Professional Documents
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In a blitzkrieg style invasion, North Korean forces crossed the 38th Parallel on June 25, 1950. The
onslaught of tanks supported by artillery was no match for the ill-equipped South Korean forces, and
the capital Seoul fell within days. Schramm’s The Reds Take a City (1951)1 details translations of first-
hand narratives written by eminent Koreans who tell of their personal experiences during the ninety
days of Communist North Korea’s capture of Seoul and the South Korean response to the act of
aggression. The personal insights describe the character and structure of the three months of
Communist rule in Seoul, and articulate the mixed and complex Korean ideological stances and
reactions to Communist rule in Seoul – ranging from the cooperation and popular support to fear and
revulsion. Mining the rich content of these accounts, this paper posits that the experience of Koreans
under Communism, while initially was one of seeming liberation, was progressively disillusioning and
especially repugnant as the collapse of Communist Seoul grew imminent. It is argued, then, that the
three-month long communist experience chastened most South Koreans and served to solidify
Syngmun Rhee’s subsequent control, but also contributed to the confusion and violence that ensued
While the North Korean forces occupied Seoul and much of South Korea, it was not an
exercise of subjugation. Indeed, the North’s Korean People’s Army (KPA) seems to have enjoyed
considerable popular support from South Koreans. One significant reason for the initial support could
be attributed to the generally amiable conduct of the KPA. Testimonies of other survivors point to the
fact that the invaders were not ruthless initially and even “reactionaries” who were targeted by the
KPA reported their conduct to be courteous and reasonable. This is apparent when Chul-Hoe Koo, a
1
Schramm, Wilbur, and John Winchell Riley. The Reds Take a City: The Communist Occupation of Seoul. With Eyewitness
Accounts. Narratives Translated by Hugh Heung-wu Cynn. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers Univ. Pr., 1951.
2
newspaper reporter and reactionary, states that the KPA official examining him ordered food and
“when white rice and beef soup were brought in he ordered them to be placed before me and … in a
kindly manner he asked me to eat”.2 Evidence of this official behavior of courtesy is observable at
several different social and official levels, suggesting that the North Korean forces were “well trained
to win the hearts of the people”.3 This points to the fact that the North Korean conquest was aimed at
the unification of the divided country and the establishment of a Communist government in Seoul by
gaining the good will of the people rather than mere subjugation – though military force was present.
Disillusionment with the corruption and economic injustice rampant in the capitalist democracy
was another significant factor that accorded the Northern forces popular support initially. Such
supporters seem to have pro-communist or nationalist inclinations, and it is worth mention that most
personal accounts suggest the active involvement and collaboration of many students from Seoul.
Propaganda through radio addresses, flyers and other media sources that called for the unification of
Korea and the expulsion of “imperialists like the United States” and “corrupt and inefficient
puppet regime – Syngman Rhee referred to as “the puppet of American imperialism run by
warmongers of Wall Street”,5 – seem to have struck a chord with individuals who had not seen their
lives improve significantly since post-liberation. Others were enamored by the institutional reform that
Communist regime promised, especially in the position of women, on land and industries with respect
to ownership. Notably, appreciation was often expressed for the efficiency and discipline of the
Communist state that was displayed. Professor Yu, one of the framers of the Republic of Korea
2
Schramm, Wilbur, and John Winchell Riley. "Treatment of Reactionaries." In The Reds Take a City: The Communist
Occupation of Seoul. With Eyewitness Accounts. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers Univ. Pr., 1951., pg 81.
3
Schramm, Wilbur, and John Winchell Riley. "Official Conduct and Personnel Policy." In The Reds Take a City: The
Communist Occupation of Seoul. With Eyewitness Accounts. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers Univ. Pr., 1951., pg 66.
4
Schramm, Wilbur, and John Winchell Riley. "The Blueprint of Occupation." In The Reds Take a City: The Communist
Occupation of Seoul. With Eyewitness Accounts. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers Univ. Pr., 1951., 34.
5
Ibid, 37.
3
constitution, is observed to comment that “the shortcoming of democracy is its slowness to act;
The Communist government promised a “paradise for diligent people”7 with the elimination of
social hierarchies, nationalization of industries and the introduction of sweeping reforms. Employment
was promised on an equal basis to both men and women, and with the claim that “women are no longer
slaves” 8 a crackdown on licensed prostitution and concubinage ensued. The obvious respect with
which a Seoul husband reported that “if the Women’s Alliance accused a man of having a concubine,
he was put into jail”9 points to the admiration of the populace for the institutional reforms that were
The admiration and popular support that the North Korean occupation enjoyed eroded over
time as the courteous behavior of North Korean officials gave way to brutality and repression. Kun-Ho
Lee, a Korean writer, attributes this change to the fact that “[the property class and liberals” of the
South were so ‘reactionary’ that they not only showed unwillingness to cooperate but also engaged in
hostile activity”10 (page 52). The worsening war situation and the growing intensity of U.N. air raids
were observed to be correlated with the escalating repression faced by the citizens in Seoul. The
occupation government engaged in forced migration of inhabitants of Seoul for relocation in North
Korea. Those forced to leave for the North arrived in P’yongyang only to be told that nothing was
prepared for them. Upon returning to Seoul, they found their former homes occupied by complete
strangers and their possessions gone. Survivors attribute this injustice to punishment for non-
6
Schramm, Wilbur, and John Winchell Riley. "The Reds Come to Seoul." In The Reds Take a City: The Communist
Occupation of Seoul. With Eyewitness Accounts. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers Univ. Pr., 1951., 29.
7
Schramm, Wilbur, and John Winchell Riley. "The Blueprint of Occupation." In The Reds Take a City: The Communist
Occupation of Seoul. With Eyewitness Accounts. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers Univ. Pr., 1951., 37.
8
Ibid, 35.
9
Schramm, Wilbur, and John Winchell Riley. "Institutional Reforms." In The Reds Take a City: The Communist
Occupation of Seoul. With Eyewitness Accounts. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers Univ. Pr., 1951., 161.
10
Schramm, Wilbur, and John Winchell Riley. "The Character of the Invader." In The Reds Take a City: The Communist
Occupation of Seoul. With Eyewitness Accounts. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers Univ. Pr., 1951., 52.
4
cooperation and to “make the majority of the city population propertyless so that they would have to
cooperate”.11
Even those who had previously been pro-communist or enamored by the institutional reforms
promised grew progressively disappointed in the new Communist order. The poor performance rate of
promised reforms and the worsening of economic conditions and status of many supports contributed
to the erosion of support for the occupying government. Although the nationalization of large
industries and land had been one of the initial strident promises of the occupying forces, farmers were
often found to be at the expense of unjust taxation policies. The plight of farmers were known even to
non-farmers who are noted to state that “[the occupying government] collects more than seventy per
cent of the output in spite of their announced twenty-five per cent” and that “farmers rather preferred to
have no land at all since after all their trouble most of the harvest would be requisitioned”.12 Small
business owners, too, saw their capital erode due to taxation after trusting state propaganda that small
Atrocities mounted as the collapse of the occupying Communist regime seemed apparent, much
to the repugnance of South Koreans. Rounding up prisoners of war and ‘reactionaries’ for summary
execution also became increasingly prevalent. Public officials, property owners and prisoners-of-war,
bound by their wrists, were forced to stand in line for hours awaiting interrogation by “People’s
Courts”. These improvised trials were conducted under a climate of fear and though the “jury” were
asked for their opposition, none responded any such opposition for fear of their lives. The “omniscient
and omnipotent prosecutors, judges and executionors”14 were often political prisoners released by the
occupying government seeking retribution against their former oppressors. The massacre of innocent
11
Ibid, 55.
12
Schramm, Wilbur, and John Winchell Riley. "Institutional Reforms." In The Reds Take a City: The Communist
Occupation of Seoul. With Eyewitness Accounts. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers Univ. Pr., 1951., 168.
13
Ibid, 163
14
Schramm, Wilbur, and John Winchell Riley. " The Character of the Invader." In The Reds Take a City: The Communist
Occupation of Seoul. With Eyewitness Accounts. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers Univ. Pr., 1951., 51.
5
citizens by the People’s Court, forced migration and mobilization of males into the military force
(“Voluntary Corps”) intensified as weeks rolled by – much to the dread of South Koreans.
Source Analysis
Having said that, however, this paper acknowledges that while the narratives in The Reds Take
a City lend insights into the governance styles present in Communist Seoul and South Korean reactions
to the experience, it cannot be taken to be wholly authoritative or unbiased due to the possibility that
the author was compiling accounts that would sell American anti-Communist propaganda. The
compilation of personal accounts is not entirely representative of every walk of life and the canvas is
spread to show the suffering experienced by eminent Koreans with liberal political leanings. It fails to
account for pro-socialist or nationalist members of society and to describe their relationship with the
North Korean forces. While the tragic accounts can scarcely be thought representative of Seoul as a
whole, a close study of their motives and reactions, as well as the intensity of their anti-Communist
feelings offers some limited perspectives on the attempted communist aggression on South Korea.
Moreover, Schramm’s research on Korea was funded by the United States Information Agency,
translated into twelve languages and distributed throughout the world. The distinctly anti-communist
theme present in the book could be intended for members of the world to “reflect well upon the
bitterness, the indignity and the inhumanity of the Communist leaders of aggression and their misled
followers” and to join America’s rallying cry against Communism. This inherent bias in the
compilation of accounts may overestimate the harshness of the North Korean occupation of Seoul.
However, this also demonstrates that the United States viewed the North Korean assault as a case of
Soviet aggression and believed that it needed to respond, not just by preparing itself militarily, but also
politically in order to galvanize global support to meet Soviet aggression. It is also an indication of the
extent to which this “naked Soviet aggression” in Korea was a powerful impetus and would go on to
The North Korean occupation of Seoul effectively ended when United Nations forces drove the
former out in September 1950 – restoring Syngman Rhee’s anti-communist South Korea. The
experience under Communist governance chastened most South Koreans and the North Korean
occupation only served to solidify Syngman Rhee’s subsequent control. It could be imagined that
many now came to believe that Rhee’s government, despite its many shortcomings, was preferable to
the one led by Communist North Korea. Outraged by the North Korean invasion and emboldened by
U.S. support, Rhee would go onto become ferociously anti-Communist – eliminating domestic
political opposition. The temporary North Korean occupation also set off a new wave of violence as a
new round of reprisals against all who might have rallied to the Northern cause began. The experience
during the occupation of Seoul and much of South Korea would significantly set back the peaceful