The Doctrine of Forms Under Critique Part II - Metaphysics A 9

The Doctrine of Forms under Critique The Doctrine of Forms under Critique
problems raised by the concept of Forms as causes, more

University Press Scholarship Online
specifically in relation to the notion that they were, in some
Oxford Scholarship Online way or other, mathematical or quasi-mathematical objects. At
lines 992a24 - b18, an intermediary conclusion recapitulates
all the difficulties created by the causality of Forms. The very
Aristotle's Metaphysics Alpha: Symposium last part of the chapter turns on the general notion of a
Aristotelicum universal science, in relation to the beginnning of Book A as
Carlos Steel and Oliver Primavesi
well as to the theory of science that we know from the
Print publication date: 2012 Posterior Analytics.
Print ISBN-13: 9780199639984
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2013 Keywords: Academy - causality and explanation - doctrine of Forms -
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199639984.001.0001 (philosophy,of) mathematics - mathematical objects - metaphysics (or ‘wisdom’
or,‘first philosophy’) - Plato - science – Speusippus
The second part of Chapter9(which I will designate hereafter

as ‘A 9b’) lists a long series of objections (oraporiai1) against
The Doctrine of Forms under a theory of first principles which is ascribed to ‘those who
Critique posit Forms’ (or: ‘ideas’; cf. 990a34–b1).2I do not intend to
concentrate on the historical and doxographical aspects of this
PART II text, let me just say that it seems to me that the views that are
discussed and sharply criticized here are mainly those
MetaphysicsA 9, 991b9–993a10 ascribed (by Aristotle) to Plato – although the mention of some
Michel Crubellier
contemporary philosophers (̷‫)̵ݘ̵ ڲ‬, who reduced philosophy
to mathematics (992a33), may evoke Speusippus rather than
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199639984.003.0010
Plato. In fact, this is a striking difference between A 9band the
more or less, often narrowly parallel exposition of Books M
and N, while M–N constantly mentions the existence of
Abstract and Keywords different and dissenting opinions among the partisans of
separate non-sensible substances, classifies them into three
The second part of Chapter 9 has no exact parallel in Book M, main types and puts in a prominent position Speusippus’
but its subject-matter, as well as many of its arguments, may criticisms of the doctrine of Forms, there is practically nothing
be found in Books M and N. Moreover, there is no real cut at like that in A 9. Unless I missed something out, there are only
991b8-9, and the discussion is continuous. Chapter 9 as a three (p.298) places3where Aristotle considers alternative
whole is constituted by a list of objections, some of them conceptions, and he seems to do so in order to check all
stated in a very compressed way, to the theory of Forms. possible interpretations of a thesis or to build a destructive
These objections seem to have belonged to a comprehensive dilemma. In the same way, when he mentions the theory of an
context of discussions and perplexities about the doctrine of ‘intermediate’ number which is supposed to be the subject-
Forms (although this is not crucial for the understanding of matter of arithmetic, he writes that “itwill be necessaryto
each arguments, it is assumed here that the particular state of introduce some other kind of number”, as if this was an
the doctrine which is discussed in this chapter was Plato's own
inescapable consequence of the doctrine of Forms, while in N
one). The first subsection of this section considers the
3he speaks of “the first philosophers who posited two kinds of
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numbers”, thus acknowledging that other options were open. I Since A, 990b1–991b9 is nearly identical with M, i078b34–
do not mean that when he wrote Book A he was faced (or 1080a8, one interesting question is, which book borrowed this
thought he was faced) with a monolithic doctrine, but that he common section from the other one. Apart from the fact –
was mainly concerned with Plato’s conceptions, and that always noticed and much commented on – that M uses the
Speusippus’ suggestions for a radical revision of Platonism4 third person plural where A uses the first person. There are
were not on his agenda. They are not explicitly mentioned, and other indications that A is the original context:
in fact the phrase he uses at the beginning of Chapter9to
introduce the holders of the views that he intends to discuss, •M 4 contains a few lines (1079b3–11) which are
not in A 9, and which seem to improve the
o‫(̷̵̴̱̭̥͉̱̼ ̺̩̥̬ڱ ̺۩̼ ڲ‬990a34–b1), taken in a strict sense,
does not include Speusippus. argument of lines 990b22–991a8. To show precisely
that, and how, it fills in a gap in the Alpha version,
His objections are characteristically set out in a short, often would need a detailed discussion which would lead
laconic form; the longest ones (991b9–21,992b24–993a2) take us too far away from the scope of this paper,9but it
up 12 lines of the Bekker edition, and the shortest (992a1–2) is easy to make the experience in the opposite
does not cover a full line. In the whole section, which is 99 sense and ask why, if M were the original text,
lines long, I count 18 objections.5More embarrassing, they Aristotle (or some editor) should have wished to put
follow one another in a very dry and paratactic way. There is these lines out while writing a second version. I
none of these easy and convenient transition-marking cannot see any motive to do so.
sentences or title-sentences that we find so often in Aristotle: •Lines 992a24ff., introduced by ‫̬۫ ̺̳́ۆ‬,
most of the objections are introduced by an ‫(̱̼ڙ‬10 times), or recapitulate a series of arguments which explicitly
by a ̬۫or an ̷‫̬۫ۍ‬, which I chose to render merely by starting goes back to the beginning of chapter A 9:
on the next line. There are two ‫(̺̳́ۆ‬992a24 andb18), which (p.300)
seem more promising,6but are not completely explicit, at least
at first sight, as to what is ‘summed up’ or what kind of In sum, while philosophy inquires into the causes of the
‘larger’ point of view is to be taken. In such a state of affairs, it things that are manifest to us, we gave up this inquiry
would be awkward to draw a general picture or plan of this (…). Instead of that, thinking we were telling what the
section before discussing the details (the readers will find it in substance of the things is, we have claimed that there
Appendix ii). Nevertheless, one might raise a (p.299) are some quite different substances: but as to how these
preliminary question as to how it is related to the first part of might be the substance of those, we explain that through
the chapter, and whether it has been aptly divided at 991b9. idle talk: for ‘partaking’, as I said earlier, is nothing.
(992a24–29)
The main motive to cut the text at that place is certainly the
fact that the first part of chapter9is to be found almost The reproach of having needlessly introduced a new kind of
literally in Book M, chapters4and5, and that there, the end of substances is Aristotle’s introduction at lines 990b1–8, and
a b participation labelled as ‘idle talk’ refers back to 991a20–22.
M 5 (1080 8 = 991 8–9) marks the separation between two
sections obviously different in their object and even in their
•The last arguments of A 9aand the first argument
style, and explicitly declared as such in the announcement of
of A 9bdeal with the same question, namely: “How
the plan at the beginning of the book.7It is also worth noticing
are the Platonic Forms supposed to be causes?” – a
that most of the objections that form the second part of A 9
question which was set out in a general form at
have their counterparts in various places between M 5 and the
991a8: “Most of all, one may raise difficulties about
end of N,8generally in a much more developed form.
what the Forms are supposed to bring to those of geometrical kinds). Now if this is so, we are faced with
the sensible things which are eternal or to another difficulty: why did Aristotle decide to cut right in the
generated and perishable things.” middle of this train of arguments when he decided later on to
copy a part of A9 into his new treatise against the Academy?
On the opposite side, I can see only one fact which could
support the claim that the original context might have been M: The most plausible explanation is that 991b9 is the point at
many arguments that we read in the second part of A 9 are which Aristotle introduces the issue of Forms as numbers,10
expressed in a much compressed way, and look very much like which he decided to deal with separately in the general plan of
reminders that presuppose that the readers already know Books M–N. In fact, the general project of M–N differs from
what the matter is, while M and N contain longer, even that of A because in M–N Aristotle appears to introduce an
exhaustive and painstakingly worked out versions of the same ontological perspective which is not present (at least not
arguments. A prime example is the argument about units, explicitly developed) in Book A. His original questions in M 1
which takes only seven lines in Book A (991b21–27), while it are: are there some eternal, unchanging and non-sensible
covers more than 150 lines in Book M. So when Aristotle realities? What are they? Forms, numbers, or what else? And
writes (in Book A) that “many strange consequences will in what sensearethey what they are supposed to be? – the
follow” without specifying what these strange consequences crucial issue being their description as substances. That is
are, he is most likely referring to a fuller version of the why Aristotle keeps the matter of ideal numbers for a separate
argument, with which he thinks his readers must be treatment.11Unlike that, his main concern in A might be
acquainted. But it is not necessary to infer from this that what called properly metaphysical, in the sense of a quest for the
he presupposes is precisely M–N. For the general picture of deepest and most universal principles of natural beings and
the Academy between Plato and Aristotle that we can draw phenomena, and Plato’s reformist ontology is set out as a
from Aristotle’s testimony is that of impassioned discussions variant of, or an alternative to, the theories of thephysiologoi.
about the meaning of Plato’s doctrines and the difficulties Of course, the ‘Platonic turn’ brought in some questions that
inherent to them: so that we may admit that both texts refer (p.302)
the Presocratic philosophers would never have
independently to that common background. (Another version
thought of: especially the question of what the substance of
of this argument in favour of the anteriority of M–N would be
natural and sensible things is (which is raised by the claim
to claim that the brevity of arguments in A 9bmakes a clear-
that this is what the Forms are12). Thus it would be too rash to
cut stylistic difference between both parts of chapter9. But claim that the ontological issues are altogether absent from A
the case is not so clear: in fact, the section about the proofs of 9, even the problem raised about the nature of the alleged
the existence of Forms does contain references which are even ideal numbers is mentioned, as we shall see. Symmetrically,
shorter than the shortest in A 9band seem to refer to some the questions about the explanation of nature are present in
well-known controversies. Such is the case of the mention of M–N too, and even more explicitly, since they are the main
the Third Man Argument at 990b17: o‫̼ ̬۫ ڲ‬۱̵ ̷̵̧̼̹̼ and central topic of Book N.13
‫ –̵̷̱̻̫̥̳̽ ̵̷̸̵̹͉́ډ‬full stop.)
(I wish to be clear that while stressing this difference of
(p.301) Thus it seems to me that the original context was A concerns between A and M–N, I do not intend to discover an
and that the text is continuous at 991b9. In fact, it seems to evolution in Aristotle’s thought, or in his historical and
me that there is a large unit beginning at 991a8 and extending philosophical interpretation of the philosophy of Plato and the
at least as far as 991b21 (for what follows, up to the early Academy. His views are basically the same, and the same
recapitulation at 992a23, may seem to change the topic and arguments occur in both contexts. The difference is limited to
focus on the status of the ‘ideal’ numbers and the ‘ideal’
the choice of an angle of attack, and I would describe it as be described as numbers in general, while the second assumes
tactical rather than strategic.) the existence of certain kind of numbers which are identical
with the Forms. As a result, the class of Forms would be
So I think it would be wrong to consider 991b9 as the included in the class of numbers in general.
beginning of something new, and that is why I chose to label
the arguments in my section from (viii) on, to insist that they This thesis must sound strange, and many scholars are
are just the follow-up of the seven moves that Dorothea Frede reluctant to charge it to Plato’s account. However, we have to
has analyzed in the first part of chapter9. But more precisely, take into consideration the striking circumstance that Aristotle
and despite the fact that the recapitulation at 992a24ff. often brings in this thesis as a premise in a dialectical
encompasses the whole chapter from its beginning, the refutation: “if Forms are numbers…” (or: “if numbers are
argument at 991b9 continues a line of inquiry that began at Forms”), “then –” and there follows some absurd, untenable or
991a8 (the place at which Erasmus or his collaborators very unwelcome consequence. This way of doing things would be
aptly made a divide between chapters4and5in the text of impudent cheating, and indeed absurd and ineffective, if Plato
Book M). For the first four objections bear on the existence of and his followers had never assumed anything like that,
Forms (the plausibility of their existence and the validity of the although we do not read it in the dialogues: for we must admit
proofs devised by the Platonists to support that claim) and on that some of Plato’s closest disciples were among Aristotle’s
the special point of the types of objects of which there can or readers or audience; most probably, indeed, some of these
cannot exist Forms, without any mention of the causality, i.e. texts were written specially for them. But it is true that the
the explanatory role, of Forms. This question is introduced, thesis itself clashes both with what we know about Platonic
a Forms and with what we think about numbers. It seems (1)
with some emphasis, at 991 8: “But the most embarrassing of
all questions is: what can Forms bring to sensible things that that numbers could not perform what the Forms are supposed
are eternal, or to those that are generated and perish? (…) It to perform, and (2) that numbers which were at the same time
does not play any role, either in the scientific knowledge of the Forms could not be true numbers. Such ‘numbers’ do not lend
other things (…) or in their being”, and so on. The ensuing themselves to the simplest operations that are associated with
discussion examines in what sense the Forms could be said to numbers: not only the four operations of arithmetic, but even
be the causes of sensible things and meets incidentally, as we such basic activities as comparing two numbers, or counting.
have seen, the question of their being the ̷‫̧̩̻ۍ‬of those
According to Aristotle’s own report, the second objection was
things. This line of inquiry seems to be continued up to 992b
seen by Plato himself. That is why, he says, Plato proposed to
18, but with a good deal of parentheses or digressions caused
distinguish a class of ‘mathematical’ numbers, intermediary
by the interference, so to say, of the obscure and difficult
between the ideal numbers and concrete (p.304) collections of
assertion that the Forms are numbers. Since this thesis plays
countable objects. Aristotle goes just one step farther and
such an (p.303) important role in Aristotle’s discussion of the
claims that such ‘Form-numbers’ cannot be called numbers in
Platonist doctrine of first principles, it may be worthwhile to
any tolerable sense.15
give a short review of how it appears in Aristotle’s texts and
try to explain how he seems to have understood it and in The first objection goes deeper into the heart of Platonism. For
which way he intends to use it against Plato. whatever their ontological status might be, we expect to find
in things called ‘forms’ an intelligible content, exhibiting the
He sometimes states this thesis by saying that Forms are
real nature of the objects of which they are said to be the
numbers, and sometimes that numbers are Forms.14But Forms. Now it does not seem plausible that numbers could
actually, these two propositions do not amount to a claim of ever represent in a satisfactory way such things as natural
unqualified identity. Rather, the first one says that Forms can beings or ethical norms. The properties that are commonly
ascribed to number and to the series of natural integers, seem Actually, even the fact that those are eternal, while the
to forbid that: made up of abstract units, all of them alike, and others are not, will make no difference. If, on the other
generated by a simple law, they have a monotony and hand, that means that the things here are ratios of
simplicity of structure which remains far behind the variety numbers, just as musical consonance is, then clearly the
and complexity of natural beings. They do not even seem fit things of which they are ratios, are some reality which is
for being ‘elements’ out of which natural beings could be one. Now, if this is something definite, i.e. the
generated by composition and combination. Thus Aristotle 》relevant「matter, then obviously the numbers
objects to the Pythagoreans that by assuming that all things themselves will be some ratios of something to
are numbers, they are committed to make up things that have something else. I mean something like this: let Callias be
lightness and weight out of elements that have not weight or a ratio, expressible in numbers, of fire, earth and
lightness, so that “they seem to speak of another heaven and water,19then Human-Itself, be it a certain kind of
other bodies” than those we perceive.16The difficulty was number or not, will nevertheless be a ratio, expressible
probably not so hard for the Platonists since, according to in numbers, of certain things and not a number, i.e. it
their idealist epistemology, they had to refer only to the will not be a certain numberbecause of that. (991b9–21)
intelligible structure of objects, and so they were able to make
a distinction between essential and accidental properties The assumption that Forms are numbers is introduced without
(weight, for instance, could be conceived as a feature further details, with just an ̭‫̸̹̭ڵ‬, which strongly suggests
belonging to (or resulting from) the formal-arithmetical that Aristotle is merely reporting a Platonic or Academic claim
structure of Earth or Water, rather than like our feeling of (“if it is truethat…”). This is perhaps the very first mention of
something being ‘heavy’). Still, they could not entirely escape this thesis in the course of Book A. But the parallel with
the objection: for what number will be the Form of Man, for Pythagorean doctrines drawn in lines 987b11–25 also suggests
instance, or that ofJustice?17 some kind of identity between Forms and numbers, and there
is one sentence which puts the two terms together at 987b21–
Another function that the Forms have to fulfil is to provide a
22: ‫>̵̵̧̭̲́ڕ ̶ڕ‬sc. the great and the small@ ̫۩̹ ̲̩̼۩ ̴̶̵̥͉̭̱
causal explanation of things and phenomena, as it appears
̷̼‫̵ږ ݘ‬۱̺ ̼۩ ̭‫̷̼ ̵̱̩ڷ̭ ̯̬ڵ‬۳̺ ‫̷̴̺͉̱̹ͅڅ‬. Admittedly, it is
particularly in thePhaedo: “It is clear to me”, says Socrates,
grammatically awkward, so that the editors often excise one of
“that, if there is anything beautiful apart from the Beautiful-
the two terms, either ̼۩ ̭‫=(̯̬ڵ‬eller, Ross) or ̷̼۳̺ ‫̷̴͉̱̹چ‬۳̺
Itself, there is no other reason for this being beautiful than the
(Christ, Jaeger20). But maybe we should keep the text of the
fact that it partakes in that Beautiful; and I say the same for
manuscripts and consider the phrase ‫̵̶̴̱̭͉̥ ̩̼̩̲ ̵̵̧̭̲́ڕ ̶ڕ‬
every other thing.”18But if Forms are numbers, how could
̷̼‫̵ږ ݘ‬۱̺as equivalent to a dependent clause indicating a
numbers be the causes of natural beings? This is the first point
cause or an explanation. The causes ascribed to the forms by
that Aristotle tackles in section A 9b.
the Platonists pertain to the region of quantity, so that we
(p.305)
(viii)How could numbers be the causes of could paraphrase or expand the text in this way:”》sincethey
are generated「out of the great-and-small through partaking
natural beings?
of the one,the forms are numbers.“
If it is true that the Forms are numbers, how will they be
causes? Is it because the things are another kind of The discussion on the causality of numbers comes in the form
numbers – for instance, this number here would be of two successive attempts to interpret the sentence: “the
‘human’, this one Socrates and that one Callias? How, causes of natural sensible things are numbers”, which is most
then, will those numbers be causes for these ones? probably the thesis ascribed to Plato or the Platonists.
(p.306) The first attempt seems to rest on the implicit premise all these numbers are substances, they are distinct collections
that what is caused by a number must itself be a number, so of units (stars or years or musical intervals, or ‘pure’ units)
that sensible particulars (individuals such as Socrates or and there isa priorino reason that the fact that there are 12
Callias) would have to be numbers. It is opposed to another of these be the cause of there being 12 of those.
interpretation,21in which sensible objects could be described
The strange thing in this objection is that it seems to reject the
as ratios of numbers. There is a very close parallel to this
very premise on which Aristotle himself had built the first
alternative in N 5, 1092b8–23.22
interpretation, namely that what is caused by a number must
The first interpretation ends very soon in a blind alley, and itself be (in some sense) a number; to which someone would
Aristotle does not say much about the reasons of this failure. perhaps add that this premise looks much like the Aristotelian
Although the text here is very compressed, I am inclined to principle of ‘synonymy of the cause’, stating that everything
think that the relation between those ‘other numbers’ that the comes from some thing which has the same name and the
caused things are, and the numbers which are their causes, is same definition: ‫ ̔(̧̩̻ۍ̷ ̵̧̱̩̼̭̫̫ ̷̴̵̵̻̽́̽ͅ ̲ڕ ̯̼̻̤̲ږ‬3,
meant to be the same as exists between particular collections 1070a–4–5). But, first, to say that what is caused by a number
of twelve objects,23for instance (these twelve stones or these must be a number does not mean that every collection of
twelve people), and the number 12 conceived in an abstract or twelve items has ‘twelve’ (or ‘the Twelve’) as its cause.
general way, whatever that may mean. Aristotle does not dwell Second, Aristotle specifies that the principle of synonymy in its
on how a particular thing could ‘be’ a number (in N 5 he stronger form holds for substances and not (or not necessarily)
24 for the other categories. So he could assume it as a plausible
mentions, albeit in an enigmatic manner, the speculations of
Eurytos, which he seems to parallel with some arithmo- Platonic premise, and conversely its rejection implies denying
geometrical conceptions – perhaps, for instance, our way of that the Forms, if they were numbers, could be substances.
designating classes ofpolygonsby the number of their
He probably took more seriously the second interpretation,
summits). He does not criticize directly this attribution of one
since he cites27with some sympathy the verses in which
25
number to one kind of natural beings, but he just suggests
Empedocles characterizes the nature of the bones by a due
that the fact that there are 12 Xs here, taken by itself, cannot
proportion of their elements. – Ofbone, actually, not of ‘the
hold for an explanation of the fact that there are 12 Ys there
bones’. – That is true, but for Aristotle, homoeomeric tissues
(̧̼ ̷‫)̵ۯ̻ڱ̭ ̷̧̱̼ڵ̩ ̷̷̺̱̼̼ͅ ̷̵̱̭̲݉ڕ ̵ۓ‬. I admit that this is
are not amorphous stuffs, but organs of a kind, having their
nothing more than a guess, and that it might seem rash or
own form, though not fully individuated into aschema,and
arbitrary to extract any precise interpretation from a six-words
their matter – an animal is a much more complicated
interrogative sentence. My answer would be to put forth, as a
structure, and could not be reduced to a mere proportion of
plausible parallel, the detailed argument, well supplied with
elements.–True again, but this might be considered as a
examples, which forms the main bulk of chapter N 6 (1093a1–b
matter of degree rather than of nature. So let us assume, for
11). Aristotle argues that since all things must be countable, it
the sake of argument, that Callias could be defined by his DNA
must happen that two different facts share in the same
and that his DNA, since it is a discrete and finite structure,
number(s), and that does not mean that the number 7, for
could be adequately described by some set of natural numbers
instance, is the cause of the Pleiades, of the seven captains
put in the convenient order.28Even then, Aristotle would
against Thebes or of the fact that children lose (some of) their
insist, such a description still involves a (p.308) matter-plus-
milk-teeth at seven.26The addition that “even the (p.307) fact
form pattern: the numbers must express, first, the presence of
that those》numbers「are eternal, while the others are not,
some elementary matters in certain determined quantities,
will make no difference” seems to be there in order to
and then (but only then) the way in which these matters are
preclude the hypothesis of a paradigmatic type of causality. If
disposed. Thus there is something that these numbers would rather that, since Greekarithmoiare normally integers, an
count or measure. (This is another way of saying that numbers adequate description of a natural (p.309) object, through
are not substances, i.e. that number-predicates are incomplete numbers, presupposes an analysis into (absolutely) simple
predicates). terms, like in our ‘H2o’ formula.
An interesting particular in this argument is the insistence on

(ix)How could one Form be produced out of
the fact that this something must be one (‫)̱̼ ̥̫ ̵ښ‬. First, one
several Forms?
would perhaps have found it enough to show that the numbers
are not the whole of the substance that they were supposed to One number may be produced out of many numbers, but
describe, so that either the idea of human (Human-itself), if it how could one Form be produced out of several Forms?
is assumed that it consists only in numbers, is not sufficient to If it is not out of the Forms themselves, but out of the
explain Callias (this branch of the dilemma would be left things that are in the number (for instance,》the units
implicit) or Human-itself too would have some kind of that are「in the myriad), how, then, will these units be?
matter,29and would be ‘a ratio, expressible in numbers, of For if you say that they are similar, this entails many
certain things, and not a number’ (b19–20). The objection then strange consequences, and likewise if you say that they
expands in a rather unexpected direction, for Aristotle insists have not the same form, i.e. either》the units in the
that even if Human-itself were a number, it would not be a
same number「are not themselves similar to one
number forthatreason, i.e. he wants to make it clear that the
another, or all the units》in one number「are not
fact that although numbers do play a certain role in the
similar to all the ‘other’ units》in another number「: for
explanation of natural phenomena, this is not enough to
how will they differ, since they are without properties?
conclude that the Forms must be numbers. So, while Aristotle
These conceptions are not rationally plausible, neither
began by asking how, if Forms are numbers, they could
do they fit in with our intuitions. (991b21–27)
explain things, he now concludes that the Platonists cannot
find support for the thesis that Forms are numbers in the fact This objection questions the analogy between Forms and
that numbers contribute (in a limited way) to the explanation numbers – I say ‘analogy’, not ‘identity’, because even the
of things. identity between Forms and (ideal) numbers must imply a kind
of analogy with (ordinary arithmetical) numbers –and it does
Second, the sentence ̷̵̬ܻ̳ ‫̷̱̫̳̈́ ۯ̻ڱ̭ ̵۠ ̱̼ ̥̫ ̵ښ ̵ۯ̼̻ڕ ̱̼ۆ‬is
so by referring to an essential property of arithmetical
far from being unambiguous. The succession of the singular ‫̵ښ‬
numbers, namely the possibility to generate one number from
̫̥ ̼̱and the plural relative ̵۠has surprised many a reader,
several other numbers. Of course, it would just be silly to
but Ross is certainly right in rejecting the emendation of ̵۠
claim, e.g. that ”horse+dog=human”; still it would be worth
into ̷‫۔‬, since “a ratio involves” (at least) “two terms”. Thus
considering whetherhumanmight result from some definite
the proposition must be predicative, not existential, i.e. not:
combination ofanimalandbiped– a combination which could
“there is something oneof which they are ratios”, but: “the
perhaps be given a mathematical form.30Besides, when
things of which they are ratiosare some reality which is one”.
reading ‫̴͉̱̹څ ̺ڸ̭ ̵ݥ̴͉̱̹څ ̵ݥ̷̸̳̳ ̲ڕ‬۱̺ ̵̧̫̭̼̩̱, one
But I do not agree with his interpretation of ‫̵ښ‬as meaning immediately thinks of the four arithmetical operations,
that these things (taken all together, I suppose) form one especially addition and multiplication, but more refined
class. I suppose that in this interpretation, ‫̱̼ ̥̫ ̵ښ‬would algorithms could fit in that formula as well. Actually, the
mean something like a prime matter, or matter in general, but second option of section (viii), ‫̩͉ݘ̵̩̼څ̼ ̵ݥ̴͉̱̹څ ̷̱̫̳̈́ ̱̼ۆ‬,
I cannot see the point of demonstrating that at that moment; might refer to something like that – and that could explain the
besides, that does not result from the premises. The idea is transition to our objection: for if numbers explain reality by
means of relations existing between them, then these relations The strange consequences are probably still stranger and
could in turn be understood as relations between certain more numerous if one assumes that the units are different,
Forms. either each one being different from any other (an hypothesis
which nobody ever made, although Aristotle mentions it for
Aristotle does not dwell on this question, neither does he bring completeness’ sake), or the units of the ideal Two being
forward counterexamples. In any case, the aim of his equivalent to each other but different from those of the ideal
rhetorical question: ‫ ;̺ݥ̸ ̷̺̬ڸ̭ ̵ژ ̬۫ ̵ݥ̬ڱ̭ ̶ڕ‬is not entirely Three, and so on. This last (p.311) view appears to have been
clear: does that mean that it can never happen, or just that 34
Plato’s own view, and the main target of Aristotle’s
this is not always the case? For it might seem that this can be
criticisms: for objections (x), (xi) and (xiii) seem to presuppose
true with some restrictions and conditions. However the
this special assumption rather than the general notion that
correct Aristotelian answer to (p.310) this question, I think, is
Forms are numbers.
that this is totally impossible, since these “partial Forms”
could not be fully real (i.e. exist ‫)ܪ̵̧̭̭̳̭̼̿ڕ‬inthe compound There is a very long discussion of this conception in Book M
Form. He turns off to another, deeper problem, which (chapters7–8, 1081b35–1083a17), in which Aristotle shows
concerns the philosophy of mathematics: how should we that the alleged nature of such numbers contradicts the basic
conceive the process of generating a number by means of an facts which build up our experience of natural integers, and on
arithmetical operation? The most plausible answer (which which the very possibility of arithmetic depends, namely: (1)
avoids the absurdity of adding the dog to the horse) is that All the units are equivalent by definition: they admit no
addition consists in joining two collections of objects. But difference, be it qualitative or quantitative; (2) any two
while this is easy to understand in the case of distinct concrete numbers can be compared and a number is greater than
collections, such as these seven pebbles and those five another if it contains, as one of its parts, a number equal to
pebbles, in the case of “pure numbers” it raises the difficult that number; (3) one counts by the repeated addition of one
question of what their ‘units’ are or mean.31At line 991b23, unit; (4) one can count as far as one likes, and there is no
the phrase ̷‫̴̱̬̤̱̹̽ ܼ̼ ̵ڕ ̵̷ڸ‬probably just refers to the fact greatest number. Here he just mentions the incompatibility
thatmuria(ten thousands) is the largest number with a name between the supposition that there are different kinds of units,
in ancient Greek. So one should think of “the units in the and the notion of pure numbers without any other property
myriad” as a very large stock of units, out of which the than the number (Anzahl) of the units that they contain (for a
arithmetician can draw as many as he wants for his current development of this objection, see M 8, 1083a1–17: the alleged
purpose.32 differences can be neither quantitative nor qualitative). This
remark has also the force of anad hominemargument against
This question is set out more systematically and at full length Plato, since Socrates in theRepublicspeaks of units which are
in M, in which it fills more than one half of the book (chapters ‫̴̹̲̱̻ ̬۫ۍ̷ ۯ̩̲ ۯ̵̸̼̩ ̵ܬ̸ ̵̷̼̻̩̲ښ ̭̼ ̵̷̻ڵ‬۱̵ ̷̵̬̱̩̥̹̾(“any
6–9, from 1080a12 to 1086a21). Here Aristotle limits himself to one being equal to any other, without the slightest
a few hints. If the units of any number are equivalent to the difference”).35
units of any other one, then “many strange consequences”, he
says, will follow. What are these consequences? It seems that The next three objections (x,xiandxii991b27–992a2) have
they do not concern arithmetical operations in themselves, but little to do with the first principles and first causes of natural
the compatibility of the assumption that the units are all alike beings; rather, they raise special difficulties about some
with the thesis that Forms are numbers. Actually, the parallel consequences that follow from the admission of Form-
passage of M 7, 1081a5–17, is itself very short, but it goes numbers.
clearly in that direction.33
(x)Difficulties about the ‘intermediary’ kind of properties of such mathematical objects, but on the possibility
of finding a place for them into a general ontological map. The
numbers
parallel passage of N 3, 1090b32–1091a5, develops it into a
Here begins a sort of digression (see the General Plan in dilemma: if these numbers derive from the same principles as
Appendix ii) which covers sections (x) to (xii) or (xiii). After the Forms and the ideal numbers (i.e. the One and the
the first two objections against the explanatory role of Forms indefinite Two), they cannot be distinct from the ideal
as causes for physical facts or objects, section (viii) introduced numbers; but if they have principles of their own, this will be
a third objection specifically levelled at the possibility that this an unjustified complication of the primary ontological entities.
explanatory role be related in some way to them being
numbers. This question is pursued up to the end of section (p.313) (xi)Difficulty about the units of the Two
(xiii) through asking what these numbers should be. That leads
Both units that form the Two》would「come from some
Aristotle to raise some additional difficulties (x–xii) as to
(p.312) the structure and ‘generation’ of numbers: in a sense, prior Two; but this is impossible. (991b31–992a1)
these questions are independent from the causal role of The text here is cryptic. The objection seems to rest on the
Forms, and they might come from a stock of objections that difficulty of conceiving the relationship between the ideal Two
had already be discussed inside the Academy; they are which is the first ideal number, and the “indefinite Two”(or
present, in a much more developed form, in the second part of “indefinite Dyad”) which is one of the principles. How is it
Book M. But they have an impact on the question of the possible to speak of a “Two” before the generation of the Form
causality of Forms, especially by calling into question the
Two? The most plausible parallels are M 7, 1083b23–36 (and
notion that they should be real substances.
in our chapter, lines 990b17–22).38In M 7, Aristotle reports
that the generation of the ideal Two results from a process of
The first difficulty is directed at the notion of a special
‘equalization’ applied to the great and the small, which
‘intermediary’ class of numbers, which are supposed to be the
constitute the indefinite Two. The phrase ‫ۯ̩̲ ̷̴̳̤̫̭̽ ݘ̷̼ ̲ڕ‬
numbers to which the theorems of arithmetic refer. Since the
properties of ideal numbers are incompatible with the basics ̴̷̱̲̹‫“(̵̵̼̥͉̻̩̻́ڱ ݘ‬from the equalization of the great and
of arithmetic, then there must exist a distinct genus of small”), which occurs twice (1083b23–24 and 30–31), looks
arithmetic numbers, the ontological status of which is much like a quotation.
problematic:
Aristotle is often blamed for taking Plato at his word and
treating the indefinite Two as a (definite) pair of two things,
It will be necessary to introduce some other kind36of
the great on the one hand and the small on the other. He
number, the object of arithmetic, and all the
should have understood that the talk of duality was rather a
‘intermediary’ beings mentioned by some philosophers:
sort of a catchword, used to suggest a very general notion of
how,37and from what principles, are they》supposed to
difference or variability, and that Plato’s indefinite Two was in
exist「? Or why will they exist between the numbers in
fact very near to his own concept of matter. But independently
our world and the numbers-themselves? (991b27–31)
of Aristotle’s distrust of the use of metaphors in philosophy,
These ‘intermediate’ mathematical objects have already been we must remember that the doxographical informations that
mentioned in Chapter6, 987b14–18, where Aristotle explained present the Dyad as a material principle are to be found in
the necessity of positing them by the fact that the practice of later authors, mainly Neoplatonists. To these commentators,
geometry or arithmetic often requires more than one circle or the Aristotelian concept of matter, or a concept of “prime
more than one number Three, for instance, while the relevant matter” derived from Aristotelian matter, was a basic and
Ideas must be unique. The difficulty does not bear on the familiar metaphysical notion, which – thus following a
suggestion made by Aristotle himself39– they were inclined to the One.”40Just as the previous argument questioned their
recognize in earlier philosophical conceptions. But most originating from the indefinite Two, this one questions the role
probably the case was not so clear for Plato’s contemporaries of the One.
and even for Aristotle himself, for he seems to have hesitated
between recognizing the affinities between Plato’s conceptions Aristotle’s fighting spirit about this issue shows that he felt he
and his own, and enhancing the differences (as is particularly was in a strong position. And he was indeed, for his theory of
potentiality and actuality provides an effective solution to the
manifest inPhysicsI 9, among other places).
ontological problems raised by parts and wholes. This solution
(p.314)
(xii)How is a number, taken as a whole, could be stated (for a simple standard case) as follows: if
several objects of typeaput together form an object of typeb,
one object?
several objects of typebtogether form an object of typec, and
How is a number, taken as a whole,oneobject? (992a1– so on (as is the case, say, with the series:brick:wall:house:
2) town), there is one type of object which may be called properly
real and one, while the other objects are either just parts
This question is often put forth by Aristotle as a challenge to (which exist only potentially) or clusters of such objects (which
the Platonists. See the parallel passage of M 7, 1082a15–26: are not really ‘one’). In my fictitious example, this most real
object (or substance) would probably be the house.41These
How can the Two be a certain nature beside the two
units, or the Three besides the three units? either real objects are characterized by the full possession of a
(p.315) form (entelecheia) or by the fact that they are
through participation of the one to the other, as in the
case of thewhite manbesidewhiteandman(since it generated by other objects possessing the same form. In
partakes of these); or the one is a difference of the other, Books Z–H, this solution was extended to definition and its
parts. Did Aristotle intend to extend it to the question of the
as in the case ofhumanbesideanimalandbiped.
unity of number? In fact, his answers vary. In Z 13, he just
Again, some objects are one by contact, others by puts in a dilemma: “either the Two is not one thing, or there is
blending or by the position》of their parts「: but none of no unit really existing (‫ )ܪ̵̧̭̭̳̭̼̿ڕ‬in it.” In ̔ 10, he seems to
these could be the case for the units out of which the claim that “the moving cause” is responsible for the unity of a
Two or the Three are made. But, just like thetwo number.42Most probably, he thought that in fact the unitsare
personsare not some unitary object beside the one and more real than the number of which they are supposed to be ‘a
the other, necessarily the case must be the same for the part’43: so that this question was intended for showing a weak
units. And the fact that the units are indivisible》while point in Plato’s conceptions, rather than raising what he would
humans are not「will make no difference: for points are have considered as a serious philosophical problem.
indivisible too, and neverthelessa pairof them is not

something distinct beside the two points.
(xiii)“One” is said in many senses
In addition to what has been said, if it is true that the
In addition to this passage, the question arises in several
units are different,44they should have explained that in
places, (some of them very conspicuous), in the rest of the
the same way as those who say that the elements are
Metaphysics:Z 13, I039a13–14, H 3, 1044a2–9, ̔ 10,
four, or two. For none of them says that the common
1075b34–37. In our context, it seems to be the counterpart of
nature, like ‘body’, is the element, but each one says that
the previous argument, both referring to the Platonic tenet (at
this is fire and earth, whether body is45a46common
least, in Aristotle’s report of Plato’s principles) that numbers
“are generated out of the great-and-small through partaking of
nature or not. Whereas in fact they speak as if’the One’ very large number of such stuffs. Moreover they do not seem
were some homogeneous substance like fire or water. If to be able to mix and give birth to different compounds, and so
this is so, the numbers will not be substances: but on.
clearly, if it is true that there is some One-itself and that
At the same time, they speak as if there were a universal
it is a principle,》one must admit that「the ‘one’ is said
nature of the One. So this section ends up with a dilemma. If
in many senses. That would be impossible otherwise.
(a) this nature of the One is to be understood as a
(992a2–10)
“homogeneous substance”, a stock of units which are all alike
(p.316) The introductive sentence connects the objection with and out of which numbers are constituted, then numbers are
section (ix) above, because of the collective phrase ̸̹۱̺ ̷̼̺݉ but clusters and no number can be a substance. If (b) the
̭‫̷̵̴̺̱̥̯̹ڱ‬and of the mention of a difference in the units. “One-itself” is no such stuff, but rather unity conceived as a
Form, then it has nothing to do with the units as components
Aristotle draws an unusual parallel between the Academic of numbers. Then the term ‘one’ would be equivocal – and,
doctrine of Form-numbers and the way in which the Aristotle would like to add that a good deal of Plato’s theory of
Presocratics dealt with the elementary bodies. Of course, this principles rests on that equivocity. He makes that diagnosis in
fits well within the general programme of Book A, and reminds the last section of M 8, which is actually the parallel passage
us that in spite of the change of perspective that Plato for our argument from A 9b:
introduced in philosophy, his task remains substantially the
(p.317)
same as that of the Presocraticphysiologoi, i.e. to give a
unified account of the essence and causes of natural
One might wonder whether the One, or the Three and
phenomena. At the same time, this gives a new direction to
the Two, is prior. Insofar as the number is a compound,
Aristotle’s examination of the doctrine. Up to that point, the
the unit is prior; but insofar as this is the universal and
hypothesis of Forms was discussed from the point of view of
the form, the number (1084b–5).
its explanatory value (“how can the Forms becauses?”). Here,
and in the next two objections as well, the question is rather: (…) In what sense, then, is the One a principle? –
“how can Forms be theelementsof things?”,47or alternatively: Because it is not divisible, they say. But the universal is
“how could they be analyzed into elements?” Of course, this is indivisible as well as the part and the element: but in
explanatory too, but the question itself is set out at an different manners, for the one is indivisible because of
ontological level – a line of inquiry which Aristotle will explore its notion, while the other is indivisible in time. In which
first by means of the number scheme, then, in the objections sense, then, is the One a principle? (…). Well, they say
of section (xiv), by means of geometry. that the One is a principle in both ways. But this is
impossible: for the one is a principle insofar as it is a
There is something bizarre in this way of giving the Platonists Form, and the other as a part and as a matter (b13–20).
a piece of advice and inciting them to follow the example of an
Empedocles, for instance. But Aristotle’s aim is to point out a (…) In fact, both are ‘one’ in a sense – potentially, to tell
contradiction in their talk of units. In order to ensure their the truth (ifthe number is one object and is not a heap,
ideal numbers, the status of Forms, and thus of substances, but different numbers are made of different units, as
they had to claim that the Ideal Three, for instance, is not they say), while none of these units exists in the full
made out of the same units as the ideal Two, and so on. That sense (‫)̩̹̥̼̩̲ږ ̺۩̵̷̴ ̧̼̻ڕ ̲ۍ̷ ’̬ ܪ̵̧̭̭̳̭̼̿ڕ‬. The cause
makes them look like the four elementary bodies, for each of of the error in which they fell is that they inquired at the
them is made of a distinct homogeneous stuff. Of course, this
comparison has a very limited value, since there should be a
same time from the point of view of mathematics and up to points and arithmetical units, through the notion that a
from the point of view of general accounts (…) (b20–25). unit is a point without position (in our passage, line 992a16
alludes to that possibility, but only to preclude it; as to points,
see the next argument).
(xiv–a)Difficulties met by the geometrical
analysis of forms The same sudden shift from numbers to geometrical figures is
to be found in Book M, at the beginning of chapter9.50Why
Now, with the aim of reducing the substances to their did not Aristotle feel compelled to explain it, or at least to
principles, we have assumed that lengths result from the comment on the fact that the Platonists joined two very
short and the long, i.e. of a certain kind of small and different, and perhaps incompatible accounts of the forms? In
great, surface from large and narrow, and volume from fact, he did something like that later on – in section (xix),
deep and shallow. But how will the surface have a line,
992b13–18.
or the solid a line or a surface? For the large and narrow
is a kind different from deep and shallow. Then, just as Neither does he object in A 9, as he does in B 5 and N 3, that
number is not contained in these things, because many in fact it is not true that bodies cannot exist without their
and few is a kind different of these, so, clearly, none of surfaces, and so on, but rather the other way round, since
these higher kinds will exist in the lower ones. But, on these are only the limits of those,51and thus are less real than
the other hand, the large is not the genus of the deep: them. His argument is that the different kinds of geometrical
for》if it were so「, the body would be a particular kind objects (uni-, bi- and tri-dimensional) are heterogeneous and
of surface. (992a10–19) incommensurable – a notion which he expresses by saying that
their alleged principles (short and long, narrow and large,
Without any transition, Aristotle turns to another kind of shallow and deep) are entirely distinct, in a way that recalls
analysis of the forms into elements, namely an analysis of Speusippus’ ‘episodism’. Another, slightly anachronistic way of
spatial forms into simpler objects from which they could be stating the same difficulty might be: “How is it possible to
geometrically reconstructed. We may take a more precise account for the unity of space and at the same time for the
notion of such an analysis from a parallel passage in Book B, necessary distinction between its three dimensions?” In the
in the discussion of the twelfth aporia, namely: “Are numbers, idiom of the geometrical conceptions of the fourth century bc:
volumes, surfaces and points substances ”?48There, Aristotle “How will the surfacehavea line, or the solidhavea line or a
offers a kind of philosophical reconstruction of the history of surface”? On this point, Aristotle’s position seems very weak,
philosophy, much in the style of Book A. After the Presocratic in that he appears to disregard or ignore a characteristic
philosophers, he says, had reduced the variety and richness of feature of geometrical definitions, the one we express by
sensible things to a few elementary qualities, or to the mere saying that they are definitions by construction. He just
notion of a ‘body’, some Moderns (obviously he means the notices that the methods of analysis that he (and the
Platonists) pushed this reduction further, and claimed that a Platonists) did know and practice, i.e. the methods of
body is less real than its surfaces, or a surface than its sides, definition by means of kinds and species, or the notion of
since those (p.318) cannot be without these, while the division of a whole into its parts, are not suitable to deal with
converse is not true. According to the Platonic standard of these questions: “the large (p.319) is not the genus of the
ontological priority: “objects which can be without》the deep: for if it were so, the body would be a particular kind of
existence of「others while these cannot be without them》are surface”52
said to be prior「in nature and in substance: Plato used this
distinction.”49This kind of analysis may have been continued (xiv–b)Where do points come from?
As to points, then, out of what do they exist in》other lead us quite far, but I would have only very uncertain
geometrical objects「? In fact, Plato went so far as to conjectures to offer on that subject.
contest this kind, claiming that it was》just「an opinion
Aristotle’s refutation of this thesis, on the contrary, is simple,
of the geometers. Instead he called it: ‘principle of the
clear and effective: since these objects would be lines,
line’, and he often claimed that this was what his
however short, they would necessarily have extremities, which
‘indivisible lines’ were. Nevertheless, such lines must
would be points.
have a limit, so that the same argument by which there
is a line implies that there is a point too. (992a19–24)
(xv)Introduction of the recapitulation: we gave
This difficulty is closely connected to the previous one. While up the main goal of philosophy
that one bore on the special principles that must be assumed
In sum, while wisdom seeks after the cause》which
for each kind of geometrical objects, Aristotle now turns to the
explains「the things that are manifest to us, we gave up
principles that could be ascribed to points, with the additional
difficulty that, in their case, one cannot conceive of any this inquiry. Actually, we do not say a thing of the cause
indeterminate or material pair of the “great-and-small” type. which is the origin of change. Instead of that, thinking
He reports that actually Plato did not admit to these pure we were telling what the substance of the things is, first,
points in the Euclidean sense of “that which has no parts”, we have claimed that there are some quite different
while having a position – not a position in a Cartesian-like substances: but as to how these might be the substance
system of coordinates (that would have no sense in Euclidean of those, we explain that through idle talk: for
geometry), but a position in a particular geometrical figure. ‘partaking’, as I said earlier, is nothing. (992a24–29)
Instead of that, Plato (according to Aristotle’s report) assumed
As I said earlier, this recapitulation (‫ )…̬۫ ̺̳́ۆ‬encompasses
the notion of indivisible lines, which he called ‫̴̴̺ܻ̩̹̫ ۯ̩̹̿څ‬
all that has been said from the beginning of chapter9on. In
.53If M 9, 1085b7–34 has to be taken as a parallel to our
fact, the prospect that it opens is still larger than that, since it
passage (as I believe it has), the phrase ̷̼‫۔̷ ̶ڕ ̷̷̧̭̱̼̻̽̿ ݘ‬
refers to the definition of philosophy as the knowledge of the
̸̷̷̱‫“(̴̦͉̭̫̭ ۩̼ ̱̻ݘ‬the element out of which they generate
causes, given in the first two chapters. One can only be struck
geometrical magnitudes”) is another description of the same
by the gravity of the charge that Aristotle is bringing here
kind of entity, i.e. the point as the starting-point of a process
against Plato and the Platonists: nothing less than the
of growth in the three spatial dimensions, thus giving birth to
desertion of philosophy.
geometrical bodies.54
The following lines recapitulate the successive moments of
According to this report, Aristotle and Plato held distinct and
this accusation:
quite opposite views as to the nature of points. For Aristotle, a
point is nothing more than the limit of a line, so that it is •they have forged a class of quite different
impossible to add points to one another in order (p.320) to substances (cf. 990b1–8, developed in lines 990b8–
generate a line.55Plato, on the contrary, appears to have 991a8);
conceived a line as something like a set of microscopic, point- •they claim that the Forms are the substance of
like elements. The phrase “indivisible lines” suggests that natural things, but they cannot explain plausibly
such elements were conceived as homogeneous to the how this can be the case (this is the criticism of the
macroscopic line of which they were constituents. paradigmatism and of participation in lines 991a8–
b
9, more or less mingled, admittedly, with the
I will not try to inquire further on this extremely interesting general discussion of the causality of Forms);
testimony about Plato’s geometry, not only because it could
(p.321) •the types of causality that they ascribe to from our experience of the sciences or from some sufficient
the Forms are inadequate. evidence, that this is a cause, or ratherthecause (the
determiner can be taken from ‫)̸̹̭ۆ‬. Both aspects are
This criticism is developed in the next sections. The case of the important here: that this is not an immediate piece of
moving cause is mentioned first here (at linesb25–26) without knowledge but has to be inferred, and that this inference is
further argument, probably due to the fact that the moving based on undisputable facts (‫)̵̴̭ݥ̹ۂ‬. The definition of
cause is particularly characteristic of physical substances and
science at the beginning of thePosterior Analyticsincludes the
that the inability of Platonic Forms to start a process of
knowledge of the cause and the recognition that this is the
change is supposed to be self-evident, since they are supposed
cause.61The notion that a correct understanding of natural
to be free from any kind of change whatever. I will try to show
philosophy bears out the importance of the explanation
that section (xvi) concerns the final cause, while (xvii) and
through final causes is a well-known Aristotelian conception –
(xviii) deal with matter. The aim of section (xix) is less clear
displayed with some solemnity, for instance, in the prologue of
(on this see below p.327).
theParts of Animals.62
(xvi)The Forms cannot be final causes To match with this interpretation, and avoid being committed
to the notion of a cause of the sciences, I ventured to construe
Now, the Forms have no connection with what the
̼̩̺݉ ‫̴̸̺̱̩̦̼̻̱ڕ‬as an instrumental: “that which we see, by
sciences show us to be the cause and through which
every intelligence and every nature produce, or with this means of the sciences, to be the cause.”63Another possibility
cause, which we say is one of the principles. Rather, would be to choose the reading of Branch ̪, ‫̺۩̼ ۯ̸̹̭ ۄ‬
mathematics has become》the whole of「philosophy for ‫̵̷̱̼ڵ̩ ̵ۃ ̵̴̭ݥ̹ۂ ̴̸̺̩̦̼̻̱ڕ‬, giving ̸̧̭̹ + Acc. the meaning
the Moderns, although they say that one has to study of ‘all over’, i.e. “on many occasions in our experience of the
56 sciences.”
mathematical sciences for the sake of something else.
(992a29–b1) The exact meaning of ̼̩̼̯̺ͅ ̼ܻ̺ ̩‫̵̴̧̩ ̵̱̩ڷ̭ ̵̴̭̩̾ ̵ڦ ̧̺̩̼ڱ‬
This section contains two rather explicit allusions to Plato’s ̼‫̵ݥ̹̿څ ̵ݥ‬is not immediately clear either. If we take the two
dialogues. The idea that mathematics must be practised, not ̷‫ ̬۫ۍ‬to introduce two entirely distinct objects, the second one
for themselves, but as a ‘prelude’ to a higher kind of seems underdetermined, since it implies that there is more
than one principle; besides, the identity of ‘we’ is not
knowledge,57is central toRepublicVII.58The cause “through
specified. Therefore, I suppose that we have to connect this
which every intelligence and every nature produce” evokes the
phrase with the former one (“what the sciences show us to be
Phaedoand Socrates’ intellectual autobiography.59So it seems
the cause”), taking the sentence, with its two ̷‫̬۫ۍ‬, to be
at least plausible that the cause mentioned here is the final
equivalent to the negative form of a sentence with an
cause, although it is not designated by one of the usual
epexegetical ̧̲̩: the Forms have nothing to do with A, and
Aristotelian phrases. The periphrase ‫̴̸̺̱̩̦̼̻̱ڕ ̺̩̼݉ ̸̹̭ۆ‬
especially with that particular sort of A that is B. Then the
‫(̵̷̱̼ڵ̩ ̵ۃ ̵̴̭ݥ̹ۂ‬a 29–30) is somewhat obscure. The most
difference between A and B is clear: while A refers to final
natural interpretation is that this is something that provides a
causes in general, B is the principle which has the nature of a
causeforthe sciences, but, as many commentators
final cause; i.e. the Good (if ‘we’ means ‘we, at the Academy’),
remarked,60the notion that the final cause explains the
or the Prime Mover (if ‘we’ is more specifically Aristotle
existence or the possibility of scientific knowledge is far from
himself). Both interpretations of the first person plural are
being obvious. And we have to take into account ‫̵̴̭ݥ̹ۂ‬and acceptable, but the first one makes the objection more
‫̵ۅ‬, which suggest that we are in a position to (p.322) infer, interesting. For there is more force in detecting a self-
contradiction than in stating that Plato or Speusippus ignored it is a predicate and a difference of the substance and of
a typical Aristotelian tenet. Is it possible to claim that there is the matter rather than a matter: for instance》they say
no link between the Platonic forms and the One-itself or the it is「the great and the small, just as natural
Good-itself? Aristotle would admit that they have a strong philosophers too speak of the rare and the compact,
connection with the one, but not with the good, because the saying that these differences are the first differences of
Platonists do not explain why the one is supposed (p.323) to the underlying stuff: for these are a kind of excess and
be goodper se. In fact, this section echoes a criticism which deficiency. (992b1–7)
Aristotle raised against Plato in chapter7: “those who speak of
This objection is narrowly linked with the previous one, since
the One or of Being say that this kind of nature is the cause of
it points to the same kind of error: just as they should not have
reality; however they do not say that reality exists or is
considered the Forms in such a mathematical manner, they
generated for the sake of that, so that in a way they say and
are wrong to describe their “underlying substance” (p.324) in
they do not say that the good is the cause. For they do not say
mathematical terms, i.e. as “great-and-small”, and so on.
that in an unqualified way, but accidentally.”64Aristotle is
Aristotle’s argument is easy to grasp: great and small are
often blamed for that reproach.65How can one be so absurdly
predicates, in fact they presuppose the existence of another
unfair as to deny that Plato did recognize the final causes, and
underlying reality, so that they are not sufficient to explain the
set the good as the highest principle of his philosophy? And
what does Aristotle mean when he says that the good is a constitution of a self-existingousia.68
cause only ‘accidentally’?
(xvii–b)Difficulties about the status of change
In our passage, he clearly acknowledges that the Platonists
And as to change, if change consists in these things, then
say that the good is “one of the principles.” He does not claim
clearly the Forms will change; and if it does not, where
that they have ignored the good or that they did not say
does it come from? For》if one cannot explain change「
explicitly that it is a principle. Actually, the difficulty lies in the
the whole inquiry into nature is ruined. (992b7–9)
fact that the Forms have no real connection (̷‫)̸̱̩̼̭̼ڊ ̵͉۫ۍ‬
with the good, probably because they are conceived only in a Here too there is some continuity with the previous objection
mathematical manner, i.e. as formal structures that can be (Ross considers them as one objection, and he may be right),
analyzed into elements: that is why he adds the satirical
as can be seen from the transition (̸̧̭̹ ̼̭…) and from the fact
remark about the modern philosophers who replaced
that ̼̩‫̩̼ݘ‬at line 7 refers, like the one at line 8, to the great
philosophy by mathematics, which they treat as an end in
and the small, or to any other form of the pair “excess and
66
itself. Actually, Aristotle himself does not consider that forms
deficiency”: just as the great and small is interpreted by
(I mean his own ‘forms’ without a capital) must be apart from
Aristotle as a material principle, it is also supposed to provide
the good: on the contrary, the identity between the formal and
an explanation of change and motion.69
67
the final causes is a central Aristotelian thesis. But since
Plato considers that they are entirely immutable, his Forms On the basis of this assumption, he builds a refutative dilemma
are unable to explain change and generation. as follows: either the great-and-small is the same thing as
change, or it is not. If it is identical with change, then the
(xvii–a)Their material principle is conceived in a Forms – since they are generated out of the great-and- small –
too ‘mathematical’ manner will partake of motion, and thus will not be eternal. If it is not,
then, where does change come from? For – it should be added
One might think that the underlying substance which
– the Platonists appear to have assumed the great-and-small in
plays the role of matter is rather mathematical, and that
order to explain change, and more generally anyone who
wants to explain the structure and order of reality must be (b) Another way of integrating this interpretation in a larger
able to account for change. context would be to link it with the discussions of N 2, where
the thesis “all things are one” plays the role of an unwelcome
(xvii)What does it mean that “all things are consequence that one must find how to avoid: “they thought
one”? that all things would become one thing, being-itself, unless
one would be able to solve or to disobey Parmenides’ dictum:
And what seems easy – namely, to show that all things
you will never force what-is-not to be,but that it is necessary
are one –, that does not result. For throughecthesisit
to demonstrate that not-being is”, and so on.71Thus to prove
does not result that all are one, but that there is some
that “all things》are「one”, although this is obviously not a
‘one- itself’, if one grants them all》their postulates「,
Platonic thesis, could be one essential step towards the
and not even that, if one does not grant that the
demonstration that there exists a principle such as the great-
universal is a genus – which is impossible for some
and-small. That would be in continuity with the previous
objects. (992b–13)
arguments, which also bear on this principle.
(p.325) This objection has the form of a refutation through
(c) Another solution would be to suppose that the phrases ‫̵ژ‬
invalidation of an inference brought forth by the opponent.
‫̵̸̩̼̩ڊ‬, ̸̵̤̼̩ ‫̵ژ‬, ̩‫̵ژ ̱̼ ̼̈́ۍ‬do not stand for “absolutely all
The exact nature of the inferential scheme implemented here
things”, but for “all the things of a certain class.” The text
(the so-called ‫ )̺̱̻̭͉̲ڙ‬is not fully clear, but I will return to
would then mean: “what seems easy – namely, to show that all
that point a little later. First we have to clear the meaning of
》Xs「are one –, that does not result. For throughecthesisit
the clause ‫̵̸̩̼̩ڊ ̵ژ ̱̼ۆ‬.
does not result that all are one, but that there is some one “X-
itself”, and so on. The ‘easy task’ would be to show that
The most natural way to read it is to understand that it means
wherever there is a common name for a multiplicity of objects,
that “all things”, absolutely everything, “are one.” Then the
these objects are one in a sense, insofar as they partake of
rest of the argument would read smoothly: “for through
(p.326) some common nature. This procedure is very common
ecthesisit does not result thatall thingsare one, but thatthere
in Plato’s dialogues, and this seems to be what Aristotle
is a one-itself,if one grants them all》their postulates「, and
(probably following an Academic use) calls “the One over
not even that, if one does not grant that the universal is a
genus – which is impossible for some objects.” The difficulties Many” argument (̼۱ ‫)̵ݥ̷̸̳̳ ̸̧ڕ ̵ژ‬, orecthesis.72
begin when one tries to make philosophical sense of that. Let
There are at least two different uses of ‫̺̱̻̭͉̲ڙ‬in the
us leave aside the fact that the extremely paradoxical thesis
Aristotelian corpus.73One of them refers to a move sometimes
“all things are one” would be thought to be easy to establish:
used in syllogistic demonstrations, which consists of
after all, it might be one of those naivetours de forcethat
extracting a determined part of a class and to treat it as a new
Socrates laughs at in thePhilebus.70But if Aristotle thinks he
distinct term, which will be able to play the role of a subject of
wins a point against the Platonists by showing that they did
universal propositions. The other one appears in ‘Platonic
not prove that all things are one, this implies that this
contexts’, and refers to the procedure I have just described.
proposition should play an important role in their doctrine.
Ecthesisin that sense is not a deductive process; in fact it
Now it is difficult to see which role and why.
looks rather like Aristotelian induction. But the crucial
(a) One could think of the assumption of a universal genus of difference between the Platonic argument throughecthesis
‘being’, but then it would only have the (relatively weak) kind and the process described by Aristotle, is thatecthesisis
of unity of a genus. supposed to provide a proof for the existence of the common
term and for the fact that it subsumes the ‘many terms’ out of
which it has been extracted. According to Aristotle, it seems And there is no explanation of the lengths, surfaces and
that the Platonists assumed that this scheme always works, on volumes that ‘come after the numbers’: neither of how
the one condition that the common term be used in a non- they exist or will exist, nor of whether they have some
equivocal way. But he would object that there is a second potentiality.76For these objects cannot be Forms (since
condition for the subsumption: it results only in the case of they are not numbers), nor ‘intermediate’ objects (for
substances: “let us assume that there exists only white things those are mathematical objects), nor the perishable
and thatwhitemeans one and the same thing. Nevertheless things; but, again, this is obviously a fourth domain of
white things will be many and not one. For what is white will reality. (992b13–18)
not be one by continuity, nor in its account” (i.e. it will still be
possible and necessary to distinguish white swans, white The objection in this section is very akin to those in sections
snow, white milk, and so on): “so it is necessary to assume not (x) and (xiv–b), because it refers to a category of non-sensible
objects which are not the Forms of natural sensible objects.
only thatbeingmeans one and the same thing, whatever the
The genus which is at stake here, ̼۩ ̴̭̼۩ ̷̼۳̺ ‫͉̱̹څ‬- ̴̷۳̺
subject of which it is predicated”, but that it meansjust what
̴̦̲̯ ̼̭ ̲̩‫̩̭̹̥̼̻ ۯ̩̲ ̸̸̧̩̬̭ڕ ۯ‬, are geometrical objects which
is beingandjust what is one(‫”)̵ۅ ̸̹̭ۆ ۯ̩̲ ̵ژ ̸̹̭ۆ‬.74This
seem to be prior, since they “follow [sc. immediately] the
argument fromPhysicsI is levelled at Parmenides, not at the
numbers” and are not mathematical objects (b 16–17). The
Platonists. But actually one may well suspect that in such
difficulty is that the existence of such entities complicates the
contexts ‘Parmenides’ does not mean the man Parmenides, nor
ontological system, and it is not easy to conceive what their
the text and arguments of hisPoem,but some reconstruction,
principles are.
elaborated in the Academy, of (some of) the paradoxes from
the first part of thePoem. Anyhow, it may help to understand Perhaps the position of this objection at this place will call for
the brief sentence of our passage: ̷‫’̳̳څ ̵ژ ̵̸̩̼̤ ̵̧̱̩̼̭̫̫ ۍ‬ an explanation. It seems to be apart from the previous ones
̩‫̵ښ ̱̼ ̼̈́ۍ‬. (p.327) Besides, it would be effective against the (i.e. those from the beginning of the recapitulation at 991b24
Platonic argument in both interpretations (i.e. against “all Xs on), which bear exclusively or mainly on the question of the
are one” as well as against “all things are one”). causality of the forms. It may also be the case that it
completes (p.328) the recapitulation, since the previous series
It is not easy to decide between these two interpretations. In
of objections ended with some remarks about geometrical
favour of “all things are one”, one may say that this is the most
entities.
natural reading and that it echoes nicely the discussions in N
2 andPhysics1. In favour of “all Xs”, that it fits better in with (xx)The many senses of “being”
̷̼‫̵̷̵̼̩̬ͅڅ ̷̵̧̺̱ڕ ̵ڕ ’̬ ̷̼ݘ‬75and with the phrase “what
seems to be easy.” Moreover, that would complete the list of In general, to look for the elements of beings without
the four Aristotelian causes, if I was right to find the moving making distinctions, while they are said》to ‘be’「in
a many different ways,77is》to look for something that
cause at lines 992 25–26, the final cause in section (xvi), and
the material cause in (xvii–a) and (xvii–b). But maybe it is not is「impossible to find – the more so if one inquires as
necessary to find all of the four causes in this passage. they do, which elements beings are made out of. For out
Especially, one might argue that it would be too violent of of what does acting-on, or being-acted-on, or the
Aristotle to deny that the Forms could provide even aformal straight, come? It seems pretty impossible to grasp that,
explanation for natural things. but, if ever it is possible, this would be only for the
elements of substances. Thus looking for the elements of
(xix)What are the principles of the geometrical
kinds?
all beings, or believing that one has found them, is not feature of Plato’s philosophical programme (very plausibly, to
true. (992b18–24) judge fromRepublicVII) and from which he was careful to
distance himself.78Now, this looks like a way of overreaching
The ‫̺ݥ̳ۂ‬that introduces this section is probably different in
the aim, since Aristotle’s original concern in Book A was the
meaning from the ‫̺ݥ̳ۂ‬at line 992a24. While that one was question of the kinds of causes, not that of the systematic
clearly meant to gather all that had been said earlier, this one architecture of science or the sciences. Nevertheless, there is
indicates rather a broadening of the perspective, through still a link with the more general question about first
questions that bear on the possibility of a universal science. It principles, since Plato’s project rests on the notion of
seems to me that this line of inquiry goes throughout this last elements, i.e. on the conception of Form as an entity that can
part of the chapter. be analyzed into its elementary parts and reconstructed, and
perhaps constructeda priorifrom such simple constituents.
The first objection is a well-known one. Aristotle recalls that
‘being’ is said in many senses, and that one has to make some Book A actually considers two ways of being a principle
distinctions in order to reach a scientific knowledge of beings. (arche):either as a (first) cause, or as an element.
That does not necessarily imply that there cannot be one
These arguments appear to come back to the same themes
science of all beings, but that means that such a science, if it
that Aristotle developed in theouvertureof chapters1and2:
exists, should not treat ‘being’ as a uniform realm of reality:
the relation between science and sensation, and the universal
the beings are situated in various positions in respect to one
character of wisdom. They also prefigure the ‘dispensatory’
another, and the first important task of ontology is to map out
character of Aristotle’s science of being, that is, a science of
these relations (this is the object of the theory of categories).
beingqua beingrather than a universal science of everything
This objection is given a specific form in the case of an inquiry that there is.
into the elements of things: the analysis of something into
elements cannot be carried through in a satisfactory way How might one even come to know the elements of all
things? Clearly, it impossible to be already in a state in
except in the case of substances. This claim is not argued for,
but only illustrated with some effective counterexamples: what which one has an acquaintance of anything prior》to
sort of things could the elements of processes (‘acting’, ‘being that「. For, just as a person who learns geometry may
acted on’) or of qualitative determinations (such as ‘straight’)? have some pre-existing knowledge of some other things,
The underlying premise is most probably that only a self- but does not know in advance any of the things of which
subsistent object can have elements, that is, immanent geometry is the science, i.e. on which he is supposed to
components. This objection joins together two of the main learn something, and likewise for the other sciences, so
criticisms that Aristotle addressed to Plato: first, he did not that if there is a science of all things, such as some
have a correct notion of what was or was not a substance, and people claim there is, then the person》who would learn
second, insofar as he conceived his first principles as ‘first it「should begin without any acquaintance with anything
elements’, he could not go very far beyond a relatively whatever. However, every learning is acquired by means
rudimentary ontology. of things that are already known to us (either all of them
or some of them), i.e. through demonstrations or through
(p.329) (xxi)The aporia about the knowledge of definitions (for you must know beforehand the terms out
first principles of which the definition is made, and you must be
acquainted with them) – and similarly in the case of
The last four arguments bear on the possibility of a universal knowledge through induction. On the other hand, even if
science, a project that Aristotle considered a distinctive
it were the case that such a knowledge be naturally have tried to escape Meno’s dilemma, or Aristotle’s version of
present in us, one wonders how we could possess the Meno’s dilemma, by making a distinction between knowledge
most important of all kinds of knowledge without being by demonstrations, which must presuppose some pre-existing
aware of it. (992a24–993a2) knowledge, and knowledge through definitions, that one could
conceive as a form of intuitive grasp of the essence of an
This is another well-known objection, since this is the question object. Then Aristotle’s answer would be that in the case of
which is discussed in the last chapter of thePosterior definitions, one must at least possess some degree of
Analytics. Here, it receives the standard (p.330) form of an comprehension of the language in which the definition is
Aristotelianaporia,79in which two alternative propositions are expressed, which in turn implies some knowledge of the
discussed separately: the second one is a variant of Plato’s objects to which the words refer, were it only the ability to
doctrine of reminiscence (we have a pre-existent knowledge of recognize these objects (cf. 992b2–33: ̸̷̵̧̹̭̬̭̩̱ ̲̩‫̵̱̩ڷ̭ ۯ‬
some things, which enables us to acquire a demonstrative ̵̴̫̹̱̩͆).
knowledge of anything). The first one is not so clearly stated;
in fact the best way to account for what we read in the text is (p.331) (xxii)How can one make sure that the
to express it under the form of a dilemma: either we have elements of reality are such and such?
already some reflexive and definite knowledge of some
objects, and then the demonstrative knowledge that we will How could one come to know of what》elements the
develop on the basis of such knowledge will not be a universal beings「are made, and how could one be certain of that?
science; or we have no such knowledge, and then we will not There is some difficulty with that too: for somebody
be able to learn anything whatever. This dilemma is a variant might dispute about that, just as it is the case with some
of Meno’s paradox, so that theaporiaexplores an alternative combinations of sounds. For some people hold that ZA is
between Meno’s dilemma and its standard Platonic answer, made of S, D and A,82while others say that it is a quite
i.e. the theory of reminiscence. The terms of theaporiaare distinct sound and none of those we know. (993a2–7)
nearly the same in thePosterior Analytics. One difference is
This passage has a celebrity of its own, for it provides an
that thePosterior Analyticsdoes not dwell on the question,
interesting testimony on the evolution of the pronunciation of
whether the science under consideration will be universal or
the consonant ̮ by the time of Aristotle.83With this example, I
not. The question is given a more general form, namely: “how
suppose he is raising the question of how one will be able to
can scientific knowledge begin”? But the objection to the
determine the ultimate elements of something. Aristotle
reminiscence theory is the same in both texts: how could we
stresses the fact that the notion of’element’, on which the
possess an actual knowledge without even noticing it?
methods of analysis rest, has itself something intuitive –
Another difference, of course, is that thePosterior Analytics intuitive, but not necessarily sensible. The fact that the
example here is an example of audition, does not imply that
sets out an alternative solution instead of the reminiscence
Aristotle thought that the inquiry into the elements was always
doctrine. This solution mobilizes a general theory of the
a matter of sense-perception.
development of knowledge which is very close to what we
have read in the first chapter of Book A (from perception to
So how can one make sure that one has actually grasped, in an
universal science through memory, language and
adequate way, the ultimate elements that one is looking for?
experience),80and rests ultimately on sense-perception.81 And if there are conflicting opinions on that question, as there
b are for the pronunciation of letters, who is to arbitrate, and on
The specific mention of definition at lines 992 31–33 suggests
the basis of what criteria? The suggestion is that the so-called
that some people (probably members of the Academy) may
‘elements’ do not provide a firm basis for scientific knowledge, (990b8–991a8)

maybe because they are not entirely real. Objections against the thesis that the Forms are
causes
(p.332)
(xxiii)Could intellectual knowledge (v)They are neither causes of motion and change
precede sense-perception? (991a11) neither do they contribute to the scientific
knowledge of sensible things (991a12–i3)or to their
As to things which are objects of perception, how could being
someone come to know them without having a
(991a13–20)
perceptive experience of them? However, that would be (p.333) (vi-vii)They are not ‘models’
a necessary consequence, if it is true that these things84
(991a20–b9)
are the elements out of which all》beings are made「,
(viii-xiii)If the Forms are numbers, how can they be
just as the complex sounds are made out of the relevant
a
causes?
phonemes. (993 7–10)
(viii)attempts at an explanation by means of numbers
If all things have the same constitutive parts, if those are in a make appear the existence of material components,
finite number and are intelligible, then one could get an which cannot be reduced to them
adequate knowledge of something that is sensible, without (991b9–21)
ever having had any sensible experience of it. This is the (ix-xiii)how (i.e. of what kind of units) would such
oldest known form of the “blind man problem”, proposed by numbers be constituted?
Locke after William Molyneux.85Aristotle’s answer is (991b21–992a10)
undoubtedly that this supposition is absurd, for “if some (x-xii)digression on some particular difficulties
sensation is missing, necessarily some science will be missing (991b27–992a2)
86 Objections about the geometrical analysis of
too.”
forms
It is particularly striking that the inquiry ofMetaphysicsA, (xiv-a)how should we conceive the integration of the
which had begun by a praise of wisdom as opposed to geometrical dimensions ?
perception and empirical knowledge, and later on enhanced (992a10–19)
the turn made by philosophy, under the influence of Plato, in (xiv-b)the special problem of the points
the direction of non-sensible structures and explanations,
(992a19–24)
should end up reminding us of the inescapable bounds of Recapitulation
sense.
(xv)General recapitulation: the Forms are not suitable
for causal explanation (in none of the 4 causal
Appendix I
patterns):
General plan of A 9 (992a24–29)
–we have left off efficient causation
Objections against the thesis of the existence of Forms [contained in (xv), 992a25–26]
–and we are unable to explain how Forms could be the
(i)The Forms uselessly duplicate the real objects
̷‫̧̱̩̻ۍ‬of sensible objects
(990a34–b8)
[contained in (xv), 992a27–29]
(ii-iv)The arguments that we use to prove that there
(xvi)the Forms have nothing to do with final causality
are Forms are not conclusive, or imply some
(992a29–b1)
unwelcome conclusions
(xvii-a)their ‘material’ principle is conceived in a too (xxii): M 8, 1084b3–25

mathematical manner (xiv-a): M 9, 1085a7 –?
(992b1–7) (xiv-b): M 9, 1085b27–34
(xvii-b)a development about the material principle: is (xv): –
it, or is it not, the same thing as change? (xvi): –
(992b7–9) (xvii-a): N 1, 1088a15-21
(xviii)the thesis that “all things would be one” cannot (xvii-b): –
be demonstrated (xviii): N 2,1089a2–15
b (xix): –
(992 9–13)
(xix)The Forms that would correspond to geometrical (xx): –
objects have no clear ontological position. (xxi):Posterior Analytics II 19
b (xxii): –
(992 13–18)
Objections against the possibility of an universal (xxiii):Posterior Analytics 1 18
science based on a systematic construction of
reality from absolutely simple ‘elements’
Notes:
(xx)The notion of an analysis into elements does not
(1) Cf. A 7, 988b21, and the mention of ‘theaporiaiwe
make sense for categories other than substance
discussed in our prefatory essay’ in Book B, 1, 995b4–5.
(99b18–24).
(xxi-xxii)Such elements could not be learnt: (2) According to the predominant usage of Anglo-Saxon
(xxi)dilemma: theMenoparadoxvs. the implausible scholars, I use the (capitalized) word ‘Forms’ for Plato’s
thesis of reminiscence substantial intelligible entities, which Aristotle callsideaias
(992b27–993a2) well aseide. Nevertheless, and although I do not think there is
(xxii)by which criteria could we recognize these a significant difference in meaning, I have kept ‘ideas’ forideai
alleged ‘elements’ ? when translating Aristotelian texts. In the subtitle of (xiv–a),
(993a2–7) below p.317, ‘forms’ is not a misprint.
(xxiii)We could know sensible factsa priori, which is
absurd (3) 991b10–14ff.:“sensible objects are numbers”vs. “they can
(993a7–10) be described by numerical proportions”; 991b23–26:“every
unit is different from any other one, even within the same
(p.334) Appendix II number”vs. “the units in the same number are homogeneous,
but differ from the units in another number”; 992b7–8, a
Parallel places for some arguments of the second part of rather obscure passage:“change is (vs.: ‘is not’) identical with
MetaphysicsA 9 the material principle”; to which one would perhaps like to
add 991b19: “Human-itself is (vs.:‘is not’) a certain number”,
b
(viii): N 5, 1092 8–23; N6 but in fact it belongs to the context of the first occurrence.
(ix): M 6–7, 1080a12–1082a15
(x): N 3, 1090b32–1091a5 (4) Namely, the rejection of the Forms, the notion of separate
(xi): M 7, 1083b23–26; M 8, 1084b23–32 levels of reality (the ‘episodic’ universe) and the thesis that the
(xxi): M 7, 1082a15–26 (see alsoZ13, 1039a13–14; H good is not primary, but occurs later in the course of the
a b development of nature.
3,1044 2–9; ̔10, 1073 32–37)
(5) See Appendix 11 for an overall view of the arguments in does not appear (the last ones being the sole witnesses of
chapter9. In this paper I have kept Ross’s numbering of the Aristotle’s representation of his master’s doctrines), and
objections (in low-case Roman figures) for the commodity of therefore he claimed that the texts we read were “lists of
the readers. In fact, I disagree with him on some minor arguments compiled from his previous writings” (see
particular points, so that I had to subdivide his numbers (xiv) Aristotle’s Criticism of Plato and the Academy,pp. 193–8, and
and (xvii). Appendix 11, pp. 488–94). But in his view, this must be the
case for both texts (i.e. for A 9 as well as for Book M), while I
(6) I intend to show that the two ‘̼̭’ at 992b7 and 9 also think that there are sufficient marks of literary and rhetorical
indicate a kind of closest connection.
continuity in A. In M, chapter4(1078b9–12), Aristotle does
7 a distinguish between an original version of the doctrine of
( ) M 1, 1076 26–32: “After that (= after having studied the
Forms and further developments in which the assimilation to
̴̴̩͉̯̩̼̱̲̤) we will have to consider the Ideas in themselves,
numbers played a (presumably important) role, but he does
without any other specifications (‫ )̺ݥ̸̳چ‬and as much as is
not say that Plato took no part in these developments. In
required for form’s sake. For most of those things have been
actual fact, in Book M, he seems to make methodical, rather
already much developed in public discussions; and the longest
than historical, distinctions. He wants to discuss first the
part of our discourse has to meet these problems again, when
status of mathematical objects without any considerations
we will examine whether the substance and the principles of
about their being Forms or not (M 2–3, cf. M 1, 1076a2–26),
things are numbers and Ideas: for this is the third object of
then (M 4–5) the status of the Forms “independently of the
inquiry, which remains after the Ideas”.
nature of numbers” (1078b9–12), before considering the case
8 of Form-numbers (M 6–9).
( ) See the list of parallel passages in Appendix 111.
(9) To put it in a few words: in order to build a refutative (11) In fact, the sentence from M 1 I quoted above (in note7)
dilemma against the thesis of the existence of separate, seems to disclose that the section that deals with Forms is
substantial Forms, Aristotle uses the premise:The expressions borrowed from a previous account (cf. ̼̭͉̹̳̯̼̩̱ͅ ̫۩̹ ̼۩
which refer to a substance in the sensible world must indicate ̸̷̳̳۩ ̲̩‫̸ێ ۯ‬۱ ̼‫̶́ڕ ̵ݥ‬- ̼̭̹̱̲‫)̵̫̳́̈́ ̵ݥ‬, and even that it has
a substance in the realm of Forms, and vice versa(990b34ff.). been amputated (̸̭̹‫̷̴̵̽̈́ ̵̷̻ۆ ۯ̩̲ ̺ݥ̸̳چ ̵ݥ̼ۍ̩ ̵ݥ̭̬ڱ ̵ݥ̼ ۯ‬
In Book M, 1079b3–11, he adds that it is not possible to reject ̵̤̹̱̿) of a part that the exposition in M–N will meet again
that premise by saying that the Form and the sensible objects later on through a different path (‫̸̹ ̬۫ ̱̼ڙ‬۱̺ ‫̵ۭ̼ ̭̬݉ ̵̵̧̯̭̲ڕ‬
that participate in it share the same definitionexcept that in ̵̻̲̥̱̀ ‫̼ ̵ܬ̵̸̼̩څ‬۱̵ ̸̧̳̭́ ̷̵̳̫̈́, etc.).
the case of the Form one must add something to the definition
(12) Cf. 991a13, 991b1–3, 992a26–27.
in order to specify that we mean the Form itself, and not one
of the particulars. This addition looks like filling in a gap he
(13) Book N (with or without the last pages of M, from 1085b18
had discovered later in his own argument.
on) is probably the ̸̵̧̳̭́ ̷̳̫̺̈́mentioned at 1076a30.
(10) On this point I do agree with Cherniss, but only as far as a

(14) Forms are numbers:MetaphysicsA 9, 991b9–21 and 21–
description of the text is concerned. For the conclusion that I
27; M 8, 1083a17–20 and 1084a12–15; M 9, 1086a11–13; N 3,
draw from this fact is diametrically opposed to his. He thought
1090a16–19. Numbers are Forms:MetaphysicsM 6, 1080b11–
he could strengthen his main thesis (i.e. that Plato never
12; M 7, 1081a5–17, 1082a28–b1, 1082b19–26 and 1082b28–
taught anything like the assimilation of Forms and numbers)
32; M 8, 1084a7–10; N 2, 1090a2–7; N 4, 1092a5–8; N 6,
by distinguishing in Aristotle’s reports, between the sections
1093b21–23. The distribution into these two classes, of course,
in which this thesis was mentioned and the ones in which it
may be discussed. There is one occurrence in theDe Anima(I
2, 404b24–25), where numbers are said to be identical with (25) His report about Eurytos is expressed in a neutral tone.
Forms: “For some say that numbers are the Forms themselves Theophrastus does not seem to be any more sarcastic when he
and the principles”, etc. (this is also the only mention of the mentions him in a similar context in hisMetaphysics, 6a15–25.
thesis outside theMetaphysics). See also the exposition of On the contrary, he seems to consider that he went farther
Plato’s doctrines in A 6, and especially the comparison with than the Platonists in the direction of spelling out
the Pythagoreans at lines 987b11–25. mathematical or para-mathematical explanations for concrete
natural objects. The fact that Aristotle as well as Theophrastus
(15) The discussion of this issue forms the main bulk of the refer to Eurytos suggests that they had found nothing of that
third part of Book M, i.e. chapters6–8. kind in the Academy.
(16) N 3, 1090a32–35. (26) This passage was often taken (for instance in Diels-Kranz
Vorsokratiker) to be a testimony of the beliefs of some
(17) This difficulty might explain why scholars who would not
‘unknown Pythagoreans’, without any textual ground as far as
plainly reject Aristotle’s testimony are often inclined to see in
I can see. I would rather view it as a more or less satirical
the Form-number a mere symbol of the corresponding object
passage, or more precisely a case of refutation through
(for instance Zeller, Robin) – a solution which can be traced
“reduction to a paradox”, levelled at the Platonists themselves.
back to the allegorical interpretations of late Antiquity.
(27)De AnimaI 5, 420a3–6;Parts of AnimalsI 1, 642a20–24.

(18) Plato,Phaedo, 100c.
(28) Aristotle’s own view about these matters was probably
(19) Branch ̪ has a longer text: “…of fire, earth, waterand air,
more refined, as may be seen by his discussion of an
the idea too will be a certain number of some other underlying
hypothesis put forward by Socrates the Younger in Z chapter
realities.” The Arabic version and the Vetustissima go along
11, 1036b21ff. (insofar as one can safely guess what Socrates’
with ̩.
̸̷̩̹̩̪̳̦may have been). For there, Aristotle seems to insist
(20) ̷̼۳̺ ‫̷̴͉̱̹څ‬۳̺was also omitted by the Greek model of the (1) that the nature of an animal cannot be understood
Arabic translation, or excised by the translator himself. See independently of the particular kind(s) of matter it has, and (2)
also in this volume Steel, pp. 186–8. that an adequate account of the disposition of parts that
characterizes it as an animal, i.e. a living being, cannot be
(21) ̸̷̵̼̭̹̈́at lineb10 is answered by ̭‫̱̼ۆ ’̬ ڱ‬at lineb13. given without referring to the capacities created by this
disposition (for instance the capacity of the hand to grasp
(22) ̷‫ ̷̸̺̹̥̼́ۂ ̬۫ۍ̷ ̱̩̼̻̱̹̱̬͆ ̬۫ ̵͉۫ۍ‬o‫̵ݥ̼ ̷̱̱̼ڵ̩ ̷̴̧͉̱̹څ ڲ‬ something, and so on). At the end, the discussions of Z–H
̷‫̵̱̩ڷ̭ ݘ̷̼ ۯ̩̲ ̵̧̻́ۍ‬, ̸̷̵̼̭̹̈́ ̺ۚ ‫ڢ ̷̺̫̳̈́ ]ۂ[̱̼ۆ ڢ )…(̷̱̹ۆ‬ come to the notion that form and matter are in a way the same
̴̵̧̻̩̽̾́ ‫̵ݥ̴͉̱̹څ‬, etc. thing (H 6, 1045b17ff.)
(23) In ancient Greek, an ‫̴̺͉̱̹̈́څ‬is, in Jakob Klein’s phrase, (29) At linesb17–18, branch ̪ of the ms. tradition (followed by
“a certain number of certain things” (ein gewissener Anzahl Ross and Jaeger) has an expansion of the sentence, which
gewissener Dinge), so that any concrete dozen is an ‫̴̺͉̱̹̈́څ‬, gives this implication a universal form: “the Form too will be a
and one has to wonder what the number 12 is a number of, as certain number of some other underlying realities, and
we shall see. Human-itself (…) will be a ratio of certain things”, etc. But the
meaning of the argument appears to be the same in the
(24) N 5, 1092b10–13.
shorter version.
(30) The ‘alternative version’ of Alexander’s commentary (i.e. alteraof Alexander’s commentary too seems to presuppose ‫ڈ‬
the text given by manuscripts L and F) considers such a ̸‫(̺ݥ‬see 112, 27 Hayduck).
possibility (p. 110 Hayduck).
(38) M 8, 1084b23–32, alludes to the same difficulty.
(31) In 1884 Frege considered that this question still deserved
the attention of philosophers and mathematicians: see (39) N 1, 1087b4ff.
Grundlagen derArithmetik, §§34–44.
(40) A 6, 987b21–22 (although it is not certain whether this
32 sentence describes the generation of Forms or of numbers).
( ) In hisPsammites(i.e.The Sand-reckoner), Archimedes,
starting from a fictitious problem (how to reckon the number
(41) I chose this example because it gives a clear and familiar
of sand grains that would be contained in the sphere of
series of nested units, and I do not want to enter into the
heavens, if it were full of sand), builds up a coherent
question whether a house (or any artefact in general) may
numeration system, which in fact could be extended as far as
really be called anousia; certainly it is less of anousiathan a
one would like. I take it that here, in very much the same way,
living being.
the number 10 000 represents the possibility of countingad
infinitum. (42) Maybe the phrase ̺ۚ ̼۱ ̵̷̲̱‫(̷̸̭̱݉ ̵ݘ‬1075b37) is meant
to apply only to the two other examples given in the same
(33) “If all the units are comparable and equivalent (…), the
context, i.e. the unity of soul and the body, or “in general, the
ideas cannot be identical with numbers: for which number will
form of the thing and the thing.” It is difficult to conceive of
be man-itself or animal-itself or any other Form for there is
something like that in the case of number, unless one says that
one idea of each thing, while there is an infinity of similar and
the ̵̷̲̱‫̵ݘ‬is the person who counts, which is not altogether
equivalent numbers, so that there is no reason why this Three
here should be man-itself rather than any other Three. Now if impossible, cf.PhysicsIV 14, 223a16–29: but this would not be
ideas are not numbers, they just cannot exist: for from what a real production.
principles will they come to exist, since the One and the
(43) Notice the characteristical formulation at H 3 1044a4: “if
indefinite Two are the principles of number”, and so on
it is true thatnumber is one thing” (̭‫(̺ڸ̭ ̵̧̼̻ږ ̸̹̭ڵ‬repeated
(1081a5–17).
in the following sentence).
(34) Cf. M 7, 1083a32–35.
(44) Alexander (115, 22) mentions a variant reading ‫̷̱̹̤̱̬̾څ‬
35 (which is also to be found in the Arabic version), instead of
( )Republicvii, 526a.
̷̷̬̱̤̹̱̾; but he too prefers ̷̷̬̱̤̹̱̾. ‫̷̷̱̹̤̱̬̾څ‬might be
(36) I keep ‫̷̵̺̥̫ ̱̼ ̵̹̭̼̈́ښ‬, as in Branch ̩. explained by the wish to have a balanced development of both
horns of the dilemma introduced at lines 991b23–25: the units
(37) This is the text of Aband M (‫ ;)̺ݥ̸ ڊ‬the text given by the are either similar to one another or different. Only the second
Mss of Branch ̩, the Arabic translation and the Vetustissima
horn has been really discussed in lines 991b26–992a2, and the
(‫)̺ݥ̸̳چ‬, should be translated: “…and all the intermediary
situation to which linesa2–6 refer is ambiguous in some way,
beings mentioned by some philosophers exist absolutely or since Aristotle stresses at the same time the fact that the units
derive from some principles.” But in this particular case, the are not all of the same type and that there are homogeneous
text of Branch ̪ must certainly be preferred, since it is kinds of units which are more or less like the four simple
supported by 1090b33–35 in the parallel passage of Book N, 3, bodies. Moreover, he wants to point out an internal
1090b32–1091a5: ̷‫̺ݥ̸̵̸̭݉ڱ̭ ̵ڇ ̵̷̭̱̿ڙ ’̼ۑ̷ ̵̱̻̩̲̦̹ڱ̭ ’̼ۑ‬ contradiction of the Platonists). Thus ‫̷̷̱̹̤̱̬̾څ‬would not be
̲̩‫(̴̴̺̲̱̼̩̯͉̩̈́ ۂ ̱̩̼̻ڙ̷̵̧̺̼ ̲ڕ ۯ‬sc. ‫)̴̺͉̱̹̈́څ‬.Therecensio
entirely absurd. Anyhow, it seems to me that the argument account of their composition or of their essence, and also (xix)
draws mainly on the hypothesis of the dissimilarity of units. of their origin.
Alexander’saltera versioopts for ̷̷̬̱̤̹̱̾and explains it by
saying that the units of the ideal number differ from (52) Cf. M 9, 1085b2–3: “either the surface will nothavelines
arithmetical units. or it willbea line”.
(45) This should be understood as reported speech (‘whether (53) At linesa21–22, instead of keeping Ross’s broken
they think that body is a common nature’, etc.), for it would be punctuation, it is better to follow the suggestion he made in
pointless to mention here the way in which things are in his commentary (vol. I, p. 207–208), i.e. to admit that the
themselves, while it would be more significant to stress that object of ‫̴̴̺ܻ̩̹̫ ̵ۭ̹̿څ ̱̭̳̤̲ڕ‬is the genus of points. The
even those who think that body is a nature common to all four apparent incongruity of coining a name for something that he
elements they do not mention it as a principle and an element. believed not to exist might be explained away by saying that
he did not mean to find a convenient description for Euclidean
(46) At 992a6, E and two other manuscripts of Branch ̩ have (fictitious) points, but to define precisely the role that they had
̼̱ ̷̵̵̲̱̈́instead of ̷̵̵̲̱̈́alone. That does not necessarily to play in geometry, or in the philosophy of geometry. The next
lead to a different sense, since ̼̱ might just enhance the fact sentence would then mean that he claimed that his “indivisible
that the ontological status of body as a ‘common nature’ is not, lines” were able to play that role as well as (indeed, better
and perhaps cannot be, clearly conceived of. The Arabic than) standard geometrical points.
version and the Vetustissima too omit that ̼̱.
(54) Cf. M 2, 1077a24–26.
(47) The general question of Book A is: “what are the first
principlesof natural things?,” but this notion of principles is (55) Cf.Physicsv, 231a21–b18.
interpreted sometimes as ‘first causes’, sometimes as ‘first
(56) Branch ̪ has “…for the sake oftheother》parts of
elements’.
knowledge「”.
(48) B 5, 1001b26–1002a20; see also N 3, 1090b5–7.
(57) The reading ‫ )̩(̵̱̹̤̿ ̵̳̳́ډ‬is to be preferred to ̼‫̵ݥ‬
(49) ̍ 11, 1019a2–4. ‫)̪(̵̱̹̤̿ ̵̳̳́ډ‬, because ̼‫̵̱̹̤̿ ̵̳̳́ډ ̵ݥ‬implies that
mathematics are ancillary sciences, or an organon for any
(50) M 9, 1085a7. other branch of knowledge, while ‫̵̱̹̤̿ ̵̳̳́ډ‬fits better with
the existence of one particular science (dialectic) beyond
(51) N 3, 1090b8–13, cf. B 5, 1002a18ff. The ground for this
mathematics. While in the ̪ version, the plural must mean
objection is given in the second part of M 2 (1077a18ff.),
several sciences, in ̩, it may refer to “something else” in
where he distinguishes between “prior inlogos” and “prior in
general, i.e. another part of reality.
ousia”, and assumes that bodies (i.e. concrete natural bodies)
are prior inousia,because only they are able to possess the (58)Republicvii, 531d–532c.
permanent natural capacities which define a form. The reason
why, in our chapter, he renounces such a devastating (59)Phaedo, 97 b–d.
argument is probably that this is precisely the conclusion at
which he is aiming: geometrical figures cannot be substances (60) Since Bonitz 1842, p. 123.
(any more than numbers – another conclusion which he leaves
(61)Posterior Analytics 1 2,
to his readers) because it is impossible to give a satisfactory
(62)Parts of AnimalsI1, 640a13–641b17
(63) Alternatively, we could keep the dative with its original (75) This argument is not necessarily decisive, since the thesis
value, but interpret “being a causeforthe sciences”, not as a that “for some objects, the universal cannot be a genus” can
cause explaining the existence or constitution of the sciences, be an objection to the general premise that“anynon-equivocal
but as “furnishing the sciences what theyneed,or what they universal indicates a genus”, even if this premise is used to
seek after,i.e. a correct mode of explanation.” ascertain that there is a genus of whateveris,or of whateveris
one.
(64) A 7, 988b11–16.
(76) This is ̩’s text, also presupposed by the Arabic translation
(65) See for instance Ross’s commentary, vol. I, p. 179. and the Vetustissima. ̪ has: “… nor of which potentiality [or:
‘capacity’] they have.”
(66) On (mathematical) forms and the good, see B 2, 996b22–
b
1. (77) Branch ̪ has: ̴ۭ ̵̬̱̭̳̼̩̺̈́ ̼۩ ̸̷̳̳̩̿‫̵̴̩̭̫̭̳̈́ ̺ݥ‬
(instead of the absolute participle ̸̷̳̳̩̿‫)̵̵̴̷̥̫̭̳́ ̺ݥ‬, but
(67)Physics11 7, 198a25–26.
the meaning is essentially the same.
(68) The same objection is systematically developed in N 1,
with much detail and doxographical information. A particularly (78) See for instancePosterior Analytics1, chapter 32.
close parallel is 1088a15–21.

(79) Cf. ‫̵̴ۭ ۩̳̳څ‬at lineb33.
(69) Cf.Physics1 9.
(80) A 1, 980a27–981a1.
70
( )Philebus15 d–e. (81) For sense-perception as an alternative to reminiscence,
seePosterior Analytics, 99b33–35.
(71) N 2, 1089a2–6.
(82) All extant Greek manuscripts and the Vetustissima have:…
(72) The “One over Many” argument has been just mentioned
that ̴̻̩is made of ̻, ̴ and ̩.” But the reading ̮̩, proposed
at the beginning of the chapter as one of the standard Platonic
by Bonitz after Alexander’s testimony (132, 16 133, 4
proofs of the existence of Forms, at 990b13–14.
Hayduck) is warranted by the Arabic translator who wisely
(73) A third technical use of ‫̵̱̩̭͉̱̼̲ڙ‬, ‫̺̱̻̭͉̲ڙ‬in ancient chose to gloss over the example instead of trying to translate
Greek is the ‘exposition’ used in geometrical treatises. It it: “the sixth letter of the Greek alphabet, which iszayand has
consists in rephrasing the theorem that is to be demonstrated this form” – and at that place the Leiden manuscript bears the
with reference to a particular figure, on which the awkward but unmistakable drawing of a Greek ̮ (see the
construction and the reasoning will be performed. Although it facsimilein Bouyges, p. 158, 1. 3).
was used to describe a standard Euclidean procedure, it is not
to be found in theElements, and owes its success to Proclus’ (83) It was pronounced /zd/ before the fourth century bc, and
commentary on Euclides. The word itself is not used by evolved later to /z/, as is shown by the name of the Persian god
Aristotle in this sense, but he is well aware of the process. Ahura Mazda, which was transliterated as ’̷̴̡̹̤̮̯̺by Plato,
and as ’̷̡̹ ̴̤̻̬̯̺in later authors (this is exactly the
(74)Physics1 3, 186a5–34. The context is a refutation of alternative mentioned by Aristotle). The fact that our Greek
Parmenides’ paradoxes; but at the end of the chapter, Aristotle manuscripts have ̴̻̩instead of ̮̩attests that at some time
mentions some unnamed philosophers, who “to the argument in late Antiquity or in the early Middle Ages, even the memory
that all things would be one, ifbeingmeans one thing, of that change had been lost: so the editors tried to find an
》conceded「that not-being is.” example which could be adequate to what they (rightly) felt to
The Doctrine of Forms under Critique
be the philosophical meaning of the objection, and they chose /

̴̻̩, probably because the sigma it contains could be
pronounced as voiced or voiceless according to the persons or
places.
(84) Reading ̼̩‫̩̼ݘ‬as in the Greek manuscripts and the Arabic

translation. Editors generally follow a reading that seems to
be presupposed by Alexander (p. 133–134 Hayduck): ̼̩‫۩̼ۍ‬,
which would mean:“… if it is true that thesame thingsare the
elements of which all beings are made” The meaning is much
the same in both versions, since it rests on ̸̵̵̤̼́(“these are
the elements ofallthings”) more than on ̼̩‫̩̼ݘ‬/̼̩‫̤̼ۍ‬.
(85) Locke,Essay, 11, ix, §6.
(86)Posterior Analytics1 18, 81a38–b9.
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The Doctrine of Forms under Critique The Doctrine of Forms under Critique

problems raised by the concept of Forms as causes, more

The second part of Chapter9(which I will designate hereafter

An interesting particular in this argument is the insistence on

indivisible too, and neverthelessa pairof them is not

‘elements’ do not provide a firm basis for scientific knowledge, (990b8–991a8)

(xvii-a)their ‘material’ principle is conceived in a too (xxii): M 8, 1084b3–25

(10) On this point I do agree with Cherniss, but only as far as a

(27)De AnimaI 5, 420a3–6;Parts of AnimalsI 1, 642a20–24.

(62)Parts of AnimalsI1, 640a13–641b17

close parallel is 1088a15–21.

be the philosophical meaning of the objection, and they chose /

(84) Reading ̼̩‫̩̼ݘ‬as in the Greek manuscripts and the Arabic

(85) Locke,Essay, 11, ix, §6.

(86)Posterior Analytics1 18, 81a38–b9.

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