APPELLATE PRACTICE CASE DIGEST – RULE 37
1 - MERALCO vs LA CAMPANA FOODS
New Trial; Fraud; As a ground for new trial, fraud must be extrinsic or collateral, that
is, one which prevents the aggrieved party from having a trial or presenting his case
to the court, or that which is used to procure the judgment without fair submission of
the controversy.—On the other hand, as a motion for new trial grounded on fraud,
Meralco’s motion likewise fails to convince. The fraud it claims is in the ex-parte
motion of La Campana to declare it in default. Meralco claims that the reason for the
ex-parte motion was “to deprive the defendant of the opportunity to oppose it,
knowing that defendant actually filed its answer.” But how could La Campana have
known about the answer with counterclaim when it was actually received only on
October 8, 1990, as evidenced by the registry return receipt attached to Meralco’s
Annex “H,” while the ex-parte motion to declare Meralco in default was filed much
earlier on September 27, 1990? “Fraud, as a ground for new trial, must be extrinsic or
collateral, that is, it is the kind of fraud which prevented the aggrieved party from
having a trial or presenting his case to the court, or was used to procure the judgment
without fair submission of the controversy.” Meralco’s failure to go to trial in this case
is solely attributable to its failure to comply with the Rules of Court.
Appeals; Certiorari; The special civil action of certiorari cannot be a substitute for a
lost appeal.—Having lost its right to appeal, Meralco cannot take refuge in the instant
petition for certiorari and prohibition. The Court has always maintained that the
special civil action of certiorari cannot be a substitute for a lost appeal, and there
appears to be no cogent reason why such policy should be waived in this case.
Facts: A complaint filed by la campana against meralco for recovery of money w/
prelim injunction after it receive a notice of disconnection and for alleged non
payment of the following: differential billing of 65k as value of electric energy used but
it was not registered in the meter due to alleged tampering discovered on sept 22
1986 and the underbilling of 169k (w/ balance of 28k) due to meter multiplier failure.
Summons and copy of complaint was received by meralco on aug 23 1990.
RTC judge QC Lopez inhibited and was reraffled to Judge Dayaw.
Meralco filed a motion for extension of time of 15 days within which to file an answer
at the clerk, allegedly refused the same. And the motion not acted upon bec it did not
contain a notice of hearing as req at sec 4 &5 Rule 15.
Meralco’s Answer w/ counterclaim was received on Sept 21 1990.(beyond the period
to answer.
La campana filed exparte motion to declare meralco in default, (granted)
Instead of appealing to CA, Meralco filed on dec 3 1990 a motion to set aside
judgement by default and/or for new trial that it filed it answer and the judgement by
default was obtained by fraud. Denied by Judge Dayaw, that the motion for extention
did not containany notice of date and place of hearing, also stated that the motion to
set aside judgment by default and/or for new trial was a pro forma motion because it
did not set forth the facts and circumstances which allegedly constituted the fraud
upon which the motion was grounded.
Meralco filed a notice of appeal, but opposed by la campana on gorund of out of time
and since the motion to set aside judgment by default and/or for new trial did not stop
the running of the period to appeal, which expired on Dec 14, 1990, or 15 days from
the time Meralco received the decision on Nov 29, 1990.
TC denied notice of appeal and granted the execution of la campana.
Meralco filed the instant petition for certiorari and profibitionclaming judge commited
grave abuse of discretion.
Issue: Whether judge Dayaw commited grave abuse of discretion in its order.
Ruling: No. The case of Gozon, et al.vs CA: It is well-entrenched in this jurisdiction
that a motion which does not meet the requirements of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of
the Rules of Court is considered a worthless piece of paper which the clerk has no
right to receive and the court has no authority to act upon.
Meralco was aware of the importance of such a notice since it insisted in its motion to
set aside judgment by default and/or for new trial that it should have received notice
of hearing of the motion to declare it in default which La Campana filed ex parte.
When it filed in Branch 78 its answer with counterclaim on Sep 21, 1990, fourteen
days after the expiration of the period within which to file an answer, Meralco was
already in default and, naturally, it had to bear all the legal consequences of being in
default. It chose to play it safe.
Under the Rules, what an aggrieved party seeks to set aside is the order of default,
an interlocutory order which is, therefore, not appealable, and not the judgment by
default, which is a final disposition of the case and appealable to the CA. Notice that
in the following pertinent provisions, the Rules expressly state that what may be set
aside is the order of default, while the judgment itself may be appealed to a higher
court: sec 3 relief from order of default, Sec 9 Service upon party in default and Sec 2
judgement or orders subject to appeal.
While a motion for new trial grounded on fraud, thisMeralco's motion likewise fails to
convince. Meralco claims that the reason for the ex-parte motion was "to deprive the
defendant of the opportunity to oppose it, knowing that defendant actually filed its
answer." But how could La Campana have known about the answer with counterclaim
when it was actually received only on Oct, 1990, as evidenced by the registry return
receipt attached to Meralco's Annex "H,"while the ex-parte motion to declare Meralco
in default was filed much earlier on Sep 27, 1990? "Fraud, as a ground for new trial,
must be extrinsic or collateral, that is, it is the kind of fraud which prevented the
aggrieved party from having a trial or presenting his case to the court, or was used to
procure the judgment without fair submission of the controversy."Meralco's failure to
go to trial in this case is solely attributable to its failure to comply with the Rules of
Court.
Judge correct a pro forma motion, it did not interrupt the running of the period to
appeal. Accordingly, having received the decision on Nov 29, 1990, Meralco had until
Dec 14, 1990, within which to file a notice of appeal. The notice of appeal which it
filed on Jan 28, 1991, was clearly filed out of time. Hence, Dismissed.
2 - SOLORIA vs DE LA CRUZ
New trial; Failure to attend trial for lack of advance notice justifies new trial —The
failure of counsel for petitioners to attend the trial for lack of advance notice on him
constitutes an “accident” within the meaning of Section 1, Rule 37 of the (old or
revised) Rules of Court which, in turn, is a proper and valid ground, to grant a new
trial (Muerteguy vs. Delgado, 22 Phil. 109; Lavitoria vs. Judge of Court of First
Instance of Tayabas, 32 Phil. 204; Villegas vs. Roldan, 76 Phil. 349). Rule 37 is
applicable to cases filed in the Court of Agrarian Relations (Rule 20 of the Rules of
Court of Agrarian Relations).
When affidavits of merits are not necessary.—Affidavits of merits are not necessary if
the granting of the motion for new trial is not discretionary with the court, but is
demandable as of right, as where the movant has been deprived of his day in court
through no fault or negligence on his part because no notice of hearing was furnished
him in advance so as to enable him to prepare for trial
FACTS: Cefronio dela Cruz commenced a proceeding against Juliana Soloria
alleging inter alia, that since 1959 he has been a share-tenant of said respondent
Soloria over her one-hectare parcel of first class riceland situated at Barrio San
Antonio, San Manuel, Pangasinan; on May 20, 1961, said respondent, without any
justifiable and legal cause or prior approval of the court, summarily ejected him from
the landholding in question; that he had shared on a fifty-fifty (50-50) basis the net
harvest of 30 and 45 cavans of palay produced in said land. Wherefore, petitioner de
la Cruz prays that he be reinstated in the disputed landholding; that the net harvest of
palay be reliquidated on the sharing basis provided for by law; that he be awarded
damages for his unrealized shares from the time he was unlawfully ejected until he is
fully reinstated in his hold-ing, and attorney’s fees in the amount of P200.00.
Respondent filed her answer to the petition, denying the material allegations thereof
and setting up the following special defenses: that no tenancy relationship exists
between her and respondent de la Cruz; that de la Cruz has no legal capacity to sue,
he being a minor, that she is not the exclusive owner of the land in question, but she
owns it in common with Emeteria and Ignacio, both surnamed Soloria; and that said
land is being cultivated by one Valeriano.
On this scheduled hearing, neither respondents nor their counsel appeared; hence,
the court a quo, upon motion, allowed petitioner De la Cruz to present his evidence ex
parte and thereafter considered the case submitted for decision. On August 30, 1962,
the court a quo rendered a decision granting the reliefs prayed for in the petition of
said Cefronio de la Cruz. Three (3) days after receipt of the above decision, counsel
for respondents presented a motion to reconsider and set aside said decision and to
allow them to cross- exam-ine petitioners’ witnesses and to present their own
evidence claiming that they were deprived of their day in court, because their failure
to attend the scheduled hearing was due to an accident since notice thereof was
received only six (6) days after said trial. This claim was supported by an affidavit,
attached to the motion, of Atty. Dario R. Navarro, counsel of respondents, attesting to
this fact. The court a quo denied respondents’ motion for reconsideration and/or new
trial; hence, the present petition before this Court.
Issue: Whether the lower court erred in its decision.
Ruling: YES.
It is not disputed that counsel for respondents (petitioners herein) did not receive
notice of hearing on or before June 8, 1962, which was the scheduled date of trial;
hence, they failed to attend said hearing. This circumstance, i.e. failure to attend trial
for lack of advance notice, has been held in previous cases to constitute an “accident”
within the meaning’ of Section 1, Rule 37, of the (old or revised) Rules of Court which,
in turn, is a proper and valid ground lo grant a new trial, hence, the court a quo should
have granted a new trial.
The appealed order stresses that petitioners-appellants were negligent in failing to
apprise the court in due time of their intention to cross-examine the witnesses of the
opposing party and produce evidence of their own. When they had from August 8,
1963 to August 30, 1963 to do so. This delay can only be relevant as evidence to a
waiver of the right to be heard. But there is no evidence of any such intention on the
part of the appellants, and a renunciation of such a fundamental right (to their day in
court) is not to be lightly inferred.
3 - VIKING INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION vs CA
New Trial; Grounds; Mistake; The mistake referred to in the law is one which ordinary
prudence could not have guarded against.— Definitely, petitioner’s reliance on
“honest mistake” is misplaced. The mistake referred to above is one which ordinary
prudence could not have guarded against. Here, the mistake petitioner committed is a
mistake of law.
FACTS: petitioner extended to respondent Jose L. Luison, Jr. a loan amounting to
P2,000,000.00 secured by a promissory note and a real estate mortgage. Two years
thereafter, petitioner demanded from respondent the payment of P19,102,916.39,
purportedly representing the principal amount of the loan, plus interest and penalties.
Respondent disputed the accuracy of the amount. Thus, petitioner threatened to
foreclose the real estate mortgage, prompting respondent to file a petition for
prohibition and declaratory relief3 with the RTC. Petitioner refused to answer the
petition because it was erroneously impleaded as “Viking Trading Corporation,”
instead of “Viking Industrial Corporation.” Consequently, the court, upon motion of
respondent, declared petitioner in default and allowed respondent to present his
evidence ex parte.
The RTC rendered a judgment by default in favor of respondent.
Petitioner received a copy of the judgment but did not interpose an appeal. Petitioner
refused to acknowledge the full satisfaction of the judgment by default. Thus,
respondent filed two motions, to wit: (1) “Ex-Parte Motion to Require Viking Industrial
Corporation (petitioner) to Cause the Cancellation of the Annotation of Mortgage and
to Return (to respondent) the Transfer Certificate of Title. RTC, this time, denied
respondent’s twin motions and set aside the judgment by default on the ground that
the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over petitioner because of improper service of
summons. Summons was served upon “Viking Trading Corporation,” not upon
petitioner “Viking Industrial Corporation.”
Upon respondent’s motion for reconsideration, the RTC overturned its order and
reinstated the judgment by default.4 The court also granted respondent’s twin
motions earlier mentioned. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was
denied.
Petitioner then filed with the RTC a motion for new trial on the ground that the
petitioner acted in the honest mistake since the petition had been served on it for
“Viking Trading Corporation” must first be corrected to reflect its true corporate name.
The motion for new trial was granted but was later on reversed by the CA, hence, this
petition for certiorari.
Issue: Whether the motion for new trial was seasonable filed.
RULING: NO. Also, the controversy at bar is a question of fact which is outside of the
ambit of certiorari which deals with question of law.
As ruled by the CA, Private respondent’s contention that they received only the
decision on January 9, 1999 is a lie, flimsy and frivolous. Way back on October 15,
1997, private respondent went to the Court of Appeals by way of Petition for Certiorari
assailing the decision of the lower court. Common sense dictates, that one could not
have gone to the Court of Appeals without private respondent’s receiving a copy of
the decision of the lower court. Thus, in our mind, we are not convinced that private
respondent did not receive a copy of the decision.
At any rate, even if the motion for new trial was filed on time, still, the same should
not have been granted by the RTC. Petitioner claimed that it committed an “honest
mistake” in not filing an answer to respondent’s petition for prohibition and declaratory
relief because of its belief that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over it.
We are not persuaded. Petitioner’s “honest mistake” hardly qualifies as a ground for a
new trial. Definitely, petitioner’s reliance on “honest mistake” is misplaced. The
mistake referred to above is one which ordinary prudence could not have guarded
against. Here, the mistake petitioner committed is a mistake of law. Its lawyer
believed that he should not file an answer because his client is erroneously
impleaded.
Clearly, petitioner’s counsel, instead of ignoring respondent’s petition, should have
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the court has not acquired jurisdiction
over its person as the summons (with a copy of the petition) served upon it is
defective. Definitely, his invocation of “honest mistake” is misplaced. To grant it will
set a precedent allowing a new trial upon a party’s mere acknowledgement that in
failing to file an answer, he committed an “honest mistake.” In effect, there will be no
end to litigation.
4 - SALAZAR vs SALAZAR
COMPROMISE; JUDGMENT BY DEFAULT; MISTAKE.—In view of the evidence
showing a compromise between the parties, it was natural and logical that the plaintiff
herein believed that the action brought against him by the defendant herein had been
ended by the aforesaid compromise and that he was relieved, therefore, from the duty
of filing his answer. Such belief being. excusable and having prevented the plaintiff
herein from making a defense that would have been good and efficacious, this case
comes within the provisions of section 513 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and the
judgment by default must be set aside and a new trial ordered.
FACTS: In a case involving claim of damages, Victoriano Salzar was ordered in
default and was ordered to pay a sum of money in favor of the plaintiff. Apparently,
defendants after having been served in due form with the complaint and summons
and not having appeared nor answered to the complaint, and the time fixed by the law
having expired, the court finds the defendants in default.
The record in this case does not show the date of the filing of the complaint by
Cayetana Salazar in the Case referred to, neither is there shown the date of the
citation and service of the same upon Victoriano Salazar wherein he could answer to
such complaint. It appears to this court, however, that this defendant, Victoriano
Salazar, was undoubtedly cited and served with the complaint in accordance with law
and that this was long before the 11th of March, 1905 proven and evidenced by
pleading filed herein by Attorney F. E. Dominguez, representing Victoriano Salazar.
He was allowed the permission asked for the purpose of answering such complaint,
and the time fixed for the filing of such answer was five days, yet he never at any time
filed his said answer referred to.
The transaction or compromise entered into between Cayetana and Victoriano
Salazar has been proven by Exhibit I of the plaintiff, and is a certified copy executed
by a notary of the original instrument covering said transaction, which instrument was
left in the possession of Macario Adriatico, the attorney for Cayetana Salazar. Said
instrument covering this transaction appears executed before a notary public and was
so executed for the purpose of compromise.
ISSUE: whether the belief of a compromise is an excusable defence to set aside the
order of default.
RULUNG: YES.
In view of these proofs we consider it natural and logical that Victoriano Salazar
believed, and that such belief was well founded, that the action brought against him
by Cayetana Salazar had been ended in fact by virtue of the aforesaid compromise
and that he was therefore, relieved from the duty of filing his answer. Perhaps
technically such belief would be erroneous, but it was, without doubt, excusable and
the causes were reasonable why he did not answer; and this having been the cause
that prevented Salazar from making or utilizing a defense which would have been
good and efficacious—that is, the aforesaid transaction or compromise.
Hence, we grant a new trial of the case wherein Victoriano Salazar shall be permitted
to answer the complaint of Cayetana Salazar.
5 - PHILIPPINE PHOSPHATE FERTILIZER vs. CIR
New Trial; Requisites; Words and Phrases; The “mistake” that is allowable in Rule 37
is one which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against; Negligence to be
“excusable” must also be one which ordinary diligence and prudence could have
guarded against and by reason of which the rights of an aggrieved party have
probably been impaired; The test of excusable negligence is whether a party has
acted with ordinary prudence while transacting important business.—It is true that
petitioner could not move for new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence
because in order to have a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence, it
must be proved that: (a) the evidence was discovered after the trial; (b) such
evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial with reasonable
diligence; (c) it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching; and
(d) it is of such weight that, if admitted, will probably change the judgment. This does
not mean however, that petitioner is altogether barred from having a new trial. As
pointed out by Judge Acosta, the reasons put forth by petitioner could fall under
mistake or excusable negligence. The “mistake” that is allowable in Rule 37 is one
which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against. Negligence to be
“excusable” must also be one which ordinary diligence and prudence could not have
guarded against and by reason of which the rights of an aggrieved party have
probably been impaired. The test of excusable negligence is whether a party has
acted with ordinary prudence while transacting important business. In this case, it
cannot be said that petitioner did not act with ordinary prudence in claiming its refund
with the CTA, in light of its previous cases with the CTA which did not require invoices
and the non-mandatory nature of CTA Circular No. 1-95.
Taxation; In cases before tax courts, Rules of Court applies only by analogy or in a
suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient shall be liberally
construed in order to promote its objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive
disposition of every action and proceeding; The quest for orderly presentation of
issues is not an absolute—it should not bar the courts from considering undisputed
facts to arrive at a just determination of a controversy.
Technicalities and legalisms, however exalted, should not be misused by the
government to keep money not belonging to it and thereby enrich itself at the
expense of its law-abiding citizens.—Since it is not disputed that petitioner is entitled
to tax exemption, it should not be precluded from presenting evidence to substantiate
the amount of refund it is claiming on mere technicality especially in this case, where
the failure to present invoices at the first instance was adequately explained by
petitioner. As we pronounced in BPI-Family Savings Bank, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals: .
. . Technicalities and legalisms, however exalted, should not be misused by the
government to keep money not belonging to it and thereby enrich itself at the
expense of its law-abiding citizens. If the State expects its taxpayers to observe
fairness and honesty in paying their taxes, so must it apply the same standard against
itself in refunding excess payments of such taxes. Indeed, the State must lead by its
own example of honor, dignity and uprightness.
FACTS: Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer Corporation is a domestic corporation
registered with the Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA). It manufactures
fertilizers for domestic and international distribution and as such, utilizes fuel, oil and
other petroleum products which it procures locally from Petron Philippines.
Petron initially pays the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs
the taxes and duties imposed upon the petroleum products. Petron is then
reimbursed by petitioner when Petron sells such petroleum products to the petitioner.
Thereafter, petitioner sought a refund of specific taxes paid on the purchases of
petroleum products from Petron pursuant to the incentives it enjoyed by virtue of its
EPZA registration. Since the two-year period within which petitioner could file a case
for tax refund before the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) was about to expire and no
action had been taken by the BIR, petitioner instituted a petition for review before the
CTA against the CIR. CTA promulgated its Decision finding that while petitioner is
exempt from the payment of excise taxes, it failed to sufficiently prove that it is
entitled to refund in this particular case since it did not submit invoices to support the
summary5of petroleum products sold and delivered to it by Petron. The grant of
refund privileges must be strictly construed against the taxpayer and liberally in favor
of the government. Petitioner has the burden to prove the material allegations in its
petition as well as the truth of its claim.
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that it failed to submit
invoices because it thought that the presentation of said invoices was not necessary
to prove the claim for refund, since petitioner’s previous claims, in CTA Case Nos.
4654, 4993 and 4994,8 involving similar facts, were granted by the CTA even without
the presentation of invoices. It then prayed that the CTA decision be reconsidered
and allow petitioner to present and offer the invoices in evidence to present its claim.
CTA denied.
Petitioner filed another motion for reconsideration with motion for new trial praying
that it be allowed to present an additional witness and to have invoices and receipts
pre-marked. CTA once again denied.
Issue: whether CTA erred in denying the petitioner’s claim for refund.
RULING: YES.
The primary question that has to be resolved is whether an Affidavit of Non-Forum
Shopping, erroneously signed by counsel, may be cured by subsequent compliance.
Generally, subsequent compliance with the requirement of affidavit of non-forum
shopping does not excuse a party from failure to comply in the first instance.
A certification of the plaintiff’s counsel will not suffice for the reason that it is
petitioner, and not the counsel, who is in the best position to know whether he
actually filed or caused the filing of a petition. A certification against forum shopping
signed by counsel is a defective certification that is equivalent to non-compliance with
the requirement and constitutes a valid cause for the dismissal of the petition. There
are instances, however, when we treated compliance with the rule with relative
liberality, especially when there are circumstances or compelling reasons making the
strict application of the rule clearly unjustified.
Here, the affidavit of non-forum shopping was signed by petitioner’s counsel. Upon
receipt of the resolution of the CA, however, which dismissed its petition for non-
compliance with the rules on affidavit of non-forum shopping, petitioner submitted,
together with its motion for reconsideration, an affidavit signed by petitioner’s
president in compliance with the said rule.
We deem this to be sufficient especially in view of the merits of the case, which may
be considered as a special circumstance or a compelling reason that would justify
tempering the hard consequence of the procedural requirement on non-forum
shopping.
In this case, there is no dispute that petitioner is entitled to exemption from the
payment of excise taxes by virtue of its being an EPZA registered enterprise.46 As
stated by the CTA, the only thing left to be determined is whether or not petitioner is
entitled to the amount claimed for refund.
Petitioner’s entire claim for refund, however, was denied for petitioner’s failure to
present invoices allegedly in violation of CTA Circular No. 1-95. But nowhere in said
Circular is it stated that invoices are required to be presented in claiming refunds.
It is true that petitioner could not move for new trial on the basis of newly discovered
evidence because in order to have a new trial on the basis of newly discovered
evidence, it must be proved that: (a) the evidence was discovered after the trial; (b)
such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial with
reasonable diligence; (c) it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or
impeaching; and (d) it is of such weight that, if admitted, will probably change the
judgment. This does not mean however, that petitioner is altogether barred from
having a new trial. As pointed out by Judge Acosta, the reasons put forth by petitioner
could fall under mistake or excusable negligence. The “mistake” that is allowable in
Rule 37 is one which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against. Negligence
to be “excusable” must also be one which ordinary diligence and prudence could not
have guarded against and by reason of which the rights of an aggrieved party have
probably been impaired. The test of excusable negligence is whether a party has
acted with ordinary prudence while transacting important business.
In this case, it cannot be said that petitioner did not act with ordinary prudence in
claiming its refund with the CTA, in light of its previous cases with the CTA which did
not require invoices and the non-mandatory nature of CTA Circular No. 1-95.
We reiterate the fundamental principle that technical rules of procedure are not ends
in themselves but are primarily designed to aid in the administration of justice.56 And
in cases before tax courts, Rules of Court applies only by analogy or in a suppletory
character and whenever practicable and convenient shall be liberally construed in
order to promote its objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition
of every action and proceeding.
6 - BERNALDEZ vs FRANCIA
Motion for New Trial; Requisites.—We have previously ruled that a motion for new
trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence shall be granted when the
concurrence of the following requisites is established: (a) the evidence is discovered
after trial; (b) the evidence could not have been discovered and produced during trial
even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; and (c) the evidence is material and
not merely corroborative, cumulative or impeaching and is of such weight that if
admitted, would probably change the judgment. In order that a particular piece of
evidence may be regarded as “newly discovered” for purposes of granting a new trial,
it is essential to show that the offering party exercised reasonable diligence in seeking
to locate such evidence before or during trial but had nonetheless failed to secure it.
FACTS: Respondent Conchita Francia is the registered owner of a residential lot in
Sampaloc, Manila. Located beside said lot is a parcel of land owned by petitioners
Guillermo and Lourdes Bernaldez. Thereafter, the building and other improvements
erected on respondent’s lot were destroyed by fire. Subsequently, petitioners built
their kitchen and in the process encroached upon a portion of respondent’s lot.
Respondent had her property resurveyed by a geodetic engineer and as a result, she
was able to confirm that petitioners had encroached upon some nineteen square
meters of her lot.
Respondent made several demands upon petitioners to vacate the portion of her lot
which they were occupying, but petitioners did not comply therewith. Respondent
then filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila a complaint against
petitioners, praying that the court determine the rightful owner of the area in dispute.
RTC rendered its decision holding that petitioners had encroached on respondent’s
lot by an area of seventeen square meters.
Petitioners filed with the trial court a motion for new trial on the ground of newly
discovered evidence. They claimed that the TCT covering respondent’s lot referred to
another lot owned by Nolasco and Editha Tupaz. However, the RTC denied the
motion for lack of merit.
Issue: Whether the lower court erred in its decision by rejecting the petitioner’s
motion for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence.
RULING: NO.
We have previously ruled that a motion for new trial on the ground of newly
discovered evidence shall be granted when the concurrence of the following
requisites is established: (a) the evidence is discovered after trial; (b) the evidence
could not have been discovered and produced during trial even with the exercise of
reasonable diligence; and (c) the evidence is material and not merely corroborative,
cumulative or impeaching and is of such weight that if admitted, would probably
change the judgment. In order that a particular piece of evidence may be regarded as
“newly discovered” for purposes of granting a new trial, it is essential to show that the
offering party exercised reasonable diligence in seeking to locate such evidence
before or during trial but had nonetheless failed to secure it.
The evidence offered by petitioners, issued by the Registry of Deeds of Manila not to
respondent, but to “Spouses Nolasco E. Tupaz and Editha L. Tupaz,”21 does not
satisfy the aforementioned requisites.
The Court notes that although petitioners found out about the existence of said TCT
only after trial, they could have easily discovered the same before or during the trial of
the case had they bothered to check the TCT of respondent’s lot to ascertain whether
or not it overlapped with their own lot. In any case, TCT No. 180189 is hardly material
to their case, considering that respondent’s TCT is of a different number: TCT No.
180199. Hence, it is not difficult to see why the two certificates of title refer to different
parcels of land and owners. Such piece of evidence would certainly not have affected,
much less, altered the outcome of the case.
7 - CAPUZ v COURT OF APPEALS
Doctrine: When a motion to lift an order of default contains the reasons for the failure
to answer as well as the facts constituting the prospective defense of the defendant
and it is sworn to by said defendant, neither a formal verification nor a separate
affidavit of merit is necessary.
Default; Affidavit of Merit; Grounds for a motion for new trial.—We agree that the
verified motion of petitioner could be considered as a motion for new trial. The
grounds alleged by petitioner in his motion are the same as the grounds for a motion
for new trial under Rule 37, which are: (1) that petitioner’s failure to file his answer
was due to fraud, mistake, accident or excusable negligence; and (2) that he has a
meritorious defense. Petitioner explained that upon receiving the summons, he
immediately saw private respondent and confronted him with the receipt evidencing
his payment. Thereupon, private respondent assured him that he would instruct his
lawyer to withdraw the complaint. The prior payment of the loan sought to be
collected by private respondent is a good defense to the complaint to collect the same
loan again. The only reason why respondent court did not consider the motion of
petitioner as a motion for new trial was because the said motion did not include an
affidavit of merit. The allegations contained in an affidavit of merit required to be
attached to a motion to lift an order of default or for a new trial need not be embodied
in a separate document but may be incorporated in the petition itself.
FACTS: Ernesto Banez filed a complaint for a sum of money against Petitioner,
Capuz, with the RTC of Kalookan City.Capuz was served summons. He also failed to
file an answer, therefore Banez filed an Ex Parter Motion to Declare Capuz in default.
The RTC declared the Capuz in default and allowed Banez to present his evidence ex
parte.RTC decided in favor of Capuz. On November 13, Capuz received the order
declaring him in default and also the decision rendered by the RTC. Capuz filed a
verified motion to lift the order of default and to set aside the decision. His defense
was that he confronted Banez about the receipt for the payment of his obligation to
Banez.
The RTC denied the verified urgent motion stating that the motion to lift order of
default did not toll the period to appeal and that Capuz’s only remedy to appeal the
decision within the said period.
Capuz appealed to the CA which affirmed the RTC. The CA stated that Capuz may
no longer lift the order of default because there was already a decision, and his
remedies were either to appeal or to file a motion for new trial. It further stated that
the motion to lift the order of default and to set aside the decision may not be treated
as a motion for new trial because it was not accompanied by an affidavit of merit.
ISSUES: Whether the motion filed by Capuz may be treated as a motion for new trial.
RULING: YES. The verified motion of petitioner could be considered as a motion for
new trial.
• The grounds alleged by petitioner in his motion are the same as the
grounds for a motion for new trial under Rule 37, which are:
• That petitioner's failure to file his answer was due to
fraud, mistake, accident or excusable negligence;
• That he has a meritorious defense. Petitioner explained
that upon receiving the summons, he immediately saw
private respondent and confronted him with the receipt
evidencing his payment.
• Thereupon, private respondent assured him that he would
instruct his lawyer to withdraw the complaint. The prior
payment of the loan sought to be collected by private
respondent is a good defense to the complaint to collect
the same loan again.
• The allegations contained in an affidavit of merit required to be
attached to a motion to lift an order of default or for a new trial need
not be embodied in a separate document but may be incorporated
in the petition itself.
• Stated otherwise, when a motion to lift an order of default
contains the reasons for the failure to answer as well as the
facts constituting the prospective defense of the defendant
and it is sworn to by said defendant, neither a formal
verification nor a separate affidavit of merit is necessary.
• Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa opined that the affidavit of merit
may either be drawn up as a separate document and appended to
the motion for new trial or the facts which should otherwise be set
out in said separate document may, with equal effect, be alleged in
the verified motion itself.
DISPOSITION:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged decision of the Court of
Appeals is REVERSED.
8 - DULOS REALTY vs CA
Civil Procedure; Technicalities should not be resorted to in derogation of the intent of
the rules which is the proper and just determination of controversies.—In Lim vs.
Court of Appeals, 188 SCRA 23, 33 (1990) we held that technicalities should not be
resorted to in derogation of the intent of the rules which is the proper and just
determination of controversies. Every party-litigant should be afforded the amplest
opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause free from undue
constraints of technicalities.
Appeals; Courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound
discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming
under the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies; Their findings of
fact in that regard are generally accorded great respect, if not finality by the courts. --
Accordingly, the trial court properly relied on the HLURB decision, when said court
amended its decision on November 28, 1989. By reason of the special knowledge
and expertise of administrative agencies over matters falling under their jurisdiction,
they are in a better position to pass judgment thereon. Thus, their findings of fact in
that regard are generally accorded great respect, if not finality by the courts.
FACTS: Petitioner Dulos Realty is the owner and developer of Airmen’s Village
Subdivision located at Las Piñas. It entered into a contract to sell a house and lot with
private respondent Vicenta Peleas in an instalment basis. The parties agreed that in
case private respondent defaulted in the payment of any monthly installment, she
would have a grace period of not less than 120 days within which to pay. If despite
the grace period she still failed to pay, petitioner could declare the contract cancelled.
The right to cancel, however, would not obtain if private respondent’s non-payment
were due to petitioner’s failure to complete development within the period allowed by
the National Housing Authority.
Peleas and her family occupied the premises. Thereafter, she failed to pay the
monthly amortizations when they became due. This resulted in demands made by
Dulos for her to vacate the premises, otherwise a civil case would be filed against her.
However, before it could initiate the appropriate civil case, she filed with the then
Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (now Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board or HLURB) a complaint for failure to develop the subdivision in accordance
with its approved plan, thus violating Presidential Decree No. 957 and related laws.
Dulos filed a complaint for rescission of contract and recovery of possession with
damages before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, alleging among others, that she
failed to pay her obligation under the contract. In her answer, she reiterated her
allegation regarding petitioner’s failure to develop the subdivision.
HLURB rendered its decision dismissing her complaint as the records show that
complainant did not adduce any evidence to support her allegations of incomplete
development which is vehemently denied by respondents.
However, RTC dismissed the complaint of Dulos on the ground that both parties are
in pari delicto and are both guilty of breach of the contract.
Dulos filed a Motion for Reopening/Clarification and Reconsideration, alleging that
Vicenta Peleas had voluntarily relinquished possession of the subject property —
which was later on granted. Nevertheless, such decision was likewise overturned,
hence this petition.
ISSUE: Did the appellate court err in treating petitioner’s motion for reopening/
clarification and reconsideration as a motion for new trial?
RULING: YES.
A motion for new trial was aimed to convince the court that its ruling was erroneous
and improper for being contrary to the law or the evidence. However, apparent from
petitioner’s motion and the subsequent hearing thereon was petitioner’s intention to
make the trial court reconsider its decision to conform with the law and the evidence
by reiterating the decision of the HLURB, the government agency which has the
primary jurisdiction on the enforcement of PD 957 as amended, and by informing said
trial court that private respondent already abandoned the premises.
That private respondent had already abandoned the premises is not a newly found
evidence for admittedly, petitioner knew of it before the trial court rendered its
decision. Hence, it could not be introduced through a motion for new trial under
Section 1 Rule 37 of the Rules of Court. either could said abandonment be introduced
through a motion to reopen, because such motion could only be made after the case
was submitted for decision but before judgment is actually rendered. In this case, it
was only introduced as evidence in the motion filed after judgment, which in our view
is appropriately one for reconsideration. Had the trial court not allowed petitioner to
present said proof of abandonment, said court would not have had the chance to
correct its decision. It would have effectively forced private respondent to continue
with the contract to buy the house and lot on installment, even if she had lost interest
in performing her obligations under that contract to the great prejudice of petitioner.
Thus, we agree with the petitioner that evidence on abandonment of the premises by
private respondent was properly received even only for purposes of reconsideration
and clarification.
9 - ALFARERO vs SEVILLA
New Trial; A motion for new trial should be made within the period for perfecting an
appeal.— The time is past for petitioners’ arguments. Our scrutiny of the records
shows that the second query posed, under the circumstances of this case, is moot
and academic. Rule 37, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure clearly
provides that a motion for new trial should be made “within the period for taking an
appeal.” Instead, what the record shows is that petitioners, in effect, only asked for a
new trial after the appellate court had rendered its decision on appeal. Such a
situation is definitely not permissible under the Rules. It is well accepted that a motion
for new trial based on newly discovered evidence may indeed be filed after judgment,
but within the period for perfecting an appeal.
Due Process; As a rule, basic considerations of due process dictate that no question
will be entertained on appeal unless it has been raised in the court below. —
Moreover, the record clearly and categorically shows that petitioners’ second query
was not raised in the proceedings at the first instance. As a rule, basic considerations
of due process dictate that no question will be entertained on appeal unless it has
been raised in the court below. Points of law, theories of the case, questions of fact
and law, issues, and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower court need
not and ordinarily will not be considered by the reviewing court, as these cannot be
raised for the first time at that late stage.
FACTS: Spouses Sevilla are the registered owners of a piece of land situated at San
Vicente, Panabo, Davao [del Norte]. A portion of which was sold to Spouses Alfarero
in the amount of P12,000 subject to the rights of repurchase by the original patentee
or his heirs within 5 years from the date of the conveyance.
Plaintiff Petra Sevilla allegedly sent a letter to the parents of the defendants and to
the defendants themselves, indicating the plaintiffs’ desire to repurchase the above-
mentioned parcel of land, but defendants allegedly objected to the offer of
repurchase.
Plaintiffs filed the present action to repurchase. Defendants’ rejection of the offer to
repurchase is based on the defense that the plaintiffs’ action has already prescribed,
that plaintiffs’ offer to repurchase is already beyond the five (5) year limitation period.
According to the defendants, the Deed of Sale was executed sometime in December
1985 although notarized only on May 26, 1986. Hence, according to them, counting
from December 1985 [to] January 3, 1991, when the plaintiffs filed the present action,
the five (5) year period has then elapsed.
Both the trial court and the CA ruled in favor of the plaintiffs despite its motion for new
trial upon the alleged discovery of new evidence, hence, this petition.
Issue: Can a party litigant file a motion for new trial even if the case is on appeal and
pending before the court of appeals on the ground of newly discovered evidence?
RULING: NO.
The petitioners’ submissions are not even worthy of a lengthy refutation as the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure clearly provide that a motion for new trial or reconsideration
must be filed within the period for taking an appeal.
Rule 37 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure clearly provides that a motion for new
trial should be made “within the period for taking an appeal.” Instead, what the record
shows is that petitioners, in effect, only asked for a new trial after the appellate court
had rendered its decision on appeal. Such a situation is definitely not permissible
under the Rules. It is well accepted that a motion for new trial based on newly
discovered evidence may indeed be filed after judgment, but within the period for
perfecting an appeal.
Moreover, the record clearly and categorically shows that petitioners’ second query
was not raised in the proceedings at the first instance. As a rule, basic considerations
of due process dictate that no question will be entertained on appeal unless it has
been raised in the court below. Points of law, theories of the case, questions of fact
and law, issues, and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower court need
not and ordinarily will not be considered by the reviewing court, as these cannot be
raised for the first time at that late stage.
10 - HABALUYAS ENTERPRISES vs.
 JUDGE MAXIMO M. JAPSON
Certiorari; Motions; A motion for new trial or reconsideration is not a prerequisite to an
appeal, petition for review, or petition for review on certiorari.—On the other hand, a
motion for new trial or reconsideration is not a pre-requisite to an appeal, a petition for
review or a petition for review on certiorari, and since the purpose of the amendments
above referred to is to expedite the final disposition of cases, a strict but prospective
application of the said ruling is in order.
Effective June 1, 1986 no motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or
reconsideration may be filed in the Metropolitan and Municipal Courts, RTC’s and the
I.A.C., except in cases pending in the Supreme Court.— Beginning one month after
the promulgation of this Resolution, the rule shall be strictly enforced that no motion
for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration may be filed with
the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and the
Intermediate Appellate Court. Such a motion may be filed only in cases pending with
the Supreme Court as the court of last resort, which may in its sound discretion either
grant or deny the extension requested.
FACTS: Respondents have filed a motion for reconsideration of the Decision of the
Second Division of the Court promulgated on August 5, 1985 which granted the
petition for certiorari and prohibition and set aside the order of respondent Judge
granting private respondents' motion for new trial.
ISSUE: Whether the fifteen-day period within which a party may file a motion for
reconsideration of a final order or ruling of the Regional Trial Court may be extended.
RULING: YES
SINCE, the law and the Rules of Court do not expressly prohibit the filing of a motion
for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration of a final order or judgment.
The Court resolved that the interest of justice would be better served if the ruling in
the original decision IN THE CASE OF GIBS VS CFI (refer below) were applied
prospectively from the time herein stated. The reason is that it would be unfair to
deprive parties of their right to appeal simply because they availed themselves of a
procedure which was not expressly prohibited or allowed by the law or the Rules. On
the other hand, a motion for new trial or reconsideration is not a pre-requisite to an
appeal, a petition for review or a petition for review on certiorari, and since the
purpose of the amendments above referred to is to expedite the final disposition of
cases, a strict but prospective application of the said ruling is in order. Hence, for the
guidance of Bench and Bar, the Court restates and clarifies the rules on this point, as
follows:
1.) Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution(May 30, 1986), the
rule shall be strictly enforced that no motion for extension of time to file a motion for
new trial or reconsideration may be filed with the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial
Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and the Intermediate Appellate Court. Such a
motion may be filed only in cases pending with the Supreme Court as the court of last
resort, which may in its sound discretion either grant or deny the extension
requested.
2.) In appeals in special proceedings under Rule 109 of the Rules of Court and in
other cases wherein multiple appeals are allowed, a motion for extension of time to
file the record on appeal may be filed within the reglementary period of thirty (30)
days. If the court denies the motion for extension, the appeal must be taken within the
original period, inasmuch as such a motion does not suspend the period for appeal
.The trial court may grant said motion after the expiration of the period for appeal
provided it was filed within the original period.
All appeals heretofore timely taken, after extensions of time were granted for the filing
of a motion for new trial or reconsideration, shall be allowed and determined on the
merits.
(In the case of Gibbs vs. Court, of First Instance (80 Phil. 160), the Court dismissed
the petition for certiorari and ruled that the failure of defendant's attorney to file the
petition to set aside the judgment within the reglementary period was due to
excusable neglect, and, consequently, the record on appeal was allowed. The Court
did not rule that the motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or
reconsideration could not be granted.)
11 - NATIONAL COMMERCIAL BANK OF SAUDI ARABIA vs. COURT OF
APPEALS
Doctrine: The motion for reconsideration, however, being fatally defective for lack of
notice of hearing, cannot be cured by a belated filing of a notice of hearing.
Civil Procedure; Motions; The requirement of notice under Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15
in connection with Section 2, Rule 37 of the Revised Rules of Court is mandatory.—
The requirement of notice under Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 in connection with Section
2, Rule 37 of the Revised Rules of Court is mandatory. The absence of a notice of
hearing is fatal and, in cases of motions to reconsider a decision, the running of the
period to appeal is not tolled by their filing or pendency.
The motion for reconsideration, being fatally defective for lack of notice of hearing,
cannot be cured by a belated filing of a notice of hearing.
FACTS:
National Commercial Bank of Saudi Arabia (NCBSA) filed a case against Philippine
Banking Corporation in the RTC of Makati on December 4, 1985 to recover the
duplication in the payment of the proceeds of a letter of credit NCBSA has issued
because both the head office and regional office of PBC collected the proceeds of the
LOC.
The RTC rendered a decision in favor of NCBSA. PBC filed a motion for
reconsideration, however there was no notice of hearing. NCBSA filed a
manifestation pointing out the lack of notice of hearing. On September 27, 1993,
NCBSA filed a Motion for Writ of Execution of the decision of the trial court. On even
date, PBC filed a Motion to Set Motion for Reconsideration for Hearing. It was denied
by the RTC.
PBC filed another motion for reconsideration stating that the lack of notice was merely
due to an honest mistake by counsel. RTC denied the MR stating that there was no
compelling reason to warrant a liberal construction on the rules of motion. PBC
appealed to the CA which first affirmed the RTC. On PBC’s Motion for
Reconsideration, however, the Court of Appeals, by Amended Decision of March 8,
1996, set aside its February 27, 1995 Decision and granted PBC’s Petition for
Certiorari and directed the trial court to resolve PBC’s Motion for Reconsideration (of
the trial court’s August 24, 1993 Decision.
The CA stated that to deny the MR is too harsh an application of procedural rules
especially so when petitioner has filed a motion to set the motion for reconsideration
for hearing and had furnished private respondent a copy of the motion, a fact which is
not denied by the latter.
ISSUES: Whether the MR should be granted even though there was a lack of notice
of hearing.
RULING: NO.
The Motion for Reconsideration was merely Pro Forma.
The requirement of notice under Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 in connection with Section
2, Rule 37 of the Revised Rules of Court is mandatory. The absence of a notice of
hearing is fatal and, in cases of motions to reconsider a decision, the running of the
period to appeal is not tolled by their filing or pendency. In the case at bar, it is not
disputed that PBC’s Motion for Reconsideration of the August 24, 1993 decision of
the trial court did not contain the requisite notice of hearing
The motion for reconsideration, however, being fatally defective for lack of notice of
hearing, cannot be cured by a belated filing of a notice of hearing. More so in the
case at bar where the Motion to Set the Motion for Reconsideration was filed after the
expiration of the period for filing an appeal
PBC’s appeal for justice and fairness does not lie, however, there being nothing on
record to show that it has been a victim of injustice or unfairness. On the contrary, as
found by the Court of Appeals in its original decision, PBC had the opportunity to
participate in the trial and present its defense and had actually made full use of the
remedies under our rules of procedure. More importantly, there was no oppressive
exercise of judicial authority that would call for the annulment of the trial court’s
resolutions.
• The requirement of notice in this kind of motion is mandatory. The Motion for
Reconsideration thus remained a mere scrap of paper which deserved no
consideration.
• The Motion for Reconsideration was of PBC was only a rehash of its arguments
raised during trial before the RTC, namely:
• Prescription
• Laches
• Lack of double payment
DISPOSITION:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The
Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 8, 1996 is SET ASIDE.
12 - SECURITY BANK AND TRUST COMPANY vs. RODOLFO M. CUENCA
Motions for Reconsideration; Pleadings and Practice; A motion for reconsideration is
not pro forma just because it reiterated the arguments earlier passed upon and
rejected by the court.—Respondent contends that petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration of the CA Decision, in merely rehashing the arguments already
passed upon by the appellate court, was pro forma; that as such, it did not toll the
period for filing the present Petition for Review. Consequently, the Petition was filed
out of time. We disagree. A motion for reconsideration is not pro forma just because it
reiterated the arguments earlier passed upon and rejected by the appellate court. The
Court has explained that a movant may raise the same arguments, precisely to
convince the court that its ruling was erroneous.
Where the circumstances of a case do not show an intent on the part of the movant
merely to delay the proceedings, the Supreme Court has refused to characterize the
motion as simply pro forma.—There is no clear showing of intent on the part of
petitioner to delay the proceedings. In Marikina Valley Development Corporation vs.
Flojo, the Court explained that a pro forma motion had no other purpose than to gain
time and to delay or impede the proceedings. Hence, “where the circumstances of a
case do not show an intent on the part of the movant merely to delay the
proceedings, our Court has refused to characterize the motion as simply pro forma.” It
held: “We note finally that because the doctrine relating to pro forma motions for
reconsideration impacts upon the reality and substance of the statutory right of
appeal, that doctrine should be applied reasonably, rather than literally. The right to
appeal, where it exists, is an important and valuable right. Public policy would be
better served by according the appellate court an effective opportunity to review the
decision of the trial court on the merits, rather than by aborting the right to appeal by a
literal application of the procedural rules relating to pro forma motions for
reconsideration.”
FACTS:
Defendant-appellant Sta. Ines Melale (‘Sta. Ines’/SIMC) is a corporation engaged in
logging operations. It was a holder of a Timber License Agreement issued by the
DENR. On 10 November 1980, Security Bank and Trust Co. granted appellant Sta.
Ines a credit line in the amount of (P8,000,000.00) effective until November 30, 1981
to assist the latter in meeting the additional capitalization requirements of its logging
operations.
To secure payment, it executed a chattel mortgage over some of its machineries and
equipment. And as an additional security, its President and Chairman of the Board of
Directors Rodolfo Cuenca, executed an Indemnity agreement in favor of Security
Bank whereby he bound himself jointly and severally with Sta. Ines.
Thereafter, Cuenca resigned as President and Chairman of the Board of Directors of
defendant-appellant Sta. Ines. Subsequently, the shareholdings of Cuenca in Sta.
Ines were sold at a public auction to Adolfo Angala. Before and after this, Sta Ines
availed of its credit line.
Sta Ines encountered difficulty in making the amortization payments on its loans and
requested SBTC for a complete restructuring of its indebtedness. SBTC
accommodated SIMC’s request and signified its approval in a letter dated 18
February 1988 wherein SBTC and Sta. Ines, without notice to or the prior consent of ]
Cuenca, agreed to restructure the past due obligations of defendant-appellant Sta.
Ines. To formalize their agreement to restructure the loan obligations of Sta. Ines,
Security Bank and Sta. Ines executed a Loan Agreement dated 31 October 1989 ‘
Sta Ines made payments up to (P1,757,000.00) The defaulted in the payment of its
restructured loan obligations to SBTC despite demands made upon appellant SIMC
and CUENCA,
SBTC filed a complaint for collection of sum of resulting after trial on the merits in a
decision by the court a quo, from which Cuenca appealed
CA: Released Cuenca from liability because 1989 Loan Agreement novated the 1980
credit accommodation which extinguished the Indemnity Agreement for which Cuenca
was liable solidarily. No notice/consent to restructure. Since with expiration date,
liable only up to that date and up to that amount (8M). Amounted to extension.of time
with no notice to surety therefore released from liability.
A motion fro Reconsideration thereafter was filed but was later on dismissed for being
pro forma.
ISSUE: Whether the petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was pro forma
RULING: NO.
The court found no adequate reason to reject the contention of petitioner and thereby
deprive it of the opportunity to fully argue its cause.
Respondent contends that petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration of the CA Decision,
in merely rehashing the arguments already passed upon by the appellate court, was
pro forma; that as such, it did not toll the period for filing the present Petition for
Review. Consequently, the Petition was filed out of time.
We disagree. A motion for reconsideration is not pro forma just because it reiterated
the arguments earlier passed upon and rejected by the appellate court. The Court has
explained that a movant may raise the same arguments, precisely to convince the
court that its ruling was erroneous.
Moreover, there is no clear showing of intent on the part of petitioner to delay the
proceedings. The Court explained that a pro forma motion had no other purpose than
to gain time and to delay or impede the proceedings. Hence, “where the
circumstances of a case do not show an intent on the part of the movant merely to
delay the proceedings, our Court has refused to characterize the motion as simply pro
forma.
Respondent maintains that the present Petition for Review does not contain a
sufficient written explanation why it was served by registered mail. In this case, the
Petition does state that it was served on the respective counsels of Sta. Ines and
Cuenca “by registered mail in lieu of personal service due to limitations in time and
distance.” This explanation sufficiently shows that personal service was not
practicable. In any event, we find no adequate reason to reject the contention of
petitioner and thereby deprive it of the opportunity to fully argue its cause.
13 - ELIZABETH M. GAGUI vs. SIMEON DEJERO and TEODORO R. PERMEJO
Civil Procedure; Appeals; Fresh Period Rule; To standardize the appeal periods
provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the
Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the
notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order
dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.―We agree with
petitioner that starting from the date she received the Resolution denying her Motion
for Reconsideration, she had a “fresh period” of 15 days within which to appeal to this
Court. The matter has already been settled in Neypes v. Court of Appeals, 469 SCRA
633 (2005), as follows: To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and
to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to
allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional
Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or
motion for reconsideration. Henceforth, this “fresh period rule” shall also apply to Rule
40 governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts;
Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals;
Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45
governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The new rule aims to regiment
or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying
the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final
order or resolution. Since petitioner received the CA Resolution denying her two
Motions for Reconsideration only on 16 March 2011, she had another 15 days within
which to file her Petition, or until 31 March 2011. This Petition, filed on 30 March
2011, fell within the prescribed 15-day period.
Civil Procedure; Judgments; Immutability of Judgments; Once a decision or order
becomes final and executory, it is removed from the power or jurisdiction of the court
which rendered it to further alter or amend it. It thereby becomes immutable and
unalterable and any amendment or alteration which substantially affects a final and
executory judgment is null and void for lack of jurisdiction, including the entire
proceedings held for that purpose.
FACTS: On 14 December 1993, respondents Simeon Dejero and Teodoro Permejo
filed separate Complaints for illegal dismissal, nonpayment of salaries and overtime
pay, refund of transportation expenses, damages, and attorney fees against PRO
Agency Manila, Inc., and Abdul Rahman Al Mahwes.
The Labor Arbiter Pedro Ramos rendered a decision ordering respondents Pro Agecy
Manila Inc., and Abdul Rahman Al Mahwes to pay complainants. The LA also issued
a Writ of Execution. When the writ was returned unsatisfied, an Alias Writ of
Execution was issued, but was also returned unsatisfied.
Respondents filed a Motion to Implead Respondent Pro Agency Manila, Inc.
Corporate Officers and Directors as Judgment Debtor. It included petitioner as the
Vice-president/Stockholder/Director of PRO Agenct, Manila, Inc. The LA granted the
motion.
Upon appeal, NLRC denied the appeal for lack of merit. NLRC ruled that in so far as
overseas migrant workers are concerned, it is R.A. 8042 itself that describes the
nature of the liability of the corporation and its officers and directors. It is not essential
that the individual officers and directors be impleaded as party respondents to the
case instituted by the worker. A finding of liability on the part of the corporation will
necessarily mean the liability of the corporate officers or directors.
The CA affirmed the NLRC decision. The two Motions for Reconsideration were
denied.
On 1 August 2011, respondents filed their Comment, alleging that the petition had
been filed 15 days after the prescriptive period of appeal under Section 2, Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court. On 14 February 2012, petitioner filed a Reply, countering that she
has a fresh period of 15 days from 16 March 2011 (the date she received the
Resolution of the CA) or up to 31 March 2011 to file the Petition.
Hence, this Petition for Review filed on 30 March 2011.
ISSUE: Whether the petitioner has a fresh period of 15 days within which to file a
petition in accordance with the Neypes Rule.
RULING: YES
In a misleading attempt to discredit this petition, respondents insist that by opting to
file a Motion for Reconsideration instead of directly appealing the CA Decision,
petitioner effectively lost her right to appeal. Hence, she should have sought an
extension of time to file her appeal from the denial of her motion.
This contention, however, deserves scant consideration. We agree with petitioner that
starting from the date she received the Resolution denying her Motion for
Reconsideration, she had a “fresh period” of 15 days within which to appeal to this
Court. The matter has already been settled in Neypes v. Court of Appeals.
The court in Neypes case established to standardize the appeal periods provided in
the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court
deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of
appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a
motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.
Henceforth, this “fresh period rule” shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from
the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review
from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from
quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by
certiorari to the Supreme Court. The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal
period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new
trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution.
Since petitioner received the CA Resolution denying her two Motions for
Reconsideration only on 16 March 2011, she had another 15 days within which to file
her Petition, or until 31 March 2011. This Petition, filed on 30 March 2011, fell within
the prescribed 15-day period.
14 - ESQUIVEL vs ALEGRE
Civil Procedure; Judgments; Difference between an amended judgment and a
supplemental judgment.––– There is a difference between an amended judgment and
a supplemental judgment. In an amended and clarified judgment, the lower court
makes a thorough study of the original judgment and renders the amended and
clarified judgment only after considering all the factual and legal issues. The amended
and clarified decision is an entirely new decision which supersedes the original
decision (Magdalena Estate, Inc. v. Caluag, 11 SCRA 333 [1964]; Sta. Romana v.
Lacson, 104 SCRA 93 [1981]). Following the Court’s differentiation of a supplemental
pleading from an amending pleading, it can be said that a supplemental decision
does not take the place or extinguish the existence of the original. As its very name
denotes, it only serves to bolster or add something to the primary decision. A
supplement exists side by side with the original. It does not replace that which it
supplements
The supplemental decision in case at bar cannot stand alone as a judgment on the
merits as there was no declaration of the respective rights of the parties.–––In the
instant case no restudy was made by respondent court of the original decision but
only on the issues raised in the supplemental complaint. The supplemental decision
cannot stand alone as a judgment on the merits as there was no declaration of the
respective rights and duties of the parties. It only declared the supplemental
defendants as successors-in-interest of the defendants in the original complaint,
“such that whatever is the result of the appealed case shall be legally binding upon
them . . .”
Execution; After a decision became final and executory, the prevailing party is entitled
as a matter of right to a writ of execution the issuance of which is a ministerial duty
compellable by mandamus; The writ of execution must conform to the judgment to be
executed.
FACTS: In the action of ejectment petitioners secured a judgment ordering
respondents to vacate a parcel of land situated in Legaspi City. In said ejectment
case, respondents claimed prior and continued possession of the land in question,
and with respect to Original Certificate of Title No. 28 of the Register of Deeds of
Legaspi City on which petitioners based their action, respondents alleged that the
same was secured through fraud.
Upon this decision being appealed to the Court of First Instance, the same was
affirmed, the court holding that the evidence of prior possession in favor of petitioners
was so strong that the action for annulment of petitioner’s title was only a mere weak
attempt to annul an existing certificate of title in favor of which the presumption of law
is clearly on its side. Eventually, this decision of the Court of First Instance was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Respondents’ attempt to have the case appealed to
the Supreme Court did not prosper, and so, the ejectment decision became final and
executory.”
City Court of Legaspi ordered the issuance of a writ of execution for the enforcement
of its judgment. However, before the decision could be executed, petitioners, the
spouses Cresenciana Atun and Lamberto Esquivel filed against respondents or
reconveyance with nullity of judgment, damages and preliminary injunction, before the
Court of First Instance of Albay. The preliminary injunction was initially granted but
was later on dissolved.
A supplemental complaint was later on filed which was ruled upon by the trial court
which allegedly modified the original decision according to the petitioners.
Petitioners claim that the decision of respondent court in the supplemental complaint
revised the decision in the original complaint tantamount to an amendment or reversal
of said original decision of respondent court penned by a previous presiding judge.
ISSUE: Whether the decision upon the supplemental complaint is tantamount to the
amendment of the original decision.
RULING. NO.
There is a difference between an amended judgment and a supplemental judgment.
In an amended and clarified judgment, the lower court makes a thorough study of the
original judgment and renders the amended and clarified judgment only after
considering all the factual and legal issues. The amended and clarified decision is an
entirely new decision which supersedes the original decision. Following the Court’s
differentiation of a supplemental pleading from an amending pleading, it can be said
that a supplemental decision does not take the place or extinguish the existence of
the original. As its very name denotes, it only serves to bolster or adds something to
the primary decision. A supplement exists side by side with the original. It does not
replace that which it supplements.
In the instant case no restudy was made by respondent court of the original decision
but only on the issues raised in the supplemental complaint. The supplemental
decision cannot stand alone as a judgment on the merits as there was no declaration
of the respective rights and duties of the parties. It only declared the supplemental
defendants as successors-in-interest of the defendants in the original complaint,
“such that whatever is the result of the appealed case shall be legally binding upon
them.

It must be pointed out that the dispositive portion itself of the supplemental decision is
clear and unambiguous. It does not make any declaration or pronouncement that may
be taken to have revised or amended the original decision. All that it declares is that
the supplemental defendants Wilfredo Encinas and Patrocinia Dasmarinas are
successors-in-interest of defendants Teotimo Alaurin and Visitacion Magno such that
whatever is the result of the appealed case shall be legally binding upon them.