1. Tamano vs.
s. Ortiz, 291 SCRA 584 the Court of Appeals granted, to resolve the Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage ahead
[G.R. No. 126603. June 29, 1998]
ESTRELLITA J. TAMANO, petitioner, vs. HON. RODOLFO A. ORTIZ, Presiding Judge, RTC-Br.
89, Quezon City, HAJA PUTRI ZORAYDA A. TAMANO, ADIB A. TAMANO and the
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the decision of the
Court of Appeals of 30 September 1996 in CA-G.R. SP. No. 39656 which affirmed the decision of
the Regional Trial Court-Br. 89, Quezon City, denying the motion to dismiss as well as the motion
for reconsideration filed by petitioner Estrellita J. Tamano.
On 31 May 1958 Senator Mamintal Abdul Jabar Tamano (Tamano) married private
respondent Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda) in civil rites. Their marriage supposedly
remained valid and subsisting until his death on 18 May 1994. Prior to his death, particularly on 2
June 1993, Tamano also married petitioner Estrellita J. Tamano (Estrellita) in civil rites in
Malabang, Lanao del Sur.
On 23 November 1994 private respondent Zorayda joined by her son Adib A. Tamano (Adib)
filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage of Tamano and Estrellita on the ground that
it was bigamous. They contended that Tamano and Estrellita misrepresented themselves
as divorced and single, respectively, thus making the entries in the marriage contract false and
fraudulent.
Private respondents alleged that Tamano never divorced Zorayda and that Estrellita was
not single when she married Tamano as the decision annulling her previous marriage with Romeo
C. Llave never became final and executory for non-compliance with publication requirements.
Estrellita filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City was
without jurisdiction over the subject and nature of the action. She alleged that "only a party to the
[1]
marriage" could file an action for annulment of marriage against the other spouse, hence, it was
only Tamano who could file an action for annulment of their marriage. Petitioner likewise
contended that since Tamano and Zorayda were both Muslims and married in Muslim rites the
jurisdiction to hear and try the instant case was vested in the sharia courts pursuant to Art. 155 of
the Code of Muslim Personal Laws.
The lower court denied the motion to dismiss and ruled that the instant case was properly
cognizable by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City since Estrellita and Tamano were married
[2]
in accordance with the Civil Code and not exclusively in accordance with PD No. 1083 or
the Code of Muslim Personal laws. The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied; hence,
petitioner filed the instant petition with this Court seeking to set aside the 18 July 1995 order of
respondent presiding judge of the RTC-Br. 89, Quezon City, denying petitioners motion to dismiss
and the 22 August 1995 order denying reconsideration thereof.
In a Resolution dated 13 December 1995 we referred the case to the Court of Appeals for
consolidation with G.R. No. 118371. Zorayda and Adib A. Tamano however filed a motion, which
of the other consolidated cases.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the instant case would fall under the exclusive jurisdiction
of sharia courts only when filed in places where there are shariacourts. But in places where there
are no sharia courts, like Quezon City, the instant case could properly be filed before the Regional
Trial Court.
Petitioner is now before us reiterating her earlier argument that it is the sharia court and not
the Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction over the subject and nature of the action.
[3]
Under The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, Regional Trial Courts have jurisdiction
[4]
over all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital relations. Personal actions, such
as the instant complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage, may be commenced and tried where
the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal
[5]
defendants resides, at the election of the plaintiff. There should be no question by now that what
determines the nature of an action and correspondingly the court which has jurisdiction over it are
[6]
the allegations made by the plaintiff in this case. In the complaint for declaration of nullity of
marriage filed by private respondents herein, it was alleged that Estrellita and Tamano were
married in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code. Never was it mentioned that Estrellita
and Tamano were married under Muslim laws or PD No. 1083. Interestingly, Estrellita never stated
in her Motion to Dismiss that she and Tamano were married under Muslim laws. That she was in
fact married to Tamano under Muslim laws was first mentioned only in her Motion for
Reconsideration.
Nevertheless, the Regional Trial Court was not divested of jurisdiction to hear and try the
instant case despite the allegation in the Motion for Reconsideration that Estrellita and Tamano
were likewise married in Muslim rites. This is because a courts jurisdiction cannot be made to
depend upon defenses set up in the answer, in a motion to dismiss, or in a motion for
[7]
reconsideration, but only upon the allegations of the complaint. Jurisdiction over the subject
matter of a case is determined from the allegations of the complaint as the latter comprises a
[8]
concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiffs causes of action.
Petitioner argues that the sharia courts have jurisdiction over the instant suit pursuant to Art.
[9]
13, Title II, PD No. 1083, which provides -
Art. 13. Application. - (1) The provisions of this Title shall apply to marriage and divorce
wherein both parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the
marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the
Philippines.
(2) In case of a marriage between a Muslim and a non-Muslim, solemnized not in
accordance with Muslim law or this Code, the Civil Code of the Philippines shall apply.
(3) Subject to the provisions of the preceding paragraphs, the essential requisites and
legal impediments to marriage, divorce, paternity and filiation, guardianship and
custody of minors, support and maintenance, claims for customary dower (mahr),
betrothal, breach of contract to marry, solemnization and registration of marriage and
divorce, rights and obligations between husband and wife, parental authority, and the
property relations between husband and wife shall be governed by this Code and other
applicable Muslim laws.
As alleged in the complaint, petitioner and Tamano were married in accordance with the
Civil Code. Hence, contrary to the position of petitioner, the Civil Code is applicable in the instant
case. Assuming that indeed petitioner and Tamano were likewise married under Muslim laws, the
same would still fall under the general original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts.
Article 13 of PD No. 1083 does not provide for a situation where the parties were married
both in civil and Muslim rites. Consequently, the sharia courts are not vested with original
and exclusive jurisdiction when it comes to marriages celebrated under both civil and Muslim
laws. Consequently, the Regional Trial Courts are not divested of their general original jurisdiction
under Sec. 19, par. (6) of BP Blg. 129 which provides -

Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. - Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction: x x x (6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any
court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions x x x x

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals
sustaining the 18 July 1995 and 22 August 1995 orders of the Regional Trial Court - Br. 89, Quezon
City, denying the motion to dismiss and reconsideration thereof, is AFFIRMED. Let the records of
this case be immediately remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings until terminated.

SO ORDERED.
 2. Domagas vs. Jensen, 448 SCRA 663
G.R. No. 158407 January 17, 2005
FILOMENA DOMAGAS, petitioner,
vs.
VIVIAN LAYNO JENSEN, respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
1
This is a petition for review on certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, of the Decision of
2
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 73995, which affirmed the Decision of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City, Branch 44, in Civil Case No. 2000-0244-D, which declared null
and void the decision of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Calasiao, Pangasinan in Civil Case
3
No. 879.
The antecedent facts follow.
On February 19, 1999, petitioner Filomena Domagas filed a complaint for forcible entry against
respondent Vivian Jensen before the MTC of Calasiao, Pangasinan. The petitioner alleged in her
complaint that she was the registered owner of a parcel of land covered by Original Certificate of
Title (OCT) No. P-30980, situated in Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan, and with an area
of 827 square meters. On January 9, 1999 the respondent, by means of force, strategy and stealth,
gained entry into the petitioner’s property by excavating a portion thereof and thereafter
constructing a fence thereon. As such, the petitioner was deprived of a 68-square meter portion
of her property along the boundary line. The petitioner prayed that, after due proceedings,
judgment be rendered in her favor, thus:
3. And, after trial, judgment be rendered:
a) DECLARING the writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and Writ of Preliminary
Injunction permanent;
b) ORDERING defendant, his representatives, agents and persons acting under her, to
vacate the portion of the property of the plaintiff occupied by them and to desist from
entering, excavating and constructing in the said property of the plaintiff described in
paragraph 2 hereof and/or from disturbing the peaceful ownership and possession of
the plaintiff over the said land, pending the final resolution of the instant action;
c) ORDERING defendant to pay reasonable rental at FIVE THOUSAND (₱5,000.00)
PESOS per month from January 9, 1999 up to the time she finally vacates and removes
all constructions made by her in the property of the plaintiff and up to the time she finally
restores the said property in the condition before her illegal entry, excavation and
construction in the property of the plaintiff;
d) ORDERING defendant to pay actual damages in the amount of TWENTY
THOUSAND (₱20,000.00) PESOS; moral damages in the amount of TWENTY
THOUSAND (₱20,000.00) PESOS; attorney’s fees of THIRTY THOUSAND
(₱30,000.00) PESOS in retainer’s fee and ONE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED
(₱1,500.00) PESOS per court appearance fee; exemplary damages in the amount of
TWENTY THOUSAND (₱20,000.00) PESOS, and, costs.
4
Plaintiff further prays for other reliefs and remedies just and equitable in the premises.
The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 879. The summons and the complaint were not served
on the respondent because the latter was apparently out of the country. This was relayed to the
Sheriff by her (the respondent’s) brother, Oscar Layno, who was then in the respondent’s house
at No. 572 Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan. The Sheriff left the summons and complaint
5
with Oscar Layno, who received the same.
Nonetheless, on May 17, 1999, the court rendered judgment ordering the respondent and all
persons occupying the property for and in the latter’s behalf to vacate the disputed area and to
pay monthly rentals therefor, including actual damages, attorney’s fees, and exemplary damages.
The fallo of the decision reads:
1) Ordering the defendant, her representatives, agents and persons acting under her,
to vacate the 68-square meters which she encroached upon;
2) Ordering the defendant to pay a monthly rental of ₱1,000.00 to the plaintiff;
3) To pay plaintiff actual damages of ₱20,000.00; attorney’s fees of ₱15,000.00 and
exemplary damages in the amount of ₱20,000.00 plus the costs.
6
SO ORDERED.
The respondent failed to appeal the decision. Consequently, a writ of execution was issued on
September 27, 1999.
On August 16, 2000, the respondent filed a complaint against the petitioner before the RTC of
Dagupan City for the annulment of the decision of the MTC in Civil Case No. 879, on the ground
that due to the Sheriff’s failure to serve the complaint and summons on her because she was in
Oslo, Norway, the MTC never acquired jurisdiction over her person. The respondent alleged
therein that the service of the complaint and summons through substituted service on her brother,
Oscar Layno, was improper because of the following: (a) when the complaint in Civil Case No.
879 was filed, she was not a resident of Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan, but of Oslo,
Norway, and although she owned the house where Oscar Layno received the summons and the
complaint, she had then leased it to Eduardo Gonzales; (b) she was in Oslo, Norway, at the time
the summons and the complaint were served; (c) her brother, Oscar Layno, was merely visiting
her house in Barangay Buenlag and was not a resident nor an occupant thereof when he received
the complaint and summons; and (d) Oscar Layno was never authorized to receive the summons
and the complaint for and in her behalf.
7
The respondent further alleged that the MTC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
complaint in Civil Case No. 879 because the petitioner, the plaintiff therein, failed to show prior
possession of the property. She further claimed that the alleged forcible entry was simply based
on the result of the survey conducted by Geodetic Engineer Leonardo de Vera showing that the
property of the respondent encroached on that of the petitioner.
The respondent filed a Manifestation dated August 31, 2000, and appended thereto the following:
8 9
(a) a copy of her passport showing that she left the country on February 17, 1999; (b) a copy of
the Contract of Lease dated November 24, 1997, executed by her and Eduardo D. Gonzales over
 10
her house for a period of three (3) years or until November 24, 2000; (c) her affidavit stating, inter
alia, that she owned the house at Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan, which she leased to
Eduardo Gonzales; that she was married to Jarl Jensen, a citizen of Norway, on August 23, 1987
and had resided in Norway with her husband since 1993; that she arrived in the Philippines on
December 31, 1998, but left on February 17, 1999; she returned to the Philippines on July 30,
2000 and learned, only then, of the complaint against her and the decision of the MTC in Civil
Case No. 879; her brother Oscar Layno was not a resident of the house at Barangay Buenlag;
11
and that she never received the complaint and summons in said case; (d) the affidavit of Oscar
Layno declaring that sometime in April 1999, he was in the respondent’s house to collect rentals
from Eduardo Gonzales; that the Sheriff arrived and served him with a copy of the summons and
the complaint in Civil Case No. 879; and that he never informed the respondent of his receipt of
12
the said summons and complaint; (e) an affidavit of Eduardo Gonzales stating that he leased the
house of the respondent and resided thereat; the respondent was not a resident of the said house
although he (Gonzales) allowed the respondent to occupy a room therein whenever she returned
to the Philippines as a balikbayan; and that Oscar Layno was not residing therein but only collected
the rentals.
In her answer to the complaint, the petitioner alleged that the respondent was a resident of
Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan and was the owner of the subject premises where
Oscar Layno was when the Sheriff served the summons and complaint; that the service of the
complaint and summons by substituted service on the respondent, the defendant in Civil Case No.
879, was proper since her brother Oscar Layno, a resident and registered voter of Barangay.
Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan, received the complaint and summons for and in her behalf.
13
The petitioner appended the following to her answer: (a) a copy of the Deed of Absolute Sale
executed by Jose Layno in her favor, dated August 26, 1992, showing that the respondent was a
14
resident of Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan; (b) a Real Estate Mortgage executed by
the respondent, dated February 9, 1999 showing that she was a resident of Barangay Buenlag,
15
Calasiao, Pangasinan; (c) the Joint Affidavit of Vicenta Peralta and Orlando Macalanda, both
residents of Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan, declaring that the respondent and her
brother Oscar Layno were their neighbors; that the respondent and her brother had been residents
of Barangay Buenlag since their childhood; that although the respondent left the country on several
occasions, she returned to the Philippines and resided in her house at No. 572 located in the said
16
barangay; and (d) the Voter’s Registration Record of Oscar Layno, approved on June 15, 1997.
After due proceedings, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of the respondent. The
dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of plaintiff Vivian Layno Jensen and against
defendant Filomena Domagas, as follows:
1. The Decision of the Municipal Trial Court of Calasiao, Pangasinan in Civil Case No.
879, entitled Filomena Domagas versus Vivian Layno Jensen is declared null and void,
for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff and the subject matter.
2. Defendant Filomena Domagas is ordered to pay plaintiff, the following:
a.) Actual damages, representing litigation expenses in the amount of
₱50,000.00;
b.) Attorney’s fees in the amount of ₱50,000.00;
c.) Moral Damages in the amount of ₱50,000.00;
d.) Exemplary Damages in the amount of ₱50,000.00; and
e.) Costs of suit.
17
SO ORDERED.
The trial court declared that there was no valid service of the complaint and summons on the
respondent, the defendant in Civil Case No. 879, considering that she left the Philippines on
February 17, 1999 for Oslo, Norway, and her brother Oscar Layno was never authorized to receive
the said complaint and summons for and in her behalf.
The petitioner appealed the decision to the CA which, on May 6, 2003, rendered judgment
affirming the appealed decision with modifications. The CA ruled that the complaint in Civil Case
No. 879 was one for ejectment, which is an action quasi in rem. The appellate court ruled that
since the defendant therein was temporarily out of the country, the summons and the complaint
should have been served via extraterritorial service under Section 15 in relation to Section 16,
Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, which likewise requires prior leave of court. Considering that there
was no prior leave of court and none of the modes of service prescribed by the Rules of Court was
followed by the petitioner, the CA concluded that there was really no valid service of summons
and complaint upon the respondent, the defendant in Civil Case No. 879.
Hence, the present petition.
The petitioner assails the decision of the CA, alleging that the appellate court erred in holding that
the respondent’s complaint for ejectment is an action quasi in rem. The petitioner insists that the
complaint for forcible entry is an action in personam; therefore, substituted service of the summons
and complaint on the respondent, in accordance with Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, is
valid. The petitioner, likewise, asserts that Oscar Layno is a resident and a registered voter of
Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan; hence, the service of the complaint and summons on
the respondent through him is valid.
The respondent, on the other hand, asserts that the action for forcible entry filed against her was
an action quasi in rem, and that the applicable provision of the Rules of Court is Section 15 of Rule
14, which calls for extraterritorial service of summons.
The sole issue is whether or not there was a valid service of the summons and complaint in Civil
Case No. 879 on the respondent herein who was the defendant in the said case. The resolution
of the matter is anchored on the issue of whether or not the action of the petitioner in the MTC
against the respondent herein is an action in personam or quasi in rem.
The ruling of the CA that the petitioner’s complaint for forcible entry of the petitioner against the
respondent in Civil Case No. 879 is an action quasi in rem, is erroneous. The action of the
petitioner for forcible entry is a real action and one in personam.
18
The settled rule is that the aim and object of an action determine its character. Whether a
proceeding is in rem, or in personam, or quasi in rem for that matter, is determined by its nature
19
and purpose, and by these only. A proceeding in personam is a proceeding to enforce personal
rights and obligations brought against the person and is based on the jurisdiction of the person,
although it may involve his right to, or the exercise of ownership of, specific property, or seek to
20
compel him to control or dispose of it in accordance with the mandate of the court. The purpose
of a proceeding in personam is to impose, through the judgment of a court, some responsibility or
21
liability directly upon the person of the defendant. Of this character are suits to compel a
22
defendant to specifically perform some act or actions to fasten a pecuniary liability on him. An
action in personam is said to be one which has for its object a judgment against the person, as
distinguished from a judgment against the propriety to determine its state. It has been held that an
action in personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights or obligations; such action is brought
against the person. As far as suits for injunctive relief are concerned, it is well-settled that it is an
23 24
injunctive act in personam. In Combs v. Combs, the appellate court held that proceedings to
enforce personal rights and obligations and in which personal judgments are rendered adjusting
the rights and obligations between the affected parties is in personam. Actions for recovery of real
25
property are in personam.
On the other hand, a proceeding quasi in rem is one brought against persons seeking to subject
26
the property of such persons to the discharge of the claims assailed. In an action quasi in rem,
an individual is named as defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interests
27
therein to the obligation or loan burdening the property. Actions quasi in rem deal with the status,
ownership or liability of a particular property but which are intended to operate on these questions
only as between the particular parties to the proceedings and not to ascertain or cut off the rights
or interests of all possible claimants. The judgments therein are binding only upon the parties who
28
joined in the action.
Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. - Subject to the provisions of the next
succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or building in force,
intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom
the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of
the right to hold possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal
representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any time
within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in
the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving
of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such
possession, together with damages and costs.
Under Section 15, Rule 70 of the said Rule, the plaintiff may be granted a writ of preliminary
prohibition or mandatory injunction:
Sec. 15. Preliminary Injunction. – The court may grant preliminary injunction, in accordance with
the provisions of Rule 58 hereof, to prevent the defendant from committing further acts of
dispossession against the plaintiff.
A possessor deprived of his possession through forcible entry or unlawful detainer may, within five
(5) days from the filing of the complaint, present a motion in the action for forcible entry or unlawful
detainer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to restore him in his
possession. The court shall decide the motion within thirty (30) days from the filing thereof.
If, after due proceedings, the trial court finds for the plaintiff, it shall then render judgment in his or
her favor, thus:
Sec. 17. Judgment. – If, after trial, the court finds that the allegations of the complaint are true, it
shall render judgment in favor of the plaintiff for the restitution of the premises, the sum justly due
as arrears of rent or as reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the premises,
attorney’s fees and costs. If it finds that said allegations are not true, it shall render judgment for
the defendant to recover his costs. If a counterclaim is established, the court shall render judgment
for the sum found in arrears from either party and award costs as justice requires.
From the aforementioned provisions of the Rules of Court and by its very nature and purpose, an
action for unlawful detainer or forcible entry is a real action and in personam because the plaintiff
seeks to enforce a personal obligation or liability on the defendant under Article 539 of the New
29
Civil Code, for the latter to vacate the property subject of the action, restore physical possession
thereof to the plaintiff, and pay actual damages by way of reasonable compensation for his use or
30
occupation of the property.
As gleaned from the averments of the petitioner’s complaint in the MTC, she sought a writ of a
preliminary injunction from the MTC and prayed that the said writ be made permanent. Under its
decision, the MTC ordered the defendant therein (the respondent in this case), to vacate the
property and pay a "monthly rental" of ₱1,000.00 to the plaintiff therein (the petitioner in this case).
On the issue of whether the respondent was validly served with the summons and complaint by
the Sheriff on April 5, 1999, the petitioner asserts that since her action of forcible entry against the
respondent in Civil Case No. 879 was in personam, summons may be served on the respondent,
by substituted service, through her brother, Oscar Layno, in accordance with Section 7, Rule 14
of the Rules of Court. The petitioner avers that Oscar Layno, a person of suitable age and
discretion, was residing in the house of the respondent on April 5, 1999. She avers that the fact
that the house was leased to and occupied by Eduardo Gonzales was of no moment. Moreover,
the Sheriff is presumed to have performed his duty of properly serving the summons on the
respondent by substituted service.
The contention of the petitioner has no merit.
31
In Asiavest Limited v. Court of Appeals , the Court had the occasion to state:
In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary for the court
to validly try and decide the case. Jurisdiction over the person of a resident defendant who does
not voluntarily appear in court can be acquired by personal service of summons as provided under
Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. If he cannot be personally served with summons within
a reasonable time, substituted service may be made in accordance with Section 8 of said Rule. If
he is temporarily out of the country, any of the following modes of service may be resorted to: (a)
substituted service set forth in Section 8; (2) personal service outside the country, with leave of
court; (3) service by publication, also with leave of court; or (4) any other manner the court may
32
deem sufficient.
Thus, any judgment of the court which has no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is null
33
and void.
In the present case, the records show that the respondent, before and after his marriage to Jarl
Jensen on August 23, 1987, remained a resident of Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan.
This can be gleaned from the Deed of Absolute Sale dated August 26, 1992 in which she declared
that she was a resident of said barangay. Moreover, in the Real Estate Mortgage Contract dated
February 9, 1999, ten days before the complaint in Civil Case No. 879 was filed, the petitioner
categorically stated that she was a Filipino and a resident of Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao,
Pangasinan. Considering that the respondent was in Oslo, Norway, having left the Philippines on
February 17, 1999, the summons and complaint in Civil Case No. 879 may only be validly served
on her through substituted service under Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
SEC. 7. Substituted service. — If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a
reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving
copies of the summons at the defendant’s residence with some person of suitable age and
discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant’s office or regular place
of business with some competent person in charge thereof.
Strict compliance with the mode of service is required in order that the court may acquire
34
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. The statutory requirement of substituted service
must be followed faithfully and strictly and any substituted service other than that authorized by
35 36
the statute is rendered ineffective. As the Court held in Hamilton v. Levy :
In sum, then, the respondent was not validly served with summons and the complaint in Civil Case
No. 879 on April 5, 1999, by substituted service. Hence, the MTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over
the person of the respondent; as such, the decision of the MTC in Civil Case No. 879 is null and
void.

… The pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to the service of summons must be stated in IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. No costs.
the proof of service or Officer’s Return; otherwise, any substituted service made in lieu of personal
service cannot be upheld. This is necessary because substituted service is in derogation of the
SO ORDERED.
usual method of service. It is a method extraordinary in character and hence may be used only as
prescribed and in the circumstances authorized by statute. Here, no such explanation was made.
Failure to faithfully, strictly, and fully comply with the requirements of substituted service renders
37
said service ineffective.

38
In Keister v. Narcereo, the Court held that the term "dwelling house" or "residence" are generally
held to refer to the time of service; hence, it is not sufficient to leave the summons at the former’s
dwelling house, residence or place of abode, as the case may be. Dwelling house or residence
refers to the place where the person named in the summons is living at the time when the service
is made, even though he may be temporarily out of the country at the time. It is, thus, the service
of the summons intended for the defendant that must be left with the person of suitable age and
discretion residing in the house of the defendant. Compliance with the rules regarding the service
39
of summons is as much important as the issue of due process as of jurisdiction.

The Return of Service filed by Sheriff Eduardo J. Abulencia on the service of summons reads:

Respectfully returned to the court of origin the herein summons and enclosures in the above-
entitled case, the undersigned caused the service on April 5, 1999.

Defendant Vivian Layno Jensen is out of the country as per information from her brother Oscar
Layno, however, copy of summons and enclosures was received by her brother Oscar Layno on
April 5, 1999 as evidenced by his signature appearing in the original summons.

Calasiao, Pangasinan, April 6, 1999.

(Sgd.)
EDUARDO J. ABULENCIA

40
Junior Process Server

As gleaned from the said return, there is no showing that as of April 5, 1999, the house where the
Sheriff found Oscar Layno was the latter’s residence or that of the respondent herein. Neither is
there any showing that the Sheriff tried to ascertain where the residence of the respondent was
on the said date. It turned out that the occupant of the house was a lessor, Eduardo Gonzales,
and that Oscar Layno was in the premises only to collect the rentals from him. The service of the
summons on a person at a place where he was a visitor is not considered to have been left at the
residence or place or abode, where he has another place at which he ordinarily stays and to which
41
he intends to return.

The Voter’s Registration Record of Oscar Layno dated June 15, 1997 wherein he declared that
he was a resident of No. 572 Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan, as well as the Joint
Affidavit of Vicenta Peralta and Orlando Macasalda cannot prevail over the Contract of Lease the
respondent had executed in favor of Eduardo Gonzales showing that the latter had resided and
occupied the house of the respondent as lessee since November 24, 1997, and the affidavit of
Eduardo Gonzales that Oscar Layno was not residing in the said house on April 5, 1999.

3. Yu vs. Pacleb, 580 SCRA 197
G.R. No. 130316 January 24, 2007
ERNESTO V. YU and ELSIE O. YU, Petitioners,
vs.
1
BALTAZAR PACLEB, Respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
The present petition filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court originated from an action for forcible
entry and damages filed by petitioners Ernesto and Elsie Yu against respondent Baltazar Pacleb.
The antecedent facts follow.
Sometime in September 1992, Ruperto Javier allegedly offered to sell Lot No. 6853-D to
petitioners for P75 per sq.m.lawphil.net The lot was approximately 18,000 square meters and was
located in Barangay Langkaan, Dasmariñas, Cavite. Javier supposedly purchased the lot from
one Rebecca del Rosario who, in turn, acquired it from respondent and his wife. The title of the
property (Transfer Certificate of Title [TCT] No. T-118375), however, remained in the names of
respondent and his wife. The instruments in support of the series of alleged sales were not
registered.
On September 11, 1992, petitioners accepted the offer and gave Javier P200,000 as
downpayment for the lot. Javier then delivered his supposed muniments of title to petitioners. After
the execution of a contract to sell, he formally turned over the property to petiti oners.
At the time of the turn-over, a portion of the lot was occupied by Ramon C. Pacleb, respondent’s
son, and his wife as tenants. On September 12, 1992, Ramon and his wife allegedly surrendered
possession of their portion to petitioners. Later on, petitioners appointed Ramon as their trustee
over the subject lot.
Aside from taking possession of the property, petitioners also caused the annotation on TCT No.
2 10
T-118375 of a decision rendered in their favor in Civil Case No. 741-93. This decision attained
finality on April 19, 1995.
Petitioners alleged that they exercised ownership rights as well as enjoyed open, public and
peaceful possession over the property from September 12, 1992 until the early part of September
1995. During this time, respondent was in the United States.
Upon respondent’s return to the Philippines in May 1995, he allegedly entered the property by
means of force, threat, intimidation, strategy and stealth thereby ousting petitioners and their
trustee, Ramon.
Despite repeated demands, respondent, asserting his rights as registered owner of the property,
refused to vacate the premises and surrender its possession to petitioners.
3
Petitioners filed an action for forcible entry in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Dasmariñas,
Cavite on November 23, 1995. Respondent filed an answer with compulsory counterclaim dated
December 8, 1995. After the issues were joined, the MTC required the submission of the parties’
position papers at a preliminary conference on March 11, 1996. Respondent failed to comply.
On June 17, 1996, the MTC ruled:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the [respondent] and other persons claiming right under
him are hereby ordered to surrender physical possession of Lot No. 6853-D in favor of the
[petitioners] and to pay the sum of TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND (P25,000.00) PESOS as
attorney’s fees.
SO ORDERED.
4
5
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Imus, Cavite rendered a decision affirming the MTC
decision in toto.
6
7
Respondent elevated his case to the Court of Appeals (CA) which rendered the assailed decision
on March 18, 1997:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED; the Decision dated October 25, 1996 of the [RTC] of
Imus, Cavite in Civil Case No. 052-96 and the Decision of the [MTC] of Dasmariñas, Cavite in Civil
Case No. 182 are SET ASIDE; and Civil Case No. 182 for Forcible Entry and Damages is hereby
ordered DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
8
SO ORDERED.
In a resolution dated August 20, 1997, the CA denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration for
lack of merit.
Before us now come petitioners who claim that the appellate court erred in finding that respondent
had prior physical possession of the subject property.lawphil.net
"In an action for forcible entry, the plaintiff must prove that he was in prior possession of the land
or building and that he was deprived thereof by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy or
9
stealth." The plaintiff, however, cannot prevail where it appears that, as between himself and the
defendant, the latter had possession antedating his own. We are generally precluded in a Rule
45 petition from reviewing factual evidence tracing the events prior to the first act of
11
spoliation. However, the conflicting factual findings of the MTC and RTC on one hand, and the
CA on the other, require us to make an exception.
We overrule petitioners’ contentions.
12
The Civil Code states that possession is the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right. In the
grammatical sense, to possess means to have, to actually and physically occupy a thing, with or
13
without right. "Possession always includes the idea of occupation x x x. It is not necessary that
the person in possession should himself be the occupant. The occupancy can be held by another
14 15
in his name." Without occupancy, there is no possession.
16
Two things are paramount in possession. First, there must be occupancy, apprehension or
17
taking. Second, there must be intent to possess (animus possidendi).
Here, petitioners failed to establish that they had prior physical possession to justify a ruling in
their favor in the complaint for forcible entry against respondent.
In the decision in Civil Case No. 741-93 (a case for specific performance and damages against
Javier, the alleged vendor of the lot in question) upon which petitioners based their right to possess
in the first place, the trial court categorically stated:
The [petitioners were never placed] in possession of the subject property on which [was] planned
to be [site of] a piggery, nor [were they] given a clearance or certification from the Municipal
18
Agrarian Reform Officer. (emphasis ours)
Where a dispute over possession arises between two persons, the person first having actual
possession is the one who is entitled to maintain the action granted by law; otherwise, a mere
usurper without any right whatever, might enter upon the property of another and, by allowing
himself to be ordered off, could acquire the right to maintain the action of forcible entry and
27
detainer, however momentary his intrusion might have been.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated March
18, 1997 in CA-G.R. SP No. 42604 is AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.

The claim that the lot was turned over to petitioners in 1992 was self-serving in the face of this SO ORDERED.
factual finding. On the other hand, the tax declarations and receipts in the name of respondent in
19
1994 and 1995 established the possession of respondent. The payment of real estate tax is one
of the most persuasive and positive indications showing the will of a person to possess in concepto
20
de dueño or with claim of ownership.

"[P]ossession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every
21
square meter of the ground before he is deemed in possession." In this case, Ramon, as
22
respondent’s son, was named caretaker when respondent left for the United States in 1983. Due
to the eventual loss of trust and confidence in Ramon, however, respondent transferred the
23
administration of the land to his other son, Oscar, in January 1995 until his return in May 1995. In
other words, the subject land was in the possession of the respondent’s sons during the contested
period.

Petitioners cite an alleged document (Kusangloob na Pagsasauli ng Lupang Sakahan at

Pagpapahayag ng Pagtalikod sa Karapatan) dated March 10, 1995 executed by them and Ramon
to prove a turn over of possession. They also seek to prove their exercise of rights over the land
through alleged frequent visits and the designation of Ramon as their own trustee as declared in
a joint affidavit attached to their position paper filed with the MTC. These instruments, however,
fail to convince us of petitioners’ actual occupancy of the subject land. First, petitioners themselves
acknowledged that Ramon and his wife occupied part of the land as tenants of respondent.
Second, Ramon, a mere tenant, had no authority to sign such document dated March 10, 1995
waiving all rights to the land. Third, there was no clear proof in the records of the appointment of
Ramon as petitioners’ trustee save their self-serving statements to this effect. Finally, at the time
the Kusangloob na Pagsasauli document was executed, the caretaker of the land was no longer
24
Ramon but Oscar.

Most important, the title of the land in question (TCT No. T-118375) remained in the name of
25
respondent. "As the registered owner, petitioner had a right to the possession of the property,
26
which is one of the attributes of ownership." The Civil Code states:

Art. 538. Possession as a fact cannot be recognized at the same time in two different personalities
except in the cases of co-possession. Should a question arise regarding the fact of possession,
the present possessor shall be preferred; if there are two possessors, the one longer in
possession; if the dates of the possession are the same, the one who presents a title; and if all
these conditions are equal, the thing shall be placed in judicial deposit pending determination of
its possession or ownership through proper proceedings.

In view of the evidence establishing respondent’s continuing possession of the subject property,
petitioners’ allegation that respondent deprived them of actual possession by means of force,
intimidation and threat was clearly untenable. In Gaza v. Lim, we held that:
 4. Cabutihan vs. Landcenter Construction, 383 SCRA 353
[G.R. No. 146594. June 10, 2002]
REBECCA T. CABUTIHAN, petitioner, vs. LANDCENTER CONSTRUCTION & DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Breach of contract gives rise to a cause of action for specific performance or for rescission. A
suit for such breach is not capable of pecuniary estimation; hence, the assessed value of the real
estate, subject of the said action, should not be considered in computing the filing fees. Neither a
misjoinder nor a non-joinder of parties is a ground for dismissal of an action, because parties may
be dropped or added at any stage of the proceedings.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, assailing the Orders dated
September 8, 2000 and November 21, 2000, promulgated by of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
[1]
Pasig City, Branch 263. The first assailed Order disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, this Court hereby resolves to dismiss the instant
[2]
complaint.
[3]
Reconsideration was denied in the second challenged Order.
The Facts
Culled from the pleadings, the facts of this case are as follows.
On December 3, 1996, herein respondent Landcenter Construction & Development
[4]
Corporation, represented by Wilfredo B.Maghuyop -- entered into an Agreement with Petitioner
Rebecca Cabutihan. The Agreement stipulates:
WHEREAS, [respondent corporation], x x x is the absolute owner, x x x of a parcel of land situated
at Kay-biga, Paranaque, Metro Manila covered under Transfer Certificate of Title No. (S-30409)
(partially cancelled by TCT Nos. 110001 to 110239) and particularly described as follows:
A parcel of land (Plan Psu-80206, Case No. 290, G.L.R.O. Record No. 2291), situated in the Barrio
of Kay-biga, Municipality of Paranaque, Province of Rizal. Bounded on the NE., by properties of
Eulogio Cruz and Isidro Alano; on the E., by property of Justo Bernardo; on the SE., by properties
of Marcelo Nofuente and Lorenzo Molera; on the SW., by properties of Higino and Pedro P. Lopez;
on the W., by property of Odon Rodriguez; and on the NW., by properties of Evaristo de los Santos
and Pastor Leonardo.....; containing an area of ONE HUNDRED SEVEN THOUSAND AND
FORTY SEVEN (107,047) SQUARE METERS, more or less.
WHEREAS, [respondent corporation] decided to engage the assistance of [petitioner] and x x x
herein called the FACILITATOR for the purpose of facilitating and arranging the recovery of the
property in question, as well as the financing of such undertakings necessary in connection
thereto;
WHEREFORE, premises considered and of the mutual covenants of the parties, they have
agreed, as follows:
1. The FACILITATOR undertakes to effect the recovery of the property subject
hereof, including the financing of the undertaking, up to the registration of the same
in the name of [respondent corporation], except any and all taxes due;
2. The FACILITATOR shall be responsible for whatever arrangements necessary in
relation to the squatters presently occupying [a] portion of the property, as well as the
legitimate buyers of lots thereof;
3. As compensation for the undertaking of the FACILITATOR, [she] shall be entitled
to Twenty [Percent] (20%) of the total area of the property thus recovered for and in
behalf of [respondent corporation].
[5]
xxx xxx xxx.
[6]
Armed with Board Resolution No. 01, Series of 1997, which had authorized her to
represent the corporation, Luz Baylon Ponce entered into a February 11, 1997 Deed of
Undertaking with a group composed of petitioner, Wenifredo P. Forro, Nicanor Radan Sr. and Atty.
Prospero A. Anave. The Deed states the following:
WHEREAS, the UNDERTAKER [respondent corporation] solicited, engaged and hereby
voluntarily acknowledges the assistance of certain persons, in recovering, arranging and financing
the undertaking up to completion/consummation of the same;
WHEREAS, the UNDERTAKER freely, voluntarily, unconditionally and irrevocably agreed,
committed and undertook to compensate x x x said persons, in the manner, specified hereinbelow;
WHEREFORE, considering the foregoing premises, and the mutual covenants of the parties, the
UNDERTAKER hereby unconditionally and irrevocably [c]ommit[s] and [u]ndertake[s], as follows:
1. To pay or compensate the following persons, based on the gross area of the afore-described
parcel of land or gross proceeds of the sale thereof, as the case may be, to wit:
Rebecca T. Cabutihan ------------------------------------ 20%
Wenifredo P. Forro ----------------------------------- 10%
Nicanor Radan, Sr. ------------------------------------ 4%
Atty. Prospero A. Anave ----------------------------------- 2.5%
TOTAL ----------------------------------- 36.5%
2. Execute a Deed of Assignment unto and in favor of each of the persons above-mentioned
corresponding to their respective shares in the subject parcel of land or in the proceeds thereof;
3. This Undertaking as well as the Deed of Assignment above-stated shall be effective and binding
[7]
upon the heirs, successors-in-interest, assigns or designates of the parties herein.
An action for specific performance with damages was filed by petitioner on October 14, 1999
before the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 263. She alleged:
[6.] [Petitioner] accomplished her undertakings under the subject Agreement and the
Undertaking. So in a letter dated 18 April 1997, x x x, [respondent corporation] was informed
accordingly thereof. Simultaneously, [petitioner] demanded upon [respondent corporation] to
execute the corresponding Deed of Assignment of the lots in the subject property, as
compensation for the services rendered in favor of the [respondent corporation]. The subject letter
was duly received and acknowledged receipt, by then Acting Corporate Secretary of the
[respondent corporation].
[7.] [Respondent corporation] failed and refused to act on x x x said demand of [petitioner]. Hence,
[she] sent a letter dated May 8, 1997, to the Register of Deeds for Paranaque, to inform x x x said
Office of x x x [her] claim x x x;
[8.] x x x [T]he subject property was already transferred to and registered in the name of
[respondent corporation] under Transfer Certificate of Title No. -123917-, of the Registry of Deeds
for Paranaque City x x x;
xxx xxx xxx
[10.] With x x x said title of the property now in the possession of the [respondent corporation],
[petitioner] is apprehensive that the more that [she] will not be able to obtain from [respondent
corporation], compliance with the afore-stated Agreement and Undertaking, to the extreme
detriment and prejudice of [petitioner] and her group, x x x;
xxx xxx xxx
[8]
[12.] Then in a letter, dated 10 September 1999, [petitioner] through counsel sent to [respondent
corporation] a Formal Demand, to comply with its obligation x x x but x x x [respondent corporation]
[9]
did not heed the demand. x x x.
Petitioner prayed, inter alia, that respondent corporation be ordered to execute the
appropriate document assigning, conveying, transferring and delivering the particular lots in her
favor. The lots represented compensation for the undertakings she performed and accomplished,
as embodied in the Agreement.
Respondent then filed a Motion to Dismiss, alleging the following:
5. Because of the troubled situation obtaining at the management level of [respondent
corporation], the sale between [respondent corporation] and PCIB regarding the Fourth Estate
Subdivision was not registered with the Register of Deeds office, although [respondent
corporation] continued holding the deed of sale over the Fourth Estate Subdivision.
6. A group of persons led by one Wilfredo Maghuyop, including herein [petitioner], Wenifredo
Forro, Nicanor Radan, and others, taking advantage of the management mess at [respondent
corporation], tried to grab ownership of the [respondent corporation], and with use of fraud, cheat,
misrepresentation and theft of vital documents from the office of [respondent corporation],
succeeded in filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission false papers and documents
purporting to show that the Articles of Incorporation of [respondent corporation] had been
amended, installing Maghuyop as president of [respondent corporation]. It was on these occasions
that [petitioner] and her companions x x x, with use of fraud, stealth, tricks, deceit and cheat
succeeded in letting Luz Baylon Ponce sign a so-called Deed of Undertaking by virtue of which
[respondent corporation] is duty-bound to give to [petitioner], Forro, Radan and Atty. Prospero
Anave 36.5% of the land area of the Fourth Estate Subdivision as compensation for alleged
services and expenses made by these people in favor of [respondent corporation]. They also
caused said x x x Maghuyop to sign an Agreement with [petitioner] expressing an obligation on
the part of [respondent corporation] to give a big part of the land x x x to [petitioner]. These
Agreement and Deed of Undertaking are being made by herein [petitioner] as her causes of action
in the present case.
Wilfredo Maghuyop was a stranger to [respondent corporation], and he was an impostor used by
[petitioner] and her companions to barge into the management of [respondent corporation] for the
purpose of stealing and creating an obligation against [respondent corporation] in their favor.
7. But Luz Baylon Ponce, whose signature appears on the instrument denominated as Deed of
Undertaking, vehemently denies that she signed said instrument freely and voluntarily.She says
that Wenifredo Forro and Nicanor Radan were once real estate agents of [respondent corporation]
who promised to help sell lots from her project Villaluz II Subdivision located [in] Malibay, Pasay
City. According to Luz Baylon Ponce, the Board of Directors of [respondent corporation] negotiated
with Forro and Radan for the latter to sell units/lots of Villaluz II Subdivision, and to help obtain a
financier who would finance for the expenses for the reconstitution of the lost title of the Fourth
Estate Subdivision situated [in] Sucat, Paranaque City. Shortly thereafter, these two men resigned
from [respondent corporation] as agents, after they manipulated the signing of x x x said Deed of
Undertaking by Luz Baylon Ponce on February 11, 1997. The latter is an old woman 80 years of
age. She is weak, has x x x poor sight, and is feeble in her mental ability. Forro and Radan inserted
the Deed of Undertaking among the papers intended for application for reconstitution of
[respondent corporations] title which these men caused Luz Baylon Ponce to sign, and she
unknowingly signed the Deed of Undertaking. x x x.
[10]
In the Motion, respondent sought the dismissal of the Complaint on the grounds of (1)
improper venue, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, and (3) nonpayment of the proper
docket fees. Specifically, it contended:
8. That venue is improperly laid
xxx xxx xxx
(b) In other words, the present case filed by [petitioner] is for her recovery (and for her companions)
of 36.5% of [respondent corporations] land (Fourth Estate Subdivision) or her interest therein. x x
x therefore, x x x the present case filed x x x is a real action or an action in rem.
(c) x x x [Following] Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, as amended x x x the present case
should have been filed by [petitioner] with the proper court in Paranque City which has jurisdiction
over the x x x Fourth Estate Subdivision because said subdivision is situated in Paranaque
City. Since [petitioner] filed the present case with this x x x [c]ourt in Pasig City, she chose a wrong
venue x x x.
xxx xxx xxx

9. That the [c]ourt has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim
xxx xxx xxx
(c) x x x Wenifredo P. Forro, Nicanor Radan, Sr. and Atty. Prospero A. Anave are not named as
plaintiffs in the complaint. [Petitioner] x x x is not named as representative of Forro, Radan and
Anave by virtue of a Special Power of Attorney or other formal written authority. According to the
Rules, where the action is allowed to be prosecuted or defended by a representative or someone
acting in a fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary shall be included in the title of the case and shall be
deemed to be the real party in interest (Sec. 3, Rule 3, Rules of Court, as amended x x x).
xxx xxx xxx
10. That a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied with
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Obviously, [petitioner] has not paid the docket or filing fees on the value of her land claim x x
x. Thirty-six percent (36%) x x x is P180,000,000.00, x x x.
[11]
Ruling of the Trial Court
The RTC ruled that the allegations in the Complaint show that its primary objective was to
recover real property. Equally important, the prayer was to compel respondent to execute the
necessary deeds of transfer and conveyance of a portion of the property corresponding to 36.5
percent of its total area or, in the alternative, to hold respondent liable for the value of the said
portion, based on the prevailing market price. The RTC further ruled that, since the suit would
affect the title to the property, it should have been instituted in the trial court where the property
[12]
was situated.
Furthermore, the action was filed only by petitioner. There was no allegation that she had
been authorized by Forro, Radan and Anave to represent their respective shares in the
compensation.
Finally, since this case was an action in rem, it was imperative for petitioner to pay the
appropriate docket or filing fees equivalent to the pecuniary value of her claim, a duty she failed
[13]
to discharge. Consequently, following Manchester Development Corp. v. Court of Appeals, the
trial court never acquired jurisdiction over the case.
[14]
Hence, this Petition.
Issues
In her Memorandum, petitioner phrases the issue in this wise:
Whether or not the dismissal of the [C]omplaint was in accordance with the pertinent law and
[15]
jurisprudence on the matter.
She argues that the RTC erred in dismissing her Complaint on the grounds of (1) improper
venue, (2) non-joinder of necessary parties, and (3) non-payment of proper docket fees.
This Courts Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
First Issue:
Proper Venue
Maintaining that the action is in personam, not in rem, petitioner alleges that the venue was
properly laid. The fact that she ultimately sought the conveyance of real property not located in
the territorial jurisdiction of the RTC of Pasig is, she claims, an anticipated consequence and
beyond the cause for which the action was instituted.
On the other hand, the RTC ruled that since the primary objective of petitioner was to recover
real property -- even though her Complaint was for specific performance and damages -- her action
should have been instituted in the trial court where the property was situated, in accordance
[16]
with Commodities Storage & Ice Plant Corp. v. Court of Appeals.
We agree with petitioner. Sections 1 and 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court provide an answer
[17]
to the issue of venue. Actions affecting title to or possession of real property or an interest
therein (real actions), shall be commenced and tried in the proper court that has territorial
jurisdiction over the area where the real property is situated. On the other hand, all other actions,
(personal actions) shall be commenced and tried in the proper courts where the plaintiff or any of
the principal plaintiffs resides or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides.
In Commodities Storage cited earlier, petitioner spouses obtained a loan secured by a
mortgage over their land and ice plant in Sta. Maria, Bulacan. Because they had failed to pay the
loan, the mortgage was foreclosed and the ice plant auctioned. Before the RTC of Manila, they
sued the bank for damages and for the fixing of the redemption period. Since the spouses
ultimately sought redemption of the mortgaged property, the action affected the mortgage debtors
[18]
title to the foreclosed property; hence, it was a real action. Where the action affects title to the
[19]
property, it should be instituted in the trial court where the property is situated.
[20]
In National Steel Corp. v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that an action in which
petitioner seeks the execution of a deed of sale of a parcel of land in his favor x x x has been held
to be for the recovery of the real property and not for specific performance since his primary
objective is to regain the ownership and possession of the parcel of land.
[21]
However, in La Tondea Distillers, Inc. v. Ponferrada, private respondents filed an action
for specific performance with damages before the RTC of Bacolod City. The defendants allegedly
reneged on their contract to sell to them a parcel of land located in Bago City - - a piece of property
which the latter sold to petitioner while the case was pending before the said RTC. Private
respondent did not claim ownership but, by annotating a notice of lis pendens on the title,
recognized defendants ownership thereof. This Court ruled that the venue had properly been laid
in the RTC of Bacolod, even if the property was situated in Bago.
 [22]
In Siasoco v. Court of Appeals, private respondent filed a case for specific performance
with damages before the RTC of Quezon City. It alleged that after it accepted the offer of
petitioners, they sold to a third person several parcels of land located in Montalban, Rizal. The
Supreme Court sustained the trial courts order allowing an amendment of the original Complaint
for specific performance with damages. Contrary to petitioners position that the RTC of Quezon
City had no jurisdiction over the case, as the subject lots were located in Montalban, Rizal, the
said RTC had jurisdiction over the original Complaint. The Court reiterated the rule that a case for
specific performance with damages is a personal action which may be filed in a court where any
of the parties reside.
A close scrutiny of National Steel and Ruiz reveals that the prayers for the execution of a
Deed of Sale were not in any way connected to a contract, like the Undertaking in this case. Hence,
even if there were prayers for the execution of a deed of sale, the actions filed in the said cases
were not for specific performance.
In the present case, petitioner seeks payment of her services in accordance with the
undertaking the parties signed. Breach of contract gives rise to a cause of action for specific
[23]
performance or for rescission. If petitioner had filed an action in rem for the conveyance of real
property, the dismissal of the case would have been proper on the ground of lack of cause of
action.
Petitioner insists that the value of the real property, which was the subject of the contract,
has nothing to do with the determination of the correct docket or filing fees.
The RTC ruled that although the amount of damages sought had not been specified in the
body of the Complaint, one can infer from the assessed value of the disputed land that it would
amount to P50 million. Hence, when compared to this figure, the P210 paid as docket fees would
appear paltry.
We hold that the trial court and respondent used technicalities to avoid the resolution of the
case and to trifle with the law. True, Section 5, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court requires that the
assessed value of the real estate, subject of an action, should be considered in computing the
filing fees. But the Court has already clarified that the Rule does not apply to an action for specific
[28] [29]
performance, which is classified as an action not capable of pecuniary estimation.
Besides, if during the course of the trial, petitioners 20 percent claim on the Fourth Estate
Subdivision can no longer be satisfied and the payment of its monetary equivalent is the only
[30]
solution left, Sunlife Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion holds as follows: Where the filing of the
initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment
of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the assailed

Orders REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the court of origin which is
ordered to PROCEED with deliberate speed in disposing of the case. No costs.
Second Issue:
Non-Joinder of Proper Parties SO ORDERED.

Petitioner claims that she was duly authorized and empowered to represent the members
of her group and to prosecute their claims on their behalf via a Special Power of Attorney executed
by Forro, Radan and Anave. Besides, she argues that the omission of her companions as plaintiffs
did not prevent the RTC from proceeding with the action, because whatever judgment would be
rendered would be without prejudice to their rights. In the alternative, she avers that the trial court
may add or drop a party or parties at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just.

The RTC ruled that there was no allegation anywhere in the records that petitioner had been
authorized to represent Forro, Radan and Anave, who were real parties-in-interest with respect to
their respective shares of the 36.5 percent claim. Such being the case, the trial court never
acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter of their claims.

Again, we side with petitioner. Neither a misjoinder nor a non-joinder of parties is a ground
for the dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped or added by order of the court, on motion
[24]
of any party or on the courts own initiative at any stage of the action. The RTC should have
ordered the joinder of such party, and noncompliance with the said order would have been ground
for dismissal of the action.

Although the Complaint prayed for the conveyance of the whole 36.5 percent claim without
impleading the companions of petitioner as party-litigants, the RTC could have separately
proceeded with the case as far as her 20 percent share in the claim was concerned, independent
of the other 16.5 percent. This fact means that her companions are not indispensable parties
[25]
without whom no final determination can be had. At best, they are mere necessary parties who
ought to be impleaded for a complete determination or settlement of the claim subject of the
[26]
action. The non-inclusion of a necessary party does not prevent the court from proceeding with
the action, and the judgment rendered therein shall be without prejudice to the rights of such
[27]
party.

Third Issue:
Correct Docket Fees
 5. Citizen Surety vs. Melencio-Herrera, 38 SCRA 369
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-32170. March 31, 1971.]
CITIZENS’ SURETY & INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., Petitioner, v. HON. JUDGE A.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, SANTIAGO DACANAY, and JOSEFINA DACANAY, Respondents.
Dayos, Tesoro & Gloria, Jr. for Petitioner.
Respondent Judge for and in his own behalf.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; JURISDICTION; ACTION IN PERSONAM; PERSONAL SERVICE OF
SUMMONS REQUIRED. — We agree with respondent Judge that the action of plaintiff petitioner,
being in personam, the Court could not validly acquire jurisdiction on a non-appearing defendant,
absent a personal service of summons within the forum. We have explicitly so ruled in Pantaleon
v. Asuncion, 105 Phil. 765, pointing out without such personal service, any judgment on a non-
appearing defendant would be violative of due process. In the aforecited case this Court, through
Justice Roberto Concepcion, now Chief Justice, ruled as follows: . . . "It is a well-settled principle
of Constitutional Law that, in an action strictly in personam, like the one at bar, personal service
of summons, within the forum, is essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant, who does not voluntary submit himself to the authority of the court. In other words,
summons by publication cannot — consistently with the due process clause in the Bill of Rights
— confer upon the court jurisdiction over said defendants.’Due process of law requires personal
service to support a personal judgment, and, when the proceeding is strictly in personam brought
to determine the personal rights and obligations of the parties, personal service within the state or
a voluntary appearance in the case is essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction so as to constitute
compliance with the constitutional requirement of due process. . . .’Although a state legislature
has more control over the form of service on its own residents than nonresidents, it has been held
that in actions in personam . . . service by publication on resident defendants who are personally
within the state and can be found therein is not "due process of law," and statute allowing it is
unconstitutional.’ (16A C.J.S., pp. 786, 789; Emphasis our)"
2. CIVIL LAW; OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS; CREDITORS; REMEDY AGAINST
ABSCONDING DEBTORS. — The proper recourse for a creditor in the same situation as
petitioner is to locate properties, real or personal, of the resident defendant debtor with unknown
address and cause them to be attached under Rule 57, Sec. l(f), in which case, the enactment
converts the action into a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem and the summons by publication may
then accordingly be deemed valid and effective But because debtors who abscond and conceal
themselves are also quite adept at concealing their properties, the dismissal of the case below by
respondent Judge should be set aside and the case held pending in the court’s archives, until
petitioner as plaintiff succeed in determining the whereabouts of the defendants’ person or
properties and causes valid summons to be served personally or by publication as the case may
be. In this manner, the tolling of the period of prescription for as long as the debtor remains in
hiding would properly be a matter of court record, and he can not emerge after a sufficient lapse
of time from the dismissal of the case to profit from his own misdeed and claim prescription of his
just debt.
DECISION
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Petitioner Citizens’ Surety & Insurance Company, Inc. seeks review of an order of respondent
Judge in Civil Case No. 77134 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XVII, entitled
"Citizens’ Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. v. Santiago Dacanay and Josefina Dacanay," dismissing
the complaint for lack of proper service of summons upon defendants.
The record is to the effect that petitioner had filed its complaint in the Court below, alleging that at
request of defendant Santiago Dacanay, the plaintiff Surety Company had issued its Surety Bonds
Nos. 4942 and 4944, the first, in favor of Gregorio Fajardo to guarantee payment of a P5,000-
promissory note executed by said Dacanay, and the second, in favor of Manufacturers Bank &
Trust Co., to guarantee payment of another promissory note in like amount; that in consideration
of said bonds, Santiago and Josefina Dacanay executed Indemnity Agreements, binding
themselves jointly and severally to indemnify plaintiff for any losses, costs and expenses which it
might sustain in connection with the issuance of the bonds aforesaid, with interest at 12% per
annum; that as additional security, the Dacanays mortgaged to plaintiff a parcel of land in Baguio
City, covered by Certificate of Title No. T-8116, the mortgage having been duly recorded; that the
promissory notes were not paid .and as a result, plaintiff Surety was compelled to pay P5,000.00
to Gregorio Fajardo and P4,081.69 to the Manufacturers’ Bank; that the Dacanays failed to
reimburse the Surety for such payments, whereupon the Surety caused the extrajudicial
foreclosure of the mortgage to pay its claim of P12,941.69 representing its payments, interest and
stipulated liquidated damages: that at the foreclosure sale, the land mortgaged was sold to plaintiff,
as highest bidder, for the sum of P2,000.00 — leaving an unsatisfied balance of P10,491.69, that
plaintiff sought to recover from defendants Dacanay, plus 10% thereof as attorneys’ fees, and the
costs.
At petitioner’s request, respondent Judge caused summons to be made by publication in the
newspaper Philippines Herald. But despite the publication and deposit of a prepaid copy of the
complaint at the Manila post office, defendants did not appear within the period of 60 days from
last publication, as required by the summons.
Plaintiff then asked that defendants be declared in default; but :instead, the Judge, by order of
May 16, 1970, asked it to show cause why the action should not be dismissed, the suit being in
personam and defendants not having appeared. Then, on May 29, 1970, respondent Judge
dismissed the case, despite plaintiff Surety’s argument that the summons by publication was
sufficient and valid under section 16 of Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court.
We agree with respondent Judge that the action of plaintiff petitioner, being in personam, the Court
could not validly acquire jurisdiction on a non-appearing defendant, absent a personal service of
summons within the forum. We have explicitly so ruled in Pantaleon v. Asunción, 105 Phil. 765,
pointing out without such personal service, any judgment on a non-appearing defendant would be
violative of due process. In the aforecited case this Court, through Justice Roberto Concepción,
now Chief Justice, ruled as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Apart from the foregoing, it is well-settled principle of Constitutional Law that, in an action strictly
in personam, like the one at bar, personal service of summons, within the forum. is essential to
the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, who does not voluntarily submit
himself to the authority of the court. In other words, summons by publication cannot — consistently
with the due process clause in the Bill of Rights — confer upon the court jurisdiction over said
defendants.
‘Due process of law requires personal service to support a personal judgment, and. when the
proceeding is strictly in personam brought to determine the personal rights and obligations of the
parties, personal service within the state or a voluntary appearance in the case is essential to the
acquisition of jurisdiction so as to constitute compliance with the constitutional requirement of due
process. . . .
‘Although a state legislature has more control over the form of service on its own residents than
nonresidents, it has been held that in actions in personam . . . service by publication on resident
defendants, who are personally within the state and can be found therein is not "due process of
law," and a statute allowing it is unconstitutional.’ (16A C.J.S., pp. 786, 789; Emphasis ours.)"

The proper recourse for a creditor in the same situation as petitioner is to locate properties, real
or personal, of the resident defendant debtor with unknown address and cause them to be
attached under Rule 57, section 1(f), in which case, the attachment converts the action into a
proceeding in rem or quasi in rem and the summons by publication may then accordingly be
deemed valid and effective.

But because debtors who abscond and conceal themselves are also quite adept at concealing
their properties, the dismissal of the case below by respondent Judge should be set aside and the
case held pending in the court’s archives, until petitioner as plaintiff succeeds in determining the
whereabouts of the defendants’ person or properties and causes valid summons to be served
personally or by publication as the case may be. In this manner, the tolling of the period of
prescription for as long as the debtor remains in hiding would properly be a matter of court records
and he can not emerge after a sufficient lapse of time from the dismissal of the case to profit from
his own misdeed and claim prescription of his just debt.

WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal of the case issued by the Court below is hereby set aside,
and in the interest of justice, the proceedings are ordered suspended, to be held pending until the
plaintiff petitioner succeeds in ascertaining the whereabouts of the defendants and/or locating
properties of the same, to enable proper summons to be issued conformably to this Opinion. No
costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor and

Makasiar, JJ., concur.

Dizon and Castro, JJ., reserve their votes.

 6. Go vs. UCPB, G.R. No. 156187, 442 SCRA 264
[G.R. No. 156187. November 11, 2004]
JIMMY T. GO, petitioner, vs. UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK, ANGELO V. MANAHAN,
FRANCISCO C. ZARATE, PERLITA A. URBANO and ATTY. EDWARD
MARTIN, respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
[1] [2]
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision dated 31 July 2002
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 62625, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed orders dated June 7, 2000, August 9,
2000 and November 8, 2000 are SET ASIDE.
Respondent judge is directed to DISMISS Civil Case No. 67878 on the ground of improper
[3]
venue.
Petitioner Jimmy T. Go and Alberto T. Looyuko are co-owners of Noahs Ark International,
Noahs Ark Sugar Carriers, Noahs Ark Sugar Truckers, Noahs Ark Sugar Repacker, Noahs Ark
Sugar Insurers, Noahs Ark Sugar Terminal, Noahs Ark Sugar Building, and Noahs Ark Sugar
[4]
Refinery.
Sometime in August 1996, petitioner Jimmy T. Go and Alberto T. Looyuko applied for an
Omnibus Line accommodation with respondent United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) in the
[5]
amount of Nine Hundred Million (P900,000,000) Pesos, and was favorably acted upon by the
latter.
The transaction was secured by Real Estate Mortgages over parcels of land, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 64070, located at Mandaluyong City with an area of 24,837
square meters, and registered in the name of Mr. Looyuko; and TCT No. 3325, also located at
Mandaluyong City with an area of 14,271 square meters, registered in the name of Noahs Ark
Sugar Refinery.
On 21 July 1997, the approved Omnibus Line accommodation granted to petitioner was
[6]
subsequently cancelled by respondent UCPB. As a consequence, petitioner Jimmy T. Go
demanded from UCPB the return of the two (2) TCTs (No. 64070 and No. 3325) covered by Real
Estate Mortgages earlier executed. UCPB refused to return the same and proceeded to have the
two (2) pre-signed Real Estate Mortgages notarized on 22 July 1997 and caused the registration
thereof before the Registry of Deeds of Mandaluyong City on 02 September 1997.
On 15 June 1999, respondent UCPB filed with the Office of the Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio
[7]
Sheriff of Mandaluyong City an extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage covered by TCT
No. 64070, for nonpayment of the obligation secured by said mortgage. As a result, the public
auction sale of the mortgaged property was set on 11 April 2000 and 03 May 2000.
To protect his interest, petitioner Jimmy T. Go filed a complaint for Cancellation of Real
Estate Mortgage and damages, with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction, against respondent bank and its officers, namely, Angelo V. Manahan,
Francisco C. Zarate, Perlita A. Urbano and Atty. Edward E. Martin, together with Ex-Officio Sheriff
Lydia G. San Juan and Sheriff IV Helder A. Dyangco, with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City,
[8]
Branch 266, docketed as Civil Case No. 67878. The complaint was subsequently amended on
22 May 2000. The amended complaint alleged, among other things, the following: that petitioner
Jimmy T. Go is a co-owner of the property covered by TCT No. 64070, although the title is
registered only in the name of Looyuko; that respondent bank was aware that he is a co-owner as
he was asked to sign two deeds of real estate mortgage covering the subject property; that the
approved omnibus credit line applied for by him and Looyuko did not materialize and was
cancelled by respondent bank on 21 July 1997, so that the pre-signed real estate mortgages were
likewise cancelled; that he demanded from respondent bank that TCTs No. 64070 and No. 3325
be returned to him, but respondent bank refused to do so; that despite the cancellation of the
omnibus credit line on 21 July 1997, respondent bank had the two deeds of real estate mortgage
dated and notarized on 22 July 1997 and caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage
constituted on TCT No. 64070; that the auction sale scheduled on 11 April 2000 and 03 May 2000
be enjoined; that the two real estate mortgages be cancelled and TCTs No. 64070 and No. 3325
be returned to him; and that respondent bank and its officers be ordered to pay him moral and
exemplary damages and attorneys fees.
On 07 June 2000, respondent bank, instead of filing an answer, filed a motion to
[9]
dismiss based on the following grounds: 1) that the court has no jurisdiction over the case due
to nonpayment of the proper filing and docket fees; 2) that the complaint was filed in the wrong
venue; 3) an indispensable party/real party in interest was not impleaded and, therefore, the
complaint states no cause of action; 4) that the complaint was improperly verified; and 5) that
petitioner is guilty of forum shopping and submitted an insufficient and false certification of non-
forum shopping.
[10]
On 07 June 2000, the trial court issued an order granting petitioners application for a writ
of preliminary injunction. Correspondingly, the auction sale, scheduled on 11 April 2000 and 03
May 2000, was enjoined.
[11]
On 09 August 2000, the trial court denied respondent banks motion to dismiss Civil Case
[12]
No. 67878. A motion for reconsideration was filed, but the same was likewise denied in an
[13]
Order dated 08 November 2000.
Respondent bank questioned said orders before the Court of Appeals via a petition
[14]
for certiorari dated 03 January 2001, alleging that the trial court acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in issuing an order denying the motion to dismiss and
the motion for reconsideration thereof.
[15]
On 31 July 2002, the Court of Appeals set aside the Orders dated 07 June 2000, 09
August 2000 and 08 November 2000 issued by the trial court and directed the trial court to dismiss
Civil Case No. 67878 on the ground of improper venue.
[16]
A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner, which was denied in an order dated
[17]
14 November 2002.
[18]
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
[19]
On 16 June 2003, the Court gave due course to the petition, and required the parties to
file their respective memoranda. Respondents filed their Joint Memorandum on 27 August 2003,
while petitioner filed his on 25 September 2003 upon prior leave of court for extension. With leave
of this Court, private respondents filed their reply to petitioners memorandum.
In his memorandum, petitioner raised a lone issue:
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT FAILED TO APPLY THE LAW AND ESTABLISHED

JURISPRUDENCE ON THE MATTER BY ISSUING THE QUESTIONED
RESOLUTIONS FINDING THAT THE CASE A QUO IS A REAL ACTION.
Simply put, the issue to be resolved in this case is whether petitioners complaint for
cancellation of real estate mortgage is a personal or real action for the purpose of determining
venue.
In a real action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of real property, or as provided for in Section
[20]
1, Rule 4, a real action is an action affecting title to or possession of real property, or interest
therein. These include partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on, real property.
The venue for real actions is the same for regional trial courts and municipal trial courts -- the court
[21]
which has territorial jurisdiction over the area where the real property or any part thereof lies.
Personal action is one brought for the recovery of personal property, for the enforcement of
some contract or recovery of damages for its breach, or for the recovery of damages for the
[22]
commission of an injury to the person or property. The venue for personal actions is likewise
the same for the regional and municipal trial courts -- the court of the place where the plaintiff or
any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants
resides, at the election of the plaintiff, as indicated in Section 2 of Rule 4.
[23]
It is quite clear then that the controlling factor in determining venue for cases of the above
nature is the primary objective for which said cases are filed. Thus:
[24]
1. In Commodities Storage & Ice Plant Corp. v. Court of Appeals, this Court ruled
that an action to redeem by the mortgage debtor affects his title to the foreclosed
property. If the action is seasonably made, it seeks to erase from the title of the
judgment or mortgage debtor the lien created by registration of the mortgage and
sale. If not made seasonably, it may seek to recover ownership to the land since
the purchasers inchoate title to the property becomes consolidated after [the]
expiration of the redemption period. Either way, redemption involves the title to
the foreclosed property. It is a real action.
[25]
2. In Fortune Motors, (Phils.), Inc., v. Court of Appeals, this Court quoting the
decision of the Court of Appeals ruled that since an extrajudicial foreclosure of
real property results in a conveyance of the title of the property sold to the highest
bidder at the sale, an action to annul the foreclosure sale is necessarily an action
affecting the title of the property sold. It is therefore a real action which should be
commenced and tried in the province where the property or part thereof lies.
[26]
3. In Punsalan, Jr. v. Vda. de Lacsamana, this court ruled that while it is true that
petitioner does not directly seek the recovery . . . of the property in question, his
action for annulment of sale and his claim for damages are closely intertwined
with the issue of ownership of the building which, under the law, is considered
immovable property, the recovery of which is petitioners primary objective. The
prevalent doctrine is that an action for the annulment or rescission of a sale of
real property does not operate to efface the fundamental and prime objective and
nature of the case, which is to recover said real property. It is a real action.
Respondent Court, therefore, did not err in dismissing the case on the ground of
improper venue which was timely raised.
[27]
4. In Ruiz v. J. M. Tuason Co., Inc., et al., the court ruled that although [a]
complaint is entitled to be one for specific performance, yet the fact that
[complainant] asked that a deed of sale of a parcel of land . . . be issued in his
favor and that a transfer certificate of title covering said land be issued to him,
shows that the primary objective and nature of the action is to recover the parcel
of land itself because to execute in favor of complainant the conveyance
requested there is need to make a finding that he is the owner of the land which
in the last analysis resolves itself into an issue of ownership. Hence, the action
must be commenced in the province where the property is situated . . . ."
[28]
5. In Dr. Antonio A. Lizares, Inc. v. Hon. Hermogenes Caluag, this Court ruled
that an action praying that defendant be ordered `to accept the payment being
made by plaintiff for the lot which the latter contracted to buy on installment basis
from the former, to pay plaintiff compensatory damages and attorneys fees and
to enjoin defendant and his agents from repossessing the lot in question, is one
that affects title to the land under Section 3 of Rule 5, of the Rules of Court, and
shall be commenced and tried in the province where the property or any part
thereof lies, because, although the immediate remedy is to compel the defendant
to accept the tender of payment allegedly made, it is obvious that this relief is
merely the first step to establish plaintiffs title to [the] real property.
6. In Land Tenure Administration, et al. v. The Honorable Higinio B. Macadaeg and
[29]
Alejandro T. Lim, this Court ruled that where the lessee seeks to establish an
interest in an hacienda that runs with the land and one that must be respected by
the purchaser of the land even if the latter is not a party to the original lease
contract, the question of whether or not the standing crop is immovable property
become[s] irrelevant, for venue is determined by the nature of the principal claim.
Since the lessee is primarily interested in establishing his right to recover
possession of the land for the purpose of enabling him to gather his share of the
crops, his action is real and must be brought in the locality where the land is
situated.
[30]
7. In Espineli & Mojica v. Hon. Santiago and Vda. de Ramirez, the court ruled that
although the main relief sought in the case at bar was the delivery of the certificate
of title, said relief, in turn, entirely depended upon who, between the parties, has
a better right to the lot in question. As it is not possible for the court to decide the
main relief, without passing upon the claim of the parties with respect to the title
to and possession of the lot in question, the claim shall be determined x x x in the
province where [the] said property or any part thereof lies.
[31]
The case of Carandang v. Court of Appeals, is more particularly instructive. There, we
held that an action for nullification of the mortgage documents and foreclosure of the mortgaged
property is a real action that affects the title to the property. Thus, venue of the real action is before
the court having jurisdiction over the territory in which the property lies, which is the Court of First
Instance of Laguna.
Petitioner in this case contends that a case for cancellation of mortgage is a personal action
and since he resides at Pasig City, venue was properly laid therein. He tries to make a point by
[32]
alluding to the case of Francisco S. Hernandez v. Rural Bank of Lucena.
[33]
Petitioners reliance in the case of Francisco S. Hernandez v. Rural Bank of Lucena is
misplaced. Firstly, said case was primarily an action to compel the mortgagee bank to accept
payment of the mortgage debt and to release the mortgage. That action, which is not expressly
included in the enumeration found in Section 2(a) of Rule 4 of the Old Civil Procedure and now
under Section 1, Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, does not involve titles to the
mortgaged lots. It is a personal action and not a real action. The mortgagee has not foreclosed
the mortgage. The plaintiffs title is not in question. They are in possession of the mortgaged lots.
Hence, the venue of the plaintiffs personal action is the place where the defendant or any of the
defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the
election of the plaintiff. In the case at bar, the action for cancellation of real estate mortgage filed
by herein petitioner was primarily an action to compel private respondent bank to return to him the
properties covered by TCTs No. 64070 and No. 3325 over which the bank had already initiated
foreclosure proceedings because of the cancellation by the said respondent bank of the omnibus
credit line on 21 July 1997. The prime objective is to recover said real properties.
Secondly, Carandang distinctly articulated that the ruling in Hernandez does not apply where the
mortgaged property had already been foreclosed. Here, and as correctly pointed out by the
appellate court, respondent bank had already initiated extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings, and
were it not for the timely issuance of a restraining order secured by petitioner Go in the lower court,
the same would have already been sold at a public auction.
 [34]
In a relatively recent case, Asset Privatization Trust v. Court of Appeals, it was succinctly
stated that the prayer for the nullification of the mortgage is a prayer affecting real property, hence,
is a real action.

In sum, the cancellation of the real estate mortgage, subject of the instant petition, is a real
[35]
action, considering that a real estate mortgage is a real right and a real property by itself. An
action for cancellation of real estate mortgage is necessarily an action affecting the title to the
property. It is, therefore, a real action which should be commenced and tried in Mandaluyong City,
the place where the subject property lies.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed decision dated
31 July 2002 and the Order dated 14 November 2002 denying the motion for reconsideration are
hereby AFFIRMED. With costs.

SO ORDERED.
 7. Gochan vs. Gochan, 372 SCRA 356
G.R. No. 146089 December 13, 2001
VIRGINIA GOCHAN, LOUISE GOCHAN, LAPU-LAPU REAL ESTATE CORPORATION, FELIX
GOCHAN AND SONS REALTY CORPORATION, MACTAN REALTY DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, petitioners,
vs.
MERCEDES GOCHAN, ALFREDO GOCHAN, ANGELINA GOCHAN-HERNAEZ, MA. MERCED
GOCHAN GOROSPE, CRISPO GOCHAN, JR., and MARLON GOCHAN, respondents.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is a petition for review seeking to set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals dated
1 2
September 10, 1999 in CA-G.R. SP No. 49084, as well as its Resolution dated November 22,
2000, denying the Motion for Reconsideration.
Respondents were stockholders of the Felix Gochan and Sons Realty Corporation and the Mactan
Realty Development Corporation. Sometime in 1996, respondents offered to sell their shares in
the two corporations to the individual petitioners, the heirs of the late Ambassador Esteban
Gochan, for and in consideration of the sum of P200,000,000:00. Petitioners accepted and paid
the said amount to respondents. Accordingly, respondents issued to petitioners the necessary
3
"Receipts." In addition, respondents executed their respective "Release, Waiver and
4
Quitclaim," wherein .they undertook that they would not initiate any suit, action or complaint
against petitioners for whatever reason or purpose.
In turn, respondents, through Crispo Gochan, Jr., required individual petitioners to execute a
5
"promissory note," undertaking not to divulge the actual consideration they paid for the shares of
stock. For this purpose, Crispo Gochan, Jr. drafted a document entitled "promissory note" in his
own handwriting and had the same signed by Felix Gochan, III, Louise Gochan and Esteban
Gochan, Jr.
Unbeknown to petitioners, Crispo Gochan, Jr. inserted in the "promissory note" a phrase that says,
6
"Said amount is in partial consideration of the sale."
On April 3, 1998, respondents filed a complaint against petitioners for specific performance and
damages with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 11, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-
21854. Respondents alleged that sometime in November 1996, petitioner Louise Gochan, on
behalf of all the petitioners, offered to buy their shares of stock, consisting of 254 shares in the
Felix Gochan and Sons Realty Corporation and 1,624 shares of stock in the Mactan Realty
Development Corporation; and that they executed a Provisional Memorandum of Agreement,
wherein they enumerated the following as consideration for the sale:
1. Pesos: Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200M)
2. Two (2) hectares more or less of the fishpond in Gochan Compound, Mabolo, Lot 4F-
2-B
3. Lot 2, Block 9 with an area of 999 square meters in Gochan Compound, Mabolo,
Cebu
4. Three Thousand (3,000) square meters of Villas Magallanes in Mactan, Cebu
7
5. Lot 423 New Gem Building with an area of 605 square meters.
Accordingly, respondents claimed that they are entitled to the conveyance of the aforementioned
properties, in addition to the amount of P200,000,000.00, which they acknowledge to have
received from petitioners. Further, respondents prayed for moral damages of P15,000,000.00,
exemplary damages of P2,000,000.00, attorney's fees of P14,000,000.00, and litigation expenses
of P2,000,000.00.
Petitioners filed their answer, raising the following affirmative defenses: (a) lack of jurisdiction by
the trial court for non-payment of the correct docket fees; (b) unenforceability of the obligation to
convey real properties due to lack of a written memorandum thereof, pursuant to the Statute of
Frauds; (c) extinguishment of the obligation by payment; (d) waiver, abandonment and
renunciation by respondent of all their claims against petitioners; and (e) non-joinder of
indispensable parties.
On August 7, 1998, petitioners filed with the trial court a motion for a preliminary hearing on the
affirmative defenses. In an Order dated August 11, 1998, the trial court denied the motion, ruling
as follows:
As the grant of said motion lies in the discretion of the court under Section 6 of Rule 16
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, this Court in the exercise of its discretion, hereby
denies the said motion because the matters sought to be preliminarily heard do not
appear to be tenable. For one, the statute of frauds does not apply in this case because
the contract which is the subject matter of this case is already an executed contract.
The statute of frauds applies only to executory contracts. According to Dr. Arturo M.
Tolentino, a leading authority in civil law, since the statute of frauds was enacted for the
purpose of preventing frauds, it should not be made the instrument to further them.
Thus, where one party has performed his obligation under a contract, equity would
agree that all evidence should be admitted to prove the alleged agreement (PNB vs.
Philippine Vegetable Oil Company, 49 Phil. 897). For another, the contention of the
defendants that the claims of the plaintiffs are already extinguished by full payment
thereof does not appear to be indubitable because the plaintiffs denied under oath the
due execution and genuineness of the receipts which are attached as Annexes 1-A, 1-
B and 1-C of defendants' answer. This issue therefore has to be determined on the
basis of preponderance of evidence to be adduced by both parties. Then, still for
another, the contention that the complaint is defective because it allegedly has failed to
implead indispensable parties appears to be wanting in merit because the parties to the
memorandum of agreement adverted to in the complaint are all parties in this case.
Then the matter of payment of docketing and filing fees is not a fatal issue in this case
because the record shows that the plaintiffs had paid at least P165,000.00 plus in the
form of filing and docketing fees. Finally, regarding exerting earnest efforts toward a
compromise by the plaintiffs, the defendants cannot say that there is an absence of an
allegation to this effect in the complaint because paragraph 11 of the complaint precisely
states that "before filing this case, earnest efforts toward a compromise have been
made."
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the above Order was denied by the trial court on
September 11, 1998.
Petitioners thus filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 49084. On September 10, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered the appealed decision
dismissing the petition on the ground that respondent court did not commit grave abuse of
discretion, tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in denying the motion to hear the
8
affirmative defenses.
Again, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied by the Court of
9
Appeals in its assailed Resolution of November 22, 2000.
Petitioners, thus, filed the instant petition for review anchored on the following grounds:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE AND PALPABLE ERROR IN
FINDING THAT THE CORRECT DOCKET FEES HAVE BEEN PAID.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN RULING THAT THE
PMOA WAS A PARTIALLY EXECUTED CONTRACT AND HENCE NOT COVERED
BY THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS.
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN DECIDING THAT THE
CLAIMS OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN EXTINGUISHED BY
PAYMENT OR FULL SETTLEMENT DESPITE THE PRESENCE OF RECEIPTS
SIGNED BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS SHOWING THE CONTRARY.
IV.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN RESOLVING THAT
FELIX GOCHAN III AND ESTEBAN GOCHAN, JR. ARE NOT INDISPENSABLE
10
PARTIES AND THEREFORE NEED NOT BE IMPLEADED AS PARTIES.
11
Respondents filed their Comment, arguing, in fine, that petitioners are guilty of forum-shopping
when they filed two petitions for certiorari with the Court of Appeals; and that the Court of Appeals
did not err in dismissing the petition for certiorari.
The instant petition has merit.
The rule is well-settled that the court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of
12
the prescribed docket fees. In the case of Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) v. Asuncion, this
Court held that it is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the
payment of the prescribed docket fee that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter
or nature of the action.
Respondents maintain that they paid the correct docket fees in the amount of P165,000.00 when
they filed the complaint with the trial court. Petitioners, on the other hand, contend that the
complaint is in the nature of a real action which affects title to real properties; hence, respondents
should have alleged therein the value of the real properties which shall be the basis for the
assessment of the correct docket fees.
The Court of Appeals found that the complaint was one for specific performance and incapable of
pecuniary estimation. We do not agree.
It is necessary to determine the true nature of the complaint in order to resolve the issue of whether
or not respondents paid the correct amount of docket fees therefor. In this jurisdiction, the dictum
adhered to is that the nature of an action is determined by the allegations in the body of the
13
pleading or complaint itself, rather than by its title or heading. The caption of the complaint below
was denominated as one for "specific performance and damages." The relief sought, however, is
the conveyance or transfer of real property, or ultimately, the execution of deeds of conveyance
in their favor of the real properties enumerated in the provisional memorandum of agreement.
Under these circumstances, the case below was actually a real action, affecting as it does title to
or possession of real property.
14
In the case of Hernandez v. Rural Bank of Lucena, this Court held that a real action is one where
the plaintiff seeks the recovery of real property or, as indicated in section 2(a) of Rule 4 (now
Section 1, Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), a real action is an action affecting title to
or recovery of possession of real property.
It has also been held that where a complaint is entitled as one for specific performance but
nonetheless prays for the issuance of a deed of sale for a parcel of land, its primary objective and
nature is one to recover the parcel of land itself and, thus, is deemed a real action. In such a case,
the action must be filed in the proper court where the property is located:
In this Court, the appellant insists that her action is one for specific performance, and,
therefore, personal and transitory in nature.
This very issue was considered and decided by this Court in the case of Manuel B. Ruiz
vs. J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. et al., L-18692, promulgated 31 January 1963. There the
Court, by unanimous vote of all the Justices, held as follows:
'This contention has no merit. Although appellant's complaint is entitled to be
one for specific performance, yet the fact that he asked that a deed of sale of
a parcel of land situated in Quezon City be issued in his favor and that a
transfer certificate of title covering said parcel of land be issued to him shows
that the primary objective and nature of the action is to recover the parcel of
land itself because to execute in favor of appellant the conveyance requested
there is need to make a finding that he is the owner of the land which in the
last analysis resolves itself into an issue of ownership. Hence, the action must
be commenced in the province where the property is situated pursuant to
Section 3, Rule 5, of the Rules of Court, which provides that actions affecting
title to or recovery of possession of real property shall be commenced and
15
tried in the province where the property or any part thereof lies."
In the case at bar, therefore, the complaint filed with the trial court was in the nature of a real
action, although ostensibly denominated as one for specific performance. Consequently, the basis
for determining the correct docket fees shall be the assessed value of the property, or the
estimated value thereof as alleged by the claimant. Rule 141, Section 7, of the Rules of Court, as
amended by A.M. No. 00-2-01-SC, provides:
Section 7. Clerks of Regional Trial Courts. — x x x
(b) xxx xxx xxx
 In a real action, the assessed value of the property, or if there is none, the estimated
value thereof shall be alleged by the claimant and shall be the basis in computing the
fees.
16
We are not unmindful of our pronouncement in the case of Sun Insurance, to the effect that in
case the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court
may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable
prescriptive period. However, the liberal interpretation of the rules relating to the payment of docket
fees as applied in the case of Sun Insurance cannot apply to the instant case as respondents have
never demonstrated any willingness to abide by the rules and to pay the correct docket fees.
Instead, respondents have stubbornly insisted that the case they filed was one for specific
performance and damages and that they actually paid the correct docket fees therefor at the time
17
of the filing of the complaint. Thus, it was stated in the case of Sun Insurance:
Likewise, we do not find that there is forum-shopping in the case at bar. The first petition, docketed
as CA-G.R. SP. No. 49084, which is now the subject of the instant petition, involved the propriety
of the affirmative defenses relied upon by petitioners in Civil Case No. CEB-21854. The second
petition, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 54985, raised the issue of whether or not public respondent
Judge Dicdican was guilty of manifest partiality warranting his inhibition from further hearing Civil
Case No. CEB-21854.
More importantly, the two petitions did not seek the same relief from the Court of Appeals. In CA-
G.R. SP. No. 49084, petitioners prayed, among others, for the annulment of the orders of the trial
court denying their motion for preliminary hearing on the affirmative defenses in Civil Case No.
CEB-21854. No such reliefs are involved in the second petition, where petitioners merely prayed
for the issuance of an order enjoining public respondent Judge Dicdican from further trying the
case and to assign a new judge in his stead.

The principle in Manchester could very well be applied in the present case. The pattern True, the trial court has the discretion to conduct a preliminary hearing on affirmative defenses. In
and the intent to defraud the government of the docket fee due it is obvious not only in the case at bar, however, the trial court committed a grave abuse of its discretion when it denied
the filing of the original complaint but also in the filing of the second amended complaint. the motion for preliminary hearing. As we have discussed above, some of these defenses, which
petitioners invoked as grounds for the dismissal of the action, appeared to be indubitable, contrary
to the pronouncement of the trial court. Indeed, the abuse of discretion it committed amounted to
However, in Manchester, petitioner did not pay any additional docket fee until the case
an evasion of positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
was decided by this Court on May 7, 1987. Thus, in Manchester, due to the fraud 19
contemplation of law, which would have warranted the extraordinary writ of certiorari. Hence, the
committed on the government, this Court held that the court a quo did not acquire
Court of Appeals erred when it dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by petitioners.
jurisdiction over the case and that the amended complaint could not have been admitted
inasmuch as the original complaint was null and void.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is GRANTED. This case is
REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 11, which is directed to forthwith
In the present case, a more liberal interpretation of the rules is called for considering
conduct the preliminary hearing on the affirmative defenses in Civil Case No. CEB-21854.
that, unlike Manchester, private respondent demonstrated his willingness to abide by
the rules by paying the additional docket fees as required. The promulgation of the
decision in Manchester must have had that sobering influence on private respondent SO ORDERED.
who thus paid the additional docket fee as ordered by the respondent court. It triggered
his change of stance by manifesting his willingness to pay such additional docket fee as
may be ordered.

Respondents accuse petitioners of forum-shopping when they filed two petitions before the Court
of Appeals. Petitioners, on the other hand, contend that there was no forum-shopping as there
was no identity of issues or identity of reliefs sought in the two petitions.

We agree with petitioners that they are not guilty of forum-shopping. The deplorable practice of
forum-shopping is resorted to by litigants who, for the purpose of obtaining the same relief, resort
to two different fora to increase his or her chances of obtaining a favorable judgment in either one.
18
In the case of Golangco v. Court of Appeals, we laid down the following test to determine whether
there is forum-shopping:

Ultimately, what is truly important to consider in determining whether forum-shopping

exists or not is the vexation caused the courts and the parties-litigant by a person who
asks different courts and/or administrative agencies to rule on the same or related
causes and/or grant the same or substantially the same reliefs, in the process creating
the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by the different fora upon the same
issues.

In sum, two different orders were questioned, two distinct causes of action and issues
were raised, and two objectives were sought; thus, forum shopping cannot be said to
exist in the case at bar.
 8. Manchester Development Corp. vs. CA, 149 SCRA 562
G.R. No. 75919 May 7, 1987
MANCHESTER DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, CITY LAND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, STEPHEN ROXAS,
ANDREW LUISON, GRACE LUISON and JOSE DE MAISIP, respondents.
Tanjuatco, Oreta and Tanjuatco for petitioners.
Pecabar Law Offices for private respondents.
RESOLUTION
GANCAYCO, J.:
Acting on the motion for reconsideration of the resolution of the Second Division of January
28,1987 and another motion to refer the case to and to be heard in oral argument by the Court En
Banc filed by petitioners, the motion to refer the case to the Court en banc is granted but the
motion to set the case for oral argument is denied.
Petitioners in support of their contention that the filing fee must be assessed on the basis of the
amended complaint cite the case of Magaspi vs. Ramolete. 1 They contend that the Court of
Appeals erred in that the filing fee should be levied by considering the amount of damages sought
in the original complaint.
The environmental facts of said case differ from the present in that —
1. The Magaspi case was an action for recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land
2
with damages. While the present case is an action for torts and damages and specific performance
3
with prayer for temporary restraining order, etc.
2. In the Magaspi case, the prayer in the complaint seeks not only the annulment of title of the
defendant to the property, the declaration of ownership and delivery of possession thereof to
plaintiffs but also asks for the payment of actual moral, exemplary damages and attorney's fees
4
arising therefrom in the amounts specified therein. However, in the present case, the prayer is for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction during the pendency of the action against
the defendants' announced forfeiture of the sum of P3 Million paid by the plaintiffs for the property
in question, to attach such property of defendants that maybe sufficient to satisfy any judgment
that maybe rendered, and after hearing, to order defendants to execute a contract of purchase
and sale of the subject property and annul defendants' illegal forfeiture of the money of plaintiff,
ordering defendants jointly and severally to pay plaintiff actual, compensatory and exemplary
damages as well as 25% of said amounts as maybe proved during the trial as attorney's fees and
declaring the tender of payment of the purchase price of plaintiff valid and producing the effect of
payment and to make the injunction permanent. The amount of damages sought is not specified
in the prayer although the body of the complaint alleges the total amount of over P78 Million as
damages suffered by plaintiff.
5 be amended. Consequently, the order admitting the amended complaint and all subsequent
3. Upon the filing of the complaint there was an honest difference of opinion as to the nature of
the action in the Magaspi case. The complaint was considered as primarily an action for recovery
of ownership and possession of a parcel of land. The damages stated were treated as merely to
the main cause of action. Thus, the docket fee of only P60.00 and P10.00 for the sheriff's fee were
paid.
6
In the present case there can be no such honest difference of opinion. As maybe gleaned from
the allegations of the complaint as well as the designation thereof, it is both an action for damages
and specific performance. The docket fee paid upon filing of complaint in the amount only of
P410.00 by considering the action to be merely one for specific performance where the amount
involved is not capable of pecuniary estimation is obviously erroneous. Although the total amount
of damages sought is not stated in the prayer of the complaint yet it is spelled out in the body of
the complaint totalling in the amount of P78,750,000.00 which should be the basis of assessment
of the filing fee.
4. When this under-re assessment of the filing fee in this case was brought to the attention of this
Court together with similar other cases an investigation was immediately ordered by the Court.
Meanwhile plaintiff through another counsel with leave of court filed an amended complaint on
September 12, 1985 for the inclusion of Philips Wire and Cable Corporation as co-plaintiff and by
emanating any mention of the amount of damages in the body of the complaint. The prayer in the
original complaint was maintained. After this Court issued an order on October 15, 1985 ordering
the re- assessment of the docket fee in the present case and other cases that were investigated,
on November 12, 1985 the trial court directed plaintiffs to rectify the amended complaint by stating
the amounts which they are asking for. It was only then that plaintiffs specified the amount of
7
damages in the body of the complaint in the reduced amount of P10,000,000.00. Still no amount
of damages were specified in the prayer. Said amended complaint was admitted.
On the other hand, in the Magaspi case, the trial court ordered the plaintiffs to pay the amount of
P3,104.00 as filing fee covering the damages alleged in the original complaint as it did not consider
the damages to be merely an or incidental to the action for recovery of ownership and possession
8
of real property. An amended complaint was filed by plaintiff with leave of court to include the
government of the Republic as defendant and reducing the amount of damages, and attorney's
9
fees prayed for to P100,000.00. Said amended complaint was also admitted.
In the Magaspi case, the action was considered not only one for recovery of ownership but also
for damages, so that the filing fee for the damages should be the basis of assessment. Although
the payment of the docketing fee of P60.00 was found to be insufficient, nevertheless, it was held
that since the payment was the result of an "honest difference of opinion as to the correct amount
to be paid as docket fee" the court "had acquired jurisdiction over the case and the proceedings
thereafter had were proper and regular." 10 Hence, as the amended complaint superseded the
original complaint, the allegations of damages in the amended complaint should be the basis of
the computation of the filing fee. 11
In the present case no such honest difference of opinion was possible as the allegations of the
complaint, the designation and the prayer show clearly that it is an action for damages and specific
performance. The docketing fee should be assessed by considering the amount of damages as
alleged in the original complaint.
As reiterated in the Magaspi case the rule is well-settled "that a case is deemed filed only upon
payment of the docket fee regardless of the actual date of filing in court . 12 Thus, in the present
case the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case by the payment of only P410.00 as
docket fee. Neither can the amendment of the complaint thereby vest jurisdiction upon the
Court. 13 For an legal purposes there is no such original complaint that was duly filed which could
proceedings and actions taken by the trial court are null and void.
The Court of Appeals therefore, aptly ruled in the present case that the basis of assessment of the
docket fee should be the amount of damages sought in the original complaint and not in the
amended complaint.

The Court cannot close this case without making the observation that it frowns at the practice of
counsel who filed the original complaint in this case of omitting any specification of the amount of
damages in the prayer although the amount of over P78 million is alleged in the body of the
complaint. This is clearly intended for no other purpose than to evade the payment of the correct
filing fees if not to mislead the docket clerk in the assessment of the filing fee. This fraudulent
practice was compounded when, even as this Court had taken cognizance of the anomaly and
ordered an investigation, petitioner through another counsel filed an amended complaint, deleting
all mention of the amount of damages being asked for in the body of the complaint. It was only
when in obedience to the order of this Court of October 18, 1985, the trial court directed that the
amount of damages be specified in the amended complaint, that petitioners' counsel wrote the
damages sought in the much reduced amount of P10,000,000.00 in the body of the complaint but
not in the prayer thereof. The design to avoid payment of the required docket fee is obvious.

The Court serves warning that it will take drastic action upon a repetition of this unethical practice.

To put a stop to this irregularity, henceforth all complaints, petitions, answers and other similar
pleadings should specify the amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of the
pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the assessment of the
filing fees in any case. Any pleading that fails to comply with this requirement shall not bib accepted
nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the record.

The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee.
An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court,
much less the payment of the docket fee based on the amounts sought in the amended pleading.
The ruling in the Magaspi case 14 in so far as it is inconsistent with this pronouncement is
overturned and reversed.

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is denied for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
 9. Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. vs. Asuncion, 170 SCRA 274
G.R. Nos. 79937-38 February 13, 1989
SUN INSURANCE OFFICE, LTD., (SIOL), E.B. PHILIPPS and D.J. WARBY, petitioners,
vs.
HON. MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION, Presiding Judge, Branch 104, Regional Trial Court, Quezon
City and MANUEL CHUA UY PO TIONG, respondents.
Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & De los Angeles Law Offices for petitioners. Tanjuatco,
Oreta, Tanjuatco, Berenguer & Sanvicente Law Offices for private respondent.
GANCAYCO, J.:
Again the Court is asked to resolve the issue of whether or not a court acquires jurisdiction over a
case when the correct and proper docket fee has not been paid.
On February 28, 1984, petitioner Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL for brevity) filed a complaint
with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila for the consignation of a premium refund on
a fire insurance policy with a prayer for the judicial declaration of its nullity against private
respondent Manuel Uy Po Tiong. Private respondent as declared in default for failure to file the
required answer within the reglementary period.
On the other hand, on March 28, 1984, private respondent filed a complaint in the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City for the refund of premiums and the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment which was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-41177, initially against petitioner SIOL, and
thereafter including E.B. Philipps and D.J. Warby as additional defendants. The complaint sought,
among others, the payment of actual, compensatory, moral, exemplary and liquidated damages,
attorney's fees, expenses of litigation and costs of the suit. Although the prayer in the complaint
did not quantify the amount of damages sought said amount may be inferred from the body of the
complaint to be about Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00).
Only the amount of P210.00 was paid by private respondent as docket fee which prompted
petitioners' counsel to raise his objection. Said objection was disregarded by respondent Judge
Jose P. Castro who was then presiding over said case. Upon the order of this Court, the records
of said case together with twenty-two other cases assigned to different branches of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City which were under investigation for under-assessment of docket fees
were transmitted to this Court. The Court thereafter returned the said records to the trial court with
the directive that they be re-raffled to the other judges in Quezon City, to the exclusion of Judge
Castro. Civil Case No. Q-41177 was re-raffled to Branch 104, a sala which was then vacant.
On October 15, 1985, the Court en banc issued a Resolution in Administrative Case No. 85-10-
8752-RTC directing the judges in said cases to reassess the docket fees and that in case of
deficiency, to order its payment. The Resolution also requires all clerks of court to issue certificates
of re-assessment of docket fees. All litigants were likewise required to specify in their pleadings
the amount sought to be recovered in their complaints.
On December 16, 1985, Judge Antonio P. Solano, to whose sala Civil Case No. Q-41177 was
temporarily assigned, issuedan order to the Clerk of Court instructing him to issue a certificate of
assessment of the docket fee paid by private respondent and, in case of deficiency, to include the
same in said certificate.
On January 7, 1984, to forestall a default, a cautionary answer was filed by petitioners. On August
30,1984, an amended complaint was filed by private respondent including the two additional
defendants aforestated.
Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion, to whom Civil Case No. Q41177 was thereafter assigned, after his
assumption into office on January 16, 1986, issued a Supplemental Order requiring the parties in
the case to comment on the Clerk of Court's letter-report signifying her difficulty in complying with
the Resolution of this Court of October 15, 1985 since the pleadings filed by private respondent
did not indicate the exact amount sought to be recovered. On January 23, 1986, private
respondent filed a "Compliance" and a "Re-Amended Complaint" stating therein a claim of "not
less than Pl0,000,000. 00 as actual compensatory damages" in the prayer. In the body of the said
second amended complaint however, private respondent alleges actual and compensatory
damages and attorney's fees in the total amount of about P44,601,623.70.
On January 24, 1986, Judge Asuncion issued another Order admitting the second amended
complaint and stating therein that the same constituted proper compliance with the Resolution of
this Court and that a copy thereof should be furnished the Clerk of Court for the reassessment of
the docket fees. The reassessment by the Clerk of Court based on private respondent's claim of
"not less than P10,000,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages" amounted to P39,786.00
as docket fee. This was subsequently paid by private respondent.
Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals questioning the said order
of Judie Asuncion dated January 24, 1986.
On April 24, 1986, private respondent filed a supplemental complaint alleging an additional claim
of P20,000,000.00 as d.qmages so the total claim amounts to about P64,601,623.70. On October
16, 1986, or some seven months after filing the supplemental complaint, the private respondent
paid the additional docket fee of P80,396.00.
1
On August 13, 1987, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision ruling, among others, as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Denying due course to the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 1, 09715 insofar as
it seeks annulment of the order
(a) denying petitioners' motion to dismiss the complaint, as amended, and
(b) granting the writ of preliminary attachment, but giving due course to the
portion thereof questioning the reassessment of the docketing fee, and
requiring the Honorable respondent Court to reassess the docketing fee to be
2
paid by private respondent on the basis of the amount of P25,401,707.00.
Hence, the instant petition.
During the pendency of this petition and in conformity with the said judgment of respondent court,
3
private respondent paid the additional docket fee of P62,432.90 on April 28, 1988.

The main thrust of the petition is that the Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the lower court
did not acquire jurisdiction over Civil Case No. Q-41177 on the ground of nonpayment of the
correct and proper docket fee. Petitioners allege that while it may be true that private respondent
had paid the amount of P182,824.90 as docket fee as herein-above related, and considering that
the total amount sought to be recovered in the amended and supplemental complaint is
P64,601,623.70 the docket fee that should be paid by private respondent is P257,810.49, more
or less. Not having paid the same, petitioners contend that the complaint should be dismissed and
all incidents arising therefrom should be annulled. In support of their theory, petitioners cite the
4 only upon payment of the docket fee regardless of the actual date of its filing in court. Said case
latest ruling of the Court in Manchester Development Corporation vs. CA, as follows:
The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the
prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will
not thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less the payment of the docket
fee based on the amounts sought in the amended pleading. The ruling in the
Magaspi Case in so far as it is inconsistent with this pronouncement is
overturned and reversed.
On the other hand, private respondent claims that the ruling in Manchester cannot apply
retroactively to Civil Case No. Q41177 for at the time said civil case was filed in court there was
no such Manchester ruling as yet. Further, private respondent avers that what is applicable is the
5
ruling of this Court in Magaspi v. Ramolete, wherein this Court held that the trial court acquired
jurisdiction over the case even if the docket fee paid was insufficient.
The contention that Manchester cannot apply retroactively to this case is untenable. Statutes
regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to
6
that extent.
7 the amended complaint. The opposition notwithstanding, the amended complaint was admitted by
In Lazaro vs. Endencia and Andres, this Court held that the payment of the full amount of the
docket fee is an indispensable step for the perfection of an appeal. In a forcible entry and detainer
case before the justice of the peace court of Manaoag, Pangasinan, after notice of a judgment
dismissing the case, the plaintiff filed a notice of appeal with said court but he deposited only P8.00
for the docket fee, instead of P16.00 as required, within the reglementary period of appeal of five
(5) days after receiving notice of judgment. Plaintiff deposited the additional P8.00 to complete the
amount of the docket fee only fourteen (14) days later. On the basis of these facts, this court held
that the Court of First Instance did notacquire jurisdiction to hear and determine the appeal as the
appeal was not thereby perfected.
8 opinion as to the correct amount to be paid as docket fee in that as the action appears to be one
In Lee vs. Republic, the petitioner filed a verified declaration of intention to become a Filipino
citizen by sending it through registered mail to the Office of the Solicitor General in 1953 but the
required filing fee was paid only in 1956, barely 5V2 months prior to the filing of the petition for
citizenship. This Court ruled that the declaration was not filed in accordance with the legal
requirement that such declaration should be filed at least one year before the filing of the petition
for citizenship. Citing Lazaro, this Court concluded that the filing of petitioner's declaration of
intention on October 23, 1953 produced no legal effect until the required filing fee was paid on
May 23, 1956.
9 prohibitory injunction during the pendency of the action against the defendants' announced
In Malimit vs. Degamo, the same principles enunciated in Lazaro and Lee were applied. It was
an original petition for quo warranto contesting the right to office of proclaimed candidates which
was mailed, addressed to the clerk of the Court of First Instance, within the one-week period after
10
the proclamation as provided therefor by law. However, the required docket fees were paid only
after the expiration of said period. Consequently, this Court held that the date of such payment
must be deemed to be the real date of filing of aforesaid petition and not the date when it was
mailed.
11
Again, in Garica vs, Vasquez, this Court reiterated the rule that the docket fee must be paid
before a court will act on a petition or complaint. However, we also held that said rule is not
applicable when petitioner seeks the probate of several wills of the same decedent as he is not
required to file a separate action for each will but instead he may have other wills probated in the
same special proceeding then pending before the same court.
12
Then in Magaspi, this Court reiterated the ruling in Malimit and Lee that a case is deemed filed
involved a complaint for recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land with damages
filed in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. Upon the payment of P60.00 for the docket fee and
P10.00 for the sheriffs fee, the complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. R-11882. The prayer of
the complaint sought that the Transfer Certificate of Title issued in the name of the defendant be
declared as null and void. It was also prayed that plaintiff be declared as owner thereof to whom
the proper title should be issued, and that defendant be made to pay monthly rentals of P3,500.00
from June 2, 1948 up to the time the property is delivered to plaintiff, P500,000.00 as moral
damages, attorney's fees in the amount of P250,000.00, the costs of the action and exemplary
damages in the amount of P500,000.00.
The defendant then filed a motion to compel the plaintiff to pay the correct amount of the docket
fee to which an opposition was filed by the plaintiff alleging that the action was for the recovery of
a parcel of land so the docket fee must be based on its assessed value and that the amount of
P60.00 was the correct docketing fee. The trial court ordered the plaintiff to pay P3,104.00 as filing
fee.
The plaintiff then filed a motion to admit the amended complaint to include the Republic as the
defendant. In the prayer of the amended complaint the exemplary damages earlier sought was
eliminated. The amended prayer merely sought moral damages as the court may determine,
attorney's fees of P100,000.00 and the costs of the action. The defendant filed an opposition to
the trial court. The trial court reiterated its order for the payment of the additional docket fee which
plaintiff assailed and then challenged before this Court. Plaintiff alleged that he paid the total
docket fee in the amount of P60.00 and that if he has to pay the additional fee it must be based
on the amended complaint.
The question posed, therefore, was whether or not the plaintiff may be considered to have filed
the case even if the docketing fee paid was not sufficient. In Magaspi, We reiterated the rule that
the case was deemed filed only upon the payment of the correct amount for the docket fee
regardless of the actual date of the filing of the complaint; that there was an honest difference of
for the recovery of property the docket fee of P60.00 was correct; and that as the action is also
one, for damages, We upheld the assessment of the additional docket fee based on the damages
alleged in the amended complaint as against the assessment of the trial court which was based
on the damages alleged in the original complaint.
However, as aforecited, this Court overturned Magaspi in Manchester. Manchester involves an
action for torts and damages and specific performance with a prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order, etc. The prayer in said case is for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
forfeiture of the sum of P3 Million paid by the plaintiffs for the property in question, the attachment
of such property of defendants that may be sufficient to satisfy any judgment that may be rendered,
and, after hearing, the issuance of an order requiring defendants to execute a contract of purchase
and sale of the subject property and annul defendants' illegal forfeiture of the money of plaintiff. It
was also prayed that the defendants be made to pay the plaintiff jointly and severally, actual,
compensatory and exemplary damages as well as 25% of said amounts as may be proved during
the trial for attorney's fees. The plaintiff also asked the trial court to declare the tender of payment
of the purchase price of plaintiff valid and sufficient for purposes of payment, and to make the
injunction permanent. The amount of damages sought is not specified in the prayer although the
body of the complaint alleges the total amount of over P78 Millon allegedly suffered by plaintiff.
Upon the filing of the complaint, the plaintiff paid the amount of only P410.00 for the docket fee
based on the nature of the action for specific performance where the amount involved is not
capable of pecuniary estimation. However, it was obvious from the allegations of the complaint as
well as its designation that the action was one for damages and specific performance. Thus, this
court held the plaintiff must be assessed the correct docket fee computed against the amount of
damages of about P78 Million, although the same was not spelled out in the prayer of the
complaint.
Meanwhile, plaintiff through another counsel, with leave of court, filed an amended complaint on
September 12, 1985 by the inclusion of another co-plaintiff and eliminating any mention of the
amount of damages in the body of the complaint. The prayer in the original complaint was
maintained.
On October 15, 1985, this Court ordered the re-assessment of the docket fee in the said case and
other cases that were investigated. On November 12, 1985, the trial court directed the plaintiff to
rectify the amended complaint by stating the amounts which they were asking for. This plaintiff did
as instructed. In the body of the complaint the amount of damages alleged was reduced to
P10,000,000.00 but still no amount of damages was specified in the prayer. Said amended
complaint was admitted.
Applying the principle in Magaspi that "the case is deemed filed only upon payment of the docket
fee regardless of the actual date of filing in court," this Court held that the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the case by payment of only P410.00 for the docket fee. Neither can the
amendment of the complaint thereby vest jurisdiction upon the Court. For all legal purposes there
was no such original complaint duly filed which could be amended. Consequently, the order
admitting the amended complaint and all subsequent proceedings and actions taken by the trial
13
court were declared null and void.
The present case, as above discussed, is among the several cases of under-assessment of docket
fee which were investigated by this Court together with Manchester. The facts and circumstances
of this case are similar to Manchester. In the body of the original complaint, the total amount of
damages sought amounted to about P50 Million. In the prayer, the amount of damages asked for
was not stated. The action was for the refund of the premium and the issuance of the writ of
preliminary attachment with damages. The amount of only P210.00 was paid for the docket fee.
On January 23, 1986, private respondent filed an amended complaint wherein in the prayer it is
asked that he be awarded no less than P10,000,000.00 as actual and exemplary damages but in
the body of the complaint the amount of his pecuniary claim is approximately P44,601,623.70.
Said amended complaint was admitted and the private respondent was reassessed the additional
docket fee of P39,786.00 based on his prayer of not less than P10,000,000.00 in damages, which
he paid.
On April 24, 1986, private respondent filed a supplemental complaint alleging an additional claim
of P20,000,000.00 in damages so that his total claim is approximately P64,601,620.70. On
October 16, 1986, private respondent paid an additional docket fee of P80,396.00. After the
promulgation of the decision of the respondent court on August 31, 1987 wherein private
respondent was ordered to be reassessed for additional docket fee, and during the pendency of
this petition, and after the promulgation of Manchester, on April 28, 1988, private respondent paid
an additional docket fee of P62,132.92. Although private respondent appears to have paid a total
amount of P182,824.90 for the docket fee considering the total amount of his claim in the amended
and supplemental complaint amounting to about P64,601,620.70, petitioner insists that private
respondent must pay a docket fee of P257,810.49.
The principle in Manchester could very well be applied in the present case. The pattern and the
intent to defraud the government of the docket fee due it is obvious not only in the filing of the
original complaint but also in the filing of the second amended complaint.
However, in Manchester, petitioner did not pay any additional docket fee until] the case was
decided by this Court on May 7, 1987. Thus, in Manchester, due to the fraud committed on the
government, this Court held that the court a quo did not acquire jurisdiction over the case and that
the amended complaint could not have been admitted inasmuch as the original complaint was null
and void.
In the present case, a more liberal interpretation of the rules is called for considering that, unlike
Manchester, private respondent demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules by paying the
additional docket fees as required. The promulgation of the decision in Manchester must have had
that sobering influence on private respondent who thus paid the additional docket fee as ordered
by the respondent court. It triggered his change of stance by manifesting his willingness to pay
such additional docket fee as may be ordered.
Nevertheless, petitioners contend that the docket fee that was paid is still insufficient considering
the total amount of the claim. This is a matter which the clerk of court of the lower court and/or his
duly authorized docket clerk or clerk in-charge should determine and, thereafter, if any amount is
found due, he must require the private respondent to pay the same.
Thus, the Court rules as follows:
1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of
the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature
of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the
docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond
the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third party claims and similar pleadings,
which shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The
court may also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its
applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading
and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not
specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by the court, the
additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of
the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the
additional fee.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Clerk of Court of the court a quo is
hereby instructed to reassess and determine the additional filing fee that should be paid by private
respondent considering the total amount of the claim sought in the original complaint and the
supplemental complaint as may be gleaned from the allegations and the prayer thereof and to
require private respondent to pay the deficiency, if any, without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
 10. Tacay vs. RTC of Tagum, 180 SCRA 433 1 ) P 2,000 as monthly rents from February, 1987;

2 ) Actual damages, as proven;

G.R. Nos. 88075-77 December 20, 1989
3 ) Moral and nominal damages as the Honorable Court may fix ;
MAXIMO TACAY, PONCIANO PANES and ANTONIA NOEL, petitioners,
vs. 4) P30,000.00, "as attorney's fees, and representation fees of P5,000.00 per
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF TAGUM Davao del Norte, Branches 1 and 2, Presided by Hon. day of appearance;"
4
Marcial Fernandez and Hon. Jesus Matas, respectively, PATSITA GAMUTAN, Clerk of Court, and
GODOFREDO PINEDA, respondents.
and
Eduardo C. De Vera for petitioners.
4) that he (Pineda) be granted such "further relief and remedies ... just and
equitable in the premises.
RESOLUTION

The prayer of each complaint contained a handwritten notation (evidently made by plaintiff's
counsel) reading, "P5,000.00 as and for," immediately above the typewritten words, "Actual
damages, as proven," the intention apparently being to make the entire phrase read, " P5,000.00
5
NARVASA, J.: as and for actual damages as proven.

1 6
In the Regional Trial Court at Tagum, Davao del Norte, three Motions to dismiss were filed in behalf of each of the defendants by common counsel . Every
motion alleged that the Trial Court had not acquired jurisdiction of the case —
2
(3) actions for recovery of possession (acciones publicianas ) were separately instituted by
Godofredo Pineda against three (3) defendants, docketed as follows: . . . for the reason that the ... complaint violates the mandatory and clear
provision of Circular No. 7 of the ... Supreme Court dated March 24,1988, by
failing to specify all the amounts of damages which plaintiff is claiming from
1) vs. Antonia Noel Civil Case No. 2209 defendant;" and

2) vs. Ponciano Panes Civil Case No. 2210
3) vs. Maximo Tacay Civil Case No. 2211.
Civil Cases Numbered 2209 and 2211 were raffled to Branch I of the Trial Court, presided over by
Judge Marcial Hernandez. Civil No. 2210 was assigned to Branch 2, presided over by Judge Jesus
Matas.
3
The complaints all alleged the same essential facts (1) Pineda was the owner of a parcel of land
measuring 790 square meters, his ownership being evidenced by TCT No. T-46560; (2) the
previous owner had allowed the defendants to occupy portions of the land by mere tolerance; (3)
having himself need to use the property, Pineda had made demands on the defendants to vacate
the property and pay reasonable rentals therefor, but these demands had been refused; and (4)
the last demand had been made more than a year prior to the commencement of suit. The
complaints prayed for the same reliefs, to wit:
1) that plaintiff be declared owner of the areas occupied by the defendants;
2) that defendants and their "privies and allies" be ordered to vacate and
deliver the portions of the land usurped by them;
3) that each defendant be ordered to pay:
. . . for ... failure (of the complaint) to even allege the basic requirement as to
the assessed value of the subject lot in dispute.
Judge Matas denied the motion to dismiss filed in Civil Case No. 2210 but ordered the expunction
of the "allegations in paragraph 11 of the ... complaint regarding moral as well as nominal damages
7
. On motion of defendant Panes, Judge Matas later ordered the striking out, too, of the
"handwritten amount of 'P5,000. 00 as and for.' including the typewritten words 'actual damages
8
as proven' ... in sub-paragraph b of paragraph 4 in the conclusion and prayer of the complaint ..."
The motions to dismiss submitted in Civil Cases Numbered 2211 and 2209 were also denied in
9
separate orders promulgated by Judge Marcial Fernandez. His Order in Case No. 2209 dated
March 15, 1989 (a) declared that since the "action at bar is for Reivindicatoria, Damages and
Attorney's fees ... (d)efinitely this Court has the exclusive jurisdiction," (b) that the claims for actual,
moral and nominal damages "are only one aspect of the cause of action," and (c) because of
absence of specification of the amounts claimed as moral, nominal and actual damages, they
should be "expunged from the records."
Ascribing grave abuse of discretion to both Judges Matas and Fernandez in the rendition of the
Orders above described, the defendants in all three (3) actions have filed with this Court a "Joint
Petition" for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for temporary restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction," praying essentially that said orders be annulled
and respondent judges directed to dismiss all the complaints "without prejudice to private
respondent Pineda's re-filing a similar complaint that complies with Circular No. 7." The joint
petition (a) re-asserted the proposition that because the complaints had failed to state the amounts
being claimed as actual, moral and nominal damages, the Trial Courts a quo had not acquired
jurisdiction over the three (3) actions in question-indeed, the respondent Clerk of Court should not
have accepted the complaints which initiated said suits, and (b) it was not proper merely to
expunge the claims for damages and allow "the so-called cause of action for "reivindicatoria"
10
remain for trial" by itself.
The joint petition should be, as it is hereby, dismissed.
It should be dismissed for failure to comply with this Court's Circular No. 1-88 (effective January
11
1, 1989). The copies of the challenged Orders thereto attached were not certified by the proper
Clerk of Court or his duly authorized representative. Certification was made by the petitioners'
counsel, which is not allowed.
The petition should be dismissed, too, for another equally important reason. It fails to demonstrate
any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent Judges in rendering the Orders
complained of or, for that matter, the existence of any proper cause for the issuance of the writ of
mandamus. On the contrary, the orders appear to have correctly applied the law to the admitted
facts.
It is true that the complaints do not state the amounts being claimed as actual, moral and nominal
damages. It is also true, however, that the actions are not basically for the recovery of sums of
money. They are principally for recovery of possession of real property, in the nature of an accion
publiciana. Determinative of the court's jurisdiction in this type of actions is the nature thereof, not
the amount of the damages allegedly arising from or connected with the issue of title or
possession, and regardless of the value of the property. Quite obviously, an action for recovery of
12
possession of real property (such as an accion plenaria de possesion) or the title thereof, or for
13
partition or condemnation of, or the foreclosure of a mortgage on, said real property - in other
words, a real action-may be commenced and prosecuted without an accompanying claim for
actual, moral, nominal or exemplary damages; and such an action would fall within the exclusive,
original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.
Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 provides that Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction inter alia over "all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property,
or any interest therein, except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or
buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
14
Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts." The rule applies regardless of the value of the
real property involved, whether it be worth more than P20,000.00 or not, infra. The rule also applies
even where the complaint involving realty also prays for an award of damages; the amount of
those damages would be immaterial to the question of the Court's jurisdiction. The rule is unlike
15
that in other cases e.g., actions simply for recovery of money or of personal property, or actions
16 17
in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction in which the amount claimed, or the value of the personal
property, is determinative of jurisdiction; i.e., the value of the personal property or the amount
claimed should exceed twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) in order to be cognizable by the
Regional Trial Court.
Circular No. 7 of this Court, dated March 24, 1988, cannot thus be invoked, as the petitioner does,
as authority for the dismissal of the actions at bar. That circular, avowedly inspired by the doctrine
laid down in Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of appeals, 149 SCRA 562 (May 7,
1987), has but limited application to said actions, as shall presently be discussed. Moreover, the
rules therein laid down have since been clarified and amplified by the Court's subsequent decision
in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) v. Asuncion, et al., G.R. Nos. 79937-38, February 13, 1989.
Circular No. 7 was aimed at the practice of certain parties who omit from the prayer of their
complaints "any specification of the amount of damages," the omission being "clearly intended for
no other purposes than to evade the payment of the correct filing fees if not to mislead the docket
clerk, in the assessment of the filing fee." The following rules were therefore set down:
1. All complaints, petitions, answers, and similar pleadings should specify the amount of damages
being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages
shall be considered in the assessment of the filing fees in any case.
2. Any pleading that fails to comply with this requirement shall not be accepted nor admitted, or
shall otherwise be expunged from the record.
3. The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket
fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the
Court, much less the payment of the docket fee based on the amount sought in the amended
pleading.
The clarificatory and additional rules laid down in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion,
supra, read as follows:
1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but (also) the payment
of the prescribed docket fee that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject-matter or
nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of
the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case
beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims and similar pleadings,
which shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The
court may also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its
applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading
and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not
specified in the pleading, or if specified, the same has been left for determination by the court, the
additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of
the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the
additional fee.
As will be noted, the requirement in Circular No. 7 that complaints, petitions, answers, and similar
pleadings should specify the amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of the
pleading but also in the prayer, has not been altered. What has been revised is the rule that
subsequent "amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in
the Court, much less the payment of the docket fee based on the amount sought in the amended
pleading," the trial court now being authorized to allow payment of the fee within a reasonable
time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. Moreover, a new
rule has been added, governing awards of claims not specified in the pleading - i.e., damages
arising after the filing of the complaint or similar pleading-as to which the additional filing fee
therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment.
Now, under the Rules of Court, docket or filing fees are assessed on the basis of the "sum
claimed," on the one hand, or the "value of the property in litigation or the value of the estate," on
18
the other. There are, in other words, as already above intimated, actions or proceedings
involving real property, in which the value of the property is immaterial to the court's jurisdiction,
account thereof being taken merely for assessment of the legal fees; and there are actions or
proceedings, involving personal property or the recovery of money and/or damages, in which the
value of the property or the amount of the demand is decisive of the trial court's competence (aside
19
from being the basis for fixing the corresponding docket fees).
Where the action is purely for the recovery of money or damages, the docket fees are assessed
on the basis of the aggregate amount claimed, exclusive only of interests and costs. In this case,
the complaint or similar pleading should, according to Circular No. 7 of this Court, "specify the
amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer,
and said damages shall be considered in the assessment of the filing fees in any case."

Two situations may arise. One is where the complaint or similar pleading sets out a claim purely
for money or damages and there is no precise statement of the amounts being claimed. In this
event the rule is that the pleading will "not be accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be
expunged from the record." In other words, the complaint or pleading may be dismissed, or the
claims as to which the amounts are unspecified may be expunged, although as aforestated the
Court may, on motion, permit amendment of the complaint and payment of the fees provided the
claim has not in the meantime become time-barred. The other is where the pleading does specify
the amount of every claim, but the fees paid are insufficient; and here again, the rule now is that
the court may allow a reasonable time for the payment of the prescribed fees, or the balance
thereof, and upon such payment, the defect is cured and the court may properly take cognizance
of the action, unless in the meantime prescription has set in and consequently barred the right of
action.

Where the action involves real property and a related claim for damages as well, the legal fees
shall be assessed on the basis of both (a) the value of the property and (b) the total amount of
related damages sought. The Court acquires jurisdiction over the action if the filing of the initiatory
pleading is accompanied by the payment of the requisite fees, or, if the fees are not paid at the
time of the filing of the pleading, as of the time of full payment of the fees within such reasonable
time as the court may grant, unless, of course, prescription has set in the meantime. But where-
as in the case at bar-the fees prescribed for an action involving real property have been paid, but
the amounts of certain of the related damages (actual, moral and nominal) being demanded are
unspecified, the action may not be dismissed. The Court undeniably has jurisdiction over the action
involving the real property, acquiring it upon the filing of the complaint or similar pleading and
payment of the prescribed fee. And it is not divested of that authority by the circumstance that it
may not have acquired jurisdiction over the accompanying claims for damages because of lack of
specification thereof. What should be done is simply to expunge those claims for damages as to
which no amounts are stated, which is what the respondent Courts did, or allow, on motion, a
reasonable time for the amendment of the complaints so as to allege the precise amount of each
item of damages and accept payment of the requisite fees therefor within the relevant prescriptive
period.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to costs.

 11. Ayala Corp. vs. Madayag, 181 SCRA 687
G.R. No. 88421 January 30, 1990
AYALA CORPORATION, LAS PIÑAS VENTURES, INC., and FILIPINAS LIFE ASSURANCE
COMPANY, INC., petitioners
vs.
THE HONORABLE JOB B. MADAYAG, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION, BRANCH 145 and THE SPOUSES CAMILO AND MA.
MARLENE SABIO, respondents.
Renato L. De la Fuente for petitioners.
Camilo L. Sabio for private respondents.
GANCAYCO, J.:
Once more the issue relating to the payment of filing fees in an action for specific performance
with damages is presented by this petition for prohibition.
Private respondents filed against petitioners an action for specific performance with damages in
the Regional Trial Court of Makati. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the
lower court has not acquired jurisdiction over the case as private respondents failed to pay the
prescribed docket fee and to specify the amount of exemplary damages both in the body and
prayer of the amended and supplemental complaint. The trial court denied the motion in an order
dated April 5, 1989. A motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners was likewise denied in an
order dated May 18, 1989. Hence this petition.
The main thrust of the petition is that private respondent paid only the total amount of P l,616.00
as docket fees instead of the amount of P13,061.35 based on the assessed value of the real
properties involved as evidenced by its tax declaration. Further, petitioners contend that private
respondents failed to specify the amount of exemplary damages sought both in the body and the
prayer of the amended and supplemental complaint.
1 While it is true that the determination of certain damages as exemplary or corrective damages is
In Manchester Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals a similar case involving an action
for specific performance with damages, this Court held that the docket fee should be assessed by
considering the amount of damages as alleged in the original complaint.
However, the contention of petitioners is that since the action concerns real estate, the assessed
value thereof should be considered in computing the fees pursuant to Section 5, Rule 141 of the
Rules of Court. Such rule cannot apply to this case which is an action for specific performance
with damages although it is in relation to a transaction involving real estate. Pursuant
to Manchester, the amount of the docket fees to be paid should be computed on the basis of the
amount of damages stated in the complaint.
Petitioners also allege that because of the failure of the private respondents to state the amount
of exemplary damages being sought, the complaint must nevertheless be dismissed in
accordance to Manchester. The trial court denied the motion stating that the determination of the
exemplary damages is within the sound discretion of the court and that it would be unwarrantedly
presumptuous on the part of the private respondents to fix the amount of exemplary damages
being prayed for. The trial court cited the subsequent case of Sun Insurance vs. Judge
2
Asuncion in support of its ruling.
The clarificatory and additional rules laid down in Sun Insurance are as follows:
1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but (also)
the payment of the prescribed docket fee that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the
subject-matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not
accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee
within a reasonable tune but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period.
2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third party claims and similar
pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed
therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time
but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate
pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment
awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified, the same has been left for
determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the
judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy
to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.
Apparently, the trial court misinterpreted paragraph 3 of the above ruling of this Court wherein it is
stated that "where the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified, the
same has been left for the determination of the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall
constitute a lien on the judgment" by considering it to mean that where in the body and prayer of
the complaint there is a prayer, say for exemplary or corrective damages, the amount of which is
left to the discretion of the Court, there is no need to specify the amount being sought, and that
any award thereafter shall constitute a lien on the judgment.
3
In the latest case Tacay vs. Regional Trial Court of Tagum, this Court had occasion to make the
clarification that the phrase "awards of claims not specified in the pleading" refers only to
"damages arising after the filing of the complaint or similar pleading . . . as to which the additional
filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment." The amount of any claim for damages,
therefore, arising on or before the filing of the complaint or any pleading, should be specified.
left to the sound discretion of the court, it is the duty of the parties claiming such damages to
specify the amount sought on the basis of which the court may make a proper determination, and
for the proper assessment of the appropriate docket fees. The exception contemplated as to
claims not specified or to claims although specified are left for determination of the court is limited
only to any damages that may arise after the filing of the complaint or similar pleading for then it
will not be possible for the claimant to specify nor speculate as to the amount thereof.
The amended and supplemental complaint in the present case, therefore, suffers from the material
defect in failing to state the amount of exemplary damages prayed for.
As ruled in Tacay the trial court may either order said claim to be expunged from the record as it
did not acquire jurisdiction over the same or on motion, it may allow, within a reasonable time, the
amendment of the amended and supplemental complaint so as to state the precise amount of the
exemplary damages sought and require the payment of the requisite fees therefor within the
relevant prescriptive period.
4
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The trial court is directed either to expunge from the
record the claim for exemplary damages in the amended and supplemental complaint, the amount
of which is not specified, or it may otherwise, upon motion, give reasonable time to private
respondents to amend their pleading by specifying its amount and paying the corresponding
docketing fees within the appropriate reglementary or prescriptive period. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 12. Negros Oriental Planters Association vs. Hon.
On 17 August 2005, more than six years after NOPA filed its Answer, NOPA filed a
THIRD DIVISION Motion to Dismiss on the ground of an alleged failure of Campos to file the correct filing

NEGROS ORIENTAL PLANTERS G.R. No. 179878 fee. According to NOPA, Campos deliberately concealed in his Complaint the exact amount of
ASSOCIATION, INC. (NOPA),
actual damages by opting to estimate the value of the unwithdrawn molasses in order to escape
Petitioner,
Present: the payment of the proper docket fees.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
- versus - Chairperson, On 30 June 2006, the RTC issued an Order denying the Motion to Dismiss. NOPA
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO, received this Order on 17 July 2006.
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.
HON. PRESIDING JUDGE OF RTC- On 1 August 2006, NOPA filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the 30 June
NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, BRANCH
52, BACOLOD CITY, and ANICETO 2006 Order. On 5 January 2007, the RTC issued an Order denying NOPAs Motion for
MANOJO CAMPOS,
Reconsideration.
Respondents. Promulgated:

December 24, 2008

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x On 2 April 2007, NOPA filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals
assailing the Orders of the RTC dated 30 June 2006 and 5 January 2007.
DECISION On 23 May 2007, the Court of Appeals issued the first assailed Resolution dismissing
the Petition for Certiorari on the following grounds:

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
1. Failure of the Petitioner to state in its Verification that the
allegations in the petition are based on authentic records, in violation of
Section 4, Rule 7, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended by A.M.
Whats sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. No. 00-2-10-SC (May 1, 2000), which provides:

[1]
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking the reversal of the Resolutions of x x x - A pleading is verified by an affidavit that
the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations
the Court of Appeals dated 23 May 2007 and 16 August 2007, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge
02651 outrightly dismissing the Petition for Certiorari filed by petitioner Negros Oriental Planters or based on authentic records.

Association, Inc. (NOPA) against private respondent Aniceto Manojo Campos (Campos). A pleading required to be verified which
contains a verification based on information and belief, or
lacks a proper verification, shall be treated as an
unsigned pleading.
On 17 March 1999, Campos filed a Complaint for Breach of Contract with Damages,
docketed as Civil Case No. 99-10773, against NOPA before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
2. Failure of the petitioner to append to the petition relevant
Negros Occidental, Bacolod City. According to the Complaint, Campos and NOPA entered into pleadings and documents, which would aid in the resolution of the instant
petition, in violation of Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, such as:
two separate contracts denominated as Molasses Sales Agreement. Campos allegedly paid the
consideration of the Molasses Sales Agreement in full, but was only able to receive a partial a. Ex-parte Motion to Set the Case for Pre-Trial dated July 27,
1999;
delivery of the molasses because of a disagreement as to the quality of the products being b. Notice of Pre-Trial;
c. Motion for Leave to File Third Party Complaint;
delivered.
d. Orders dated July 31, 2000, March 20 2001, November 17,
2004, and May 17, 2005, respectively;
e. Motion to Suspend the Proceedings dated August 10, 2003;
f. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute; and
g. Motion for Reconsideration to the Order dated May 12, 2005.

Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, provides:
When any tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in
excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and
there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court,
alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the
proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and
granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may
require.
The petition shall be accompanied by a
certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution
subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents
relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification
of non-forum shopping as provided in the paragraph of
section 3, Rule 46.
3. Failure of petitioners counsel to indicate in the petition his current
IBP Official Receipt Number, in violation of Bar Matter No. 1132 and/or A.M.
No. 287, which reads as follows:
The Court resolved, upon recommendation of
the Office of the Bar Confidant, to GRANT the request of
the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Sanguniang Panlalawigan of Ilocos
Norte to require all lawyers to indicate their Roll of
Attorneys Number in all papers or pleadings submitted to
the various judicial or quasi-judicial bodies in addition to
the requirement of indicating the current Professional
Tax Receipt (PTR) and the IBP Official Receipt or
[2]
Lifetime Member Number.
On 22 June 2007, NOPA filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the above Resolution,
attaching thereto an Amended Petition for Certiorari in compliance with the requirements of the
Court of Appeals deemed to have been violated by NOPA. The Court of Appeals denied the said
Motion in the second assailed Resolution dated 16 August 2007.
Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari, where NOPA raises the following issue
and arguments:
ISSUE
WHETHER OR NOT THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT CA COMMITTED
REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT THERE WAS NO
SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROCEDURAL
REQUIREMENTS WHEN PETITIONER FAILED TO ALLEGE IN ITS
VERIFICATION THAT THE ALLEGATIONS THEREIN ARE TRUE AND
CORRECT OF HIS PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OR BASED ON AUTHENTIC
RECORDS AND FAILURE TO ATTACH THE NECESSARY DOCUMENTS
ON ITS PLEADINGS AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 1, RULE 65 OF THE
[3]
1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
ARGUMENTS
1. The requirement that a pleading be verified is merely formal and
not jurisdictional. The court may give due course to an unverified pleading
where the material facts alleged are a matter of record and the questions
raised are mainly of law such as in a petition for certiorari.
[4]
2. Petitioner had attached to its Petition for Certiorari clearly legible
and duplicate original or a certified true copy of the judgment or final order or
resolution of the court a quo and the requisite number of plain copies thereof
[5]
and such material portions of the record as would support the petition.
3. Substantial compliance of the rules, which was further supplied
by the petitioners subsequent full compliance demonstrates its good faith to
[6]
abide by the procedural requirements.
4. The resolution of the important jurisdictional issue raised by the
petitioner before the PUBLIC RESPONDENT CA would justify a relaxation of
[7]
the rules.
The original Verification in the original Petition for Certiorari filed by NOPA states as
follows:
1. That I am the President and Chairman of the Board of Directors
of Negros Oriental Planters Association, Inc. (NOPA), the petitioner in this
case, a domestic corporation duly organized under Philippine Laws, with
principal place of business at Central Bais, Bais City, Philippines; that I am
duly authorized by the Board of NOPA (Secretarys Certificate attached as
Annex A) to cause the preparation of the foregoing petition; and that I hereby
affirm and confirm that all the allegations contained herein are true and
[8]
correct to my own knowledge and belief;
NOPA claims that this Court has in several cases allowed pleadings with a Verification
that contains the allegation to the best of my knowledge and the allegation are true and correct,
[9]
without the words of his own knowledge, citing Decano v. Edu, and Quimpo v. De la
[10]
Victoria. NOPA claims that the allegations in these cases constitute substantial compliance with
the Rules of Court, and should likewise apply to the case at bar.
NOPA is mistaken. NOPA cited cases promulgated before 1 May 2000, when Section
4 of Rule 7 was amended by A.M. No. 00-2-10. Before the amendment, said Section 4 stated:
 SEC. 4. Verification.Except when otherwise specifically required by
law or rule, pleadings need not be under oath, verified or accompanied by
affidavit.
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the
pleading and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his knowledge
and belief.
As amended, said Section 4 now states:
SEC. 4. Verification.Except when otherwise specifically required by
law or rule, pleadings need not be under oath, verified or accompanied by
affidavit.
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the
pleading and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his personal
knowledge or based on authentic records.
Clearly, the amendment was introduced in order to make the verification requirement
stricter, such that the party cannot now merely state under oath that he believes the statements
made in the pleading. He cannot even merely state under oath that he has knowledge that such
statements are true and correct. His knowledge must be specifically alleged under oath to be
either personal knowledge or at least based on authentic records.
Unlike, however, the requirement for a Certification against Forum Shopping in Section
5, wherein failure to comply with the requirements is not curable by amendment of the complaint
[11]
or other initiatory pleading, Section 4 of Rule 7, as amended, states that the effect of the failure
to properly verify a pleading is that the pleading shall be treated as unsigned:
A pleading required to be verified which contains a
verification based on information and belief, or upon knowledge, information
and belief, or lacks a proper verification, shall be treated as an unsigned
pleading.
Unsigned pleadings are discussed in the immediately preceding section of Rule 7:
SEC. 3. Signature and address. x x x.
xxxx
An unsigned pleading produces no legal effect. However, the
court may, in its discretion, allow such deficiency to be remedied if it shall
appear that the same was due to mere inadvertence and not intended for
delay. Counsel who deliberately files an unsigned pleading, or signs a
pleading in violation of this Rule, or alleges scandalous or indecent matter
therein, or fails to promptly report to the court a change of his address, shall
be subject to appropriate disciplinary action. (5a)
A pleading, therefore, wherein the Verification is merely based on the partys knowledge
and belief produces no legal effect, subject to the discretion of the court to allow the deficiency to
be remedied. In the case at bar, the Court of Appeals, in the exercise of this discretion, refused to
allow the deficiency in the Verification to be remedied, by denying NOPAs Motion for
Reconsideration with attached Amended Petition for Certiorari.
May an appellate court reverse the exercise of discretion by a lower court? The old
[12]
case of Lino Luna v. Arcenas states that it can, but only in exceptional cases when there is
grave abuse of this discretion or adverse effect on the substantial rights of a litigant:
Discretionary power is generally exercised by trial judges in
furtherance of the convenience of the courts and the litigants, the expedition
of business, and in the decision of interlocutory matters on conflicting facts
where one tribunal could not easily prescribe to another the appropriate rule
of procedure.
The general rule, therefore, and indeed one of the fundamental
principles of appellate procedure is that decisions of a trial court which "lie in
discretion" will not be reviewed on appeal, whether the case be civil or
criminal at law or in equity.
We have seen that where such rulings have to do with minor
matters, not affecting the substantial rights of the parties, the prohibition of
review in appellate proceedings is made absolute by the express terms of the
statute; but it would be a monstrous travesty on justice to declare that where
the exercise of discretionary power by an inferior court affects adversely the
substantial legal rights of a litigant, it is not subject to review on appeal in any
case wherein a clear and affirmative showing is made of an abuse of
discretion, or of a total lack of its exercise, or of conduct amounting to an
abuse of discretion, such as its improper exercise under a misapprehension
of the law applicable to the facts upon which the ruling is based.
In its very nature, the discretionary control conferred upon the trial
judge over the proceedings had before him implies the absence of any hard-
and-fast rule by which it is to be exercised, and in accordance with which it
may be reviewed. But the discretion conferred upon the courts is not a willful,
arbitrary, capricious and uncontrolled discretion. It is a sound, judicial
discretion which should always be exercised with due regard to the rights of
the parties and the demands of equity and justice. As was said in the case of
The Styria vs. Morgan (186 U. S., 1, 9): "The establishment of a clearly
defined rule of action would be the end of discretion, and yet discretion should
not be a word for arbitrary will or inconsiderate action." So in the case of
Goodwin vs. Prime (92 Me., 355), it was said that "discretion implies that in
the absence of positive law or fixed rule the judge is to decide by his view of
expediency or by the demands of equity and justice."
There being no "positive law or fixed rule" to guide the judge in the
court below in such cases, there is no "positive law or fixed rule" to guide a
court of appeal in reviewing his action in the premises, and such courts will
not therefore attempt to control the exercise of discretion by the court below
 unless it plainly appears that there was "inconsiderate action" or the exercise
of mere "arbitrary will," or in other words that his action in the premises
amounted to "an abuse of discretion." But the right of an appellate court to
review judicial acts which lie in the discretion of inferior courts may properly
be invoked upon a showing of a strong and clear case of abuse of power to
the prejudice of the appellant, or that the ruling objected to rested on an
[13]
erroneous principle of law not vested in discretion.
The case at bar demonstrates a situation in which there is no effect on the substantial
rights of a litigant. NOPAs Petition for Certiorari is seeking the reversal of the Orders of the RTC
denying NOPAs Motion to Dismiss on the ground of failure to pay the proper docket fees. The
alleged deficiency in the payment of docket fees by Campos, if there is any, would not inure to the
benefit of NOPA.
There is therefore no substantive right that will be prejudiced by the Court of Appeals
exercise of discretion in the case at bar. While the payment of docket fees is jurisdictional, it is
nevertheless unmistakably also a technicality. Ironically, in seeking the leniency of this Court on
the basis of substantial justice, NOPA is ultimately praying for a Writ of Certiorari enjoining the
action for breach of contract from being decided on the merits.Whats sauce for the goose is sauce
for the gander. A party cannot expect its opponent to comply with the technical rules of procedure
while, at the same time, hoping for the relaxation of the technicalities in its favor.
There was therefore no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals
warranting this Courts reversal of the exercise of discretion by the former. However, even if we
decide to brush aside the lapses in technicalities on the part of NOPA in its Petition for Certiorari,
we nevertheless find that such Petition would still fail.
NOPA seeks in its Petition for Certiorari for the application of this Courts ruling
[14]
in Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, wherein we ruled that the court
acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon payment of the prescribed docket fee. An
amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the court, much
less the payment of the docket fee based on the amount sought in the amended pleading.
[15]
In denying NOPAs Motion to Dismiss, the RTC cited Sun Insurance Office, Ltd.
[16]
(SIOL) v. Asuncion, wherein we modified our ruling in Manchester and decreed that where the
initiatory pleading is not accompanied by the payment of the docket fee, the court may allow
payment of the fee within a reasonable period of time, but in no case beyond the applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period. The aforesaid ruling was made on the justification that, unlike
in Manchester, the private respondent in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) demonstrated his
willingness to abide by the rules by paying the additional docket fees required. NOPA claims
that Sun is not applicable to the case at bar, since Campos deliberately concealed his claim for
damages in the prayer.
[17]
In United Overseas Bank (formerly Westmont Bank) v. Ros, we discussed
how Manchester was not applicable to said case in view of the lack of deliberate intent to defraud
manifested in the latter:
This Court wonders how the petitioner could possibly arrive at the conclusion
that the private respondent was moved by fraudulent intent in omitting the
amount of damages claimed in its Second Amended Complaint, thus placing
itself on the same footing as the complainant in Manchester, when it is clear
that the factual milieu of the instant case is far from that of Manchester.
First, the complainant in Manchester paid the docket fee only in the
amount of P410.00, notwithstanding its claim for damages in the amount
of P78,750,000.00, while in the present case, the private respondent
paid P42,000.00 as docket fees upon filing of the original complaint.
Second, complainant's counsel in Manchester claimed, in the body
of the complaint, damages in the amount of P78,750.00 but omitted the same
in its prayer in order to evade the payment of docket fees. Such fraud-defining
circumstance is absent in the instant petition.
Finally, when the court took cognizance of the issue of non-
payment of docket fees in Manchester, the complainant therein filed an
amended complaint, this time omitting all mention of the amount of damages
being claimed in the body of the complaint; and when directed by the court to
specify the amount of damages in such amended complaint, it reduced the
same from P78,750,000.00 to P10,000,000.00, obviously to avoid payment
of the required docket fee. Again, this patent fraudulent scheme is wanting in
the case at bar.
This Court is not inclined to adopt the petitioner's piecemeal
construction of our rulings in Manchester and Sun Insurance. Its attempt to
strip the said landmark cases of one or two lines and use them to bolster its
arguments and clothe its position with jurisprudential blessing must be struck
down by this Court.
All told, the rule is clear and simple. In case where the party does
not deliberately intend to defraud the court in payment of docket fees, and
manifests its willingness to abide by the rules by paying additional docket fees
when required by the court, the liberal doctrine enunciated in Sun
Insurance and not the strict regulations set in Manchester will apply.
In the case at bar, Campos filed an amount of P54,898.50 as docket fee, based on the
amounts of P10,000,000.00 representing the value of unwithdrawn molasses, P100,00.00 as
storage fee, P200,00.00 as moral damages, P100,000.00 as exemplary damages
and P500,000.00 as attorneys fees. The total amount considered in computing the docket fee
was P10,900,000.00. NOPA alleges that Campos deliberately omitted a claim for unrealized profit
of P100,000.00 and an excess amount of storage fee in the amount of P502,875.98 in its prayer
and, hence, the amount that should have been considered in the payment of docket fees
is P11,502,875.98. The amount allegedly deliberately omitted was therefore only P602,875.98 out
of P11,502,875.98, or merely 5.2% of said alleged total. Camposs pleadings furthermore evince
his willingness to abide by the rules by paying the additional docket fees when required by the
Court.

Since the circumstances of this case clearly show that there was no deliberate intent to
defraud the Court in the payment of docket fees, the case of Sun should be applied, and the Motion
to Dismiss by NOPA should be denied.

WHEREFORE, the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 23 May 2007 and 16
August 2007, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 02651, outrightly dismissing the Petition
for Certiorari filed by petitioner Negros Oriental Planters Association, Inc. against private
respondent Aniceto Manojo Campos, are AFFIRMED. No costs.
 13. Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog vs. Melicor, 455 SCRA 460 (2005)
[G.R. No. 140954. April 12, 2005]
[1]
HEIRS OF BERTULDO HINOG: Bertuldo Hinog II, Bertuldo Hinog III, Bertuldo Hinog, Jr.,
Jocelyn Hinog, Bertoldo Hinog IV, Bertoldo Hinog V, Edgardo Hinog, Milagros H.
Pabatao, Lilian H. King, Victoria H. Engracia, Terisita C. Hinog, Paz H. Besana, Roberto
C. Hinog, Vicente C. Hinog, Roel C. Hinog, Marilyn C. Hinog, Bebot C. Hinog, lordes C.
Hinog, Pablo Chiong, Arlene Lanasang (All respresented by Bertuldo Hinog
III), petitioners, vs. HON. ACHILLES MELICOR, in his capacity as Presiding Judge,
th
RTC, Branch 4, 7 Judicial Region, Tagbiliran City, Bohol, and CUSTODIO BALANE,
RUFO BALANE, HONORIO BALANE, and TOMAS BALANE, respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court which
assails the Orders dated March 22, 1999, August 13, 1999 and October 15, 1999 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 4, of Tagbilaran City, Bohol in Civil Case No. 4923.
The factual background of the case is as follows:
On May 21, 1991, private respondents Custodio, Rufo, Tomas and Honorio, all surnamed
Balane, filed a complaint for Recovery of Ownership and Possession, Removal of Construction
and Damages against Bertuldo Hinog (Bertuldo for brevity). They alleged that: they own a 1,399-
square meter parcel of land situated in Malayo Norte, Cortes, Bohol, designated as Lot No. 1714;
sometime in March 1980, they allowed Bertuldo to use a portion of the said property for a period
of ten years and construct thereon a small house of light materials at a nominal annual rental
of P100.00 only, considering the close relations of the parties; after the expiration of the ten-year
period, they demanded the return of the occupied portion and removal of the house constructed
thereon but Bertuldo refused and instead claimed ownership of the entire property.
Accordingly, private respondents sought to oust Bertuldo from the premises of the subject
property and restore upon themselves the ownership and possession thereof, as well as the
payment of moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees and litigation expenses in amounts
justified by the evidence.
[2]
On July 2, 1991, Bertuldo filed his Answer. He alleged ownership of the disputed property
by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 2, 1980, executed by one Tomas Pahac with the
[3]
knowledge and conformity of private respondents.
After the pre-trial, trial on the merits ensued. On November 18, 1997, private respondents
rested their case. Thereupon, Bertuldo started his direct examination. However, on June 24, 1998,
Bertuldo died without completing his evidence.
On August 4, 1998, Atty. Sulpicio A. Tinampay withdrew as counsel for Bertuldo as his
services were terminated by petitioner Bertuldo Hinog III. Atty. Veronico G. Petalcorin then entered
[4]
his appearance as new counsel for Bertuldo.
On September 22, 1998, Atty. Petalcorin filed a motion to expunge the complaint from the
record and nullify all court proceedings on the ground that private respondents failed to specify in
the complaint the amount of damages claimed so as to pay the correct docket fees; and that
[5]
under Manchester Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, non-payment of the correct
[6]
docket fee is jurisdictional.
In an amended motion, filed on October 2, 1998, Atty. Petalcorin further alleged that the
private respondents failed to pay the correct docket fee since the main subject matter of the case
[7]
cannot be estimated as it is for recovery of ownership, possession and removal of construction.
Private respondents opposed the motion to expunge on the following grounds: (a) said
motion was filed more than seven years from the institution of the case; (b) Atty. Petalcorin has
not complied with Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court which provides that the death of the
original defendant requires a substitution of parties before a lawyer can have legal personality to
represent a litigant and the motion to expunge does not mention of any specific party whom he is
representing; (c) collectible fees due the court can be charged as lien on the judgment; and (d)
[8]
considering the lapse of time, the motion is merely a dilatory scheme employed by petitioners.
In their Rejoinder, petitioners manifested that the lapse of time does not vest the court with
jurisdiction over the case due to failure to pay the correct docket fees. As to the contention that
deficiency in payment of docket fees can be made as a lien on the judgment, petitioners argued
that the payment of filing fees cannot be made dependent on the result of the action taken.
[9]
On January 21, 1999, the trial court, while ordering the complaint to be expunged from the
records and the nullification of all court proceedings taken for failure to pay the correct docket fees,
nonetheless, held:
The Court can acquire jurisdiction over this case only upon the payment of the exact prescribed
docket/filing fees for the main cause of action, plus additional docket fee for the amount of
damages being prayed for in the complaint, which amount should be specified so that the same
can be considered in assessing the amount of the filing fees. Upon the complete payment of such
fees, the Court may take appropriate action in the light of the ruling in the case of Manchester
[10]
Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, supra.
Accordingly, on January 28, 1999, upon payment of deficiency docket fee, private
[11]
respondents filed a manifestation with prayer to reinstate the case. Petitioners opposed the
[12]
reinstatement but on March 22, 1999, the trial court issued the first assailed Order reinstating
[13]
the case.
[14]
On May 24, 1999, petitioners, upon prior leave of court, filed their supplemental pleading,
[15]
appending therein a Deed of Sale dated November 15, 1982. Following the submission of private
[16]
respondents opposition thereto, the trial court, in its Order dated July 7, 1999, denied the
supplemental pleading on the ground that the Deed of Absolute Sale is a new matter which was
never mentioned in the original answer dated July 2, 1991, prepared by Bertuldos original counsel
and which Bertuldo verified; and that such new document is deemed waived in the light of Section
[17]
1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court. The trial court also noted that no formal substitution of the parties
was made because of the failure of defendants counsel to give the names and addresses of the
legal representatives of Bertuldo, so much so that the supposed heirs of Bertuldo are not specified
[18]
in any pleading in the case.
On July 14, 1999, petitioners manifested that the trial court having expunged the complaint
and nullified all court proceedings, there is no valid case and the complaint should not be admitted
for failure to pay the correct docket fees; that there should be no case to be reinstated and no
[19]
case to proceed as there is no complaint filed.
[20] [21]
After the submission of private respondents opposition and petitioners rejoinder, the
trial court issued the second assailed Order on August 13, 1999, essentially denying petitioners
manifestation/rejoinder. The trial court held that the issues raised in such manifestation/rejoinder
are practically the same as those raised in the amended motion to expunge which had already
been passed upon in the Order dated January 21, 1999. Moreover, the trial court observed that
the Order dated March 22, 1999 which reinstated the case was not objected to by petitioners within
the reglementary period or even thereafter via a motion for reconsideration despite receipt thereof
[22]
on March 26, 1999.
[23]
On August 25, 1999, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was
denied by the trial court in its third assailed Order dated October 15, 1999. The trial court held that
[24]
the Manchester rule was relaxed in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. vs. Asuncion. Noting that there
has been no substitution of parties following the death of Bertuldo, the trial court directed Atty.
Petalcorin to comply with the provisions of Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. The trial court
also reiterated that the Order dated March 22, 1999 reinstating the case was not assailed by
[25]
petitioners within the reglementary period, despite receipt thereof on March 26, 1999.
On November 19, 1999, Atty. Petalcorin complied with the directive of the trial court to
[26]
submit the names and addresses of the heirs of Bertuldo.
On November 24, 1999, petitioners filed before us the present petition for certiorari and
[27]
prohibition. They allege that the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in
allowing the case to be reinstated after private respondents paid the docket fee deficiency since
the trial court had earlier expunged the complaint from the record and nullified all proceedings of
the case and such ruling was not contested by the private respondents. Moreover, they argue that
the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in allowing the case to be filed and
denying the manifestation with motion to dismiss, despite the defect in the complaint which prayed
for damages without specifying the amounts, in violation of SC Circular No. 7, dated March 24,
1988.
In their Comment, private respondents aver that no grave abuse of discretion was committed
by the trial court in reinstating the complaint upon the payment of deficiency docket fees because
petitioners did not object thereto within the reglementary period. Besides, Atty. Petalcorin
possessed no legal personality to appear as counsel for the heirs of Bertuldo until he complies
[28]
with Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.
At the outset, we note the procedural error committed by petitioners in directly filing the
instant petition before this Court for it violates the established policy of strict observance of the
judicial hierarchy of courts.
Although the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have
concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas
corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of
[29] [30]
choice of court forum. As we stated in People vs. Cuaresma:
This Court's original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari is not exclusive. It is shared by this
Court with Regional Trial Courts and with the Court of Appeals. This concurrence of jurisdiction
is not, however, to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute,
unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor will be directed. There is
after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and also
serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs.
A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance
of extraordinary writs against first level (inferior) courts should be filed with the Regional Trial
Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme
Courts original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and
important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is [an] established
policy. It is a policy necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Courts time and attention
which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further
[31]
over-crowding of the Courts docket.
The rationale for this rule is two-fold: (a) it would be an imposition upon the precious time of this
Court; and (b) it would cause an inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the
adjudication of cases, which in some instances had to be remanded or referred to the lower court
as the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues
[32]
because this Court is not a trier of facts.
Thus, this Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be
obtained in the appropriate courts, and exceptional and compelling circumstances, such as cases
of national interest and of serious implications, justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy
of writ of certiorari, calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction. Exceptional and compelling
[33]
circumstances were held present in the following cases: (a) Chavez vs. Romulo on citizens right
[34]
to bear arms; (b) Government of the United States of America vs. Purganan on bail in extradition
[35]
proceedings; (c) Commission on Elections vs. Quijano-Padilla on government contract involving
modernization and computerization of voters registration list; (d) Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB vs.
[36] [37]
Zamora on status and existence of a public office; and (e) Fortich vs. Corona on the so-called
Win-Win Resolution of the Office of the President which modified the approval of the conversion
to agro-industrial area.
In this case, no special and important reason or exceptional and compelling circumstance
analogous to any of the above cases has been adduced by the petitioners so as to justify direct
recourse to this Court. The present petition should have been initially filed in the Court of Appeals
in strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts. Failure to do so is sufficient cause
for the dismissal of the petition at bar.
In any event, even if the Court disregards such procedural flaw, the petitioners contentions
on the substantive aspect of the case fail to invite judgment in their favor.
The unavailability of the writ of certiorari and prohibition in this case is borne out of the fact
that petitioners principally assail the Order dated March 22, 1999 which they never sought
reconsideration of, in due time, despite receipt thereof on March 26, 1999. Instead, petitioners
went through the motion of filing a supplemental pleading and only when the latter was denied, or
after more than three months have passed, did they raise the issue that the complaint should not
have been reinstated in the first place because the trial court had no jurisdiction to do so, having
already ruled that the complaint shall be expunged.
After recognizing the jurisdiction of the trial court by seeking affirmative relief in their motion
to serve supplemental pleading upon private respondents, petitioners are effectively barred by
[38]
estoppel from challenging the trial courts jurisdiction. If a party invokes the jurisdiction of a court,
[39]
he cannot thereafter challenge the courts jurisdiction in the same case. To rule otherwise would
amount to speculating on the fortune of litigation, which is against the policy of the Court.
[40]
Nevertheless, there is a need to correct the erroneous impression of the trial court as well
as the private respondents that petitioners are barred from assailing the Order dated March 22,
1999 which reinstated the case because it was not objected to within the reglementary period or
even thereafter via a motion for reconsideration despite receipt thereof on March 26, 1999.
It must be clarified that the said order is but a resolution on an incidental matter which does
[41]
not touch on the merits of the case or put an end to the proceedings. It is an interlocutory order
since there leaves something else to be done by the trial court with respect to the merits of the
[42]
case. As such, it is not subject to a reglementary period. Reglementary period refers to the
period set by the rules for appeal or further review of a final judgment or order, i.e., one that ends
the litigation in the trial court.
Moreover, the remedy against an interlocutory order is generally not to resort forthwith
to certiorari, but to continue with the case in due course and, when an unfavorable verdict is
[43]
handed down, to take an appeal in the manner authorized by law. Only when the court issued
such order without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and when the
assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not afford
adequate and expeditious relief will certiorari be considered an appropriate remedy to assail an
[44]
interlocutory order. Such special circumstances are absolutely wanting in the present case.
 Time and again, the Court has held that the Manchester rule has been modified in Sun
[45]
Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) vs. Asuncion which defined the following guidelines involving the
payment of docket fees:
1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the
payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over
the subject-matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading
is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment
of the fees within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period.
2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims and similar
pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee
prescribed therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of said fee within a
reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period.
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate
pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment
awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been
left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute
a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his
duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional
fee.
Plainly, while the payment of the prescribed docket fee is a jurisdictional requirement, even
its non-payment at the time of filing does not automatically cause the dismissal of the case, as
long as the fee is paid within the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period, more so when the
[46]
party involved demonstrates a willingness to abide by the rules prescribing such payment. Thus,
when insufficient filing fees were initially paid by the plaintiffs and there was no intention to defraud
[47]
the government, the Manchester rule does not apply.
Under the peculiar circumstances of this case, the reinstatement of the complaint was just
and proper considering that the cause of action of private respondents, being a real action,
[48]
prescribes in thirty years, and private respondents did not really intend to evade the payment of
the prescribed docket fee but simply contend that they could not be faulted for inadequate
[49]
assessment because the clerk of court made no notice of demand or reassessment. They were
in good faith and simply relied on the assessment of the clerk of court.
Furthermore, the fact that private respondents prayed for payment of damages in amounts
justified by the evidence does not call for the dismissal of the complaint for violation of SC Circular
No. 7, dated March 24, 1988 which required that all complaints must specify the amount of
damages sought not only in the body of the pleadings but also in the prayer in order to be accepted
and admitted for filing. Sun Insurance effectively modified SC Circular No. 7 by providing that filing
fees for damages and awards that cannot be estimated constitute liens on the awards finally
[50]
granted by the trial court.
Thus, while the docket fees were based only on the real property valuation, the trial court
acquired jurisdiction over the action, and judgment awards which were left for determination by
the court or as may be proven during trial would still be subject to additional filing fees which shall
constitute a lien on the judgment. It would then be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court of the
trial court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional
[51]
fees.
It is worth noting that when Bertuldo filed his Answer on July 2, 1991, he did not raise the
issue of lack of jurisdiction for non-payment of correct docket fees. Instead, he based his defense
on a claim of ownership and participated in the proceedings before the trial court. It was only in
September 22, 1998 or more than seven years after filing the answer, and under the auspices of
a new counsel, that the issue of jurisdiction was raised for the first time in the motion to expunge
by Bertuldos heirs.
After Bertuldo vigorously participated in all stages of the case before the trial court and even
invoked the trial courts authority in order to ask for affirmative relief, petitioners, considering that
they merely stepped into the shoes of their predecessor, are effectively barred by estoppel from
challenging the trial courts jurisdiction. Although the issue of jurisdiction may be raised at any
stage of the proceedings as the same is conferred by law, it is nonetheless settled that a party
may be barred from raising it on ground of laches or estoppel.
[52]
Moreover, no formal substitution of the parties was effected within thirty days from date of
[53]
death of Bertuldo, as required by Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. Needless to stress,
the purpose behind the rule on substitution is the protection of the right of every party to due
process. It is to ensure that the deceased party would continue to be properly represented in the
[54]
suit through the duly appointed legal representative of his estate. Non-compliance with the rule
on substitution would render the proceedings and judgment of the trial court infirm because the
court acquires no jurisdiction over the persons of the legal representatives or of the heirs on whom
[55]
the trial and the judgment would be binding. Thus, proper substitution of heirs must be effected
for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over their persons and to obviate any future claim by any
heir that he was not apprised of the litigation against Bertuldo or that he did not authorize Atty.
Petalcorin to represent him.
The list of names and addresses of the heirs was submitted sixteen months after the death
of Bertuldo and only when the trial court directed Atty. Petalcorin to comply with the provisions of
Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. Strictly speaking therefore, before said compliance, Atty.
Petalcorin had no standing in the court a quo when he filed his pleadings. Be that as it may, the
matter has been duly corrected by the Order of the trial court dated October 15, 1999.
To be sure, certiorari under Rule 65
[56]
is a remedy narrow in scope and inflexible in
[57]
character. It is not a general utility tool in the legal workshop. It offers only a limited form of
[58]
review. Its principal function is to keep an inferior tribunal within its jurisdiction. It can be invoked
only for an error of jurisdiction, that is, one where the act complained of was issued by the court,
officer or a quasi-judicial body without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
which is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction,
[59]
not to be used for any other
[60]
purpose, such as to cure errors in proceedings or to correct erroneous conclusions of law or
[61]
fact. A contrary rule would lead to confusion, and seriously hamper the administration of justice.
Petitioners utterly failed to show that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in issuing
the assailed resolutions. On the contrary, it acted prudently, in accordance with law and
jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.