MORAL OBLIGATION REGARDING LAW

Eric Rukamp
April 6, 2017
PHI 317-01: Philosophy of Law
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Through the course of studying jurisprudence, one inevitably comes to the question of

obligation. That is, to what degree does a civilian have a duty to obey the law because it’s the

law? We have discussed at length an assumed degree of separation from law and the people

involved with the law. While the people involved with the law are prone to err, the law as law

exists with a pure purpose. However, does the error of man undermine the law? To answer this

question, we may again summarize learned theories regarding law and analyze real court cases to

apply each theory’s reasoning. Specifically, philosophers such as Plato, John Rawls, Ronald

Dworkin, Martin Luther King, Jr., and David Lyons will provide the lens through which we

analyze the court cases of Walker v. Birmingham and Wisconsin v. Yoder.

What better place to start than one of the most ancient philosophic foundations: Plato. In

writing his Crito, Plato lays the scene of Socrates in prison the night prior to his execution. A

friend, Crito, attempts to spirit away Socrates; Socrates logically explains that he cannot, and

must accept the rule of the law. Plato’s dialogue reveals some key points:

“…we are never intentionally to do wrong…Nor when injured injure in return, as the

many imagine; for we must injure no one at all…we ought not to retaliate or render evil

for evil to anyone.”

Plato believed in man’s ultimate purpose of being good, which involved exemplifying the best

virtues and avoiding all evil. He certainly would not have been a proponent for the old saying,

“an eye for an eye.” Continuing from there, Plato argues that the good man understands the
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authority of law. The law derives from the state, and it is the state that provides the opportunity

for man to grow and become learned. To that effect, Plato adds:

“…after having brought you into the world, and nurtured and educated you, and given

you and every other citizen a share in every good that we had to give…that if [you] do

not like us when [you] has come of age and has seen the ways of the city… go where

[you]…But he who has experience of the manner in which we order justice and

administer the State, and still remains, has entered into an implied contract that he will

do as we command him.”

Because man has grown and been nurtured by the state, that man has full obligation to obey the

law. This is one of the more extreme stances we study on this topic, because it leaves absolutely

no room for civil disobedience.

John Rawls continues on this topic by giving description to our assumption of the law as

law with a pure purpose. He describes law as justice; all citizens are to enjoy the same degree of

equality when it comes to rights under law. This justice is upheld by the various institutions of

government. To this justice we are obligated twofold: to obey just institutions when they apply to

us, and to create just institutions when they don’t exist (Dimock, 315). It is within Rawls’

writing that we start to see elements of disobedience. To this point, we assume that law is just

because it’s derived from a just source. When a just system produces unjust law [much as it did

in Crito], this isn’t reason enough to say the system is unjust. The unjust law is binding, so long

as it is not exceedingly unjust (Dimock, 320). In order to change unjust law, proper procedure is
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first attempted. If this fails, civil disobedience may be employed. Rawls’ civil disobedience is

public, nonviolent, and political; its purpose is to change the injustice. This differs from sheer

noncompliance, which he calls conscientious refusal. The moral obligation to obey ceases at the

high perception of injustice, and in reaction people are indeed able to disobey the law –

according to Rawls.

Ronald Dworkin reasserts Rawls’ point of justice by using the term “validity.” There is a

natural obligation to obey law, but when the law is interpreted as against the moral compass of

the people, the validity of that law comes into question. He illustrates this point by reflecting on

those who dodged the military draft of the Vietnam War based on conscience. The majority

believe that the dodger must be prosecuted, and if convicted ought to be punished. After all,

disregarding conscription laws is a criminal offense under most law systems. However, Dworkin

points out that there are prima facie, or good reasons, to not prosecute those who do it out of

conscience. If you prosecute a small group of people who present good reasoning, you only

alienate them and spread injustice. Thusly, they are able to be civilly disobedient based on moral

objection. A state has no reason to prosecute such a small group, unless the number grows so

alarmingly that it risks the stability of the state. To this end, we can put Dworkin in the same

philosophic camp as Rawls.

In conjunction with Rawls and Dworkin is the famous Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.

Known the world over for his peaceful demonstrations of civil disobedience for civil rights, he

heavily based his reasoning on the Dworkin-Rawls thought. That is, he understood that the law
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exists as the law; those who disobey the law risk receiving punishment as determined by the

courts. In addition, he asserted that injustice can only be tolerated until injustice so prevents

basic rights. There is the obligation to obey the law, but there is also the obligation to disobey

laws when injustice robs people of the rights they naturally have. Civil disobedience occurs then

openly, publicly, and lovingly to try to correct the injustice. Thusly, he defends by saying:

“I submit that an individual who breaks a law that conscience tells him is unjust and who

willingly accepts the penalty of imprisonment in order to arouse the conscience of the

community over its injustice, is in reality expressing the highest respect for the law.”

(Dimock, 313)

Much as Socrates’ behaved in Plato’s Crito, Dr. King, Jr. has shown the injustice through his

action by being imprisoned on racial grounds. Thusly, he proved the injustice through the very

action he outlines in his letter from Birmingham Jail.

Until now we have seen the Platonic foundation of total obedience to law supplemented

with contemporary, more classically liberal concepts of justice, fairness, and civil disobedience.

But now we note David Lyons, who argues based on the moral quality of the person in relation

to the state. Civil disobedients like Dr. King, Jr. or Gandhi, he argues, had “no obligation to obey

the unjust legal systems they opposed…” (Dimock, 337) because of the unjust relationship

between them, their people, and the law. Lyons argues that where injustice is held up by

government, there is no obligation at all to obey that law. Lyons continues by deriding the

Dworkin-Rawls thought for its assumption that there is an underlying moral obligation to obey
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law, with the exception of civil disobedience. Lyons thusly illustrates the dilemma within having

an exception to the rule.

Putting these theories into a legal context, we begin with the case of Walker v.

Birmingham. This is the case that landed Dr. King, Jr. and other fellow clergymen in

Birmingham Jail. The case arose from Dr. King, Jr. and associates marching and demonstrating

without the necessary permit, which had been denied them by admitted white-supremacist city

officials. The demonstrators were then arrested for not having the permits, fined $50 an

imprisoned for 5 days. The Supreme Court of Alabama and the Supreme Court of the United

States affirmed this ruling on the grounds that, even though the city ruling was unconstitutional,

it was still the law and needed to be obeyed. There was no allowance for disobedience against

the city. This is an excellent example of the shortcomings of “law is law is law.” We understand

now that unconstitutional law is unjust and need not be obeyed, just as Dr. King, Jr.’s

demonstrators did with their civil disobedience and as Dworkin and Rawls interpreted it.

Wisconsin v. Yoder provides a legal backdrop for the prima facie of Dworkin’s

philosophy. Here we have an Amish family refusing to obey the law that their children attend

school until age 16. It is in the Amish religion that children only attend school until 8th grade.

The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in favor of Yoder, reasoning that the mandate itself wasn’t

invalid. Rather, its application to one specific group would be unconstitutional and infringing on

First Amendment rights. The family had sound reasoning to disobey this law because of

religious practices that went against it. This is then a prima facie for Dworkin, just as it would be
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logical for Rawls. I say this because the family made it known why they were disobeying the

law. They did so publicly and with good reasoning.

Civil disobedience will always be debated within the realm of jurisprudence. We can

concur, for the sake of this argument that law does exist for a good purpose. However, the law

may be used in unjust ways. To correct the injustice, there are appropriate avenues of

disobedience and inappropriate avenues. The good way will be to peacefully and publicly

disobey the law, and then accept the punishment to illustrate the injustice and appeal to the moral

reasoning of your fellow man. However, the moment you take away those elements: public,

peaceful, punishment, you are no longer being disobedient. Rather, you enter dangerous territory

of anarchy for the sake of anarchy.

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Sources

Dimock, Susan. Classic readings and cases in philosophy of law. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge,

2016.

"The Internet Classics Archive | Crito by Plato." The Internet Classics Archive | Crito by Plato.

Accessed April 06, 2017. http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/crito.html.