Liability – quasi-delicts vs.

criminal offense

EN BANCG.R. No. L-4920 June 29, 1953

FRANCISCO DIANA and SOLEDAD DIANA, plaintiffs-appellants, vs.BATANGAS TRANSPORTATION
CO., defendant-appellee.
Zosimo D. Tanalega for appellants.Gibbs, Gibbs, Chuidian and Quasha for appellee.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

The present appeal stems from a case originally instituted in the Court of First Instance of Laguna wherein
plaintiffs seek to recover from defendant as a party subsidiarily liable for the crime committed by an
employee in the discharge of his duty the sum of P2,500 as damages, plus legal interest, and the costs of
action.

The appeal was originally taken to the Court of Appeals but the case was certified to this court on the
ground that it poses merely a question of law.

Plaintiffs are the heirs of one Florenio Diana, a former employee of the defendant. On June 21, 1945, while
Florenio Diana was riding in Truck No. 14, belonging to the defendant, driven by Vivencio Bristol, the truck
ran into a ditch at Bay, Laguna, resulting in the death of Florenio Diana and other passengers.
Subsequently, Vivencio Bristol was charged and convicted of multiple homicide through reckless
imprudence wherein, among other things, he was ordered to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the
amount of P2,000. When the decision became final, a writ of execution was issued in order that the
indemnity may be satisfied but the sheriff filed a return stating that the accused had no visible leviable
property. The present case was started when defendant failed to pay the indemnity under its subsidiary
liability under article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. The complaint was filed on October 19, 1948 (civil
case No. 9221).

On December 13, 1948, defendant filed a motion to dis- miss on the ground that there was another action
pending between the same parties for the same cause (civil case No. 8023 of the Court of First Instance of
Laguna) in which the same plaintiffs herein sought to recover from the same defendant the amount of
P4,500 as damages resulting from the death of Florenio Diana who died while on board a truck of
defendant due to the negligent act of the driver Vivencio Bristol. This first action was predicated on culpa
aquiliana.

On December 16, 1948, plaintiffs filed a written opposition to the motion to dismiss. On February 3, 1949,
the lower court, having found the motion well founded, dismissed the complaint, without special
pronouncement as to costs; and their motion for reconsideration having been denied, plaintiffs took the
present appeal.

The only question to be determined is whether the lower court correctly dismissed the complaint on the
sole ground that there was another action pending between the same parties for the same cause under
Rule 8, section 1(d) of the Rules of Court.

The determination of this issue hinges on the proper interpretation of Rule 8, section 1 (d) which allows the
dismissal of a case on the ground that "there is another action pending between the same parties for the
same cause." Former Justice Moran, commenting on this ground, says: "In order that this ground may be
invoked, there must be between the action under consideration and the other action, (1) identity of parties,
or at least such as representing the same interest in both actions; (2) identity of rights asserted and relief
prayed for, the relief being found on the same facts; and (3) the identity on the two preceding particulars
should be such that any judgment which may be rendered on the other action will, regardless of which
party is successful, amount to res adjudicata in the action under consideration." [I Moran, Comments on
the Rules of Court, (1952), p. 168.].

There is no doubt with regard to the identity of parties. In both cases, the plaintiffs and the defendant are
the same. With regard to the identity of reliefs prayed for, a different consideration should be made. It
should be noted that the present case (civil case No. 9221) stems from a criminal case in which the driver
of the defendant was found guilty of multiple homicide through reckless imprudence and was ordered to
pay an indemnity of P2,000 for which the defendant is made subsidiarily liable under article 103 of the
Revised Penal Code, while the other case (civil case No. 8023) is an action for damages based on culpa
aquiliana which underlies the civil liability predicated on articles 1902 to 1910 of the old Civil Code. These
two cases involve two different remedies. As this court aptly said: "A quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a
separate legal institution under the Civil Code, with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is
entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime. * * *. A distinction exists between the civil liability
arising from a crime and the responsibility for cuasi-delictos or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligent
act causing dam- ages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under article 100 of the Revised
Penal Code, or create an action for cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual under articles 1902-1910 of the
Civil Code (Barredo vs. Garcia and Al- mario, 73 Phil., 607). The other differences pointed out between
crimes and culpa aquiliana are:.

1. That crimes affect the public interest, while cuasi-delitos are only of private concern.
2. That, consequently, the Penal Code punishes or corrects the criminal act, while the Civil Code, by
means of indemnification, merely repairs the damage.
3. That delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts, because the former are punished only if there is a penal
law clearly covering them, while the latter, cuasi-delitos, include all acts in which 'any kind of fault or
negligence intervenes. (P. 611, supra.).

Considering the distinguishing characteristics of the two cases, which involve two different remedies, it can
hardly be said that there is identity of reliefs in both actions as to make the present case fall under the
operation of Rule 8, section 1(d) of the Rules of Court. In other words, it is a mistake to say that the
present action should be dismissed because of the pendency of another action between the same parties
involving the same cause. Evidently, both cases involve different causes of action. In fact, when the Court
of Appeals dismissed the action based on culpa aquiliana (civil case No. 8023), this distinction was
stressed. It was there said that the negligent act committed by defendant's employee is not a quasi crime,
for such negligence is punishable by law. What plaintiffs should have done was to institute an action under
article 103 of the Revised Penal Code (CA-G.R. No. 3632-R). And this is what plaintiffs have done. To
deprive them now of this remedy, after the conviction of defendant's employee, would be to deprive them
altogether of the indemnity to which they are entitled by law and by a court decision, which injustice it is our
duty to prevent.

Wherefore, the order appealed from is reversed and the case is hereby remanded to the lower court for
further proceedings. No pronouncement as to costs.

Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, Jugo, and Labrad
SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 170813 April 16, 2008
B.F. METAL (CORPORATION), Petitioner,versus SPS. ROLANDO M. LOMOTAN and LINAFLOR LOMOTAN and
RICO UMUYON, Respondents.

April 16, 2008The instant petition raises the following issues: (1) whether the amount of actual damages based
only on a job estimate should be lowered; (2) whether Spouses Lomotanare also entitled to moral damages;
and (3) whether the award of exemplary damages and attorneys is warranted. For their part, respondents
contend that the aforementioned issues are factual in nature and therefore beyond the province of a
petitioner for review under Rule 45.

This is not the first instance where the Court has given due course to a Rule 45 petition seeking solely the
review of the award of damages.[8] A partys entitlement to damages is ultimately a question of law because not
only must it be proved factually but also its legal justification must be shown. In any case, the trial court and
the appellate court have different findings as to the amount of damages to which respondents are entitled.
When the factual findings of the trial and appellate courts are conflicting, the Court is constrained to look into
the evidence presented before the trial court so as to resolve the herein appeal.[9]
The trial court split the award of actual damages into three items, namely, the cost of the wrecked jeep, the
medical expenses incurred by respondent Umuyon and the monetary value of his earning capacity. On appeal,
the Court of Appeals reduced the amount of medical expenses and loss of earning capacity to which
respondent Umuyon is entitled but increased from P96,700.00 to P130,655.00 the award in favor of
Spouses Lomotan for the cost of repairing the wrecked jeep.

The instant petition assails only the modified valuation of the wrecked jeep. Petitioner points out that the
alleged cost of repairing the jeep pegged at P130,655.00 has not been incurred but is only a job estimate or a
sum total of the expenses yet to be incurred for its repair. It argues that the best evidence obtainable to prove
with a reasonable degree of certainty the value of the jeep is the acquisition cost or the purchase price of the
jeep minus depreciation for one year of use equivalent to 10% of the purchase price.

Petitioners argument is partly meritorious.

Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such
pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such compensation is referred to as actual or
compensatory damages.[10] Actual damages are such compensation or damages for an injury that will put the
injured party in the position in which he had been before he was injured. They pertain to such injuries or losses
that are actually sustained and susceptible of measurement. To justify an award of actual damages, there must
be competent proof of the actual amount of loss. Credence can be given only to claims which are duly
supported by receipts.[11]

In People v. Gopio,[12] the Court allowed the reimbursement of only the laboratory fee that was duly receipted
as the rest of the documents, which the prosecution presented to prove the actual expenses incurred by the
victim, were merely a doctors prescription and a handwritten list of food expenses.[13] In Viron Transportation
Co., Inc. v. Delos Santos,[14] the Court particularly disallowed the award of actual damages, considering that the
actual damages suffered by private respondents therein were based only on a job estimate and a photo
showing the damage to the truck and no competent proof on the specific amounts of actual damages suffered
was presented.

In the instant case, no evidence was submitted to show the amount actually spent for the repair or
replacement of the wrecked jeep. Spouses Lomotan presented two different cost estimates to prove the
alleged actual damage of the wrecked jeep. Exhibit B, is a job estimate by Pagawaan Motors, Inc., which
pegged the repair cost of the jeep at P96,000.00, while Exhibit M, estimated the cost of repair at P130,655.00.
Following Viron, neither estimate is competent to prove actual damages. Courts cannot simply rely on
speculation, conjecture or guesswork in determining the fact and amount of damages.[15]
As correctly pointed out by petitioner, the best evidence to prove the value of the wrecked jeep is reflected in
Exhibit I, the Deed of Sale showing the jeeps acquisition cost at P72,000.00. However, the depreciation value of
equivalent to 10% of the acquisition cost cannot be deducted from it in the absence of proof in support
thereof.

Petitioner also questions the award of moral and exemplary damages in favor of Spouses Lomotan. It argues
that the award of moral damages was premised on the resulting physical injuries arising from the quasi-delict;
since only respondent Umuyon suffered physical injuries, the award should pertain solely to him.
Correspondingly, the award of exemplary damages should pertain only to respondent Umuyon since only the
latter is entitled to moral damages, petitioner adds.

In the case of moral damages, recovery is more an exception rather than the rule. Moral damages are not
punitive in nature but are designed to compensate and alleviate the physical suffering, mental anguish, fright,
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar harm
unjustly caused to a person. In order that an award of moral damages can be aptly justified, the claimant must
be able to satisfactorily prove that he has suffered such damages and that the injury causing it has sprung from
any of the cases listed in Articles 2219[16] and 2220[17] of the Civil Code. Then, too, the damages must be shown
to be the proximate result of a wrongful act or omission.The claimant must establish the factual basis of the
damages and its causal tie with the acts of the defendant. In fine, an award of moral damages would require,
firstly, evidence of besmirched reputation or physical, mental or psychological suffering sustained by the
claimant; secondly, a culpable act or omission factually established; thirdly, proof that the wrongful act or
omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the damages sustained by the claimant; and fourthly, that
the case is predicated on any of the instances expressed or envisioned by Article 2219 and Article 2220 of the
Civil Code.[18]

In culpa aquiliana, or quasi-delict, (a) when an act or omission causes physical injuries,
or (b) where the defendant is guilty of intentional tort, moral damages may aptly be
recovered. This rule also applies, as aforestated, to breaches of contract where the
defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. In culpa criminal, moral damages could be
lawfully due when the accused is found guilty of physical injuries, lascivious acts,
adultery or concubinage, illegal or arbitrary detention, illegal arrest, illegal search, or
defamation.[19]

Undoubtedly, petitioner is liable for the moral damages suffered by

respondent Umuyon. Its liability is based on a quasi-delict or on its negligence in the
supervision and selection of its driver, causing the vehicular accident and physical
injuries to respondent Umuyon. Rivera is also liable for moral damages to
respondent Umuyon based on either culpa criminal or quasi-delict. Since the decision
in the criminal case, which found Rivera guilty of criminal negligence, did not award
moral damages, the same may be awarded in the instant civil action for damages.

Jurisprudence show that in criminal offenses resulting to the death of the victim, an
award within the range of P50,000.00 to P100,000.00 as moral damages has become
the trend.[20] Under the circumstances, because respondent Umuyon did not die but
had become permanently incapacitated to drive as a result of the accident, the award
of P30,000.00 for moral damages in his favor is justified.[21]
However, there is no legal basis in awarding moral damages to Spouses Lomotan whether arising from the
criminal negligence committed by Rivera or based on the negligence of petitioner under Article 2180.[22] Article
2219[23] speaks of recovery of moral damages in case of a criminal offense resulting in physical injuries
or quasi-delictscausing physical injuries, the two instances where Rivera and petitioner are liable for moral
damages to respondent Umuyon. Article 2220[24] does speak of awarding moral damages where there is injury
to property, but the injury must be willful and the circumstances show that such damages are justly due. There
being no proof that the accident was willful, Article 2220 does not apply.

Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or correction for the public good, in
addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.[25] Exemplary damages cannot be
recovered as a matter of right; the court will decide whether or not they should be adjudicated.[26] In quasi-
delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence.[27] While the amount
of the exemplary damages need not be proved, the plaintiff must show that he is entitled to moral, temperate
or compensatory damages before the court may consider the question of whether or not exemplary damages
should be awarded.[28]

As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, Spouses Lomotan have shown that they are entitled to
compensatory damages while respondent Umuyon can recover both compensatory and moral damages. To
serve as an example for the public good, the Court affirms the award of exemplary damages in the amount
of P100,000.00 to respondents. Because exemplary damages are awarded, attorneys fees may also be
awarded in consonance with Article 2208 (1).[29] The Court affirms the appellate courts award of attorneys fees
in the amount of P25,000.00.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 58655 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The award of actual damages for the cost of repairing
the owner-type jeep is hereby REDUCED to P72,000.00 while the moral damages of P30,000.00 is awarded
solely to respondent Umuyon. All other awards of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. Following
jurisprudence,[30] petitioner is ordered to PAY legal interest of 6% per annum from the date of promulgation of
the Decision dated 21 April 1997 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 72, Antipolo, Rizal and 12% per annum
from the time the Decision of this Court attains finality, on all sums awarded until their full satisfaction.

SO ORDERED.
Tort distinguished from civil liability arising from a crime

Padilla vs. CA

Section 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states the fundamental proposition that WHEN A CRIMINAL
ACTION IS INSTITUTED, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly
instituted with it. There is no implied institution when the offended party expressly waives the civil action or
reserves his right to institute it separately.
The extinction of the civil action by reason of acquittal in the criminal case refers exclusively to civil liability ex
delicto founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code. In other words, the civil liability which is also
extinguished upon acquittal of the accused is the civil liability arising from the act as a crime.

As easily as 1942, the Supreme Court speaking through Justice Jorge Bocobo in Barredo v. Garcia, laid down
the rule that the same punishable act or omission can create two kinds of civil liabilities against the accused
and, where provided by law, his employer. ‘There is the civil liability arising from the act as a crime and the
liability arising from the same act as a quasi-delict. Either one of these two types of civil liability may be
enforced against the accused, However, the offended party cannot recover damages under both types of
liability. For instance, in cases of criminal negligence or crimes due to reckless imprudence, Article 2177 of the
Civil Code provides: The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only when
it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil might arise did not exist. Thus, the civil liability is
not extinguished by acquittal where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of
evidence is required in civil cases; where the court expressly declares that the liability of the accused is not
criminal but only civil in nature as, for instance, in the felonies of estafa, theft, and malicious mischief
committed by certain relatives who thereby incur only civil liability; and, where the civil liability does not arise
from or is not based upon the criminal act of which the accused was acquitted. Article 29 of the Civil Code also
provides that:

When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved
beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. Such
action requires only a preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the court may require the
plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the complaint should be found to be malicious.

If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In the
absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the
acquittal is due to that ground.

More recently, we held that the acquittal of the defendant in the criminal case would not constitute an
obstacle to the filing of a civil case based on the same acts which led to the criminal prosecution.

There appear to be no sound reasons to require a separate civil action to still be filed considering that the facts
to be proved in the civil case have already been established in the criminal proceedings where the accused was
acquitted. Due process has been accorded the accused. He was, in fact, exonerated of the criminal charged.
The constitutional presumption of innocence called for more vigilant efforts on the part of prosecuting
attorneys and defense counsel, a keener awareness by all witnesses of the serious implications of perjury, and
a more studied consideration by the judge of the entire records and of applicable statutes and precedents. To
require a separate civil action simply because the accused was acquitted would mean needless clogging of
court dockets and unnecessary duplication of litigation with all its attendant loss of time, effort, and money on
the part of all concerned.
We see no need to amend Article 29 of the Civil Code in order to allow a court to grant damages despite a
judgment of acquittal based on reasonable doubt. What Article 29 clearly and expressly provides is a remedy
for the plaintiff in case the defendant has been acquitted in a criminal prosecution on the ground that his guilt
has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. It merely emphasizes that a civil action for damages is not
precluded by an acquittal for the same criminal act or omission. The Civil Code provision does not state that
the remedy can be availed of only in a separate civil action. A separate civil case may be filed but there is no
statement that such separate filing is the only and exclusive permissible mode of recovering damages.

There is nothing contrary to the Civil Code provision in the rendition of a judgment of acquittal and a judgment
awarding damages in the same criminal action. The two can stand side by side. A judgment of acquittal
operates to extinguish the criminal liability. It does not, however, extinguish the civil liability unless there is
clear showing that the act from which civil liability might arise did not exist.

A different conclusion would be attributing to the Civil Code a trivial requirement, a provision which imposes
an uncalled for burden before one who has already been the victim of a condemnable, yet non-criminal, act
may be accorded the justice which he seeks.

People vs. Ligon

It does not follow that a person who is not criminally liable is also free from civil liability. While the guilt of the
accused in a criminal prosecution must be established beyond reasonable doubt, only a preponderance of
evidence is required in a civil action for damages. The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the
accused when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.

In the case at bar, we find that a preponderance of evidence exists sufficient to establish the facts from which
the civil liability of Gabat arises. On the basis of the trial court’s evaluation of testimonies of both prosecution
and the defense witnesses at the trial and applying the quantum of proof required in civil cases, we find that a
preponderance of evidence establishes that Gabat by his act and omission with fault and negligence caused
damage to Rosales and should answer civilly for the damage done.

Rufo Mauricio Construction vs. IAC

The death of the accused during the pendency of his appeal or before the judgment of conviction (rendered
against him by the lower court) became final and executory extinguished his criminal liability meaning his
obligation to serve the imprisonment imposed and his pecuniary liability for fines, but not his civil liability
should the liability or obligation arise (not from a crime, for here, no crime was committed, the accused not
having been convicted by final judgment, and therefore still regarded as innocent) but from a quasi-delict, as in
this case. The liability of the employer here would not be subsidiary but solidary with his driver (unless said
employer can prove there was no negligence on his part at all, that is, if he can prove due diligence in the
selection and supervision of his driver).

Dulay vs. CA

The term “physical injuries” in Article 33 has already been construed to include bodily injuries causing death. It
is not the crime of physical injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code. It includes not only physical injuries but
also consummated, frustrated, and attempted homicide

Since Article 2176 covers not only acts of negligence but also acts which are intentional and voluntary, it was
therefore erroneous on the part of the trial court to dismiss petitioner’s complaint simply because it failed to
make allegations of attendant negligence attributable to private respondents.
Chua vs. CA

Under the Revised Penal Code, every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. When a criminal
action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be
deemed instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right
to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

The basis of civil liability arising from crime is the fundamental postulate that every man criminally liable is also
civilly liable. When a person commits a crime he offends two entities namely (1) the society in which he lives in
or the political entity called the State whose law he has violated; and (2) the individual member of the society
whose person, right, honor, chastity or property has been actually or directly injured or damaged by the same
punishable act or omission. An act or omission is felonious because it is punishable by law, it gives rise to civil
liability not so much because it is a crime but because it caused damage to another. Additionally, what gives
rise to the civil liability is really the obligation and the moral duty of everyone to repair or make whole the
damage caused to another by reason of his own act or omission, whether done intentionally or negligently.
The indemnity which a person is sentenced to pay forms an integral part of the penalty imposed by law for the
commission of the crime. The civil action involves the civil liability arising from the offense charged which
includes restitution, reparation of the damage caused, and indemnification for consequential damages.

Under the Rules, where the civil action for recovery of civil liability is instituted in the criminal action pursuant
to Rule 111, the offended party may intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the offense.

Private respondent did not waive the civil action, nor did she reserve the right to institute it separately, nor
institute the civil action for damages arising from the offense charged. Thus, we find that the private
prosecutors can intervene in the trial of the criminal action.

Cerezo vs. Tuazon

The same negligent act may produce civil liability arising from a delict under Article 103 of the Revised Penal
Code, or may give rise to an action for a quasi-delict under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. An aggrieved party
may choose between the two remedies. An action based on a quasi-delict may proceed independently from
the criminal action. There is, however, a distinction between civil liability arising from a delict and civil liability
arising from a quasi-delict. The choice of remedy, whether to sue for a delict or a quasi-delict, affects the
procedural and jurisdictional issues of the action.

The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary. Where there is a solidary
obligation on the part of debtors, as in this case, each debtor is liable for the entire obligation. Hence, each
debtor is liable to pay for the entire obligation in full. There is no merger or renunciation of rights, but only
mutual representation. Where the obligation of the parties is solidary, either of the parties is indispensable,
and the other is not even a necessary party because complete relief is available from either.

Moreover, an employer’s liability based on a quasi-delict is primary and direct, while the employer’s liability
based on a delict is merely subsidiary. The words “primary and direct,” as contrasted with “subsidiary,” refer to
the remedy provided by law for enforcing the obligation rather than to the character and limits of the
obligation. Although liability under Article 2180 originates from the negligent act of the employee, the
aggrieved party may sue the employer directly. When an employee causes damage, the law presumes that the
employer has himself committed an act of negligence in not preventing or avoiding the damage. This is the
fault that the law condemns. While the employer is civilly liable in a subsidiary capacity for the employee’s
criminal negligence, the employer is also civilly liable directly and separately for his own civil negligence in
failing to exercise due diligence in selecting and supervising his employee. The idea that the employer’s liability
is solely subsidiary is wrong.

The action can be brought directly against the person responsible (for another), without including the author
of the act. The action against the principal is accessory in the sense that it implies the existence of a prejudicial
act committed by the employee, but it is not subsidiary in the sense that it can not be instituted till after the
judgment against the author of the act or at least, that it is subsidiary to the principal action; the action for
responsibility (of the employer) is in itself a principal action

In contrast, an action based on a delict seeks to enforce the subsidiary liability of the employer for the criminal
negligence of the employee as provided in Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. To hold the employer liable
in a subsidiary capacity under a delict, the aggrieved party must initiate a criminal action where the employee’s
delict and corresponding primary liability are established. If the present action proceeds from a delict, then the
trial court’s jurisdiction over Foronda is necessary. However, the present action is clearly for the quasi-delict of
Mrs. Cerezo and not for the delict of Foronda.
Concept of Criminal Negligence

FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. 162987 May 21, 2009

SOFIA M. GUILLANG, represented by SUSAN GUILLANG-CABATBAT, REYNALDO, GERARDO,BIENVENIDO,
DAWNA, and NELLIE, all surnamed GUILLANG,GENARO GUILLANG, JOSE DIGNADICE, and ALVIN LLANILLO,
Petitioners, - versus - RODOLFO BEDANIA and RODOLFO DE SILVA, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N - CARPIO, J.:
The Case

This is a petition for review[1] of the 3 June 2003 Decision[2] and the 23 March 2004 Resolution[3] of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 69289. The 3 June 2003 Decision set aside the 5 December 2000 Decision[4] of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 30, Manila (trial court). The 23 March 2004 Resolution denied the motion for
reconsideration.

The Facts

On 25 October 1994, at about 5:45 in the afternoon, petitioner Genaro M. Guillang (Genaro) was driving his
brand new Toyota Corolla GLI sedan with conduction sticker no. 54-DFT (car) along Emilio Aguinaldo Highway
(highway) in Cavite. Genaro, Antero Guillang (Antero), Felipe Jurilla, Jose Dignadice (Dignadice), and Alvin
Llanillo (Llanillo) had all just left from Golden City, Dasmarias, Cavite, and were on their way to Manila. At the
other side of the highway, respondent Rodolfo A. Bedania (Bedania) was driving a ten-wheeler Isuzu cargo
truck with plate no. CAC-923 (truck) towards Tagaytay City. The truck was owned by respondent Rodolfo de
Silva (de Silva).

Along the highway and the road leading to the Orchard Golf Course, Bedania negotiated a U-turn. When the
truck entered the opposite lane of the highway, Genaros car hit the right portion of the truck. The truck
dragged Genaros car some five meters to the right of the road.

As a consequence, all the passengers of the car were rushed to the De La Salle University Medical Center in
Dasmarias, Cavite for treatment. Because of severe injuries, Antero was later transferred to the Philippine
General Hospital. However, on 3 November 1994, Antero died due to the injuries he sustained from the
collision. The car was a total wreck while the truck sustained minor damage.

On 24 April 1995, petitioners Genaro, Llanillo, Dignadice, and the heirs of Antero [5] instituted a complaint for
damages based on quasi-delict against respondents Bedania and de Silva.

On 5 December 2000, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioners. The trial court found Bedania
grossly negligent for recklessly maneuvering the truck by making a sudden U-turn in the highway without due
regard to traffic rules and the safety of other motorists. The trial court also declared de Silva grossly negligent
in the selection and supervision of his driver, Bedania. The dispositive portion of the decision provides:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendants Rodolfo A. Bedania and Rodolfo de Silva,
jointly and severally, to pay plaintiffs, as follows:

1. The sum of P508,566.03 representing the damage/repair costs of the Toyota to plaintiff Genaro M.
Guillang.
2. The sum of P50,000.00 for the death of Antero Guillang plus P185,000.00 for his burial expenses, to the
heirs of Antero Guillang.
3. For hospital and medical expenses as reflected in Exhibits E, E-1 to E-30 to plaintiffs Genaro M. Guillang,
Jose Dignadice and Alvin Llanillo.
4. The sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages for the heirs of the deceased Antero Guillang.
5. The sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages each to plaintiffs Jose Dignadice, Alvin Llanillo and Genaro
Guillang.
6. The sum of P50,000.00 as exemplary damages.
7. The sum of P100,000.00 as and for attorneys fess.
8. The costs of the suit.

SO ORDERED.[6]

Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals.

On 3 June 2003, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision in favor of respondents. The dispositive portion of
the decision provides:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appealed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint of the
herein appellees in Civil Case No. 95-73666 is DISMISSED, for lack of merit. The appellants counterclaims in the
instant case are likewise DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to cost.

SO ORDERED.[7]

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. On 23 March 2004, the Court of Appeals denied the motion.

Hence, this petition.

The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

According to the trial court, there is a presumption that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if
at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.[8]In this case, the trial court found that the
Traffic Accident Investigation Report (report),[9] corroborated by the testimonies of the witnesses, showed that
the truck committed a traffic violation by executing a U-turn without signal lights. The trial court also declared
that Bedania violated Sections 45(b),[10] 48,[11] and 54[12] of Republic Act No. 4136[13] when he executed the
sudden U-turn. The trial court added that Bedania violated another traffic rule when he abandoned the victims
after the collision.[14] The trial court concluded that Bedania was grossly negligent in his driving and held him
liable for damages.

Moreover, the trial court found that Bedania did not make the U-turn at an intersection. According to the trial
court, vehicles trying to maneuver to change directions must seek an intersection where it is safer to
maneuver and not recklessly make a U-turn in a highway. The trial court said Bedania should have observed
extreme caution in making a U-turn because it was unexpected that a long cargo truck would execute a U-turn
along the highway.

The trial court also said that Bedanias gross negligence raised the legal presumption that de Silva, as Bedanias
employer, was negligent in the selection and supervision of his employees. The trial court said that, under
Articles 2176[15] and 2180[16] of the Civil Code, de Silvas liability was based on culpa aquiliana which holds the
employer primarily liable for tortious acts of his employees, subject to the defense that he exercised all the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employees. The trial court ruled
that de Silva failed to prove this defense and, consequently, held him liable for damages.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial courts decision and said that the trial court overlooked substantial facts
and circumstances which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion and alter the results of
the case.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the testimonies of the witnesses and declared that they were contrary to
human observation, knowledge and experience. The Court of Appeals also said that the following were the
physical evidences in the case:

1. It was not yet dark when the incident transpired;

2. The four-lane highway the appellees were cruising on was wide, straight, dry, relatively plain and
with no obstructions to the drivers vision;
3. The point of impact of the collision is on the lane where the car was cruising and the car hit the
gas tank of the truck located at its right middle portion, which indicates that the truck had already properly
positioned itself and had already executed the U-turn before the impact occurred;
4. Genaro Guillang was not able to stop the car in time and the cars front portion was totally
wrecked. This negates appellees contention that they were traveling at a moderate speed; and
5. The sheer size of the truck makes it improbable for the said vehicle to negotiate a U-turn at a
sudden and fast speed as appellees vigorously suggest without toppling over on its
side.[17] (Citations omitted)

The Court of Appeals concluded that the collision was caused by Genaros negligence. The Court of Appeals
declared that the truck arrived at the intersection way ahead of the car and had already executed the U-
turn when the car, traveling at a fast speed, hit the trucks side. The Court of Appeals added that considering
the time and the favorable visibility of the road and the road conditions, Genaro, if he was alert, had ample
time to react to the changing conditions of the road. The Court of Appeals found no reason for Genaro not to
be prudent because he was approaching an intersection and there was a great possibility that vehicles would
be traversing the intersection either going to or from Orchard Golf Course. The Court of Appeals said Genaro
should have slowed down upon reaching the intersection. The Court of Appeals concluded that Genaros failure
to observe the necessary precautions was the proximate cause of Anteros death and the injuries of the
petitioners.

The Court of Appeals also relied on the testimony of Police Traffic Investigator Efren Videna (Videna) that the
car was running at a fast speed and overtook another vehicle just before the collision occurred.[18] The Court of
Appeals concluded that Genaro did not see the truck as the other vehicle temporarily blocked his view of the
intersection. The Court of Appeals also gave weight to Videnas testimony that it was normal for a ten-wheeler
truck to make a U-turn on that part of the highway because the entrance to Orchard Golf Course was
spacious.[19]

The Issues

Petitioners raise the following issues:

1. Did the Court of Appeals decide a question of substance in this case in a way probably not in accord with
law or with the applicable decisions of the Honorable Supreme Court?
2. Did the Court of Appeals depart from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings particularly
when it revised, and recast the findings of facts of the trial court pertaining to credibility of witnesses of which
the trial court was at the vantage point to evaluate?
3. Did the Court of Appeals act with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when
it rendered the palpably questionable Court of Appeals Decision that tampered with the findings of fact of
the trial court for no justifiable reason?
4. Is the Court of Appeals judgment and resolution reversing the decision of the trial court supported by
the evidence and the law and jurisprudence applicable?[20]

The issue in this case is who is liable for the damages suffered by petitioners. The trial court held Bedania and
de Silva, as Bedanias employer, liable because the proximate cause of the collision was the sudden U-turn
executed by Bedania without any signal lights. On the other hand, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial
courts decision and held Genaro liable because the proximate cause of the collision was Genaros failure to
stop the car despite seeing that Bedania was making a U-turn.

The Ruling of the Court

The principle is well-established that this Court is not a trier of facts. Therefore, in an appeal
by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised. The resolution of factual
issues is the function of the lower courts whose findings on these matters are received with respect and are, as
a rule, binding on this Court.[21]

However, this rule is subject to certain exceptions. One of these is when the findings of the appellate court are
contrary to those of the trial court.[22] Findings of fact of the trial court and the Court of Appeals may also be
set aside when such findings are not supported by the evidence or where the lower courts conclusions are
based on a misapprehension of facts.[23] Such is the situation in this case and we shall re-examine the facts and
evidence presented before the lower courts.

Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relations between the parties, is called a quasi-delict. To sustain a claim based on quasi-delict, the
following requisites must concur: (a) damage suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of defendant; and
(c) connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of defendant and the damage incurred by
the plaintiff.[24]

There is no dispute that petitioners suffered damages because of the collision. However, the issues on
negligence and proximate cause are disputed.

On the Presumption of Negligence and Proximate Cause

Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the interest of another person that degree
of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers
injury. In Picart v. Smith,[25] we held that the test of negligence is whether the defendant in doing the alleged
negligent act used that reasonable care and caution which an ordinary person would have used in the same
situation.

The conclusion of the Court of Appeals that Genaro was negligent is not supported by the evidence on
record. In ruling that Genaro was negligent, the Court of Appeals gave weight and credence to Videnas
testimony. However, we find that Videnas testimony was inconsistent with the police records and report that
he made on the day of the collision.First, Videna testified that the car was running fast and overtook another
vehicle that already gave way to the truck.[26] But this was not indicated in either the report or the police
records. Moreover, if the car was speeding, there should have been skid marks on the road when Genaro
stepped on the brakes to avoid the collision. But the sketch of the accident showed no skid marks made by the
car.[27] Second, Videna testified that the petitioners came from a drinking spree because he was able to smell
liquor.[28] But in the report,[29] Videna indicated that the condition of Genaro was normal. Videna did not
indicate in the report that Genaro had been drinking liquor or that Genaro was obviously drunk. Third, Videna
testified that when he arrived at the scene, Bedania was inside his truck.[30] This contradicts the police records
where Videna stated that after the collision Bedania escaped and abandoned the victims.[31] The police records
also showed that Bedania was arrested by the police at his barracks in Anabu, Imus, Cavite and was turned
over to the police only on 26 October 1994.[32]

Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, unless there is proof to the contrary, a person driving a vehicle is
presumed negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.
In this case, the report[33] showed that the truck, while making the U-turn, failed to signal, a violation of traffic
rules. The police records also stated that, after the collision, Bedania escaped and abandoned the petitioners
and his truck.[34] This is another violation of a traffic regulation.[35] Therefore, the presumption arises that
Bedania was negligent at the time of the mishap.
The evidence presented in this case also does not support the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the truck
had already executed the U-turn before the impact occurred. If the truck had fully made the U-turn, it should
have been hit on its rear.[36] If the truck had already negotiated even half of the turn and is almost on the other
side of the highway, then the truck should have been hit in the middle portion of the trailer or cargo
compartment. But the evidence clearly shows, and the Court of Appeals even declared, that the car hit the
trucks gas tank, located at the trucks right middle portion, which disproves the conclusion of the Court of
Appeals that the truck had already executed the U-turn when it was hit by the car.

Moreover, the Court of Appeals said that the point of impact was on the lane where the car was
cruising. Therefore, the car had every right to be on that road and the car had the right of way over the truck
that was making a U-turn. Clearly, the truck encroached upon the cars lane when it suddenly made the U-turn.

The Court of Appeals also concluded that Bedania made the U-turn at an intersection. Again, this is not
supported by the evidence on record. The police sketch[37] does not indicate an intersection and only shows
that there was a road leading to the Orchard Golf Course near the place of the collision. Furthermore, U-turns
are generally not advisable particularly on major streets.[38] Contrary to Videnas testimony, it is not normal for
a truck to make a U-turn on a highway. We agree with the trial court that if Bedania wanted to change
direction, he should seek an intersection where it is safer to maneuver the truck. Bedania should have also
turned on his signal lights and made sure that the highway was clear of vehicles from the opposite direction
before executing the U-turn.

The finding of the Court of Appeals that it was not yet dark when the collision occurred is also not supported
by the evidence on record. The report stated that the daylight condition at the time of the collision was
darkness.[39]

Contrary to the conclusion of the Court of Appeals, the sheer size of the truck does not make it improbable for
the truck to execute a sudden U-turn. The trial courts decision did not state that the truck was traveling at a
fast speed when it made the U-turn. The trial court said the truck made a sudden U-turn, meaning the U-turn
was made unexpectedly and with no warning, as shown by the fact that the trucks signal lights were not
turned on.

Clearly, Bedanias negligence was the proximate cause of the collision which claimed the life of Antero and
injured the petitioners. Proximate cause is that which, in the natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by
any efficient, intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred.[40] The cause of the collision is traceable to the negligent act of Bedania for if the U-turn was
executed with the proper precaution, the mishap in all probability would not have happened. The sudden U-
turn of the truck without signal lights posed a serious risk to oncoming motorists. Bedania failed to prevent or
minimize that risk. The trucks sudden U-turn triggered a series of events that led to the collision and,
ultimately, to the death of Antero and the injuries of petitioners.

We agree with the trial court that de Silva, as Bedanias employer, is also liable for the damages suffered by
petitioners. De Silva failed to prove that he exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of his employees.

On the Award of Damages and Attorney’s Fees

According to prevailing jurisprudence, civil indemnity for death caused by a quasi-delict is pegged
at P50,000.[41] Moral damages in the amount of P50,000 is also awarded to the heirs of the deceased taking
into consideration the pain and anguish they suffered.[42] Bienvenido Guillang (Bienvenido), Anteros son,
testified that Sofia, Anteros wife and his mother, became depressed after Anteros death and that Sofia died a
year after.[43] Bienvenido also testified on the pain and anguish their family suffered as a consequence of their
fathers death.[44] We sustain the trial courts award of P50,000 as indemnity for death and P50,000 as moral
damages to the heirs of Antero.

As to funeral and burial expenses, the court can only award such amount as are supported by proper
receipts.[45] In this case, petitioners proved funeral and burial expenses of P55,000 as evidenced by Receipt No.
1082,[46] P65,000 as evidenced by Receipt No. 1146[47] and P15,000 as evidenced by Receipt No. 1064,[48] all
issued by the Manila South Cemetery Association, Inc., aggregating P135,000. We reduce the trial courts award
of funeral and burial expenses from P185,000 to P135,000.

As to hospitalization expenses, only substantiated and proven expenses, or those that appear to have been
genuinely incurred in connection with the hospitalization of the victims will be recognized in court.[49] In this
case, the trial court did not specify the amount of hospitalization expenses to be awarded to the
petitioners. Since petitioners presented receipts for hospitalization expenses during the trial, we will
determine the proper amounts to be awarded to each of them. We award hospitalization expenses
of P27,000.98 to the heirs of Antero,[50] P10,881.60 to Llanillo,[51] P5,436.77 to Dignadice,[52] and P300 to
Genaro[53] because these are the amounts duly substantiated by receipts.

We affirm the trial courts award of P508,566.03 for the repair of the car. The Court notes that there is no
dispute that Genaro was driving a brand new Toyota Corolla GLI sedan and that, after the collision, the car was
a total wreck. In this case, the repair order presented by Genaro is sufficient proof of the damages sustained
by the car.[54]

MORAL DAMAGES may be recovered in quasi-delicts causing physical injuries.[55] However, in accordance with
prevailing jurisprudence, we reduce the award of moral damages from P50,000 to P30,000 each to Llanillo,
Dignadice, and Genaro since they only suffered physical injuries brought about by the collision.[56]

IN QUASI-DELICTS, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence.[57] While
the amount of exemplary damages need not be proved, the plaintiff must show that he is entitled to moral,
temperate or compensatory damages before the court may consider the question of whether or not
exemplary damages should be awarded.[58] In this case, Bedania was grossly negligent in suddenly making a U-
turn in the highway without signal lights. To serve as an example for the public good, we affirm the trial courts
award of exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000.

Finally, we affirm the trial courts award of attorneys fees in the amount of P100,000. Under Article 2208 of the
Civil Code, attorneys fees may be recovered when, as in this case, exemplary damages are awarded.

WHEREFORE, we REVERSE the 3 June 2003 Decision and 23 March 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 69289. We REINSTATE with MODIFICATIONS the 5 December 2000 Decision of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 30, Manila. We ORDER Rodolfo Bedania and Rodolfo de Silva, jointly and severally, to pay
the following amounts:

1. Funeral and Burial Expenses of P135,000 to the heirs of Antero Guillang;

2. Hospitalization Expenses of P27,000.98 to the heirs of Antero Guillang, P10,881.60 to Alvin
Llanillo, P5,436.77 to Jose Dignadice, and P300 to Genaro Guillang; and
3. Moral damages of P30,000 each to Alvin Llanillo, Jose Dignadice, and Genaro Guillang.
SO ORDERED.