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1. [Mo. 1049. May 16, 1903.

THE UNITED STATES, complainant and appellee, vs. FRED L. DORR ET AL.,
defendants and appellants.

Facts:

In 1902, a complaint was filed in the CFI Manila against Fred L. Dorr and Edward
F. O'Brien, charging them with the publication of a false and malicious libel against
Señor Benito Legarda, one of the United States Philippine Commissioners.

The defendants were tried and found guilty of the offense charged in the complaint.
From this judgment the defendants have appealed to this court.

During the course of the proceedings a motion was made by the defendants asking
that they be granted a trial by jury, as provided for in Article III, section 2, of the
Constitution of the United States, and under the sixth amendment to the Constitution,
which motion was denied by the court. The motion was opposed by the complainant
arguing that the provisions of the Constitution of the United States relating to trial
by jury are not in force in the Philippines.

The determination of this question involves the consideration of the political status
of these Islands, the power of Congress under the Constitution, and the nature of the
constitutional provisions relating to jury trials.

It is contended, also, by counsel for the defendants, that Congress could not lawfully
authorize the Philippine Commission to enact the libel law passed by it on October
24, 1901, under which the defendants have been convicted. The objection to the law
is based upon the theory of the division of the Federal Government into three
branches, executive, legislative, and judicial, and that the powers of legislation
vested in Congress to make laws cannot be delegated by that department to the
judgment, wisdom, or patriotism of any other body or authority.

Issue:
Whether or not the Legislature’s power to legislate may be delegated.
Held:
Yes. While the authorities cited in support of the general proposition maintain the
doctrine, there are well-known exceptions to the general rule not referred to in these
decisions, for the reason that the decision of the case did not require their
consideration. A well-known exception is that of municipal corporations, upon
which the powers of legislation are commonly bestowed.

The case in question forms an exception to this general rule equally well established.
Congress, in the exercise of its power to make rules and regulations for the
government of the territories, has often delegated the power of legislation to the
territorial government. The case of American Insurance Company vs. Canter (1 Pet,
511), before cited, originated under an act of the governor and legislative council of
Florida, organizing a court and vesting in it admiralty jurisdiction, and in which the
jurisdiction of the court was sustained by the Supreme Court of the United States.

Speaking of the power of Congress in creating territorial governments, it is said in


the case of De Lima vs. Bidwell (182 U. S., 1) that "the power to establish territorial
government has been too long exercised by Congress and acquiesced in by the
Supreme Court to be deemed an unsettled question."

We reach the conclusion in this case:

1. That while the Philippine Islands constitute territory which has been acquired by
and belongs to the United States, there is a difference between such territory and the
territories which are a part of the United States with reference to the Constitution of
the United States.

2. That the Constitution was not extended here by the terms of the treaty of Paris,
under which the Philippine Islands were acquired from Spain. By the treaty the status
of the ceded territory was to be determined by Congress.

3. That the mere act of cession of the Philippines to the United States did not extend
the Constitution here, except such parts as fall within the general principles of
fundamental limitations in favor of personal rights formulated in the Constitution
and its amendments, and which exist rather by inference and the general spirit of the
Constitution, and except those express provisions of the Constitution which prohibit
Congress from passing laws in their contravention under any circumstances; that the
provisions contained in the Constitution relating to jury trials do not fall within either
of these exceptions, and, consequently, the right to trial by jury has not been
extended here by the mere act of the cession of the territory.

4. That Congress has passed no law extending here the provision of the Constitution
relating to jury trials, nor were any laws in existence in the Philippine Islands, at the
date of their cession, for trials by jury, and cousequently there is no law in the
Philippine Islands entitling the defendants in this case to such trial; that the Court of
First Instance committed no error in overruling their application for a trial by jury.

We also reach the conclusion that the Philippine Commission is a body expressly
recognized and sanctioned by act of Congress, having the power to pass laws, and
has the power to pass the libel law under which the defendants were convicted.

Dipositive portion: "We conclude that the publication of the caption and headlines
in the "Manila Freedom," upon which the information is based, constituted the
offense of libel; that the judgment is sustained by the evidence; that the defendants,
Fred L. Dorr and Edward F. O'Brien, are guilty of the offense charged in the
information;

2. G.R. No. 103982.December 11, 1992.*

ANTONIO A. MECANO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent.

Facts:

Petitioner is a Director of NBI. He was hospitalized for cholecystitis, on account of


which he incurred medical and hospitalization expenses which he is claiming from
the COA. He requested the reimbursement of his expenses on the ground that he is
entitled to the benefits under Section 699 of the RAC.

COA Chairman Eufemio C. Domingo denied petitioner’s claim on the ground that
Section 699 of the RAC has been repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987,
solely for the reason that the same section was not restated nor re-enacted in the
Administrative Code of 1987. He commented, however, that the claim may be filed
with the Employees’ Compensation Commission, considering that the illness of
Director Mecano occurred after the effectivity of the Administrative Code of 1987.
Issue:

Whether or not the Administrative Code of 1987 repealed or abrogated Section 699
of the RAC

Held:

No. In the case of the two Administrative Codes in question, the ascertainment of
whether or not it was the intent of the legislature to supplant the old Code with the
new Code partly depends on the scrutiny of the repealing clause of the new Code.
This provision is found in Section 27, Book VII (Final Provisions) of the
Administrative Code of 1987

There are two categories of repeal by implication.

1. Where provisions in the two acts on the same subject matter are in an
irreconcilable conflict, the later act to the extent of the conflict constitutes an
implied repeal of the earlier one.
2. If the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly
intended as a substitute, it will operate to repeal the earlier law.

Implied repeal by irreconcilable inconsistency takes place when the two statutes
cover the same subject matter; they are so clearly inconsistent and incompatible with
each other that they cannot be reconciled or harmonized; and both cannot be given
effect, that is, that one law cannot be enforced without nullifying the other.

Comparing the two Codes, it is apparent that the new Code does not cover nor
attempt to cover the entire subject matter of the old Code. There are several matters
treated in the old Code which are not found in the new Code, such as the provisions
on notaries public, the leave law, and the public bonding law, military reservations,
claims for sickness benefits under Section 699, and still others.

Lastly, it is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals of statutes by


implication are not favored. The presumption is against inconsistency and
repugnancy for the legislature is presumed to know the existing laws on the subject
and not to have enacted inconsistent or conflicting statutes. Hence, every effort must
be used to make all acts stand and if, by any reasonable construction, they can be
reconciled, the later act will not operate as a repeal of the earlier.
3. No. L-66614. January 25, 1988.*

PRIMITIVO LEVERIZA, FE LEVERIZA, PARUNGAO & ANTONIO C.


VASCO, petitioners, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, MOBIL OIL
PHILIPPINES & CIVIL AERONAUTICS ADMINISTRATION, respondents.

Facts:

This case stemmed from 3 contracts of lease involving the Civil Aeronautics
Administration, public respondent (lessor) representing the RP, Rosario Leveriza,
petitioner, (lessee) and Mobil Oil Ph, private respondent (sub-lessee). The subject
matter of the contracts is the same parcel of land at the MIA area and such was leased
to two lessees for durations of time which overlapped.

Contract A – a lease contract of April 2, 1965 between CAA and Leveriza over the
land for 25 years.

Contract B – a lease contract of May 21, 1965 between Leveriza and Mobil for the
25 years.

Contract C – a lease contact of June 1, 1968 between CAA and Mobil for 25 years.

It is not disputed that the Leverizas (lessees) entered into a contract of sublease
(Contract “B”) with Mobil Oil Philippines without the consent of CAA (lessor).

After series of events, Mobil sought for the rescission of Contract A and B on the
ground that Contract A from which Contract B was derived has already been
cancelled by the defendant CAA and that approval of the Department Head is not
necessary under Section 32 (par. 24) of the Republic Act 776 which expressly vested
authority to enter into such contracts in the Administrator of CAA.

Petitioners Leverizas assailed the validity of such cancellation, claiming that the
Airport General Manager had no legal authority to make the cancellation even if it
has been ratified by the Director. Petitioners also contend that the administrator of
CAA cannot execute without approval of the President or the Department
Secretary of Public Works, a valid contract of lease over real property owned by
the Republic of the Philippines, citing Sections 567 and 568 of the Revised
Administrative Code
The Trial court declared Contracts A and B as having been validly cancelled.

Issue:

Whether or not the administrator of CAA can execute/cancel without the approval
of the Department Secretary a valid contract of lease over real property owned by
the RP.

Held:

Yes. The Director of the CAA does not need the prior approval of the President or
the Secretary of Public Works and Communications in the execution of the Contracts
of lease.

Under 567 of the Revised Administrative Code, such contract of lease must be
executed:

(1) by the President of the Philippines, or

(2) by an officer duly designated by him or

(3) BY AN OFFICER EXPRESSLY VESTED BY LAW.

As correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, the CAA has the power to execute the
deed or contract involving leases of real properties belonging to the Republic of the
Philippines, not because it is an entity duly designated by the President but because
the said authority to execute the same is, by law expressly vested in it under RA
776. The exception, however, is the sale of properties acquired by CAA or any
other real properties of the same which must have the approval of the President of
the Philippines.

There is no dispute that the Revised Administrative Code is a general law while
Republic Act 776 is a special law nor in the fact that the real property subject of
the lease in Contract “C” is real property belonging to the Republic of the
Philippines. General legislation must give way to special legislation on the same
subject.

4. Luzon Development Bank vs. Association of Luzon Development Bank


Employees
G.R. No. 120319. October 6, 1995.*

Facts:

From a submission agreement of the Luzon Development Bank (LDB) and the
Association of Luzon Development Bank Employees (ALDBE) arose an arbitration
case of whether or not the company has violated the CBA.

At a conference, the parties agreed on the submission of their respective Position


Papers to Atty. Ester S. Garcia, in her capacity as Voluntary Arbitrator to which
LDB failed to do so.

Without LDB’s Position Paper, the Voluntary Arbitrator rendered a decision in favor
of ALDBE.

Hence, this petition seeking to set aside the decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator
and to prohibit her from enforcing the same.

The state of our present law relating to voluntary arbitration provides that “(t)he
award or decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator x x x shall be final and executory after
ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the copy of the award or decision by the
parties,”5 while the “(d)ecision, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and
executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within ten (10)
calendar days from receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders.”

Hence, while there is an express mode of appeal from the decision of a labor arbiter,
Republic Act No. 6715 is silent with respect to an appeal from the decision of a
voluntary arbitrator. Past practice shows that a decision or award of a voluntary
arbitrator is elevated to the Supreme Court itself on a petition for certiorari, in effect
equating the voluntary arbitrator with the NLRC or the Court of Appeals.

Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7902, provides that
the Court of Appeals shall exercise:

“x x x x x x x x x (3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments,


decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial
agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, including the Securities and
Exchange Commission, the Employees’ Compensation Commission and the Civil
Service Commission, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the
Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of this
Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the
fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.

Issue:

Where should the appeals from a voluntary arbitrator be filed?

Held:

The Decision or Award of voluntary arbitrator should be appealed with the CA.

The Court ruled that the awards of voluntary arbitrators determine the rights of
parties; hence, their decisions have the same legal effect as judgments of a court.
“A voluntary arbitrator by the nature of her functions acts in a quasi-judicial
capacity.” Under these rulings, it follows that the voluntary arbitrator, whether
acting solely or in a panel, enjoys in law the status of a quasi-judicial agency but
independent of, and apart from, the NLRC since his decisions are not appealable to
the latter.

An “instrumentality” such as a Voluntary Arbitrator, is anything used as a means


or agency. Thus, the terms governmental “agency” or “instrumentality” are
synonymous in the sense that either of them is a means by which a government
acts, or by which a certain government act or function is performed. The word
“instrumentality,” with respect to a state contemplates an authority to which the
state delegates governmental power for the performance of a state function.

The voluntary arbitrator no less performs a state function pursuant to a


governmental power delegated to him under the provisions therefor in the Labor
Code and he falls, therefore, within the contemplation of the term “instrumentality”
in the aforequoted Sec. 9 of B.P. 129. The fact that his functions and powers are
provided for in the Labor Code does not place him within the exceptions to said
Sec. 9 since he is a quasi-judicial instrumentality as contemplated therein.

5. G.R. No. 102976. October 25, 1995.*

IRON AND STEEL AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS


and MARIA CRISTINA FERTILIZER CORPORATION, respondents.
Facts:

Petitioner Iron and Steel Authority (“ISA”) was created by Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 272 in order to develop and promote the iron and steel industry in the
Philippines. That among others, it has the power to initiate expropriation
proceedings

The National Steel Corporation (“NSC”) then a wholly owned subsidiary of the
National Development Corporation which is itself an entity wholly owned by the
National Government, embarked on an expansion program embracing, among
other things, the construction of an integrated steel mill in Iligan City. The
construction of such a steel mill was considered a priority and major industrial
project of the Government. Pursuant to the expansion program of the NSC,
Proclamation No. 2239 was issued by the President of the Philippines on 16
November 1982 withdrawing from sale or settlement a large tract of public land
located in Iligan City, and reserving that land for the use and immediate occupancy
of NSC.

Since certain portions of the public land subject matter of Proclamation No. 2239
were occupied by a non-operational chemical fertilizer plant and related facilities
owned by private respondent Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corporation (“MCFC”),
Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 1277, also dated 16 November 1982, was issued
directing the NSC to “negotiate with the owners of MCFC, for and on behalf of the
Government, for the compensation of MCFC’s present occupancy rights on the
subject land.”

LOI No. 1277 also directed that should NSC and private respondent MCFC fail to
reach an agreement within a period of sixty (60) days from the date of LOI No.
1277, petitioner ISA was to exercise its power of eminent domain under P.D. No.
272 and to initiate expropriation proceedings in respect of occupancy rights of pri

Negotiations between NSC and private respondent MCFC did fail. Accordingly, on
18 August 1983, petitioner ISA commenced eminent domain proceedings against
private respondent MCFC in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, of Iligan City,
On 17 September 1983, a writ of possession was issued by the trial court in favor
of ISA. ISA in turn placed NSC in possession and control of the land occupied by
MCFC’s fertilizer plant installation.

The case proceeded to trial. While the trial was ongoing, however, the statutory
existence of petitioner ISA expired on 11 August 1988. MCFC then filed a motion
to dismiss, contending that no valid judgment could be rendered against ISA which
had ceased to be a juridical person. Petitioner ISA filed its opposition to this
motion.

In the alternative, petitioner ISA urged that the Republic of the Philippines, being
the real party-in-interest, should be allowed to be substituted for petitioner ISA. In
this connection, ISA referred to a letter from the Office of the President dated 28
September 1988 which especially directed the Solicitor General to continue the
expropriation case.

The Court of Appeals went on to say that the action for expropriation could not
prosper because the basis for the proceedings, the ISA’s exercise of its delegated
authority to expropriate, had become ineffective as a result of the delegate’s
dissolution, and could not be continued in the name of Republic of the Philippines,
represented by the Solicitor General

Issue:

Whether or not the Republic of the Philippines is entitled to be substituted for ISA
in view of the expiration of ISA’s term.

Held:

Yes. The expiration of ISA’s statutory term did not by itself require or justify the
dismissal of the eminent domain proceedings. It should also be noted that the
enabling statute of ISA expressly authorized it to enter into certain kinds of
contracts “for and in behalf of the Government”

Administrative Law; Government Owned and Controlled Corporations;


Government Agencies and Instrumentalities; The Iron and Steel Authority (ISA)
appears to be a non-incorporated agency or instrumentality of the Republic of the
Philippines, or more precisely of the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines.—Clearly, ISA was vested with some of the powers or attributes
normally associated with juridical personality. There is, however, no provision in
P.D. No. 272 recognizing ISA as possessing general or comprehensive juridical
personality separate and distinct from that of the Government. The ISA in fact
appears to the Court to be a non-incorporated agency or instrumentality of the
Republic of the Philippines, or more precisely of the Government of the Republic
of the Philippines. It is common knowledge that other agencies or instrumentalities
of the Government of the Republic are cast in corporate form, that is to say, are
incorporated agencies or instrumentalities, sometimes with and at other times
without capital stock, and accordingly vested with a juridical personality distinct
from the personality of the Republic.

Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; The term “Authority” has been used to
designate both incorporated and non-incorporated agencies or instrumentalities of
the Government.—It is worth noting that the term “Authority” has been used to
designate both incorporated and non-incorporated agencies or

instrumentalities of the Government. Same; Same; Same; Agency; The ISA is an


agent or delegate of the Republic, while the Republic itself is a body corporate and
juridical person vested with the full panoply of powers and attributes which are
compendiously described as “legal personality.”—We consider that the ISA is
properly regarded as an agent or delegate of the Republic of the Philippines. The
Republic itself is a body corporate and juridical person vested with the full panoply
of powers and attributes which are compendiously described as “legal personality.”

Same; Same; Same; Same; When the statutory term of a non-incorporated agency
expires, the powers, duties and functions as well as the assets and liabilities of that
agency revert back to, and are reassumed by, the Republic of the Philippines, in the
absence of special provisions of law specifying some other disposition thereof.—
When the statutory term of a non-incorporated agency expires, the powers, duties
and functions as well as the assets and liabilities of that agency revert back to, and
are re-assumed by, the Republic of the Philippines, in the absence of special
provisions of law specifying some other disposition thereof such as e.g., devolution
or transmission of such powers, duties, functions, etc to some other identified
successor agency or instrumentality of the Republic of the Philippines. When the
expiring agency is an incorporated one, the consequences of such expiry must be
looked for, in the first instance, in the charter of that agency and, by way of
supplementation, in the provisions of the Corporation Code. Since, in the instant
case, ISA is a non-incorporated agency or instrumentality of the Republic, its
powers, duties, functions, assets and liabilities are properly regarded as folded back
into the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and hence assumed once
again by the Republic, no special statutory provision having been shown to have
mandated succession thereto by some other entity or agency of the Republic.

Same; Same; Same; Administrative Law; The Republic may initiate or participate
in actions involving its agents.—In E.B. Marcha Transport Company, Inc. v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, the Court recognized that the Republic may initiate
or participate in actions involving its agents. There the Republic of the Philippines
was held to be a proper party to sue for recovery of possession of property
although the “real” or registered owner of the property was the Philippine Ports
Authority, a government agency vested with a separate juridical personality. The
Court said: “It can be said that in suing for the recovery of the rentals, the Republic
of the Philippines acted as principal of the Philippine Ports Authority, directly
exercising the commission it had earlier conferred on the latter as its agent. x x x”

6. G.R. No. 145972. March 23, 2004.*

IGNACIA BALICAS, petitioner, vs. FACT-FINDING & INTELLIGENCE


BUREAU (FFIB), OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, respondent.

Facts:

Petitioner Balicas a SEMS of the DENR, together with several officials from
HLURB and DENR, was charged with gross negligence with the Ombudsman
after a tragic landslide happened in Cherry Hills Subdivision. The charge against
petitioner involved a supposed failure on her part to monitor and inspect the
development of CHS, which was assumed to be her duty as DENR senior
environmental management specialist assigned in the province of Rizal.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner should be held liable.


Held:

No. In order to ascertain if there had been gross neglect of duty, we have to look
at the lawfully prescribed duties of petitioner. Unfortunately, DENR regulations
are silent on the specific duties of a senior environmental management specialist.
Internal regulations merely speak of the functions of the Provincial Environment
and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) to which petitioner directly reports.

Based from the letter of the Chief of Personnel which defines the duties of a
SEMS, the monitoring duties mainly deal with broad environmental concerns,
particularly pollution abatement. This general monitoring duty is applicable to all
types of physical developments that may adversely impact on the environment,
whether housing projects, industrial sites, recreational facilities, or scientific
undertakings.

However, a more specific monitoring duty is imposed on the HLURB as the sole
regulatory body for housing and land development. It is mandated to encourage
greater private sector participation in low-cost housing through (1) liberalization
of development standards, (2) simplification of regulations and (3)
decentralization of approvals for permits and licenses.

The legal duty to monitor housing projects, like the Cherry Hills Subdivision,
against calamities such as landslides due to continuous rain, is clearly placed on
the HLURB, not on the petitioner as PENRO senior environmental management
specialist. In fact, the law imposes no clear and direct duty on petitioner to
perform such narrowly defined monitoring function.

7. Malagas vs. Penachos, Jr.

G.R. No. 86695. September 3, 1992.*

Facts:

The petitioners filed a complaint against the chairman and members of PBAC in
their official and personal capacities on the ground that they refused without just
cause their requirements for bidding. As a result, they were not included in the
list of prequalified bidders, could not secure the needed plans and other
documents, and were unable to participate in the scheduled bidding.

On the same date, Judge Lodrigio L. Lebaquin issued a restraining order


prohibiting PBAC from conducting the bidding and awarding the project.2

On December 16, 1988, the defendants filed a motion to lift the restraining order
on the ground that the Court was prohibited from issuing restraining orders,
preliminary injunctions and preliminary mandatory injunctions by P.D. 1818.

In the petition now before us, it is reiterated that P.D. 1818 does not cover the
ISCOF (a state college) because of its separate and distinct corporate personality.
It is also stressed again that the prohibition under P.D. 1818 could not apply to
the present controversy because the project was vitiated with irregularities

Issue:

Whether or not the restraining order and injunctions issued by the court binds the
defendant.

Held:

Yes. P.D. 1818 was not intended to shield from judicial scrutiny irregularities
committed by administrative agencies such as the anomalies above described.
Hence, the challenged restraining order was not improperly issued by the
respondent judge and the writ of preliminary injunction should not have been
denied.

Administrative Law; Government instrumentality, defined; Iloilo State College of


Fisheries is a government instrumentality; Applicability of P.D. 188.—

The 1987 Administrative Code defines a government instrumentality as follows:

Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated


within the department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by
law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds,
and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. This term includes
regulatory agencies, chartered institutions, and government-owned or controlled
corporations. (Sec. 2 (5) Introductory Provisions). The same Code describes a
chartered institution thus: Chartered institution—refers to any agency organized
or operating under a special charter, and vested by law with functions relating to
specific constitutional policies or objectives. This term includes the state
universities and colleges, and the monetary authority of the state. (Sec. 2 (12)
Introductory Provisions). It is clear from the above definitions that ISCOF is a
chartered institution and is therefore covered by P.D. 1818.

Government contracts; Public bidding requirement; Injunctions in cases involving


infrastructure projects.—It is apparent that the present controversy did not arise
from the discretionary acts of the administrative body nor does it involve merely
technical matters.

What is involved here is non-compliance with the procedural rules on bidding


which required strict observance. The purpose of the rules implementing P.D.
1594 is to secure competitive bidding and to prevent favoritism, collusion and
fraud in the award of these contracts to the detriment of the public. This purpose
was defeated by the irregularities committed by PBAC. It has been held that the
three principles in public bidding are the offer to the public, an opportunity for
competition and a basis for exact comparison of bids. A regulation of the matter
which excludes any of these factors destroys the distinctive character of the
system and thwarts the purpose of its adoption.

8. Preclaro vs. Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. 111091. August 21, 1995.*

Facts:

On 1 October 1989, the Chemical Mineral Division of the Industrial Technology


Development Institute (ITDI), a component of the Department of Science and
Technology (DOST) employed Petitioner under a written contract of services as
Project Manager to supervise the construction of the ITDI-CMD (JICA) Building at
the DOST Compound in Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila. The contract was to
remain in effect from October 1, 1989 up to the end of the construction period
unless sooner terminated.

Petitioner was charged before the Sandiganbayan with a violation of Sec. 3(b) of
R.A. No. 3019 as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. After trial on the merits, the Sandiganbayan rendered judgment
finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

In the present petition, the petitioner insisted that Sandiganbayan lacks


jurisdiction to his person as he is not a public officer because he was neither
elected nor appointed.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner should be deemed as a public officer.

Held:

Yes. Petitioner miscontrues the definition of “public officer” in R.A. No. 3019
which, according to Sec. 2(b) thereof ” includes elective and appointive officials
and employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the classified or unclassified
or exemption service receiving compensation, even nominal, from the
government. . . .” The word “includes” used in defining a public officer in Sec. 2(b)
indicates that the definition is not restrictive. The terms “classified, unclassified or
exemption service” were the old categories of positions in the civil service which
have been reclassified into Career Service and Non-Career Service by PD 807
providing for the organization of the Civil Service Commission and by the
Administrative Code of 1987.

From the foregoing classification, it is quite evident that petitioner falls under the
non-career service category (formerly termed the unclassified or exemption
service) of the Civil Service and thus is a public officer as defined by Sec. 2(b) of
the Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019).

Similarly, petitioner’s averment that he could not be prosecuted under the Anti-
Graft & Corrupt Practices Act because his intervention “was not required by law
but in the performance of a contract of services entered into by him as a private
individual contractor,” is erroneous. As discussed above, petitioner falls within the
definition of a public officer and as such, his duties delineated in Annex “B” of the
contract of services are subsumed under the phrase “wherein the public officer in
his official capacity has to intervene under the law.” Petitioner’s allegation, to
borrow a cliche, is nothing but a mere splitting of hairs.

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