DEFENSES FOR LGU EXPROPRIATION

The exercise of the right of eminent domain, whether directly by the State, or by its authorized agents, is
necessarily in derogation of private rights, and the rule in that case is that the authority must be strictly
construed. No species of property is held by individuals with greater tenacity, and none is guarded by
the constitution and the laws more sedulously, than the right to the freehold of inhabitants. When the
legislature interferes with that right, and, for greater public purposes, appropriates the land of an
individual without his consent, the plain meaning of the law should not be enlarged by doubt[ful]
interpretation. (Bensley vs. Mountainlake Water Co., 13 Cal., 306 and cases cited [73 Am. Dec. 576].)

The statutory power of taking property from the owner without his consent is one of the most delicate
exercise of governmental authority. It is to be watched with jealous scrutiny. Important as the power
may be to the government, the inviolable sanctity which all free constitutions attach to the right of
property of the citizens, constrains the strict observance of the substantial provisions of the law which
are prescribed as modes of the exercise of the power, and to protect it from abuse. …(Dillon on
Municipal Corporations [5th Ed.], sec. 1040, and cases cited; Tenorio vs. Manila Railroad Co., 22 Phil.,
411.)

The power of eminent domain is essentially legislative in nature. It is firmly settled, however, that such
power may be validly delegated to local government units, other public entities and public utilities,
although the scope of this delegated legislative power is necessarily narrower than that of the
delegating authority and may only be exercised in strict compliance with the terms of the delegating
law.[22]

A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise
the power of eminent domain for public use, purpose, or welfare for the benefits of the poor and the
landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and
pertinent laws; Provided, however, That the power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a
valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner, and such offer was not accepted;
Provided, further, That the local government unit may immediately take possession of the property
upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court of at
least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on the current tax declaration
of the property to be expropriated; Provided, finally, That the amount to be paid for the expropriated
property shall be determined by the proper court, based on the fair market value at the time of the
taking of the property.

Despite the existence of this legislative grant in favor of local governments, it is still the duty of the
courts to determine whether the power of eminent domain is being exercised in accordance with the
delegating law.[23] In fact, the courts have adopted a more censorious attitude in resolving questions
involving the proper exercise of this delegated power by local bodies, as compared to instances when it
is directly exercised by the national legislature.[24]
The courts have the obligation to determine whether the following requisites have been complied with
by the local government unit concerned:

1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf
of the local government unit, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation
proceedings over a particular private property .calr

2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the
poor and the landless.

3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of the Constitution, and
other pertinent laws.

4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be
expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.[25]

In the present case, the City of Mandaluyong seeks to exercise the power of eminent domain over
petitioners’ property by means of a resolution, in contravention of the first requisite. The law in this case
is clear and free from ambiguity. Section 19 of the Code requires an ordinance, not a resolution, for the
exercise of the power of eminent domain. We reiterate our ruling in Municipality of Parañaque v. V.M.
Realty Corporation[26] regarding the distinction between an ordinance and a resolution. In that 1998
case we held that:miso

ule 67 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court reveals that expropriation proceedings are comprised of two
stages:

(1) the first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of
eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit; it ends
with an order, if not in a dismissal of the action, of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful
right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the
complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the
complaint;

(2) the second phase is concerned with the determination by the court of the just compensation for the
property sought to be taken; this is done by the court with the assistance of not more than three (3)
commissioners.[27]
Clearly, although the determination and award of just compensation to the defendant is indispensable
to the transfer of ownership in favor of the plaintiff, it is but the last stage of the expropriation
proceedings, which cannot be arrived at without an initial finding by the court that the plaintiff has a
lawful right to take the property sought to be expropriated, for the public use or purpose described in
the complaint. An order of condemnation or dismissal at this stage would be final, resolving the
question of whether or not the plaintiff has properly and legally exercised its power of eminent domain.

The Court has already discussed this inconsistency between the Code and the IRR, which is more
apparent than real, in Municipality of Parañaque vs. V.M. Realty Corporation,[29] which we quote
hereunder:

Petitioner relies on Article 36, Rule VI of the Implementing Rules, which requires only a resolution to
authorize an LGU to exercise eminent domain. This is clearly misplaced, because Section 19 of RA 7160,
the law itself, surely prevails over said rule which merely seeks to implement it. It is axiomatic that the
clear letter of the law is controlling and cannot be amended by a mere administrative rule issued for its
implementation. Besides, what the discrepancy seems to indicate is a mere oversight in the wording of
the implementing rules, since Article 32, Rule VI thereof, also requires that, in exercising the power of
eminent domain, the chief executive of the LGU must act pursuant to an ordinance.

Therefore, while we remain conscious of the constitutional policy of promoting local autonomy, we
cannot grant judicial sanction to a local government unit’s exercise of its delegated power of eminent
domain in contravention of the very law giving it such power.

DENIED ON THEground that the movants interest (was) indirect, contingent, remote, conjectual (sic),
consequential (sic) and collateral. At the very least, it (was), if it (existed) at all, purely inchoate, or in
sheer expectancy of a right that may or may not be granted

ejectment cases be suspended or that the execution thereof be enjoined in view of the pendency of the
expropriation case filed by respondent City over the same parcels of land.

There is no doubt that the members of SBMI have a personality to intervene before this Court. The
plaintiff-appellant itself, in their Comment to the defendants-appellees motion to set aside this Courts
19 August 1998 resolution, recognized Dr. Rosario Abiog, as one of the intended beneficiaries of the
expropriation case. The plaintiff-appellant also enumerated the ejectment cases pending before the
lower courts when it filed a motion for the issuance of temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction upon appeal to this Court. Moreover, the plaintiff-appellant also furnished this
Court with a copy of the THIRD PARTY CLAIM it filed before the City Sheriff Office and Sheriff Dante Lot
to enjoin them from implementing and executing the Demolition Order issued by the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Manila (Branch 3) against Angelina Maglonso.
he petition of the plaintiff to expropriate the property does not ipso facto create any fiat that would give
rise to the claim of the movant of legal interest in the property. The petition could well be denied
leaving any assertion of interest on the part of the movant absolutely untenable. If the petition, on the
other hand, is granted, that would be the time for the movant to intervene, to show that they are the
intended beneficiaries, and if the plaintiff would distribute the property to other persons, the remedy is
to compel the plaintiff to deliver the lot to them

PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK, G.R. No. 173085 v Nachura

This case is about the authority of the court in an expropriation case to adjudicate questions of
ownership of the subject properties where such questions involve the determination of the validity of
the issuance to the defendants of Certificates of Land Ownership Awards (CLOAs) and Emancipation
Patents (EPs), questions that fall within the jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB).

FACTS:

Bases Conversion Development Authority (BCDA), a government corporation, filed several expropriation
actions before the various branches of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)

They were the registered owners of the expropriated lands that they acquired as beneficiaries of the
comprehensive agrarian reform program. Another defendant was Land Bank of the Philippines, the
mortgagee of the lands by virtue of the loans it extended for their acquisition. The lands in these cases
were located in Porac and Floridablanca, Pampanga.

On learning of the expropriation cases before Branch 58, petitioner Philippine Veterans Bank (PVB) filed
motions to intervene in all the cases with attached complaints-in-intervention, a remedy that it adopted
in similar cases with the other branches.

PVB alleged that the covered properties actually belonged to Belmonte Agro-Industrial Development
Corp. which mortgaged the lands to PVB in 1976. PVB had since foreclosed on the mortgages and
bought the same at public auction in 1982. Unfortunately, the bank had been unable to consolidate
ownership in its name.

denied PVBs motion for intervention on the ground that the intervention amounts to a third-party
complaint that is not allowed in expropriation cases and that the intervention would delay the
proceedings in the cases before it. Besides, said Branch 58, PVB had a pending action for annulment of
the titles issued to the individual defendants and this was pending before Branch 62 of the court.

The Issue Presented

The issue presented in this case is whether or not the CA erred in holding that PVB was not entitled to
intervene in the expropriation cases before Branch 58 of the Angeles City RTC.

Court’s Ruling

PVB maintains that in deciding the case, the RTC and the CA ignored Section 9, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, which authorizes the court adjudicating the expropriation case to hear and decide
conflicting claims regarding the ownership of the properties involved while the compensation for the
expropriated property is in the meantime deposited with the court. Section 9 provides:

Sec. 9. Uncertain ownership; conflicting claims. If the ownership of the property taken is uncertain, or
there are conflicting claims to any part thereof, the court may order any sum or sums awarded as
compensation for the property to be paid to the court for the benefit of the person adjudged in the
same proceeding to be entitled thereto. But the judgment shall require the payment of the sum or sums
awarded to either the defendant or the court before the plaintiff can enter upon the property, or retain
it for the public use or purpose if entry has already been made.

PVBs point regarding the authority of the court in expropriation cases to hear and adjudicate conflicting
claims over the ownership of the lands involved in such cases is valid. But such rule obviously cannot
apply to PVB for the following reasons:

1. At the time PVB tried to intervene in the expropriation cases, its conflict with the farmer
beneficiaries who held CLOAs, EPs, or TCTs emanating from such titles were already pending
before Angeles City RTC Branch 62, a co-equal branch of the same court. Branch 58 had no
authority to pre-empt Branch 62 of its power to hear and adjudicate claims that were already
pending before it.
2. 2. Of course, subsequently, after the CA dismissed PVBs petition on January 26, 2006, the latter
filed a motion for reconsideration, pointing out that it had in the meantime already withdrawn
the actions it filed with Branch 62 after learning from the decision of the Supreme Court in
Department of Agrarian Reform v. Cuenca,[7] that jurisdiction over cases involving the
annulment of CLOAs and EPs were vested by Republic Act 6657 in the DARAB.[8]

PVB now points out that, since there was no longer any impediment in RTC Branch 58 taking
cognizance of its motion for intervention and adjudicating the parties conflicting claims over the
expropriated properties, the CA was in error in not reconsidering its decision.

Actually, PVBs remedy was to secure an order from Branch 58 to have the proceeds of the
expropriation deposited with that branch in the meantime, pending adjudication of the issues of
ownership of the expropriated lands by the DARAB. Section 9 above empowers the court to
order payment to itself of the proceeds of the expropriation whenever questions of ownership
are yet to be settled. There is no reason why this rule should not be applied even where the
settlement of such questions is to be made by another tribunal.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals
dated January 26, 2006 and its resolution dated June 2, 2006 in CA-G.R. SP 88144.
___________-

Republic v Mupas G.R. No. 181892 September 8, 2015

Established that they are the intended beneficiaries, the intervenors then have the right to seek
protection from this Court.
Takenaka and Asahikosan informed the RTC that they had previously filed two collection cases
against PIATCO, docketed as Claim Nos. HT-04-248 and HT-05-269, before the High Court of
Justice, Queen's Bench Division, Technology and Construction Court in London, England,
(London Court) on August 9, 2004.

Takenaka and Asahikosan asked the RTC to: (a) hold in abeyance the release of just
compensation to PIATCO until the London awards are recognized and enforced in the
Philippines; and (b) order that the just compensation be deposited with the RTC for the benefit
of PIATCO's creditors.

The RTC initially denied Takenaka and Asahikosan's respective Motions43 in the August 8, 2006
Order, but subsequently reconsidered its ruling.44 In a March 12, 2007 Order, the RTC treated
Takenaka's Manifestation with the attached Manifestation and Motion as a motion to intervene
and allowed Takenaka and Asahikosan to intervene in the case as PIATCO's creditors.

JESUS IS LORD V MUNICIPALITY

The Antecedents

The Municipality of Pasig needed an access road from E. R. Santos Street, a municipal road near
the Pasig Public Market, to Barangay Sto. Tomas Bukid, Pasig, where 60 to 70 houses, mostly
made of light materials, were located. The road had to be at least three meters in width, as
required by the Fire Code, so that fire trucks could pass through in case of conflagration.2
Likewise, the residents in the area needed the road for water and electrical outlets.3 The
municipality then decided to acquire 51 square meters out of the 1,791-square meter property
of Lorenzo Ching Cuanco, Victor Ching Cuanco and Ernesto Ching Cuanco Kho covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. PT-66585,4 which is abutting E. R. Santos Street.

On April 19, 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig approved an Ordinance5 authorizing the
municipal mayor to initiate expropriation proceedings to acquire the said property and
appropriate the fund therefor. The ordinance stated that the property owners were notified of
the municipality’s intent to purchase the property for public use as an access road but they
rejected the offer.

On July 21, 1993, the municipality filed a complaint, amended on August 6, 1993, against the
Ching Cuancos for the expropriation of the property under Section 19 of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code. The plaintiff alleged therein that it
notified the defendants, by letter, of its intention to construct an access road on a portion of the
property but they refused to sell the same portion. The plaintiff appended to the complaint a
photocopy of the letter addressed to defendant Lorenzo Ching Cuanco.6

The plaintiff deposited with the RTC 15% of the market value of the property based on the latest
tax declaration covering the property. On plaintiff’s motion, the RTC issued a writ of possession
over the property sought to be expropriated. On November 26, 1993, the plaintiff caused the
annotation of a notice of lis pendens at the dorsal portion of TCT No. PT-92579 under the name
of the Jesus Is Lord Christian School Foundation, Incorporated (JILCSFI) which had purchased the
property.7 Thereafter, the plaintiff constructed therein a cemented road with a width of three
meters; the road was called Damayan Street.

When apprised about the complaint, JILCSFI filed a motion for leave to intervene as defendant-
in-intervention, which motion the RTC granted on August 26, 1994.10

In its answer-in-intervention, JILCSFI averred, by way of special and affirmative defenses, that
the plaintiff’s exercise of eminent domain was only for a particular class and not for the benefit
of the poor and the landless. It alleged that the property sought to be expropriated is not the
best portion for the road and the least burdensome to it. The intervenor filed a crossclaim
against its co-defendants for reimbursement in case the subject property is expropriated.11 In
its amended answer, JILCSFI also averred that it has been denied the use and enjoyment of its
property because the road was constructed in the middle portion and that the plaintiff was not
the real party-in-interest. The intervenor, likewise, interposed counterclaims against the plaintiff
for moral damages and attorney’s fees.12
Rule 19, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 1. Who may intervene. – A person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or
in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be
adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court
or of an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action. The
court shall consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the
adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and whether or not the intervenor’s rights may
be fully protected in a separate proceeding.

In Alfelor v. Halasan,[63] the Court held that:

Under this Rule, intervention shall be allowed when a person has (1) a legal interest in the
matter in litigation; (2) or in the success of any of the parties; (3) or an interest against the
parties; (4) or when he is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or disposition
of property in the custody of the court or an officer thereof.[64]

Jurisprudence describes intervention as “a remedy by which a third party, not originally

impleaded in the proceedings, becomes a litigant therein to enable him, her or it to protect or
preserve a right or interest which may be affected by such proceedings.”[65] “The right to
intervene is not an absolute right; it may only be permitted by the court when the movant
establishes facts which satisfy the requirements of the law authorizing it.”[66]

In Osop’s Amended Complaint before the RTC, MSU was already impleaded as one of the
defendants in Civil Case No. 6381. MSU came under the jurisdiction of the RTC when it was
served with summons. It participated in Civil Case No. 6381, where it was represented by Atty.
Fontanilla, counsel for Muslim and Ramos, who was deputized by the OSG as counsel for MSU.
MSU adopted the Answer to the Amended Complaint of its co-defendants, Muslim and Ramos,
and also joined Muslim and Ramos in subsequent pleadings filed before the RTC in Civil Case No.
6381. Evidently, the rights and interests of MSU were duly presented before the RTC in Civil
Case No. 6381. Unfortunately, the RTC issued the Orders dated March 20, 2003 and August 21,
2003 in Civil Case No. 6381 adverse to MSU and its co-defendants, Muslim and Ramos.
demanding something adversely to both of them
___________-
IS IT PROPER TO FILE A COMPLAINT IN INTERVENTION ON THE GROUND OF FRAUD AND RIGHT
TO REPURCHASE SUBJECT PROPERTY?

NO. BECAUSE THESE ARE MATTERS THAT SHOULD BE TAKEN UP IN A SEPARATE PROCEEDING.

In the case at bar, the intervenors are claiming that they are the legitimate heirs of Estanislao
Miñoza and Inocencia Togono and not the original plaintiffs represented by Leila Hermosisima.
True, if their allegations were later proven to be valid claims, the intervenors would surely have
a legal interest in the matter in litigation. Nonetheless, this Court has ruled that the interest
contemplated by law must be actual, substantial, material, direct and immediate, and not
simply contingent or expectant. It must be of such direct and immediate character that the
intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment.[19]
Otherwise, if persons not parties to the action were allowed to intervene, proceedings would
become unnecessarily complicated, expensive and interminable.

Moreover, the intervenors’ contentions that Leila’s predecessors-in-interest executed, in fraud

of the intervenors, an extra judicial settlement of the estate of the late spouses Estanislao
Miñoza and Inocencia Togono and adjudicated unto themselves the estate of the deceased
spouses, and that subsequently, her predecessors-in-interest fraudulently and deceitfully sold
the subject lots to the NAC, would unnecessarily complicate and change the nature of the
proceedings.

In addition to resolving who the true and legitimate heirs of Estanislao Miñoza and Inocencia
Togono are, the parties would also present additional evidence in support of this new allegation
of fraud, deceit, and bad faith and resolve issues of conflicting claims of ownership, authenticity
of certificates of titles, and regularity in their acquisition. Verily, this would definitely cause
unjust delay in the adjudication of the rights claimed by the original parties, which primarily
hinges only on the issue of whether or not the heirs represented by Leila have a right to
repurchase the subject properties from the MCIAA.

Verily, the allegation of fraud and deceit is an independent controversy between the original
parties and the intervenors. In general, an independent controversy cannot be injected into a
suit by intervention, hence, such intervention will not be allowed where it would enlarge the
issues in the action and expand the scope of the remedies. It is not proper where there are
certain facts giving the intervenor’s case an aspect peculiar to himself and differentiating it
clearly from that of the original parties; the proper course is for the would-be intervenor to
litigate his claim in a separate suit.[21] Intervention is not intended to change the nature and
character of the action itself, or to stop or delay the placid operation of the machinery of the
trial. The remedy of intervention is not proper where it will have the effect of retarding the
principal suit or delaying the trial of the action.[