Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Data Availability: Data are available from public sources identified in the paper.
We are grateful for comments received from two anonymous reviewers, Sarah McVay, Mark Vargas, Han Yi, and workshop
participants at The University of Oklahoma and The University of Texas at Dallas.
Editor’s note: Accepted by Sanjay Kallapur.
1303
1304 Fan, Barua, Cready, and Thomas
I. INTRODUCTION
cVay 共2006兲 hypothesizes that managers have incentives to report core expenses 共de-
M fined as cost of goods sold and selling, general, and administrative expenses兲 as income-
decreasing special items in an attempt to inflate core profitability. Managers are moti-
vated to manage earnings in this way because market participants may be particularly interested in
core earnings 共or pro forma earnings兲 rather than bottom-line GAAP earnings 共Bradshaw and
Sloan 2002; Gu and Chen 2004; Kinney and Trezevant 1997兲, and core earnings typically receive
higher valuation multiples than non-core earnings 共Lipe 1986兲. By shifting core expenses to
special items, the firm increases core earnings, while bottom-line net income remains unaffected.1
McVay 共2006兲 presents empirical evidence supportive of classification shifting in the form of
a positive relation between income-decreasing special items and unexpected core annual earnings.
As income-decreasing special items increase, the firm tends to report higher than expected core
earnings. However, McVay 共2006, Table 10兲 also reports that the positive relation disappears 共and,
in fact, becomes negative兲 when contemporaneous accruals are dropped from the core earnings
expectations model. She further cautions that the initial evidence in favor of classification shifting
may be attributable to the use of contemporaneous accruals in the core earnings expectations
model. More specifically, the core earnings expectations model 共which includes accruals as a
control for performance兲 could induce a mechanical relation between unexpected core earnings
and special items 共which are mainly accrual-based兲. Thus, there is currently some uncertainty
regarding the extent to which income-decreasing special items include shifted core expenses.2
Research in the area of classification shifting is relatively new, and it is essential that subse-
quent research provides improvements to the core earnings expectations model. We first extend
McVay’s 共2006兲 core earnings expectations model and show that as further controls for perfor-
mance are included, the evidence in favor of classification shifting increases. We also present a
series of empirical examinations of unexpected core earnings at the quarterly level that are robust
to the underlying bias discussed in McVay 共2006兲. As research in this area grows and researchers
develop fundamental views, it is important that findings from initial studies are validated. Our tests
provide broad support for McVay’s conclusion of classification shifting by managers.3
A central aspect of our analysis is the use of quarterly rather than annual data. This distinction
allows us to use the differential incentives to manipulate fourth versus interim quarter earnings as
a platform for constructing tests of classification shifting. These examinations are inherently tests
of a joint hypothesis—that managers both engage in classification shifting and are more prone to
do so in fourth quarters. Consequently, our results also contribute to the literature on differential
incentives/constraints facing managers attempting to manipulate fourth quarter earnings. Using
quarterly data, we demonstrate that classification shifting is more pronounced in the fourth quarter
than in interim quarters.
We next consider that classification shifting is one means of earnings manipulation, while
others exist 共e.g., accrual manipulation兲. To the extent that managers are more constrained in their
ability to manipulate accruals 共Brown and Pinello 2007兲, they may use classification shifting as an
1
Unlike income classification shifting, accrual manipulation and real activities management affect reported bottom-line
GAAP earnings.
2
McVay 共2006兲 provides several approaches to test for classification shifting, some of which are not necessarily expected
to be affected by the mechanical relation between unexpected core earnings and 共accrual兲 special items. She finds 共1兲
subsequent reversal of shifted earnings is more likely when there is no opportunity to shift in the subsequent year, 共2兲
shifting is more likely when firms just meet the analyst forecast, especially for high-growth firms, 共3兲 shifting is more
likely when the type of special item is easier to shift, and 共4兲 abnormal returns in the subsequent year tend to be
negatively related to shifted earnings as these earnings recur in core earnings, disappointing investors.
3
In this study, we limit our tests to the relation between unexpected core earnings and special items in the current quarter.
We do not examine the subsequent reversal of unusually high core earnings associated with special items.
alternative to inflate core earnings. Finally, we examine classification shifting to meet earnings
thresholds such as analysts’ forecasts, one-year-ago same-quarter earnings, and zero earnings. We
do so, however, using a core earnings expectations model that does not rely on contemporaneous
accruals.
In the next section, we discuss the background literature and analysis of the classification
shifting issue identified in McVay 共2006兲. In Section III, we develop our hypotheses. Section IV
details the data, sample, and descriptive statistics. Section V describes the research design and
reports tests of hypotheses, while Section VI concludes the study.
As these same accrual special item amounts also appear within the total special item amount, a
situation is created wherein the dependent variable 共i.e., unexpected core earnings兲 that is partially
determined by variable X 共accrual special items兲 is regressed on a variable 共income-decreasing
special items兲 that is also partially determined by variable X. This potentially creates a mechanical
共positive兲 relation between the dependent variable and independent variable.
To illustrate, the basic McVay design employs a two-stage regression procedure. In the first
stage, expected firm-year core earnings, E共CE兲, is derived as a function of accruals in that year
multiplied by an industry-determined multiplier a. The value of this multiplier averages 0.22 共see
McVay 2006, Table 4兲. Consequently, a dollar of special item accrual expense/loss reduces E共CE兲
by $0.22 on average. The difference between actual core earnings and E共CE兲 is identified as
“unexpected core earnings” and is regressed on special items 共SI兲 in a second stage analysis of the
form:
III. HYPOTHESES
We rely on comparative analyses of relative shifting activities between firm-groups that are a
priori more versus less likely to engage in classification-shifting activities. Specifically, we use
quarterly data, as opposed to annual data in McVay 共2006兲, and partition the sample based on
accrual manipulation constraints and earnings thresholds. To rule out the possibility of spurious
accrual special item effects driving our results, we eliminate current-period accruals from the core
earnings expectations model.7 It is likely that the overall relation between unexpected core earn-
ings and special items includes both classification shifting and a performance-driven effect. How-
ever, for certain firms and in certain quarters, classification shifting may be more prevalent be-
cause of greater managerial incentives or opportunities. Breaking down the data by specific
quarters and by different levels of managerial incentives and opportunities gives us a better
4
This statement holds so long as a is positive. Empirically, this assumption is true most of the time 共81.5 percent in
McVay 关2006兴兲.
5
Gu and Chen 共2004, footnote 10兲 recognize that the interrelationships between non-cash special items and accruals can
create problems in research designs that include both variables. They show 共in their Table 6, Panel B兲 that the persis-
tence coefficient of special items changes sign after the inclusion of the accruals variable, which they interpret as the
effect of noncash nonrecurring items being included in accruals.
6
It is also straightforward to show that in a changes analysis 共i.e., unexpected change in core earnings兲 negative accrual
special items tend to increase expected change in core earnings and, as a consequence, decrease unexpected change in
core earnings. This produces a mechanical negative relation between unexpected change in core earnings and income-
decreasing special items.
7
In addition, in a sensitivity test reported below, we specifically address whether the relation between our estimate of
unexpected core earnings and income-decreasing special items is related to the amount of contemporaneous accrual
special items. We find no evidence that it is.
8
We find similar results for our sample of firms. The average magnitude of income-decreasing special items 共scaled by
sales兲 in the fourth quarter is 5.36 percent, compared to only 1.64 percent in the first three quarters. We also find that
income-decreasing special items are reported for 31.7 percent of the fourth quarter observations, compared to only 15.6
percent of the observations for the first three quarters.
9
The intuition behind their use of net operating assets is that the balance sheet accumulates the effects of previous
accounting choices. Therefore, firms with higher than expected net operating assets are more likely to have reported
optimistic earnings in the past. To validate their measure, Barton and Simko 共2002兲 report that firms with larger net
operating assets at the beginning of the current year reported more positive abnormal accruals in the previous 20
quarters. Using Dechow et al.’s 共2008兲 Fraud Score, Omer et al. 共2008兲 also find that the level of net operating assets
provides a measure of prior earnings management.
H2: Managers shift core expenses to special items more when the ability to manipulate
accruals is constrained.
Finally, we examine the extent to which managers use classification shifting as a way to meet
three earnings benchmarks: analysts’ forecasts, earnings of the same quarter in the prior year, and
profit. In general, prior studies find evidence consistent with earnings management at each thresh-
old 共e.g., Burgstahler and Dichev 1997a; Degeorge et al. 1999; Payne and Thomas 2003; Brown
and Caylor 2005兲. There are clear market incentives for meeting versus missing the analyst
forecast threshold 共e.g., Kasznik and McNichols 2002兲. Dechow and Skinner 共2000兲 note that
earnings management is greater when such actions allow managers to meet or beat analysts’
forecasts than when they otherwise would not. On a quarterly basis, Bartov et al. 共2002兲 find that
firms meeting or beating analysts’ earnings expectations enjoy a higher return over the quarter than
firms that fail to meet these expectations. They find that the equity premium to firms meeting or
beating expectations is only marginally affected by whether reported quarterly earnings are genu-
ine or are the result of earnings or expectations management. Therefore, the ex post equity pre-
mium following quarterly earnings announcements provides an ex ante incentive for managers to
manipulate earnings numbers.
Other studies document that analysts and investors pay more attention to “street” or pro forma
earnings as defined by managers and view them as more value-relevant 共Bradshaw and Sloan
2002; Bhattacharya et al. 2004; Gu and Chen 2004兲. Bradshaw and Sloan 共2002兲 show that the
market responds to street earnings more than traditional GAAP earnings and that managers have
taken a proactive role in defining street earnings when communicating to investors. Analysts also
tend to exclude special items from their forecasts. Thus, it is likely that managers take advantage
of the market’s focus on core earnings instead of bottom-line GAAP earnings to shift some core
expense items in the income statement.
For similar reasons, managers may use classification shifting to report quarterly earnings that
meet or just beat earnings of the same quarter in the prior year or that just meet or beat zero
earnings. This could occur because managers have incentives 共e.g., stock premium, bonuses,
reputation, job security兲 to avoid quarterly earnings decreases and losses. In summary, we expect
that managers shift core expenses to income-decreasing special items more when quarterly earn-
ings of their firms just meet or beat 共1兲 the analysts’ consensus forecasts, 共2兲 earnings of the same
quarter in the prior year, or 共3兲 zero earnings. Our hypothesis related to classification shifting
around earnings benchmarks follows:
H3: Managers shift core expenses to special items more when quarterly earnings just meet or
beat earnings benchmarks.
Degeorge et al. 共1999兲 suggest that managers first attempt to report a profit, then to report
earnings increases and, last, they are concerned with meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts. Payne
and Thomas 共2003兲 find evidence consistent with earnings management mostly for the zero earn-
ings threshold followed by the analyst forecast threshold. In contrast, Graham et al. 共2005兲 report
that managers most prefer to avoid reporting an earnings decrease. Brown and Caylor 共2005兲 show
that achieving the analyst forecast threshold has become the most important over time. Because
prior research provides mixed conclusions, we have no a priori expectations on which of the three
thresholds should show the most evidence of classification shifting.
TABLE 1
Variable Definitions with Corresponding Compustat Data Item Numbers
Variable Definition
CEq ⫽ Core Earnings, calculated as sales 共#2兲 minus cost of goods sold 共#30兲 minus selling,
general, and administrative expenses 共#1兲 in quarter q.
UE_CEq ⫽ Unexpected Core Earnings, calculated as the reported core earnings 共CEq兲 minus the
expected core earnings estimated by industry-year-quarter, excluding firm i:
CEq = 0 + 1CEq−4 + 2CEq−1 + 3ATOq + 4ACCRUALSq−4 + 5ACCRUALSq−1
+ 6⌬SALESq + 7NEG_⌬SALESq + 8RETURNSq−1 + 9RETURNSq + q .
%SIq ⫽ Special Items 共#32兲 as a percentage of sales 共#2兲. Income-decreasing special items are
multiplied by ⫺1, where special items are income-decreasing, and are set to 0 where
special items are income-increasing.
ACCRUALSq ⫽ Accruals, calculated as net income before extraordinary items 共#8兲 minus cash from
operations 共#108兲.
RETURNSq ⫽ Three-month market-adjusted return corresponding to the fiscal quarter.
ATOq ⫽ Asset Turnover Ratio, defined as SALESq / 共共NOAq + NOAq−1兲 / 2兲, where NOAq, or net
operating assets, is operating assets minus operating liabilities. Operating assets are
calculated as total assets 共#44兲 less cash and short-term investments 共#36兲. Operating
liabilities are calculated as total assets 共#44兲 less total debt 共#45 and #51兲, less book
value of common and preferred equity 共#55 and #56兲, less minority interest 共#53兲.
Average NOA is required to be positive.
⌬SALESq ⫽ Percentage Change in Sales, calculated as 共SALESq − SALESq−4兲 / SALESq−4.
NEG_⌬SALESq ⫽ ⌬SALESq if the percentage change in sales is less than 0, and 0 otherwise.
TABLE 2
Descriptive Statistics
Standard
Variable Mean Median Deviation 25% 75%
CEq 0.038 0.085 0.346 0.023 0.154
UE_CEq 0.000 0.005 0.189 ⫺0.041 0.056
%SIq 2.59% 0.00% 0.112 0.00% 0.00%
CEq−4 0.025 0.086 0.391 0.023 0.154
CEq−1 0.033 0.084 0.351 0.021 0.155
ATOq 2.873 1.010 6.885 0.459 2.259
ACCRUALSq−4 ⫺0.093 ⫺0.066 0.541 ⫺0.241 0.063
ACCRUALSq−1 ⫺0.111 ⫺0.067 0.519 ⫺0.248 0.056
⌬SALESq 19.26% 8.54% 0.539 ⫺4.39% 26.56%
RETURNSq−1 0.002 ⫺0.034 0.331 ⫺0.183 0.126
RETURNSq 0.001 ⫺0.033 0.332 ⫺0.184 0.126
See Table 1 for variable definitions. The full sample consists of 132,393 firm-quarter observations. The sample with
analysts’ forecast data available has 67,980 firm-quarter observations. All variables are winsorized at 1st and 99th
percentile.
10
Variables are defined in Table 1.
11
Reported core earnings are calculated as sales minus cost of goods sold and selling, general, and administrative
expenses. As a sensitivity test, we also consider using I/B/E/S actual quarterly earnings in place of Compustat core
quarterly earnings. While the use of I/B/E/S data substantially reduces our sample, we continue to find support for our
hypotheses. So that our results are directly comparable to those in McVay 共2006兲, we employ Compustat core earnings
as our primary analysis.
12
In Table 3, the Spearman 共Pearson兲 correlation between CEq and CEq−1 is 0.7902 共0.7351兲. The Spearman 共Pearson兲
correlation between CEq and CEq−4 is 0.7357 共0.6530兲.
TABLE 3
Spearman/Pearson Correlation Matrix
CEq CEq−1 CEq−4 ACCRUALSq−1 ACCRUALSq−4 ATOq
CEq 1.0000 0.7351 0.6530 ⴚ0.2750 ⴚ0.2806 0.0308
CEq−1 0.7902 1.0000 0.6446 ⴚ0.2084 ⴚ0.3043 0.0295
CEq−4 0.7357 0.6999 1.0000 ⴚ0.3019 ⴚ0.2415 0.0135
ACCRUALSq−1 ⴚ0.2947 ⴚ0.2654 ⴚ0.3129 1.0000 0.3171 0.0381
ACCRUALSq−4 ⴚ0.3055 ⴚ0.3441 ⴚ0.2722 0.0342 1.0000 0.0238
ATOq ⴚ0.0554 ⴚ0.0558 ⴚ0.0921 0.1460 0.1039 1.0000
RETURNSq 0.1748 0.1503 0.0675 ⴚ0.0396 ⴚ0.0361 0.0789
RETURNSq−1 0.1627 0.1678 0.0764 ⴚ0.0166 ⴚ0.0538 0.0819
⌬SALESq 0.2474 0.1928 0.0393 0.0800 ⴚ0.0094 0.1573
NEG_⌬SALESq ⴚ0.2621 ⴚ0.2150 ⴚ0.0900 ⴚ0.0486 0.0244 ⴚ0.1836
UE_CEq 0.2392 ⫺0.0089 0.0151 ⴚ0.0121 ⴚ0.0046 ⴚ0.0346
%SIq ⴚ0.0616 ⴚ0.0327 ⴚ0.0163 ⴚ0.0339 ⴚ0.0685 ⴚ0.1000
Variable definitions are in Table 1. There are 132,393 firm-quarter observations. Spearman 共Pearson兲 correlations are below
共above兲 the diagonal. All variables are winsorized at 1st and 99th percentile. Amounts in bold are significant at the 0.01
level.
Since asset turnover 共ATO兲 tends to be inversely related to profit margins 共Nissim and Penman
2001兲 and the definition of core earnings closely parallels profit margins, we include ATO in the
model. Sloan 共1996兲 finds that accrual levels are an explanatory variable for future performance,
so we use lagged operating accruals 共ACCRUALSq−1 and ACCRUALSq−4兲 as a control for current
operating performance. For reasons discussed earlier, we do not include current-period accruals.
Also similar to McVay 共2006兲, we include percentage changes in sales 共∆SALES兲 and allow
different slopes for sales increases and decreases 共NEG兲. The reason for this inclusion is that, even
though core earnings are scaled by sales, as sales grow, fixed costs become smaller per sales
dollar. Those costs increase more when activity rises than they decrease when activity falls by an
equivalent amount 共Anderson et al. 2003兲.
In addition to the variables proposed by McVay 共2006兲, we also add the current quarter’s
returns 共RETURNS兲 and the previous quarter’s returns to the model. The use of current quarter’s
returns controls for current performance. The reason for including prior-period returns is that the
market may detect deteriorating performance and decrease its expectations of core earnings prior
to it being reported in the current quarter.
We obtain coefficients for model 共2兲 using all observations in a particular industry-year-
quarter excluding firm i. Expected core earnings for firm i are measured using these coefficients
multiplied by the actual values of the variables in the model for firm i. This model controls for the
macroeconomic and industry shocks as well as the seasonal effect on expected core earnings. We
then obtain unexpected core earnings, calculated as the difference between reported and expected
core earnings:13
13
Consistent with McVay 共2006兲, we identify E共CEq兲 as “expected” and UE_CEq as “unexpected” core earnings. Since
E共CEq兲 is partially determined by contemporaneous independent variables, these two variables are not, in fact, ex ante
in nature and so constitute ex post measures of normal and abnormal core earnings.
TABLE 4
Regression of Unexpected Core Earnings on Special Items as a Percentage of Sales Using
Alternative Measures of Expected Core Earnings
Dependent Variable = UE_CEq = CEq − E„CEq…
E„CEq… = f„McVay… E„CEq… = f„full…
E„CEq… = 0 E„CEq… = f„CEq−4… model) model)
Intercept 0.0564 0.0091 0.0063 0.0041
共59.25兲 共13.57兲 共10.82兲 共6.67兲
%SIq ⫺0.7099 ⫺0.3531 ⫺0.2630 ⫺0.1586
共⫺85.71兲 共⫺60.28兲 共⫺48.06兲 共⫺16.38兲
R2 5.26% 2.67% 1.71% 0.89%
Variable definitions are in Table 1. The full sample consists of 132,393 firm-quarter observations.
In column 1, unexpected core earnings are defined as core earnings in quarter q.
In column 2, unexpected core earnings are defined as core earnings minus expected core earnings, where expected core
earnings are calculated using the coefficients from the model shown below, estimated for each industry-year-quarter,
excluding firm i:
CEq = 0 + 1CEq−4 + q .
In column 3, unexpected core earnings are defined as core earnings minus expected core earnings, where expected core
earnings are calculated using the coefficients from the model shown below, estimated for each industry-year-quarter,
excluding firm i:
CEq = 0 + 1CEq−4 + 2ATOq + 3ACCRUALSq−4 + 4⌬SALESq + 5NEG_⌬SALESq + q .
In column 4, unexpected core earnings are defined as core earnings minus expected core earnings, where expected core
earnings are calculated using the coefficients from the model shown below, estimated for each industry-year-quarter,
excluding firm i:
CEq = 0 + 1CEq−4 + 2CEq−1 + 3ATOq + 4ACCRUALSq−4 + 5ACCRUALSq−1 + 6⌬SALESq + 7NEG_⌬SALESq
+ 8RETURNSq−1 + 9RETURNSq + q .
.
All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. Amounts reported are regression coefficients 共with t-statistics in
parentheses兲.
Next, we use a core earnings expectations model that approximates the one used in McVay
共2006兲, except that it excludes current-period accruals and is estimated using quarterly data.
current performance and special items have a strong negative relation. However, as one provides
additional controls for performance, the performance effect diminishes.14,15
Tests of Hypotheses
Test of H1
The first hypothesis predicts that shifting is more pervasive in the fourth quarter. As discussed
in Section II, prior research provides evidence that accrual manipulation is more constrained in the
fourth quarter, leaving managers to resort to alternative earnings management techniques such as
income classification shifting. Thus, we expect that the relation between unexpected core earnings
and special items will be more positive 共or less negative兲 for fourth quarter observations, com-
pared to observations for the first three quarters.
Table 5 presents the results using subsamples with observations from the fourth quarter and
those from the first three quarters. The results show a less negative coefficient for the fourth
quarter subsample compared to the subsample for the first three quarters.16 Recall that a more
positive 共or less negative兲 relation between unexpected core earnings and special items is evidence
of more classification shifting. Comparing the coefficients of ⫺0.1440 for the fourth quarter and
⫺0.1819 for the first three quarters indicates that classification shifting is more pervasive in the
fourth quarter. The difference between the two estimated coefficients 共0.0379兲 is statistically
significant 共t ⫽ 4.05; p ⬍ 0.01兲. This result provides support for H1 that classification shifting is
more pervasive in the fourth quarter, even though the performance-driven effect is still the domi-
nating factor.17
Test of H2
Our next hypothesis 共H2兲 suggests that those managers who are more constrained in their
ability to manipulate accruals because of previous accrual management activity are more likely to
engage in classification shifting in the current quarter. To the extent that one earnings management
option is not available, managers are likely to implement the next. Following Barton and Simko
共2002兲, we measure managers’ accrual manipulation constraint using net operating assets at the
beginning of the quarter 共scaled by sales兲. They demonstrate that firms that have optimistically
reported accruals in prior periods tend to have higher net operating assets. We classify firms in the
high 共low兲 group when their net operating assets are above or equal to 共below兲 the median for the
14
To find direct evidence of classification shifting, ideally one would find a positive relation between UE_CE and %SI.
Since we do not find this for the full version of the model but our results and anecdotal evidence suggests that it is
occurring, this provides a fruitful avenue for future research. As the literature advances and expectations models better
control for the performance effect, the relation between UE_CE and %SI is expected to become positive.
15
To determine whether the relation between our estimate of unexpected core earnings from Model 共2兲 and income-
decreasing special items is mechanically driven by contemporaneous accrual special items, we estimate accrual special
items as other funds from operations 共#81兲 plus gains and losses on the sale of property, plant, and equipment and
investments 共#102兲. We split the sample into those with estimated accrual special items, scaled by sales, greater 共less兲
than 0.5 percent 共⫺0.5 percent兲. We also create a third sample with estimated accrual special items between 0.5 percent
and ⫺0.5 percent. We find the relations between UE_CE and %SI across these three groups do not differ significantly.
For estimated accrual special items less than ⫺0.5 percent 共greater than 0.5 percent兲 关between ⫺0.5 percent and 0.5
percent兴, the coefficient on %SI 共i.e., ␣1 in Model 共4兲兲 is ⫺0.1542 共⫺0.1506兲 关⫺0.1736兴.
16
In Table 5 and all remaining tables, differences in coefficients between Q4 and Q1–3 are tested using an indicator
variable for fourth quarter observations. For example, for Table 5 we estimate the following model: UE_CEq = ␣0
+ ␣1%SIq + ␣2Q4 + ␣3%SIq ⴱ Q4 + q, where the prediction is ␣3 ⬎ 0. In the tables, we present results separately for Q4
and Q1–3 to make the results for each subsample more evident.
17
The increased evidence of classification shifting in the fourth quarter might be a result of increased opportunity 共i.e.,
firms report more special items in the fourth quarter兲 or a result of increased incentives. However, either explanation
supports H1 that classification shifting is more likely in the fourth quarter.
TABLE 5
Regression of Unexpected Core Earnings on Special Items as a Percent of Sales:
Fourth Quarter (Q4) versus First Three Quarters (Q1–3)
Test (H1): Q4
Independent Variable Q4 Q1–3 > Q1–3
Intercept 0.0070 0.0032
共5.41兲** 共5.72兲**
%SIq ⫺0.1440 ⫺0.1819 0.0379
共⫺19.12兲** 共⫺28.54兲** 共4.05兲**
R2 1.08% 0.82%
Number of Observations 33,454 98,939
*, ** Indicates significant at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively, using a two-tailed test.
Variable definitions are in Table 1. All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. Amounts reported are
regression coefficients 共with t-statistics in parentheses兲.
Test of H3
For the next set of tests, we split the sample based on reported earnings relative to earnings
benchmarks. Hypothesis 3 predicts that classification shifting is more prevalent in subsamples that
just meet or beat the analyst forecast, one-year-ago same-quarter earnings, and zero earnings,
respectively. In particular, the coefficients on %SIq are expected to be more positive 共or less
negative兲 for subsamples with observations that have these characteristics.
18
Of course, our use of this measure requires the joint assumption that net operating assets provide a reliable measure of
prior upward accrual manipulation and that prior upward accrual manipulation reduces the ability of managers to
manipulate accruals in the current period. To the extent that this joint assumption is false, inferences from our results are
limited. Other studies employing net operating assets find evidence consistent with it being a measure of managers’
accrual manipulation constraint 共e.g., Mosebach and Simko 2005; Ettredge et al. 2007; Omer et al. 2008兲.
19
While not the intended purpose of our study, these results are also consistent with a portfolio approach to managing
earnings 共e.g., Jiambalvo 1996; Fields et al. 2001; Lin et al. 2006; Cohen and Zarowin 2008; Cohen et al. 2008兲.
TABLE 6
Regression of Unexpected Core Earnings on Special Items as a Percent of Sales:
High Net Operating Assets (HighNOA) versus Low NOA (LowNOA)
Test (H1): Q4
Independent Variable Full Sample Q4 Q1–3 > Q1–3
HighNOA 0.0130 0.0218 0.0103
共17.41兲** 共12.05兲** 共12.97兲**
LowNOA ⫺0.0051 ⫺0.0084 ⫺0.0040
共⫺6.80兲** 共⫺4.62兲** 共⫺5.04兲**
%SIq ⴱ HighNOA 共A兲 ⫺0.1153 ⫺0.1019 ⫺0.1441 0.0422
共⫺17.83兲** 共⫺9.44兲** 共⫺16.55兲** 共3.22兲**
%SIq ⴱ LowNOA 共B兲 ⫺0.2063 ⫺0.1848 ⫺0.2305 0.0457
共⫺31.49兲** 共⫺17.70兲** 共⫺24.67兲** 共3.42兲**
Test 共H2兲: A ⬎ B 0.0910 0.0829 0.0864
共9.88兲** 共5.52兲** 共6.77兲**
R2 1.25% 1.77% 1.07%
Number of Observations 132,393 33,454 98,939
*, ** Indicates significant at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively, using a two-tailed test.
Variable definitions are in Table 1. HighNOA 共LowNOA兲 is an indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm-quarter observation
has net operating assets at the beginning of the quarter above or equal to 共below兲 the median for the industry-year-quarter,
and 0 otherwise. All variables are winsorized at 1st and 99th percentile. Amounts reported are regression coefficients 共with
t-statistics in parentheses兲.
We use the I/B/E/S Detail File to determine whether firms just meet or beat analysts’ fore-
casts. The analyst forecast is defined as the median of the last three individual analysts’ forecasts
after the previous quarter’s earnings announcement and before the current quarter’s earnings
announcement.20 Firms reporting an earnings forecast error equal to $0.00 or $0.01 are considered
as just meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts. These observations include approximately 26 per-
cent of our sample. For the prior period earnings benchmark, we define firms as just meeting or
beating if they report a change in reported operating income per share 共Compustat data item #177兲
from $0.00 to $0.03, constituting approximately 17 percent of our quarterly observations. For the
zero earnings benchmark, firms that report operating income per share from $0.00 to $0.04 are
defined as those just meeting the threshold, which equals approximately nine percent of our
quarterly observations.
Results for testing H3 are presented in Tables 7–9. In Table 7 for the full sample, the coeffi-
cient of %SI is ⫺0.0956 for firms that just meet or beat the analyst forecast threshold 共JustMBF兲
versus ⫺0.1288 for other firms 共NotJustMBF兲. The difference in coefficients of 0.0332 is statis-
tically significant 共t ⫽ 2.17; p ⫽ 0.03兲. The difference increases to 0.0581 共t ⫽ 2.01; p ⫽ 0.04兲 for
observations in the fourth quarter and falls to 0.0251 共t ⫽ 1.36; p ⫽ 0.17兲 in the interim quarters.
20
We use the I/B/E/S data unadjusted for stock splits for reasons discussed in Payne and Thomas 共2003兲.
TABLE 7
Regression of Unexpected Core Earnings on Special Items as a Percent of Sales:
Just Meet or Beat Forecasts (JustMBF) versus Not Just Meet or Beat Forecasts
(NotJustMBF)
Test (H1): Q4
Independent Variable Full Sample Q4 Q1–3 > Q1–3
JustMBF 0.0083 0.0133 0.0069
共7.68兲** 共4.98兲** 共5.98兲**
NotJustMBF 0.0061 0.0118 0.0042
共9.33兲** 共7.75兲** 共5.93兲**
%SIq ⴱ JustMBF 共A兲 ⫺0.0956 ⫺0.0533 ⫺0.1270 0.0737
共⫺6.79兲** 共⫺1.98兲* 共⫺7.62兲** 共2.54兲**
%SIq ⴱ NotJustMBF 共B兲 ⫺0.1288 ⫺0.1114 ⫺0.1521 0.0407
共⫺21.57兲** 共⫺10.78兲** 共⫺19.84兲** 共3.38兲**
Test 共H2兲: A ⬎ B 0.0332 0.0581 0.0251
共2.17兲* 共2.01兲* 共1.36兲
R2 0.84% 0.92% 0.94%
Number of Observations 67,980 17,563 50,417
*, ** Indicates significant at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively, using a two-tailed test.
Variable definitions are in Table 1. JustMBF 共NotJustMBF兲 is an indicator variable that equals 1 共0兲 if a firm-quarter
observation has an analyst forecast error of $0.00 or $0.01, and 0 共1兲 otherwise. Analyst forecast error is defined as actual
earnings per share as reported by I/B/E/S less the median of the last three individual analyst forecast after the previous
quarter’s earnings announcement and before the current quarter’s earnings announcement. All variables are winsorized at
1st and 99th percentile. Amounts reported are regression coefficients 共with t-statistics in parentheses兲.
We also note that the differences in Q4 versus Q1–3 are significant for both JustMBF and Not-
JustMBF firms. Overall, we conclude that finding the most evidence of classification shifting in
the fourth quarter for firms that just meet or beat the analyst forecast supports H3.21
We then split the full sample into the subsample with firm-quarter earnings that just meet or
beat prior period earnings 共JustMBP兲 and the subsample with firm-quarter earnings that do not just
meet or beat prior period earnings 共NotJustMBP兲. Managers of firms with earnings that ex post just
meet or beat earnings in the same quarter of previous year are expected to have had stronger
incentives ex ante to shift core expenses to special items, especially in the fourth quarter. The
results in Table 8 show that for the full sample and for each of the subsamples, the relation
between unexpected core earnings and special items is less negative for JustMBP firms. These
results are consistent with H3. We also find stronger evidence of classification shifting to just
meeting or beating prior period earnings in the fourth quarter.
21
As an additional test using analyst data, we consider the extent to which analysts exclude income-decreasing special
items. We do this by comparing I/B/E/S actual earnings to reported earnings per share excluding extraordinary items
from Compustat. To the extent that analysts do not incorporate income-decreasing special items in their forecasts, we
expect I/B/E/S actual earnings to be greater than reported earnings. For our sample of observations with I/B/E/S data 共n
⫽ 67,980兲, we find that approximately 23 percent have I/B/E/S earnings greater than reported earnings per share
excluding extraordinary items. Furthermore, if classification shifting is meant to mislead financial statement users, then
we expect to find more evidence of classification shifting when I/B/E/S earnings exclude expenses. This is what we find.
When I/B/E/S earnings are greater than reported earnings, we find that the relation between unexpected core earnings
and special items is less negative for the full sample 共t ⫽ 4.12; p ⬍ 0.01兲, in Q4 共t ⫽ 2.33; p ⫽ 0.02兲, and in Q1–3 共t
⫽ 3.63; p ⬍ 0.01兲.
TABLE 8
Regression of Unexpected Core Earnings on Special Items as a Percent of Sales:
Just Meet or Beat Prior Earnings (JustMBP) versus Not Just Meet or Beat Prior Earnings
(NotJustMBP)
Test (H1): Q4
Independent Variable Full Sample Q4 Q1–3 > Q1–3
JustMBP 0.0120 0.0156 0.0113
共9.15兲** 共4.21兲** 共8.41兲**
NotJustMBP 0.0027 0.0057 0.0017
共4.52兲** 共4.04兲** 共2.72兲**
%SIq ⴱ JustMBP 共A兲 ⫺0.0995 ⫺0.0741 ⫺0.1373 0.0632
共⫺6.70兲** 共⫺3.06兲** 共⫺6.69兲** 共2.10兲*
%SIq ⴱ NotJustMBP 共B兲 ⫺0.1630 ⫺0.1484 ⫺0.1860 0.0376
共⫺32.74兲** 共⫺18.23兲** 共⫺27.09兲** 共3.73兲**
Test 共H3兲: A ⬎ B 0.0635 0.0743 0.0487
共4.05兲** 共2.91兲** 共3.36兲**
R2 0.93% 1.11% 0.88%
Number of Observations 126,932 31,923 95,009
*, ** Indicates significant at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively, using a two-tailed test.
Variable definitions are in Table 1. JustMBP 共NotJustMBP兲 is an indicator variable that equals 1 共0兲 if a firm-quarter
observation has a reported change in operating income per share 共Compustat data item #177兲 in the current quarter
compared to the same quarter in the prior year between $0.00 and $0.03, and 0 共1兲 otherwise. All variables are winsorized
at 1st and 99th percentile. Amounts reported are regression coefficients 共with t-statistics in parentheses兲.
Table 9 reports results for firms that just meet or beat the zero earnings threshold 共JustMBZ兲
versus other firms 共NotJustMBZ兲. For the full sample, the coefficient on %SI for JustMBZ firms is
positive 共0.0304兲 and significant 共t ⫽ 1.96; p ⫽ 0.05兲, while the coefficient on %SI for NotJust-
MBZ firms is significantly negative 共⫺0.1762; t ⫽ ⫺36.60; p ⬍ 0.01兲. The difference is significant
共t ⫽ 12.71; p ⬍ 0.01兲. We also find significant differences in Q4 and in Q1–3. For JustMBZ firms,
the coefficient on %SI is positive in Q4 共0.0400兲 and negative in Q1–3 共⫺0.0039兲, but the
difference is not significant 共t ⫽ 1.39; p ⫽ 0.16兲, probably due to lower power tests resulting from
the small number of observations that just meet or beat the zero earnings threshold. The difference
between Q4 and Q1–3 for NotJustMBZ is significantly positive 共t ⫽ 3.73; p ⬍ 0.01兲. Overall, the
evidence supports classification shifting for firms that just meet or beat the zero earnings bench-
mark, again, supporting H3.
As a final test, we consider the three earnings thresholds jointly. That is, we test for income
classification shifting when firm-quarter observations just meet or beat any of the three earnings
thresholds. This joint test presumably contains less measurement error because evidence in favor
of classification shifting is found for each of the three earnings thresholds in Tables 7–9. For
example, in our test of the zero earnings threshold in Table 9, the explicit assumption is that firms
that are classified as not just meeting or beating the benchmark 共NotJustMBZ兲 are less likely to
have shifted core expenses. However, these firms may just meet or beat the analyst forecast 共prior
period earnings兲 threshold. These firms may shift in response to these alternative earnings bench-
marks, but our test in Table 9 would not properly test this.
Because we require information for all earnings thresholds jointly, the sample size reduces to
66,034 firm-quarter observations. We first note that for this smaller sample, approximately 12.6
TABLE 9
Regression of Unexpected Core Earnings on Special Items as a Percent of Sales:
Just Meet or Beat Zero Earnings (JustMBZ) versus Not Just Meet or Beat Zero Earnings
(NotJustMBZ)
Test (H1): Q4
Independent Variable Full Sample Q4 Q1–3 > Q1–3
JustMBZ 0.0388 0.0514 0.0355
共22.46兲** 共11.41兲** 共19.76兲**
NotJustMBZ 0.0005 0.0031 ⫺0.0003
共0.90兲 共2.30兲* 共⫺0.47兲
%SIq ⴱ JustMBZ 共A兲 0.0304 0.0400 ⫺0.0039 0.0439
共1.96兲* 共1.57兲 共⫺0.18兲 共1.39兲
%SIq ⴱ NotJustMBZ 共B兲 ⫺0.1762 ⫺0.1622 ⫺0.1980 0.0358
共⫺36.60兲** 共⫺20.65兲** 共⫺29.76兲** 共3.67兲**
Test 共H3兲: A ⬎ B 0.2066 0.2022 0.1941
共12.71兲** 共7.59兲** 共8.63兲**
R2 1.45% 1.78% 1.32%
Number of Observations 132,393 33,454 98,939
*, ** Indicates significant at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively, using a two-tailed test.
Variable definitions are in Table 1. JustMBZ 共NotJustMBZ兲 is an indicator variable that equals 1 共0兲 if a firm-quarter
observation has a reported operating income per share in the current quarter between $0.00 and $0.04, and 0 共1兲 otherwise.
All variables are winsorized at 1st and 99th percentile. Amounts reported are regression coefficients 共with t-statistics in
parentheses兲.
共26.8兲 关33.3兴 percent of the observations that are classified as not just meeting or beating the
analyst forecast 共prior period earnings兲 关zero earnings兴 threshold actually just meet or beat one of
the other two thresholds. Thus, we know that our tests in Tables 7–9 contain some measurement
error and inferences could be affected. The results of our joint tests are reported in Table 10. We
find for the full sample, for Q4, and for Q1–3 that the coefficient on %SI is significantly less
negative for firms that just meet or beat any earnings threshold 共JustMB兲 than for other firms
共NotJustMB兲. We also note that the coefficient on %SI is significantly less negative in Q4 than in
Q1–Q3 for JustMB firms and for NotJustMB firms. The results in Table 10 provide broad support
for H3.
VI. CONCLUSION
This study addresses the issue of whether and when managers use classification shifting to
manage core earnings. Prior research provides evidence that investors and analysts tend to fixate
on core earnings 共Bradshaw and Sloan 2002; Gu and Chen 2004; Kinney and Trezevant 1997兲 and
that earnings reported higher in the income statement tend to have higher valuation multiples 共Lipe
1986兲. Thus, the extent to which managers shift core expenses to special items is important for
understanding how managers may take advantage of the market’s fixation on core earnings num-
bers.
McVay 共2006兲 documents a positive relation between unexpected core earnings and income-
decreasing special items, concluding that managers shift core expenses to special items to improve
core earnings. However, McVay 共2006兲 notes that this finding does not hold 共and in fact becomes
negative兲 when contemporaneous total accruals 共which include accrual special items兲 are excluded
from core earnings expectations model. Thus, there is some debate of the extent to which man-
TABLE 10
Regression of Unexpected Core Earnings on Special Items as a Percent of Sales:
Just Meet or Beat Any of the Three Earnings Benchmarks (JustMB) versus Not Just Meet
or Beat Any of the Three Earnings Benchmarks (NotJustMB)
Test (H1): Q4
Independent Variable Full Sample Q4 Q1–3 > Q1–3
JustMB 0.0108 0.0196 0.0083
共11.84兲** 共8.56兲** 共8.63兲**
NotJustMB 0.0040 0.0078 0.0027
共5.56兲** 共4.64兲** 共3.49兲**
%SIq ⴱ JustMB 共A兲 ⫺0.0812 ⫺0.0445 ⫺0.1140 0.0695
共⫺6.96兲** 共⫺2.02兲* 共⫺8.19兲** 共2.90兲**
%SIq ⴱ NotJustMB 共B兲 ⫺0.1355 ⫺0.1185 ⫺0.1569 0.0384
共⫺21.42兲** 共⫺10.90兲** 共⫺19.15兲** 共3.01兲**
Test 共H3兲: A ⬎ B 0.0543 0.0740 0.0429
共4.09兲** 共3.00兲** 共2.65兲**
R2 0.93% 1.13% 0.98%
Number of Observations 66,034 16,995 49,039
*, ** Indicates significant at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively, using a two-tailed test.
Variable definitions are in Table 1. JustMB 共NotJustMB兲 is an indicator variable that equals 1 共0兲 if a firm-quarter
observation has any of the following: an analyst forecast error of $0.00 or $0.01, a reported change in operating income per
share 共Compustat data item #177兲 in the current quarter compared to the same quarter in the prior year between $0.00 and
$0.03, or a reported operating income per share in the current quarter between $0.00 and $0.04, and 0 共1兲 otherwise. All
variables are winsorized at 1st and 99th percentile. Amounts reported are regression coefficients 共with t-statistics in
parentheses兲.
agers shift core expenses to special items. McVay 共2006兲 calls for research to improve the core
earnings expectations model and to provide additional cross-sectional tests of classification shift-
ing.
Using quarterly data, we first extend McVay’s 共2006兲 core earnings expectations model by
dropping current-period accruals and including additional controls for performance. We develop
alternative measures for unexpected core earnings based on different models for expected core
earnings. We then examine the relation between unexpected core earnings and income-decreasing
special items 共measured as a positive number兲. Without sufficient control for performance, we first
observe a strong negative relation, as opposed to a positive relation that indicates classification
shifting. However, this negative relation significantly diminishes with additional performance
controls.
Next, we provide additional cross-sectional tests to evaluate increased classification shifting
in specific settings. First, we show that classification shifting is more prevalent in the fourth
quarter than in interim quarters. This finding is consistent with managers adopting alternative
earnings management techniques in the fourth quarter 共Cohen et al. 2009兲 and that it is more
difficult to achieve earnings thresholds using accrual manipulation in the fourth quarter 共Brown
and Pinello 2007兲. Second, we document that classification shifting is more prominent when
managers appear to be constrained in their ability to manipulate current-period accruals because of
prior upward accrual manipulation 共Barton and Simko 2002兲. This result is consistent with the
reasoning that managers have a portfolio of choices for manipulating reported performance. To the
extent that one option for manipulating earnings is limited, managers will turn to the next. While
accrual manipulation and real activities management have been extensively investigated in the
literature, income classification shifting has received relatively little attention and represents a
viable opportunity for managers to manipulate reported earnings.
In addition, we find greater evidence of classification shifting for samples of firms that just
meet or beat analysts’ forecasts, one-year-ago same-quarter earnings, and zero earnings. These
results are consistent with managers attempting to avoid market penalties 共Barth et al. 1999;
Bartov et al. 2002; Kasznik and McNichols 2002兲 and other negative consequences associated
with missing earnings targets. These results are also consistent with managers having more incen-
tive to shift income when investors are likely giving more weight to earnings performance 共e.g.,
Hayn 1995; Burgstahler and Dichev 1997b; Barth et al. 1998; Collins et al. 1999; Barua et al.
2006兲.
Clearly, the extent, timing, and incentives under which managers engage in classification
shifting is an important area of research. To the extent that managers attempt to fool investors by
shifting core expenses to special items, it is important for researchers to better understand the
effects on investors, auditors, regulators, and other market participants. Because this area of
research is relatively new, there is ample opportunity for future research to explore the settings
under which classification shifting occurs and to improve upon models to measure expected core
earnings or core expenses.22 Although we improve upon the model in McVay 共2006兲, we have not
been able to fully control for performance. Future research may consider further advancements of
the model to facilitate research on classification shifting.
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