Polyarchy in Five South American States:

Assessing the Quality of Democracy in Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela

by

Miguel Centellas

Department of Political Science

3303 Friedmann Hall
Western Michigan University
Kalamazoo, MI 49008

miguel.centellas@wmich.edu

This paper measures the degree of polyarchy in five South American states (Bolivia, Colombia,
Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela) since 1978 using a model developed by Altman and Pérez-Liñán
(1999) and Centellas (1999). The model measures polyarchy in the electoral process along two
axes: participation and competition. Our model follows Dahl’s basic premise that polyarchy
requires high levels of both effective participation and political competition within a context of
civil and political liberties. Effective participation is a function of voter turnout, modified to
account for null/blank votes and votes for parties not elected to the legislature. Effective
competition is a function of the relative balance between government and opposition forces in the
legislature. These measures should complement qualitative assessments of the progress of
polyarchy in these five states and coincide with observed reality.

Prepared for delivery at the 58th Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association,
Chicago, 27-30 April 2000. I thank Emily Hauptmann and Aníbal Pérez-Liñán for their
comments and advice.

2
 Polyarchy in Five South American States

Introduction

Twenty-five years after the beginning of democracy’s “third wave” (Huntington

1991) we are presented with a virtual laboratory within which to study “democracy.”
More countries select their governments by relatively free, fair, and competitive elections
(a standard commonly deemed central to calling a country a “democracy”) today than at
any other period in the world’s history. Still, we are not much closer to understanding the
conditions favorable to the development of democracy than we were before the third
wave began in 1974. Some progress has been made, of course. Robert Dahl points out
that “we have much better answers than could be obtained only a few generations ago
and far better answers than at any earlier time in recorded history” (1999, 31). It is only
recently, after a substantial amount of time has passed since many of the “third wave”
states took their tentative steps into the democratic world, that we are able to rigorously
test more formal hypotheses. In short, despite the explosion of literature on
democratization and democratic consolidation literature in recent years, we now stand at
the edge of a new horizon of social scientific exploration into the nature of “democracy”
as a social scientific concept. This paper is only one preliminary attempt at such an
exploration.
David Collier and Steven Levitsky (1997) produced an important exploration into
the categorization of democracy qua democratization literature. Their work on
“democracy with adjectives” is a rigorous discussion of alternate classification strategies
for subtypes of democracy along theoretical criteria in order to “encourage scholars to be
more careful in their definition and use of concepts” (Collier and Levitsky 1997, 432). It
should come as no surprise that Collier and Levitsky were spurred by the proliferation of
democratic subtypes produced by the post-“third wave” literature. Their article is an
important attempt to unify these new democratic subtypes into a more coherent
framework. Another approach to analytical within-type differentiation of democracies is
an empirical one. Such is the approach pursued in this paper.
Empirical studies of political concepts are driven by data —that is, by the real
world of cases. Aristotle conducted one of the earliest studies of politics. The Politics was
the result of painstaking data collection and analysis of the Greek world. It was from this
data that Aristotle formulated a six-category typology of political systems and
subsequently developed formal hypotheses about causal effects. This basic social
scientific approach has not changed substantially since the time of Aristotle. The
development of theories and hypotheses concerned with democracy and democratization
is still developed from available data —cases of democratic governments are observed
and analyzed to find similarities and modal patterns that provide understanding of causal
mechanisms or necessary conditions.
The limited number of cases of polyarchy —both in time (only since the 1900s) 1
1 As Robert Dahl points out (e.g. 1971, 1999), the limitation of the suffrage to property holding men
restricted the “democratic” nature of those states. Since “polyarchy” means that the many rule, the
exclusion of these groups —particularly women, who constitute approximately half of the adult
population— means that no regime was a polyarchy until the early part of this century.

3
and space (predominantly in European countries)— severely restricted and over-
determined causal models developed to produce empirical theories of democracy. Until
quite recently, it was widely accepted that democracy was a product of certain specific
socioeconomic or cultural variables. The harsh reality of the distribution of democracy
around the globe led to various ethnocentric notions of democracy’s necessary
“preconditions” —including the now-laughable theory that climate was a significant
factor.
Today there are approximately one hundred “democratic” countries in the world
(including the island microstates). Most of the remaining countries make some claim to
democratic legitimacy. This means that for the first time in modern history, European
states (or transplanted European states) no longer constitute the bulk of democratic states.
Although European states still constitute a disproportionately higher number of
democratic states than any other region, the recent rise in the number of non-European
democratic cases allows for more careful testing of hypotheses about possible causes or
patterns of democracy. We now have a larger and more varied sample of countries for
which data can be collected and analyzed. Careful collection of data allows for testing of
previous hypotheses concerning the causes or preconditions of democracy. More
importantly, the collection of data allows us to begin our study of democracy with a
tabula rasa; we, as political scientists, can undertake an Aristotelian endeavor and begin
categorizing regimes along various dimensions as well as disaggregating the components
of their “constitutions” (using the Aristotelian understanding of the word) for analysis.2
Subsequently, we should reconsider and rebuild democratic theory with a more
vigorous and data-driven critical esprit. This does not mean, of course, that we reject all
previous theories. Our previous theories and hypotheses are still relevant to the progress
of the discipline. But we must not attach ourselves too strongly to theories and hold fast
to them in the face of contradictory empirical evidence. Instead, we political theorists
should embrace the availability of new and more diverse data and methods. Dahl (1999)
points out that after twenty-five centuries of political theory we are still not much closer
to understanding what democracy is or how it comes to be. But, he also points out, we
now have more cases of democracy from which to develop and test better theories and
hypotheses. I agree; the future of democratic theory is an open vista waiting to be
explored.

Theory

Georg Sørensen argues that a “narrow concept of democracy provides the most
adequate starting point” (1998, 11) for developing theories of democratization. He uses
Dahl’s concept of polyarchy to provide a minimalist definition of democracy as a
political system.3 The various conditions Dahl gives for polyarchy are combined into
2 For recent examples of such works, see Arend Lijphart and Carlos Waisman (1996), Kurt von
Mettenheim (1997), Giovanni Sartori (1997), Thomas Manz and Moira Zuazo (1998), Dieter Nohlen
and Mario Fernández (1998), Matthew S. Shugart and John Carey (1997), John Carey (1997), Emerson
Niou and Peter Ordeshook (1997), and Philipe Schmitter (1997).
3 The distinction of democracy as a political system was advanced by Joseph Schumpeter (1942)
and even more recently by authors such as Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan (1996). This does not mean,
of course, that democracy was not understood as a political system much earlier. Rather, the emphasis

4
three dimensions: competition, participation, and civil and political liberties. Larry
Diamond, Jonathan Hartlyn, Juan J. Linz, and S. M. Lipset (1999) follow a similar
approach in their volume on democracy in Latin America. Collier and Levitsky also
provide a typology of democracies using these three dimensions of polyarchy in their
discussion of “diminished” subtypes (1997, 437-42). The use of a limited definition of
democracy provides practical benefits for the study of democracy and democratization.
Dahl’s Polyarchy (1971) provides a conceptual starting point or ideal-type against which
we can measure the various “democratic” states in the world. It is important to keep in
mind that this paper limits itself by considering only political democracy (i.e. polyarchy)
as opposed to social or economic democracy. The minimalist definition of democracy
used in this paper, however, does go beyond Joseph Schumpeter’s definition of
democracy as merely a method or “institutional arrangement for arriving at political
decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive
struggle for the people’s vote” (1976, 269).
Still, a minimalist definition does provide a large degree of “leverage.” The use of
a minimalist definition of democracy allows us to avoid the minefield of more normative
or value-driven approaches. As such, minimalist definitions “refer to democratic
procedures, rather than to substantive policies or other outcomes that might be viewed as
democratic … they deliberately focus on the smallest possible number of attributes that
are still seen as producing a viable standard for democracy” (Collier and Levitsky 1997,
433). Linz, for example, defines democracy as “a free competition of power by peaceful
means, free elections at regular intervals in a constitutional framework that provides the
conditions for such a free competition in terms of freedom of speech, of assembly, of
political organization, etc.” (1978, 5-6). Yossi Shain shares Linz’s conviction and points
out that holding onto more “idealistic” or “utopian” definitions of democracy can be
detrimental to democracy itself (1995). As Linz and Stepan (1978) point out, democratic
idealists who are to critical of imperfect democracies may inadvertently help anti-
democrats to come to power.
Throughout any discussion of polyarchy as a minimalist definition of democracy
we must remember that Dahl has no intention to limit democracy only to the “political”
sphere. The call for more participatory or direct democracy raised by authors as various
as Jean-Jacques Rousseau, C. B. Macpherson (1977), and Carol Pateman (1970) are also
shared by Dahl (e.g. Dahl 1982; 1985). Polyarchy is more than merely an
institutionalized system of frequent elections; it requires that those elections be
meaningful. I do share Dahl’s hope that polyarchy is the best vehicle with which to reach
social or economic democracy. Still, this paper does limit itself to consider polyarchy
primarily as a product of institutional components rather than economic, social, or
cultural preconditions. This paper shares Sørensen’s conviction that “socioeconomic
conditions do affect the quality of political democracy but they do not prevent the
development of a democratic system” (1998, 19). Like Sørensen, this paper argues that
democratic systems can exist in countries regardless of their level of socioeconomic
development. Thus, this paper does not expect that any of the traditionally accepted
economic, social, or cultural preconditions for democracy are necessary for democracy.

here is on the distinction between democracy as means (or method) and democracy as ends (or product).
The use of a minimalist definition of democracy —as used in this paper— focuses on democracy as
means.

5
 Several of these “preconditions” have previously been refuted. S. M. Lipset
(1959) argued that modernization or industrialization was necessary for democracy.
Drawing from Aristotle and Max Weber, Lipset wrote that “the more well-to-do a nation,
the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy” (1959, 31). Consequently, Lipset
and other modernization scholars argued that, for democracy to flourish in non-
industrialized countries, economic development would have to precede democracy.
Guillermo O’Donnell (1973) presented a scathing critique of this approach when he
pointed out that economic development tended to produce “bureaucratic-authoritarian”
states rather than democratic ones. Also drawing from the Weberian tradition, Gabriel
Almond and Sidney Verba (1963) argued that the ideal political culture required for
democracy was the Anglo-American (i.e. Protestant) model. Samuel Huntington (1984)
and Terry Lynn Karl (1990) criticize this ethnocentric approach, pointing out that
cultures are not so readily reduced into pro-democratic and anti-democratic dichotomies.
For example, though Catholicism was once considered a central element of an anti-
democratic culture, it was a powerful force behind the “third wave” of democracy as well
as in opposition movements against authoritarian rulers. Another similar precondition
presented was that of “social structure.” Barrington Moore concluded that “a vigorous
and independent class of town dwellers has been an indispensable element in the growth
of parliamentary democracy. No bourgeois, no democracy” (1966, 418). Goran Therborn
argues against Moore’s position, stating that democracy has “always and everywhere”
been produced from a struggle against the bourgeoisie (1983, 271).
This paper stands in stark contrast to earlier perspectives which stressed the
preconditions for democracy. Instead, this paper stems from the perspective that
institutions and state structures are more crucial in determining the success or failure of
democracy.4 Thus, the five states discussed in this paper allow for a research design that
controls for cultural, economic, or social “preconditions” of democracy. This paper
instead focuses on the institutions of polyarchy and political democracy that can help or
hinder democratic consolidation. A more detailed discussion of the rationale for case
selection and method is presented in the subsequent section.
Dahl shifted the democratization literature toward the concept of polyarchy. Dahl
described polyarchies as “regimes that have been substantially popularized and
liberalized” (1971, 8). This led Dahl (1971) to outline seven necessary “institutions”5
necessary for polyarchy:

4 State institutions and structures are also “preconditions” of a sort for democracy. But these are a
substantially different character than the preconditions developed by modernization theorists. States and
their leaders have more direct control over their constitutional designs than over socioeconomic or
cultural conditions. Leaders cannot simply decide to develop a country in the same way that they can
decide to change the electoral law. Secondly, however, the institutional “preconditions” are neither
necessary nor sufficient for democratic consolidation. Some electoral laws may be “better” than others;
but states can sustain democracy even with poor institutions. The United States, for example, has
survived more than two centuries with a plurality electoral system combined with presidentialism. The
framework for the institutional approach I adopt is that some institutional designs produce less hurdles
than others. A citizenry with enough determination and will for democracy can overcome any number
of obstacles on the road to democratic consolidation. Still, the lower the cost for democratic
consolidation, the greater the likelihood for democratic consolidation.
5 Dahl’s use of the word “institutions” is very different from the use of the word throughout this
paper. Instead, Dahl’s seven “institutions” are best understood as “minimal necessary conditions” for
polyarchy.

6
 (1) Freedom to form and join organizations
(2) Freedom of expression
(3) Right to vote
(4) Right of political leaders to compete for support
(5) Alternative sources of information
(6) Free and fair elections
(7) Institutions for making government policies depend on votes and other
expressions of preference

The term “polyarchy” is used by Dahl to “distinguish modern representative government

from all other political systems, whether nondemocratic regimes or earlier democratic
systems” (1989, 218). The seven “institutions” of polyarchy outlined above distinguish
polyarchy not only from authoritarian regimes, but are also necessary to solve the
democratic problem of scale: Athenian-style, direct democracy is no longer possible in
modern polities with millions of autonomous, diverse, and territorially scattered citizens.
These seven necessary institutions constitute the “minimum viable standard” for cases to
be considered as polyarchies. Each of the cases presented in this paper meets this
minimal threshold.
The greatest advantage of using Dahl’s concept of polyarchy is that, while it
retains a “minimalist” character in its procedural elements, it allows for further
conceptualization of democracy into spheres other than the political. This means that
while polyarchy has minimum conditions, it does not have a ceiling. Similarly, Dahl’s
polyarchy can be applied to a variety of different types of democracies, not only to liberal
democracies. The minimal necessary conditions of polyarchy are also quite compatible
with a broad range of constitutional designs.
The use of an operationalized definition of “polyarchy” in this paper allows for
more quantitative discussion of democratic consolidation. I first wish to emphasize that
this paper is not intended to dismiss qualitative assessments of democratic consolidation;
such accounts of democratizing nations are vital for gaining understanding of particular
cases, for hypothesis testing, and for theory formation —in short, for the advancement of
cumulative social scientific knowledge. Rather, I wish to encourage the use of
quantitative assessments of democracy along side qualitative understanding of particular
cases and their particular sociohistorical context. Quantitative assessments provide the
advantage of clearer specification of causal mechanisms and help avoid normative biases
by focusing on a priori established and theory-driven empirical criteria. Qualitative
assessments provide the advantage of allowing subtler readings of empirical data to take
into consideration and account for other variables which may be peculiar to an aspect of
time or space of the case in question which may effect, but are not included in, a strictly
quantitative model. The combination of these two traditionally opposed research
strategies can provide more balanced —even if less “statistically powerful”— findings.
Thus, the conclusions reached about each case in this study are based equally on
quantitative data developed and presented in this paper as well as qualitative assessments
from case-specific literatures.
First, however, we need to understand what is meant by democratic consolidation.
Perhaps the simplest way to describe democratic consolidation is as that condition that

7
exists when democratic norms become the routinized and accepted process for political
decision-making. Or, as Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan write: “we mean by consolidated
democracy a political situation in which … democracy has become ‘the only game in
town’” (1996, 5). To say that democratic norms become “the only game in town” is to
say that (at least) most political and social actors agree to an electoral mechanism to
choose leaders, that these leaders are accountable to those who voted for them, that
decisions are made with regard to the majority principle, but with minority rights, and
that decisions that political leaders make are accepted as binding.
Such a definition of “democratic consolidation” does not, of course, imply any
particular type of democratic state —so long as it meets the minimal necessary conditions
for polyarchy. Linz and Stepan (1997) agree that there may be more than one type of
consolidated democracy. Samuel Huntington (1991) also rejects the political culture
argument that democracy is linked to certain cultural aspects unique to Western Europe,
leaving the door open for new variants of democracies and democratic theory. Dahl
himself, in his most recent work (1999), continues to emphasize the diversity of
institutional arrangements that can produce “democratic norms.”
This paper begins from the premise that more careful differentiation of new
democracies leads to better understanding of the institutional designs best suited to
democracy —either in general theories or region-specific theories. Or, as Collier and
Levitsky argue, that “improved description … is essential for assessing the causes and
consequences of democracy” (1997, 432). An example of analytical assessment of the
consequences of democratic subtypes is a recent work by Arend Lijphart (1999) which
compares the policy outcomes and effectiveness of government between consensus and
majoritarian democracy. A significant benefit of careful cataloguing of democratic
subtypes will allow for other similar explorations into the patterns and consequences of
those subtypes.
This paper considers the problem of “democratic consolidation” by focusing on
polyarchy as measured along the dimensions of participation and competition. Such a
formulation follows Dahl’s own typology (1971). Figure 1 represents the four basic
regime types identified by Dahl (1971): closed hegemonies, competitive oligarchies,
inclusive hegemonies, and polyarchies. Each of the cases considered in this paper fit the
minimal definition of a democratic state; hence, they are all polyarchies. This paper is
concerned with assessing the quality of polyarchy of each case relative to the others.
Thus, a case of “democratic consolidation” is synonymous with what Dahl terms a “full
polyarchy.”

Figure 1. Types of political regimes as defined by Robert Dahl.

Low participation High participation

High competition Competitive oligarchy Polyarchy

Low competition Closed hegemony Inclusive hegemony

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 This two-dimensional analysis does not diminish the importance of the third
dimension of polyarchy —civil and political liberties. Instead, the dimension of civil and
political liberties is a “free-floating” dimension that can (at least in theory) coexist within
any type of political system. Although we intuitively expect high levels of civil and
political liberties to exist as a product of high levels of competition and participation, it is
conceivable that such a condition could exist in the absence of broader procedural
democratic norms. Aristotle’s The Politics differentiates between six types of regimes
along the dimensions of number of persons in power and how they used their power
(Book III). That is, a monarchy and an aristocracy are distinguished from despotism and
oligarchy, respectively, by their concern for the “common good.” The case of Colombia
(discussed in greater detail in subsequent sections) provides a good example; until
recently, Colombia maintained high levels of civil and political liberties (as measured by
Freedom House) despite low levels of both participation and competition. The civil and
political liberties dimension does come into consideration, however, for assessing
whether a state is a full polyarchy. A state with relatively high levels of competition and
participation that does not also protect the civil and political liberties of all its citizens is
not a full polyarchy; at best such a state is a near-polyarchy. Thus, this paper emphasizes
that civil and political liberties are a necessary though not sufficient condition for
democratic consolidation. Following the Collier and Levitsky (1997) typology, we could
place “illiberal democracy” in this category of regimes with high levels of participation
and competition but without high levels of civil and political liberties.
Democratic consolidation is a step in the democratization process. Dahl considers
democratization as consisting of three distinct stages (1971, 10):

(1) Transformation of hegemonies and competitive oligarchies into near-polyarchies

(2) Transformation of near-polyarchies into full polyarchies
(3) Further democratization of full polyarchies

Dahl uses the term “democratization” to refer to the fact that states can become more
democratic even though the ideal-type of democracy is never attainable. Thus, even after
democratic consolidation states should continue to seek ways to become even more
democratic (e.g. more inclusive, participatory, representative, just, etc.). What this paper
describes as “democratic consolidation” is Dahl’s second stage of democratization:
transformation of near-polyarchies into full polyarchies. Thus, this paper operationalized
democratic consolidation as existing once a state is categorized as a “full polyarchy” for
at least two consecutive elections.
Daniel Levine and Brian Crisp similarly conceive of four stages of
democratization “running from inauguration through consolidation to a transformation to
maturity” (1999, 369). They, like Dahl, also emphasize that democratization is not a
unidirectional process, pointing out that “hard-won stability can be put in jeopardy by
rapid social change, institutional rigidity, and organizational complacency” (1999, 369).
Thus, we understand that democratic decay is as important a concept to understand as
democratic consolidation. More importantly, however, the model of polyarchy developed
in this paper does not consider polyarchy or democratic consolidation as a “final stage”
after which democrats can rest easy. Instead, polyarchy is only the first giant leap into a

9
world of greater inclusion, participation, and empowerment of the demos. But it is an
important first leap nevertheless.
Much of the early debate concerning the consolidation of third wave democracies
appeared to ignore the emphasis Dahl placed on “further democratization” of polyarchies.
Democracy is a “moving target” (Dahl 1989) which is never reached —though it can, of
course, be steadily approached. Part of the measure of a consolidated democracy is that of
a state that —after fair and competitive electoral forms are stable and routinized—
consistently strives to reform itself in order to offer greater degrees of democracy for its
citizens. This paper, therefore, labels a state a “full polyarchy” if it has a regime in which
political democracy is instituted even while the regime makes explicit efforts (not mere
posturing or rhetoric) towards deeper democratization of the political, social, or economic
spheres. A regime may thus be a consolidated democracy even if “deeper” social or
economic democracy is temporarily lacking. By “temporarily lacking” I mean, however,
that a polyarchy enters a phase of “democratic deepening” and strives to improve itself
along social or economic (or other) dimensions.
Finally, it must be kept in mind that all of the cases studied in this paper are at
least near-polyarchies; that is, they are all democratic in varying degrees. All five of the
South American states considered in this paper have experienced relatively free and fair
competitive elections for at least two decades.6 Thus, we focus our attention to
differentiating the quality of democracy of states a priori categorized as polyarchies as
specified in Dahl’s regime typology.
Focusing on cases that are “democratic” in some sense, this paper develops a
“within-type” differentiation along the same three dimensions of polyarchy. This paper
considers those cases that rate highly along all three dimensions as “full polyarchies” and
all others as “near-polyarchies.” Full polyarchies can also be further subdivided into
distinctions between those that lack governability and those that do not (Collier and
Levitsky 1997, 443). This dimension should be further distinguished between lack of
governability due to continued military influence (“praetorian polyarchies”) and due to
weak or minority governments (“ineffective polyarchies”). Near-polyarchies can be
further subdivided into six subtypes based on relatively low levels of one or more
dimensions:

(1) “aristocratic” high levels of competition and civil and political liberties
(2) “hegemonic” high levels of participation and civil and political liberties
(3) “illiberal” high levels of competition and participation
(4) “restricted” high levels of civil and political liberties only
(5) “oligarchic” high levels of competition only
(6) “plebeian” high levels of participation only
(7) “electoral” low levels on all dimensions

Of course, near-polyarchies could also be further differentiated along the governability

dimension. This further classifies polyarchies such as “aristocratic polyarchies,”
“praetorian-aristocratic polyarchies,” or “ineffective-aristocratic polyarchies.”

6 Bolivia’s democracy is, technically, only eighteen years old (1982-2000). But the 1978, 1979, and
1980 elections were considered, by most observers, as relatively “free and fair.” Two such elections,
1979 and 1980, actually produced civilian governments that endured for several months.

10
 Case Selection and Method

This paper follows a most-similar research design. The case selection was meant
to control for the variables presented in the “preconditions” literature as well as for other
differences between Latin American democracies. Since the five cases will differ in their
ratings as polyarchies, the most-similar research design helps support the argument that
institutional factors are responsible for the differences in the quality of democracy across
cases. The case selection also allows for an embeded least-similar research design.
Colombia and Venezuela are both similar to each other on some important dimensions
and different to the other three cases.
The analysis for our time-series data begins from 1978 for three reasons. First,
this date was selected because it was the closest year in which Colombia and Venezuela
had election —both had elections that year— in close proximity to the date of democratic
transitions in the other three cases. Second, the date also marks a “transition” of sorts for
Colombia as well; the National Front agreement between the Conservative and Liberal
parties ended that year. Third, Freedom House data used in this paper to measure civil
and political liberties are available only from 1972. Going back to 1972 only adds two
more elections to the sample (Colombia 1974 and Venezuela 1972) and does not change
the findings significantly.7
All five cases share a common (political) culture. The “centralist tradition” of
Latin America (Véliz 1980) is evident in each case. Each of the five states has a tradition
of centralized political processes, especially when compared to the more “federal”
Argentina and Brazil. All of the countries also share the culture of caudillaje described
by Glen Caudill Dealy (1992). This culture of caudillaje stands in contrast to the Western
non-dualist tradition in its defense of a distinction between the public and private and
applies a “one-morality/two-morality construct” which leads to personalismo (Dealy
1992). Finally, all five countries share a similar Spanish colonial heritage, which includes
a common language (Spanish), religion (Catholicism), and historical symbols (e.g. all
were liberated by Simón Bolívar). The singular exception may be Colombia, which has a
longer tradition of political parties than all the others. Still, for most of the modern period
(beginning in the 1850s) Colombia’s two largest political parties —the Liberals and
Conservatives— engulfed the countryside in bloody civil wars that were not resolved
until the 1958 National Front agreement.
In terms of socioeconomic development, the five South American cases are rather
similar (see Table 1). All are also clearly “developing nations” when compared to
advanced industrial states. In order to compare beyond these five cases, this paper also
includes data on five European states. This group of states also includes three “third
wave” regimes (Greece, Portugal, and Spain) and two “second wave” regimes (France
7 The inclusion of Freedom House scores for Venezuela since 1972 changes the mean for FH to 2.0 rather
than 2.1 (a difference of only 0.1) and does not change the lowest or highest scores. Similarly, inclusion
of Freedom House scores for Colombia since 1972 changes the mean for FH to 2.9 rather than 2.8 (also
a difference of only 0.1). Colombia’s pre-1978 scores do, however, produce a different lowest score of
2.0. Of course, including pre-transition FH scores for Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru would heavily bias
results against any finding of democratic consolidation. Subsequently, this paper will consider data only
from 1978 onwards or from first year of democratic rule (Bolivia 1982, Ecuador 1979, Peru 1980).

11
and Italy). Although data for competitiveness and effective participation are not yet
available, these five cases will also be included in future research. 8 With the exception of
Greece, which is predominantly Orthodox, these European countries are, like the South
American cases, predominantly Catholic.9 Greece, Portugal, and Spain can also be
considered “developing” countries in comparison to the remainder of Europe. Similarly,
although France is substantially more developed, Italy is among the less developed states
in the European Union. Thus, like the five South American cases, these five Southern
European cases further develop the most-similar research design employed in this paper.

Table 1. UNDP socioeconomic indicators for South American and South European
cases, circa 1997.
Real GDP Adult Life Human
per capita literacy rate expectancy development
Country (PPP$) (%) (years) index
Bolivia 2 880 83.6 61.4 0.652
Colombia 6 810 90.9 70.4 0.768
Ecuador 4 940 90.7 69.5 0.747
Peru 4 680 88.7 68.3 0.739
Venezuela 8 860 92.0 72.4 0.792
France 22 030 99.0 78.1 0.918
Greece 12 769 96.6 78.1 0.867
Italy 20 290 98.3 78.2 0.900
Portugal 14 270 90.8 75.3 0.858
Spain 15 930 97.2 78.0 0.894
Source: UNDP 1999.

Table 1 is instructive. First, of course, the South American cases are clearly less
developed than the European ones; the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
ranks all five among the “medium human development” countries. Thus, the
“preconditions” literature should lead us to expect that the five South American cases are
less capable of sustaining polyarchies than the European cases. Second, however, it is
important to note that Bolivia is the poorest and least developed of the South American
cases. Yet the results presented in subsequent sections point to Bolivia as the only clear
case of democratic consolidation. A more case-specific study using the same data and
method supports this conclusion (Centellas 1999). The classification of Bolivia —the
poorest of the South American cases— as a consolidated democracy falsifies the
“preconditions” hypothesis that equates socioeconomic development with democracy.

8 This paper is part of a larger dissertation project that involves at least twenty-two countries,
including Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, Costa Rica, Hungary, Mexico, Paraguay, Poland,
Rumania, and Uruguay.
9 Here I do not mean to imply that all ten states share a similar level of “religiosity” (i.e. church
attendance, doctrinal obedience, etc.). I simply mean that each of these ten cases share non-Protestant
political cultures. Even for secularists within these countries, we can speak of a broader “Catholic”
culture (or “civilization”) in the way that Dealy (1992) or Huntington (1991) speaks of them.

12
Lijphart (1999) makes a similar argument regarding India, which has sustained
democratic rule since 1977 despite extremely low levels of development.
Each of the five South American states also has relatively small governments in
terms of total government spending as percentage of gross domestic product (GDP).
Overall, Latin American governments steadily spend close to 25 percent of GDP during
this time period, in contrast to increasing expenditures of 40 to 50 percent of GDP for the
industrial economies (Gavin and Hausmann 1998, 35). Each of the five South American
states considered here performed slightly above the Latin American median, however,
with the exception of Peru (Stein 1998, 97). It is also clear that all five South American
cases are rather similar in economic structure and all have moved towards privatization of
their state-owned industries in recent years (e.g. Boeker 1993; Fukasaku and Hausmann
1998).
Along with socioeconomic similarities, our five South American cases also share
many institutional features, allowing us to focus better on the relevant variables that
explain successful democratic consolidation. All five states have presidential systems, an
institutional variable widely discussed as critical for explaining the failures of democracy
in Latin America (e.g. Linz 1994; 1996a). Bolivia, however, is a significant exception. Its
hybrid system of “parliamentarized presidentialism” (Mayorga 1997) helps demonstrate
the validity of Giovanni Sartori’s (1994) argument that a simple division of regimes into
dichotomous “presidential” and “parliamentary” systems misses some key differences.
Controlling for “presidentialism” as a possible independent variable affecting democratic
consolidation allows us to examine other institutional variables —often associated with,
but not necessary for, presidentialism. Those findings are presented in subsequent
sections.
All five cases also shared similar experiences with the post-1982 economic crisis
that ravaged Latin America. Though the debt crisis impacted each state differently, all
five weathered the economic storm with democratically elected governments. The
transitions to democracy in Ecuador and Peru (1979 and 1980, respectively) were among
the earliest in the third wave of democracy and occurred before the debt crisis. Bolivia
did not have a democratic government until 1982, although its transition to democracy
began in 1978. More importantly, however, the 1982-85 government of Hernán Siles
Zuazo came to power just as the debt crisis began. Unlike countries such as Argentina,
Brazil, or Chile, the economic crisis was not a contributing factor to the collapse of
authoritarian regimes in the five South American cases considered here. Finally, the fact
that each of the five countries managed to survive the debt crisis without a return to
authoritarian rule adds a level of optimism to one’s sense of their ability to survive future
crises.
The inclusion of Colombia and Venezuela adds further to this paper. Although
both have been governed by democratically elected governments since 1958, both have
recently come under scrutiny both for Colombia’s lack of democratic consolidation and
for Venezuela’s recent democratic crisis (e.g. McCoy 1999; Hoskin and Murillo 1999;
Gaviria Vélez 1998). This unfortunate reality allows us to control for any possible “third
wave” variable. The analysis presented in this paper sheds some light on the quality of
democratic rule in those countries since 1978. Also, the theory of democratization
underpinning this paper is not unidirectional but rather recognizes that democratic
regimes can break down. Thus, including Colombia and Venezuela may add to the

13
current knowledge about the possible causes of democratic breakdowns.
Colombia and Venezuela have different experiences with democracy. The data
presented in this paper demonstrates that Colombia was never a consolidated democracy
(or “full polyarchy”), a case also made by Jonathan Hartlyn and John Dugas (1999) and
Gary Hoskin and Gabriel Murillo (1999). Bruce Bagley (1984) went so far as to classify
Colombia as an “inclusionary authoritarian regime” rather than a democracy. In contrast,
Venezuela appears to be a consolidated democracy from at least 1968 through 1988, an
argument also made by Levine and Crisp (1999). By this time, Venezuela’s two dominant
parties —AD (Acción Democrática, Democratic Action) and COPEI (Comité de
Organización Política Electoral Independiente, known as the Social Christian Party)—
had moved away from their Punto Fijo power-sharing arrangement and into a competitive
two-party system. Colombia, on the other hand, became mired in a system described by
Fermín González and Miguel E. Cárdenas as “mono(bi)partism” (1998). This difference
allows us to speculate both why Colombia’s was never a consolidated democracy and
why Venezuela’s consolidated democracy is having such problems today —especially
after the end of “partyarchy” and the collapse of the traditional party system (McCoy
1999). Finally, the collapse of party systems in Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela
are compared to Bolivia’s more stable political party system.
Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru are compared to each other to differentiate within the
“third wave” cases. Although all three began their democratization with similar
trajectories, by 1992 Peru was no longer “democratic” in any meaningful normative sense
of the word after Fujimori’s autogolpe (“self-coup”) and the collapse of the party system.
Similarly, although Ecuador has not had a democratic breakdown of the magnitude of
Peru’s, it seems to be merely “muddling through” (Barczak 1997; Isaacs 1996). Again,
the reasons for these differences appear to be institutional in nature and are explored in
the analysis section of this paper.
Finally, the use of cross-panel data also allows us to consider a combination of
synchronic and diachronic comparisons between cases. Diachronic comparisons allow us
not only to compare cases across time, but also to compare one case at one time interval
with another case at a different time interval. This approach can prove quite fruitful for
pinpointing causal variables. Subdividing the time analysis by decade allows us to see a
dramatic change in values among cases as Peru and Venezuela began demonstrating
democratic breakdowns in the second time period while Bolivia and Colombia improved.
Subsequently, institutional causes for democratic consolidation and democratic
breakdown become even clearer. Most especially, the collapse of the party system in
Venezuela, Peru, and Ecuador become clear as an explanatory variable. These findings
give greater leverage to the finding of institutional factors as causes for democratic
consolidation.

Data

The model of polyarchy used in this paper contains three dimensions. The two
more “institutional” dimensions of competition and participation are measured using
electoral data for all elections since 1978. Data for Bolivia’s 1978 and 1979 general
elections are dropped out of much of the analysis, however, since 1982 is the actual

14
beginning of the nation’s democratic period. Election results for Bolivia’s 1980 elections,
however, are included in the analysis because the 1982-85 government was constituted
from the results of the 1980 general elections. The data presented come from elections for
the lower legislative chamber. The two exceptions are Ecuador (which has a unicameral
legislature) and Bolivia (where a single ballot is used for the presidential contest and both
legislative chambers). The third dimension, civil and political rights, is measured using
Freedom House data.

Competition

One dimension of polyarchy is competition. This dimension is operationalized

using a measure for effective competition first developed by David Altman and Aníbal
Pérez-Liñán (1999). Their measure relies on the distinction between government and
opposition political parties. This paper defines government parties as those parties
represented in legislature which are members of a formal government coalition.
Consequently, opposition parties include all other political parties represented in the
legislature but which do not formally participate in the government coalition (even if they
support the government some of the time).
Altman and Pérez-Liñán developed measures for the size of the “typical”
opposition and government parties. These measures are designed to account for
fragmentation but are weighted in favor of the largest political parties. We first calculate
the size of the “typical” opposition party (O):

O=
∑ οι 2

∑ οι
where oi is the share of seats for the i-th opposition party. We next calculate the size of
the “typical” government party (G):

G=
∑γι 2

∑γι
where gi is the share of seats for the i-th government party. These measures allow us to
find the relative size of government and opposition blocs rather than using aggregate
shares of seats for government and opposition. Aggregate measures do not capture
measures for the size of “typical” government and opposition parties since they disregard
fragmentation and party size. This calculation of “government” and “opposition” size
assumes that one-party governments with large shares of seats in the legislature are more
effective at implementing policies than multi-party government coalitions—even if both
control the same aggregate number of seats in the legislature.
Using these two measures, Altman and Pérez-Liñán next developed an index of
effective opposition (IEO) to measure the “opposition’s influence over the process of the
formation of public policies and [its ability] to present a viable electoral alternative to the
government party” (1999, 89):

15
 Ο
IEO =
Γ

with IEO values measured along a scale from zero (when the government controls the
entire legislature) to one (when the opposition is the same size as the government). IEO
values can also be greater than one in the case that the opposition is more powerful than
the government. Of course, IEO values greater than one do not signify a “better”
polyarchy. If the opposition is stronger than the government, governability suffers due to
“a substantial distortion of the majority preference nested in the political regime”
(Altman and Pérez-Liñán 1999, 88).
Finally, using government and opposition values, Altman and Pérez-Liñán also
calculate an index of competitiveness (C):

Γ −Ο
C =1−
100

with C values measured along a scale from zero (when either the government or the
opposition controls the legislature) to one (when the government and opposition are
balanced). It is this final index that is the actual measurement used to categorize countries
as “competitive” for classification as polyarchies.

Participation

The second dimension of polyarchy is participation. This dimension can be

operationalized with an index of effective participation. Effective participation is related
to the idea that democracy (as ideal-type) is distinguished from other political systems by
“being completely or almost completely responsive to all its citizens” (Dahl 1971, 2). The
index of effective participation (IEP) is calculated as:

IEP = Τ × (1 − Β) × (1− Ε )

where T is the ratio of voter turnout, B is the ratio of blank and null votes, and E is the

16
ratio of votes cast for “excluded” parties. Effective participation values are measured as a
ratio from zero (no citizen participation) and one (“ideal” or complete citizen
participation).
This index of effective participation measures the degree to which all citizens’
preferences are represented in the legislature. This definition is based on the a priori
conception of an ideal-type polyarchy in which:

(1) All citizens participate in general elections

(2) All citizens vote for political parties
(3) All political parties competing in elections are represented in the legislature

Of course, no actual polyarchy can live up to these three standards.10 This measure of
effective participation, therefore, measures the degree to which a political regime
represents its citizens (via political parties).11 The above criteria for an ideal-type
polyarchy are derived from the assumption that a legislative body only represents those
citizens who voted for the political parties represented in that legislative body. The
criteria are useful, however, to compare the performance of polyarchies relative to each
other.
Voter turnout data is obtained from the International Institute for Democracy and
Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) and measures the ratio of votes over voting age
population (Votes/VAP). Although the voting age population figures are often estimates,
this measure of voter turnout seems more appropriate than figures reported as votes over
registered voters. A glance at the International IDEA data shows that some states have
significant discrepancies between these two figures. There is no evidence to believe that
voting age population figures have significant errors. The benefit of using voting age
population figures, however, is that they also help us to measure how “inclusive” an
electoral system is. The degree to which the voting age population is not registered to
vote (which, by definition, means they cannot vote) limits the participation of citizens. If
registration is a particularly difficult process (e.g. literacy tests or travelling long
distances to registration offices) then many citizens may effectively be restricted from
practicing their right to suffrage.
The measure for effective participation is weighted to reduce voter turnout based
on the ratio of spoiled ballots (blank and null votes) and votes for “excluded” parties.
10 We may, of course, not always want every citizen to vote (e.g. uninformed citizens) or every party
(e.g. fascist parties) to win a seat to the legislature. But, I insist, to the degree that citizens are not
informed or capable of making decisions or support anti-democratic parties is, to a great degree, a
measure of the quality of a polyarchy. In a normative sense, better polyarchies produce citizens who are
better informed, more highly educated, and capable of making individual and collective decisions.
Similarly, better polyarchies produce more tolerant and democratic political cultures that would
diminish anti-democratic sentiment and the political parties they produce.
11 It must be made clear that the index of effective participation only measures representation via the
political party system. Representation and participation are, of course, more complicated phenomenon
and more difficult to quantitatively (or even qualitatively) measure. Participation —especially in Latin
America— often entails direct, public action (marches, demonstrations, hunger strikes, etc.) but can also
take informal forms (membership in civic organizations, letters to representatives, campaign
contributions, etc.). The absence of detailed survey and other data on Latin American political
participation creates a problem for quantitatively measuring political participation. There is evidence,
however, that electoral participation is strongly correlated to other forms of political participation. Thus,
using voter turnout to calculate a rough measure of participation may be appropriate.

17
Voters casting blank and null votes participate in the most basic act of citizenship —
voting— and may demonstrate some confidence in the legitimacy of the electoral
mechanism. This paper assumes that voters casting blank ballots express a rejection of
specific political actors even if still accepting the democratic system (Rojas and Zuazo
1996, 56). This is similar to the conception of spoiled ballots as “protest” votes. Spoiled
ballots correspond with voter preferences or interests not represented by any political
party or a rejection of the political system en toto. It is a gross distortion to consider an
election “inclusive” if protest voting is high —regardless of raw voter turnout.
The model of polyarchy developed in this paper emphasizes the need for all
citizens to find their interests expressed through a political party. Polyarchies rely on the
institution of political parties to represent citizens in order to address the problem of scale
in modern polities. As such, political parties are “indispensable” for democracy (Lipset
2000). Those political parties that participate in elections constitute the party system. A
party system becomes more “inclusive” as the ratio of the electorate casting blank and
null votes diminishes and voter identification with existing parties increases.
Parties that are “excluded” are those parties that compete in legislative elections
but do not win any seats in the legislature. Such parties are excluded from the process of
“ruling” —defined as “the ability to initiate collective action, to participate in the
determination of public policy and supervise its execution, to attend to the needs of the
larger society and shape its future” (Poggi 1978, 68). At the very least, political parties
represented in the legislature have some ability to shape political outcomes. Even if
limited to a small number of seats, parties can initiate legislation, participate in public
discussion and alter its promulgation, and give a legitimate voice to issues concerning
their constituent or ideological base. An electoral system is also more “inclusive” as the
number of parties not winning seats in the legislature diminishes. This is especially true
in proportional systems (as are all five South American states) but also applies to
plurality electoral systems.
A careful distinction must be made between effective participation and
competition. A polity may be “competitive” in the sense that two or more parties truly
compete among each other. Thus, the restriction or “exclusion” or political parties (either
through gerrymandering or other electoral institutions) may not diminish the level of
within-system competitiveness. But the exclusion of relevant parties or actors from the
political system diminishes the representative nature of the state. To the extent that votes
are not translated into seats (with-system representation), the electoral participation of
voters was not effective.
Due to missing data for some countries, adjustments in the measurement of
participation were necessary. For Colombia 1994 and Colombia 1998, first round
presidential votes were used as a proxy for legislative votes. A test of the relationship
between presidential and legislative elections showed that the margin of difference
between the two was rather small.12 For those elections, however, effective participation
12 The mean value for Valid/VAP for 1978-90 presidential elections (N=4) was 0.398. The mean
value for Valid/VAP in legislative elections for the same years (N=4) was 0.378. The difference
between the two is only 0.02. However, presidential Valid/VAP figures were not always higher than for
legislative elections; in the 1990 election presidential Valid/VAP figures were lower than legislative
Valid/VAP by 0.094. The size of the sample does not allow for a confident conclusion that presidential
elections since 1990 have lower voter participation than legislative election. The relatively close
congruence of figures for both types of elections, however, suggest that presidential Valid/VAP figures

18
measures were not conceptually possible; the closest value obtained was of the ratio of
valid votes over voting age population (Valid/VAP). Colombia 1991 data does not allow
for accurate calculation of votes for excluded parties due to the large number of
independent candidates —classified as “other.” Instead, the Colombia 1991 calculation
also uses the ratio of valid votes over voting age population. Data for Ecuador 1998 does
not include information on blank and null votes. Similarly, there is not the necessary data
to calculate effective participation. Subsequently, only the ratio of votes over voting age
population figures is available; the reader should keep in mind that information on blank
and null votes and votes for excluded parties should substantially deflate this number.13
The data used for calculating the variables presented in this paper are included in
Appendix A.

Civil and Political Liberties

The third dimension of polyarchy is civil and political liberties. This dimension is
operationalized with data from the Freedom House Annual Survey of Freedom. Freedom
House uses a seven-point scale for both civil rights and political liberties. It is important
to note that the Freedom House score “does not rate governments per se but rather the
rights and freedoms individuals have in each country” (Freedom House 1998, 592).
Measures are related to the relative degree of freedom citizens can enjoy regardless of the
“official” rights offered by governments or constitutions. This paper creates a simple
measure for civil and political liberties by taking the mean of ratings for civil rights and
political liberties. Subsequently, the combined scale for civil and political liberty ranges
from a low of one (most freedom) to seven (least freedom). Freedom House indicators of
political rights and civil liberties (FH) are taken from the organization’s Annual Survey of
Freedom. Freedom House considers countries with combined scores between 1.0 and 2.5
“free;” between 3.0 and 5.5 “partly free;” and between 5.5 and 7.0 “not free.”
Both Freedom House measures include all of the seven “institutions of polyarchy”
as defined by Dahl. The Political Liberties index includes information on elected
officials, free and fair elections, and associational autonomy. The Civil Liberties index
includes information on freedom of association, access to alternative sources of
information, as well as associational autonomy. Both indexes, however, go beyond
Dahl’s minimal requirements for polyarchy and include other types of civil and political
rights. These include questions about the rule of law, trade unions, and property rights,
among others.14

Results and Analysis

may serve as a relatively close proxy for IEP values in the absence of legislative electoral data.
13 The mean difference between Votes/VAP and IEP for Ecuador 1979-1996 (N=8) is 0.159. This means
that Ecuador’s measure for 1998 IEP could be estimated as 0.34 rather than the measure of 0.49 used as
a proxy. Thus, the measure errs on the side of overestimating effective participation for 1998. If 0.34 is
used for Ecuador 1998 IEP, then the mean IEP for Ecuador becomes 0.43 rather than the reported 0.45.
The difference of 0.02 is rather small, however and does not appear to significantly bias the estimate.
14 For a full discussion, consult the methodology chapter of the Annual Survey of Freedom.

19
 The data demonstrate that the experience of among our five cases of competitive
elections is, on the whole, somewhat positive (see Table 2). Bolivia and Ecuador share
the highest means, though Bolivia ends the time series with the highest score at a
considerably high 0.95 (Bolivia also has the highest low score). Venezuela’s mean
competitiveness score falls in the middle of the group. Its fate, however, now rests largely
in the hands of President Hugo Chávez Frias. After Chávez closed the legislature in 1999
—claiming the newly-elected constituent assembly should replace the parliament— and
suspended many constitutional provisions, its competitiveness score was a low 0.10.
Similarly, Peru’s measures for competitiveness collapsed after President Alberto
Fujimori’s autogolpe in 1992. Colombia’s measures for competitiveness have vacillated,
although they end at a moderately high level (ranking third behind Bolivia and Ecuador
respectively).

Table 2. Average, lowest, highest, and last index of competitiveness values from the
period since 1978 or first year of democratic rule.
Mean Lowest Highest Last
Bolivia 0.89 0.74 0.97 0.95
Colombia 0.61 0.50 0.82 0.78
Ecuador 0.88 0.66 0.99 0.88
Peru 0.63 0.51 1.00 0.51
Venezuela 0.78 0.10 0.97 0.10
Sources: Based on data in CNE 1997a, CNE 1997b, Nohlen 1993, Gutiérrez 1998, Hoskin 1998, Barczak
1997, McCoy 1999, Inter-Parliamentary Union PARLINE Database, and data provided by Monica
Barczak, Arend Lijphart, and Grace Ivana Deheza.

Data for effective participation are more mixed (see Table 3). Again, Bolivia’s
mean ranks among the top two, along with Venezuela. Figures for effective participation
in the last election of the time series, however, catapult Bolivia into first place while
Venezuela sinks almost to the level of Peru. Colombia has the lowest mean, though it has
improved even as effective participation for Peru and Venezuela in their latest elections
have collapsed to 0.31 and 0.32 respectively.

Table 3. Average, lowest, highest, and last index of effective participation values
resulting from elections since 1978 or first year of democratic rule.
Mean Lowest Highest Last
Bolivia 0.51 0.43 0.59 0.59
Colombia 0.35 0.25 0.47 0.47
Ecuador 0.45 0.33 0.52 0.49
Peru 0.41 0.31 0.55 0.31
Venezuela 0.56 0.32 0.74 0.32
Sources: Based on data in International IDEA 1999, CNE 1997a, CNE 1997b, Nohlen 1993, Gutiérrez
1998, Barczak 1997, McCoy 1999, and Inter-Parliamentary Union PARLINE Database, Political Database

20
of the Americas, and data provided by Arend Lijphart and Monica Barczak.
Notes: Uses estimated values for Colombia 1991, Colombia 1994, Colombia 1998, and Ecuador 1998.

A consideration of voter turnout over total voting age population demonstrates the
importance of using a measure for effective participation (see Table 4). This is especially
clear in the case of Peru, whose mean difference between voter turnout and effective
participation is 0.19. This dramatic difference is due primarily to the substantial number
of blank and null votes cast in the last two elections (both after Fujimori’s autogolpe).
The difference is smallest for Colombia (0.01), which may be explained by the fact that
Colombia does not have a mandatory voting law. Thus, there may not be a need for
“protest voting” in Colombia; voters merely stay away from the polls instead. Peru,
however, experiences high levels of protest voting. A case in point is that blank and null
ballots accounted for a full 44.4 percent of all ballots cast in the 1995 Peruvian election.

Table 4. Average, lowest, highest, and last voter turnout (Vote/VAP) for elections since
1978 or first year of democratic rule.
Mean Lowest Highest Last
Bolivia 0.58 0.50 0.65 0.65
Colombia 0.36 0.28 0.48 0.48
Ecuador 0.59 0.43 0.69 0.49
Peru 0.60 0.57 0.65 0.58
Venezuela 0.61 0.39 0.77 0.42
France 0.63 0.58 0.70 0.60
Greece 0.86 0.84 0.88 0.84
Italy 0.92 0.87 0.94 0.87
Portugal 0.80 0.77 0.88 0.79
Spain 0.76 0.71 0.83 0.81
Sources: Based on data in International IDEA 1999, CNE 1997a, CNE 1997b, Barczak 1997, Nohlen 1993,
Inter-Parliamentary Union PARLINE Database, and Political Database of the Americas.

Voter turnout figures for the European cases are, not surprisingly, higher than for
the South American ones. This higher turnout rate for Europe cannot be explained by
mandatory voting, since all of the South American states (except for Colombia) have
obligatory voting laws. It is certain that effective participation measures should lower the
voter turnout rates somewhat. This effect should be largest for France and Italy —both
have higher percentages of spoiled votes reported by International IDEA. Still, it is
interesting to note that voter turnout figures for France (the lowest of the European
group) are very close to those for Bolivia. More striking is the fact that voter turnout in
the last French election is only slightly higher than the effective participation measure for
Bolivia’s last general election. This finding suggests that a strong argument can be made
for Bolivia as a consolidated democracy. If we assume that measures for competitiveness
are high throughout Europe, then Bolivia should rate well in comparative perspective.
Bolivia may not have as high levels of participation as some European countries; but it

21
has certainly reached the level of France.
Finally, Freedom House data on civil and political liberties demonstrate that
Bolivia and Ecuador are, once again, among the better performers (see Table 5). Keeping
in mind that, for Freedom House indicators, lower scores mean higher levels of freedom,
Venezuela’s mean of 2.1 is the best in the group. Venezuela, however, has seen its
Freedom House scores increase recently, reaching 4.0 (classifying the country as only
“partly free”) after Chávez suspended the legislature in 1999. Similarly, Peru’s mean
places it in the “partly free” category, due mainly to the high scores following Fujimori’s
autogolpe in 1992. Colombia’s results are somewhat puzzling at first glance; levels of
competitiveness and participation increased in recent years even as Freedom House
measures have indicated dramatic reductions in civil and political liberties. This is mainly
due, however, to the combination of an escalation in both the guerrilla war and the
growing strength of drug cartels and right-wing paramilitary groups in its wake.

Table 5. Average, lowest, highest, and last Freedom House scores from the period since
1978 or first year of democratic rule.
Mean Lowest Highest Last
Bolivia 2.4 2.0 3.0 2.0
Colombia 3.0 2.5 4.0 4.0
Ecuador 2.3 2.0 3.0 2.5
Peru 3.5 2.5 5.5 4.5
Venezuela 2.1 1.5 4.0 4.0
France 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5
Greece 1.8 1.5 2.0 2.0
Italy 1.4 1.0 2.0 1.5
Portugal 1.4 1.0 2.0 1.0
Spain 1.6 1.0 2.5 1.5
Sources: Based on data in Freedom House’s Annual Survey.

The improvements in Colombia’s polity after the 1991 Constitution may simply
be a matter of “too little, too late.” However, Colombia never scored better than 2.5 on
the Freedom House scale —the highest score possible within the “free” category. Thus,
the presence of the leftist guerrilla insurgencies (and, subsequently, the systemic
problems they created) was felt for some time. Recently, however, observers are openly
admitting that Colombia faces a severe crisis of state (Hartlyn and Dugas 1999). If we
accept the argument that polyarchy requires a functioning state, and that “no state, no
democracy” (Linz and Stepan 1996), then Colombia cannot be considered consolidated
polyarchy when the state effectively controls only slightly more than one third its
national territory. Colombia’s measures for participation and competition appear to be
improving (though still not at relatively high levels when compared to other states).
However, the inability of the Colombian state to monopolize the mechanisms of coercion
throughout its territory leaves the protection of civil and political rights beyond the ability
of the state. Similarly, the anti-guerrilla and anti-narcotics military campaigns have begun

22
to erode the guarantees of civil and political liberties in Colombia.
Table 5 also allows for a comparison among the levels of civil and political
liberties between the European and South American cases. Not surprisingly, the
European cases do much better as a group on the Freedom House indicators. Again,
Bolivia and rates rather well in direct comparison to the European cases, especially in the
most recent three years. Bolivia ended the time series with a Freedom House score of 2.0,
putting it at the same level as Greece and only one notch below France, Spain , and Italy.
The decline in levels of civil and political liberties for Venezuela is even more dramatic
when compared to the European cases. For the 1978-1988 period, Venezuela’s mean
Freedom House scores as 1.5, rivaling that of all the European cases. Since then,
however, Venezuela has become among the worst rated of the South American cases.
Results of the analysis of data for two dimensions of polyarchy (competition and
participation) after the last election is summarized in Figure 2. A fuller categorization of
each post-electoral case (a country-year combination, e.g. Colombia 1992, Bolivia 1989)
is presented in Table 6. Bolivia clearly qualifies as a “full polyarchy” or consolidated
democracy due to its relatively high measures along all three dimensions combined with
majority governments since 1985. Ecuador appears to rank in the “ineffective polyarchy”
category. Ecuador also scores relatively well in all three dimensions (only slightly behind
Bolivia), but it does not score well on the measure of effective opposition (see Appendix
A-3). Ecuador’s opposition is very often too strong in comparison to the government.
Thus, even though Ecuador’s system remains competitive, it appears to lack
governability. That is to say, an executive who faces a very large opposition block in
Congress and with whom he has had to negotiate very often heads the state.15 The
problem is made even more acute by the fact that Ecuador’s political party system is
highly fragmented and parliament members can defect from their parties at will (Barczak
1997). This problem of governability was made evident in the recent January 2000 coup
that replaced President Jamil Muhuad Witt. Because of the coup, Ecuador may perhaps
also be described as a “praetorian polyarchy” due to the political power of the military.

Figure 2. Classification of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela along the
dimensions of competition and participation after their most recent elections.

Low participation High participation

Colombia 1998 Bolivia 1997

High competition
Venezuela 1998 Ecuador 1998 (*)

Low competition
Peru 1995 no cases

15 It has been pointed out that the United States also often exists with a “divided” government with
different parties controlling the executive and legislative branches of government. This problem,
however, is a recent phenomenon (see Cox and Kernell 1991; Jacobson 1991; Mayhew 1991). Juan J.
Linz (1996a) argues that the potential for “dual legitimacy” (i.e. divided government) is a key problem
of presidentialism and argues that the United States has sustained democracy despite its presidential
system.

23
 Venezuela 1999 (†)

Note: (*) Ecuador has maintained levels of competition almost as high as Bolivia. Unlike Bolivia, however,
Ecuador also tends to score above 1.00 on the effective opposition scale. This means that while Ecuador’s
political system is competitive, the government is unable to govern effectively as it is most often a minority
government. This has produced executive instability, leading up to the military-backed golpe of January
2000. (†) The collapse of political competition after Chávez suspended the Venezuela’s legislature and
Supreme Court in 1999 may tentatively place Venezuela in the same category as Peru.

24
Table 6. Differentiation of existing cases by polyarchy subtype.
Country/Year FH C IEP Governability
Full polyarchies
Bolivia 1985 2.5 0.74 0.54 Yes
Bolivia 1989 2.5 0.96 0.45 Yes
Bolivia 1993 2.5 0.90 0.46 Yes
Bolivia 1997 2.0 0.97 0.59 Yes
Ecuador 1986 (*) 2.5 0.84 0.43 Yes
Ecuador 1988 (*) 2.0 0.66 0.50 Yes
Ecuador 1990 (*) 2.0 0.99 0.51 Yes
Ecuador 1998 (*) 2.0 0.88 0.49 Yes
Peru 1980 2.5 0.69 0.43 Yes
Peru 1985 2.5 0.60 0.55 Yes
Venezuela 1978 (*) 1.5 0.92 0.72 Yes
Venezuela 1983 1.5 0.65 0.74 Yes
Venezuela 1988 (*) 1.5 0.75 0.67 Yes
Ineffective polyarchies
Bolivia 1982 2.5 0.95 0.49 No
Ecuador 1992 2.5 0.96 0.52 No
Aristocratic polyarchies
Colombia 1986 2.5 0.82 0.39 Yes
Ecuador 1979 (*) 2.0 0.72 0.33 Yes
Ecuador 1984 2.0 0.90 0.38 No
Ecuador 1994 2.5 0.86 0.38 No
Venezuela 1998 2.5 0.97 0.32 No
Illiberal polyarchies
Colombia 1998 3.5 0.78 0.47 No
Ecuador 1996 3.0 0.91 0.52 No
Peru 1990 3.5 1.00 0.43 No
Restricted polyarchies
Colombia 1978 2.5 0.52 0.30 Yes
Colombia 1982 2.5 0.50 0.38 Yes
Oligarchic polyarchies
Colombia 1991 3.0 0.60 0.25 Yes
Venezuela 1993 3.0 0.88 0.36 No
Electoral polyarchies
Colombia 1990 3.5 0.51 0.37 Yes
Colombia 1994 3.5 0.56 0.27 Yes
Peru 1992 5.5 0.52 0.35 Yes
Peru 1995 4.5 0.51 0.31 Yes
Sources: Based on data in International IDEA 1999, CNE 1997a, CNE 1997b, Barczak 1997, Nohlen 1993,
Gutiérrez 1998, Hoskin 1998, McCoy 1999, Inter-Parliamentary Union PARLINE Database, Political
Database of the Americas, and Freedom House’s Annual Survey, and data provided by Monica Barczak,
Arend Lijphart, and Grace Ivana Deheza.
Notes: The cut-off point between “high” and “low” levels of competition and participation is 0.60 and 0.40,
respectively. (*) Size of the “typical” government party larger than the “typical” opposition party but
presidents’ parties or coalitions did not hold a majority in the legislature.

25
 Bolivia best fits the category of “democratic consolidation” after its last election.
Table 6 also shows that Bolivia has rated as a “full polyarchy” for the past four elections;
the country also rated high on all dimensions during its first democratic government
(1982-85), although the UDP (Unidad Democrática Popular, Democratic Popular Union)
government did not control a legislative majority. More significantly, each election since
1985 has produced an alternation of power along with a trend towards increasing
competitiveness, voter electoral participation, and civil and political liberties.
Colombia appears to be a clear case of a “ineffective-oligarchic polyarchy” due to
its relatively high levels of competition combined with low measures of participation,
low levels of civil and political liberties, and minority government after the 1998
election. For most the earlier period of this time-series, Colombia qualified as a
“restricted polyarchy” due to its relatively low levels of competition and participation
combined with relatively high levels of civil of political liberties. This assessment fits the
qualitative description often given of Colombia as “exclusionary” due to the congruence
between the Liberal and Conservative parties since the 1958 National Front agreement.
Similarly, the reduced levels of participation in both the 1993 and 1998 elections place
Venezuela somewhere in between the categories of “aristocratic polyarchy” and
“ineffective-oligarchic polyarchy” even though it could be classified as a “full polyarchy”
until 1993. The dramatic drop in competition after Chávez suspended the legislature in
1999, however, may lead us to tentatively place Venezuela in the category of “electoral
polyarchy.” It is too early to tell, however, whether this is a temporary condition or
whether Chávez is, as some speculate, another Fujimori.
Finally, Peru is clearly a case of a “electoral polyarchy” despite the façade of
democratic norms. After Fujimori’s 1992 autogolpe, Peru has experienced very low
levels of competition and effective participation. Similarly, Freedom House measures of
civil rights and political liberties in Peru are rather high. Thus, Peru scores low along all
three dimensions since 1992. The recent April 2000 elections were also marred by
accusations of voter fraud and irregularities, although Fujimori did finally concede a run-
off election for June of this year. The June 2000 elections offer an opportunity for another
democratic transition in Peru.

Discussion

A critical consideration of cases presented in Table 6 suggests only two cases of

“democratic consolidation.” Bolivia is the clearest case with four consecutive elections
(15 years) that produced high levels of competition, participation, and civil and political
liberties as well as governability. Bolivia also has a total of five consecutive elections (18
years) that produced high levels of competition, participation, and civil and political
liberties. Venezuela also appears as a consolidated democracy, rating as a “full
polyarchy” from 1978-1992 and three consecutive elections (also 15 years). However, the
president enjoyed a legislative majority in only one of those governments (1983-88) The
other two countries, Ecuador and Peru, are more dubious. Ecuador did experience three
consecutive elections (5 years) rating as a “full polyarchy,” but this was short-lived and
in the context of only two presidential elections. Also, in none of these years did
Ecuador’s president enjoy a parliamentary majority. Similarly, Peru only experienced two

26
consecutive elections (10 years) that produced cases within the “full polyarchy” category.
Colombia has not yet reached the level of “full polyarchy.”
A key condition for democratic consolidation is a combination of institutional
rules that produce high levels of competition with executive governability. This paper
stresses governability because democracy is also a form of government of the state (Linz
and Stepan 1996). A high level of competition combined with governability (measured as
a larger size of “typical” government party versus the “typical” opposition party) is
essential for a “full polyarchy” as defined in this paper. More importantly, an institutional
arrangement that combines effective opposition and high levels of competition with
executive and legislative congruence produces a government that is both governable and
competitive. The balance of government and opposition means that no party or coalition
is hegemonic. At the same time, congruent government control of the executive and
legislature is a positive value often associated with parliamentarism (e.g. Linz 1996b).
The logic of presidentialism’s “checks and balances” which Linz decries (1996a)
often lead to “gridlock” —a political fact not conducive to new democracies.16 We
should, of course, be weary of too-powerful presidents (such as Fujimori and Chávez)
who wield their legislatures like rubber stamps. These “authoritarian” presidents do not
by themselves refute the need executives have for legislative support. After all, they gain
governability at the expense of competitiveness. If we accept Linz’s (1996a) claim that
presidentialism produces the problem of “dual legitimacy,” then the problem of
presidentialism can be formulated another way: legislatures with electoral legitimacy
need friendly executives to sign and execute their laws. Either way, I argue that
presidential democracies work best (both in a technical and normative sense) when the
executive and legislative branches are controlled by the same party or coalition. Although
Venezuela, and to lesser extent Ecuador and Peru, showed signs of democratic
consolidation, these proved fragile over time. This paper, of course, does not claim that
Bolivia’s democracy will not break down in the future. But the accomplishment of one of
the region’s poorest and least developed countries to achieve such dramatic democratic
success is, to say the least, remarkable.
A great deal of Bolivia’s success has to do with its method of selecting the
executive. Like Chile, Bolivia’s constitution allows for the election of the executive by
the legislature if no presidential candidate wins a majority of the votes. Unlike Chile,
however, Bolivia has a multiparty system that virtually guarantees no presidential
candidate wins an electoral majority. Thus, the selection of the Bolivian president has
been made by the legislature since 1982. This political fact produced a hybrid system
René Antonio Mayorga (1997) terms “parliamentarized presidentialism.” The Bolivian
model of parliamentarized presidentialism relies on two key features: strong party
discipline and synchronic elections of the legislature and executive. These two features
produce one of the simplest electoral systems. Voters cast one single party list ballot (as
in many parliamentary systems) that determines the fate of both legislative chambers and
presidential candidates.17 This electoral system is in tune with Nohlen’s (1999) call for
simpler electoral designs.
16 I do not believe that presidential systems and their potential for “gridlock” is inherently bad for
democracy. An important distinction must be made, however, between new and older democracies. The
United States can afford to experience prolonged periods of divided government after more than two
hundred years of democratically elected governments. Newer democracies, however, face pressures
great pressures, including the need to spur socioeconomic development.

27
 Future extensions of this research project will not only extend beyond the
countries included in this study; the research agenda includes exploration into causal
mechanisms. Including a larger number of cases will allow for the testing of several
hypotheses relating various institutional designs and the three dimensions of polyarchy
(used as dependent variables). In the meantime, this paper suggests that —in the context
of disciplined parties— electoral rules that provide for synchronic elections for the
executive and legislative branches and ensure majoritarian government offer less
obstacles to democratic consolidation. Bolivia’s “parliamentarized” political system
bridges the gap between presidentialism and parliamentarism, offering the stability of
presidentialism with the increased legitimacy of parliamentarism. Although it may be too
early to promote the Bolivian political model for export, it is at least an option for new
democracies to consider.

17 The introduction of a multi-member plurality system (MMP) in the 1994 constitution has made the
Bolivian electoral system only slightly more complicated. Whereas before the 1997 general election
Bolivians cast a single party-list ballot, they now cast two: one ballot for their “uninominal” (district)
representative and the other for the single party list that determines the president, the senate, and the
remainder of the lower legislature.

28
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 Appendix A-1

Polyarchy Indicators, Bolivia 1978-2000

Year FH Votes/VAP Valid/VAP IEP IEO C

1
1978-79 4.0 0.78 0.76 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 2
1979-80 3.0 0.69 0.60 0.59 0.29 0.41
2 2
1980-81 6.0 0.59 0.52 0.49 0.46 0.49
1981-82 6.0 — — — 0.00 0.00
3 3
1982-83 2.5 — — — 1.39 0.95
3 3
1983-84 2.5 — — — 1.39 0.95
3 3
1984-85 2.5 — — — 1.39 0.95
1985-86 2.5 0.65 0.57 0.54 0.20 0.74
1986-87 2.5 — — — 0.20 0.74
1987-88 2.5 — — — 0.20 0.74
1988-89 2.5 — — — 0.20 0.74
1989-90 2.5 0.51 0.46 0.45 0.85 0.96
1990-91 2.5 — — — 0.85 0.96
1991-92 2.5 — — — 0.85 0.96
1992-93 2.5 — — — 0.85 0.96
1993-94 2.5 0.50 0.48 0.46 0.69 0.90
1994-95 2.5 — — — 0.58 0.86
1995-96 3.0 — — — 0.69 0.86
1996-97 2.5 — — — 0.69 0.86
1997-98 2.0 0.65 0.61 0.59 0.83 0.97
1998-99 2.0 — — — 0.76 0.95
1999-00 2.0 — — — 0.76 0.95
Sources: Based on data in International IDEA 1999, CNE 1997a, CNE 1997b, Freedom House’s Annual
Survey of Freedom, and data provided by Instituto Nacional de Estadística.
Notes: 1The 1978 election was annulled by the military and no parliament assembled; hence, no votes were
“effective.” 2Because of military coups mid-year, IEO and C values are reduced in half. 3Reflects UDP
government as an alliance of three parties (MIR, MNRI, and PCB).

33
 Appendix A-2

Polyarchy Indicators, Colombia 1978-2000

Year FH Votes/VAP Valid/VAP IEP IEO C

1978-79 2.5 0.31 0.31 0.30 0.03 0.52
1979-80 2.5 — — — 0.03 0.52
1980-81 2.5 — — — 0.03 0.52
1981-82 2.5 — — — 0.03 0.52
1982-83 2.5 0.39 0.39 0.38 0.01 0.50
1983-84 2.5 — — — 0.01 0.50
1984-85 2.5 — — — 0.01 0.50
1985-86 2.5 — — — 0.01 0.50
1986-87 2.5 0.41 0.41 0.39 0.65 0.82
1987-88 2.5 — — — 0.65 0.82
1988-89 2.5 — — — 0.65 0.82
1989-90 3.5 — — — 0.65 0.82
1990-91 3.5 0.40 0.40 0.37 0.02 0.51
1991-92 3.0 0.28 0.25 n/a 0.03 0.60
1992-93 3.0 — — — 0.09 0.60
1993-94 3.0 — — — 0.09 0.60
1 1
1994-95 3.5 0.28 0.27 n/a 0.03 0.56
1995-96 4.0 — — — 0.03 0.56
1996-97 4.0 — — — 0.03 0.56
1997-98 4.0 — — — 0.03 0.56
1 1
1998-99 3.5 0.48 0.47 n/a 1.70 0.78
1999-00 4.0 — — — 1.70 0.78
Sources: Based on data in International IDEA 1999, Nohlen 1993, Archer and Shugart 1997, Gutiérrez and
Hoyos 1998, Hoskin 1998, Inter-Parliamentary Union PARLINE Database, Freedom House’s Annual
Survey, and data provided by Arend Lijphart and Grace Ivana Deheza.
Notes: 1Based on first round presidential votes.

34
 Appendix A-3

Polyarchy Indicators, Ecuador 1978-2000

Year FH Votes/VAP Valid/VAP IEP IEO C

1978-79 4.0 — — — 0.00 0.00
1979-80 2.0 0.43 0.36 0.33 0.30 0.72
1980-81 2.0 — — — 0.30 0.72
1981-82 2.0 — — — 0.49 0.93
1982-83 2.0 — — — 0.55 0.94
1983-84 2.0 — — — 0.55 0.94
1984-85 2.0 0.56 0.43 0.38 2.17 0.90
1985-86 2.5 — — — 2.78 0.84
1986-87 2.5 0.65 0.50 0.43 0.75 0.96
1987-88 2.5 — — — 0.96 0.99
1988-89 2.0 0.67 0.52 0.50 0.20 0.66
1989-90 2.0 — — — 0.30 0.79
1990-91 2.0 0.65 0.52 0.51 0.92 0.99
1991-92 2.5 — — — 1.01 0.99
1992-93 2.5 0.69 0.53 0.52 1.32 0.96
1993-94 2.5 — — — 1.32 0.96
1994-95 2.5 0.51 0.39 0.38 4.64 0.86
1995-96 2.5 — — — 4.64 0.87
1996-97 3.0 0.68 0.53 0.52 0.67 0.91
1997-98 3.0 — — — 8.25 0.83
1998-99 2.0 0.49 n/a n/a 0.56 0.88
1999-00 2.5 — — — 0.56 0.88
Sources: Based on data in International IDEA 1999, Barczak 1997, Inter-Parliamentary Union PARLINE
Database, Freedom House’s Annual Survey, and data provided by Monica Barczak.

35
 Appendix A-4

Polyarchy Indicators, Peru 1978-2000

Year FH Votes/VAP Valid/VAP IEP IEO C

1978-79 4.5 0.49 0.41 0.41 — —
1979-80 4.5 — — — — —
1980-81 2.5 0.58 0.45 0.43 0.44 0.69
1981-82 2.5 — — — 0.44 0.69
1982-83 2.5 — — — 0.44 0.69
1983-84 2.5 — — — 0.44 0.69
1984-85 2.5 — — — 0.44 0.69
1985-86 2.5 0.65 0.57 0.55 0.33 0.60
1986-87 2.5 — — — 0.33 0.60
1987-88 2.5 — — — 0.33 0.60
1988-89 2.5 — — — 0.33 0.60
1989-90 3.0 — — — 0.33 0.60
1990-91 3.5 0.57 0.43 0.43 1.01 1.00
1991-92 4.0 — — — 1.01 1.00
1992-93 5.5 0.64 0.49 0.35 0.12 0.52
1993-94 5.0 — — — 0.12 0.52
1994-95 4.5 — — — 0.12 0.52
1995-96 4.5 0.58 0.32 0.31 0.13 0.51
1996-97 3.5 — — — 0.13 0.51
1997-98 4.5 — — — 0.13 0.51
1998-99 4.5 — — — 0.13 0.51
1999-00 4.5 — — — 0.13 0.51
Sources: Based on data in International IDEA 1999, Nohlen 1993, Political Database of the Americas,
Inter-Parliamentary Union PARLINE Database, and Freedom House’s Annual Survey.

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 Appendix A-5

Polyarchy Indicators, Venezuela 1978-2000

Year FH Votes/VAP Valid/VAP IEP IEO C

1978-79 1.5 0.75 0.72 0.72 0.82 0.92
1979-80 1.5 — — — 0.82 0.92
1980-81 1.5 — — — 0.82 0.92
1981-82 1.5 — — — 0.82 0.92
1982-83 1.5 — — — 0.82 0.92
1983-84 1.5 0.77 0.74 0.74 0.38 0.65
1984-85 1.5 — — — 0.38 0.65
1985-86 1.5 — — — 0.38 0.65
1986-87 1.5 — — — 0.38 0.65
1987-88 1.5 — — — 0.38 0.65
1988-89 1.5 0.73 0.70 0.67 0.48 0.75
1989-90 2.0 — — — 0.48 0.75
1990-91 2.0 — — — 0.48 0.75
1991-92 2.0 — — — 0.48 0.75
1992-93 3.0 — — — 0.48 0.75
1993-94 3.0 0.39 0.39 0.36 1.95 0.88
1994-95 3.0 — — — 1.95 0.88
1995-96 3.0 — — — 1.95 0.88
1996-97 2.5 — — — 1.95 0.88
1997-98 2.5 — — — 1.95 0.88
1998-99 2.5 0.42 0.36 0.32 1.18 0.97
1999-00 4.0 — — — 0.02 0.10
Sources: Based on data in International IDEA 1999, Nohlen 1993, McCoy 1999, Inter-Parliamentary Union
PARLINE Database, Freedom House’s Annual Survey, and data provided by Arend Lijphart.

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