1

I. ABSTRACT

The West Philippine Sea dispute, involving China and the Philippines, has been a great
source of friction between the two states.
China is basing its alleged ownership over the entirety of the South China Sea, which
includes the West Philippine Sea, on historical accounts, and documents showing ownership to
the entire water mass. In effect, such claim makes the entire South China Sea a part of China’s
internal waters.
The Philippines has claim over some portion of the disputed area. This claim is based upon
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) wherein a coastal nation has
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) 200 miles from the baseline in which said nation has the
exclusive right to exploit natural resources found within the EEZ.
With the brewing conflict and a maritime arms race happening between the contending
states, this issue has replaced the Middle East conflicts as a possible source for World War III
given the involvement and interest of the United States to expand its influence in Asia and ensure
the freedom of navigation in the area, and China’s insistence on a bilateral approach, to the
exclusion of third parties like the United States or the United Nations, and China’s saber rattling
approach against other claimants, makes this an urgent problem that must be resolved.
Based on information gathered throughout the web, it has been established that China’s claim
is full of inconsistencies, false equivalencies, fallacies, all of which are backed up by China’s
immense maritime weapons development spending and deployment of naval forces in the
disputed area.
 2

II. INTRODUCTION

The South China Sea is a marginal sea that is part of the Pacific Ocean encompassing an
area from the Singapore and Malacca Straits to the Strait of Taiwan of around 3,500,000 square
kilometers (1,400,000 sq mi). The area's importance largely results from one-third of the world's
shipping transiting through its waters, and that it is believed to hold huge oil and gas reserves
beneath its seabed.
It is south of mainland China and Taiwan, west of the Philippines, northwest of Sabah,
Sarawak (Malaysia) and Brunei, north of Indonesia, northeast of the Malay Peninsula (Malaysia)
and Singapore, and east of Vietnam.
With its economic and geopolitical importance, multiple claims by border countries
abound lead by China, who argues using a bilateral diplomatic approach, and by the Philippines
who wants international arbitration to settle the disputes basing it on the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
There are three issues in to be discussed in this research. The first is the basis of China’s
claim, its alleged historical ownership of the South China Sea, the Philippines claim under the
UNCLOS, and lastly, to determine what has the greater weight in establishing a claim, supposed
historical rights or the UNCLOS.
Understanding China’s claim and how those claims work relative to the UNCLOS is one
of the approaches made in this research. Available remedies for the Philippines will also be
looked at since, as of January 22, 2013, the Philippines have already filed arbitration proceedings
against China. Whether or not China will participate in the proceedings remains to be seen.
The arbitration petition filed by the Philippines is an important turning point. With
judicial efficiency, and barring any hostile attempts by China to derail, if not, to stop, the
proceedings, this arbitration will settle who has exclusive control of the vast natural resources
found in the disputed area.
As it stands, the Philippines can let the wheels of international justice turn. Without
sufficient military capability which can offset China’s military advantage, the Philippines must
resort to international arbitration, and at the worst possible scenario, must ask the United States
for help in containing Chinese aggressive behavior.
 3

III. METHODS

Most of the information gathered here is sourced from internet searches. The South China
Sea controversy is very much talked about in international circles that there’re a lot of resource
materials to be gathered, study, and apply in this particular scenario.
From local sources, like online newspapers, to foreign news reports and commentaries,
there are a lot of information floating around. It’s just a matter of finding what is needed and
what can be used to advance the purpose of this study: to identify the source of China’s claim
and what remedies are available to the Philippines.
As most of the information gathered are from third parties, the impression that the
proponent gets is that there are hostile reactions against China’s attitude regarding the South
China Sea dispute. From its insistence on a bilateral approach, using to its advantage its immense
economic and military might to gain leverage, to blatantly disregarding the UNCLOS, which
China is a signatory, it is clear from the information gathered that China has no intention of
letting go of its “indisputable sovereignty” over the entire South China Sea.
The information gathered can be used to dissect the path that China may undertake if the
arbitration will not be in its favor. From a third party perspective on China’s supposed historical
rights to the South China Sea, it is clear that China will go to any lengths to maintain the status
quo.
Sorting and quantifying all the available resources, the proponent chose the needed
information based on its impact, relevance, and historical accuracy to the subject matter at hand.
Applying concepts of a case digest, the information have been filtered and only those of
relevance and importance are shown in this study.
 4

IV. RESULTS

This illustration shows the extent of China’s claim to the entire South China Sea. As
shown in the picture, China is asserting “indisputable sovereignty” within the line.

CHINA’S CLAIM

China claimed sovereignty over 90% of the water and all the islands in the South China
Sea by drawing a nine-dash line covering 90% of that sea, prompting her neighbors to protest
that her claim contradicts international law, specifically the 1982 United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
China justified her exaggerated claim on the South China Sea by arguing that ancient
Chinese texts mentioned certain islands in the South China Sea, proving that Chinese people
 5

were the first to navigate that sea and the first to discover the islands in the area, that China was
the first country to exercise jurisdiction over the islands and that the South China Sea was
China’s historic water. China further argued that in 1947, when China published a map of that
sea with an eleven-dash line (predecessor of the nine-dash line), nobody protested, proving that
the world had accepted China’s claim. However, close examination shows that China’s
arguments are baseless.
NamViet News refuted the historical claim of China on a lot of points:
1. The first point, regarding China’s 1947 map of the sea, was not protested by anyone
because it was ignored. The map has as much legal weight as the traditional Chinese
political thought which said that the world (All-under-heaven) is under the authority of
Chinese emperors.
2. Countries with historical borders with the Arctic Ocean formed the Arctic Council to
divide the Arctic natural resources according to the rules of the UNCLOS. China, without
any historical borders to the Arctic, petitioned to join the Arctic Circle in order to have a
share of the resources found therein arguing that the Arctic Circle “common heritage for
all of humankind”. If the Arctic Ocean is a “common heritage for all of humankind”, then
the South China Sea is a common heritage for all the peoples who live on its shores, not
only for China.
3. Peoples of the Austronesian language family, more specifically the Malayo-Polynesian
branch, were the first to navigate the South China Sea. Between 5000-2500 BC, they
crossed the South China Sea to populate the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia. From
Southeast Asia, they crossed the Pacific Ocean to populate Melanesia and Micronesia by
1200 BC, Polynesia by 1000 BC, Easter Island by 300 AD, Hawaii by 400 AD and New
Zealand by 800 AD. Since the Austronesian peoples (ancestors of the Filipinos,
Indonesians and Malaysians) were the first to navigate the South China Sea, they were
the first to discover the islands in the area and to fish in the associated waters. Though
they did not invent writing to record their discovery, it would be ludicrous to deny their
discovery of the islands so close to the Philippines and Indonesia in light of the fact that
they were able to discover the various islands in the vast Pacific Ocean.
4. The South China Sea has always been an international waterway since prehistory. Indian
traders navigated that sea early in prehistory, introducing Indian philosophies to
 6

Southeast Asia, leading to the formation of many Indianised states on Islands Southeast
Asia in ancient time. One of those states was Srivijaya, located on Indonesia in the 7th
century and exercised prominent maritime activities in the South China Sea.
5. Attacking precedent, NamViet states: even if Chinese people were the first to navigate
the South China Sea (not true), China cannot claim sovereignty over the water that is
used by many other countries. The Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia do not claim
sovereignty over the South China Sea, the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean even
though their Austronesian ancestors were the first to navigate those waters. Norway does
not claim sovereignty over the Norwegian Sea even though the Norsemen (Vikings) were
the first to navigate that water to populate Iceland and Greenland in the 9th century.
Portugal does not claim sovereignty over the water off the West African coast, the water
around the Cape of Good Hope and the Indian Ocean even though Portuguese under
Bartolomeu Diaz and Vasco da Gama were the first to navigate those waters in 1488 and
1498. Spain does not claim sovereignty over the Atlantic Ocean, the Magellan Strait and
the Pacific Ocean even though Spaniards under Christopher Columbus and Ferdinand
Magellan were the first to navigate those waters in 1492 and 1521. Russia does not claim
sovereignty over the Bering Sea even though Russians under Vitus Bering were the first
to navigate that water in 1741.
6. Ancient Chinese texts which mention the South China Sea islands do not describe
discovery of the islands but only describe general knowledge about the islands,
knowledge shared among the fishermen, merchants and pirates from various countries
who navigated that sea since prehistory. Chinese writers were the first to write about the
South China Sea islands because China invented writing earlier, not because Chinese
people were the first to navigate that sea or the first to discover the islands. (Source not
provided)
7. Ancient Chinese texts which mention the South China Sea islands mention those islands
as foreign lands, not as China’s territories, and do not describe which activities the
authority of ancient China exercised on the islands. Therefore, there is no proof of
China’s jurisdiction over the islands. In the case of Scarborough shoal (part of the
Philippines claim in the disputed area), China argued that Kublai Khan’s officials were
the first to map out and to establish jurisdiction over those islands in 1279. However,
 7

Kublai Khan was the Great Khan of the Mongol Empire who conquered China. If any
country can inherit Scarborough shoal from Kublai Khan, it is Mongolia, not China.
8. Official maps of the Yuan Dynasty and Ching Dynasty, including but not limited to Da
Qing Zhi Sheng Quan Tu (published in 1862) and Huang Chao Yi Tong Yu Di Zen Du
(published in 1894), show that the southernmost extent of China ends at Hainan islands.
9. The Chinese empire originated on the Yellow river basin and eventually conquered many
lands and peoples, including Tibet and Sinkiang, which is why China is a multiethnic,
multi-languages country. At the time when China allegedly discovered the South China
Sea islands, China’s border on the mainland was not what it is today, Tibet and Sinkiang
were independent countries of the Tibetans and the Uyghurs, respectively. The Tibetans
and the Uyghurs are demanding self-determination. Three dozens Tibetan monks have
burned themselves to death to draw attention of humanity to the sufferings of their people
under China’s rule. If China is serious about its historical claim, it should return to its
historical border on the mainland, return Tibet and Sinkiang to the Tibetans and the
Uyghurs, respectively.
As pointed out by NamViet, news from Vietnam, another claimant to the parts of the
South China Sea, there are a lot of consistency issues, historical precedents, and legal
implications to China’s claim to the South China Sea. Which, as said in the report, makes China
wary of any international arbitration since, from the face of it, China’s claim are very hard to
prove in the courts of law.
Another publication which assesses China’s historical rights are from the Diplomat,
specifically the article published by Mohan Malik, Professor at Asia-Pacific Center for Security
Studies, Honolulu. Though his piece is not meant to be an encompassing idea on what’s
happening in the South China Sea, he sheds a little light in the problems of China’s historical
claim.
Since the end of the Second World War, China has been redrawing its maps, redefining
borders, manufacturing historical evidence, using force to create new territorial realities,
renaming islands, and seeking to impose its version of history on the waters of the region. The
passage of domestic legislation in 1992, “Law on the Territorial Waters and Their Contiguous
Areas,” which claimed four-fifths of the South China Sea, was followed by armed skirmishes
with the Philippine and Vietnamese navies throughout the 1990s. More recently, the dispatch of
 8

large numbers of Chinese fishing boats and maritime surveillance vessels to the disputed waters
in what is tantamount to a “people’s war on the high seas” has further heightened tensions.
To quote Sujit Dutta, “China’s unmitigated irredentism [is] based on the . . . theory that the
periphery must be occupied in order to secure the core. This is an essentially imperial notion that
was internalized by the Chinese nationalists—both Kuomintang and Communist. The current
regime’s attempts to reach its imagined geographical frontiers often with little historical basis
have had and continue to have highly destabilizing strategic consequences.”
Apparently, one reason Southeast Asians find it difficult to accept Chinese territorial
claims is that it would amount to acceptance of the notion of Han racial superiority over other
Asian races and empires. Says Jay Batongbacal of the University of the Philippines law school:
“Intuitively, acceptance of the nine-dash line is a corresponding denial of the very identity and
history of the ancestors of the Vietnamese, Filipinos, and Malays; it is practically a modern
revival of China’s denigration of non-Chinese as ‘barbarians’ not entitled to equal respect and
dignity as peoples.
The “history question” is very complex and defies an easy explanation. If historical
claims had any validity then Mongolia could claim all of Asia simply because it once conquered
the lands of the continent. There is absolutely no historical basis to support either of the dash-line
claims, especially considering that the territories of Chinese empires were never as carefully
delimited as nation-states, but rather existed as zones of influence tapering away from a civilized
center to the periphery of alien barbarians. This is the position contemporary China took starting
in the 1960s, while negotiating its land boundaries with several of its neighboring countries. But
this is not the position it takes today in the cartographic, diplomatic, and low-intensity military
skirmishes to define its maritime borders.
Historical rights are difficult to prove, especially those dating back in the B.C. era.
China’s claim, as shown in these 2 articles, clearly show that China’s claim cannot be
substantiated and full of fallacies making it difficult to prove its historical rights before the courts
of law.
To understand the Philippine claim to the West Philippine Sea, a part of South China Sea,
UNCLOS, and the relevant UNCLOS provisions must provided.
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea is the international agreement that
resulted from the third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), which
 9

took place between 1973 and 1982. The Law of the Sea Convention defines the rights and
responsibilities of nations in their use of the world's oceans, establishing guidelines for
businesses, the environment, and the management of marine natural resources. The Convention,
concluded in 1982, replaced four 1958 treaties. UNCLOS came into force in 1994; a year
after Guyana became the 60th nation to sign the treaty.[1] As of October 2012, 164 countries and
the European Union have joined in the Convention. However, it is uncertain as to what extent the
Convention codifies customary international law.
 10

The above illustration shows how and to what extent does a coastal state enjoys the
benefits of the natural resources found within its 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone
(EEZ).

The dark green portions show countries that signed and ratified the UNCLOS. Note that
both China and the Philippines are signatories and ratified the said convention. Light green parts
are countries that signed the UNCLOS but never ratified it. The grey areas are countries that
never signed nor ratified the Convention.
The Philippines claim extends to the legally mandated extent as provided by the
UNCLOS. The advent of Chinese intrusion in to the Philippines 200 mile EEZ sparked the
hostility between them until the Philippines filed a case against China in an ad hoc arbitration in
accordance to Annex VII of the UNCLOS on January 22, 2013.
UNCLOS sets forth in Part XV rules for the resolution of disputes between State Parties
arising out of the interpretation or application of UNCLOS. Pursuant to Article 287(1) of
UNCLOS, when signing, ratifying, or acceding to UNCLOS, a State may make a declaration
choosing one or more of the following means for settling such disputes:

 the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) in Hamburg, Germany;
 the International Court of Justice in The Hague, The Netherlands;
 ad hoc arbitration (in accordance with Annex VII of UNCLOS); or
 a “special arbitral tribunal” constituted for certain categories of disputes (established
under Annex VIII of UNCLOS).
 11

Pursuant to Article 287(3) of UNCLOS, arbitration under Annex VII is the default means
of dispute settlement if a State has not expressed any preference with respect to the means of
dispute resolution available under Article 287(1) of UNCLOS (and has not expressed any
reservation or optional exceptions pursuant to Article 298 of UNCLOS). Likewise, pursuant to
Article 287(5) of UNCLOS, if the parties have not accepted the same procedure for the
settlement of the dispute, arbitration under Annex VII is the default means of dispute settlement
(again subject to same exceptions or reservations pursuant to Article 298).
 12

The illustration shows the extent and distance from the baseline where the EEZ is in
effect. It also contains the reason why there are several disputes in the area, the existence of vast
sea and mineral resources located therein.

CHINA’S RIGHTS VS THE UNCLOS

As illustrated in the first few chapters, China’s claim to the entirety of the South China
Sea has no basis and full of inconsistencies. As a signatory, albeit with conditions, China has to
respect whatever treaty stipulations provided for in the UNCLOS.
Although the UNCLOS respects historical claims to areas beyond the EEZ of said
country, it does not change the fact that the Chinese designs are hampering regional growth and
provides economic and military jitters across the region.
Claims based on shaky historical grounds are not sufficient to wantonly disregard the
UNCLOS provisions that were ratified by China.
Chinese assertions based on historical claims must be substantiated by a clear historic
title. It should be noted that under public international law, historical claims are not historical
titles. A claim by itself, including historical claim, could not be a basis for acquiring a territory.
Under international law, the modes of acquiring a territory are: discovery, effective occupation,
prescription, cession and accretion. Also, under public international law, for a historical claim to
mature into a historical title, a mere showing of long usage is not enough.
Other criteria have to be satisfied, such as that the usage must be open, continuous,
adverse or in the concept of an owner, peaceful and acquiesced by other states. Mere silence by
other states to one’s claim is not acquiescence under international law. Acquiescence must be
affirmative such that other states recognize the claim as a right on the part of the claimant that
other states ought to respect as a matter of duty. There is no indication that the international
community has acquiesced to China’s so-called historical claim.
Naming and placing on maps are also not bases in determining sovereignty. In
international case law relating to questions of sovereignty and ownership of land features, names
and maps are not significant factors in the determination of international tribunals’ determination
of sovereignty.
Many of the findings in this study came from third party observers, other claimants, and
Philippine sources. There was a difficulty in locating sources from China to have a balanced
 13

view on the study. What is present during the search is China’s exaggerated historical claim,
China’s refusal to accept and participate in the arbitration, and China’s insistence on a bilateral
approach to the problem.

V. DISCUSSION

Based on the observations, it is clear that China will never let go of its “sovereignty” over
the disputed area. With shaky historical basis, inconsistent presentation of their historical claims,
and yet possessing tremendous economic and military might, it is evident that China will not be
really affected even with an adverse ruling by the Ad Hoc Trbiunal.
The fact that the UNCLOS has no means of enforcing their decision, based on the
reports, articles, and commentaries observed, it will be a test of the entire UNCLOS treaty as far
as dispute resolution goes. Add the fact that China, as a member of the UN’s Security Council
with veto power, can hamper any military or economic sanctions that the tribunal can sanction in
case the dispute is resolved in favor of the Philippines.
In summary, as presented by the studies in the previous chapters, Chinese claims over the
entire South China Sea are marred with inconsistencies and fallacies. And with China refusing to
participate in the arbitration proceedings, electing instead a bilateral approach, the Philippines,
with its gross disadvantage in terms of economic and military might, has no other recourse but to
do what it did, which personally the proponent agrees. The filing of an arbitration case before the
UNCLOS is the only reasonable and feasible way to obtain the relief prayed for.
The proponent therefore concludes that, China’s claim cannot stand in the eyes of
international law. But with the evident deficiency in terms of economy and military of the
Philippines, the latter’s legal claim cannot be exercised without international support.
There is also the matter that should China get an adverse ruling by the Ad Hoc Tribunal,
there’s no one who can stop China from withdrawing from the UNCLOS and pursue a unilateral
approach in resolving the dispute. Hopefully such action by China will not materialize, another
set of questions come to mind. Is the Philippines ready to face a China that is no longer bound by
the UNCLOS? Is the Philippines ready and willing to accept an adverse judgment by the Ad Hoc
Tribunal? How would the Philippines react to a Chinese unilateral approach to settle the dispute?
 14

In the broader context, the results show that China’s refusal to participate in the
arbitration proceedings can equate to China’s refusal to abide by international law. In the South
China Sea dispute, there are other claimants aside from the Philippines. Taiwan, Malaysia,
Indonesia, Vietnam, Thailand, etc. An adverse ruling for China in the Sino-Philippine dispute
will have repercussions to the other claimants, especially to those who have already concluded a
treaty of joint exploration with China. Although their rights will not be impaired, it can make
other claimant parties wary of China’s reaction and be mindful about future maritime relations
with China.

SOURCES:
http://www.interaksyon.com/article/53321/ph-finally-files-case-vs-china-before-unclos-tribunal-
over-disputed-territories

http://www.academia.edu/1192973/Dispute_Settlement_Provisions_of_UNCLOS

http://namvietnews.wordpress.com/chinas-rise-is-a-big-reason-to-ratify-the-law-of-the-sea-
convention/refuting-chinas-nine-dash-claim/

http://www.thechinastory.org/2013/04/the-paradox-of-the-south-china-sea-disputes/

http://thediplomat.com/2013/08/30/history-the-weak-link-in-beijings-maritime-claims/4/

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_China_Sea

http://opiniojuris.org/2013/01/23/will-china-participate-in-the-unclos-arbitration-with-the-
philippines/

http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2013/08/28/an-update-on-the-philippines-china-unclos-
arbitration/

http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1288

http://globalnation.inquirer.net/34031/ph-sovereignty-based-on-unclos-principles-of-
international-law
 15

re listed with blue background and in bold.

Date of
Member state See also
admission

19 November
Afghanistan
1946

14 December
Albania
1955

Algeria 8 October 1962

Andorra 28 July 1993

1 December
Angola
1976

11 November
Antigua and Barbuda
1981

24 October
Argentina
1945

Armenia 2 March 1992 Former members: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

1 November
Australia Australia and the United Nations
1945

Austria 14 December
 16

Date of
Member state See also
admission

1955

Azerbaijan 2 March 1992 Former members: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

18 September
Bahamas
1973

21 September
Bahrain
1971

17 September
Bangladesh
1974

9 December
Barbados
1966

24 October
Belarus Former members: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
1945

27 December
Belgium
1945

25 September
Belize
1981

20 September
Benin [note 1]
1960
 17

Date of
Member state See also
admission

21 September
Bhutan
1971

Bolivia (Plurinational State 14 November

of)[note 2] 1945

Bosnia and Herzegovina 22 May 1992 Former members: Yugoslavia

17 October
Botswana
1966

24 October
Brazil Brazil and the United Nations
1945

21 September
Brunei Darussalam
1984

14 December
Bulgaria
1955

20 September
Burkina Faso [note 3]
1960

18 September
Burundi
1962

16 September
Cabo Verde [note 4]
1975
 18

Date of
Member state See also
admission

14 December
Cambodia [note 5]
1955

20 September
Cameroon [note 6]
1960

9 November
Canada Canada and the United Nations
1945

Central African 20 September

Republic [note 7] 1960

20 September
Chad
1960

24 October
Chile
1945

24 October Former members: Republic of China and China and the

China
1945 United Nations

5 November
Colombia
1945

12 November
Comoros
1975

Congo [note 8] 20 September

 19

Date of
Member state See also
admission

1960

2 November
Costa Rica
1945

20 September
Côte d'Ivoire [note 9]
1960

Croatia 22 May 1992 Former members: Yugoslavia

24 October
Cuba
1945

20 September
Cyprus
1960

Czech Republic 19 January 1993 Former members: Czechoslovakia

Democratic People's 17 September

Republic of Korea 1991

Democratic Republic of the 20 September

Congo [note 10] 1960

24 October
Denmark
1945

Djibouti 20 September
 20

Date of
Member state See also
admission

1977

18 December
Dominica
1978

24 October
Dominican Republic
1945

21 December
Ecuador
1945

24 October
Egypt Former members: United Arab Republic
1945

24 October
El Salvador
1945

12 November
Equatorial Guinea
1968

Eritrea 28 May 1993

17 September
Estonia Former members: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
1991

13 November
Ethiopia
1945
 21

Date of
Member state See also
admission

13 October
Fiji Fiji and the United Nations
1970

14 December
Finland
1955

24 October
France France and the United Nations
1945

20 September
Gabon
1960

21 September
Gambia [note 11]
1965

Georgia 31 July 1992 Former members: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

18 September Former members: German Democratic

Germany
1973 Republic and Germany and the United Nations

Ghana 8 March 1957

25 October
Greece
1945

17 September
Grenada
1974
 22

Date of
Member state See also
admission

21 November
Guatemala
1945

12 December
Guinea
1958

17 September
Guinea-Bissau
1974

20 September
Guyana
1966

24 October
Haiti
1945

17 December
Honduras
1945

14 December
Hungary
1955

19 November
Iceland
1946

30 October
India India and the United Nations
1945

Indonesia
28 September Withdrawal of Indonesia (1965–1966) and Indonesia and the
 23

Date of
Member state See also
admission

1950 United Nations

Iran (Islamic Republic 24 October

of) [note 12] 1945

21 December
Iraq
1945

14 December
Ireland
1955

Israel 11 May 1949 Israel, Palestine, and the United Nations

14 December
Italy
1955

18 September
Jamaica
1962

18 December
Japan Japan and the United Nations
1956

14 December
Jordan
1955

Kazakhstan [note 13] 2 March 1992 Former members: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Kenya 16 December
 24

Date of
Member state See also
admission

1963

14 September
Kiribati
1999

Kuwait 14 May 1963

Kyrgyzstan 2 March 1992 Former members: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Lao People's Democratic 14 December

Republic [note 14] 1955

17 September
Latvia Former members: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
1991

24 October
Lebanon
1945

17 October
Lesotho
1966

2 November
Liberia
1945

14 December
Libya[14][note 15]
1955

Liechtenstein
18 September
 25

Date of
Member state See also
admission

1990

17 September
Lithuania Former members: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
1991

24 October
Luxembourg
1945

20 September
Madagascar [note 16]
1960

1 December
Malawi
1964

17 September Former members: Federation of Malaya and Malaysia and

Malaysia
1957 the United Nations

21 September
Maldives [note 17]
1965

28 September
Mali
1960

1 December
Malta
1964

17 September
Marshall Islands Marshall Islands and the United Nations
1991
 26

Date of
Member state See also
admission

27 October
Mauritania
1961

Mauritius 24 April 1968

7 November
Mexico Mexico and the United Nations
1945

Micronesia (Federated 17 September

Federated States of Micronesia and the United Nations
States of) 1991

Monaco 28 May 1993

27 October
Mongolia
1961

Montenegro 28 June 2006 Former members: Yugoslavia

12 November
Morocco
1956

16 September
Mozambique
1975

Myanmar [note 18] 19 April 1948

Namibia 23 April 1990

 27

Date of
Member state See also
admission

14 September
Nauru
1999

14 December
Nepal 1955

10 December
Netherlands
1945

24 October
New Zealand New Zealand and the United Nations
1945

24 October
Nicaragua
1945

20 September
Niger
1960

Nigeria 7 October 1960

27 November
Norway
1945

Oman 7 October 1971

30 September
Pakistan Pakistan and the United Nations
1947
 28

Date of
Member state See also
admission

15 December
Palau
1994

13 November
Panama
1945

10 October
Papua New Guinea
1975

24 October
Paraguay
1945

31 October
Peru
1945

24 October
Philippines [note 19] Philippines and the United Nations
1945

24 October
Poland
1945

14 December
Portugal
1955

21 September
Qatar
1971

Republic of Korea
17 September
 29

Date of
Member state See also
admission

1991

Republic of Moldova [note 20] 2 March 1992 Former members: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

14 December
Romania
1955

Former members: Union of Soviet Socialist

24 October
Russian Federation Republics and Soviet Union and the United Nations andRussia
1945
and the United Nations

18 September
Rwanda
1962

23 September
Saint Kitts and Nevis [note 21]
1983

18 September
Saint Lucia
1979

Saint Vincent and the 16 September

Grenadines 1980

15 December
Samoa
1976

San Marino 2 March 1992

Sao Tome and Principe [note 16 September

 30

Date of
Member state See also
admission

22] 1975

24 October
Saudi Arabia
1945

28 September
Senegal
1960

1 November
Serbia Former members: Yugoslavia
2000

21 September
Seychelles
1976

27 September
Sierra Leone
1961

21 September
Singapore Former members: Malaysia
1965

Slovakia 19 January 1993 Former members: Czechoslovakia

Slovenia 22 May 1992 Former members: Yugoslavia

19 September
Solomon Islands
1978

Somalia 20 September
 31

Date of
Member state See also
admission

1960

7 November
South Africa [note 23]
1945

South Sudan 14 July 2011

14 December
Spain
1955

14 December
Sri Lanka [note 24]
1955

12 November
Sudan
1956

4 December
Suriname [note 25]
1975

24 September
Swaziland
1968

19 November
Sweden
1946

10 September
Switzerland
2002
 32

Date of
Member state See also
admission

24 October
Syrian Arab Republic Former members: United Arab Republic
1945

Tajikistan 2 March 1992 Former members: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

16 December
Thailand [note 26]
1946

The former Yugoslav

8 April 1993 Former members: Yugoslavia
Republic of Macedonia

27 September
Timor-Leste
2002

20 September
Togo
1960

14 September
Tonga
1999

18 September
Trinidad and Tobago Trinidad and Tobago and the United Nations
1962

12 November
Tunisia
1956

24 October
Turkey
1945
 33

Date of
Member state See also
admission

Turkmenistan 2 March 1992 Former members: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

5 September
Tuvalu Tuvalu and the United Nations
2000

25 October
Uganda
1962

24 October
Ukraine Former members: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
1945

9 December
United Arab Emirates
1971

United Kingdom of Great 24 October

United Kingdom and the United Nations
Britain and Northern Ireland 1945

United Republic of 14 December

Former members: Tanganyika and Zanzibar
Tanzania 1961

24 October
United States of America United States and the United Nations
1945

18 December
Uruguay
1945

Uzbekistan 2 March 1992 Former members: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

 34

Date of
Member state See also
admission

15 September
Vanuatu Vanuatu and the United Nations
1981

Venezuela (Bolivarian 15 November

Republic of) [note 27] 1945

20 September
Vietnam
1977

30 September
Yemen Former members: Yemen and Democratic Yemen
1947

1 December
Zambia
1964

25 August
Zimbabwe 1980