This Land is Our Land: Moro Ancestral Domain and Its

Implications for Peace and Development in the Southern

Philippines

Astrid S. Tuminez

SAIS Review of International Affairs, Volume 27, Number 2, Summer-Fall

2007, pp. 77-91 (Article)

Published by Johns Hopkins University Press

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1353/sais.2007.0044

For additional information about this article

https://muse.jhu.edu/article/220994

Access provided by Jawaharlal Nehru University (3 Jan 2018 07:16 GMT)

 This
SAIS Review vol. Land
XXVII no.I2s (Summer–Fall
Our Land 2007)
77

This Land Is Our Land: Moro

Ancestral Domain and Its
Implications for Peace and
Development in the Southern
Philippines

Astrid S. Tuminez

This paper examines land in Mindanao as both a root of conflict and a key to potential,
long-term conflict resolution. It reviews the history of Moro land ownership and political
dominance in the sultanates of Maguindanao and Sulu, which pre-dated Spanish and U.S.
colonial rule. It looks at the Moro conflict with the Philippine government as a response to
Moro land loss and marginalization, and reviews the failure of various peace agreements
to resolve Moro grievances. Finally, the paper analyzes current negotiations between the
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Philippine government (GRP) on ancestral
domain, and examines how ancestral domain could promote long-term peace and develop-
ment in Mindanao.

“By the sword and by intrigue [Moro] leaders are seeking to protect them-
selves from the impact of an alien civilization which threatens to crowd
them off of the land which for centuries they have called their own. The
Moro question, the problem of an ethnic and religious minority, has thus
become one of the most urgent of the . . . problems which Washington has
been called upon to resolve.”
—Ralston Hayden, Foreign Affairs, No. 6, 1927–1928

Introduction

S ince September 11, 2001, the U.S. media has focused abundant atten-
tion on the Muslim—or Moro—populations of Mindanao and the Sulu
archipelago in the southern Philippines.1 Headlines trumpet the Philippines
as a ‘second front’ in the U.S. global war on terror. Journalists and analysts

Dr. Tuminez is Senior Research Associate of the Philippine Facilitation Project, United
States Institute of Peace, and a Senior Fellow at the Southeast Asian Research Center of
the City University of Hong Kong. Previously, she was Director of Research, Alternative
Investments, AIG Global Investment Group; Program Officer at Carnegie Corporation
of New York; and Moscow director of the Harvard Project on Strengthening Democratic
Institutions. She is also author of Russian Nationalism Since 1856: Ideology and the Making
of Foreign Policy.

© 2007 by The Johns Hopkins University Press 77

78 SAIS Review Summer–Fall 2007
tag local guerillas, particularly members of the Moro National Liberation
Front (MNLF) and Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), as sympathizers,
if not outright collaborators, of such groups as Al-Qaeda or the militant
wing of Indonesia-based Jemaah Islamiyah. But widespread focus on ter-
rorism2 misses deeper, underlying Moro grievances rooted in the loss of
Moro ancestral land and their attendant economic, social and political
marginalization in the majority-Christian Philippines. Land ownership is at
the root of the conflict in Mindanao, and it is a key for long-lasting peace
in the region.

The Saga of Moro Displacement

The minority Moro population of the Philippines, numbering around 4–7

million today, used to dominate most of the islands of Mindanao, Sulu,
and Palawan in the southern Philippines.3 Moros include thirteen ethno-
linguistic groups, of which the Tausugs of Sulu and the Maguindanaos of
central Mindanao have historically been, and continue to be, the dominant
groups. The Tausugs and Maguindanaos dominated early state formations
in the Philippines, creating the Sultanates of Sulu and of Maguindanao,
which became cores of resistance against Spanish and U.S. colonial rulers.4
Moro resistance, however, did not outlive colonial rule, as more than 300
years of intermittent wars with colonial overlords resulted in the demise of
the sultanates. Spain and the United States conquered and co-opted Moro
leaders, some of whom willingly signed treaties or made other compromises,
which eroded the sultanates’ sovereignty.5 By 1913, U.S. military power had
effectively subdued Moro resistance.
Prior to the granting of Philippine independence in 1946, Moro lead-
ers petitioned the U.S. government (in 1921, 1924, and 1935) to keep Moros
administratively separate from Hispanized and Christianized Filipinos,
citing Moro identity and the historically troubled state of affairs between
Moros and Christian Filipinos as reasons. Some Moro leaders even indicated
a preference to remain under permanent U.S. government rather than be
lumped into a majority Christian Philippine state. But the U.S. government,
though cognizant of the distinctiveness of Moros and their long history of
resisting alien rule, failed to accommodate Moro religion and culture or
take into account the legacy and history of the old sultanates when decid-
ing on the final political status of the Philippines. 6 This act of neglect rein-
forced dynamics that would fuel Moro resentment and spark future conflict
with the Philippine government (GRP). At the same time, thwarting Moro
autonomy benefited U.S. relations with Christian Filipino political elites.
Even today, throughout Muslim Mindanao, Moros are quick to underline
historical U.S. negligence as a cause of their present predicament.7
Colonial policies under Spain and the United States profoundly al-
tered Moro land ownership. Under Spain (1565–1898), the Regalian doc-
trine made the Spanish state, by virtue of conquest, the sole owner of ‘state
domain,’ including lands, forests, bodies of water and natural resources.
The Regalian doctrine contradicted and nullified the Moro tradition of
 This Land Is Our Land 79
communal land ownership, under which clan chiefs, or datus, ruled over
and disposed of land considered to be under their jurisdiction. It removed
free communal access to water, forests, land and other natural resources
that were sources of local peoples’ daily sustenance. It nullified the domain
of the sultanates and invalidated the prior occupancy rights of Moros and
other indigenous peoples.
However, because Spain never fully conquered Moro lands, the full
impact of the Regalian doctrine was realized only during U.S. rule. After
Spain ceded the Philippines to the United States in 1898, the United States
enacted laws which further pushed Moros off their land. The Land Regis-
tration Act of 1902, for example, restricted land registration to individuals
and corporations, excluding communities and clans. And so Moros and
indigenous peoples, who only understood ancestral and communal land
ownership, became legally disenfranchised. Compliance to the Land Regis-
tration Act also depended on literacy, financial means, and sophistication
that most Moros lacked, thus intensifying their disadvantages. Another
law in 1903 removed the authority of traditional datus or chiefs to dispose
of land. This law (Philippine Commission Act No. 718) was called “An Act
making void land grants from Moro sultans or dattos or from chiefs of non-
Christian Tribes when made without governmental authority or consent.”8
Then in 1905, a Public Land Act declared all unregistered lands as public
land, with no regard to prior occupancy.
Public Land Act No. 926 in 1903 allowed individuals to acquire
homesteads not exceeding sixteen hectares and corporations 1,024 hect-
ares. A 1919 amendment allowed Christians to own homesteads up to
twenty-four hectares, but non-Christians only ten. Another amendment in
1936 stipulated that Christians could apply for homesteads not exceeding
sixteen hectares but non-Christians could apply for only four.9 In addition
to these blatantly discriminatory laws, government and corporate develop-
ment projects also displaced Moros and other indigenous peoples from
land they had occupied for centuries. The net result was “land-grabbing by
legal means” and the massive land disenfranchisement of Moros and other
indigenous groups.10
Resettlement programs bringing non-Moros to Moro lands—begun by
the United States in 1911 and continued by the independent Philippine gov-
ernment into the late 1960s—further intensified Moro dislocation. Thomas
McKenna notes that apart from “brutal pacification operations,”11 the early
decades of U.S. rule also involved “pious paternalism,” expressed partly in
resettlement programs “grounded in the colonial perception that, as non-
Christians, Muslim Filipinos were among the most benighted members of
a backward people and required additional tutelage and protection to bring
about ‘their advancement into civilization and material prosperity’ (Philip-
pine Commission Act No 253, Oct. 2, 1901).”12 Early resettlement policies
created agricultural colonies supported and funded by the GRP. These
brought planters from overpopulated Philippine areas into Mindanao to
enhance rice production and launch the cultivation of crops such as corn.
Outside the agricultural colonies, labor from other parts of the Philippines
80 SAIS Review Summer–Fall 2007
also migrated to Mindanao to meet demand on plantations and logging
concessions supported by the government.
From 1935 to the 1960s, the Philippine Commonwealth government
and the subsequent independent Philippine government continued to bring
Christian settlers to Mindanao for various purposes: to mitigate “peace and
order” problems with the Moros; to give incentives to military trainees, who
were given farms upon completion of their training; to increase rice and
corn production; to implement land reform programs; and to give land to
communist/Huk rebels who had surrendered during the administration of
President Ramon Magsaysay (1953–1957). Migration to Mindanao further
expanded as families joined friends and relatives who had gone ahead. The
Bureau of Lands’ policy of prioritizing claims based on filing of paperwork,
as opposed to occupancy, spurred further land-grabbing and land specula-
tion. A historian of the Philippines notes that population redistribution in
Mindanao created “imbalances in the distribution of political power as well
as of cultivable land and other natural and economic resources.”13 Moros
and smaller indigenous groups were the biggest losers in this process.
It is difficult to find precise demographic statistics detailing how
the Moros became a minority on their own land, but snapshots of certain
areas are indicative. For example, the census of 1918 in the Cotabato region
showed Moros to be a majority. However, a ten-fold growth in the Christian
population—mainly settlers—between 1918 and 1960 led to non-Muslims
outnumbering Moros two-to-one by 1960. In another reckoning, Cotabato’s
Moro population stood at 39 percent in 1903, but was practically halved to
20 percent by 1975. Other sources note that, in 1903, Moros constituted as
much as a 76 percent majority of Mindanao’s population, but dwindled to a
mere 23 percent in 1960. As for land ownership, Moros used to be majority
owners of land in Mindanao and Sulu in 1912 but by 1982 comprised only
18 percent of total land ownership.14

Moro Resistance and the Search for a Solution

By the 1960s, Moros were clearly a second-class minority in the Philippines.

National textbooks did not cover their history, and the majority popula-
tion denigrated Moro culture and religion. Discrimination against Moros
was widespread, resulting over time in Moro alienation and resentment.15
Moro organized resistance against the state erupted after the 1968 Jabidah
Massacre, in which government soldiers slaughtered between 28–64 Moro
recruits, who were part of a contingent being trained by the Marcos govern-
ment to invade Sabah in Malaysia. Shortly after Jabidah, Moros organized
the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), the ostensible goal of which
was to create an independent Moro state. Then in 1972, President Ferdinand
Marcos declared martial law—citing Moro rebellion as a key reason for sus-
pending democracy—and full-scale war followed. In 1976, under the aegis
of the Libyan Government, the Marcos government and the MNLF signed
a peace agreement—known as the Tripoli Agreement—promising Moro au-
tonomy in thirteen provinces and nine cities. This arrangement, however,
 This Land Is Our Land 81
was never implemented. Instead, Marcos insisted on a broad plebiscite on
autonomy—consonant with the requirements of the Philippine constitu-
tion—and then carved out two autonomous regions in Mindanao by execu-
tive decree, without transferring effective political control to the Moros.

MNLF Efforts Towards Autonomy

After ‘people power’ overthrew the Marcos government in 1986, President
Corazon Aquino opened talks with the MNLF. Though these negotiations
yielded no new agreements, Aquino’s government created the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), which embodied the autonomy
provisions of the 1987 constitution and was meant to alleviate the excesses
of the Marcos dictatorship. But the government, without Moro support,
chose to determine the limits of the autonomous area through another
broad plebiscite. Predictably, majority Christian provinces (and one majority
Moro province) opted not to join the ARMM, bringing only four provinces
into the autonomous region and creating a much smaller entity than that
envisioned in the 1976 Tripoli agreement. The MNLF itself did not play a
role in the design or conduct of the vote, and continued fighting the gov-
ernment until a new peace agreement was signed in 1996.
In 1977, a rupture occurred within the MNLF leadership. Salamat
Hashim, a Maguindanao leader and graduate of Cairo’s Al-Azhar University,
split from the largely Tausug hierarchy of the MNLF and formed the MILF,
composed mainly of Maguindanaos. The split became formal in 1984 and
marked two divergent approaches on the Moro future. The MNLF followed
a secular track towards self-determination within existing Philippine sov-
ereignty and territorial integrity, as reflected in the 1996 GRP-MNLF peace
agreement. The MILF, on the other hand, pursued a more uncompromising
stance on Moro independence, rooting their struggle in the distinctiveness
of Moro identity, religion, and the political legacy of the sultanates. The
MILF was not party to the 1996 agreement and did not support plebiscites
or elections related to the ARMM.
The MNLF, as the largest Moro resistance organization, became the
focus of GRP peacemaking under President Fidel Ramos. Arduous negotia-
tions, supported by the Organization of the Islamic Conference and Indo-
nesia in particular, culminated in the Final Peace Agreement between the
MNLF and the GRP in 1996. The agreement created a transitional Southern
Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD), chaired by for-
mer MNLF commander Nur Misuari, to oversee economic development in
fourteen provinces and nine cities in Mindanao, referred to as the Special
Zone for Peace and Development (SZOPAD). Neither the SPCPD nor SZO-
PAD, however, proved effective in resolving Moro problems. Both ran into
popular and congressional opposition and, with inadequate support from
the central government, SZOPAD never became a showcase of development.
The 1996 agreement was supposed to fulfil the promises of the 1976 Tripoli
agreement, but, again, Moros failed to receive autonomy in the promised
number of provinces.16 In another broad plebiscite, the majority Christian
populations of SZOPAD opted not to join the ARMM, but new territories
82 SAIS Review Summer–Fall 2007
were added, including Moro-dominated Basilan province and Marawi City.
The 1996 agreement also demobilized 30,000 MNLF combatants and paved
the way for over 7,000 of them to join the Philippine military and police
forces.17
The ARMM is the Philippine government’s main response to Moro
grievances and aspirations, but most experts agree that it has failed to
address critical matters of land, governance, and control over the Moro
future. One reason for the ARMM’s failure is the weakness of political sup-
port, especially from Manila political elites, and the structural weakness of
Moro autonomy. The Philippine Congress, for example, exercised power to
amend the original Organic Act creating the ARMM, but did not consult ad-
equately with Moro leaders or voters in passing Republic Act 9054 (“An Act
to Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act for the Autonomous Regional
in Muslim Mindanano”) in March 2001. With regards to power-sharing, Re-
public Act 9054 (RA 9054) stipulated that ARMM shall be represented only
“as far as practicable” in “departments, offices, commissions, agencies and
bureaus of the central government or national government that implement
and enforce policies, programs and projects of the central government or
national government in the region.” (Art. IV, Sec. 5) Provisions to appoint
at least one cabinet secretary, one Supreme Court justice, and two justices
in the Court of Appeals from the ARMM were optional—“as practicable” or
“whenever feasible.” As a result, Moro representation in the central political
bodies remained extremely weak.
Weak Moro political representation in the central government could
have been offset by strong regional autonomy, but the GRP was not pre-
pared to grant such independence to the Moros. Critically, RA 9054 failed
to establish Moro fiscal independence, despite granting the ARMM gov-
ernment limited powers of taxation and providing for revenue-sharing ar-
rangements with Manila.18 In practice, the ARMM was almost completely
dependent on block grants and subsidies from the central government.
These handouts—unpredictable in amount and timing—have, over time,
reinforced Moro dependence and mendicancy. Instead of pursuing sustain-
able economic development in the ARMM economy, the government opted
to keep the ARMM dependent on its largesse. In 2001, over 95 percent of
ARMM revenues came from the central government. Manila’s control over
ARMM funds and its political leverage were amply displayed when, in 2001,
after launching his ‘all-out war’ against the Moros, former president Joseph
Estrada bypassed the ARMM government and sent local development and
rehabilitation funds directly to local government units. RA 9054 also gave
ARMM officials no control over budgetary planning and disbursement. The
developmental impact of the ARMM’s anaemic fiscal autonomy is clear,
given that 70 percent or more of the ARMM’s budget must be used to pay
for general administration, operations, and support in the 17 national line
agencies devolved from the central government to the region.
However, blame for ARMM’s failure does not rest entirely on the
central government. Moro shortcomings—including feudal mentality, cor-
ruption, and incompetence—have been in no short supply. The rebel-turned-
 This Land Is Our Land 83
governor, Misuari, proved an incompetent administrator with exorbitant
habits. And overall, Moro leaders lacked a unified vision, fought one another
for the patronage spoils from Manila, and appeared more interested in their
own self-enrichment than the development of their people.19 The demobi-
lized MNLF leadership imploded in 2001 when Philippine president Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo supported a rival to Misuari for the ARMM governorship,
spurring a Misuari-led rebellion and landing Misuari in jail.

MILF Efforts Towards Autonomy

After the GRP signed its Final Peace Agreement with the MNLF, it opened
talks with the still-mobilized MILF in 1997. These talks, however, have been
punctuated by war. In 1997 Philippine armed forces launched offensives
against the MILF, followed in 2000 by President Estrada’s ‘all-out war.’
Talks resumed in 2001, culminating in a general Agreement on Peace that
outlined an agenda for detailed negotiation. But in 2003, under the pretext
of going after a kidnap-for-ransom gang—a pretext later acknowledged to be
false—Philippine armed forces attacked and occupied the Buliok Complex,
an MILF stronghold in the Liguasan Marsh in Maguindanao province.20
Peace talks stalled until soldiers pulled out from Buliok in 2004. To bol-
ster negotiations and strengthen ceasefire on the ground, an International
Monitoring Team (IMT) comprised of Malaysian, Bruneian, and Libyan
troops has been working on the ground since 2003. A Japanese representa-
tive has joined the IMT to monitor economic development, while Sweden
and other countries are considering adding their own monitors. Since 2001
Malaysia has officially facilitated the GRP-MILF talks, which began with a
three-item agenda: 1) security, 2) rehabilitation, and 3) ancestral domain.
Interim agreements have been signed on the first two, but ancestral domain
has been thorny and remains unresolved.
Ancestral domain refers to MILF demands for: territory that will
constitute a Moro homeland (tentatively referred to as the Bangsamoro
Juridical Entity (BJE)); sufficient control over economic resources on that
land; and a structure of governance consonant with Moro culture, involving
minimal interference from Manila.21 MILF leaders are not interested in past
peace agreements that sidetracked the roots of Moro grievances—such as
dislocation from ancestral lands, loss of Moro political and economic power,
and social marginalization—but seek what they call a ‘new formula’ that
recognizes historical injustices against the Moros and promotes restitution.
They emphasize a need to avoid past failures, decrying the inadequacies of
the ARMM and rejecting autonomy as a solution. To the MILF, ancestral
domain is the key to a more just and hopeful Moro future.
The first component of ancestral domain is land: how much terri-
tory should be set aside for Moro self-government? MILF leaders recognize
the practical impossibility of restoring the sultanates’ domain, but they
also want more territory than the present ARMM. Negotiations over land
reached an impasse in September 2006. The government offered several
hundred more Moro-dominated municipalities in addition to the current
ARMM, but the MILF asked for larger ‘conflict-affected areas,’ including
84 SAIS Review Summer–Fall 2007
previously Moro-dominated lands whose Moro populations had dwindled
due to war-related dislocation.
The second component of ancestral domain is control over economic
resources, including forests, land, rivers, and seas, and minerals found
therein. By creating a vibrant independent economy the MILF seeks to end
ARMM dependence on Manila’s patronage. Current government negotiators
are sympathetic to MILF demands, but they do not represent the weight of
political power in the GRP and face serious hurdles in delivering control
over natural resources to the Moros. The Regalian doctrine remains con-
stitutionally enshrined, making the state the sole proprietor of strategic
mineral resources. A constitutional amendment would thus be necessary
to give Moros effective control of resources in the BJE. Christian land-own-
ing families with entrenched personal, political, and corporate interests in
Mindanao are also forcefully opposed to Moro ancestral domain. These
families have a proven track record of blocking the implementation of
peace agreements, and some have actively lobbied against accommodating
Moro ancestral domain claims, calling it “treason” and a “sell-out” of the
national patrimony.22 Finally, intra-Moro rivalries over land, political power,
and natural resources also pose a challenge. Some Moro leaders currently
in power (mayors, governors, members of congress) are loath to relinquish
their current patronage perks to a potentially MILF-dominated autonomous
system. A few of them have fought the MILF, using civilian militias and
government troops, and accused the MILF of terrorism in order to discredit
MILF representation of the Moros.23
Negotiations over natural resources will spotlight areas like the Ligua-
san Marsh, a marshland of almost 45,000 hectares straddling the provinces
of Maguindanao, North Cotabato, and Sultan Kudarat in central Mindanao.
The Liguasan Marsh is purported to hold significant deposits of oil and gas,
is located on MILF-controlled territory, and is claimed by Moros as their
ancestral domain. Another area that represents potential petroleum wealth
is the Sulu Basin, where the Philippine government has already awarded ser-
vice contracts to foreign corporations for initial exploration. If oil and gas
reserves are proven in the Liguasan Marsh and Sulu Basin, their significance
in the ancestral domain debate will likely intensify. Full exploitation of these
resources depends on a durable GRP-MILF peace agreement, without which
renewed hostilities seem inevitable.24
Governance is the third component of ancestral domain and involves
the transfer of genuine political power over Moro affairs to Moros them-
selves. Moro ‘autonomy’ has not ended Manila’s control over and patronage
in Muslim Mindanao. The central government has always selected ARMM
governors, who have depended on support from Manila to sustain them. In
the 2005 gubernatorial elections in the ARMM, the political leadership in
Manila discouraged a highly qualified candidate from running and instead
supported a candidate widely perceived as brutal and corrupt; Manila’s
candidate won.25 The continued imprisonment of former ARMM governor
Misuari illustrates the perils of crossing Manila’s authority. The MILF is
seeking a different model of governance, perhaps based partly on their
 This Land Is Our Land 85
experience of running Camp Abubakar, a 5,000–hectare area covering sev-
eral villages and communities. At Abubakar the MILF controlled territory
militarily, practiced a system of governance based on Islamic principles, and
oversaw a functioning agriculture-based economic system.26 However, this
experiment of governing a demarcated territory, developing a local economy,
and nurturing Islam and Moro culture was short-lived, because government
troops captured Camp Abubakar in 2000.

Moro Self-Determination

To reinvigorate talks that stalled over territory, in December 2006 GRP ne-
gotiators made a new proposal to the MILF based on ‘self-determination.’
Over decades, GRP principals have refused to use the term self-determina-
tion in discussing policy options for the Moros. But, as senior members
of the government peace panel noted, they had to think out of the box to
prevent the talks from collapsing. The GRP guiding principle was maximal
accommodation of MILF demands without compromising Philippine sov-
ereignty and territorial integrity.
The government’s new offer fundamentally breaks with the past and
provides a framework for the potential resolution of ancestral domain. Un-
like past agreements, an arrangement based on self-determination would
not be contingent on ‘constitutional processes.’ In the past, government
insistence on constitutional processes implied the need for ‘enabling laws’
to be passed by an unsympathetic congress and plebiscites in which major-
ity Christians outvoted Moros. In the new framework, a GRP-MILF peace
agreement would govern the enabling law for the Moro homeland, thus
preventing Congress from emasculating Moro gains from negotiations.
ARMM enlargement and the creation of a genuine Moro autonomy could
theoretically happen without being held hostage to the obstreperous and
obstinate opposition of Congress or local anti-Moro groups. Although the
details of self-determination have yet to be elaborated, its tentative outline
reflects earlier consensus points on ancestral domain: an enlarged Moro
territory; self-government and the drafting of a charter by Moros; stronger
Moro taxation powers; separate Moro internal security forces; a potential
referendum to determine Moros’ final political status approximately twenty
years after a new peace agreement is signed; the right to exploit natural
resources on Moro territory; and the right to social and cultural develop-
ment. The future Moro government would be given full powers except in
foreign affairs, defense, and the printing of money. It could have symbols
such as a Bangsamoro flag. GRP negotiators anticipate challenges regarding
the constitutionality of Moro self-determination. Absent a constitutional
amendment, their main legal defense of self-determination for the Moros
is a constitutional provision declaring international law, which enshrines
the fundamental right of minorities to self-determination, as a constituent
part of Philippine law.27
86 SAIS Review Summer–Fall 2007
The Moro Outlook

The Moro story and persistent conflict in Mindanao is irrevocably linked

to land, resources, and governance—the core components of ancestral do-
main. Ancestral domain articulates the historical and legitimate founda-
tion of Moro grievances, and undermines simplistic depictions of Moros
as incorrigible rebels or terrorists driven by religious dogma.28 There is
no magic solution to the Mindanao conflict, but an understanding of
ancestral domain and its potential resolution through Moro self-deter-
mination represents an unequivocally new approach that could enhance
prospects for long-term peace and development.

Justice
Ancestral domain articulates the historical injustices suffered by Moros,
particularly their marginalization on land they had dominated for centu-
ries and their experience of second-class citizenship in the Philippines.29
The language of ancestral domain helps educate the Philippine public
on Moro grievances and enhances the potential of broader support for
a policy of national reconciliation.30

Minority Rights
Ancestral domain acknowledges and values the distinct history, religion,
and identity of Moros. Moro opinion-makers themselves have increasingly
identified the Bangsamoro as a sovereign ‘first nation,’ unjustly stripped of
land, power, and identity by colonizers and other alien rulers. They seek the
same respect as that accorded to first nations in the United States, Canada,
New Zealand, Australia, and elsewhere.31 Their intellectuals have distilled
from international charters, declarations, and reports the meaning of self-
determination and its implications for the Moros as a minority.32 Recogni-
tion of and respect for Moro identity, culture and rights could mitigate
Moro resentment, promote less prejudicial interaction among the peoples
of Mindanao, and diminish the attraction of violence as a preferred means
for preserving Moro dignity and protecting Moro aspirations.

Political and Economic Autonomy

Ancestral domain addresses long-standing Moro demand for control over
their natural resources and political power within their territory. Although
this framework provides fodder to those in the Philippines who see any
concession to the Moros as a step towards the slippery slope of secession,
nonetheless many countries’ experiences have shown that state cohesion
and integrity can be strengthened when restive minorities are given genuine
powers of self-government.33

Security
Simple and linear solutions to security problems in Mindanao, particularly
terrorism, are hard to find. But, as a recent study argues, ongoing peace ne-
gotiations are making progress and have contributed to positive outcomes
 This Land Is Our Land 87
34
in counter-terrorism. Even though ancestral domain itself is unresolved,
the framework that sustains negotiations has facilitated the creation of
institutions that have preserved a ceasefire since 2003; aided the recovery
of kidnap victims; and thwarted potential terrorist attacks.. These institu-
tions include the GRP-MILF Committees on the Cessation of Hostilities,
the International Monitoring Team and its civilian peacekeeping partners,
and the GRP-MILF AHJAG or Ad Hoc Joint Action Group, which is a joint
mechanism for discovering and pursuing terrorist and criminal suspects.35
Beyond terrorism, ancestral domain could dampen land conflict between
individuals and clans who claim the same parcels of territory. These con-
flicts often spill into GRP-MILF clashes when the warring sides seek help
from friends and relatives in the armed forces or MILF.36 These conflicts kill
people and dislocate innocent civilians. Within an ancestral domain frame-
work, a more effective process could be instituted for pursuing individual or
family land claims. In a Moro homeland, traditional leaders and indigenous
peace-making could also be exploited to resolve land conflict.

Conclusion

Conflict in Mindanao has long stunted the region’s development poten-

tial. An ancestral domain agreement could enhance peace and order, while
helping unlock long-term development and growth prospects in what is
arguably the Philippines’ most richly endowed region in terms of natural
resources.37 But potential pitfalls must be addressed. Foremost is intra-Moro
rivalry and division. MNLF and MILF elites need to forge a common vision
on Moro ancestral domain. They must work with executive power in Ma-
nila to cultivate support among local Moro government leaders who could
spoil a GRP-MILF deal. Moro ethno-linguistic differences and rivalries are
substantive and deep. Although they unite in the face of an enemy, their
track record is dismal when uniting for common purposes of governance
and economic development. The exercise of writing a Moro charter—as
envisioned in ancestral domain talks—could become a critical opportunity
to build Moro unity.
The government, especially the Office of the President, must do
more to have a genuine national policy on ancestral domain. Most Fili-
pinos remain ignorant of the GRP-MILF talks and the historical roots
of conflict in Mindanao. Congress has few, if any, supporters of Moro
ancestral domain. The government’s peace panel chair notes that the
Moro problem is an “issue [that] affects the entire nation,” but national
awareness of, and support for, this issue is dismally low.38 Without a
national policy and relatively broad support, any agreement on ancestral
domain will likely founder in the implementation phase, and conflict in
Mindanao will continue.
Finally, where will resources come for implementing an ancestral do-
main agreement? Current bilateral and multilateral development assistance
is already being deployed in Muslim Mindanao and more will likely come
after a peace agreement is signed.39 But equally important is assistance in
88 SAIS Review Summer–Fall 2007
monitoring the implementation of a new agreement to prevent failures
encountered in the past. A coalition of willing outsiders could help ensure
that both sides adhere to their commitments during a transition period
of five to seven years. The United States could take the lead in forming a
‘Friends of Mindanao’ group, working with a number of other countries
including Malaysia, Canada, Japan, Australia, and others already engaged
in Mindanao. Although U.S. policymakers have not been as officially active
in the peace talks as Malaysia has, the United States occupies a unique spot
in Mindanao and Philippine politics.40 Moros, for the most part, retain
goodwill towards the United States because they perceive it as the only out-
side power with sufficient potential leverage over the GRP and could help
them receive fair treatment. They believe the GRP seeks to maintain close
relations with the U.S. and increase U.S. security and other assistance. U.S.
leverage, Moros hope, could be used to help resolve ancestral domain, thus
correcting historical wrongs that were partly perpetrated by U.S. colonialism
and giving the peoples of Mindanao a new opportunity to advance towards
long-term peace and development.

Notes
1
 Spanish colonial rulers first coined the term ‘Moros’ in the sixteenth century to refer to
Muslims in the Philippines who reminded them of Spain’s Muslims, the Moors. Until the
1970s, Moros was pejorative, but, over time, Moros themselves reclaimed the name and
dignified it as a collective reference to the thirteen Islamized ethnic groups of the Philip-
pines.
2
 There is no space in this paper to tackle in-depth the issue of terrorism. But this paper fills
a gap created by the literature on terrorism in Mindanao that tends to skim Moro history
and neglects the core Moro narrative regarding land and displacement. See, e.g. Abuza, Zach-
ary, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia. Crucible of Terror. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers,
2003; Ressa, Maria. Seeds of Terror. New York: Free Press, 2003; and Banlaoi, Rommel C.
War on Terrorism in Southeast Asia. Quezon City, Philippines: Rex Bookstore, 2004.
3
 No reliable census data exist to show the actual number of Muslims in the Philippines
today. Beginning in 1990, religion ceased to be a criterion for classification in the Philip-
pine census. The CIA World Factbook estimates that, as of 2003, the Philippines had a
population of just over 84 million, with 5 percent of it Muslim. This would make Muslims
4.2 million, with the majority of them living in Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago. The
oft-quoted figure of five million seems to have originated from the Moro National Libera-
tion Front (MNLF) in the 1970s and has been quoted widely ever since. Moros argue that
the census does not accurately count them because researchers and government agents are
afraid of canvassing Moro ‘conflict-affected’ areas. Moros also mention polygamy as yet
another reason to believe that their numbers are greater than officially acknowledged.
4
 The Sultanate of Sulu dates back to the mid-fifteenth century and the Sultanate of Ma-
guindanao the early seventeenth century.
5
 Rodil, B.R. A Story of Mindanao and Sulu in Question and Answer. Davao City, Philippines:
MINCODE, 2003, 30–33. Majul, Cesar Adib. Muslims in the Philippines. Quezon City: Univer-
sity of the Philippines Press, 1999, Chapter VII.
6
 Schurman, Jacob G. “The Philippines.” Yale Law Journal (October 1899–July 1900):251–
22.
7
 Author notes from numerous meetings with Moros, 2003–2007.
8
 Rodil. A Story of Mindanao and Sulu in Question and Answer, 105.
9
 Ibid., 105–107.
10
 A few Moros benefited, however, including relatively sophisticated datus or chiefs, who
 This Land Is Our Land 89
also engaged in land-grabbing by titling to themselves land their followers had traditionally
tilled and owned. Fianza, Myrthena L. “Contesting Land and Identity in the Periphery. The
Moro Indigenous People of Southern Philippines.” Paper Presented at the Tenth Conference
of the International Association for the Study of Common Property, Oaxaca, Mexico, August
9–13, 2004. http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/archive/00001673/01/Contesting_Land.pdf.
11
 In the Bud Dajo massacre of 1906 in Sulu, U.S. soldiers killed 600 Tausug men, women,
and children who rebelled against the imposition of a local head tax. Gowing, Peter Gordon.
Mandate in Moroland: The U.S. Government of Muslim Filipinos, 1899–1920 . Quezon City: New
Day Publishers, 1983, 164.
12
 McKenna, Thomas M. Muslim Rulers and Rebels. Everyday Politics and Armed Separatism in the
Southern Philippines. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1998, 89.
13
 Rodil. A Story of Mindanao and Sulu, 112 and Lynch, Owen. “Native Title: The Legal Claim
of Tribal Filipinos and the Bangsa Moro to their Ancestral Land.” Paper delivered at the
15th UGAT Conference, Mindanao State University-Iligan Institute of Technology, Iligan
City, Philippines, April 16, 1982.
14
 Rodil. Ibid., 114; Gutierrez, Eric and Borras, Saturnino Jr. “The Moro Conflict. Land-
lessness and Misdirected State Policies.” Policy Studies 8. Washington, D.C.: East-West
Center, 2004, 14–17. Jubair, Salah. Bangsamoro. A Nation Under Endless Tyranny. Updated and
expanded ed. Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: IQ Marin, 1999, 130–31. 1990 and 2000 Philippine
Census (National Statistics Office). Ferrer, Miriam Coronel. “From Rebels to Governors:
‘Patronage Autonomy’ and Continuing Human Underdevelopment in Muslim Mindanao.”
In Developing Regional Minorities: Challenges for the future in East and Southeast Asia, edited by Dr.
Huhua Cao, 7. Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, forthcoming 2007.
15
 Discrimination against Moros remains rampant in the Philippines today. “Government
Admits Moros ‘Unhappy’ About Being Filipinos.” Maradika, 26, No. 11, November 2006.
“Human Development Gains Can Reduce Armed Conflict and Terrorism in the Philippines.”
UN Development Programme. Press Release, 23 May 2006. http://hdr.undp.org/docs/net-
work/hdr_net/Philippines_Press_Release_1.doc.
16
 An entire journal issue reviewing the 1996 peace agreement ten years after its signing is
Autonomy and Peace Review 2, No. 3 (October-December 2006).
17
 Controversy surrounds the implementation of the 1996 Final Peace Agreement. The GRP
insists that it “has been faithfully complying with the implementation of the Peace Agree-
ment to the letter and spirit,” while the MNLF and most Moros argue that implementation
has been spotty and Moros have yet to experience collectively the benefits of peace. Aguirre,
Alexander P. “The GRP-MNLF Peace Agreement: Revisited June 2001.” Autonomy and Peace
Review 2, No. 3 (October-December 2006):57 and other articles in this issue.
18
 This could have been done, for example, by stipulating a set amount of the national bud-
get yearly to be allocated to the ARMM government to be disbursed based on the region’s
needs.
19
 Embedded patronage in ARMM-Manila relations and problematic Moro leadership are
discussed in Ferrer. “From Rebels to Governors” and Bacani, Benedicto. “The ARMM: A
Mechanism for Self-Determination or Co-Optation?” Autonomy and Peace Review 1, No. 1
(October-December 2005):7–16.
20
 Pazzibugan, Dona. "MILF, not Pentagon Gang, Real Target, Says Military." Philippine
Daily Inquirer, February 17, 2003.
21
 Bangsamoro means Moro nation. This term, though relatively new, is used in formal
negotiations and increasingly popular in the Philippines.
22
 The author debated this issue with Zamboanga City Mayor Celso Lobregat, whose politi-
cal dynastic family has long opposed Moro interests, and with former Senator Francisco
Tatad in Manila in October 2005. See also “The Carving Up of Mindanao.” http://www.
mindanao.com/blog/?m=20051025.
23
 Arguillas, Carolyn. “Buffer zones set up to prevent CVO-MILF clashes in Maguindanao.”
Mindanews.com, July 10, 2006. See also the section on clan power in Cook, Malcolm and
Collier, Kit. Mindanao. A Gamble Worth Taking. Lowy Institute Paper 17, Lowy Institute for
International Policy, 2006.
24
 Mastura, Ishak Antonio V. “Can the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao Issue
Petroleum License? The Geopolitical Implications of Discovery of Oil and Gas in Southern
90 SAIS Review Summer–Fall 2007
Philippines.” Master’s Thesis, Centre for Energy, Petroleum and Mineral Law and Policy,
University of Dundee, Scotland, UK, January 2007, 6–7 and Astrid S. Tuminez, “Peril and
Promise. Mindanao, the Southern Philippines.” CLSA U Speaker Series. Hong Kong, June
2006.
25
 Author interviews in Mindanao, various dates, 2005 and Cook and Collier. Mindanao.
26
 Vitug, Marites and Gloria, Glenda. Under the Crescent Moon. Rebellion in Mindanao. Quezon
City, Philippines: Ateneo Center for Social Policy and Public Administration and the Insti-
tute for Popular Democracy, 2000, 106–115.
27
 Author notes from meetings with the GRP and MILF peace panels and with MILF lead-
ers. Manila and Cotabato, December 2006. A hopeful precedent with regards to ancestral
domain and self-determination is the passage in the Philippines in 1997 of the Indigenous
Peoples’ Rights Act (IPRA), whose constitutionality, when challenged, was upheld by the Su-
preme Court. Moros generally do not consider themselves one of the “indigenous peoples”
of the Philippines but independent nations unlawfully integrated into the Philippine state.
The constitutional battle over Moro self-determination and ancestral domain will be a seri-
ous one, and victory for the Moros is far from guaranteed.
28
 Richard Fernandez Blog. Pajamas Media. http://pajamasmedia.com/2007/01/islands_
in_the_war_part_1.php and http://pajamasmedia.com/2007/01/islands_in_the_war_part_
2.php.
29
 The persistent socio-economic disadvantages of Moros in the Philippines are well-
documented. Human Development Network and United Nations Human Development
Programme. Philippine Human Development Report 2005. Peace, Human Security and Human
Development in the Philippines. 2nd ed. In http://hdr.undp.org/reports/detail_reports.
cfm?view=826. See also Human Development for Peace and Prosperity in the Autonomous Region
in Muslim Mindanao. Pasig City: The World Bank Country Office, 2003.
30
 Both GRP and MILF peace panel members have looked into the experience of New Zealand
and other countries, where governments have formally apologized to indigenous minorities
for historical injustices.
31
 Moro leaders and thinkers have shown great interest in the experience of other ‘first na-
tions’ and minorities who have lost their ancestral lands—the Inuit in Canada, Native Ameri-
cans in the United States, the Maoris of New Zealand, Australian aborigines, Tamils in Sri
Lanka, South Sudanese in Sudan, Bougainvilleans in Papua New Guinea, East Timorese and
Acehnese in Indonesia. The author has worked to bring the experience of other minorities on
ancestral domain to the attention of GRP and MILF negotiators as well as opinion-makers
in Mindanao and Manila. See Astrid S. Tuminez. Ancestral Domain in Comparative Perspective.
United States Institute of Peace. Special Report 151, September 2005.
32
 Lingga, Abhoud Syed M. “The Right to Self-Determination.” Unpublished Document,
Institute of Bangsamoro Studies, 16 March 2007.
33
 Ghai, Yash P. Autonomy and Ethnicity. Negotiating Competing Claims in Multiethnic Societies.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Studies in Law and Society, 2000.
34
 Cook and Collier. Mindanao.
35
 Oledan: Perspective. http://www.sunstar.com.ph/static/dav/2007/05/10/oped/radzini.
oledan.slice.of.life.html. “Military Belatedly Bares Surrender of 8 ‘Terrorists’.” http://
www.sunstar.com.ph/static/man/2007/05/18/news/military.belatedly.bares.surrender.
of.8.terrorists..html.
36
 “Philippine Rebels Rain Mortar on Troops in South.” Reuters, 8 March 2007 and “Task
Force Formed to Solve Cotabato Land Rows,” GMA News-TV in http://www.gmanews.
tv/story/35650/Task-force-formed-to-solve-Cotabato-land-rows. In one of these land-based
conflicts in Lanao del Norte province, two clans claim ownership of the same twenty-four
hectares (one claiming ancestral domain rights and the other holding legal title). Fight-
ing over this land has killed 108 people between 1970–2005 and has spilled into GRP-
MILF skirmishes. Both sides are willing to renounce their claim if each is compensated
US$75,000. Kauswagan Road Map of Peace: Conflict Resolution Plan for 24-Hectare Problem. Notes
in author’s possession from Pakigdait, a non-governmental organization working in Lanao
del Norte.
37
 Tuminez. Peril and Promise.
 This Land Is Our Land 91
38
 Meeting with Secretary Silvestre Afable. Manila, 6 December 2006.
39
 Canada Seeks to Boost Peace Efforts, Adds P40-M to Mindanao Trust Fund. http://www.
reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/RMOI-72VMCJ?OpenDocument. The U.S. State De-
partment in 2003 offered U.S. $30 million in development assistance if a GRP-MILF peace
agreement was to be signed. Although those funds were re-allocated to the U.S. Agency for
International Development—because no peace agreement was signed in 2003—the offer is
likely to be renewed if a GRP-MILF deal is inked.
40
 U.S. involvement in the GRP-MILF peace talks from 2003–2007 has been in the form of
informal facilitation by the U.S. Institute of Peace’s Philippine Facilitation Project. Through
this project, the author has worked directly with GRP and MILF leaders on ancestral domain
issues and engaged in broader activities to strengthen the public constituency for peace in
Mindanao.