Garcillano v. House of Representatives

9/22/2017 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 575
G.R. No. 170338. December 23, 2008.*
VIRGILIO O. GARCILLANO, petitioner, vs. THE HOUSE OF

REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC
INFORMATION, PUBLIC ORDER AND SAFETY, NATIONAL
DEFENSE AND SECURITY, INFORMATION AND
COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY, and SUFFRAGE AND
ELECTORAL REFORMS, respondents.
G.R. No. 179275. December 23, 2008.*
SANTIAGO JAVIER RANADA and OSWALDO D. AGCAOILI,

petitioners, vs. THE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE SENATE PRESIDENT
THE HONORABLE MANUEL VILLAR, respondent.
MAJ. LINDSAY REX SAGGE, petitioner-in-intervention.
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., BENIGNO NOYNOY C.

AQUINO, RODOLFO G. BIAZON, PANFILO M. LACSON,
LOREN B. LEGARDA, M.A. JAMBY A.S. MADRIGAL, and
ANTONIO F. TRILLANES, respondents-intervenors.
Remedial Law; Actions; Legal Standing; Concept of legal standing or

locus standi explained in Tolentino vs COMELEC.—In Tolentino v.
COMELEC, 420 SCRA 438 (2004), we explained that “ ‘[l]egal standing’ or
locus standi refers to a personal and substantial interest in a case such that
the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury because of the
challenged governmental act x x x,” thus, generally, a party will be allowed
to litigate only when (1) he can show that he has personally suffered some
actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the
government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and
(3) the injury
_______________
* EN BANC.
http://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000015ea754a14ee79a71e7003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/68
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VOL. 575, DECEMBER 23, 2008 171
Garcillano vs. House of Representatives Committees on Public Information,

Public Order and Safety, National Defense and Security, Information and
Communications Technology, and Suffrage and Electoral Reforms
is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. The gist of the question of

standing is whether a party has “alleged such a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends
for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.”
Same; Same; Same; In recent cases, Court has relaxed the stringent
direct injury test.—Considering that locus standi is a mere procedural
technicality, the Court, in recent cases, has relaxed the stringent direct injury
test. David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 489 SCRA 160 (2006), articulates that a
“liberal policy has been observed, allowing ordinary citizens, members of
Congress, and civic organizations to prosecute actions involving the
constitutionality or validity of laws, regulations and rulings.” The fairly
recent Chavez v. Gonzales, 545 SCRA 441 (2008), even permitted a non-
member of the broadcast media, who failed to allege a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy, to challenge the acts of the Secretary of Justice
and the National Telecommunications Commission. The majority, in the
said case, echoed the current policy that “this Court has repeatedly and
consistently refused to wield procedural barriers as impediments to its
addressing and resolving serious legal questions that greatly impact on
public interest, in keeping with the Court’s duty under the 1987 Constitution
to determine whether or not other branches of government have kept
themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws, and that they
have not abused the discretion given to them.”
Same; Same; Moot and Academic; Court dismissed G.R. No. 170338 for
being moot and academic; The exercise by the Court of judicial power is
limited to the determination and resolution of actual cases and
controversies.—The Court, however, dismisses G.R. No. 170338 for being
moot and academic. Repeatedly stressed in our prior decisions is the
principle that the exercise by this Court of judicial power is limited to the
determination and resolution of actual cases and controversies. By actual
cases, we mean existing conflicts appropriate or ripe for judicial
determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, for otherwise the decision of
the Court will amount to an advisory opinion. The power of judicial inquiry
does
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172 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


not extend to hypothetical questions because any attempt at abstraction

could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile
conclusions unrelated to actualities. Neither will the Court determine a moot
question in a case in which no practical relief can be granted. A case
becomes moot when its purpose has become stale. It is unnecessary to
indulge in academic discussion of a case presenting a moot question as a
judgment thereon cannot have any practical legal effect or, in the nature of
things, cannot be enforced.
Constitutional Law; Legislative Inquiry; Senate cannot be allowed to
continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry without duly
published rules of procedure; The requisite of publication of the rules is
intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due process.—As to the
petition in G.R. No. 179275, the Court grants the same. The Senate cannot
be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry
without duly published rules of procedure, in clear derogation of the
constitutional requirement. Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
explicitly provides that “[t]he Senate or the House of Representatives, or
any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation
in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure.” The requisite of
publication of the rules is intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due
process. Publication is indeed imperative, for it will be the height of
injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a
law or rule of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive
one. What constitutes publication is set forth in Article 2 of the Civil Code,
which provides that “[l]aws shall take effect after 15 days following the
completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.” The respondents in
G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings and even on oral argument that
the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had
been published in newspapers of general circulation only in 1995 and in
2006. With respect to the present Senate of the 14th Congress, however, of
which the term of half of its members commenced on June 30, 2007, no
effort was undertaken for the publication of these rules when they first
opened their session.
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Same; Same; The absence of any amendment to the rules cannot justify
the Senate’s defiance of the clear and unambiguous language of Section 21,
Article VI of the Constitution; The constitutional mandate to publish the
said rules prevails over any custom, practice or tradition followed by the
Senate.—Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally
mandated publication by arguing that the rules have never been amended
since 1995 and, despite that, they are published in booklet form available to
anyone for free, and accessible to the public at the Senate’s internet web
page. The Court does not agree. The absence of any amendment to the rules
cannot justify the Senate’s defiance of the clear and unambiguous language
of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. The organic law instructs,
without more, that the Senate or its committees may conduct inquiries in aid
of legislation only in accordance with duly published rules of procedure,
and does not make any distinction whether or not these rules have
undergone amendments or revision. The constitutional mandate to publish
the said rules prevails over any custom, practice or tradition followed by the
Senate.
Same; Same; Statutes; Internet; Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8792,
otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, does not make
the internet a medium for publishing laws, rules and regulations.—The
invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792, otherwise
known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, to support their claim of
valid publication through the internet is all the more incorrect. R.A. 8792
considers an electronic data message or an electronic document as the
functional equivalent of a written document only for evidentiary purposes.
In other words, the law merely recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for
their being the original) of electronic data messages and/or electronic
documents. It does not make the internet a medium for publishing laws,
rules and regulations.
Same; Same; The recent publication does not cure the infirmity of the
inquiry sought to be prohibited by the instant petitions.—The Senate caused
the publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid
of Legislation in the October 31, 2008 issues of Manila Bulletin and
Malaya. While we take judicial notice of this fact, the recent publication
does not cure the infirmity of the
174

inquiry sought to be prohibited by the instant petitions. Insofar as the

consolidated cases are concerned, the legislative investigation subject
thereof still could not be undertaken by the respondent Senate Committees,
because no published rules governed it, in clear contravention of the

Constitution.
PUNO, C.J., Dissenting Opinion:
Constitutional Law; Legislative Inquiry; A faithful adherence of the
case at bar to the Neri Ruling would yield the conclusion that the “Garci
tapes” investigation may be conducted even without the published Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries, and that only those orders and proceedings
that result in the violation of the rights of the witnesses may be considered
null and void.—It will be recalled that in the March 25 Neri Decision, the
Court struck down not the entire proceedings of the Senate
investigation on the NBN-ZTE deal for want of published Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries, but only the Order dated January 30,
2008, citing petitioner Romulo L. Neri in contempt of the Senate
Committees and directing his arrest and detention (January 30 Contempt
Order) as stated in the dispositive portion of the Decision. A faithful
adherence of the case at bar to the Neri Ruling would yield the conclusion
that the “Garci tapes” investigation may be conducted even without the
published Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries, and that only those
orders and proceedings that result in the violation of the rights of the
witnesses may be considered null and void. The ponencia did not, however,
show which orders or proceedings resulted in this violation and, instead,
made a blanket prohibition of the conduct of the “Garci tapes” investigation
for want of published Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries.
Same; Same; In both the March 25 Neri Decision and the September 4 Neri
Resolution, the Court did not invalidate the entire Senate investigation
proceedings conducted in accordance with the Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries, which were not published in the 14th Congress.—In
both the March 25 Neri Decision and the September 4 Neri Resolution,
the Court did not invalidate the entire Senate investigation proceedings
conducted in accordance with the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries,
which were not
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VOL. 575, DECEMBER 23, 2008 175

published in the 14th Congress. In fact, the Court ruled on the issue of
executive privilege raised in said proceedings. It struck down only the
January 30 Contempt Order against therein petitioner Neri for failure to
comply with Section 18 of the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries,
while at the same time holding these rules as constitutionally infirm for
want of publication.
Same; Same; The continuing effectivity of the Senate Rules from one
Congress to the next, which the Court acknowledged in its September 4 Neri
Resolution, evinces the nature of the Senate as a continuing body governed
by its continuing Senate Rules.—The continuing effectivity of the Senate
Rules from one Congress to the next, which the Court acknowledged in
its September 4 Neri Resolution, evinces the nature of the Senate as a
continuing body governed by its continuing Senate Rules. If the Senate
were not a continuing body, there would be no reason for the Senate Rules
to likewise have a continuing effect. In contradistinction, the effectivity of
the Rules of Proceedings of the House of Representatives (House Rules)—
which is admittedly not a continuing body, as the terms of all congressmen
end at the same time—terminates upon the expiration of one Congress.
Thus, Rule 1, Section 1 of the 14th Congress House Rules adopted on
November 20, 2007 reflects the practice of the House of Representatives of
adopting rules of proceedings on its first meeting and organization upon the
opening of a succeeding Congress.
Same; Same; As a general rule, one-time publication suffices to satisfy
the due process requirement to inform the public of a rule that would govern
it and affect its rights.—As a general rule, one-time publication suffices to
satisfy the due process requirement to inform the public of a rule that would
govern it and affect its rights. It is not uncommon for laws and rules to
provide that they shall take effect upon a certain date following publication
in a newspaper of general circulation without having to state that they “shall
remain in force until they are amended or repealed” for them to have
continuing effect. These laws and rules are published only once, and yet
they continue to be in force. The Court itself employs this language in its
rules as shown in the recently promulgated Rule on the Writ of Habeas
Data and Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
176

Same; Same; The exception to the general rule that one-time

publication suffices for a law or rule to have continuing effect is when there
are circumstances or factors that interrupt this continuity.—The exception
to the general rule that one-time publication suffices for a law or rule to
have continuing effect is when there are circumstances or factors that
interrupt this continuity. An example is the discontinuation of the existence
of the House of Representatives as a legislative body, which terminates the
effectivity of its published Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries and
requires the publication of these rules in the succeeding Congress for them
to take effect. As discussed above and in my Dissents to the March 25 Neri
Decision and September 4 Neri Resolution, the Senate, unlike the House
of Representatives, is a continuing body. Thus, contrary to the holding of the

ponencia, the Senate’s Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries, sans
amendment, need not be published by the Senate of every Congress and
need not also state that they shall “remain in force until they are amended or
repealed” for them to be effective from one Congress to the next. Quite the
opposite of the ponencia’s ruling, in the absence of language stating that the
Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries shall not continue in effect from
one Congress to the next, these rules shall have continuing effect.
Same; Anti-Wiretapping Law; What Republic Act (R.A.) 4200 penalizes
are the acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording private
communications by means of the devices enumerated therein.—A private
communication is characterized as such based not on the content of the
communication, but on the context that it was said in private and not for
public consumption. That the content or nature of the communication is
immaterial was ruled in Ramirez v. Court of Appeals, 248 SCRA 590
(1995), viz.: ... the nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation
of the statute. The substance of the same need not be specifically alleged
in the information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly
overhearing, intercepting or recording private communications by
means of the devices enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an
individual made a secret recording of a private communication by means of
a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of
R.A. 4200.
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VOL. 575, DECEMBER 23, 2008 177

Same; Same; Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4200 provides for exceptions
when wiretapping is allowed by written order of the court.—R.A. No. 4200,
however, provides for exceptions when wiretapping is allowed by written
order of the court under Section 3, viz.: Section 3. Nothing contained in this
Act, however, shall render it unlawful or punishable for any peace officer,
who is authorized by a written order of the Court, to execute any of the
acts declared to be unlawful in the two preceding sections in cases
involving the crimes of treason, espionage, provoking war and
disloyalty in case of war, piracy, mutiny in the high seas, rebellion,
conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, inciting to rebellion,
sedition, conspiracy to commit sedition, inciting to sedition, kidnapping
as defined by the Revised Penal Code, and violations of Commonwealth
Act No. 616, punishing espionage and other offenses against national
security: Provided, That such written order shall only be issued or granted
upon written application and the examination under oath or affirmation of
the applicant and the witnesses he may produce and a showing: (1) that
there are reasonable grounds to believe that any of the crimes enumerated
hereinabove has been committed or is being committed or is about to be
committed: Provided, however, That in cases involving the offenses of
rebellion, conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, inciting to rebellion,
sedition, conspiracy to commit sedition, and inciting to sedition, such
authority shall be granted only upon prior proof that a rebellion or acts of
sedition, as the case may be, have actually been or are being committed; (2)
that there are reasonable grounds to believe that evidence will be obtained
essential to the conviction of any person for, or to the solution of, or to the
prevention of, any of such crimes; and (3) that there are no other means
readily available for obtaining such evidence.
Same; Same; Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4200 makes illegally wiretapped
communications inadmissible in any proceeding.—To further give teeth to
the above prohibition, R.A. No. 4200 makes illegally wiretapped
communications inadmissible in any proceeding, viz.: Section 4. Any
communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance,
purport, effect, or meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any
information therein contained obtained or se-
178

cured by any person in violation of the preceding sections of this Act shall
not be admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative
or administrative hearing or investigation.
Same; Same; The exception under Section 1 in relation to Section 3 of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4200 does not include the use of illegally
wiretapped communication for purposes of prosecuting violations of R.A.
No. 4200 itself.—The exception under Section 1 in relation to Section 3 of
R.A. No. 4200 does not include the use of illegally wiretapped
communication for purposes of prosecuting violations of R.A. No. 4200
itself as the Court did in Ramirez. Not reading this exception into the law
would impede the prosecution of the acts it prohibits and contradict the very
purpose for adopting the law as clearly stated in its title, “An Act to Prohibit
and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of the Privacy of
Communication, and for Other Purposes.” Well-settled is the rule in
statutory construction that “where there is ambiguity, such interpretation as
will avoid inconvenience and absurdity is to be adopted.” Interpretatio talis
in ambiguis semper frienda est, ut evitatur inconveniens et absurdum. R.A.
No. 4200 should be given a sensible construction, so as to give effect to its
rationale and intent and thus avoid an unjust or absurd interpretation. The
ineluctable conclusion is that the use of illegally wiretapped communication
must be allowed in a prosecution under R.A. No. 4200 precisely to deter the
commission of illegal wiretapping.
REYES, J., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion:
Remedial Law; Actions; Moot and Academic; While it is true that the Court
is not absolutely precluded from resolving issues that are otherwise moot, no
compelling circumstance is present here that would warrant the exercise of
judicial review.—One of the requisites of judicial power is the presence of
an actual controversy. Courts are prohibited from deciding hypothetical,
conjectural or anticipatory questions despite their vast judicial power.
Otherwise, a decision rendered would amount to nothing but an advisory
opinion, which would not augur well with the function of courts as arbiters
of con-
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VOL. 575, DECEMBER 23, 2008 179

troversies. While it is true that the Court is not absolutely precluded from
resolving issues that are otherwise moot, no compelling circumstance is
present here that would warrant the exercise of judicial review.
Same; Same; Same; When a case is impressed with public interest, a
relaxation of the application of the rules is in order.—Courts should not be
shackled by stringent rules which would result in manifest injustice. Rules
of procedure are tools crafted to facilitate, not to frustrate, the attainment of
justice. Thus, their strict and rigid application, if they result in technicalities
that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must be
eschewed. Substantial rights must not be prejudiced by a rigid and technical
application of the rules in the altar of expediency. When a case is impressed
with public interest, a relaxation of the application of the rules is in order.
Time and again, this Court has suspended its own rules and excepted a
particular case from their operation whenever the higher interests of justice
so require.
Constitutional Law; Legislative Inquiry; There is nothing in the
constitutional provision that commands that every new Congress must
publish its rules of procedure.—The Constitutional provision requiring
publication of Senate rules is contained in Section 21, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution, which reads: The Senate or the House of Representatives or
any of its respective Committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The
rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
respected. The above provision only requires a “duly published” rule of
procedure for inquiries in aid of legislation. It is silent on republication.
There is nothing in the constitutional provision that commands that every
new Congress must publish its rules of procedure. Implicitly, republication

is necessary only when there is an amendment or revision to the rules. This
is required under the due process clause of the Constitution.
180

Garcillano vs. House of Representatives Committees on Public
Information, Public Order and Safety, National Defense and
Security, Information and Communications Technology, and
Suffrage and Electoral Reforms
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the Supreme Court. Prohibition.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Eddie U. Tamondong, Tomas A. Garcillano and Rodolfo G.
Palattao for Virgilio O. Garcillano.
M.M. Lazaro & Associates for petitioners.
Ongkiko, Kalaw, Manhit & Acorda Law Offices for petitioner in
G.R. No. 179275.
Leonardo B. Palicte III for public respondents.
Gana & Manlangit Law Office for respondents-intervenors.
NACHURA, J.:
More than three years ago, tapes ostensibly containing a
wiretapped conversation purportedly between the President of the
Philippines and a high-ranking official of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) surfaced. They captured unprecedented
public attention and thrust the country into a controversy that placed
the legitimacy of the present administration on the line, and resulted
in the near-collapse of the Arroyo government. The tapes,
notoriously referred to as the “Hello Garci” tapes, allegedly
contained the President’s instructions to COMELEC Commissioner
Virgilio Garcillano to manipulate in her favor results of the 2004
presidential elections. These recordings were to become the subject
of heated legislative hearings conducted separately by committees of
both Houses of Congress.1
_______________
1 Rollo (G.R. No. 179275), p. 168.
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VOL. 575, DECEMBER 23, 2008 181


In the House of Representatives (House), on June 8, 2005, then

Minority Floor Leader Francis G. Escudero delivered a privilege
speech, “Tale of Two Tapes,” and set in motion a congressional
investigation jointly conducted by the Committees on Public
Suffrage and Electoral Reforms (respondent House Committees).
During the inquiry, several versions of the wiretapped conversation
emerged. But on July 5, 2005, National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) Director Reynaldo Wycoco, Atty. Alan Paguia and the lawyer
of former NBI Deputy Director Samuel Ong submitted to the
respondent House Committees seven alleged “original” tape
recordings of the supposed three-hour taped conversation. After
prolonged and impassioned debate by the committee members on
the admissibility and authenticity of the recordings, the tapes were
eventually played in the chambers of the House.2
On August 3, 2005, the respondent House Committees decided to
suspend the hearings indefinitely. Nevertheless, they decided to
prepare committee reports based on the said recordings and the
testimonies of the resource persons.3
Alarmed by these developments, petitioner Virgilio O. Garcillano
(Garcillano) filed with this Court a Petition for Prohibition and
Injunction, with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ
of Preliminary Injunction4 docketed as G.R. No. 170338. He prayed
that the respondent House Committees be restrained from using
these tape recordings of the “illegally obtained” wiretapped
conversations in their committee reports and for any other purpose.
He further implored that the said recordings and any reference
thereto be ordered
_______________
2 Rollo (G.R. No. 170338), pp. 7-9.

3 Id., at p. 9.
4 Id., at pp. 1-38.
182

stricken off the records of the inquiry, and the respondent House
Committees directed to desist from further using the recordings in
any of the House proceedings.5
Without reaching its denouement, the House discussion and
debates on the “Garci tapes” abruptly stopped.
After more than two years of quiescence, Senator Panfilo Lacson
roused the slumbering issue with a privilege speech, “The
Lighthouse That Brought Darkness.” In his discourse, Senator
Lacson promised to provide the public “the whole unvarnished truth
—the what’s, when’s, where’s, who’s and why’s” of the alleged
wiretap, and sought an inquiry into the perceived willingness of
telecommunications providers to participate in nefarious wiretapping
activities.
On motion of Senator Francis Pangilinan, Senator Lacson’s
speech was referred to the Senate Committee on National Defense
and Security, chaired by Senator Rodolfo Biazon, who had
previously filed two bills6 seeking to regulate the sale, purchase and
use of wiretapping equipment and to prohibit the Armed Forces of
the Philippines (AFP) from performing electoral duties.7
In the Senate’s plenary session the following day, a lengthy
debate ensued when Senator Richard Gordon aired his concern on
the possible transgression of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 42008 if the
body were to conduct a legislative inquiry on the matter. On August
28, 2007, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago delivered a privilege
speech, articulating her considered view that the Constitution
absolutely bans the use, pos-
_______________
5 Id., at pp. 36-38.

6 Rollo (G.R. No. 179275), pp. 215-220.
7 Id., at p. 169.
8 An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of
the Privacy of Communications and for Other Purposes.
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VOL. 575, DECEMBER 23, 2008 183

session, replay or communication of the contents of the “Hello

Garci” tapes. However, she recommended a legislative investigation
into the role of the Intelligence Service of the AFP (ISAFP), the
Philippine National Police or other government entities in the
alleged illegal wiretapping of public officials.9
On September 6, 2007, petitioners Santiago Ranada and Oswaldo

Agcaoili, retired justices of the Court of Appeals, filed before this
Court a Petition for Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction,10 docketed as G.R. No. 179275, seeking to bar the Senate
from conducting its scheduled legislative inquiry. They argued in the
main that the intended legislative inquiry violates R.A. No. 4200 and
Section 3, Article III of the Constitution.11
As the Court did not issue an injunctive writ, the Senate
proceeded with its public hearings on the “Hello Garci” tapes on
September 7,12 1713 and October 1,14 2007.
Intervening as respondents,15 Senators Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr.,
Benigno Noynoy C. Aquino, Rodolfo G. Biazon, Panfilo M. Lacson,
Loren B. Legarda, M.A. Jamby A.S. Madrigal and Antonio F.
Trillanes filed their Comment16 on the petition on September 25,
2007.
_______________
9 Rollo (G.R. No. 179275), pp. 169-170.

10 Id., at pp. 3-17.
11 Id., at pp. 7-13.
12 Id., at p. 24.
13 Id., at p. 44.
14 Memorandum of Respondents-Intervenors, p. 6.
15 Rollo (G.R. No. 179275), pp. 68-70.
16 Id., at pp. 71-90.
184

The Court subsequently heard the case on oral argument.17

On October 26, 2007, Maj. Lindsay Rex Sagge, a member of the
ISAFP and one of the resource persons summoned by the Senate to
appear and testify at its hearings, moved to intervene as petitioner in
G.R. No. 179275.18
On November 20, 2007, the Court resolved to consolidate G.R.
Nos. 170338 and 179275.19
It may be noted that while both petitions involve the “Hello
Garci” recordings, they have different objectives—the first is poised
at preventing the playing of the tapes in the House and their
subsequent inclusion in the committee reports, and the second seeks
to prohibit and stop the conduct of the Senate inquiry on the

wiretapped conversation.
The Court dismisses the first petition, G.R. No. 170338, and
grants the second, G.R. No. 179275.
_______________
17 Id., at p. 62. The Court identified the following issues for discussion in the
October 2, 2007 Oral Argument:
1. Whether the petitioners have locus standi to bring this suit.
2. Whether the Rules of Procedure of the Senate and the Senate Committees
governing the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation have been published, in
accordance with Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. Corollarily:
(a) Whether these Rules must be published by every Congress.
(b) What mode/s of publication will comply with the constitutional
requirement.
3. Whether the inquiry, which is centered on the so-called “Garci tapes,” violates
Section 3, Article III of the Constitution and/or Republic Act No. 4200. (Id., at p. 66.)
18 Motion for Leave to Intervene and Petition-in-Intervention filed on October 26,
2007.
19 Resolution dated November 20, 2007.
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VOL. 575, DECEMBER 23, 2008 185

-I-
Before delving into the merits of the case, the Court shall first
resolve the issue on the parties’ standing, argued at length in their
pleadings.
In Tolentino v. COMELEC,20 we explained that “ ‘[l]egal
standing’ or locus standi refers to a personal and substantial interest
in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct
injury because of the challenged governmental act x x x,” thus,
“generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when (1) he can show that
he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury because of the
allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable
to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a
favorable action.”21
The gist of the question of standing is whether a party has “alleged

such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure
that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues
upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult

constitutional questions.”22
However, considering that locus standi is a mere procedural
technicality, the Court, in recent cases, has relaxed the stringent
direct injury test. David v. Macapagal-Arroyo23 articulates that a
“liberal policy has been observed, allowing ordinary citizens,
members of Congress, and civic organizations to prosecute actions
involving the constitutionality or
_______________
20 465 Phil. 385, 402; 420 SCRA 438, 452 (2004).

21 Tolentino v. Commission on Elections, id.
22 Province of Batangas v. Romulo, G.R. No. 152774, May 27, 2004, 429 SCRA
736, 755.
23 G.R. Nos. 171396, 171409, 171485, 171483, 171400, 171489 and 171424,
May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA 160.
186

validity of laws, regulations and rulings.”24 The fairly recent Chavez

v. Gonzales25 even permitted a non-member of the broadcast media,
who failed to allege a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy, to challenge the acts of the Secretary of Justice and the
National Telecommunications Commission. The majority, in the said
case, echoed the current policy that “this Court has repeatedly and
consistently refused to wield procedural barriers as impediments to
its addressing and resolving serious legal questions that greatly
impact on public interest, in keeping with the Court’s duty under the
1987 Constitution to determine whether or not other branches of
government have kept themselves within the limits of the
Constitution and the laws, and that they have not abused the
discretion given to them.”26
In G.R. No. 170338, petitioner Garcillano justifies his standing to
initiate the petition by alleging that he is the person alluded to in the
“Hello Garci” tapes. Further, his was publicly identified by the
members of the respondent committees as one of the voices in the
recordings.27 Obviously, therefore, petitioner Garcillano stands to be
directly injured by the House committees’ actions and charges of
electoral fraud. The Court recognizes his standing to institute the
petition for prohibition.
In G.R. No. 179275, petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili justify their

standing by alleging that they are concerned citizens, taxpayers, and
members of the IBP. They are of the firm conviction that any
attempt to use the “Hello Garci” tapes will further divide the
country. They wish to see the legal and proper use of public funds
that will necessarily be defrayed in
_______________
24 David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, id., at p. 218.

25 G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008, 545 SCRA 441.
26 Id.
27 Reply in G.R. No. 170338, pp. 36-37.
187
VOL. 575, DECEMBER 23, 2008 187

the ensuing public hearings. They are worried by the continuous

violation of the laws and individual rights, and the blatant attempt to
abuse constitutional processes through the conduct of legislative
inquiries purportedly in aid of legislation.28
Intervenor Sagge alleges violation of his right to due process
considering that he is summoned to attend the Senate hearings
without being apprised not only of his rights therein through the
publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in
Aid of Legislation, but also of the intended legislation which
underpins the investigation. He further intervenes as a taxpayer
bewailing the useless and wasteful expenditure of public funds
involved in the conduct of the questioned hearings.29
Given that petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili allege an interest in
the execution of the laws and that intervenor Sagge asserts his
constitutional right to due process,30 they satisfy the requisite
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy by merely being
citizens of the Republic.
Following the Court’s ruling in Francisco, Jr. v. The House of
Representatives,31 we find sufficient petitioners Ranada’s and
Agcaoili’s and intervenor Sagge’s allegation that the continuous
conduct by the Senate of the questioned legislative inquiry will
necessarily involve the expenditure of public funds.32 It should be
noted that in Francisco, rights personal to then Chief Justice Hilario
G. Davide, Jr. had been injured by the alleged unconstitutional acts
of the House of Represen-
_______________
28 Rollo (G.R. No. 179275), p. 4.

29 Petition-in-Intervention, p. 3.
30 David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, supra note 23, at p. 223.
31 460 Phil. 830; 415 SCRA 44 (2003).
32 Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives, id., at p. 897; p. 141.
188

tatives, yet the Court granted standing to the petitioners therein

for, as in this case, they invariably invoked the vindication of their
own rights—as taxpayers, members of Congress, citizens,
individually or in a class suit, and members of the bar and of the
legal profession—which were also supposedly violated by the
therein assailed unconstitutional acts.33
Likewise, a reading of the petition in G.R. No. 179275 shows
that the petitioners and intervenor Sagge advance constitutional
issues which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their
seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. The issues are of
transcendental and paramount importance not only to the public but
also to the Bench and the Bar, and should be resolved for the
guidance of all.34
Thus, in the exercise of its sound discretion and given the liberal
attitude it has shown in prior cases climaxing in the more recent case
of Chavez, the Court recognizes the legal standing of petitioners
Ranada and Agcaoili and intervenor Sagge.
- II -
The Court, however, dismisses G.R. No. 170338 for being moot
and academic. Repeatedly stressed in our prior decisions is the
principle that the exercise by this Court of judicial power is limited
to the determination and resolution of actual cases and
controversies.35 By actual cases, we mean existing
_______________
33 Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives, supra note 31, at p. 895; p. 136.
34 Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, Jr., G.R. No. 113375, May 5, 1994, 232 SCRA
110, 139.
35 Dumlao v. Commission on Elections, 184 Phil. 369, 377; 95 SCRA 392, 400
(1980). This case explains the standards that have to be followed in the exercise of the
power of judicial review, namely: (1) the existence of an appropriate case; (2) an
interest personal and
189
VOL. 575, DECEMBER 23, 2008 189

conflicts appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, not

conjectural or anticipatory, for otherwise the decision of the Court
will amount to an advisory opinion. The power of judicial inquiry
does not extend to hypothetical questions because any attempt at
abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions
and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities.36 Neither will the
Court determine a moot question in a case in which no practical
relief can be granted. A case becomes moot when its purpose has
become stale.37 It is unnecessary to indulge in academic discussion
of a case presenting a moot question as a judgment thereon cannot
have any practical legal effect or, in the nature of things, cannot be
enforced.38
In G.R. No. 170338, petitioner Garcillano implores from the
Court, as aforementioned, the issuance of an injunctive writ to
prohibit the respondent House Committees from playing the tape
recordings and from including the same in their committee report.
He likewise prays that the said tapes be stricken off the records of
the House proceedings. But the Court notes that the recordings were
already played in the House and heard by its members.39 There is
also the widely publicized fact that the committee reports on the
“Hello Garci” inquiry were completed and submitted to the House in
_______________
substantial by the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the plea that the
function be exercised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the necessity that the
constitutional question be passed upon in order to decide the case.
36 La Bugal-B’laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos, 465 Phil. 860, 889-890; 441
SCRA 148, 178 (2004).
37 Rufino v. Endriga, G.R. Nos. 139554 and 139565, July 21, 2006, 496 SCRA
13, 46.
38 Lanuza, Jr. v. Yuchengco, G.R. No. 157033, March 28, 2005, 454 SCRA 130,
138.
39 Rollo (G.R. No. 170338), p. 9.
190

plenary by the respondent committees.40 Having been overtaken by

these events, the Garcillano petition has to be dismissed for being
moot and academic. After all, prohibition is a preventive remedy to
restrain the doing of an act about to be done, and not intended to
provide a remedy for an act already accomplished.41
- III -
As to the petition in G.R. No. 179275, the Court grants the same.
The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the
questioned legislative inquiry without duly published rules of
procedure, in clear derogation of the constitutional requirement.
Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly
provides that “[t]he Senate or the House of Representatives, or any
of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure.”
The requisite of publication of the rules is intended to satisfy the
basic requirements of due process.42 Publication is indeed
imperative, for it will be the height of injustice to punish or
otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law or rule of
which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.43
What constitutes publication is set
_______________
40 See news article “Separate findings, no closure” by Michael Lim Umbac

published in The Philippine Daily Inquirer on March 29, 2006; News item “5 House
committees in ‘Garci’ probe file report on Monday” published in The Manila Bulletin
on March 25, 2006.
41 Simon, Jr. v. Commission on Human Rights, G.R. No. 100150, January 5, 1994,
229 SCRA 117, 135-136; Agustin v. De la Fuente, 84 Phil. 515, 517 (1949).
42 Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Philippines: A Commentary, 1996 ed., p.
679.
43 Tañada v. Tuvera, 220 Phil. 422, 432-433; 136 SCRA 27, 38 (1985).
191
VOL. 575, DECEMBER 23, 2008 191

forth in Article 2 of the Civil Code, which provides that “[l]aws

shall take effect after 15 days following the completion of their
publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of
general circulation in the Philippines.”44
The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings and
even on oral argument that the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing
Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been published in newspapers of
general circulation only in 1995 and in 2006.45 With respect to the
present Senate of the 14th Congress, however, of which the term of
half of its members commenced on June 30, 2007, no effort was
undertaken for the publication of these rules when they first opened
their session.
Recently, the Court had occasion to rule on this very same
question. In Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public
Officers and Investigations,46 we said:
Fourth, we find merit in the argument of the OSG that respondent

Committees likewise violated Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution,
requiring that the inquiry be in accordance with the “duly published rules
of procedure.” We quote the OSG’s explanation:
The phrase “duly published rules of procedure” requires the
Senate of every Congress to publish its rules of procedure governing
inquiries in aid of legislation because every Senate is distinct from
the one before it or after it. Since Senatorial elections are held every
three (3) years for one-half of the Sen-
_______________
44 As amended on June 18, 1987 by Executive Order No. 200 entitled “Providing for the
Publication of Laws Either in the Official Gazette or in a Newspaper of General Circulation in
the Philippines as a Requirement for their Effectivity.”
45 Rollo (G.R. No. 179275), p. 179; Memorandum of Respondents-Intervenors, pp. 9-10.
46 G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008, 549 SCRA 77, 135-136.
192

ate’s membership, the composition of the Senate also changes by the

end of each term. Each Senate may thus enact a different set of rules
as it may deem fit. Not having published its Rules of Procedure,
the subject hearings in aid of legislation conducted by the 14th
Senate, are therefore, procedurally infirm.
Justice Antonio T. Carpio, in his Dissenting and Concurring

Opinion, reinforces this ruling with the following rationalization:
“The present Senate under the 1987 Constitution is no longer a

continuing legislative body. The present Senate has twenty-four members,
twelve of whom are elected every three years for a term of six years each.
Thus, the term of twelve Senators expires every three years, leaving less
than a majority of Senators to continue into the next Congress. The
1987 Constitution, like the 1935 Constitution, requires a majority of
Senators to ‘constitute a quorum to do business.’ Applying the same
reasoning in Arnault v. Nazareno, the Senate under the 1987 Constitution is
not a continuing body because less than majority of the Senators continue
into the next Congress. The consequence is that the Rules of Procedure must
be republished by the Senate after every expiry of the term of twelve
Senators.”47
The subject was explained with greater lucidity in our

Resolution48 (On the Motion for Reconsideration) in the same case,
viz.:
“On the nature of the Senate as a ‘continuing body,’ this Court sees fit to
issue a clarification. Certainly, there is no debate that the Senate as an
institution is ‘continuing,’ as it is not dissolved as an entity with each
national election or change in the composition of its members. However, in
the conduct of its day-to-day business the Senate of each Congress acts
separately and independently of the
_______________
47 Id., at pp. 297-298.

48 Dated September 4, 2008.
193
VOL. 575, DECEMBER 23, 2008 193

Senate of the Congress before it. The Rules of the Senate itself confirms this
when it states:
RULE XLIV
UNFINISHED BUSINESS
SEC. 123. Unfinished business at the end of the session shall
be taken up at the next session in the same status.
All pending matters and proceedings shall terminate upon the
expiration of one (1) Congress, but may be taken by the succeeding
Congress as if present for the first time.
Undeniably from the foregoing, all pending matters and proceedings, i.e.
unpassed bills and even legislative investigations, of the Senate of a
particular Congress are considered terminated upon the expiration of that
Congress and it is merely optional on the Senate of the succeeding Congress
to take up such unfinished matters, not in the same status, but as if

presented for the first time. The logic and practicality of such a rule is
readily apparent considering that the Senate of the succeeding Congress
(which will typically have a different composition as that of the previous
Congress) should not be bound by the acts and deliberations of the Senate of
which they had no part. If the Senate is a continuing body even with respect
to the conduct of its business, then pending matters will not be deemed
terminated with the expiration of one Congress but will, as a matter of
course, continue into the next Congress with the same status.
This dichotomy of the continuity of the Senate as an institution and of
the opposite nature of the conduct of its business is reflected in its Rules.
The Rules of the Senate (i.e. the Senate’s main rules of procedure) states:
RULE LI
AMENDMENTS TO, OR REVISIONS OF, THE RULES
SEC. 136. At the start of each session in which the Senators
elected in the preceding elections shall begin their term of office, the
President may endorse the Rules to the appropriate committee for
amendment or revision.
194

The Rules may also be amended by means of a motion which

should be presented at least one day before its consideration, and the
vote of the majority of the Senators present in the session shall be
required for its approval.
RULE LII
DATE OF TAKING EFFECT
SEC. 137. These Rules shall take effect on the date of their
adoption and shall remain in force until they are amended or
repealed.
Section 136 of the Senate Rules quoted above takes into account the new
composition of the Senate after an election and the possibility of the
amendment or revision of the Rules at the start of each session in which the
newly elected Senators shall begin their term.
However, it is evident that the Senate has determined that its main rules are
intended to be valid from the date of their adoption until they are amended
or repealed. Such language is conspicuously absent from the Rules. The
Rules simply state “(t)hese Rules shall take effect seven (7) days after
publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation.” The latter does
not explicitly provide for the continued effectivity of such rules until they
are amended or repealed. In view of the difference in the language of the
two sets of Senate rules, it cannot be presumed that the Rules (on legislative
inquiries) would continue into the next Congress. The Senate of the next
Congress may easily adopt different rules for its legislative inquiries which
come within the rule on unfinished business.
The language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution requiring that the
inquiry be conducted in accordance with the duly published rules of
procedure is categorical. It is incumbent upon the Senate to publish the
rules for its legislative inquiries in each Congress or otherwise make the
published rules clearly state that the same shall be effective in subsequent
Congresses or until they are amended or repealed to sufficiently put public
on notice.
If it was the intention of the Senate for its present rules on legislative
inquiries to be effective even in the next Congress, it could have
195
VOL. 575, DECEMBER 23, 2008 195

easily adopted the same language it had used in its main rules regarding
effectivity.”
Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally

mandated publication by arguing that the rules have never been
amended since 1995 and, despite that, they are published in booklet
form available to anyone for free, and accessible to the public at the
Senate’s internet web page.49
The Court does not agree. The absence of any amendment to the
rules cannot justify the Senate’s defiance of the clear and
unambiguous language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution.
The organic law instructs, without more, that the Senate or its
committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation only in
accordance with duly published rules of procedure, and does not
make any distinction whether or not these rules have undergone
amendments or revision. The constitutional mandate to publish the
said rules prevails over any custom, practice or tradition followed by
the Senate.
Justice Carpio’s response to the same argument raised by the
respondents is illuminating:
“The publication of the Rules of Procedure in the website of the Senate,

or in pamphlet form available at the Senate, is not sufficient under the
Tañada v. Tuvera ruling which requires publication either in the Official
Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. The Rules of Procedure
even provide that the rules “shall take effect seven (7) days after publication
in two (2) newspapers of general circulation,” precluding any other form of
publication. Publication in accordance with Tañada is mandatory to comply
with the due process requirement because the Rules of Procedure put a
person’s liberty at risk. A person who violates the Rules of Procedure could
be arrested and detained by the Senate.”
_______________
49 TSN, Oral Arguments, March 4, 2008, (G.R. No. 179275), pp. 413-414.
196

The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No.

8792,50 otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000,
to support their claim of valid publication through the internet is all
the more incorrect. R.A. 8792 considers an electronic data message
or an electronic document as the functional equivalent of a written
document only for evidentiary purposes.51 In other words, the law
merely recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for their being the
original) of electronic data messages and/or electronic documents.52
It does
_______________
50 Entitled “An Act Providing for the Recognition and Use of Electronic
Commercial and Non-Commercial Transactions and Documents, Penalties for
Unlawful Use Thereof and For Other Purposes,” approved on June 14, 2000.
51 MCC Industrial Sales Corporation v. Ssangyong Corporation, G.R. No.
170633, October 15, 2007, 536 SCRA 408. (Emphasis supplied.)
52 Sections 6, 7 and 10 of R.A. No. 8792 read:
Sec. 6. Legal Recognition of Data Messages.—Infor-mation shall not be denied
legal effect, validity or enforceability solely on the grounds that it is in the data
message purporting to give rise to such legal effect, or that it is merely referred to in
that electronic data message.
Sec. 7. Legal Recognition of Electronic Documents.—Electronic documents
shall have the legal effect, validity or enforceability as any other document or legal
writing, and—
(a) Where the law requires a document to be in writing, that requirement is met
by an electronic document if the said electronic document maintains its integrity and
reliability, and can be authenticated so as to be usable for subsequent reference, in that
—
(i) The electronic document has remained complete and unaltered, apart
from the addition of any endorsement and any authorized change, or any
change which arises in the normal course of communication, storage and
display; and
197
VOL. 575, DECEMBER 23, 2008 197

not make the internet a medium for publishing laws, rules and
regulations.
_______________
(ii) The electronic document is reliable in the light of the purpose for

which it was generated and in the light of all the relevant circumstances.
(b) Paragraph (a) applies whether the requirement therein is in the form of an
obligation or whether the law simply provides consequences for the document not
being presented or retained in its original form.
(c) Where the law requires that a document be presented or retained in its
original form, that requirement is met by an electronic document if—
(i) There exists a reliable assurance as to the integrity of the document
from the time when it was first generated in its final form; and
(ii) That document is capable of being displayed to the person to whom it
is to be presented: Provided, That no provision of this Act shall apply to vary
any and all requirements of existing laws on formalities required in the
execution of documents for their validity.
For evidentiary purposes, an electronic document shall be the functional
equivalent of a written document under existing laws.
This Act does not modify any statutory rule relating to the admissibility of
electronic data messages or electronic documents, except the rules relating to
authentication and best evidence.
Sec. 10. Original Documents.—(1) Where the law requires information to be
presented or retained in its original form, that requirement is met by an electronic data
message or electronic document if:
(a) The integrity of the information from the time when it was first
generated in its final form, as an electronic data message or electronic
document is shown by evidence aliunde or otherwise; and
(b) Where it is required that information be presented, that the
information is capable of being displayed to the person to whom it is to be
presented.
198


Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees,

therefore, could not, in violation of the Constitution, use its
unpublished rules in the legislative inquiry subject of these
consolidated cases. The conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation by
the Senate has to be deferred until it shall have caused the
publication of the rules, because it can do so only “in accordance
with its duly published rules of procedure.”
Very recently, the Senate caused the publication of the Senate
Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation in the
October 31, 2008 issues of Manila Bulletin and Malaya. While we
take judicial notice of this fact, the recent publication does not cure
the infirmity of the inquiry sought to be prohibited by the instant
petitions. Insofar as the consolidated cases are concerned, the
legislative investigation subject thereof still could not be undertaken
by the respondent Senate Committees, because no published rules
governed it, in clear contravention of the Constitution.
With the foregoing disquisition, the Court finds it unnecessary to
discuss the other issues raised in the consolidated petitions.
_______________
(2) Paragraph (1) applies whether the requirement therein is in the form of an

obligation or whether the law simply provides consequences for the information not
being presented or retained in its original form.
(3) For the purposes of subparagraph (a) of paragraph (1):
(a) the criteria for assessing integrity shall be whether the information
has remained complete and unaltered, apart from the addition of any
endorsement and any change which arises in the normal course of
communication, storage and display; and
(b) the standard of reliability required shall be assessed in the light of the
purpose for which the information was generated and in the light of all
relevant circumstances.
199
VOL. 575, DECEMBER 23, 2008 199

WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 170338 is DISMISSED,

and the petition in G.R. No. 179275 is GRANTED. Let a writ of
prohibition be issued enjoining the Senate of the Republic of the
Philippines and/or any of its committees from conducting any

inquiry in aid of legislation centered on the “Hello Garci” tapes.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, Carpio, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Velasco, Jr.,

Leonardo-De Castro and Brion, JJ., concur.
Puno (C.J.), Please see Dissent.
Ynares-Santiago, J., I join the Dissenting Opinion of C.J. Puno.
Austria-Martinez, J., I join the C.J. in his Dissent.
Azcuna, J., I join the C.J. in his Dissent.
Corona, J., On Leave.
Carpio-Morales, J., I join the Dissent of the Chief Justice.
Reyes, J., See Concurring and Dissenting Opinion.
DISSENTING OPINION
PUNO, C.J.:
The case at bar takes one to task in distinguishing between what
is apparent and what is real, what is central and what is peripheral,
to get to the core of the issues that will decide the controversy at bar.
The facts pertaining to both G.R. No. 170338 and G.R. No.
179275 as narrated in the ponencia are undisputed. Hence, I will go
direct to the issues.
200

First, the issues in G.R. No. 179275. These were delineated in

the Oral Argument held on October 2, 2007 as follows:
1. Whether the petitioners have locus standi to bring the suit.

2. Whether the Rules of Procedure of the Senate and the Senate
Committees governing the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation have
been published, in accordance with Section 21, Article VI of the
Constitution. Corollarily:
(b) What mode/s of publication will comply with the
constitutional requirement.
3. Whether the inquiry, which is centered on the so-called “Garci
tapes” violates Section 3, Article III of the Constitution and/or Republic Act
No. 4200.1
As I agree with the disquisition of the ponencia on the first issue,

I shall limit my discussion to the second and third issues.
Publication of Senate Rules Governing

Inquiries in Aid of Legislation
Let me hark back to the ruling of the Court on the publication of the
“Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation”
(Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries) of the Senate in its March
25, 2008 Decision2 (March 25 Neri Decision) and September 4,
2008 Resolution3 (September 4
_______________
1 Rollo, G.R. No. 179275, p. 94.

2 Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and
Investigations, Senate Committee on Trade and Commerce, and Senate Committee on
National Defense and Security, G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008, 549 SCRA 77.
Investigations, Senate Committee on Trade and Commerce, and
201
VOL. 575, DECEMBER 23, 2008 201

Neri Resolution). I respectfully submit that the ponencia is not in

accord with the ruling of the Court in these Neri cases (Neri
Ruling). The proper application of the Neri Ruling to the case at
bar will yield the conclusion that the subject Senate investigation
should be allowed to proceed even if the Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries were not published in the 14th Congress prior
to the subject investigation. Still, I maintain my dissent to the Neri
Ruling and arrive at this same conclusion through a different track.
In the March 25 Neri Decision, the Court ruled, viz.:

requiring that the inquiry be in accordance with the “duly published rules
of procedure.” We quote the OSG’s explanation:
The phrase ‘duly published rules of procedure’ requires the
three (3) years for one-half of the Senate’s membership, the
composition of the Senate also changes by the end of each term. Each
Senate may thus enact a different set of rules as it may deem fit. Not
having published its Rules of Procedure, the subject hearings in
aid of legislation conducted by the 14th Senate, are therefore,

procedurally infirm.4
_______________
Senate Committee on National Defense and Security, G.R. No. 180643, September 4,
2008, 564 SCRA 152.

National Defense and Security, G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008, 549 SCRA 77,
135-136.
202

Subsequently, the Court clarified the above ruling in the

September 4 Neri Resolution. I quote the ruling at length, viz.:
“Having touched the subject of the Rules, we now proceed to respondent

Committees’ fourth argument. Respondent Committees argue that the
Senate does not have to publish its Rules because the same was published in
1995 and in 2006. Further, they claim that the Senate is a continuing body;
thus, it is not required to republish the Rules, unless the same is repealed or
amended.
On the nature of the Senate as a “continuing body,” this Court sees fit to
issue a clarification. Certainly, there is no debate that the Senate as an
institution is “continuing”, as it is not dissolved as an entity with each
national election or change in the composition of its members. However, in
the conduct of its day-to-day business, the Senate of each Congress acts
separately and independently of the Senate of the Congress before it. The
Rules of the Senate itself confirms this when it states:
RULE XLIV
UNFINISHED BUSINESS
Congress as if present for the first time. (emphasis supplied)
Undeniably from the foregoing, all pending matters and proceedings, i.e.
unpassed bills and even legislative investigations, of the Senate of a
particular Congress are considered terminated upon the expiration of that
Congress and it is merely optional on the Senate of the succeeding Congress
to take up such unfinished matters, not in the same status, but as if
presented for the first time. The logic and practicality of such a rule is
readily apparent considering that the Senate of the succeeding Congress
(which will typically have a different composition as that of the previous
Con-
203
VOL. 575, DECEMBER 23, 2008 203

gress) should not be bound by the acts and deliberations of the Senate of
which they had no part. If the Senate is a continuing body even with respect
to the conduct of its business, then pending matters will not be deemed
terminated with the expiration of one Congress but will, as a matter of
course, continue into the next Congress with the same status.
This dichotomy of the continuity of the Senate as an institution and of
The Rules of the Senate (i.e. the Senate’s main Rules of Procedure) states:
RULE LI
AMENDMENTS TO, OR REVISIONS OF, THE RULES
SEC. 136. At the start of each session in which the Senators
elected in the preceding elections shall begin their term of office,
the President may endorse the Rules to the appropriate committee
for amendment or revision.
The Rules may also be amended by means of a motion which
should be presented at least one day before its consideration, and the
vote of the majority of the Senators present in the session shall be
required for its approval. (emphasis supplied)
RULE LII
repealed. (emphasis supplied)
204

However, it is evident that the Senate has determined that its main rules
are intended to be valid from the date of their adoption until they are
amended or repealed. Such language is conspicuously absent from the

Rules. The Rules simply state “(t)hese Rules shall take effect seven (7) days
after publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation.” (Section 24,
Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation) The latter
does not explicitly provide for the continued effectivity of such rules until
they are amended or repealed. In view of the difference in the language of
the two sets of Senate rules, it cannot be presumed that the Rules (on
legislative inquiries) would continue into the next Congress. The Senate of
the next Congress may easily adopt different rules for its legislative
inquiries which come within the rule on unfinished business.
The language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution requiring that
the inquiry be conducted in accordance with the duly published rules of
procedure is categorical. It is incumbent upon the Senate to publish the
Congresses or until they are amended or repealed to sufficiently put public
on notice.
inquiries to be effective even in the next Congress, it could have easily
adopted the same language it had used in its main rules regarding effectivity.
Lest the Court be misconstrued, it should likewise be stressed that
not all orders issued or proceedings conducted pursuant to the subject
Rules are null and void. Only those that result in violation of the rights
of witnesses should be considered null and void, considering that the
rationale for the publication is to protect the rights of witnesses as
expressed in Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. Sans such
violation, orders and proceedings are considered valid and effective.”5
(emphasis supplied)
_______________

Investigations, Senate Committee on Trade and Commerce, and
205
VOL. 575, DECEMBER 23, 2008 205

The ponencia quotes the foregoing ruling in the September 4

Neri Resolution in holding, viz.:
“Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that

“[t]he Senate or the House of Representatives, or any of its respective
committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with
its duly published rules of procedure.” The requisite of publication of the

rules is intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due process.
Publication is indeed imperative, for it will be the height of injustice to
punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law or rule of
which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. What
constitutes publication is set forth in Article 2 of the Civil Code, which
provides that “[l]aws shall take effect after 15 days following the
completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.”
The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings and even
on oral argument that the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in
Aid of Legislation had been published in newspapers of general circulation
only in 1995 and in 2006. With respect to the present Senate of the 14th
Congress, however, of which the term of half of its members commenced on
June 30, 2007, no effort was undertaken for the publication of these rules
when they first opened their session.
x x x x x x x x x
...the respondent Senate Committees, therefore, could not, in violation of
the Constitution, use its rules in the legislative inquiry subject of these
consolidated cases. The conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation by the
Senate has to be deferred until it shall have caused the publication of the
Rules, because it can do so only “in accordance with its duly published
rules of procedure.”
Very recently, the Senate caused the publication of the Senate Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation in the October 31,
2008 issues of Manila Bulletin and Malaya. While we
_______________
Senate Committee on National Defense and Security, G.R. No. 180643, September 4, 2008, pp.
42-25; p. 231.
206

take judicial notice of the fact, the recent publication does not cure the
infirmity of the inquiry sought to be prohibited by the instant petitions. In so
far as the consolidated cases are concerned, the legislative investigation
subject thereof still could not be undertaken by the respondent Senate
Committees, because no published rules govern it, in clear
contravention of the Constitution.”6 (emphasis supplied)
While the ponencia cites the Neri Ruling to support its

conclusion that the subject investigation cannot be conducted
without published rules, I submit that it fails to adhere to the Neri
Ruling, as the latter emphasizes that “not all orders issued or

proceedings conducted pursuant to the subject Rules are null and
void. Only those that result in violation of the rights of witnesses
should be considered null and void, considering that the rationale
for the publication is to protect the rights of witnesses as expressed
in Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. Sans such violation,
orders and proceedings are considered valid and effective.”
It will be recalled that in the March 25 Neri Decision, the Court
struck down not the entire proceedings of the Senate
investigation on the NBN-ZTE deal for want of published Rules
of Procedure Governing Inquiries, but only the Order dated
January 30, 2008, citing petitioner Romulo L. Neri in contempt of
the Senate Committees and directing his arrest and detention
(January 30 Contempt Order) as stated in the dispositive portion of
the Decision.7 A
_______________
6 Ponencia.
National Defense and Security, G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008, 549 SCRA 77,
139. The dispositive portion reads, viz.:
207
VOL. 575, DECEMBER 23, 2008 207

faithful adherence of the case at bar to the Neri Ruling would yield
the conclusion that the “Garci tapes” investigation may be
conducted even without the published Rules of Procedure Governing
Inquiries, and that only those orders and proceedings that result in
the violation of the rights of the witnesses may be considered null
and void. The ponencia did not, however, show which orders or
proceedings resulted in this violation and, instead, made a blanket
prohibition of the conduct of the “Garci tapes” investigation for
want of published Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries.
In line with my position in my Dissents to the March 25 Neri
Decision and the September 4 Neri Resolution, it is my considered
view that the subject “Garci tapes” investigation is not
constitutionally infirm for being conducted without the publication
of the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in the 14th Congress
prior to said investigation. In addition to the points raised in my two
Dissents, I respectfully submit that the following inconsistencies and
erroneous assumptions in the March 25 Neri Decision and

September 4 Neri Resolution merit a review of the Neri Ruling and
a consequent conclusion that the Rules of Procedure Governing
Inquiries, sans amendment since its publication in two newspapers
of general circulation on August 24, 1995, need not be published by
the Senate of every Congress.
1. The validity of one provision of the Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries but invalidity of the entire Rules
_______________
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The subject Order dated

January 30, 2008, citing petitioner Romulo L. Neri in contempt of the Senate
Committees and directing his arrest and detention, is hereby nullified.
SO ORDERED.
208

In the March 25 Neri Decision, the Court recognized the

validity and effectivity of the Rules of Procedure Governing
Inquiries, even without publication in the 14th Congress, by citing
Section 18 of said rules and holding that the January 30 Contempt
Order against therein petitioner Romulo Neri was invalid for failing
to comply with the majority voting requirement under Section 18. In
the same breath, however, the Court held that the subject
investigation on the NBN-ZTE deal was procedurally infirm for
being conducted without valid Rules of Procedure Governing
Inquiries, as these were not published in the 14th Congress. The
inconsistency is apparent in the Court’s explanation of the third and
the fourth of the five reasons for holding that the therein respondent
Senate Committees committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing
the January 30 Contempt Order, viz.:
“Third, a reading of the transcript of respondent Committees’ January

30, 2008 proceeding reveals that only a minority of the members of the
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee was present during the deliberation. Section
18 of the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation
provides that:
‘The Committee, by a vote of majority of all its members, may
punish for contempt any witness before it who disobeys any order of
the Committee or refuses to be sworn or to testify or to answer proper
questions by the Committee or any of its members.’
Clearly, the needed vote is a majority of all the members of the

Committee. Apparently, members who did not actually participate in the
deliberation were made to sign the contempt Order. Thus, there is a cloud of
doubt as to the validity of the contempt Order dated January 30, 2008...
x x x x x x x x x
requiring that the inquiry be in accordance with the
209
VOL. 575, DECEMBER 23, 2008 209

“duly published rules of procedure.” We quote the OSG’s explanation:

The phrase ‘duly published rules of procedure’ requires the
three (3) years for one-half of the Senate’s membership, the
composition of the Senate also changes by the end of each term. Each
Senate may thus enact a different set of rules as it may deem fit. Not
having published its Rules of Procedure, the subject hearings in
aid of legislation conducted by the 14th Senate, are therefore,
procedurally infirm.”8 (emphasis supplied) (footnote omitted)
In the September 4 Neri Resolution, the Court reiterated its

recognition of the validity and effectivity of Section 18 of the Rules
of Procedure Governing Inquiries, viz.:
“In the present case, the Court’s exercise of its power of judicial review
is warranted because there appears to be a clear abuse of the power of
contempt on the part of respondent Committees. Section 18 of the Rules
provides that:
‘The Committee, by a vote of majority of all its members, may punish
for contempt any witness before it who disobeys any order of the
Committee or refuses to be sworn or to testify or to answer proper questions
by the Committee or any of its members.’ (Emphasis supplied)
In the assailed Decision, we said that there is a cloud of doubt as to the
validity of the contempt order because during the deliberation of the three
(3) respondent Committees, only seven (7) Senators were present. This
number could hardly fulfill the majority require-
_______________
8 Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, Senate

Committee on Trade and Commerce, and Senate Committee on National Defense and Security,
G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008, 459 SCRA 77, 132-136.
210

ment needed by respondent Committee on Accountability of Public Officers

and Investigations which has a membership of seventeen (17) Senators and
respondent Committee on National Defense and Security which has a
membership of eighteen (18) Senators. With respect to respondent
Committee on Trade and Commerce which has a membership of nine (9)
Senators, only three (3) members were present. These facts prompted us to
quote in the Decision the exchanges between Senators Alan Peter Cayetano
and Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. whereby the former raised the issue of lack of the
required majority to deliberate and vote on the contempt order.”9 (emphasis
supplied) (footnote omitted)
But in the same breath, it assailed the validity of the Rules of

Procedure Governing Inquiries and held that orders issued and
proceedings conducted pursuant to said rules, which result in the
violation of rights of witnesses were null and void, viz.:
“The language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution requiring

that the inquiry be conducted in accordance with the duly published rules
of procedure is categorical. It is incumbent upon the Senate to publish the
Congresses or until they are amended or repealed to sufficiently put the
public on notice.
inquiries to be effective even in the next Congress, it could have easily
adopted the same language it had used in its main rules regarding effectivity.
Lest the Court be misconstrued, it should likewise be stressed that not all
orders issued or proceedings conducted pursuant to the subject Rules are
null and void. Only those that result in violation of
_______________
9 Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, Senate

Committee on Trade and Commerce, and Senate Committee on National Defense and Security,
G.R. No. 180643, September 4, 2008, pp. 40-41; pp. 226-227.
211
VOL. 575, DECEMBER 23, 2008 211

the rights of witnesses should be considered null and void, considering that
the rationale for the publication is to protect the rights of witnesses as
expressed in Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. Sans such violation,
orders and proceedings are considered valid and effective.”10
In sum, in both the March 25 Neri Decision and the September

4 Neri Resolution, the Court did not invalidate the entire Senate
investigation proceedings conducted in accordance with the Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries, which were not published in the
14th Congress. In fact, the Court ruled on the issue of executive
privilege raised in said proceedings. It struck down only the January
30 Contempt Order against therein petitioner Neri for failure to
comply with Section 18 of the Rules of Procedure Governing
Inquiries, while at the same time holding these rules as
constitutionally infirm for want of publication.
Let us proceed to the second set of inconsistencies.
2. The continuing nature of the Senate as an institution and the
discontinuing nature of its business vis-à-vis the continuing
nature of the Rules of the Senate
In attempting to harmonize the above inconsistency in the March
25 Neri Decision, the Court, in its September 4 Neri Resolution,
saw fit to “issue a clarification...(o)n the nature of the Senate as a
‘continuing body’ ” and dichotomized this nature into the
“continuity of the Senate as an institution” and the “opposite nature
of the conduct of its business.” This approach, however, spawned its
own inconsistencies.
In explaining this dichotomy and holding that the Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries could not be given continuing
_______________
10 Id., at pp. 44-45; pp. 230-231.
212

effect from one Congress to the next unless expressly so provided in

said Rules, the Court interpreted Section 136 on the “unfinished
business” in conjunction with Section 137 on the “date of taking
effect” of the Rules of the Senate, viz.:
“This dichotomy of the continuity of the Senate as an institution and of

The Rules of the Senate (i.e. the Senate’s main rules of procedure) states:
RULE XLIV
UNFINISHED BUSINESS
Congress as if presented for the first time.
RULE LII
repealed. (emphasis supplied)
However, it is evident that the Senate has determined that its main rules
are intended to be valid from the date of their adoption until they are
amended or repealed. Such language is conspicuously absent from the
Rules. The Rules simply state “(t)hese Rules shall take effect seven (7)
days after publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation.”
The latter does not explicitly provide for the continued effectivity
213
VOL. 575, DECEMBER 23, 2008 213

of such Rules until they are amended or repealed. In view of the

difference in the language of the two sets of Senate rules, it cannot be
presumed that the Rules (on legislative inquiries) would continue into
the next Congress. The Senate of the next Congress may easily adopt
different rules for its legislative inquiries which come within the rule on
unfinished business.”11 (emphasis supplied) (footnote omitted)
There is no quarrel—and my Dissent to the September 4 Neri

Resolution in fact acknowledges—that the Rules of the Senate
(Senate Rules) provide in Section 136 that all unfinished business or
pending matters and proceedings of the Senate terminate with the
expiration of a Congress. This provision, in conjunction with
Section 137, does not, however, lend support to the Court’s ruling
that absent a provision in the Rules of Procedure Governing
Inquiries explicitly stating the “continued effectivity of such rules
until they are amended or repealed,” it “cannot be presumed that the
Rules (on legislative inquiries) would continue into the next

Congress” for the following reasons:
First, in the September 4 Neri Resolution, the Court interpreted
“pending matters” in Section 136 of the Senate Rules to include the
Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries that “may be taken by the
succeeding Congress as if presented for the first time.” This posture,
however, comes also with the interpretation that the Senate may
choose not to take up the Rules of Procedure Governing
Inquiries, thereby leaving it without rules to conduct legislative
inquiries as the effectivity of the rules had terminated with the
previous Congress. This is an absurd interpretation consider-
_______________

National Defense and Security, G.R. No. 180643, September 4, 2008, pp. 43-44; p.
230.
214

ing that the Senate is fully aware that Article VI, Section 21 requires
legislative investigations to be conducted in accordance with duly
published Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries.
The September 4 Neri Resolution recognizes that the Senate
Rules have continuing effect from one Congress to the next, because
it provides in Section 137 that the Senate Rules “shall take effect on
the date of their adoption and shall remain in force until they are
amended or repealed.” The Senate Rules unmistakably state that
their effectivity can be interrupted only by amendment or repeal as
provided in Section 137 and not by termination of one Congress as
provided in Section 136. The Rules of Procedure Governing
Inquiries have the same character as the Senate Rules. Both are not
“pending matters and proceedings” that terminate with the
expiration of the Congress. Pending matters and proceedings
include investigations that have not been terminated or bills that
have not completed the legislative process in the Senate of one
Congress.
The continuing effectivity of the Senate Rules from one Congress
to the next, which the Court acknowledged in its September 4
Neri Resolution, evinces the nature of the Senate as a continuing
body governed by its continuing Senate Rules. If the Senate were
not a continuing body, there would be no reason for the Senate Rules
to likewise have a continuing effect. In contradistinction, the
effectivity of the Rules of Proceedings of the House of
Representatives (House Rules)—which is admittedly not a
continuing body, as the terms of all congressmen end at the same
time—terminates upon the expiration of one Congress. Thus, Rule 1,
Section 1 of the 14th Congress House Rules adopted on November
20, 2007 reflects the practice of the House of Representatives of
adopting rules of proceedings on its first meet-
215
VOL. 575, DECEMBER 23, 2008 215

ing and organization upon the opening of a succeeding Congress,

viz.:
RULE I
Convening and Organizing the House
x x x x x x x x x
After the oath-taking of the newly-elected Speaker, the body shall
proceed to the adoption of the rules of the immediately preceding
Congress to govern its proceedings until the approval and adoption of the
rules of the current Congress. (emphasis supplied)
On November 20, 2007, the House of Representatives of the 14th

Congress, pending the adoption of its own House Rules, adopted the
House Rules of the 13th Congress as its provisional rules.12 The
House of Representatives of each Congress adopts its own rules.13
Second, the above-quoted Sections 136 and 137 of the Senate
Rules, adopted under the regime of the 1987 Constitution, do not
depart from the provisions of the Senate Rules adopted under the
1935 Constitution, viz.:
Chapter XLVI
Unfinished Business in the Senate
Sec. 108. Unfinished business at the end of one session shall not be
affected by the closing of same, but shall be taken up again at the next
session in the same status in which it was.
_______________
12 1 Journal of the House of Representatives, July 23, 2007.

13 See 13th Cong. Rules of the House of Representatives, adopted October 27, 2004; 12th
Cong. Rules of the House of Representatives, adopted October 22, 2002; 11th Cong. Rules of
the House of Representatives, adopted August 31, 1999; 10th Cong. Rules of the House of
Representatives, adopted July 24, 1995.
216

Notwithstanding the provision of the preceding paragraph, matters

pending at the expiration of one Congress shall no longer be acted on.
Chapter LIII
Sec. 122. These Rules shall take effect on the date of their adoption
and shall remain in force until they are amended or repealed.”14
Under the 1935 Constitution (and in the 1987 Constitution, as I have

consistently maintained in my Dissents), it was well-settled that the
Senate was a continuing body as held in Arnault v. Nazareno, citing
the U.S. case McGrain v. Daugherty.15 The 1935 Constitution
provided that two-thirds, or a majority of the Senate, continued into
the next Congress.16
Contrary to the notion that the Senate is no longer a continuing
body under the 1987 Constitution—as less than a majority continue
into the Senate of the succeeding Congress17—the termination of the
unfinished business of the
_______________
14 Rules of the Senate approved on January 25, 1950, and revised as of 1966.
15 273 U.S. 135 (1927).
16 1935 Phil. Const., Art. VIII, §3 provides, viz.:
Section 3. The term of office of Senators shall be six years and shall
begin on the thirtieth day of December next following their election. The first
Senators elected under this Constitution shall, in the manner provided by law,
be divided equally into three groups, the Senators of the first group to serve
for a term of six years; those of the second group, for four years; and those of
the third group, for two years.
17 1987 Phil. Const., Art. VI, §4 in relation to Art. XVIII, §2 provides, viz.:
Art. VI, Sec. 4. The term of office of the Senators shall be six years and
shall commence, unless otherwise provided by
217
VOL. 575, DECEMBER 23, 2008 217

Senate at the expiration of a Congress and the effectivity of the

Senate Rules until amended or repealed as provided in Sections 136
and 137 of the Senate Rules under the 1987 Constitution, do not
lend support to a departure from the Arnault ruling that the Senate is
a continuing body. Under both the 1935 and the 1987 Constitutions,
the Senate Rules show that a continuing Senate’s unfinished
business terminates at the expiration of one Congress, and its rules
remain in effect from one Congress to the next.
As expounded in my Dissent to the September 4 Neri
Resolution, the Philippine Senate is patterned after the U.S. Senate,
which is a continuing body as ruled by the U.S. Supreme Court in
McGrain. The continuing nature of the U.S. Senate is also reflected
in the Standing Rules of the Senate under Rule V(2), viz.:
Rule V
Suspension and Amendment of the Rules
x x x x x x x x x
2. The rules of the Senate shall continue from one Congress to the
next Congress unless they are changed as provided in these rules.18
(emphasis supplied)
In sum, the Philippine Senate Rules under both the 1935 and the
1987 Constitutions and the Standing Rules of the
_______________
law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election.
Art. XVIII, Sec. 2. x x x

Of the Senators elected in the election in 1992, the first twelve obtaining
the highest number of votes shall serve for six years and the remaining twelve
for three years.
18 Standing Rules of the Senate, revised to September 14, 2007.
218

U.S. Senate, after which the Philippine Senate was patterned, reflect
the nature of the Senate as a continuing body. That the Senate is a
continuing body proceeds from its nature as created by the Framers
of the U.S. Constitution and adopted by the 1935 and the 1987
Philippine Constitutions. The Senate Rules are not the bases for the
continuing nature of the Senate, but they embody and reflect this
nature.
Third, the recognition that the Senate is a continuing body as
reflected in the continuing effect of the Senate Rules from one
Congress to the next is not consistent with the holding of the
ponencia that the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries must
explicitly provide for this continuing effectivity if such were the
intent of the Senate, viz.:
The Rules simply state “(t)hese Rules shall take effect seven (7) days after
publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation.” The latter does
not explicitly provide for the continued effectivity of such rules until they
are amended or repealed. In view of the difference in the language of the
two sets of Senate rules, it cannot be presumed that the Rules (on
legislative inquiries) would continue into the next Congress.19 (emphasis
supplied)
I reiterate my position in my Dissent to the September 4 Neri

Resolution that the publication of the Rules of Procedure Governing
Inquiries on August 24, 1995 has satisfied the requirement under
Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution that inquiries in aid
of legislation be conducted in accordance with the Senate’s “duly
published Rules of Procedure.” Interpreting Article 2 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, which states that “(l)aws shall take effect
after fifteen
_______________

National Defense and Security, G.R. No. 180643, September 4, 2008, p. 44; p. 230.
219
VOL. 575, DECEMBER 23, 2008 219

days following completion of their publication in the Official

Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided x x x,” the Court ruled in the
landmark Tañada v. Tuvera,20 viz.:
“…all statutes, including those of local application and private laws,

shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin
fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by
the legislature... Administrative rules and regulations must also be published
if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid

delegation.”21
Publication must be made in the Official Gazette22 or a newspaper of

general circulation.23
As a general rule, one-time publication suffices to satisfy the due
process requirement to inform the public of a rule that would govern
it and affect its rights. It is not uncommon for laws and rules to
provide that they shall take effect upon a certain date following
publication in a newspaper of general circulation without having to
state that they “shall remain in force until they are amended or
repealed” for them to have continuing effect. These laws and rules
are published only once, and yet they continue to be in force. The
Court itself employs this language in its rules as shown in the
recently promulgated Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data and Rule on
the Writ of Amparo, respectively, viz.:
_______________
20 220 Phil. 422; 136 SCRA 27 (1985); Resolution of Motion for Reconsideration,
230 Phil. 528; 146 SCRA 446 (1986).
21 Tañada v. Tuvera, 230 Phil. 528, 533-535; 146 SCRA 446, 453-454 (1986); See
also The Veterans Federation of the Philippines v. Reyes, G.R. No. 155027, February
28, 2006, 483 SCRA 526; Umali v. Estanislao, G.R. No. 104037, May 29, 1992, 209
SCRA 446.
22 Tañada v. Tuvera, 230 Phil. 528; 146 SCRA 446 (1986).
23 Executive Order No. 200, issued by President Corazon C. Aquino.
220

Section 25. Effectivity.—This Rule shall take effect on February 2,

2008 following its publication in three (3) newspapers of general
circulation.
Section 27. Effectivity.—This Rule shall take effect on October 24,
2007 following its publication in three (3) newspapers of general
circulation.
The exception to the general rule that one-time publication

suffices for a law or rule to have continuing effect is when there are
circumstances or factors that interrupt this continuity. An example is
the discontinuation of the existence of the House of Representatives
as a legislative body, which terminates the effectivity of its
published Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries and requires the
publication of these rules in the succeeding Congress for them to

take effect. As discussed above and in my Dissents to the March 25
Neri Decision and September 4 Neri Resolution, the Senate,
unlike the House of Representatives, is a continuing body. Thus,
contrary to the holding of the ponencia, the Senate’s Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries, sans amendment, need not be
published by the Senate of every Congress and need not also state
that they shall “remain in force until they are amended or repealed”
for them to be effective from one Congress to the next. Quite the
opposite of the ponencia’s ruling, in the absence of language stating
that the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries shall not continue in
effect from one Congress to the next, these rules shall have
continuing effect.
In sum, the above discussion shows that the March 25 Neri
Decision and September 4 Neri Resolution themselves provide
bases for concluding that the Senate is a continuing body and that
one-time publication of the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries,
sans amendment, suffices to satisfy the publication requirement
under Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution. I respectfully
submit that the Court ought to so conclude in order to uphold
internal consis-
221
VOL. 575, DECEMBER 23, 2008 221

tency in its ruling with respect to the constitutional requirement of

publication of the Senate’s Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries.
In line with my position in my Dissents to the Neri Ruling, I submit
that the publication of the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in
the 14th Congress prior to the conduct of the subject “Garci tapes”
investigation is not a requirement for conducting such investigation.
Having dispensed with the issue of the constitutional requirement
of publication of the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries, let us
now proceed to the third issue.
The “Garci tapes” in relation to
Article III, Section 3 of the 1987
Constitution and R.A. No. 4200
Let me begin the disquisition on the issue of “whether the
inquiry, which is centered on the so-called ‘Garci tapes’ violates
Section 3, Article III of the Constitution and/or Republic Act No.
4200” by stating what the disposition of the case at bar is not about
and proceed forthwith to what the disposition of this case is about.
To avoid clutter, let us excise the fat to get to the lean meat of the
controversy before the Court.
While the 1987 Constitution affords paramount importance to the
policy of transparency, public accountability, and informed
participation of the citizenry in a democracy, the case at bar is not
about balancing between the right to privacy of communication
under Article III, Section 324 of the
_______________
24 Article III, Section 3 of the Bill of Rights provides, viz.:

Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be
inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or
order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.
222

1987 Constitution and the right to information under Article III,

Section 725 of the charter. The petitioners in this case are not suing
as citizens demanding information from the government.
While the 1987 Constitution unmistakably recognizes the
indispensable role of legislative investigations in crafting sound law
and also gives prime recognition to the right to privacy of
communication, the case at bar is not about balancing an asserted
right to privacy of communication against the Senate’s exercise
of its power of legislative investigation. This case does not involve
a situation in which a witness in a legislative inquiry invokes the
right to privacy of communication, but the Senate compels him,
under pain of contempt, to disclose the communication on account
of an overriding public interest.
The bone of contention in the case at bar is whether the
Senate can use, in its legislative investigation, inadmissible
evidence of a surreptitiously and illegally recorded private
communication.
The law decisive of the case at bar is R.A. No. 4200 or the Anti-
Wiretapping Law enacted in 1965. Introduced by Senator Lorenzo
Tañada, the explanatory note of the bill provides the background and
rationale for the law, viz.:
_______________
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section

shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
25 Article III, Section 7 of the Bill of Rights provides, viz.:
Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public
concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and
papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
223
VOL. 575, DECEMBER 23, 2008 223

The privacy of communication and correspondence

is among the fundamental rights of an individual secured and guaranteed
by our Constitution. Thus, Section 1(5) of the Bill of Rights of the
Constitution provides that, “The privacy of communication and
correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court or
when public safety and order require otherwise.”
x x x x x x x x x
At present, the laws penalizing the violation of the privacy of
communication are inadequate to cope with modern developments. As we
are all aware of, technology today has so far advanced, and will inexorably
continue to advance, that there is now an ever-growing array of devices or
arrangements for eavesdropping… There could, indeed, be no doubt that
these modern devices or arrangements, if availed of by any or officers of the
government, to spy on another, could be the most obnoxious instruments of
oppression or arbitrary power. Sooner or later we will have to deal with the
danger that these increasingly sensitive electronic ears, which are as
fantastic as they are alarming, may annihilate completely the privacy of
communication. An additional and potent deterrent is obviously called for if
we are to guard against what might well be subversive of one of our
cherished personal freedoms which makes life worth living.
x x x x x x x x x
Considering our democratic set-up which is founded, among others on
our high regard for the individual’s rights and freedoms, the proposed
measure will be but in accord with the principles of law and government
enshrined in the Bill of Rights of our Constitution which are designed to
protect the feelings and sensibilities of every individual as a human
being against the incursions of unwelcome intruders.
Put succinctly, R.A. No. 4200 prohibits eavesdropping or

unwelcome intrusions into private communications. Section 1 of
the law provides that these acts are unlawful:
“Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by

all the parties to any private communication
224

or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or
arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such
communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a
dictaphone or dictagraph or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however
otherwise described:
It shall also be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in the
act or acts penalized in the next preceding sentence, to knowingly possess
any tape record, wire record, disc record, or any other such record, or
copies thereof, of any communication or spoken word secured either
before or after the effective date of this Act in the manner prohibited by this
law; or to replay the same for any other person or persons; or to
communicate the contents thereof, either verbally or in writing, or to
furnish transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial, to any
other person: Provided, That the use of such record or any copies
thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal investigation or trial of
offenses mentioned in Section 3 hereof, shall not be covered by this
prohibition.
Section 2. Any person who willfully or knowingly does or who shall
aid, permit, or cause to be done any of the acts declared to be unlawful
in the preceding section or who violates the provisions of the following
section or of any order issued thereunder, or aids, permits, or causes
such violation shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by imprisonment
for not less than six months or more than six years and with the accessory
penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification from public office if the
offender be a public official at the time of the commission of the offense,
and, if the offender is an alien he shall be subject to deportation
proceedings.” (emphases supplied)
A private communication is characterized as such based not on the

content of the communication, but on the context that it was said
in private and not for public consumption. That the content or
nature of the communication
225
VOL. 575, DECEMBER 23, 2008 225


is immaterial was ruled in Ramirez v. Court of Appeals,26 viz.:
“... the nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the

statute. The substance of the same need not be specifically alleged in the
information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly
overhearing, intercepting or recording private communications by means
of the devices enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an individual
made a secret recording of a private communication by means of a tape
recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A.
4200. As the Solicitor General pointed out in his COMMENT before the
respondent court: “Nowhere (in the said law) is it required that before one
can be regarded as a violator, the nature of the conversation, as well as its
communication to a third person should be professed.” (emphasis supplied)
(footnote omitted)
The Senate deliberations on R.A. No. 4200 evince the meaning of

private, as opposed to public, communication, viz.:
Senator DIOKNO. Do I understand, Mr. Senator, that under Section 1

of the bill as now worded, if a party secretly records a public speech, he
would be penalized under Section 1? Because the speech is public, but the
recording is done secretly.
Senator TAÑADA. Well, that particular aspect is not contemplated by
the bill. It is the communication between one person and another person
—not between a speaker and a public.
Senator DIOKNO. The wording of the law is “communication or
spoken word.”
Senator TAÑADA. Yes.
Senator DIOKNO. The term “spoken word” would automatically
include speeches, including, Mr. Senator, what we are doing here this
morning.
_______________
26 G.R. No. 93833, September 28, 1995, 248 SCRA 590.
226

Senator TAÑADA. As I have said, Your Honor, the purpose of this

bill is to prevent the tape recording or interception of a communication
between one person and another—not between a speaker and a public.
Because precisely, the speaker speaks so that the public may know what
he has in mind, what he wants to communicate to the people, and there

should be no objection to tape recording that speech....”27 (emphases
supplied)
R.A. No. 4200, however, provides for exceptions when

wiretapping is allowed by written order of the court under Section 3,
viz.:
“Section 3. Nothing contained in this Act, however, shall render it

unlawful or punishable for any peace officer, who is authorized by a
written order of the Court, to execute any of the acts declared to be
unlawful in the two preceding sections in cases involving the crimes of
treason, espionage, provoking war and disloyalty in case of war, piracy,
mutiny in the high seas, rebellion, conspiracy and proposal to commit
rebellion, inciting to rebellion, sedition, conspiracy to commit sedition,
inciting to sedition, kidnapping as defined by the Revised Penal Code,
and violations of Commonwealth Act No. 616, punishing espionage and
other offenses against national security: Provided, That such written order
shall only be issued or granted upon written application and the examination
under oath or affirmation of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce
and a showing: (1) that there are reasonable grounds to believe that any of
the crimes enumerated hereinabove has been committed or is being
committed or is about to be committed: Provided, however, That in cases
involving the offenses of rebellion, conspiracy and proposal to commit
rebellion, inciting to rebellion, sedition, conspiracy to commit sedition, and
inciting to sedition, such authority shall be granted only upon prior proof
that a rebellion or acts of sedition, as the case may be, have actually been or
are being committed; (2) that there are reasonable grounds to believe that
evidence will be obtained essential to the conviction of any person
_______________
27 III Records of the Senate, March 12, 1964, p. 625.
227
VOL. 575, DECEMBER 23, 2008 227

for, or to the solution of, or to the prevention of, any of such crimes; and (3)
that there are no other means readily available for obtaining such evidence.”
(emphasis supplied)
To further give teeth to the above prohibition, R.A. No. 4200

makes illegally wiretapped communications inadmissible in any
proceeding, viz.:
“Section 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence,

contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of the same or any part
thereof, or any information therein contained obtained or secured by any
person in violation of the preceding sections of this Act shall not be
admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or
administrative hearing or investigation.” (emphasis supplied)
Applying these provisions to the case at bar, the wiretapping of

the communication recorded in the “Garci tapes” may be held legal
only if it was recorded with consent of the parties to the
conversation or upon written court order. As the wiretapping was
done in the course of duty by the witness, Technical Sergeant Vidal
Doble, he may be presumed to have been acting regularly in the
performance of his official duties.28 Doble testified that he presumed
that the order of his superior to him to conduct a wiretap was legal,
viz.:
Sen. Cayetano (P)... Ngayon itong—noong sinabi sa iyo ito, anong

pakiramdam mo? Nagulat ka ba o parang normal lang sa iyo na, “Okay,
bagong assignment,” may naisip ka bang baka violation ito ng isang batas?
May naisip ka bang ganon?
_______________
28 People v. Huang Zhen Hua, G.R. No. 139301, September 29, 2004, 439 SCRA 350, 381.
228

Mr. Doble. Ang nasa isip po kasi naming noon since na galing sa

military hierarchy ang order, we assume that is a legal order, Your Honor.29
The legislative investigation should precisely be allowed to proceed

to establish the circumstances surrounding the wiretapping and
determine whether or not the wiretap was legally done with the
consent of the parties or lawful court order.
Should it be established, however, that the conversations in the
“Garci tapes” were illegally wiretapped, the question that comes to
the fore is whether the “communication or spoken word (in the
tapes), their existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or
meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any information therein
contained” may be used in the subject Senate investigations.
In Ramirez, in which the Court found that petitioner Ramirez
violated R.A. No. 4200 for secretly recording her private
conversation with therein respondent Garcia, the Court published in
its decision the transcript of the illegally wiretapped conversation as
part of the narration of the facts of the case. A mechanical and literal
reading of Sections 1 and 4 of R.A. No. 4200 would yield the absurd
conclusion that the Court violated these provisions for
“communicat(ing) the contents thereof (the illegally wiretapped
conversation), either verbally or in writing” and using the
inadmissible transcription in its judicial proceedings. It is clear to
the eye that this was not the intent of the lawmakers in enacting R.A.
No. 4200. “Legislative intent is determined principally from the
language of a statute. Where the language of a statute is clear and
unambi-
_______________
29 Transcript of Senate hearing held by the Joint Committees on National Defense

and Security and the Committees on Accountability of Public Officers and
Investigations (Blue Ribbon) and on Constitutional Amendments, Revision of Codes
and Laws, September 7, 2007, p. 95.
229
VOL. 575, DECEMBER 23, 2008 229

guous, the law is applied according to its express terms, and

interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation
would be either impossible (Pacific Oxygen and Acytelene Co. v.
Central Bank, 37 SCRA 685 [1971]) or absurd or would lead to an
injustice. (12 Casela v. Court of Appeals, 35 SCRA 279 [1970]).”30
(emphasis supplied) There is thus a need to interpret Sections 1 and
4 of R.A. No. 4200.
Section 1 in relation to Section 2 of R.A. No. 4200 provides an
exception to the prohibition on the “use of such record (of
wiretapped conversation) or any copies thereof as evidence in any
civil, criminal investigation or trial of offenses mentioned in Section
3...” The offenses under Section 3 which allows wiretapping upon
written order of the court are as follows: “treason, espionage,
provoking war and disloyalty in case of war, piracy, mutiny in the
high seas, rebellion, conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion,
inciting to rebellion, sedition, conspiracy to commit sedition,
inciting to sedition, kidnapping as defined by the Revised Penal
Code, and violations of Commonwealth Act No. 616, punishing
espionage and other offenses against national security.”
The exception under Section 1 in relation to Section 3 of R.A.
No. 4200 does not include the use of illegally wiretapped
communication for purposes of prosecuting violations of R.A. No.
4200 itself as the Court did in Ramirez. Not reading this exception
into the law would impede the prosecution of the acts it prohibits
and contradict the very purpose for adopting the law as clearly stated
in its title, “An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other
Related Violations of the Privacy of Communication, and for Other
Purposes.” Well-settled is the rule in statutory construction that
“where there is ambiguity, such interpretation as will avoid
inconvenience
_______________
30 Ramirez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 93833, September 28, 1995, 248 SCRA
590.
230

and absurdity is to be adopted.”31 Interpretatio talis in ambiguis

semper frienda est, ut evitatur inconveniens et absurdum. R.A. No.
4200 should be given a sensible construction, so as to give effect to
its rationale and intent and thus avoid an unjust or absurd
interpretation. The ineluctable conclusion is that the use of illegally
wiretapped communication must be allowed in a prosecution under
R.A. No. 4200 precisely to deter the commission of illegal
wiretapping.
Corollary to this conclusion is that such evidence should be an
exception to inadmissible evidence under Section 4 of the law.
Judges and prosecutors who possess and use illegally wiretapped
communications in prosecutions for violations of R.A. No. 4200 are
thus not liable for violating this law in the same manner that, by way
of exception, they are not liable for illegal possession of firearms
where the firearm is presented in evidence in a case involving the
prosecution of a violation of R.A. No. 8294.32 This is true despite
the absence of such an exception to illegal possession, in
contradistinction to the Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines,
which explicitly provides the following exception to infringement of
copyright under Section 184(l)(k): “Any use made of a work for the
purpose of any judicial proceedings or for the giving of professional
advice by a legal practitioner.”
For similar reasons, another exception that ought to be read into
Sections 1 and 4 of R.A. No. 4200 is the use and
_______________
31 Lanot, et al. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 164858, November 16,

2006, 507 SCRA 114.
32 An Act Amending the Provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1866, As
Amended, Entitled “Codifying the Laws on Illegal/Unlawful Possession,
Manufacture, Dealing in, Acquisition or Disposition of Firearms, Ammunition or
Explosives or Instruments Used in the Manufacture of Firearms, Ammunitions or
Explosives, and Imposing Stiffer Penalties for Certain Violations Thereof, and for
Relevant Purposes.”
231
VOL. 575, DECEMBER 23, 2008 231

admissibility of illegally wiretapped communication in legislative

investigations whose particular purpose is precisely to craft or
improve laws that will address the evil of illegal wiretapping.
Without this exception, the absurd result would be that legislators
cannot at all investigate illegal wiretaps as they happen on the
ground and plug loopholes in the law, because Section 4 of R.A. No.
4200 provides that even the fact of existence of an illegally
wiretapped communication is inadmissible in evidence. To be sure,
this could not have been the intent of the law.
Lest the herein recognized exceptions be misconstrued and open
the floodgates to violations of R.A. No. 4200, it must be emphasized
that as a general rule, illegally wiretapped material is inadmissible
for any purpose in any proceeding, including legislative
investigations, in accordance with R.A. No. 4200.33 As a very
narrow exception, however, the wiretapped material may be used
and is admitted in a judicial proceeding for prosecution of violations
of R.A. No. 4200 and, akin to this, in a legislative investigation in
aid of legislation whose purpose is precisely to address the problem
of illegal wiretap.
In the case at bar, the focus of the Senate investigation as shown
by the transcripts of its hearings34 has been the illegal wiretapping of
several personalities including the Commander-in-Chief and
President of the Philippines, the possible involvement of
telecommunication providers in the illegal wiretap, the use of scarce
intelligence resources for wire-
_______________
33 Salcedo-Ortanez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110662, August 4, 1994, 235

SCRA 111 and People v. Olivarez, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 77865, December 4, 1998, 299
SCRA 635.
34 Transcripts of Senate hearings held by the Joint Committees on National

Defense and Security and the Committees on Accountability of Public Officers and
Investigations (Blue Ribbon) and on Constitutional Amendments, Revision of Codes
and Laws, September 7 and 17, 2007.
232

tapping in connection with the conduct of the 2004 Presidential

elections, and electoral fraud. The purpose of the investigation may
also be gleaned from two bills previously filed in relation thereto by
the Chairperson of the National Defense and Security Committee,
seeking to (1) control and regulate the sale, purchase and use of
wiretapping equipment; and (2) prohibit the Armed Forces of the
Philippines from performing electoral duties.35
Prescinding from the very narrow contours of the exception in
using illegally wiretapped communications, the Senate may proceed
with the use of the “Garci tapes” in a legislative inquiry in aid of
legislation whose purpose is to craft or improve legislation on
wiretapping. On the other hand, the “Garci tapes” are not admissible
in evidence in legislative investigations for a different purpose such
as the punishment of electoral fraud. While electoral fraud is a
serious anomaly that erodes the foundation of democracy and should
not go unpunished, evidence obtained not through illegal wiretap
should be presented in proceedings investigating this matter. Resort
to illegal wiretapping to catch perpetrators of electoral fraud will
only further erode our democracy. As Senator Tañada exhorted in
the explanatory note of Senate Bill No. 9, which became the Anti-
Wiretapping Law:
“Considering our democratic set-up which is founded, among others

on our high regard for the individual’s rights and freedoms, the
proposed measure will be but in accord with the principles of law and
government enshrined in the Bill of Rights of our Constitution which are
designed to protect the feelings and sensibilities of every individual as a
human being against the incursions of unwelcome intruders.”
_______________
35 Rollo, pp. 216, 218; Comment of respondent Senate of the Philippines, p. 2.
233
VOL. 575, DECEMBER 23, 2008 233

In conducting legislative inquiries in aid of legislation for the

purpose of crafting or improving laws on wiretapping, the legislature
ought to abide by the constitutional command under Article VI,
Section 21 that in conducting such inquiries, “(t)he rights of persons
appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.” The
legislature should thus use mechanisms and procedures available to
it, such as executive sessions, in avoiding any further and
unnecessary incursion into the right to privacy of communication.
With respect to the question of whether the use of the “Garci
tapes” violates Article III, Section 3 of the Bill of Rights, the above
disquisition on R.A. No. 4200 sufficiently addresses this issue.
Under this constitutional provision, the privacy of communication
and correspondence shall be inviolable except (1) upon lawful order
of the court, or (2) when public safety or order requires otherwise as
prescribed by law. There is ostensibly no lawful order of the court
under the first exception, and any argument anchored on the second
exception will lead to R.A. No. 4200, being the only Philippine law
on wiretapping.
Anent G.R. No. 170338, it is my considered view that the
petition is moot and academic.36 The petition prays that the Court
issue a Resolution:
a) Ordering the immediate issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order

and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction restraining and preventing the House
of Representatives Committees on Public Information, Public Order and
Safety, National Defense and Security, Information Communications
Technology, and Suffrage and Electoral Reforms from making use of the
sound recording of the illegally obtained wiretapped conversations in their
Report for the
_______________
36 Philippine Airlines v. Joselito Pascua, et al., G.R. No. 143258, August 15, 2003, 409
SCRA 195.
234

inquiries conducted relative thereto, or from otherwise making use of said

recordings for any other purpose.
b) Granting the issuance of a Writ of Prohibition by commanding the
Respondent Committees to strike off the record of the proceedings any and
all references to the illegally obtained wiretapped recordings, and to desist
from further using the sound recordings of the illegally obtained wiretapped
conversations in any of its proceedings.37
The first prayer is moot and academic, as the “Garci tapes” were
already played in the session floor of the House of Representatives
on July 5, 2005.38 The second prayer is also moot and academic, as
the subject records of proceedings and reports belong to the House
of Representatives of the Thirteenth Congress, which has already
been terminated. The House of Representatives not being a
continuous body, the current House of Representatives of the
Fourteenth Congress is different from the House of Representatives
of the Thirteenth Congress. Thus, petitioner Garcillano ought to first
seek recourse to the current House of Representatives with respect to
his second prayer.
I vote to dismiss the petitions in G.R. No. 170338 and G.R. No.
179275.
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION
REYES, R.T., J.:
I concur with the ponencia insofar as it dismisses the petition in
G.R. No. 170338 but dissent insofar as it grants the petition in G.R.
No. 179275.
_______________
37 Rollo, G.R. No. 170338, pp. 36-37.

38 Id., at p. 56.
235
VOL. 575, DECEMBER 23, 2008 235

I. The petition in G.R. No. 170338 should be dismissed for

being moot.
In G.R. No. 170338, petitioner Virgilio D. Garcillano, via a
petition for prohibition and injunction, with prayer for temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, implores the
Court to issue a Resolution as follows:
a) Ordering the immediate issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order

and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction restraining and preventing the House
of Representatives Committees on Public Information, Public Order and

Safety, National Defense and Security, Information Communications
Technology, and Suffrage and Electoral Reforms from making use of the
sound recording of the illegally obtained wiretapped conversations in their
Report for the inquiries relative thereto, or from otherwise making use of
said recordings for any other purpose.
b) Granting the issuance of a Writ of Prohibition by commanding the
Respondent Committees to strike off the record of the proceedings any and
all references to the illegally obtained wiretapped recordings, and to desist
from further using the sound recordings of the illegally obtained wiretapped
conversations in any of its proceedings.1
The Court cannot grant the prayer of petitioner Garcillano

because it has been mooted. It is of public knowledge, a fit subject
of judicial notice,2 that the “Hello Garci” tapes were already played
in the House of Representatives and heard by its members.3 Then,
separate committee reports on the “Hello
_______________
1 Rollo, G.R. No. 170338, pp. 36-37.

2 Rules of Court, Rule 129, Sec. 2. Judicial Notice, when discretionary.—A court
may take judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable of
unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their
judicial functions.
3 Rollo, G.R. No. 170338, p. 9.
236

Garci” tapes were submitted to then House Speaker Jose de Venecia,

Jr.4
_______________
4 “Separate findings, no closure on ‘Hello Garci’ scandal” dated March 29, 2006
by Michael Lim Ubac in http://www.inquirer.net/
specialreports/hellogarci/view.php?db=0&article=20060329-70909. The report
partly states:
THE HOUSE of Representatives inquiry has resulted in two “Hello Garci” reports,
separate findings, no closure.
At dusk yesterday, the majority and minority blocs came up with separate
committee reports on the wiretapping scandal that nearly unseated President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo last year.

It was the majority bloc represented by the chairs of the Five House Committees
that first handed its report to Speaker Jose de Venecia.
De Venecia congratulated the chairs led by North Cotabato Representative
Emmylou Taliño-Santos for “their wisdom and dedication to duty.”
The minority report penned by Cavite Representative Gilbert Remulla highlighted
the futility of the search for truth behind an opposition allegation that the recordings
showed that Ms. Arroyo phoned Election Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano to boost
her chances of winning the 2004 presidential race.
“It’s likewise undeniable that the Arroyo government, in general, has shown utter
disregard, if not disrespect, towards the inquiry. Though members of the
administration appeared during the public hearings, nothing substantial was presented
to help ferret out the truth,” said the minority report.
Lost opportunity
The report said that the 14 public hearings could have “finally be the moment for
Congress to address the lingering problem of election cheating, but with the way the
witnesses conducted themselves, the opportunity was lost.”
The minority report would be “appended” to the main report, said Santos.
237
VOL. 575, DECEMBER 23, 2008 237

Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution provides:
“Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court

and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government.”
Thus, one of the requisites of judicial power is the presence of an

actual controversy. Courts are prohibited from deciding hypothetical,
conjectural or anticipatory questions despite their vast judicial
power. Otherwise, a decision rendered would amount to nothing but
an advisory opinion, which would not augur well with the function
of courts as arbiters of controversies. In La Bugal-B’laan Tribal
Association v. Sec. Ramos,5 the Court held:
“An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy

that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory,
lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion. The
power does not extend to hypothetical ques-
_______________
As expected, there was nothing new in the majority’s findings and recommendations.
The main report did not deviate from the revised draft report it routed to committee
members on March 13, which admitted the failure of the joint congressional inquiry to unravel
the mystery of the political controversy.
The report said that the hearings “only raised more issues and answered none,” thus
Congress should “continue to seek the answers x x x and in particular subpoena phone records
to establish the likelihood or unlikelihood that alleged wiretapping conversations could have
taken place.”
5 465 Phil. 860; 421 SCRA 148 (2004).
238

tions since any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and
barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities.”6
While it is true that the Court is not absolutely precluded from

resolving issues that are otherwise moot,7 no compelling
circumstance is present here that would warrant the exercise of
judicial review.
Too, the function of the writ of prohibition is to prevent the
execution of an act which is about to be done. It is not intended to
provide a remedy for acts already accomplished.8 The office of
prohibition is to arrest proceedings rather than
_______________
6 La Bugal-B’laan Tribal Association v. Sec. Ramos, id., at pp. 889-890; p. 178.

7 Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot, when (1) there is a grave violation of
the Constitution; (2) the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount
public interest involved demand; (3) the constitutional issue raised requires
formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and
(4) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,
G.R. Nos. 171396, 171409, 171485, 171483, 171400, 171489, & 171424, May 3,
2006, 489 SCRA 160; Lacson v. Perez, G.R. No. 147780, May 10, 2001, 357 SCRA
756; Province of Batangas v. Romulo, G.R. No. 152774, May 27, 2004, 429 SCRA
736; Albaña v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 163302, July 23, 2004, 435 SCRA
98; Acop v. Guingona, Jr., G.R. No. 134855, July 2, 2002, 383 SCRA 577; Sanlakas
v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 159085, February 3, 2004, 277 SCRA 409.
8 Heirs of Eugenia v. Roxas, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. Nos.
67195, 78618 & 78619-20, May 29, 1989, 173 SCRA 581; Agustin v. De la Fuente,
84 Phil. 515 (1949); Calbanero v. Torres, 61 Phil. 522 (1935).
239
VOL. 575, DECEMBER 23, 2008 239

to undo them.9 A preventive remedy, as a rule, does not lie to

restrain an act that is already fait accompli.10
II. The petition in G.R. No. 179275 should likewise be
dismissed because the Senate need not republish its Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation.
The issues in G.R. No. 179275 are as follows:
1. Whether the petitioners have locus standi to bring the suit.

2. Whether the Rules of Procedure of the Senate and the Senate
Committees governing the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation have
been published, in accordance with Section 21, Article VI of the
Constitution. Corollarily:
(b) What mode/s of publication will comply with the
constitutional requirement?
3. Whether the inquiry, which is centered on the so-called “Garci
tapes” violates Section 3, Article III of the Constitution and/or Republic Act
No. 4200.11
Anent the first issue, I agree with the ponencia and the dissenting
opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Reynato Puno that petitioners Santiago
Javier Ranada and Oswaldo D. Agcaoili, plus intervenor Maj.
Lindsay Rex Sagge, possess the requisite locus standi to bring the
suit.
Courts should not be shackled by stringent rules which would
result in manifest injustice. Rules of procedure are
_______________
9 Ferris, The Law of Extraordinary Remedies, p. 418.

10 Montes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143797, May 4, 2006, 489 SCRA 432.
11 Rollo, G.R. No. 179275, p. 94.
240

tools crafted to facilitate, not to frustrate, the attainment of justice.

Thus, their strict and rigid application, if they result in technicalities
that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must be
eschewed. Substantial rights must not be prejudiced by a rigid and
technical application of the rules in the altar of expediency. When a
case is impressed with public interest, a relaxation of the application
of the rules is in order.12 Time and again, this Court has suspended
its own rules and excepted a particular case from their operation
whenever the higher interests of justice so require.13
There is no question that the issues raised by petitioners Ranada
and Agcaoili and intervener Sagge are of paramount importance.
Thus, any procedural barrier to their suit should be put aside.
Now to the second issue—the meat of the second petition.
Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution states:
“The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective

committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with
its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in
or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.”
The ponencia holds that the Senate investigation on the “Hello

Garci” tapes is infirm because the Senate Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had not been duly
published at the time of the legislative inquiry in question.
_______________
12 Tomawis v. Tabao-Caudang, G.R. No. 166547, September 12, 2007, 533 SCRA
68.
13 Piczon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 76378-81, September 24, 1990, 190
SCRA 31, 38.
241
VOL. 575, DECEMBER 23, 2008 241

I hold otherwise. On this score, I reiterate my separate opinion on

the motion for reconsideration in Senate v. Ermita,14 thus:
“True it is that, as the Constitution mandates, the Senate may only

conduct an investigation in aid of legislation pursuant to its duly published
rules of procedure. Without publication, the Senate Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation is ineffective. Thus, unless and
until said publication is done, the Senate cannot enforce its own rules of
procedure, including its power to cite a witness in contempt under Section

18.
But the Court can take judicial notice that the Senate Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation was published on August 20 and
21, 1992 in the Philippine Daily Inquirer and Philippine Star during the 9th
Congress.
The Senate again published its said rules on December 1, 2006 in the
Philippine Star and Philippine Daily Inquirer during the 13th Congress.
That the Senate published its rules of procedure twice more than complied
with the Constitutional requirement.
I submit that the Senate remains a continuing body under the 1987
Constitution. That the Senate is a continuing body is premised on the
staggered terms of its members, the idea being to ensure stability of
governmental policies. This is evident from the deliberations of the framers
of the Constitution, thus:
“MR. RODRIGO. x x x
I would like to state that in the United States Federal Congress, the
term of the members of the Lower House is only two years. We have
been used to a term of four years here but I think three years is long
enough. But they will be allowed to run for reelection any number of
times. In this way, we remedy the too frequent elections every two
years. We will have elections every three years under the scheme
and we will have a continuing Senate. Every election, 12 of 24
Senators will be elected, so that 12 Senators will remain in
_______________
14 G.R. No. 180643, September 4, 2008.
242

the Senate. In other words, we will have a continuing Senate.15

xxxx
MR. DAVIDE. This is just a paragraph of that section that will
follow what has earlier been approved. It reads: “OF THE
SENATORS ELECTED IN THE ELECTION IN 1992, THE FIRST
TWELVE OBTAINING THE HIGHEST NUMBER OF VOTES
SHALL SERVE FOR SIX YEARS AND THE REMAINING
TWELVE FOR THREE YEARS.”
This is to start the staggering of the Senate to conform to the idea of
a continuing Senate.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Rodrigo). What does the
Committee say?
MR. SUAREZ. The Committee accepts the Davide proposal, Mr.

Presiding Officer.16
The Senate does not cease to be a continuing body merely because only
half of its members continue to the next Congress. To my mind, even a
lesser number of Senators continuing into the next Congress will still make
the Senate a continuing body. The Senate must be viewed as a collective
body. It is an institution quite apart from the Senators composing it. The
Senate as an institution cannot be equated to its present occupants. It is
indivisible. It is not the sum total of all sitting Senators at any given time.
Senators come and go but the very institution of the Senate remains. It is
this indivisible institution which should be viewed as continuing.
The argument that the Senate is not a continuing body because it lacks
quorum to do business after every midterm or presidential elections is
flawed. It does not take into account that the term of office of a Senator is
fixed by the Constitution. There is no vacancy in the office of outgoing
Senators during midterm or presidential elections. Article VI, Section 4 of
the 1987 Constitution provides:
_______________
15 Constitutional Commission Record (1986), p. 208.

16 Id., at p. 434.
243
VOL. 575, DECEMBER 23, 2008 243

The term of office of the Senators shall be six years and shall commence,
unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next
following their election.
The term of a Senator starts at noon of June 30 next following their
election and shall end before noon of June 30 six years after. The
constitutional provision aims to prevent a vacuum in the office of an
outgoing Senator during elections, which is fixed under the Constitution
unless changed by law on the second Monday of May,17 until June 30 when
the Senators-elect assume their office. There is no vacuum created because
at the time an outgoing Senator’s term ends, the term of a Senator-elect
begins.
The same principle holds true for the office of the President. A president-
elect does not assume office until noon of June 30 next following a
presidential election. An outgoing President does not cease to perform the
duties and responsibilities of a President merely because the people had
chosen his/her new successor. Until her term expires, an outgoing President
has the constitutional duty to discharge the powers and functions of a
President unless restricted18 by the Constitution.
In fine, the Senate is a continuing body as it continues to have a full or at

least majority membership19 even during elections until the assumption of
office of the Senators-elect. The Senate as an institution does not cease to
have a quorum to do business even during elections. It is to be noted that the
Senate is not in session
_______________
17 Constitution (1987), Art. VI, Sec. 8.

18 Id., Secs. 14 and 15 provides:
Section 14. Appointments extended by an Acting President shall remain effective, unless
revoked by the elected President, within ninety days from his assumption or reassumption of
office.
Section 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the
end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary
appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public
service or endanger public safety.
19 The Office of a Senator may be vacant for causes such as death or permanent disability.
244

during an election until the opening of a new Congress for practical reasons.
This does not mean, however, that outgoing Senators cease to perform their
duties as Senators of the Republic during such elections. When the President
proclaims martial law or suspends the writ of habeas corpus, for example,
the Congress including the outgoing Senators are required to convene if not
in session within 24 hours in accordance with its rules without need of
call.”20
The Constitutional provision requiring publication of Senate rules is
contained in Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective
Committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of
_______________
20 Constitution (1987), Art. VII, Sec. 18 provides:

The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the
Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or
rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty
days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any
part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the
President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress,
voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special
session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be
set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in
the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be
determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety
requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such
proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a
call.
245
VOL. 575, DECEMBER 23, 2008 245

procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such

inquiries shall be respected.
The above provision only requires a “duly published” rule of procedure
for inquiries in aid of legislation. It is silent on republication. There is
nothing in the constitutional provision that commands that every new
Congress must publish its rules of procedure. Implicitly, republication is
necessary only when there is an amendment or revision to the rules. This is
required under the due process clause of the Constitution.
The Senate in the 13th Congress caused the publication of the Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation. The present Senate
(14th Congress) adopted the same rules of procedure in the NBN-ZTE
investigation. It does not need to republish said rules of procedure because it
is not shown that a substantial amendment or revision was made since its
last publication that would affect the rights of persons appearing before it.
On a more practical note, there is little to be gained in requiring a new
Congress to cause the republication of the rules of procedure which has not
been amended or revised. The exercise is simply a waste of government
funds. Worse, it unduly burdens and hinders the Senate from discharging its
constitutional duties. Publication takes time and during the interregnum, it
cannot be gainsaid that the Senate is barred or restricted from conducting an
investigation in aid of legislation.
I agree with the Chief Justice that this Court must be wary of the far-
reaching consequences of a case law invalidating the Senate rules of
procedure for lack of republication. Our ruling in this petition will not only
affect the NBN-ZTE investigation, but all other Senate investigations
conducted under the 10th, 11th, 12th, and the present 14th Congress, for
which no republication of the rules has been done. These investigations
have been the basis of several bills and laws passed in the Senate and the
House of Representatives. Putting a doubt on the authority, effectivity and
validity of these proceedings is imprudent and unwise. This Court should
really be cautious in making a jurisprudential ruling that will unduly

strangle
246

the internal workings of a co-equal branch and needlessly burden the

discharge of its constitutional duty.”21
In addition, let me point out the Philippine Constitution, past and

present, were largely influenced by the United States Constitution.
In McGrain v. Daugherty,22 the United States Supreme Court
explicitly ruled that the American Senate is a continuing body. In
Arnault v. Nazareno,23 the Philippine Supreme Court, relying on
McGrain, held that the Philippine Senate is a continuing body. There
is no plausible reason why the rule should be different today.
In view of the foregoing, I find it unnecessary to delve on the
third issue which the ponencia does not also address.
WHEREFORE, I vote to DISMISS both petitions in G.R. No.
170338 and G.R. No. 179275.
Petition in G.R. No. 170338 dismissed; while petition in G.R. No.

179275 granted.
Note.—Where the issue has become moot and academic, there is

no justiciable controversy, thereby rendering the resolution of the
same of no practical use or value. (Paloma vs. Court of Appeals, 415
SCRA 590 [2003])
——o0o——
_______________
21 Senate v. Ermita, supra note 14, at pp. 30-35.

22 273 US 135 (1927).
23 Arnault v. Nazareno, 87 Phil. 29 (1950).
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Garcillano v. House of Representatives

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Garcillano v. House of Representatives

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9/22/2017 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 575

G.R. No. 170338. December 23, 2008.*

VIRGILIO O. GARCILLANO, petitioner, vs. THE HOUSE OF

G.R. No. 179275. December 23, 2008.*

SANTIAGO JAVIER RANADA and OSWALDO D. AGCAOILI,

MAJ. LINDSAY REX SAGGE, petitioner-in-intervention.

AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., BENIGNO NOYNOY C.

Remedial Law; Actions; Legal Standing; Concept of legal standing or

VOL. 575, DECEMBER 23, 2008 171

Garcillano vs. House of Representatives Committees on Public Information,

is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. The gist of the question of

172 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Garcillano vs. House of Representatives Committees on Public Information,

Garcillano vs. House of Representatives Committees on Public Information,

not extend to hypothetical questions because any attempt at abstraction

VOL. 575, DECEMBER 23, 2008 173

Garcillano vs. House of Representatives Committees on Public Information,

174 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Garcillano vs. House of Representatives Committees on Public Information,

inquiry sought to be prohibited by the instant petitions. Insofar as the

because no published rules governed it, in clear contravention of the

VOL. 575, DECEMBER 23, 2008 175

Garcillano vs. House of Representatives Committees on Public Information,

176 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Garcillano vs. House of Representatives Committees on Public Information,

Same; Same; The exception to the general rule that one-time

of Representatives, is a continuing body. Thus, contrary to the holding of the

VOL. 575, DECEMBER 23, 2008 177

Garcillano vs. House of Representatives Committees on Public Information,

178 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Garcillano vs. House of Representatives Committees on Public Information,

VOL. 575, DECEMBER 23, 2008 179

Garcillano vs. House of Representatives Committees on Public Information,

new Congress must publish its rules of procedure. Implicitly, republication

180 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the Supreme Court. Prohibition.

1 Rollo (G.R. No. 179275), p. 168.

VOL. 575, DECEMBER 23, 2008 181

Security, Information and Communications Technology, and

In the House of Representatives (House), on June 8, 2005, then

2 Rollo (G.R. No. 170338), pp. 7-9.

182 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

5 Id., at pp. 36-38.

VOL. 575, DECEMBER 23, 2008 183

session, replay or communication of the contents of the “Hello

On September 6, 2007, petitioners Santiago Ranada and Oswaldo

9 Rollo (G.R. No. 179275), pp. 169-170.

184 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

The Court subsequently heard the case on oral argument.17

to prohibit and stop the conduct of the Senate inquiry on the

VOL. 575, DECEMBER 23, 2008 185

The gist of the question of standing is whether a party has “alleged

upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult

20 465 Phil. 385, 402; 420 SCRA 438, 452 (2004).

186 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

validity of laws, regulations and rulings.”24 The fairly recent Chavez

In G.R. No. 179275, petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili justify their

24 David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, id., at p. 218.

VOL. 575, DECEMBER 23, 2008 187

the ensuing public hearings. They are worried by the continuous

28 Rollo (G.R. No. 179275), p. 4.

188 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

tatives, yet the Court granted standing to the petitioners therein

VOL. 575, DECEMBER 23, 2008 189