IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR MONTGOMERY COUNTY, ALABAMA

CIVIL DIVISION

EDWARD SIMMS, EDWINA A. RELF, and )

TISLAM D. ELLIS, )
Plaintiffs, )
)
v. ) Case No.: CV-2018-_______
)
)
ED RICHARDSON, SUPERINTENDENT OF THE )
STATE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, in his )
individual and official capacity; REGINALD )
EGGLESTON, CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE )
OFFICER, AS NAMED BY THE )
SUPERINTENDENT OF THE STATE )
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION in his individual )
and official capacity; GORDON STONE, )
MAYOR OF THE TOWN OF PIKE ROAD, in )
his individual and official capacity; and )
FICTITIOUS DEFENDANTS DOES 1 )
THROUGH 10, whether singular or plural; )
)
Defendants. )

VERIFIED COMPLAINT TO ENJOIN THE IMPROPER AND ILLEGAL SALE OF

CERTAIN PROPERTIES, GEORGIA WASHINGTON MIDDLE SCHOOL, & FOR
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT DECLARING THE RIGHTS OF THE PARTIES

COME NOW Edward Simms, Edwina A. Relf, and Tislam D. Ellis (hereinafter referred

to as “Plaintiffs”), by and through undersigned counsel, and files this Complaint against the above-

named Defendants. As grounds for said Complaint, Plaintiffs state as follows:

DESCRIPTION OF CLAIMS AND JURISDICTION

This Complaint seeks, among other things:

1. Declaratory judgment, pursuant to the provisions of Ala. Code (1975) §6-6-222, et seq.,

as amended and Rule 57 of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure;

2. Temporary restraining order, as well as preliminary and permanent injunctions,

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 pursuant to Ala. Code (1975) § 6-6-500, as amended and Rule 65 of the Alabama Rules

of Civil Procedure;

3. Issuance of a writ of certiorari; and

4. Judgment for damages resulting from breach of fiduciary duties.

PARTIES

5. Plaintiff Edward Simms is a tax-paying resident of Montgomery County, Alabama and

is over the age of nineteen years. He is employed by the Montgomery County Board of

Education (hereinafter referred to as the “MCBOE”) as a teacher at Robert E. Lee High

School. He is the parent of a student enrolled at Georgia Washington Middle School

(hereinafter referred to as “GW”).

6. Plaintiff Edwina A. Relf is a tax-paying resident of Montgomery County, Alabama and

is over the age of nineteen years. She is employed by the Montgomery County Board

of Education as a Child Nutrition Program Manager at Chisholm Elementary School.

7. Plaintiff Tislam D. Ellis is a tax-paying resident of Montgomery County, Alabama and

is over the age of nineteen years. He is employed by the MCBOE as a teacher at Sidney

Lanier High School.

8. Defendant Ed Richardson (hereinafter “Defendant Richardson”) is the interim

Superintendent of the Alabama State Department of Education (hereinafter referred to

as “ALSDE”). Defendant Richardson is over the age of nineteen (19) years and is a

resident of Montgomery County, Alabama. Defendant Richardson has certain statutory

duties with respect to the office of the superintendent of the ALSDE. Defendant

Richardson is sued in his individual and official capacities.

9. Defendant Reginald Eggleston (hereinafter “Defendant Eggleston”) has been named as

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 Chief Administrative Officer for the ALSDE by Defendant Richardson on November

9, 2017. Defendant Eggleston is sued in his individual and official capacities.

10. Defendant Gordon Stone (hereinafter “Defendant Stone”) is the mayor of the Town of

Pike Road. Defendant Stone is over the age of nineteen (19) years and is a resident of

Montgomery County, Alabama.

11. Plaintiffs do not know the true names of fictitious defendants DOE’s 1 through 10, and

therefore sue them by those fictitious names. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and

on the basis of that information and belief allege that each of those defendants was in

some manner legally responsible for the events and happenings alleged in this

complaint and for Plaintiffs’ damages. The names, capacities, and relationships of

DOE’s 1 through 10 will be alleged by amendment to this Complaint when they are

known.

FACTS

A. Relevant History of Georgia Washington Middle School

12. Legendary African-American educator, Miss Georgia Washington, founded her school

– the People’s Village School – more than one hundred and twenty (120) years ago, in

the 1890’s. (See the attached Exhibit A— “About Our School,” from the website of

Georgia Washington Middle School”).

13. In 1896, the Trustees of the People’s Village School acquired a piece of land for the

school. (See the attached Exhibit B— 1896 Deed).

14. By 1916, the People’s Village School had grown from an enrollment of four small boys

and one teacher to an enrollment of two hundred twenty-five (225) students and five

(5) teachers. (See Exhibit A).

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15. In 1932, Miss Washington wrote in a letter to school supporters that over one hundred

families owned their homes and small tracts of land in and about Mt. Meigs and that

all the land touching the school grounds was owned by African Americans. (See

Exhibit A).

16. In 1936, after forty-three (43) years of dedicated service, Miss Georgia Washington

retired but spent her retirement living in her same residence quarters at the People’s

Village School; she continued to work among the people of Mt. Meigs and watched

progress until her death in 1952.

17. The school grew and thrived and for nearly fifty years of its existence, and only the

land was held by the Trustees of the People’s Village School; however, in 1943, the

Trustees of the school authorized the conveyance of the land to the MCBOE

FOREVER. (See the attached Exhibit C—1943 Deed).

18. Miss Washington is buried on the school campus. (See Exhibit A). GW is the only

MPS school honored with having one of its founders buried on school property.

19. At the time of her death, the school that stands on the site of the People’s Village School

was renamed Georgia Washington High School in her honor. (See Exhibit A).

20. In 1974, the school system converted the Georgia Washington High School into a

junior high school without changing any of its historic heritage. (See Exhibit A).

21. Currently, GW serves most of eastern Montgomery County. (See Exhibit A).

22. The MCBOE is an autonomous state authorized entity created for the purpose of

educating children. Ala. Code (1975) § 16-8-1, et seq.

23. The MCBOE is authorized to own property and dispose of the same consistent with

state law. Ala. Code (1975) § 16-8-12.

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24. Since 1943, the land and the buildings constituting GW have been held in trust by the

MCBOE. (Ala. Code (1975) § 16-8-12(a) provides that “[r]eal and personal estate

granted, conveyed, devised, or bequeathed for the use of any particular county, school

district, or public school shall be held in trust by the county board of education for the

benefit of any such county school district or school.”)

B. Defendant Richardson’s Relationship with the Town of Pike Road

25. On or about February 13, 2012, Defendant Stone of the Town of Pike Road announced

that Defendant Richardson would serve as executive director of the then newly formed

Pike Road Education Leadership Council (PRELC), wherein Defendant Richardson

would serve as a consultant, leader, promoter, and advisor to the Town of Pike Road

and guide the municipality through the steps of establishing a public school system.

(See Exhibit D—AL.com article, February 13, 2012, reprinted on the Town of Pike

Road’s website). He continued to “help lead” the town’s school project for years

thereafter (see Exhibit E— the Town of Pike Road’s Press Release, dated January 6,

2014), including heading the search for the system’s first local superintendent (see

Exhibit F—Montgomery Advertiser Article, September 24, 2013, reprinted on the

Town of Pike Road’s website).

26. Defendant Richardson was also responsible for advising and guiding the Town of Pike

Road in the separation negotiations with Montgomery Public Schools (hereinafter

referred to as “MPS”), which included laying the groundwork for school financing and

the preliminary stages of construction of the initial Pike Road Schools System

(hereinafter “PRS”) K-8 facility.

27. Defendant Richardson was among a group of educational experts who voiced support

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 for the new PRS in October 2011.

28. Defendant Richardson also guided the Town of Pike Road through the process of

school board selection and other education-related projects. (See Exhibit E).

29. Based on information and belief, Defendant Richardson served as the advisor and

consultant for the PRELC until as recently as April 2017. (See Exhibit G—

Montgomery Advertiser Article originally published April 12, 2017). Furthermore,

there is no evidence that he has resigned from, or been removed from, this position.

30. Defendant Richardson was the advisor and consultant for the PRELC on or about 2016

when an ALSDE employee improperly sent approximately one million four hundred

thousand dollars ($1.4M) to the PRS—money that was earmarked for the education of

MPS students.

C. Defendant Richardson’s Relationship with the Alabama Public Charter School

Commission

31. Also, on or about June 2015, Defendant Richardson was appointed to and served on

the Alabama Public Charter School Commission. (See Exhibit H— Alabama Public

Charter School Commission appointees list).

32. Defendant Richardson held that position from June 1, 2015 through September 13,

2017, after which he was appointed as the interim State superintendent of education.

(See Exhibit I—AL.com Article dated September 14, 2017).

D. MPS Intervention

33. Prior to Defendant Richardson’s appointment to the position of interim state

superintendent for the ALSDE, the Alabama State Board of Education (hereinafter

“ASBOE”) hired Michael Sentance (hereinafter “Sentence”) for the position of ALSDE

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 state superintendent. (See Exhibit J).

34. On or about January 12, 2017, Sentance called for the approval of a resolution by the

ASBOE to allow him to issue to the MCBOE notice of intervention into MPS.

35. The intervention in MPS was preceded by a January 17, 2017 letter from the State

superintendent constituting a “notice to show cause.” (Exhibit K—Sentence Show

Cause Letter). That letter, insofar as it concerned matters of school finances, mentioned

the absence of a permanent Chief Financial Officer and the failure to timely submit

various financial documents. (See Exhibit K, p. 1). It also mentioned non-financial

concerns. It said nothing suggesting that any MCBOE real property needed to be sold

in order to cure any financial obligations or as a means to shore up any reserve

requirements.

36. The State superintendent’s letter promised a “commitment to a collaborative process”

if the local Board would agree to intervention. (See Exhibit K, p. 2). The local Board

did consent to such a collaborative process in intervention, and the ASBOE therefore

authorized the intervention. (Exhibit L—Intervention Resolution).

37. On or about February 9, 2017, Sentance called for the ASBOE to accept his

recommendation to intervene into MPS based on the information Sentance provided it.

The ASBOE approved Sentance’s recommendation.

38. The Education Accountability and Intervention Act of 2013 (hereinafter “EAIA”), Ala.

Code (1975) § 16-6E-1, et seq., as amended, requires that the State superintendent,

when seeking approval for an intervention, must describe in writing the conditions and

circumstances supporting the request for intervention as well as a proposed plan for

correcting the deficiencies.

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39. No plan was submitted by Sentance prior to the adoption of the resolution.

40. The adopted resolution expressed that the MCBOE would cooperate, collaborate, and

work with Sentance during the intervention.

41. At the outset, both the ASBOE and the MCBOE shared a common goal of achieving

financial and academic improvement, and it was agreed that said goal would be realized

together.

42. After both an agreement by the MCBOE to not object and the subsequent approval of

the intervention, Sentance exceeded the authority given to him by the ASBOE,

disregarded the terms of the agreement, and acted unilaterally in contradiction to the

representations he made to the ASBOE and the MCBOE.

43. On September 13, 2017, a civil action was filed against Sentance and Defendant

Eggleston for multiple abuses of authority, including but not limited to the attempted

outsourcing of custodians and Child Nutrition Program workers, the unnecessary

accrual of nearly one million three hundred thousand dollars ($1.3M) in newly created

personnel salaries, etc. (See Felix Murrell, et al. v. Michael Sentance, et al., CV-2017-

000501.00, Montgomery County Circuit Court, hereinafter referred to as the “Murrell

litigation”).

44. Later that same day, Sentance resigned from his position as the ALSDE State

superintendent.

45. Thereafter, Defendant Richardson was named the interim state superintendent for the

ALSDE on or about September 14, 2017.

46. Defendant Richardson’s status as interim state superintendent of education is short-

term and due to expire in May 2018.

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E. The Sale of GW

47. In October 2017, during the pendency of the Murrell litigation, the MCBOE voted to

sell GW to the Town of Pike Road for a sum of eleven million two hundred fifty

thousand dollars ($11.25M)—the total contractual amount due to the MCBOE—

contingent upon the results of an impact study to determine operational and financial

effects on the MCBOE resulting from the transaction.

48. Immediately after the October 2017 vote, the MCBOE performed the responsibly

diligent step of obtaining an expert impact study on the possible sale of GW. (See

Exhibit M—WSFA article dated November 3, 2017).

49. According to the expert’s impact study, “selling the school would have required a shift

of enrollment for every one of the system’s middle schools. It would have put MPS

middle schools right over ninety-five percent (95%) capacity, which experts have

recommended be between 85 and 90 percent.” (See Exhibit M). “There would be no

room for growth, a difficulty with transit, and … a need for ‘floating’ teachers.” (See

Exhibit M). Therefore, selling GW would be a bad move for MPS students.

50. On November 3, 2017, the MCBOE voted 5 to 2 against selling GW to the Town of

Pike Road for use by the recently-formed PRS. (See Exhibit M).

51. Defendant Stone, despite that vote, said that he was optimistic that the sale would still

happen: “There are a lot of pieces to this puzzle that have not been put in place yet. So

we’re still cautiously optimistic that … ultimately this deal will happen.” (See Exhibit

M).

52. Upon information and belief, the “pieces of the puzzle” referenced were that because

Defendant Richardson was the interim State superintendent he could and would push

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 through the sale of GW.

53. Defendant Stone was a material participant in the attempted illegal sale of GW to PRS.

F. The Murrell Mediation Settlement Agreement

54. After the November 3, 2017 MCBOE vote not to sell GW, Defendant Richardson

(acting as the current Interim State superintendent) settled the Murrell litigation by

executing a settlement agreement on December 28, 2017. (See Exhibit N— Murrell

Mediation Settlement Agreement).

55. In that December 28, 2017 settlement agreement, Defendant Richardson agreed to

develop and present to the MCBOE by January 26, 2018 a written intervention plan

(hereinafter referred to as the “MCIP”) that would address the following matters:

a. The scope of intervention authority;

b. The role of the MCBOE and MPS officials in the day-to-day administration of

Board Business;

c. Performance and operational standards that must be met as preconditions to

relaxation or relinquishment of intervention control (in whole or in part) over

MPS operations and a projected reasonable timeline for attainment of all

intervention objectives and concomitant release from intervention pursuant to

Ala. Code (1975) § 16-6E-4(1); and

d. Any other matters that are mandated in such a plan by the EAIA.

56. On January 5, 2018, the MCBOE passed a resolution that adopted and approved the

terms of the mediation settlement agreement. (See Exhibit O—MCBOE Resolution).

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G. The Deficient Intervention Plan

57. In January 2018, Defendant Richardson submitted a deficient document he claimed to

be the MCIP. (See Exhibit P—Deficient Montgomery County Board of Education

Intervention Plan submitted by Defendant Richardson).

58. The aforementioned document failed to address with any substance or detail the four

categories Defendant Richardson agreed to address in the MCIP.

59. Nor does the aforementioned document mention selling GW.

60. Yet, on February 9, 2018, Defendant Richardson announced that he would sell GW to

the Town of Pike Road for nine million seven hundred fifty thousand dollars ($9.75M),

a decision made:

a. Without MCBOE approval;

b. Over the objection of the MCBOE;

c. Despite an unsatisfactory impact study; and

d. In complete and willful contravention to the November 3, 2017 MCBOE vote.

(See Exhibit Q).

61. The October 2017 vote to sell GW to the Town of Pike Road was for a sum of eleven

million two hundred fifty thousand dollars ($11.25M) with no mention of the one

million four hundred thousand dollars ($1.4M) rightfully owed to MPS from PRS.

62. Defendant Richardson’s attempt to unlawfully sell GW to the Town of Pike Road in

February 2018 is also contracted at $11.25M.

63. This time, however, the sale of GW will have commingled transactions, with only

$9.75M paying for the real estate and $1.5M purportedly repaying the $1.4M due from

PRS to MPS.

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64. Based on information and belief, prior to February 2018, Defendant Richardson made

absolutely no effort to recover the $1.4M rightfully due to MPS from PRS.

65. Moreover, Defendant Eggleston knew that PRS owed $1.4M to MPS.

66. Based on information and belief, Defendant Eggleston made no effort to recover those

funds due from PRS.

67. Nor has Eggleston made any steps, gestures, or commitment to ensuring that PRS

returns the monies owed to MPS from PRS.

68. Defendant Eggleston is therefore also complicit in the illegal sale of GW.

69. Defendant Richardson is in the process of unlawfully selling the historic GW contrary

to state law and contrary to the best interests of the citizens, students, and employees

of MPS.

70. Based on information and belief, this transaction imminent and is ready for closing

within thirty (30) days of Defendant Richardson’s February 9, 2018 announcement that

he intends to sell GW.

71. Meanwhile, three (3) other MPS schools have been announced for closure—Chisholm

Elementary School, Dozier Elementary School, and Floyd Elementary School— with

no mention of them being placed on the market; however, these school buildings and

other MPS facilities that Defendant Richardson plans to close will be properties that

newly-created charter schools would have access to purchase at less than fair market

value.

72. Neither GW nor any of the three (3) elementary schools are on the list of Montgomery

County’s failing schools. (See Exhibit R—January 2018 List of Failing Schools as

Defined by the Alabama Accountability Act of 2013, as amended in 2015).

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73. In fact, GW is considered a “choice school” as defined in the Alabama Accountability

Act. (See Ala. Code (1975) § 16-6D-1, et seq.).

74. The MCBOE has the express authority and statutory right to acquire, purchase, lease,

receive, hold, transmit and convey the title to real and personal property for school

purposes— not Defendant Richardson. Ala. Code (1975) § 16-8-12(a) provides that

“[r]eal and personal estate granted, conveyed, devised, or bequeathed for the use of any

particular county, school district, or public school shall be held in trust by the county

board of education for the benefit of any such county school district or school.”

75. The MCBOE has the express authority and statutory right to enter into property

contracts after a duly adopted board resolution— not Defendant Richardson.

76. There has been no appraisal done and provided to the MCBOE nor to the public, and

no one knows the true value of any of the GW buildings or the land to which GW is

attached.

77. Defendant Richardson’s attempted sale of GW is void ab initio.

H. Divergent Treatment of MPS from Other Alabama Public School Systems

78. Defendant Richardson claims that MPS is in fiscal distress and that it failed to

maintain a one-month financial reserve. (See Exhibit P).

79. Ala. Code (1975) § 16-13A-9 states that a local board of education shall develop a

plan to establish and maintain a minimum reserve fund equal to one month's operating

expenses.

80. Based on information and belief, out of one hundred thirty-seven (137) Alabama

public school systems, at least nineteen (19) of those systems violate the law by not

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 meeting the one-month financial reserve requirement, including PRS; yet MPS has

been selected for arbitrary enforcement of this same requirement.

81. Defendant Richardson made no mention that PRS is one of the nineteen (19) school

systems violating the one-month financial reserve requirement.

82. And based upon information and belief, Defendant Richardson, as interim State

superintendent, is permitting PRS to acquire property while forcing MPS to sell real

property under the guise of shoring up MPS financial reserves.

83. Defendant Richardson has made no efforts to intervene into the other eighteen (18)

school systems having less than the one-month financial reserve.

84. MPS is the unfortunate victim of this selective, arbitrary, and capricious enforcement.

85. Moreover, Defendant Richardson’s deficient plan submitted in January 2018 does not

describe in writing how MPS will address this alleged fiscal distress, nor does it

mention selling any MCBOE real properties.

86. Selling GW, or any school building, is a decision with enormous and long-lasting

consequences. It is perhaps the most important decision that a school board can make

because it is irreversible.

87. PRS is in the process of expanding into the high school years, but it has no high school.

88. This has been a source of grave disappointment among Pike Road parents already, as

their rising high-school-age students are overcrowded and do not have a high school

proper building. (See Exhibit G).

89. Hence, the Town of Pike Road felt itself in dire need of the GW building.

90. As a consultant and advisor to PRS, Defendant Richardson had and still has a vested

interest in ensuring the success of PRS.

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91. Thus, his illegal sale of GW works even more against the best interests of MPS.

92. In addition, under the Alabama School Choice and Student Opportunity Act, Ala. Code

(1975) § 16-6F-11, charter schools such as the one recently approved for MPS have the

right to purchase school facilities at less than fair market value. This right to purchase

at a discounted rate includes the purchase of the school buildings and other MPS real

properties aforementioned in this Complaint.

93. Based on information and belief, the MPS facilities Defendant Richardson has

scheduled for closure will be sold to charter schools that he promoted and still supports.

I. The Detrimental Impact of the Sale of Georgia Washington Middle School

94. GW is an African American school founded by African Americans, and was deeded to

the MCBOE during a time when Montgomery County schools were segregated.

95. This conveyance was for the express purpose of educating African American children.

96. In 1969, the MCBOE was forced by federal court order to desegregate its school

system.

97. GW became a historic school that has maintained a culture of educating African

American students from its inception until now.

98. However, PRS, which was splintered off from MPS, was created and organized by a

predominantly White education leadership council and board of education.

99. PRS has maintained this complexion on its board of education and in its

superintendent’s position from its inception until now.

100. The predominantly White PRS now seeks to buy and operate a historically African

American school with a rich culture and heritage, which will defeat the original intent

of the creation of GW.

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101. This will detrimentally impact the African American community that has always been

a part of GW since its inception, including the historic Antioch Baptist Church—a

church whose members were integral to the creation of the school.

102. In the same manner that the taxpayers, parents, students, and citizens of Montgomery

have embraced the schools named after confederate leaders, i.e., Jefferson Davis High

School and Robert E. Lee High School, GW should be treated the same and maintain

its culture and heritage within MPS.

COUNT I-BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY OF GOOD FAITH & FAIR DEALING

103. Plaintiffs adopt and incorporate herein by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully

set out herein.

104. Since March 31, 1943, the MCBOE has held in trust the land and buildings constituting

GW.

105. Defendant Richardson selling GW over the objections of the local school board violates

his fiduciary duty of good faith to MPS and its students.

106. Alabama law is clear that, in any decision regarding the disposition of GW, the local

board of education acts in a fiduciary capacity.

107. Ala. Code § 16-8-12 states that “Real and personal estate granted, conveyed, devised,

or bequeathed for the use of any particular county, school district, or public school shall

be held in trust by the county board of education for the benefit of any such county

school district or school.”

108. The GW property was conveyed for the use of MPS, and as such it is “held in trust” by

the local board “for the benefit of” the county school system.

109. “[O]ur Legislature has made the county board of education the owner of legal title to

16
 school property, except in cities having city school boards. This is an active trusteeship

not mere nominal ownership.” White v. State, 42 Ala. App. 249, 255 (Ala. App. 1964)

(emphasis supplied).

110. IF the State superintendent acting under intervention authority has the power to sell a

school, he is acting in a fiduciary capacity.

111. Defendant Richardson has failed to act “solely in the interest of the beneficiaries” (MPS

and its students).

112. Defendant Richardson was integral to the conception and birth of PRS as it split away

from MPS. He was – formally and explicitly – a leader, consultant, and booster for PRS

from its origins to just weeks before he assumed the mantle of interim State

superintendent with intervention authority over MPS.

113. Just months ago, he was tasked with helping to solve the problems that PRS faced,

including the lack of an appropriate high school facility—the very same problems

facing him the moment he became interim State superintendent.

114. Purchasing GW was a long-coveted goal of PRS.

115. Defendant Stone predicted the sale would likely go through in the end, even after the

MCBOE decisively voted against it. The Town of Pike Road and PRS knew what the

MCBOE and MPS did not: that Defendant Richardson was the “piece of this puzzle”

that had not yet been put on the table.

116. Defendant Richardson’s unilateral decision to override the super-majority vote of the

MCBOE and ignore the results of the expert’s impact study was not the act of a

fiduciary with only MPS interests at heart.

117. Defendant Richardson was not interested in working with the MCBOE to

17
 collaboratively select a school facility to sell, if one truly was necessary to sell for

revenue purposes.

118. Defendant Richardson was insistent on choosing the one path that (a) had been rejected

by the MCBOE after receiving local community input, and (b) fulfilled the needs of his

longtime client and pet project, PRS.

119. This Court should prohibit such a violation of this fiduciary duty.

WHEREFORE, THE PREMISES CONSIDERED, Plaintiffs respectfully request this

Honorable Court to take jurisdiction of this cause and enter an Order granting the following against

Defendant Richardson:

(A) An Order compelling Defendant Richardson to perform his fiduciary duties in compliance

with state and federal laws;

(B) An Order maintaining the status quo pending an expedited final hearing in this matter; and

(C) An Order granting Plaintiffs such other, further and different relief as the Court may deem

proper under the circumstances, plus costs.

COUNT II—BREACH OF THE FIDUCIARY DUTY OF LOYALTY

120. Plaintiffs adopt and incorporate herein by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully

set out herein.

121. As a fiduciary to MPS, Defendant Richardson is also obligated to ensure that MPS has

the funds that rightfully belong to it.

122. However, he was subject to a longstanding external and conflicting loyalty to PRS.

123. “A trustee's first duty as a fiduciary is to act in all things wholly for the benefit of the

trust. … A trustee owes the beneficiaries of a trust the duty of loyalty, which requires

the trustee to preserve trust assets and to administer the trust solely in the interest of the

18
 beneficiaries.” Regions Bank v. Lowery, 101 So.3d 210, 219 (Ala. 2012).

124. Indeed, as the interim State superintendent, Defendant Richardson is obligated to

advance the interests of MPS even if there were no fiduciary duty.

125. Defendant Richardson willfully and knowingly disregarded his obligations by

permitting PRS to illegally retain approximately $1.4M that rightfully belongs to MPS.

126. He has further violated his duties to MPS by intertwining that issue with his desire to

sell GW.

127. This blatant and unashamedly illegal retention of money by PRS since 2016 should

have been corrected by now.

128. Defendant Richardson’s violation of these duties is even more egregious given his

supposed focus on building up MPS financial reserves but failing to insist and ensure

that PRS replenish its one-month financial reserve and return the money to MPS.

129. Defendant Richardson’s decisions were biased and unethical since PRS benefitted by

retaining the money to the detriment of MPS.

130. Defendant Richardson’s status as interim State superintendent is short-term, leaving

him with the incentive of continuing to work in the best interests of PRS.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs request an Order requiring Defendants, and those acting in concert with

them, to take all necessary steps to immediately ensure that PRS promptly return the money in

question to MPS.

COUNT III-INJUNCTION

131. Plaintiffs adopt and incorporate herein by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully

set out herein.

132. Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Richardson acted willfully, knowingly, maliciously, in

19
 bad faith, beyond his authority, and/or under a mistaken interpretation of the law and

is not immune from civil action pursuant to Ex parte Cranman, 792 So. 2d 392 (Ala.

2000).

133. Defendant Richardson does not have the authority, under Ala. Code (1975) § 16-6E-1

et seq. or the ASBOE’s resolution, to unilaterally sell MCBOE real property.

134. The intervention statute does not give carte blanche to the state superintendent, even

when the State Board of Education authorizes intervention.

135. Instead, the intervention statute allows the state superintendent to take action to remedy

deficiencies that are identified in the documentation that leads to the intervention

resolution. (See Ala. Code (1975) § 16-6E-4(5), providing that “[i]f the State Board of

Education approves a resolution authorizing educational intervention, the State

superintendent of education may exercise plenary authority to make such decisions or

take such actions as he or she reasonably deems necessary to correct the deficiencies

that led to the request for approval of intervention or that may be discovered in the

exercise of intervention authority.”) (Emphasis supplied).

136. The authority of the state superintendent is directly tied to, and limited to, specific

deficiencies.

137. The state superintendent’s request for intervention authority was not based on any

assertion that MPS had too many school buildings or had too little money in the bank.

138. There were no suggestions that the MCBOE was unwilling or unable to make

appropriate decisions about whether to sell properties or which properties should be

sold.

139. Defendant Richardson has a legal and ministerial duty to comply with all state and

20
 federal constitutions and laws.

140. Defendant Richardson’s willful violation of this duty will cause irreparable damage to

Plaintiffs.

141. Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief to prohibit Defendant Richardson from selling GW.

142. The harm to Plaintiffs outweighs any potential harm to Defendant Richardson and

granting an injunction will not constitute a disservice to the public’s interest.

143. Moreover, the Court should maintain the status quo with immediate relief to ensure that

Defendant Richardson does not finalize the sale of GW before an expedited final

hearing of this matter. (See Aliant Bank v. Carter, 197 So.3d 981, 987 (Ala. 2015),

stating that the purpose of granting a temporary restraining order or preliminary

injunction is to maintain the status quo until the merits of the case can be determined).

Then, upon an expedited final hearing, the Court should prohibit Defendant Richardson

from unilaterally selling GW.

WHEREFORE, THE PREMISES CONSIDERED, Plaintiffs respectfully request this

Honorable Court to take jurisdiction of this cause and enter an Order granting the following against

Defendant Richardson:

(A) An Order compelling Defendant Richardson to perform his legal duty of complying with

all state and federal laws;

(B) An Order maintaining the status quo pending an expedited final hearing of this matter;

(C) An Order enjoining Defendant Richardson from unilaterally selling GW; and

(D) An Order granting Plaintiffs such other, further, and different relief as the Court may deem

proper under the circumstances, plus costs.

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 COUNT IV: DECLARATORY JUDGMENT

144. Plaintiffs adopt and incorporate herein by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully

set out herein.

145. Plaintiffs request the Court construe and issue a ruling regarding state statutes and their

application in this given situation.

146. Plaintiffs seek the Court to provide guidance and direction to prevent Defendant

Richardson from injuring or continuing to injure Plaintiffs by not acting in accordance

with state law.

147. Defendant Richardson’s actions are contrary to law, beyond the scope of Defendant

Richardson’s authority, and/or are based on a mistaken interpretation of law.

148. Plaintiffs seek this Court to construe said state statutes, constitutional rights, and laws

in light of the circumstances of this case and issue a ruling regarding the application of

the same in this given situation. Plaintiffs seek a construction of the correct status of

the law in this given situation.

149. As a proximate consequence of Defendant Richardson’s actions, Plaintiffs will be

injured and damaged.

150. Defendant Richardson has a legal and ministerial duty to comply with state law.

151. Defendant Richardson’s actions were clearly arbitrary, capricious, in bad faith, a gross

abuse of discretion, and beyond his authority or under mistaken interpretation of the

law.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray that this Court will stay all proceedings until a hearing

can be held on the issues presented herein and additionally declare and decide the rights of all

persons impacted by this litigation and direct the course of dealings prospectively as it relates to

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these and other school properties. Moreover, Plaintiffs pray for any and all other relief to which

Plaintiffs may be entitled.

COUNT V: WRIT OF CERTIORARI

152. Plaintiffs adopt and incorporate herein by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully

set out herein.

153. It is well settled that decisions of governmental boards, such as a local board of

education, are subject to judicial review by a petition for a writ of certiorari. Alexander

v. Dothan City Board of Ed., 891 So. 2d 323, 326 (Ala. Civ. App. 2004).

154. Plaintiffs contend that Defendant Richardson acted ultra vires by attempting to sell GW

to the Town of Pike Road despite the MCBOE’s November 3, 2017 vote not to sell

GW at all.

155. Defendant Richardson alleges that he has the power to act on behalf of the MCBOE in

all matters but has failed to demonstrate that he has authority to divest the MCBOE of

its property rights after a duly held school board vote.

156. It is therefore proper to review the legality of the proceedings regarding the pending

sale of MCBOE real property.

157. Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Honorable Court will issue a writ of certiorari

and review Defendant Richardson’s decision to sell GW.

158. Because Defendant Richardson has acted willfully, knowingly, maliciously, in bad

faith, beyond his authority, and/ or under a mistaken interpretation of the law, he is not

immune from suit pursuant to the holding in Ex parte Cranman, 792 So. 2d 392 (Ala.

2000) and its progeny.

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 WHEREFORE, THE PREMISES CONSIDERED, Plaintiffs respectfully request that

this Honorable Court accept this complaint for writ of certiorari, to review the decision, actions,

and/or statements of Defendant Richardson and determine that:

(A) Plaintiffs are entitled to the relief described above in the preceding paragraphs, including

without limitation the reversal of Defendant Richardson’s decision to sell GW, since it is

arbitrary, based upon an error of law, and/or not supported by the evidence in this cause;

and

(B) Plaintiffs further pray that they be awarded any other and further relief as well as any other

orders and judgments to which they may be entitled under the facts set out above, including

an award of costs.

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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 23rd day of February 2018.

/s/ Theron Stokes /s/ Fred F. Bell. Sr.

THERON STOKES (ST012) FRED F. BELL, SR. (BEL014)
Counsel for Plaintiffs Counsel for Plaintiffs
Alabama Education Association 1015 South McDonough Street
P.O. Box 4177 Montgomery, Alabama 36104
Montgomery, Alabama 36103-4177 Phone: (334) 265-7395
Phone: (334) 834-9790 E-mail: ffbell@netzero.com
Email: therons@alaedu.org

/s/ Clint Daughtrey /s/ Victoria D. Relf

CLINT DAUGHTREY (DAU005) VICTORIA D. RELF (REL004)
Counsel for Plaintiffs Counsel for Plaintiffs
Alabama Education Association The Relf Law Firm, LLC
P.O. Box 4177 60 Commerce Street, Suite 325
Montgomery, AL 36103-4177 Montgomery, Alabama 36104
Telephone: (334) 834-9790 Phone: (334) 595-9779
Email: clintd@alaedu.org E-mail: Victoria@relf-law.com

/s/ James E. Wilson, Jr. /s/ Monica L. Arrington

JAMES E. WILSON, JR. (WIL077) MONICA L. ARRINGTON (ARR003)
Counsel for Plaintiffs Counsel for Plaintiffs
P.O. Box 6237 Arrington & Arrington
Montgomery, AL 36106 2501 Bell Road
Tel: 334-834-9899 Montgomery, Alabama 36117
E-mail: ATYWILSON@NETZERO.NET Phone: (334) 270-2007
E-mail: arringtonmon@aol.com

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * ** * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

DEFENDANTS WILL BE SERVED VIA PRIVATE PROCESS SERVER.

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