1nc no nuclear expansion

Previous attempts prove solvency is doomed – nuclear can’t compete

Lovins, 10 – Chair and Chief Scientist of Rocky Mountain Institute (Amory B, 10/25. "Nuclear
Socialism." Weekly Standard, VOL. 16, NO. 06. http://www.weeklystandard.com/articles/nuclear-
socialism_508830.html?page=1)

With such juicy incentives, why won’t private investors finance reactors? In 2005-08, with the strongest
subsidies, capital markets, and nuclear politics in history, why couldn’t 34 proposed reactors raise any
private capital? Because there’s no business case. As a recent study by Citibank U.K. is titled “New
Nuclear—the Economics Say No.” That’s why central planners bought all 61 reactors now under
construction worldwide. None were free-market transactions. Subsidies can’t reverse bleak
fundamentals. A defibrillated corpse will jump but won’t revive. American taxpayers already reimburse
nuclear power developers for legal and regulatory delays. A unique law caps liability for accidents at a
present value only one-third that of BP’s $20 billion trust fund for oil-spill costs; any bigger damages fall
on citizens. Yet the competitive risks facing new reactors are uninsured, high, and escalating. Since 2000,
as nuclear power’s cost projections have more than tripled, its share of global electricity generation has
fallen from 17 percent to 13 percent. That of cogeneration (making electricity together with useful heat
in factories or buildings) and renewables (excluding big hydropower projects) rose from 13 percent to 18
percent. These bite-sized, modular, quickly built projects—with financial risks, costs, and subsidies
generally below nuclear’s and declining—now dominate global power investments. Last year,
renewables (wind, water, solar, geothermal), excluding large hydroelectric dams, attracted $131 billion
of private capital and added 52 billion watts. Global nuclear output fell for the past three years, capacity
for two.

Uncertainty guarantees high costs – blocks adoption

Fahring, 11 – J.D. from the University of Texas School of Law, law clerk at the Texas Eleventh Court of
Appeals interested in energy law, environmental law, and tax law (T.L., “NOTE: Nuclear Uncertainty: A
Look at the Uncertainties of a U.S. Nuclear Renaissance.” Texas Environmental Law Journal, 41 Tex.
Envtl. L.J. 279, Lexis.)

The rising
projected costs of nuclear construction in the United States may also be related to rising
costs for materials, labor, and capital. From 2000 to 2008, the cost of building any type of new plant more than doubled. n151
Among the factors behind this [*293] increase: high international demand for generating equipment, rising labor costs, and rising costs for construction
materials (cement, steel, and copper). n152 The
costs associated with nuclear construction, however, are increasing
at a faster rate than construction costs for its fossil fuel rivals. n153 From 2003 to 2008, the projected cost of nuclear
power plant construction increased at a rate of fifteen percent a year. n154 In part, the greater increase in costs for nuclear construction reflects the
atrophy of the industry in the United States over the last few decades. n155 For instance, two decades ago the American Society of Mechanical Engineers
(ASME) licensed 400 nuclear suppliers and 900 sub-suppliers in the United States; as of 2011, ASME license only eighty suppliers and 200 sub-suppliers.
n156 Moreover, world-wide forging supply of reactor components is limited. n157 Today, only two companies are qualified to supply heavy forgings

needed for nuclear construction: Japan Steel Works and Creusot Forge, and only Japan Steel Works can manufacture ultra-heavy forgings. n158 The
limited supply of ultra-heavy forgings alone could double or triple nuclear construction costs. n159 In addition, the lack of skilled labor for nuclear
construction could prolong construction times and increase costs. n160 Further
increasing costs of nuclear construction is
the cost of capital. Technical uncertainty, input-cost uncertainty, and operating and revenue
uncertainty associated with nuclear power combine to increase the cost of capital in financing
nuclear construction. n161 For instance, Standard & Poor argued in 2005 that "the industry's legacy of cost growth,
technological problems, and cumbersome political and regulatory oversight and the newer risks
brought about by competition ... may have kept the credit risk too high for even [federal legislation
providing loan guarantees] to overcome." n162 D. Absence of Recent Nuclear Construction in the United States As noted above,
the history of nuclear power has led to a fourth factor causing uncertainty to developers: the
fact that it has been over a decade since the last nuclear power was constructed to completion
in the United States. n163 Current projections of the cost for new construction in the United States rely on the costs of recent foreign builds.
n164 Differences in regulation, access to alternative technologies, and public acceptance between the United States and these foreign countries render
the accuracy of [*294] projections based on foreign builds uncertain. n165 Because
the amounts of time, effort, and
materials needed to build a new nuclear plant in the United States are unclear, the lack of
recent U.S. nuclear construction represents a technical uncertainty to developers. n166