 1. Unavailability of N2 1. Unable to continue with Maintenance philosophy and C4 P6 High 36 Act 021 Ensure that there is safe location for Basil Read
Nitrogen purging of (sheet 2 rev E3) Flow purging effectively cylinders or line failure the pigging activity result integrity inspections of N2 purge storage of large quantities of N2 Project
the hard piping Jet XPE-400-PE-3010 in operational upset lines. N2 cylinders are stored at bottles for a three fuel transfer Manager
fuel system (S2S (sheet 1 rev 3) (delays) the BS and ordering is aligned approximately 80-100 bottles
including the valley XPE-400-PE-3011 with the operational volume
pipeline) (sheet 1 rev 2) requirement, however here is a
risk of unavailability Act 022 Establish a proper procedure for FMC
handling and transporting of bottles Operations
and re-use by supplier Manager
02 - High / Low or H063 Level of liquid buildup in 1. The current route of 1. Unable to remove the The design basis include a N2 C4 P3 Tolerable No further mitigation action
No Level the hard piping the hard piping contains liquid which could lead to purging and draining procedure 19 recommended
a low point that result in water hammering effect of the concern low point dead-
fluid accumulation or when the line is used leg section (refer to section
operator did not drain again 4.6.7 of XPE-400-PE-RPT-
the line 0050)
of 15.1bar high pressure rated and environmental cylinders by operations. The BS
cylinders incident piping between the gantry and
break tank is provided with a
PSV-930 with setpoint of
14.85bar
04 - High / Less or H065 Overpressure of the 1. The purging of N2 at 1. Failure of the valley The design basis include a N2 C5 P2 Tolerable No further mitigation action
No Pressure valley pipeline with N2 the BFI to the BS pipeline result in purging requirement to take into 20 recommended
includes a static head operational losses and account the static head (refer to
which could lead to high environmental incident section 4.6.7.5 of XPE-400-PE-
pressure RPT-0050)
Misdirected Flow (incorrect destination of (incorrect valve position and loss of product or of the valves and SOP in terms 20 recommended
the N2 purge stream) selections) possible fire event on the of valve positions and training of
gantry operators
eye baths, breaking of couplings well as tool box talks safety
apparatus,
machine guards,
etc.)
H354128-00000-142-066-0001, Rev. B
Page 10

Number
interface (Gas Oil) (sheet 1 rev 3) maximum allowable flow tank overflow loading of fuel and training of
operators.
exceeded
movements
safely
02 - High / Low or H071 Low level of fuel in ship 1. The ship tank level is 1. Pump cavitation, Detection of no flow is via PT- C3 P3 Low 13 No further mitigation action
No Level compartment below the pump suction operational impact (time 701, LT-704, LV-701 as well as recommended
03 - Reverse or H072 Misdirected flow or feed 1. It may happen that 1. Contamination of SOP and Training of operators C4 P4 Moderate No further mitigation action
Misdirected Flow of Gas Oil to Gasoline the ship arrive with product result operational and quality control checks 25 recommended
system multiple fuel grade costs before the transfer activity
compartments and the commence
operator connect to the
wrong compartment
04 - High / Less or H073 High pressure built up in 1. Pump against a close 1. Loss of containment PSV-730 installed on the hard C4 P3 Tolerable No further mitigation action
No Pressure the floating hose valve with positive through failure of the piping with a set point of 19 recommended
displacement pump on floating hose 1875kPa which is below the
the ship (LV-701 will design of the floating hose. The
close on high break tank product is directed to the break
level and SDV-700 will tank and FS-700 will alarm the
close in emergency via operator
ESD-999 signal)
H354128-00000-142-066-0001, Rev. B
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Number
N007 XPE-400-PE-3012 04 - High / Less or H074 Low pressure of fuel 1. The pump capacity on 1. Operational cost A service agreement is in place C5 P3 Moderate No further mitigation action
Fuel transfer from (sheet 2 rev E3) No Pressure pump from the ship the ship does not impact due to delay of off- with the fuel supplier which 26 recommended
ship to gantry XPE-400-PE-3012 provide the minimum load of ship includes the requirement for a
interface (Gas Oil) (sheet 1 rev 3) required pressure of 400 minimum pump pressure
95m3/hr
for operators
spillages
flanges
09 - Contamination/ H079 Possible contamination of 1. Valves VB-1150 or 1. Environmental incident The design includes end blanks C5 P2 Tolerable No further mitigation action
Corrosion / Erosion the fuel during transfer VG-1151 are left open and loss of product or on the listed valves and visual 20 recommended
activity or leak through possible fire event inspections by operators
leak through
19 - Environmental H080 Possible release of fuel 1. Incorrect removal of 1. Environmental risk The floating line is provided with C5 P4 High 32 Act 014 Include the requirement of a test Basil Read
hazards (Water from floating hose into the the pipeline or hose (spillage exceeds SPCC dry-couplings which minimise cycle and service interval into the Project
pollution and sea failure guidance) and financial the volume of spilled product. maintenance philosophy of the Manager
consumption, legal impact Thus minimal environmental floating hose. (note the hose will be
implemented Manager
H354128-00000-142-066-0001, Rev. B
Page 12

Number
N007 XPE-400-PE-3012 20 - Normal H081 Ship pumps or control 1. Power loss, 1. Operational cost Maintenance philosophy and C4 P2 Tolerable No further mitigation action
Fuel transfer from (sheet 2 rev E3) Operations (Are systems failure mechanical failure, etc. impact due to delay of off- integrity inspections of the 15 recommended
ship to gantry XPE-400-PE-3012 there any human load of ship equipment on the ship and
interface (Gas Oil) (sheet 1 rev 3) factors, start- inspections are done by a third
up/shutdown, party
sampling hazards)
20 - Normal H082 Incorrect transfer 1. Deviation from the 1. Contamination of Gas Operating manual (document C4 P3 Tolerable No further mitigation action
Operations (Are sequence of Gas Oil and prescribe sequence of Oil with Gasoline (note XPE-400-PE-RPT-0050 revision 19 recommended
there any human Gasoline fuel transfer more severe risk if the E1) section 4.6.2 specify that
factors, start- Gas Oil is contaminated) the Gasoline needs to be
up/shutdown, transferred first and verification
sampling hazards) checks to be done before Gas
Oil can be transferred.
hazards) the system
operator
communication
XPE-400-DSH-00264
H354128-00000-142-066-0001, Rev. B
Page 13

Number
of floating hose (Gas left in floating hose) tackle failure which is provides visibility to operator in
Oil) use to create a static terms of detection and draining
head of liquid
02 - High / Low or H088 High level in the holding 1. The tank was not 1. Overflow of the tank The holding tank is provided C4 P6 High 36 Act 023 Consider to add a high level alarm Basil Read
No Level tank emptied after previous result in environmental with level indication (sight glass) function to the barge container to Project
draining activity risk and delay in and SOP to ensure the tank is initiate operator response. Manager
start Act 024 Further to the above ensure that the Mauritz
barge holding tanks to be Coetzee and
approximately doubled in size Johann Ryan
(holding volume) to ensure that once
the local alarm on the barge is
initiated there will be sufficient time
(10-15min)for the operator to act and
prevent any discharge.
Act 025 Ensure that during procurement of Basil Read

the pigging equipment the effectives Project
of the pigging equipment is checked Manager
with the supplier and the design team
to confirm that the holding tank can
accommodate double the volume of
a 30m floating hose as stated in
action Act 024
03 - Reverse or H089 Possible misdirected flow 1. Connecting the 30m 1. Contamination of the The floating hose between jet C4 P3 Tolerable No further mitigation action
Misdirected Flow of Gas Oil to the Jet Fuel floating section to the product and ground fuel are uniquely 19 recommended
system wrong holding tank colour coded to minimise the
probability
03 - Reverse or H090 Possible misdirected flow 1. Connecting the 30m 1. Contamination of the Although the same floating hose C4 P6 High 36 Act 026 Establish a locking device and SOP Basil Read
Misdirected Flow of Gas Oil to Gasoline floating section to the product is used for Gas Oil and Gasoline for safe connection of floating hoses Project
system (ground fuels) wrong holding tank the holding tanks are uniquely Manager
(Note: The floating hose identifiable via labeling to
colour coding for Gas Oil minimise the probability
and Gasoline are the
same, however )
00264)
eye baths, permit system including
breathing maintenance of the N2 system
apparatus,
machine guards,
etc.)
H354128-00000-142-066-0001, Rev. B
Page 14

Number
floating hose (Gas in operational upset lines. N2 cylinders are stored at BS over and above the normal Manager
Oil) (delays) the BS and ordering is aligned operational requirements for the
03 - Reverse or H095 Misdirected flow of N2 1. Human error operator 1. Environmental incident The design include blind flanges C5 P2 Tolerable No further mitigation action
gantry operators
of 19bar for Gas Oil high pressure rated and environmental cylinders by operations. The
system cylinders incident pigging system drawing XPE-
04 - High / Less or H097 Exceed the hard piping 1. Unknown of what 1. Transient pressure PSV-730 is set at 18.75bar and C4 P6 High 36 Act 027 Inform the vendor that the maximum Basil Read
No Pressure line class A2 pressure of pressure is required by surge through the hard the design pressure is pressure of the pigging system Procurement
19bar for Gas Oil system the vendor for the piping and consequently documented in data sheet XPE- should not exceed the line class limit team
pigging system damage to the line 400-DSH-00249 revP2. of 19bar and if not possible the
or leaks spillages
apparatus,
machine guards,
etc.)
H354128-00000-142-066-0001, Rev. B
Page 15

Number
N009 XPE-400-PE-3012 14 - Maintenance H102 Maintenance personnel 1. Working on process 1. Possible fatality Compliance to operational C4 P1 Low 10 No further mitigation action
Pigging of the (sheet 2 rev E3) and isolation could be exposed to high systems which are policy regarding stored energy recommended
floating hose (Gas hazards pressure during under pressure or where systems as well as the SOP
Oil) maintenance activities energy is stored which include the requirement
20 - Normal H104 Stuck of the pig 1. Low or No flow of N2 1. Unable to continue with Maintenance philosophy and C4 P6 High 36 Act 018 Consider to have one additional set FMC
Operations (Are (line leaks or emptied the pigging activity result integrity inspections of N2 purge of N2 purge system available at the Operations
there any human cylinder) in operational upset lines. N2 cylinders are stored at BS over and above the normal Manager
factors, start- (delays) the BS and ordering is aligned operational requirements for the
Act 019 Consider to conduct a pigging trial Basil Read
a soft type of pig and full bore
the test)
(delays) (open)
launcher)
awareness programs)
long lead items) spares for two years. Further to
inspections of the pigging
equipment are done
H354128-00000-142-066-0001, Rev. B
Page 16

Number
N009 XPE-400-PE-3012 21 - Emergency H107 Possible release of fuel 1. Incorrect execution of 1. Environmental risk SOP and training of operators C4 P2 Tolerable No further mitigation action
Pigging of the (sheet 2 rev E3) Systems during pigging launching pigging procedure or (spillage exceeds SPCC and quality control checks after 15 recommended
floating hose (Gas and retrieval into the sea equipment failure guidance) and financial maintenance.
Oil) impact
0050
operator
communication
XPE-400-DSH-00264
the Gas Oil system XPE-400-PE-3012 in operational upset lines. N2 cylinders are stored at bottles for a three fuel transfer Manager
(S2S) (sheet 1 rev 3) (delays) the BS and ordering is aligned approximately 80-100 bottles
with the operational volume
requirement, however here is a Act 022 Establish a proper procedure for FMC
risk of unavailability handling and transporting of bottles Operations
the line 0050)
of 19bar for Gas Oil high pressure rated and environmental cylinders by operations. The BS
18.75bar
H354128-00000-142-066-0001, Rev. B
Page 17

Number
N010 XPE-400-PE-3012 04 - High / Less or H115 Overpressure of the 1. The purging of N2 at 1. Failure of the valley The design basis include a N2 C5 P2 Tolerable No further mitigation action
Nitrogen purging of (sheet 2 rev E3) No Pressure valley pipeline with N2 the BFI to the BS pipeline result in purging requirement to take into 20 recommended
the Gas Oil system XPE-400-PE-3012 includes a static head operational losses and account the static head (refer to
(S2S) (sheet 1 rev 3) which could lead to high environmental incident section 4.6.7.5 of XPE-400-PE-
pressure RPT-0050)
gantry operators
eye baths, etc.) breaking of couplings well as tool box talks safety
awareness programs)
interface (Gasoline) (sheet 1 rev 3) maximum allowable flow tank overflow loading of fuel and training of
operators.
exceeded
movements
safely
H354128-00000-142-066-0001, Rev. B
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Number
N011 XPE-400-PE-3013 02 - High / Low or H121 Low level of fuel in ship 1. The ship tank level is 1. Pump cavitation, Detection of no flow is via PT- C3 P3 Low 13 No further mitigation action
Fuel transfer from (sheet 2 rev E3) No Level compartment below the pump suction operational impact (time 803, LT-804, LV-801 as well as recommended
ship to gantry XPE-400-PE-3013 point or pump trip, valve loss) radio communication between
interface (Gasoline) (sheet 1 rev 3) closure on the ship, etc. ship and gantry operators if the
04 - High / Less or H122 High pressure built up in 1. Pump against a close 1. Loss of containment PSV-830 installed on the hard C4 P3 Tolerable No further mitigation action
No Pressure the floating hose valve with positive through failure of the piping with a set point of 19 recommended
displacement pump on floating hose 1875kPa which is below the
the ship (LV-801 will design of the floating hose. The
close on high break tank product is directed to the break
level and SDV-800 will tank and FS-800 will alarm the
close in emergency via operator
ESD-999 signal)
04 - High / Less or H123 Possible temperature and 1. The operator did not 1. Damage to pipeline Operating manual (document C5 P3 Moderate No further mitigation action
No Pressure pressure rise in the valley drain the fuel after the result in loss of XPE-400-PE-RPT-0050 revision 26 recommended
pipeline (Gasoline) transfer activity containment E1) section 4.6.2 specify that
(fire/explosion) the Gasoline line needs to be
drained and verification checks
to be done. The design also
include and pressure/relief into
the BFI storage tanks
04 - High / Less or H124 Low pressure of fuel 1. The pump capacity on 1. Operational cost A service agreement is in place C5 P3 Moderate No further mitigation action
No Pressure pump from the ship the ship does not impact due to delay of off- with the fuel supplier which 26 recommended
provide the minimum load of ship includes the requirement for a
required pressure of 400 minimum pump pressure
95m3/hr
for operators
spillages
flanges
H354128-00000-142-066-0001, Rev. B
Page 19

Number
N011 XPE-400-PE-3013 09 - Contamination/ H129 Possible contamination of 1. Valves VB-1189 or 1. Environmental incident The design includes end blanks C5 P2 Tolerable No further mitigation action
Fuel transfer from (sheet 2 rev E3) Corrosion / Erosion the fuel during transfer VG-1190 are left open and loss of product or on the listed valves and visual 20 recommended
ship to gantry XPE-400-PE-3013 activity or leak through possible fire event inspections by operators
interface (Gasoline) (sheet 1 rev 3)
leak through
19 - Environmental H130 Possible release of fuel 1. Incorrect removal of 1. Environmental risk The floating line is provided with C5 P4 High 32 Act 014 Include the requirement of a test Basil Read
hazards (Water from floating hose into the the pipeline or hose (spillage exceeds SPCC dry-couplings which minimise cycle and service interval into the Project
pollution and sea failure guidance) and financial the volume of spilled product. maintenance philosophy of the Manager
consumption, legal impact Thus minimal environmental floating hose. (note the hose will be
implemented Manager
20 - Normal H131 Ship pumps or control 1. Power loss, 1. Operational cost Maintenance philosophy and C4 P2 Tolerable No further mitigation action
Operations (Are systems failure mechanical failure, etc. impact due to delay of off- integrity inspections of the 15 recommended
there any human load of ship equipment on the ship and
factors, start- inspections are done by a third
up/shutdown, party
sampling hazards)
20 - Normal H132 Incorrect transfer 1. Deviation from the 1. Contamination of Gas Operating manual (document C4 P3 Tolerable No further mitigation action
Operations (Are sequence of Gas Oil and prescribe sequence of Oil with Gasoline (note XPE-400-PE-RPT-0050 revision 19 recommended
there any human Gasoline fuel transfer more severe risk if the E1) section 4.6.2 specify that
factors, start- Gas Oil is contaminated) the Gasoline needs to be
up/shutdown, transferred first and verification
sampling hazards) checks to be done before Gas
Oil can be transferred.
hazards) the system
H354128-00000-142-066-0001, Rev. B
Page 20

Number
N011 XPE-400-PE-3013 30 - H135 Ineffective communication 1. Language barriers 1. Operational cost SOP that all communications C4 P1 Low 10 No further mitigation action
Fuel transfer from (sheet 2 rev E3) Communication between ship, barge impact due to delay of off- are to be in English recommended
ship to gantry XPE-400-PE-3013 operator and the gantry load of ship
interface (Gasoline) (sheet 1 rev 3) operator
communication
XPE-400-DSH-00264
of floating hose left in floating hose) tackle failure which is provides visibility to operator in
(Gasoline) use to create a static terms of detection and draining
head of liquid
02 - High / Low or H138 High level in the holding 1. The tank was not 1. Overflow of the tank The holding tank is provided C4 P3 Tolerable No further mitigation action
No Level tank emptied after previous result in environmental with level indication (sight glass) 19 recommended
draining activity risk and delay in and SOP to ensure the tank is
start
03 - Reverse or H139 Possible misdirected flow 1. Connecting the 30m 1. Contamination of the Although the same floating hose C4 P6 High 36 Act 026 Establish a locking device and SOP Basil Read
Misdirected Flow of Gasoline to Gas Oil floating section to the product is used for Gas Oil and Gasoline for safe connection of floating hoses Project
system (ground fuels) wrong holding tank the holding tanks are uniquely Manager
(Note: The floating hose identifiable via labeling to
colour coding for Gas Oil minimise the probability
and Gasoline are the
same, however )
03 - Reverse or H140 Possible misdirected flow 1. Connecting the 30m 1. Contamination of the The floating hose between jet C4 P3 Tolerable No further mitigation action
Misdirected Flow of Gasoline to the Jet floating section to the product and ground fuel are uniquely 19 recommended
Fuel system wrong holding tank colour coded to minimise the
probability
00264)
etc.) permit system including
maintenance of the N2 system
H354128-00000-142-066-0001, Rev. B
Page 21

Number
floating hose in operational upset lines. N2 cylinders are stored at BS over and above the normal Manager
(Gasoline) (delays) the BS and ordering is aligned operational requirements for the
gantry operators
of 19bar for Gasoline high pressure rated and environmental cylinders by operations. The
cylinders incident pigging system drawing XPE-
04 - High / Less or H147 Exceed the hard piping 1. Unknown of what 1. Transient pressure PSV-830 is set at 18.75bar and C4 P6 High 36 Act 027 Inform the vendor that the maximum Basil Read
No Pressure line class A2 pressure of pressure is required by surge through the hard the design pressure is pressure of the pigging system Procurement
19bar for Gasoline the vendor for the piping and consequently documented in data sheet XPE- should not exceed the line class limit team
pigging system damage to the line 400-DSH-00249 revP2. of 19bar and if not possible the
or leaks spillages
apparatus,
machine guards,
etc.)
H354128-00000-142-066-0001, Rev. B
Page 22

Number
N013 XPE-400-PE-3013 14 - Maintenance H152 Maintenance personnel 1. Working on process 1. Possible fatality Compliance to operational C4 P1 Low 10 No further mitigation action
Pigging of the (sheet 2 rev E3) and isolation could be exposed to high systems which are policy regarding stored energy recommended
floating hose hazards pressure during under pressure or where systems as well as the SOP
(Gasoline) maintenance activities energy is stored which include the requirement
20 - Normal H154 Stuck of the pig 1. Low or No flow of N2 1. Unable to continue with Maintenance philosophy and C4 P6 High 36 Act 018 Consider to have one additional set FMC
Operations (Are (line leaks or emptied the pigging activity result integrity inspections of N2 purge of N2 purge system available at the Operations
there any human cylinder) in operational upset lines. N2 cylinders are stored at BS over and above the normal Manager
factors, start- (delays) the BS and ordering is aligned operational requirements for the
Act 019 Consider to conduct a pigging trial Basil Read
a soft type of pig and full bore
the test)
(delays) (open)
launcher)
awareness programs)
inspections of the pigging Act 010 Develop a procedure which Basil Read
equipment are done describes the rules regarding vendor Project
H354128-00000-142-066-0001, Rev. B
Page 23

Number
N013 XPE-400-PE-3013 21 - Emergency H157 Possible release of fuel 1. Incorrect execution of 1. Environmental risk SOP and training of operators C4 P2 Tolerable No further mitigation action
Pigging of the (sheet 2 rev E3) Systems during pigging launching pigging procedure or (spillage exceeds SPCC and quality control checks after 15 recommended
floating hose and retrieval into the sea equipment failure guidance) and financial maintenance.
(Gasoline) impact
0050
operator
communication
XPE-400-DSH-00264
the Gasoline system XPE-400-PE-3013 in operational upset lines. N2 cylinders are stored at bottles for a three fuel transfer Manager
(S2S) (sheet 1 rev 3) (delays) the BS and ordering is aligned approximately 80-100 bottles
with the operational volume
Act 022 Establish a proper procedure for FMC
requirement, however here is a
risk of unavailability handling and transporting of bottles Operations
the line 0050)
of 19bar for Gasoline high pressure rated and environmental cylinders by operations. The BS
18.75bar
H354128-00000-142-066-0001, Rev. B
Page 24

Number
N014 XPE-400-PE-3013 04 - High / Less or H165 Overpressure of the 1. The purging of N2 at 1. Failure of the valley The design basis include a N2 C5 P2 Tolerable No further mitigation action
Nitrogen purging of (sheet 2 rev E3) No Pressure valley pipeline with N2 the BFI to the BS pipeline result in purging requirement to take into 20 recommended
the Gasoline system XPE-400-PE-3013 includes a static head operational losses and account the static head (refer to
(S2S) (sheet 1 rev 3) which could lead to high environmental incident section 4.6.7.5 of XPE-400-PE-
pressure RPT-0050)
gantry operators
eye baths, breaking of couplings well as tool box talks safety
apparatus,
machine guards,
etc.)
N015 No drawing - 07 - Loss of H169 Loss of product from the 1. Hose failure or 1. The current design of SOP and training of operators C4 P6 High 36 Act 028 Basil Read need to confirm the civil Basil Read
Bayside gantry operation activity will containment gantry platform or at the pigging manifold failure the gantry platform is an and maintenance of the gantry. arrangements beneath the gantry Project
use 3D Models landside end of the gantry or mal-operation or ‘open grating’ with only Note operators will definitely and up to the sea wall. (Is it all Manager
during the review superstructure on the leaking valve or failed drip trays provided for notice this more easily than sea concrete within a ‘contained area’ ?)
elevated platform near fitting occurring on land small leaks. When the floating hose failure at sea (Will the secondary containment of
the cassettes/reels or on the gantry itself flanges are unbolted it (however it is considered a spills complies with international
could result in a major reactive response) guidance such as 40 CFR 112.7
release from the elevated requirements
platform causing a
Act 029 Basil Read need to confirm the Basil Read
significant impact
boundaries of the ‘contained area’ Project
(where does it ‘drain’ to? and (What Manager
prevents the beach or any unpaved
areas receiving the discharge)
10 - Safety H170 Exposure of maintenance 1. Instrumentation and 1. Possible fatality (falling Access way provided in design C4 P2 Tolerable No further mitigation action
Hazards (PPE, person to working at gantry access at top of from heights) for safe access with fall arrest 15 recommended
safety showers, heights structure with no fall anchor points for safety
eye baths, protection facility harness, including. SOP and
breathing training of personnel
apparatus,
machine guards,
etc.)
H354128-00000-142-066-0001, Rev. B
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Number
N015 No drawing - 14 - Maintenance H172 Possible damage to the 1. Incorrect storage 1. Degradation of the The design include a roof over C4 P6 High 36 Act 030 Review the storage facility and Basil Read
Bayside gantry operation activity will and isolation hoses when not in use (exposure to natural hoses result in integrity the hose reeler's and side include the vendor requirements (e.g. Project
use 3D Models hazards elements) concerns and operational cladding loose fitting covers, cooled dry Manager
during the review delays ventilated area, etc.)
18 - Building and H173 Overload of the Gantry 1. Possible increase of 1. Possible failure of lines The design allows for 5tons in C5 P1 Tolerable No further mitigation action
Structures structure load conditions due to result environmental risk each of the three directions and 16 recommended
wind or additional (spillage of fuel into the for wind velocity 125km/hr. The
operation requirements sea which could lead to a emergency release couplings
of additional hoses, hydrocarbon pool fire if will (set at 2tons refer to XPE-
tools, etc. ignited 400-DSH-00251) also prevent
the ship to pull the hose and
cause possible gantry damages
19 - Environmental H174 Possible release of fuel 1. Incorrect removal of 1. Environmental risk The gantry design is such that C5 P5 High 37 Act 031 Establish the requirement cycle for Basil Read
hazards (Water from gantry into the sea the pipeline or hose (spillage exceeds SPCC all product in the flexible line is off island hose inspections and Project
pollution and failure on the gantry guidance) and financial drained back to break tanks. include the requirement of a test Manager
consumption, legal impact Maintenance and integrity cycle and service interval into the
requirements) testing of the floating and fixed maintenance philosophy of the
hoses floating hose. (note the hose will be
send to the manufacturer for testing
and re-certification if mandatory) or
tested on island if feasible
Act 032 FMC to ensure that the required FMC
implemented Manager
20 - Normal H175 Possible incorrect 1. The current design 1. Contamination of SOP and training of operators C4 P6 High 36 Act 026 Establish a locking device and SOP Basil Read
Operations (Are connection of the floating requires product result operational for safe connection of floating hoses Project
there any human hose during Gas Oil and removal/replacement of costs as well as time Manager
factors, start- Gasoline transfer spool pieces which may constraints
Act 033 Remove the Gas Oil/Gasoline spool Mauritz
up/shutdown, lead to operator error
sampling hazards) piece sections and replace it with two Coetzee and
independent fixed piping connections Johann Ryan
20 - Normal H176 Loss of communication 1. Any emergency at 1. Ship is not aware of a Radio communication and SOP C5 P2 Tolerable No further mitigation action
Operations (Are between Gantry, Bayside Bayside or BFI which plant shutdown result in for operation, including a 20 recommended
there any human and Ship requires to close the fuel been delivered to warning strobe light and audible
factors, start- main feed valve from the Bayside while the siren. Refer to document XPE-
up/shutdown, ship emergency is in progress 400-PE-RPT-00126 revE1
sampling hazards) and consequently could which states that a visual alarm
lead to fatality (strobe light) is added to the
Bayside and to the end of the
gantry as well as an audio alarm
at the wharf head
availability (Does interruption due to available on plant for or a safety hazard manufacturers' criteria, Basil from Basil Read which also need to Project
the project scope unavailability of gantry quick response in terms Read contractual identify the stock levels for critical Manager
include a list of components of gantry equipment responsibilities, as well as Basil items
critical items and Read will provide operational
inspections of the gantry Act 010 Develop a procedure which Basil Read
H354128-00000-142-066-0001, Rev. B
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Number
N016 XPE-400-PE-3027 01- High / Low / No H179 Overflow of PRT-950 or 1. The pump flow rate is 1. Spillage of product The design include a bund C3 P3 Low 13 No further mitigation action
Fast flash ST-160 (sheet 1 rev 4) XPE- Flow PRT-750 30m3/hr and the PRT- inside an containment around the PRT tanks with a recommended
via pump P-210 (Jet 400-PE-3039 (sheet 950 volume is 5m3 and area (bund) level glasses and level alarms
fuel) 1 rev 4) PRT-750 has 2m3 with audible horns on PRT tanks
in the field to initiate operator
response to stop the pump. The
design also include a spring
loaded valve (close on
releasing) which will stop the
feed)
02 - High / Low or H180 Low level in tank ST-160 1. Higher outlet flow 1. Possible pump The design include a low level C3 P3 Low 13 No further mitigation action
No Level than inlet flow cavitation alarm LALL-165 on ST-160 to recommended
initiate operator response to
stop the pump and release the
spring loaded 4" valve to close
03 - Reverse or H181 Possible reverse flow air 1. Operator opens the 2" 1. Air ingress into the line None C4 P6 High 36 Act 034 Ensure that the SOP for the system FMC
Misdirected Flow ingress into the fast flash spring loaded valve to result in cavitation of the clearly states that the V-Jar system Operations
system the V-Jar is open while pump cannot be utilised while the fast flush Manager and
the fast flush pump is pump is in operation Basil Read
running Project
Manager
03 - Reverse or H182 Possible feed of Jet fuel 1. Incorrect selection of 1. Contamination of The design include unique C4 P2 Tolerable No further mitigation action
Misdirected Flow into the Gas Oil PRT-tank valves (VB-1572 and product (downgrade of jet lengths of spool pieces to act as 15 recommended
VB-1575) are open by to gas oil) result in cost a physical break to minimise the
operator impact probability.
03 - Reverse or H183 Possible feed of Gas Oil 1. 1. Incorrect selection 1. Cross contamination of The design is such that each C5 P2 Tolerable No further mitigation action
Misdirected Flow into the Jet-tank of valves (VB-1557 and fuel products product spool piece have a 20 recommended
VB-1558) are open by different length. SOP and
operator training of operators and
process information on SCADA
which will alert the operator
regarding the wrong material
feed as well as inventory
control. Sampling checks
downstream of the potential
contamination location.
15 - H184 Possible ineffective 1. Noise due to pumps 1. Spillages could occur The current philosophy of C4 P3 Tolerable No further mitigation action
Egress/Access/ communication between running and or result in environmental communication is via radio and 19 recommended
Ergonomics / the ST-160 operator of separation distance risk high level audible alarms at the
pump P-210 and PRT- between the operators PRT tanks to initiate operator
750 and PRT-950 response
the project scope unavailability of fast flush quick response in terms Read contractual identify the stock levels for critical Manager
include a list of pump components of pump equipment responsibilities, as well as Basil items
inspections of the gantry Act 010 Develop a procedure which Basil Read
1,2,3 standards) equipment selection not included in supplier document XPE-400-PE-DSH-
done according to British contract 00098 revP2)
Standard requirements
H354128-00000-142-066-0001, Rev. B
Page 27

Number
N017 XPE-400-PE-3027 01- High / Low / No H187 Overflow of PRT-950 1. The pump flow rate is 1. Spillage of product The design include a bund C3 P3 Low 13 No further mitigation action
Fast flash ST-200 (sheet 1 rev 4) XPE- Flow 30m3/hr and the PRT- inside an containment around the PRT tank with a recommended
and ST-220 via 400-PE-3027 (sheet 950 volume is 5m3 area (bund) level glass and level alarm with
pump P-220 (Jet 2 rev 4) audible horn on PRT tank in the
fuel) field to initiate operator
response to stop the pump. The
feed)
No Level and ST-200 than inlet flow cavitation alarm LALL-225 on ST-220 and recommended
LALL-205 on ST-200 to initiate
operator response to stop the
pump and release the spring
loaded 4" valve to close
running Project
Manager
15 - H190 Possible ineffective 1. Noise due to pumps 1. Spillages could occur The PRT tank is located C4 P3 Tolerable No further mitigation action
Egress/Access/ communication between running and or result in environmental approximately 7m from the ST 19 recommended
Ergonomics / the ST-200 or ST-220 separation distance risk tanks and SOP which describe
Movement and operator of pump P-220 between the operators hand signal communication due
equipment and PRT-950 to that the operators are in line
accessibility of sight of each other
inspections of the gantry
equipment are done
H354128-00000-142-066-0001, Rev. B
Page 28

Number
Fast flash ST- (sheet 1 rev 4) XPE- Flow 30m3/hr and the PRT- inside an containment around the PRT tank with a recommended
100/ST-120 and ST- 400-PE-3020 (sheet 750 volume is 2m3 area (bund) level glass and level alarm with
140 via pump P-110 1 rev 4) XPE-400- audible horn on PRT tank in the
(Gas Oil) PE-3039 (sheet 1 field to initiate operator
rev 4) response to stop the pump. The
feed)
02 - High / Low or H194 Low level in tank ST- 1. Higher outlet flow 1. Possible pump The design include a low level C3 P3 Low 13 No further mitigation action
No Level 100/ST-120/ ST-140 than inlet flow cavitation alarm LALL-105 on ST-100; recommended
LALL-125 on ST-120 and LALL-
145 on ST-140 to initiate
operator response to stop the
pump and release the spring
loaded 4" valve to close
running Project
Manager
15 - H196 Possible ineffective 1. Noise due to pumps 1. Spillages could occur The PRT tanks are on the same C4 P3 Tolerable No further mitigation action
Egress/Access/ communication between running and or result in environmental level and is located 19 recommended
Ergonomics / the ST-100 or ST-120 or separation distance risk approximately 25m from the
Movement and ST 140 operator of pump between the operators pump. SOP describe hand
equipment P-110 and PRT-750 signal communication due to
accessibility that the operators are in line of
sight of each other
equipment are done Act 010 Develop a procedure which Basil Read
H354128-00000-142-066-0001, Rev. B
Page 29

Number
Fast flash ST- (sheet 1 rev 4) XPE- Flow 30m3/hr and the PRT- inside an containment around PRT-850 with a level recommended
300/ST-320 via 400-PE-3040 (sheet 850 volume is 2m3 area (bund) glass and level alarm LAH-850
pump P-310 1 rev 4) and audible horn in the field to
(Gasoline) initiate operator response to
stop the pump. The design also
include a spring loaded valve
(close on releasing) which will
stop the feed)
No Level than inlet flow cavitation alarm LALL-305 on ST-300 to recommended
initiate operator response to
stop the pump and release the
spring loaded 4" valve to close
running Project
Manager
15 - H202 Possible ineffective 1. Noise due to pumps 1. Spillages could occur The PRT tank is located C4 P3 Tolerable No further mitigation action
Egress/Access/ communication between running and or result in environmental approximately 7m from the ST 19 recommended
Ergonomics / the ST-300 tank and separation distance risk tank and SOP which describe
Movement and PRT-850 tank operator between the operators hand signal communication due
equipment to that the operators are in line
accessibility of sight of each other
equipment are done
H354128-00000-142-066-0001, Rev. B
Page 30
Appendix D:
Piping Instrument Diagrams (P&ID’s)
H354128-00000-142-066-0001, Rev. B
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Basil Read Ltd - St Helena Airport Project

Basil Read Ltd

Hazard Operability (HAZOP) Study: BFI Ship to Shore Operations

B 2017-04-21 Final review (initial comments included) Vic Esterhuizen

Rev No Date Description Revised By

2. HAZOP Workshop Participants

Name Company Position

Table 2-1: HAZOP Attendees

3. HAZOP Study Methodology

Table 3-1: List of Acronyms used in this report

• Identify potential hazards related to process streams and sequencing of operational

Figure 3-1: Flowchart (Schematic View) of the Hazard Study Process

 That the residual risk shall be as low as reasonably practicable

Figure 4-1: Risk Matrix used during HAZOP Study

6. HAZOP Study Nodes

Node Node Decription Drawing Reference

Figure 6-1: HAZOP Nodes reviewed for the SHAP project

7. Risk Review Results

 Refer to Annex A for a Summary table of proposed mitigations

Summary of Propose Mitigation Actions and Responsibilities

Summary of Propose Mitigation Actions and Responsibilities

Summary of Propose Mitigation Actions and Responsibilities

Study Items/Node Initial Risk Action

Study Items/Node Initial Risk Action

Study Items/Node Initial Risk Action

Study Items/Node Initial Risk Action

Study Items/Node Initial Risk Action

Study Items/Node Initial Risk Action

Study Items/Node Initial Risk Action

Study Items/Node Initial Risk Action

Study Items/Node Initial Risk Action

Study Items/Node Initial Risk Action

Study Items/Node Initial Risk Action

Study Items/Node Initial Risk Action

Study Items/Node Initial Risk Action

Study Items/Node Initial Risk Action

Act 025 Ensure that during procurement of Basil Read

Study Items/Node Initial Risk Action

Study Items/Node Initial Risk Action

Study Items/Node Initial Risk Action

Study Items/Node Initial Risk Action

Study Items/Node Initial Risk Action

Study Items/Node Initial Risk Action

Study Items/Node Initial Risk Action

Study Items/Node Initial Risk Action

Study Items/Node Initial Risk Action

Study Items/Node Initial Risk Action

Study Items/Node Initial Risk Action

Study Items/Node Initial Risk Action

Study Items/Node Initial Risk Action

Study Items/Node Initial Risk Action

Study Items/Node Initial Risk Action

Study Items/Node Initial Risk Action

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