Jurisdiction (Section 50) and rules of procedure adopt a leasehold system pursuant to RA 3844. E.O. No.
adopt a leasehold system pursuant to RA 3844. E.O. No. 229 vests quasi-judicial
Quismundo v. CA, 201 SCRA 609 (1991)
This petition for review on certiorari seeks the reversal of the decision and resolution of
respondent Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 16418,1 dated November 29, 1989 and
October 9, 1990, respectively, which upheld the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court of
Angeles City, Branch 58, in AGRA. Case No. 5174.2
It appears that on February 19, 1988, private respondents, as tenants of petitioner, filed a
complaint with the trial court praying that their relationship with petitioner be changed from
share tenancy to a leasehold system, pursuant to Section 4 of Republic Act No. 3844, as
amended, their request therefor having been denied by petitioner.3
On March 2, 1988, private respondents further filed a motion for the issuance of an order
authorizing the supervision by the deputy sheriff of the court of the harvesting and
liquidation of the 1987-1988 sugarcane crops, which motion was granted by the trial court in
an order dated March 3, 1988.4
On March 16, 1988, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of cause of
action since the law that should allegedly govern the relationship of the parties is Act No.
4115, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 271, and not Republic Act No. 3844, as
amended. The trial court denied the motion for lack of merit in an order dated June 2, 1988.5
On June 18, 1988, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the denial order, invoking
as an additional ground the lack of jurisdiction of the court over the case under the authority
and by reason of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, specifically Executive Order
No. 229 and Republic Act No. 6657.6
Pending the resolution of said motion for reconsideration, private respondents filed another
motion dated November 9, 1988, for the supervision of harvesting. On December 6, 1988,
the trial court granted the motion of private respondents and denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.7
Petitioner then elevated the controversy to respondent court on a petition for certiorari but,
as stated at the outset, said court upheld the jurisdiction of the court below, ruling that:
Second. The right of the private respondents to choose leasehold tenancy is
governed by RA 3844. We find nothing in Proclamation No. 131, E.O. No. 229 and
RA 6657 divesting the trial court of jurisdiction over the case. To be sure, RA 6657
was enacted on June 10, 1988 or later than the filing of the Complaint in AGRA
Case No. 5174 on February 13, 1988. On the other hand, sec. 27 of E.O. 229
approved on July 22, 1987 provides that "... the provisions of RA 3844 and other
agrarian laws not inconsistent with this order shall have suppletory effect." We see
no inconsistency between RA 3844 and E.O. No. 229 with respect to the jurisdiction
of the trial court over the cause of action of the private respondent who desires to
powers on the DAR to determine and adjudicate "agrarian reform matters" subject
of Proclamation No. 229.8 We hold that the right of private respondents to adopt a
leasehold system under RA 3844 is distinct and separate and not affected by the
enactment of E.O. No. 229 and, hence, may be enforced pursuant to the judicial
mechanism provided for by RA 3844.9
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by respondent Court of Appeals in its
resolution dated October 9, 1990.10 Not satisfied therewith, petitioner is now before us
raising the sole issue of jurisdiction.
It is the contention of petitioner that the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City has no
jurisdiction to try the case at bar considering that the exclusive original jurisdiction to
adjudicate agrarian cases has already been vested in the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) by Executive Order No. 229, as amended by Republic Act No. 6657.
We find said contention tenable.
Executive Order No. 229, which provides for the mechanism for the implementation of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program instituted by Proclamation No. 131, dated July 22,
1987, vests in the Department of Agrarian Reform quasi-judicial powers to determine and
adjudicate agrarian reform matters. The pertinent provision of said executive order reads as
follows:
SECTION 17. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. — The DAR is hereby vested with
quasi-judicial powers to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters, and
shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving implementation
of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive original jurisdiction of
the DENR and the Department of Agriculture (DA).
The DAR shall have powers to punish for contempt and to issue subpoena,
subpoena duces tecum and writs to enforce its order or decisions.
The decisions of the DAR may, in proper cases, be appealed to the Regional Trial
Courts but shall be immediately executory notwithstanding such appeal.
The above quoted provision should be deemed to have repealed 11 Section 12 (a) and (b) of
Presidential Decree No. 946 which invested the then courts of agrarian relations with original
exclusive jurisdiction over cases and questions involving rights granted and obligations
imposed by presidential issuances promulgated in relation to the agrarian reform program.
Formerly, under Presidential Decree No. 946, amending Chapter IX of Republic Act No. 3844,
the courts of agrarian relations had original and exclusive jurisdiction over "cases involving
the rights and obligations of persons in the cultivation and use of agricultural land except
those cognizable by the National Labor Relations Commission" and "questions involving
rights granted and obligations imposed by laws, Presidential Decrees, Orders, Instructions,
Rules and Regulations issued and promulgated in relation to the agrarian reform program,"
except those matters involving the administrative implementation of the transfer of land to
the tenant-farmer under Presidential Decree No. 27 and amendments thereto which shall be
exclusively cognizable by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform.12
In 1980, upon the passage of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary
Reorganization Act, the courts of agrarian relations were integrated into the regional trial
courts and the jurisdiction of the former was vested in the latter courts.13
However, with the enactment of Executive Order No. 229, which took effect on August 29,
1987, fifteen (15) days after its release for publication in the Official Gazette, 14 the regional
trial courts were divested of their general jurisdiction to try agrarian reform matters. The said
jurisdiction is now vested in the Department of Agrarian Reform.
Thus, in the case at bar, the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, at the time private
respondents filed their complaint, was already bereft of authority to act on the same. The
allegation of private respondents that their complaint was filed on November 3, 1987, and
not on February 13, 1988 as found by the Court of Appeals, is immaterial since as of either
date Executive Order No. 229 was already in effect.
The foregoing holding is further sustained by the passage of Republic Act No. 6657, the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, which took effect on June 15, 1988. The said law
contains provisions which evince and support the intention of the legislature to vest in the
Department of Agrarian Reform exclusive jurisdiction over all agrarian reform matters.
Section 50 of said Act substantially reiterates Section 17 of Executive Order No. 229 vesting in
the Department of Agrarian Reform exclusive and original jurisdiction over all matters
involving the implementation of agrarian reform, to wit:
SECTION 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. — The DAR is hereby vested with
primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall
have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of
agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR).
xxx xxx xxx
In addition, Sections 56 and 57 thereof provide for the designation by the Supreme Court of
at least one (1) branch of the regional trial court within each province to act as a special
agrarian court. The said special court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction only over
petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners and the prosecution of
criminal offenses under said Act. Said provisions thus delimit the jurisdiction of the regional
trial court in agrarian cases only to these two instances.
It is also worth noting at this juncture that the resolution of this case by the Department of
Agrarian Reform is to the best advantage of private respondents since it is in a better
position to resolve agrarian disputes, being the administrative agency possessing the
necessary expertise on the matter. Further, the proceedings therein are summary in nature
and the department is not bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence, to the end
that agrarian reform disputes and other issues will be adjudicated in a just, expeditious and
inexpensive action or proceeding.15
WHEREFORE, the petition at bar is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is
REVERSED and another judgment is hereby rendered declaring NULL and VOID the orders of
the lower court dated March 3, 1988, June 2, 1988 and December 6, 1988. The respondent
judge, or whosoever now presides over the court a quo or to which the case is assigned, is
ordered to cease and desist from further proceeding with AGRA Case No. 5176 which is
hereby dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, without prejudice, however, to the refiling of the
same with the Department of Agrarian Reform
Merits, not technicalities
Diaz, et al. v. Mesias, Jr., G.R. No. 156345, March 4, 2004
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
June 29, 2002 Resolution1of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 70596, which dismissed
the petition on technical grounds, and its November 29, 2002 Resolution, which denied
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
Petitioners are the owners of a 1.2 hectare riceland located at Brgy. Guintigi-an, Ormoc City,
being tilled by, among others, Carlos Mesias, Sr., father of respondent Carlos Mesias, Jr.
On May 16, 1991, respondent began cultivating the land. Six years later, respondent
requested that he be granted a homelot within the riceland by petitioners and that the share
tenancy system be changed to leasehold system. Petitioners denied both requests. Hence,
respondent brought the matter to the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee for mediation.
No settlement was reached because petitioners failed to appear.
Respondent elevated the case to the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) of the
Department of Agrarian Reform. After conducting mediation proceedings between the
parties, the MARO concluded that respondent is not a bona fide tenant of the petitioners
considering that he is a member of the immediate farm household of his father, Carlos
Mesias, Sr. Thus, respondent filed a petition with the Provincial Adjudicator of Leyte who
dismissed the petition and declared that petitioner is not a tenant de jure of the 1.2 riceland
subject of this case, rather it is his father, Carlos Mesias, Sr. who is the tenant thereof.
Respondent appealed the case to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB), which reversed the decision of the Provincial Adjudicator. The dispositive portion of
the decision of the DARAB reads:
WHEREFORE, by reason of all the foregoing, the decision of the Honorable Prospero I.
Rapada, dated October 27, 1997, is hereby SET ASIDE and new decision is hereby issued:
1. Declaring petitioner Carlos Mesias, Jr. as the tenant de jure of the named
respondents in the subject farmlot;
2. Ordering the respondents and/or the administrator of said land to maintain
petitioner in the peaceful possession and cultivation of subject farmlot;
3. Ordering the petitioner to withdraw the money deposited with the Land Bank of
the Philippines, Ormoc City representing the lease rentals payable to the
respondents for the crop years 1996 and 1997 and update payment of other
rentals due and demandable;
4. Ordering the respondents to grant petitioner a homelot with an area of not more
than 3% of the total area of the tenanted ricefarm but not more than 1,000 square
meters during the existence of the tenancy relations between the parties;
5. Enjoining the parties to execute a written leasehold contract agreement
pursuant to law;
6. Ordering the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer of Ormoc City to assist the
parties in the proper determination of the terms and conditions of the contract
pursuant to law and the customs and practices of the locality;
7. Ordering the same MARO to render a report within 15 days upon receipt of this
order as to its implementation to DARAB Appellate Board copy furnished DARAB
Secretariat.
SO ORDERED.2
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration3 was denied; hence a petition for review was filed
with the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition due to defective certification against forum
shopping and failure to attach clearly legible copies of pertinent portions of the records and
other supporting documents pursuant to Rule 43, Section 6 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, attaching thereto legible copies of the records
and other supporting documents. The July 29, 2002 Resolution was partly reconsidered by
the Court of Appeals, insofar as the defective certification of forum shopping is concerned,
but held that petitioners failed to comply with the procedural requirements of Rule 43,
Section 6 of the Rules of Court.
Hence, the instant petition for review4 on the issue: whether or not the petition for review
filed by the petitioners before the Court of Appeals complies with the requirements set in
Rule 43, Section 6 of the Rules of Court.
The petition is meritorious.
We agree with petitioners’ contention that the dismissal of the petition on purely technical
grounds was unwarranted. In denying due course to the petition, the appellate court gave
premium to form and failed to consider the substantial rights of the parties.
Rule 43, Section 6 of the Rules of Court provides:
The petition for review shall (a) state the full names of the parties to the case, without
impleading the court or agencies either as petitioners or respondents; (b) contain a concise
statement of the facts and issues involved and the grounds relied upon for the review; (c) be
accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or a certified true copy of the award,
judgment, final order or resolution appealed from, together with certified true copies of such
material portions of the record referred to therein and other supporting papers; and (d)
contain a sworn certification against forum shopping as provided in the last paragraph of
section 2, Rule 42. The petition shall state the specific material dates showing that it was filed
within the period fixed herein. (2a)
In Kalayaan Arts and Crafts, Inc. v. Anglo,5 it was held that Section 6 of Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court does not require that all of the supporting papers or annexes accompanying the
petition should be certified true copies or duplicate originals. What is mandatory is that
clearly legible duplicate originals or certified true copies of the judgment or final orders of
the lower courts be attached to the petition.
A careful perusal of the records of the case shows that the petitioners substantially complied
with the procedural requirements of Rule 43, Section 6 of the Rules of Court. Attached to the
petition for review as annexes are legible certified true copies of the decision of the
DARAB,6 the Resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration by the DARAB, 7 and the decision
of the Provincial Adjudicator.8 The attachment of the final decisions of these quasi-
judicial agencies are sufficient in order for the Court of Appeals to give due course to the
petition, instead of dismissing the same on the ground of petitioners’ failure to attach copies
of the pleadings and other supporting documents. Nevertheless, even if the pleadings and
other supporting documents were not attached to the petition, the dismissal was
unwarranted because the entire records of the case will eventually be elevated to the
appellate court, pursuant to Rule 43, Section 11 of the Rules of Court.
Cases should be determined on the merits after all parties have been given full opportunity
to ventilate their causes and defenses, rather than on technicalities or procedural
imperfections. Rules of procedure are mere tools designed to expedite the decision or
resolution of cases and other matters pending in court. A strict and rigid application of rules,
resulting in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must
be avoided. In fact, Rule 1, Section 6 of the Rules of Court states that the Rules shall be
liberally construed in order to promote their objective of ensuring the just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.9
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions of
July 29 2002 and November 29, 2002 of the Court of Appeals are SET ASIDE. The instant case
is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.