ABERCA V VER (art. 32 civil code).

This case stems and happened during the martial law hahahaha

FACTS:

Sometime in the early 1980s, various Intelligence units of the AFP known as Task Force Makabansa (TFM) were ordered by
respondents then Maj. Gen. Fabian Ver to conduct pre-emptive strikes against known communist-terrorist (CT) underground
houses in view of increasing reports about CT plans to sow disturbances in Metro Manila. In compliance thereof, the TFM
raided several places, employing in most cases defectively issued judicial search warrants. During these raids, certain members
of the raiding TFM confiscated a number of purely personal items belonging to the 20 petitioners. Petitioners were arrested
without proper arrest warrants issued by the courts. For some period after their arrest, they were arrested without denied
visits of relatives and lawyers; interrogated in violation of their rights to silence and counsel, through threats, torture and other
forms of violence in order to obtain incriminatory information or confessions and in order to punish them.

Plaintiffs then filed an action for damages before the RTC of Quezon City against respondents-officers of the AFP headed
by Ver. Respondents, in their motion to dismiss, claimed that (1) the wrti of habeas corpus was suspended, thus giving
credence to petitioners’ detention; (2) respondents were immune from liability for acts done in the performance of their official
duties, and that (3) the complaint did not state a cause of action against respondents. The RTC granted the motion to dismiss.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus bars a civil action for damages for
illegal searches conducted by military personnel and other violations of rights and liberties guaranteed under the
Constitution

COURT’S RULING:

The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus (PWHC) does not destroy petitioners’ right and cause of
action for damages for illegal arrest and detention and other violations of their constitutional rights. The suspension does not
render valid an otherwise illegal arrest or detention. What is suspended is merely the right of the individual to seek release
from detention through the writ of habeas corpus as a speedy means of obtaining his liberty.

Moreover, as pointed out by petitioners, their right and cause of action for damages are explicitly recognized in PD
1755 which amended Art. 1146 of the Civil Code by adding the following text: However, when the action (for injury to the rights
of the plaintiff or for quasi-delict) arises from or out of any act, activity or conduct of any public officer involving the exercise of
powers or authority arising from martial law including the arrest, detention and/or trial of the plaintiff, the same must be
brought within one year.

Even assuming that the suspension of the PWHC suspends petitioners’ right of action for damages for illegal arrest and
detention, it does not and cannot suspend their rights and causes of action for injuries suffered because of respondents’
confiscation of their private belongings, the violation of their right to remain silent and to counsel and their right to protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures and against torture and other cruel and inhuman treatment.

The question became moot and academic since the suspension of the PWHC had been lifted with the issuance of then
Pres. Corazon Aquino of Proclamation No. 2 on March 25, 1986.

2. Whether or not respondents may invoke state immunity from suit for acts done in the performance of official
duties and functions

COURT’S RULING:

The court ruled that it may be that the respondents, as members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, were merely
responding to their duty, as they claim, "to prevent or suppress lawless violence, insurrection, rebellion and subversion" in
accordance with Proclamation No. 2054 of President Marcos, despite the lifting of martial law on January 27, 1981, and in
pursuance of such objective, to launch pre-emptive strikes against alleged communist terrorist underground houses. But this
cannot be construed as a blanket license or a roving commission untramelled by any constitutional restraint, to disregard or
transgress upon the rights and liberties of the individual citizen enshrined in and protected by the Constitution. The
Constitution remains the supreme law of the land to which all officials, high or low, civilian or military, owe obedience and
allegiance at all times. petitioners' complaint stems from Article 32 of the Civil Code which provides:

ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates
or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for
damages: ( pls look codal nalang hahah yung list nang mga constitutional rights)

In any of the cases referred to under art 32., whether or not the defendant's act or omission constitutes a criminal
offense, the aggrieved party has a right to commence an entirely separate and distinct civil action for damages, and for other
relief. Such civil action shall proceed independently of any criminal prosecution (if the latter be instituted), and may be proved
by a preponderance of evidence.The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated.
The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge unless his act or omission constitutes a violation of the Penal
Code or other penal statute.

It is obvious that the purpose of the above codal provision is to provide a sanction to the deeply cherished rights and
freedoms enshrined in the Constitution. Its message is clear: no man may seek to violate those sacred rights with impunity. In
times of great upheaval or of social and political stress, when the temptation is strongest to yield - borrowing the words of Chief
Justice Claudio Teehankee - to the law of force rather than the force of law, it is necessary to remind ourselves that certain
basic rights and liberties are immutable and cannot be sacrificed to the transient needs or imperious demands of the ruling
power. The rule of law must prevail, or else liberty will perish.

Thus, Article 32 of the Civil Code which renders any public officer or employee or any private individual liable in
damages for violating the Constitutional rights and liberties of another, as enumerated therein, does not exempt the
respondents from responsibility. Only judges are excluded from liability under the said article, provided their acts or omissions
do not constitute a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.

This is not to say that military authorities are restrained from pursuing their assigned task or carrying out their mission
with vigor. The court said that their duty to protect the Republic from its enemies, whether of the left or of the right, or from
within or without, seeking to destroy or subvert our democratic institutions and imperil their very existence. The court merely
trying to say is that in carrying out this task and mission, constitutional and legal safeguards must be observed, otherwise, the
very fabric of our faith will start to unravel. In the battle of competing ideologies, the struggle for the mind is just as vital as the
struggle of arms. The linchpin in that psychological struggle is faith in the rule of law. Once that faith is lost or compromised, the
struggle may well be abandoned

3. Whether or not a superior officer, under the notion of respondeat superior, be answerable for damages jointly and
severally with his subordinates, to the person whose constitutional rights and liberties have been violated.

COURT’S RULING:

The court ruled that the doctrine of respondeat superior is not applicable in this case. It has been generally limited in
its application to principal and agent or to master and servant relationships. No such relationship exists superiors of the
military and their subordinates. However, the decisive factor in this case is the language of Art. 32, Civil Code; the law speaks of
an officer or employee or person “directly” or “indirectly” responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights and liberties
of another. Thus, it is not the actor alone who must answer for damages under Art. 32; the person indirectly responsible has
also to answer for the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party. Art. 32 makes the persons who are directly as well as
indirectly responsible for the transgression joint tortfeasors.