CRIMINAL LAW II | CASE DIGESTS

TITLE ONE – CRIMES AGAINST NATIONAL effectuate, if possible, the beneficient purpose
SECURITY AND LAW OF NATIONS intended. Certainly a limitation of the words in
question to their literal and technical signification
would utterly defeat the unmistakable general object
November 24, 2017 - Article 114 - TREASON
of the amnesty. Upon such a construction treason, the
BURGOS, Paul Zandrix A.
highest of all political crimes, a crime which may be
punished by death under section 1 of Act No. 292,
US v. ABAD
would be included in the amnesty, while insurrection,
G.R. No. L-976. October 22, 1902
which is a crime of precisely the same nature and
LADD, J.:
differs from it solely in being inferior in degree and
punishable by fine and imprisonment only, would be
ISSUE:
excluded. A construction leading to such manifest
Whether or not the charge of “treason and sedition”
inconsistencies could be accepted only when the
was proper.
language admitted of no other. We think the
construction suggested as the true one though
FACTS:
somewhat less restricted that the precise legal
The offense with which the defendant was charged and
signification of the terms "treason" and "sedition"
of which he has been convicted is that defined in
might warrant, may be adopted without doing violence
section 14 of Act No. 292 of the United States
to the language of the proclamation, and there is no
Philippine Commission, which is as follows: "Any
room for doubt in our minds that by adopting that
person who shall have taken any oath before any
construction we carry out the real intention of the
military officer under the Civil Government of the
President.
Philippine Islands, whether such official so
The Court ruled that the offense of violation of oaths
administering the oath was specially authorized by law
of allegiance, being one of the political offenses
so to do or not, in which oath the affiant is substance
defined in Act No. 292, is included in the general words
engaged to recognize or accept the supreme authority
"treason and sedition," as used in the proclamation.
of the United States of America in these Islands or to
The defendant is entitled to the benefits of the
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto or to obey
proclamation.
the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by its
duly constituted authorities and who shall, after the
LAUREL v. MISA
passage of this act, violate the terms and provisions of
G.R. No. L-409. January 30, 1947
such oath or any of such terms or provisions, shall be
punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand dollars
ISSUE:
or by imprisonment not exceeding ten years, or both."
Whether or not respondent should be prosecuted for
the crime of Treason penalized under Art. 114 of the
In the present case the act by which the defendant is
RPC.
found by the court below to have violated the oath was
that of denying to an officer of the United States Army
FACTS:
the existence of certain rifles, which had been
Anastacio Laurel filed a petition for habeas corpus
concealed by his orders at the time of his surrender in
which was based on a theory that a Filipino citizen who
April, 1901, and of the existence and whereabouts of
adhered to the enemy giving the latter aid and comfort
which he was cognizant at the time of the denial. If this
during the Japanese occupation cannot be prosecuted
act was a violation of the oath, which upon the
for the crime of treason defined and penalized by
evidence in the case may be doubtful, it was probably
article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, for the reason
also an act of treason, as being an act of adhering to
that the sovereignty of the legitimate government in
the enemies of the United States, giving them aid and
the Philippines and, consequently, the correlative
comfort, and if the element of breach of promise is to
allegiance of Filipino citizens thereto was then
be regarded as merely an incidental circumstance
suspended.
forming no part of the essence of the crime of violation
of oaths of allegiance, the offense in this particular case
HELD:
might, perhaps, be held to be covered by the amnesty
YES. The idea of suspended sovereignty or suspended
as being, in substance, treason though prosecuted
allegiance is incompatible with our Constitution. There
under another name.
is similarity in characteristics between allegiance to the
sovereign and a wife's loyalty to her husband. Because
HELD:
some external and insurmountable force precludes the
YES. Treason, in its more general sense, is the "violation
husband from exercising his marital powers, functions,
by a subject of his allegiance to his sovereign or liege
and duties and the wife is thereby deprived of the
lord, or to the supreme authority of the state." Sedition,
benefits of his protection, may the wife invoke the
in its more general sense, is "the raising of commotion
theory of suspended loyalty and may she freely share
or disturbances in the state." Technical terms of the law
her bed with the assailant of their home? After giving
when used in a statute are ordinarily to be given their
aid and comfort to the assailant and allowing him to
technical signification. But in construing an executive
enjoy her charms during the former's stay in the
act of the character of this proclamation, as in
invaded home, may the wife allege as defense for her
construing a remedial statute, a court is justified in
adultery the principle of suspended conjugal fidelity?
applying a more liberal rule of construction in order to

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Considering that the crime of treason against the
government of the Philippines defined and penalized
in article 114 of the Penal Code, though originally
intended to be a crime against said government as
then organized by authority of the sovereign people of
the United States, exercised through their authorized
representative, the Congress and the President of the
United States, was made, upon the establishment of
the Commonwealth Government in 1935, a crime
against the Government of the Philippines established
by authority of the people of the Philippines, in whom
the sovereignty resides according to section 1, Article
II, of the Constitution of the Philippines, by virtue of the
provision of section 2, Article XVI thereof, which
provides that "All laws of the Philippine Islands . . . shall
remain operative, unless inconsistent with this
Constitution.
PEOPLE v. PEREZ
G.R. No. L-856. April 18, 1949
TUASON, J.:
ISSUE:
Whether or not the charge of Treason was proper.
FACTS:
Susano Perez alias Kid Perez alias Kid Perez was
convicted of treason and sentenced to death by
electrocution. Seven counts were alleged in the
information but the prosecution offered evidence only
on counts 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6, all of which, according to the
court, were substantiated.
Count No. 1 alleges that the accused, together with the
other Filipinos forced numerous girls and women
against their will for the purpose of satisfying the
immoral purpose and sexual desire of Colonel Mini.
Count No. 2 of the information substantially alleges:
That accused in company with some Japanese and
Filipinos forcefully took some women to attend a
banquet and a dance organized in honor of Colonel
Mini by the Puppet Governor and thereafter be used as
sex slaves by the Colonel.
Count No. 4 substantially alleges that on July 16, 1942,
that two girls were taken from their homes by the
accused and his companion named Vicente Bullecer,
and delivered to the Japanese Officer, Dr. Takibayas to
satisfy his carnal appetite, but these two, the accused
Susano Perez and his companion Vicente Bullecer,
raped the girls before delivering them to the Japanese
Officer.
Count No. 5 alleges: That on or about June 4, 1942, the
said accused deceived two women on the pretext that
they were to be taken as witnesses before a Japanese
Colonel in the investigation of a case against a certain
Chinese, but upon arriving at the Colonel’s office,
through force and intimidation, the two women were
raped by the accused and some Japanese Officials.
Count No. 6, alleges: That the accused, together with
his Filipino companion two nurses of the provincial
hospital, for not having attended a dance and
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CRIMINAL LAW II | CASE DIGESTS
reception organized by the Puppet Governor in honor
of Colonel Mini and other Japanese high ranking
officers; that upon being brought the Puppet
Governor, they were severely reprimanded by the
latter; that on July 8, 1942, against said nurses were
forced to attend another banquet and dance in order
that the Jap officers Mini and Takibayas might make a
selection which girls would suit best their fancy; that
the real purpose behind those forcible invitations was
to lure them to the residence of said Japanese Officer
Mini for immoral purposes.
HELD:
NO, the charge was not proper. The SC ruled that the
deeds committed by the accused do not constitute
treason. If furnishing women for immoral purposes to
the enemies was treason because women's company
kept up their morale, so fraternizing with them,
entertaining them at parties, selling them food and
drinks, and kindred acts, would be treason. For any act
of hospitality without doubt produces the same
general result, yet by common agreement those and
similar manifestation of sympathy and attachment are
not the kind of disloyalty that are punished as treason.
In a broad sense, the law of treason does not prescribe
all kinds of social, business and political intercourse
between the belligerent occupants of the invaded
country and its inhabitants. In the nature of things, the
occupation of a country by the enemy is bound to
create relations of all sorts between the invaders and
the natives. What aid and comfort constitute treason
must depend upon their nature degree and purpose.
To draw a line between treasonable and untreasonable
assistance is not always easy.
As general rule, to be treasonous the extent of the aid
and comfort given to the enemies must be to render
assistance to them as enemies and not merely as
individuals and in addition, be directly in furtherance
of the enemies' hostile designs. To make a simple
distinction: To lend or give money to an enemy as a
friend or out of charity to the beneficiary so that he
may buy personal necessities is to assist him as
individual and is not technically traitorous. On the
other hand, to lend or give him money to enable him
to buy arms or ammunition to use in waging war
against the giver's country enhance his strength and by
same count injures the interest of the government of
the giver. That is treason.
Applying these principles to the case at bar, appellant's
first assignment of error is correct. His
"commandeering" of women to satisfy the lust of
Japanese officers or men or to enliven the
entertainment held in their honor was not treason even
though the women and the entertainment helped to
make life more pleasant for the enemies and boost
their spirit; he was not guilty any more than the women
themselves would have been if they voluntarily and
willingly had surrendered their bodies or organized the
entertainment. Sexual and social relations with the
Japanese did not directly and materially tend to
improve their war efforts or to weaken the power of
the United State. The acts herein charged were not, by

fair implication, calculated to strengthen the Japanese
Empire or its army or to cripple the defense and
resistance of the other side. Whatever favorable effect
the defendant's collaboration with the Japanese might
have in their prosecution of the war was trivial,
imperceptible, and unintentional. Intent of disloyalty is
a vital ingredient in the crime of treason, which, in the
absence of admission, may be gathered from the
nature and circumstances of each particular case.
November 25, 2017 – Article 115 – CONSPIRACY
AND PROPOSAL TO COMMIT TREASON
UNAS, Nor-Aiza R.
US VS. BAUTISTA, ET AL.
6 PHIL. 581 NOVEMBER 3, 1906
CARSON, J.:
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was conspiracy and proposal to
commit treason.
FACTS:
During the latter part of 1903, a junta was organized
and a conspiracy entered into by a number of Filipinos,
resident in Hongkong, for the purpose of overthrowing
the Government of the United States in the Philippine
Islands by force of arms and establishing in its stead a
government to be known as the Republica Universal
Democratica Filipina. Prim Ruiz was recognized as the
titular head of this conspiracy and one Artemio Ricarte
as chief of the military forces to the organized in the
Philippines in the furtherance of the plans of the
conspirators. The appellant Francisco Bautistam was an
intimate friend of the said Ricarte; that Ricarte wrote
and notified Bautista of his coming to Manila and that,
to aid him in his journey, Bautista forwarded to him
secretly 200 pesos; that after the arrival of Ricarte,
Bautista was present, taking part in the meetings
whereat the plans of the conspirators were discussed
and perfected, and that at one of these meetings
Bautista, in answer to a question of Ricarte, assured
him that the necessary preparations had been made
and that he "held the people in readiness." The
appellant Tomas Puzon united with the conspirators
through the agency of one Jose R. Muñoz, who was
proven to have been a prime leader of the movement,
in the intimate confidence of Ricarte, and by him
authorized to distribute bonds and nominate and
appoint certain officials, including a brigadier-general
of the signal corps of the proposed revolutionary
forces; that at the time when the conspiracy was being
brought to a head in the city of Manila, Puzon held
several conferences with the said Muñoz whereat plans
were made for the coming insurrection; that at one of
these conferences Muñoz offered Puzon a commission
as brigadier-general of the signal corps and undertook
to do his part in organizing the troops; and that at a
later conference he assured the said Muñoz that he
had things in readiness, meaning thereby that he had
duly organized in accordance with the terms of his
commission.
HELD:
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Yes. It is contended that the acceptance or possession
of an appointment as an officer of the military forces
of the conspiracy should not be considered as
evidence against him. But the case at bar is to be
distinguished from these and like cases by the fact that
the record clearly disclose that the accused actually
and voluntarily accepted the appointment in question
and in doing so assumed all the obligations implied by
such acceptance, and that the charge in this case is that
of conspiracy, and the fact that the accused accepted
the appointment is taken into consideration merely as
evidence of his criminal relations with the conspirators.
It is quite conceivable that a group of conspirators
might appoint a person in no wise connected with
them to some high office in the conspiracy, in the hope
that such person would afterwards accept the
commission and thus unite himself with them, and it is
even possible that such an appointment might be
forwarded in the mail or otherwise, and thus come into
the possession of the person thus nominated, and that
such appointment might be found in his possession,
and, notwithstanding all this, the person in whose
possession the appointment was found might be
entirely innocent of all intention to join the conspiracy,
never having authorized the conspirators to use his
name in this manner nor to send such a commission to
him. Indeed, cases are not unknown in the annals of
criminal prosecutions wherein it has been proven that
such appointments have been concealed in the
baggage or among the papers of the accused persons,
so that when later discovered by the officers of the law
they might be used as evidence against the accused.
But where a genuine conspiracy is shown to have
existed as in this case, and it is proven that the accused
voluntarily accepted an appointment as an officer in
that conspiracy, we think that this fact may properly be
taken into consideration as evidence of his relations
with the conspirators.
JOSE JINGGOY E. ESTRADA VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. NO. 148965 FEBRUARY 26, 2002
PUNO, J.:
ISSUE:
Whether or not the charge against petitioner for
alleged offenses, and with alleged conspirators, is
proper.
FACTS:
In November 2000, as an offshoot of the impeachment
proceedings against Joseph Ejercito Estrada, then
President of the Republic of the Philippines, five
criminal complaints against the former President and
members of his family, his associates, friends and
conspirators were filed with the respondent Office of
the Ombudsman. The respondent Ombudsman issued
a Joint Resolution finding probable cause warranting
the filing with the Sandiganbayan of several criminal
Informations against the former President and the
other respondents therein. One of the Informations
was for the crime of plunder under Republic Act No.
7080 and among the respondents was herein

petitioner Jose Jinggoy Estrada, then mayor of San
Juan, Metro Manila.
HELD:
Yes, but only to those acts which were allegedly done
in conspiracy with the former President Joseph Estrada.
The Amended Information, in its first two paragraphs,
charges petitioner and his other co-accused with the
crime of plunder. The first paragraph names all the
accused, while the second paragraph describes in
general how plunder was committed and lays down
most of the elements of the crime itself. Sub-
paragraphs (a) to (d) describe in detail the predicate
acts that constitute the crime and name in particular
the co-conspirators of former President Estrada in each
predicate act. The predicate acts alleged in the said
four sub-paragraphs correspond to the items
enumerated in Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080. Sub-
paragraph (a) alleged the predicate act of receiving, on
several instances, money from illegal gambling, in
consideration of toleration or protection of illegal
gambling, and expressly names petitioner as one of
those who conspired with former President Estrada in
committing the offense. This predicate act corresponds
with the offense described in item 2 of the
enumeration in Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080. Sub-
paragraph (b) alleged the predicate act of diverting,
receiving or misappropriating a portion of the tobacco
excise tax share allocated for the province of Ilocos Sur,
which act is the offense described in item 1 in the
enumeration in Section 1 (d) of the law. This sub-
paragraph does not mention petitioner but instead
names other conspirators of the former President. Sub-
paragraph (c) alleged two predicate acts - that of
ordering the Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) and the Social Security System (SSS) to purchase
shares of stock of Belle Corporation, and collecting or
receiving commissions from such purchase from the
Belle Corporation which became part of the deposit in
the Jose Velarde account at the Equitable-PCI Bank.
These two predicate acts fall under items 2 and 3 in the
enumeration of R.A. No. 7080, and was allegedly
committed by the former President in connivance with
John Does and Jane Does. Finally, sub-paragraph (d)
alleged the predicate act that the former President
unjustly enriched himself from commissions, gifts,
kickbacks, in connivance with John Does and Jane
Does, and deposited the same under his account name
Jose Velarde at the Equitable-PCI Bank. This act
corresponds to the offense under item 6 in the
enumeration of Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080.
From the foregoing allegations of the Amended
Information, it is clear that all the accused named in
sub-paragraphs (a) to (d), thru their individual acts,
conspired with former President Estrada to enable the
latter to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth
in the aggregate amount of P4,097,804,173.17. As the
Amended Information is worded, however, it is not
certain whether the accused in sub-paragraphs (a) to
(d) conspired with each other to enable the former
President to amass the subject ill-gotten wealth. In
light of this lack of clarity, petitioner cannot be
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CRIMINAL LAW II | CASE DIGESTS
penalized for the conspiracy entered into by the other
accused with the former President as related in the
second paragraph of the Amended Information in
relation to its sub-paragraphs (b) to (d). We hold that
petitioner can be held accountable only for the
predicate acts he allegedly committed as related in
sub-paragraph (a) of the Amended Information which
were allegedly done in conspiracy with the former
President whose design was to amass ill-gotten wealth
amounting to more than P4 billion.
In the crime of plunder, different parties may be united
by a common purpose. In the case at bar, the different
accused and their different criminal acts have a
commonality to help the former President amass,
accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. Sub-
paragraphs (a) to (d) in the Amended Information
alleged the different participation of each accused in
the conspiracy. The gravamen of the conspiracy
charge, therefore, is not that each accused agreed to
receive protection money from illegal gambling, that
each misappropriated a portion of the tobacco excise
tax, that each accused ordered the GSIS and SSS to
purchase shares of Belle Corporation and receive
commissions from such sale, nor that each unjustly
enriched himself from commissions, gifts and
kickbacks; rather, it is that each of them, by their
individual acts, agreed to participate, directly or
indirectly, in the amassing, accumulation and
acquisition of ill-gotten wealth of and/or for former
President Estrada.
November 26, 2017 – Article 116 – MISPRISION OF
TREASON
FLORENTINO, Kimberly A.
US VS CABALLEROS ET AL
4 Phil 350 (1905)
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was Misprision of Treason.
FACTS:
Two accused were sentenced to the penalty of seven
years of presidio mayor as accessories to the crime of
assassination or murder of four American school-
teachers. Without having taken part in the said crime
as principals or as accomplices but they took part in
the burial of the corpses of the victims to conceal the
crime.
HELD:
No, the Supreme Court did not justify the evidence.
As regards to accused Baculi, although he confessed to
have assisted in the burial of the corpses, it appears
that he only did it because he was compelled by the
murderers who called him, striking him with the butts
of their guns and forced him to bury the corpses. It was
corroborated by the only eyewitness to the crime who
was present when it was committed. The witness also
stated that Baculi was not a member of the group who
murdered the Americans.

As regards to the other accused Apolonio Caballeros,
there was no proof that he took any part in the
execution of the crime and did not take any part in the
burial of the aforesaid corpses as to the testimonies of
the witness and the other accused.
The fact that the two accused did not report to the
authorities about the perpetration of the crime, which
seemed to be one of the motives for the conviction and
which the lower court took into consideration in the
judgment, is not punishable by the Penal Code and
therefore cannot render the two accused criminally
liable under the law.
November 27, 2017– Article 117 – ESPIONAGE
[NO CASE FOUND]
November 27, 2017– Article 118 – INCITING TO WAR
OR GIVING MOTIVES FOR REPRISALS
[NO CASE FOUND]
November 27, 2017 – Article 119 – VIOLATION OF
NEUTRALITY
[NO CASE FOUND]
November 27, 2017 – Article 120 –
CORRESPONDENCE WITH HOSTILE COUNTRY
[NO CASE FOUND]
November 27, 2017 – Article 121 – FLIGHT TO
ENEMY’S COUNTRY
[NO CASE FOUND]
November 27, 2017 – Article 122 – PIRACY
SANTOALLA, Stephanie M.
PEOPLE VS. LOL-LO & SARAW
G.R. No. 17958, February 27, 1922
ISSUE:
WON Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the crime
of piracy alleged in this case.
FACTS:
Two boats left Matuta, the boat 1 is of a dutch
possession and had one dutch subject, while boat 2
had 11 men, women and children, likewise from
Holland.
Boat 2 arrived in Buang and Bukid in the Dutch East
Indies, then suddenly they were surrounded by 6 vintas
manned by 24 moros who first asked for food. They
eventually entered the boat and took all the cargo,
attacked some of the men, and brutally violated two
women.
They also took the 2 women and left the ship to sink--
on board those who were left as they placed holes in
it. Two moro marauders in Tawi Tawi were identified as
Lol-lo and Saraw, and arrested for piracy.
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The accused-appellants questioned the jurisdiction of
the Philippine courts to the case, but the court ruled
that piracy is a crime against all mankind, so every
court also has jurisdiction to try these cases.
HELD:
Yes. All the elements of the crime of piracy were
present. Piracy is robbery in forcible depredation on
the high seas, without lawful authority and done animo
furandi (intention to steal), and in the spirit and
intention of universal hostility.
Philippine courts has jurisdiction to this case because
pirates are in law hostes humani generis (enemy of
mankind), a crime against all mankind. Therefore, it can
be punished in any competent tribunal of any country
where the offender may be found.
The Spanish Penal Code dealing with piracy is still in
force in the Philippines.
PEOPLE VS. CATANTAN
G.R. No. 11807, September 5, 1997
ISSUE:
Whether accused-appellant committed grave coercion
or piracy under PD. No. 532.
FACTS:
The Pilapil brothers, Eugene and Juan Jr., were fishing
in the sea, 3 kilometers away from the shores of
Tabogon, Cebu. In the course of their fishing, accused
Catantan and Ursal boarded the pumpboat of the
Pilapil's at gun point.
The pumpboat of the Pilapil brothers broke down, as a
result, they boarded another pumpboat operated by
Juanito. Catantan ordered the latter to take them to
Mungaz, Cebu. However, Juanito's pumpboat ran out
of gas and the accused were apprehended by the
police soon after the Pilapils reported the incident to
the local authorities.
HELD:
Yes. The RTC convicted the accused of the crime of
piracy under PD 532, which was affirmed by the
Supreme Court. Hence, were sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.
However, accused-appellant argues that in order that
piracy may be committed it is essential that there be
an attack on or seizure of a vessel. He claims that he
and his companion did not attack or seize the fishing
boat of the Pilapil brothers by using force or
intimidation but merely boarded the boat, and it was
only when they were already on board that they used
force to compel the Pilapils to take them to some other
place. Appellant also insists that he and Ursal had no
intention of permanently taking possession or
depriving complainants of their boat. As a matter of
fact, when they saw another pumpboat they ordered
the brothers right away to approach that boat so they
could leave the Pilapils behind in their boat.
Accordingly, appellant claims, he simply committed
grave coercion and not piracy.

The Court does not agree on the contention of the
appellant that the acts committed only constitute
grave coercion defined in Article 286 of the RPC, and
not piracy under PD No. 532.
Under the definition of piracy in PD No. 532 as well as
grave coercion as penalized in Art. 286 of the Revised
Penal Code, this case falls squarely within the purview
of piracy. While it may be true that Eugene and Juan Jr.
were compelled to go elsewhere other than their place
of destination, such compulsion was obviously part of
the act of seizing their boat.
PP v. TULIN
G.R. No. 111709, August 30, 2001
ISSUE:
WON the Philippine courts is without jurisdiction to try
the crime of piracy committed outside Philippine
waters and territory.
FACTS:
A cargo vessel owned by PNOC named MT Tabangao
was sailing near the coast of Mindoro loaded with
barrels of Kerosene, gasoline and diesel oil. Suddenly,
the cargo vessel was boarded by seven (7) fully armed
pirates named Tulin et. al., and took control over the
vessel and painted the logo and ship with black, and
then painted with the name Galilee.
In Singapore, where the ship crew was forced to sail
from Mindoro, a vessel called Navi Pride, anchored
beside MT Tabangao. One of the accused Hiong,
supervised the Navi's crew and received the cargo on
board MT Tabangao.
The said vessel went back to the Philippines and the
pirates released the original crew members in batch
after the transfer of goods were completed. The pirates
then ordered the batch not to tell authorities what
happened.
A series of arrests were effected against the accused-
appellants, charging them with qualified piracy or
violation of PD. No. 532 (Piracy in Philippine Waters),
after the Chief Engineer of the crew reported the
incident to the coast guard.
However, one of the accused-appellant Hiong, argues
that the trial court erred in convicting him as an
accomplice when the acts allegedly committed by him
were executed outside the Philippine waters and
territory, therefore stripping the Philippine courts of
jurisdiction to hold him for trial.
HELD:
Yes. The Philippine courts have jurisdiction to try this
case.
Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, before its
amendment, provided that piracy must be committed
on the high seas by any person not a member of its
complement nor a passenger thereof. Upon its
amendment by Republic Act No. 7659, the coverage of
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the pertinent provision was widened to include
offenses committed "in Philippine waters." On the
other hand, under Presidential Decree No. 532 (issued
in 1974), the coverage of the law on piracy embraces
any person including "a passenger or member of the
complement of said vessel in Philippine waters."
Hence, passenger or not, a member of the complement
or not, any person is covered by the law.
Republic Act No. 7659 neither superseded nor
amended the provisions on piracy under Presidential
Decree No. 532. There is no contradiction between the
two laws. There is likewise no ambiguity and hence,
there is no need to construe or interpret the law. All the
presidential decree did was to widen the coverage of
the law, in keeping with the intent to protect the
citizenry as well as neighboring states from crimes
against the law of nations. As expressed in one of the
"whereas" clauses of Presidential Decree No. 532,
piracy is "among the highest forms of lawlessness
condemned by the penal statutes of all countries." For
this reason, piracy under the Article 122, as amended,
and piracy under Presidential Decree No. 532 exist
harmoniously as separate laws.
As regards the contention that the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the person of accused-
appellant Hiong since the crime was committed
outside Philippine waters, suffice it to state that
unquestionably, the attack on and seizure of "M/T
Tabangao" (renamed "M/T Galilee" by the pirates) and
its cargo were committed in Philippine waters,
although the captive vessel was later brought by the
pirates to Singapore where its cargo was off-loaded,
transferred, and sold. And such transfer was done
under accused-appellant Hiong's direct supervision.
Although Presidential Decree No. 532 requires that the
attack and seizure of the vessel and its cargo be
committed in Philippine waters, the disposition by the
pirates of the vessel and its cargo is still deemed part
of the act of piracy, hence, the same need not be
committed in Philippine waters.
November 28, 2017 – Art. 123 – QUALIFIED PIRACY;
AND PD 532
CEBALLOS, Jesus C.
PEOPLE V. SIYOH, KIRAM, INDANAN AND
JAMAHALI
G.R. NO. L-57292, February 18, 1986
ISSUE:
Whether the guilty of Siyoh et al were proven beyond
reasonable doubt granting that the body of Anastacio
de Guzman was never found.
FACTS:
Antonio de Guzman together with his friends, Rodolfo
de Castro, Danilo Hiolen and Anastacio de Guzman,
who were also travelling merchants like him, were on
their way to Pilas Island, Province of Basilan. The group
were onboard a pumpboat operated by Kiram with
Siyoh as his help.

While on their way, 2 men armed with armantes
onboard a pumpboat fired at them thereupon Kiram
turned off the engine and threw a rope towards the
other pumboat. While the group’s boat was towed
towards Mataja Island, the armed men took their
money and goods as well as their clothes. After which,
Kiram uttered “It was good to kill all of you” then Siyoh
hacked de Castro and Hiolen with his “barong.”
Antonio de Guzman was able to jump out of the boat
but Kiram’s group fired at him hitting him at the back.
Antonio de Guzman was able to survive the attack and
reported it to the Philippine Army.
Antonio de Guzman was able to identify the men who
boarded their boat as the men that his group saw
talking with Kiram and Siyoh in Baluk-Baluk Island the
previous night.
The trial court found the defendants to be guilty
qualified piracy with triple murder and frustrated
murder. It then imposed to Siyoh et al the death
penalty.
HELD:
The Court upheld the decision of the trial court.
Art.123. of the RPC states that: Qualified piracy. — The
penalty of reclusion temporal to death shall be
imposed upon those who commit any of the crimes
referred to in the preceding article, under any of the
following circumstances:
1. Whenever they have seized a vessel by boarding or
firing upon the same;
2. Whenever the pirates have abandoned their victims
without means of saving themselves; or
3. Whenever the crime is accompanied by murder,
homicide, physical injuries or rape.
In the case at bar, it was proven that Siyoh et al killed
their victims, with the exception of Antonio, after they
stole the personal belongings of their victims. The
number of persons killed on the occasion of piracy is
not material. P.D. No. 532 considers qualified piracy, i.e.
rape, murder or homicide is committed as a result or
on the occasion of piracy, as a special complex crime
punishable by death regardless of the number of
victims. Thus, the recovery or non-recovery of the body
of Anastacio is immaterial in the present case.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JAIME
RODRIGUEZ alias JIMMY alias WILFRED DE LARA y
MEDRANO and RICO LOPEZ
G.R. No. L-60100, L-60768 and L-61069
March 20, 1985
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in not appreciating
their plea of guilty as a mitigating circumstance.
FACTS:
Jaime Rodriguez alias Jimmy alias Wilfred de Lara y
Medrano; Rico Lopez; Davao Reyes alias Dario Dece
7 | JMC COLLEGE OF LAW
CRIMINAL LAW II | CASE DIGESTS
Raymundo y Elausa; and Peter Ponce y Bulaybulay alias
Peter Power were crew members of M/V Noria 767.
While within the territorial waters of the Municipality
of Cagayan de Tawi-Tawi, Province of Tawi-Tawi,
armed with bladed weapons and high caliber firearms,
the group robbed the said vessel. In the course of the
robbing, several persons were killed and injured.
Leopoldo Lao, Municipal Health Officer of the said
municipality went aboard the vessel M/V Noria when it
arrived at Cagayan de Tawi-Tawi and saw at the wharf
ten dead bodies.
Upon their arraignment the accused pleaded guilty of
the crime of piracy.
The trial court imposed the penalty of death upon the
accused.
HELD:
The trial court was correct.
Sec. 3 of PD 532 otherwise known as the Anti-Piracy
Law provides that Sec. 3 Penalties.—Any person who
commits piracy or highway robbery/brigandage as
herein defined, shall, upon conviction by competent
court be punished by:
a) Piracy.—The penalty of reclusion temporal in its
medium and maximum periods shall be imposed. If
physical injuries or other crimes are committed as a
result or on the occasion thereof, the penalty of
reclusion perpetua shall be imposed. If rape, murder or
no homocide is committed as a result or on the
occasion of piracy, or when the offenders abandoned
the victims without means of saving themselves, or
when the seizure is accomplished by firing upon or
boarding a vessel, the mandatory penalty of death shall
be imposed.
Clearly, the penalty imposable upon persons found
guilty of the crime of piracy where rape, murder or
homicide is committed is mandatory death penalty.
Thus, the lower court committed no error in not
considering the plea of the three (3) defendants as a
mitigating circumstance.
In relation to the above, Art. 63 of the RPC was cited,
to wit: ART. 63. Rules for the application of indivisible
penalties.—In all cases in which the law prescribes a
single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the
courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating
circumstances that may have attended the commission
of the deed.
PEOPLE V. ANG CHO KIO
G.R. NOS. L-6687 AND L-6688
JULY 29, 1954
ISSUE:
Whether the trial court erred in not finding the accused
guilty of the complex crime of grave coercion with
murder with the imposable penalty of death.
FACTS:
 CRIMINAL LAW II | CASE DIGESTS

Ang Cho Kio was onboard PAL flight heading to Aparri

from Laoag. Somewhere over the airspace of Mt.
Province, he shot and killed the purser of the flight,
Eduardo Diago.

He then ordered the pilot, Pedro Perlas, to change

route towards Amoy. The pilot refused, prompting Kio
to shoot the pilot which caused his instantaneous
death.

For the first charge, he was sentenced to prision mayor

in the minimum and reclusion temporal as maximum.
For the second charge, the court found him guilty of
murder and grave coercion and sentenced him to
reclusion perpetua.

HELD:
The trial court was correct.

The accused committed two separate crimes, murder

and grave coercion. The defendant could have
deprived Pedro Perlas of his life without having to force
him to change the direction of the airplane; Coercion
to commit murder was not indispensable. Nor was it
indispensable to assassinate to commit coercion, quite
the contrary; for having murdered the pilot, the
defendant did not get his wish to reach Amoy: he
committed two acts that consisted of the crimes of
coercion and murder.

Complex crime is defined as a single act constituting

two or more crimes or when one of them is necessary
to commit the other. The penalty corresponding to the
most serious crime shall be imposed, applying it to its
maximum extent.

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 CRIMINAL LAW II | CASE DIGESTS

TITLE TWO – CRIMES AGAINST THE FELICIANO GALVANTE VS HON. ORLANDO C.

FUNDAMENTAL LAWS OF THE STATE CASIMIRO
G.R. NO. 162808, April 22, 2008
JUSTICE AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
November 29, 2017 – Article 124 – ARBITRARY
DETENTION
ISSUE:
ARANCES, Javy Ann G.
Whether or not the private respondents can be
charged of arbitrary detention.
RAMON MILO VS CFI JUDGE ANGELITO SALANGA
FACTS:
G.R. NO. L-37007, July 20, 1987
On May 14, 2001, private respondents, PO1 Romil
JUSTICE GANCAYCO
Avenido, PO1 Valentino Rufano, PO1 Eddie Degran,
PO1 Federico Balolot and Regional Mobile Group, PNP
ISSUE:
members of Bunawan Brook, Bunawan, Agusan del Sur,
Whether or not Juan Tuvera, Sr., a barrio captain, can
confiscated from petitioner one colt pistol super .38
be charged of arbitrary detention.
automatic with serial no. 67973, one short magazine,
and nine super .38 live ammunitions. Consequently,
FACTS:
information filed against the petitioner for Illegal
On April 21, 1973 at around 10:00 o’clock in the
Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions in Relation to
evening, in barrio Baguinay, Manaoag, Pangasinan,
Commission on Elections (Comelec) Resolution No.
Philippines, the accused with the aid of some other
3258.
private persons, conspiring, maltreated Armando
Valdez by hitting with butts of their guns and fists.
Petitioner filed against private respondents an
Immediately thereafter, willfully, unlawfully and
administrative case and criminal case for Arbitrary
feloniously, lodge and lock said Armando Valdez inside
Detention. Petitioner states that private respondents
the municipal jail of Manaoag, Pangasinan for about
aimed their long firearms at him, arbitrarily searched
eleven (11) hours.
his vehicle and put him in detention. Prosecutor II
On April 4, 1973, Tuvera filed a motion to quash the
Eliseo Diaz, Jr. filed a "Reinvestigation with Motion to
information on the ground that the facts charged
Dismiss," which was granted by Officer-in-Charge
against him do not constitute an offense of arbitrary
Prosecutor II Victoriano Pag-ong, on the ground that
detention and that the proofs adduced at the
"the action of the policemen who conducted the
investigation are not sufficient to support the filing of
warrantless search in spite of the absence of any
the information. Respondent judge quashed the
circumstances justifying the same intruded into the
motion on the ground that Tuvera Sr. was not a public
privacy of the accused and the security of his property."
officer who can be charged with arbitrary detention.
Petitioner Assistant Provincial Fiscal Ramon S. Milo
HELD:
filed an opposition thereto.
The criminal complaint for arbitrary detention was
properly dismissed by public respondents. To sustain a
HELD:
criminal charge for arbitrary detention, it must be
Arbitrary Detention is committed by a public officer
shown that (a) the offender is a public officer or
who, without legal grounds, detains a person.1 The
employee, (b) the offender detained the complainant,
elements of this crime are the following:
and (c) the detention is without legal grounds. The
second element was not alleged by petitioner in his
1. That the offender is a public officer or employee.
Affidavit-Complaint. As pointed out by private
respondent Conde in his Comment and Memorandum,
2. That he detains a person.
petitioner himself identified in his Affidavit-Complaint
that it was Police Chief Rocacorba who caused his
3. That the detention is without legal grounds.
detention. Nowhere in said affidavit did petitioner
allege that private respondents effected his detention,
Long before Presidential Decree 299 was signed into
or were in any other way involved in it. There was,
law, barrio lieutenants (who were later named barrio
therefore, no factual or legal basis to sustain the
captains and now barangay captains) were recognized
criminal charge for arbitrary detention against private
as persons in authority. In various cases, this Court
respondents.
deemed them as persons in authority, and convicted
them of Arbitrary Detention.

November 30, 2017 – Art. 125 – DELAY IN THE

Thus, it was erroneously reasoned that captain did not
DELIVERY OF DETAINED PERSONS TO THE PROPER
detained Valdez, being merely a captain, no authority,
JUDICIAL AUTHORITIES.
and that barrio captain was not a public official, not
DELFIN, Jennica Gyrl
considered persons in authority, only upon PD 299.
From the foregoing, there is no doubt that a barrio
LINO V. FUGOSA, ET. AL
captain, like private respondent Tuvera, Sr., can be held
G.R. NO. L-1159
liable for Arbitrary Detention.
JANUARY 30, 1947

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ISSUE:
Whether or not Montaniel and Deoduco were detained
illegally.
FACTS:
A petition for habeas corpus was filed against
Valeriano Fugoso, Lamberto Javaler and John Doe in
their capacity as Mayor, police and officer in charge of
the municipal jail of the City of Manila, respectively for
unlawfully detaining twelve (12) persons. Ten of the
petitioners were released. However, the other two
remained and were confined for three days and four
days respectively without warrants and charges
formally filed in court. The papers of their cases were
not transmitted to the City Fiscal’s office until late in
the afternoon of November 11, 1946. Montaniel and
Deoduco remained in custody because they were
charged with unjust vexation and disobedience to an
agent of a person in authority. The informations were
filed the same day. However, no warrants of arrests or
orders of commitment were issued by the municipal
court.
HELD:
Yes. The detention of Deoduco and Montaniel was
illegal upon the exploration of six hours without them
having been delivered to the corresponding judicial
authorities. Their cases were referred to the City Fiscal
four and three days, respectively, after they were
arrested. The illegally of their detention was not cured
by the filing of information against them, since no
warrants of arrest or orders of commitment were
issued by the municipal court. The two petitioners are
charged with light offenses. The general rule is that
when the offense charged is light the accused should
not be arrested, except in particular instances when the
court expressly orders. In the instant case, the
municipal court has not yet acted on the informations.
While an arrest may be made without warrant there are
reasonable grounds the prisoner cannot be retained
beyond the period provided by law, unless a warrant is
procured from a competent court. The City Fiscal had
no authority to issue warrants of arrest and was
powerless to validate such illegal detention by merely
filing informations or by any order of his own, either
express or implied. It is not necessary to determine
whether the City Fiscal is a judicial authority within the
purview of article 125 of the Revised Penal Code since
the petitioners’ case was referred to him long after the
expiration of the six hours provided by law. These
prisoners should have been out of prison long before
the informations were filed with the municipal court,
and they should not be retained therein merely
because of the filing of such informations since that the
offenses charged are light. Under such circumstances,
only an order of commitment could legalize the
prisoner’s continued confinement, and no such order
has ever been issued.
SORIA V DESIERTO
G.R. NOS. 153524-25, JANUARY 31, 2005
ISSUE:
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Whether or not the officers of the Office of the
Ombudsman gravely abused their discretion in
dismissing the complaint for violation of Article 125 of
the Revised Penal Code.
FACTS:
Petitioners Rodolfo Soria and Edimar Bista were
arrested on May 13, 2001, a Sunday and the day before
May 14 elections, without a warrant by respondents for
alleged illegal possession of firearms and ammunition.
One police identified Bista to have a standing warrant
of arrest for violation of BP Blg. 6. From the time of
Soria’s detention up to the time of his release, 22 hours
had already elapsed and Bista was detained for 26
days. The crimes for which Soria was arrested without
warrant are punishable by correctional penalties or
their equivalent, thus, criminal complaints or
information should be filed with the proper judicial
authorities within 18 hours of his arrest. The crimes for
which Bista was arrested are punishable by afflictive or
capital penalties, or their equivalent, thus, he could
only be detained for 36 hours without criminal
complaints or information having been filed with the
proper judicial authorities.
Petitioners filed with the Office of the Ombudsman for
Military Affairs a complaint-affidavit for violation of Art.
125 of the Revised Penal Code against herein private
respondents. The office dismissed the complaint for
lack of merit. Petitioners then filed their motion for
reconsideration which was denied for lack of merit in
the second assailed Resolution.
HELD:
No. Respondents did not abuse their discretion in
dismissing the case. Their disposition of petitioners'
complaint for violation of Article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code cannot be said to have been conjured out
of thin air as it was properly backed up by law and
jurisprudence. Grave abuse of discretion is such
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment on the
part of the public officer concerned which is equivalent
to an excess or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of
discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount
to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law.
Regarding the complaint of Soria, based on applicable
laws and jurisprudence, an election day or a special
holiday, should not be included in the computation of
the period prescribed by law for the filing of
complaint/information in courts in cases of warrantless
arrests, it being a 'no-office day. Hence, there could be
no arbitrary detention or violation of Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code.
In the same vein, the complaint of Bista against the
respondents for Violation of Article 125, will not
prosper because the running of the thirty-six (36)-hour
period prescribed by law for the filing of the complaint
against him from the time of his arrest was tolled by
one day (election day). Moreover, he has a standing
warrant of arrest for Violation of B.P. Blg. 6 and he

could only be released if he has no other pending
criminal case requiring his continuous detention.
December 1, 2017- Article 127- EXPULSION
FUENTES, Arczft Ran Z.
VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL. V. LUKBAN, ET AL.
G.R. NO. L-14639, MARCH 25, 1919
ISSUE:
Whether or not Mayor Lukban was authorized to send
those women in transferring their residence from
Manila to Davao
FACTS:
The Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, for the
best of all reasons, to exterminate vice, ordered the
segregated district for women of ill repute, which had
been permitted for a number of years in the city of
Manila, closed. Between October 16 and October 25,
1918, the women were kept confined to their houses in
the district by the police. Presumably, during this
period, the city authorities quietly perfected
arrangements with the Bureau of Labor for sending the
women to Davao, Mindanao, as laborers. At any rate,
about midnight of October 25, the police, acting
pursuant to orders from the chief of police, Anton
Hohmann and the Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo
Lukban, descended upon the houses, hustled some
170 inmates into patrol wagons, and placed them
aboard the steamers that awaited their arrival. The
women were given no opportunity to collect their
belongings, and apparently were under the impression
that they were being taken to a police station for an
investigation. They had no knowledge that they were
destined for a life in Mindanao. They had not been
asked if they wished to depart from that region and
had neither directly nor indirectly given their consent
to the deportation.
HELD:
NO. Only the court by a final judgment can order a
person to change his residence. This is illustrated in
ejectment proceedings, expropriation proceedings and
in the penalty of destierro. Hence, the Mayor and the
Chief of Police of Manila cannot force the prostitutes
residing in that City to go and live in Davao against
their will, there being no law that authorizes them to
do so. These women, despite their being in a sense,
lepers of society, are nevertheless not chattels, but
Philippine citizens, protected by the same
constitutional guarantees as are other citizens.
December 2, 2017 - Art. 128 - VIOLATION OF
DOMICILE
LAZO, Joseph Artfel T.
EDIGARDO GEROCHE, ROBERTO GARDE and
GENEROSO MARFIL alias "TAPOL" vs. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 179080 November 26, 2014
ISSUE:
11 | JMC COLLEGE OF LAW
CRIMINAL LAW II | CASE DIGESTS
WON the accused are guilty of violating art. 128?
The crime of violation against domicile
FACTS:
On May 14, 1989 in the Evening. Acccused Gerochie,
then Barangay Captain and 2 CAFGU members, hence
persons in authority who feloniously and without
judicial order entered the house of victim Mallo by
breaking the door against the will of the occupants and
injuring one of them
During Trial, the Accused were named as barangay
captain and Civilian Volunteer, which the accused later
admitted and confirmed
RTC: Found the accused guilty of slight Physical Injuries
under Art. 265
They also stated that accused should not be guilty of
violating Art. 128 for lack of proving the essential
requisite that the accused were Public Officials and that
such admission is not enough to prove that they were
public officers. It is required that clear and convincing
evidence other than the the testimony of the witnesses
that accused were in fact public officers. and when in
doubt on whether the accused were public officers,
then it should be ruled in favor of the accused
Petitioners appealed to the CA to contest the decision
on Slight Physical Injuries
CA: Upon appeal the RTC decision, the CA set aside the
ruling of the RTC on Slight Physical Injuries but ruled
that accused were guilty of Violating of Domicile
considering that the accused admitted to be the
Barangay Captain and part of the Citizen Armed Forces
HELD:
YES, The Court adopts the findings of fact and
conclusions of law of the CA. In their testimony before
the open court as well as in the pleadings they filed,
neither Geroche denied that he was a barangay captain
nor Garde and Marfil refuted that they were CAFGU
members. In holding such positions, they are
considered as public officers/employees.
December 3, 2017 - Art. 129 - SEARCH WARRANTS
MALICIOUSLY OBTAINED, AND ABUSE IN THE
SERVICE OF THOSE LEGALLY OBTAINED
SALVERON, Jan Ione R.
AURELIO S. ALVERO vs. ARSENIO P. DIZON, ET AL
G.R. No. L-342 May 4, 1946
ISSUE:
Is a search and seizure without warrant but an incident
of a lawful arrest legal?
FACTS:
While the battle for Manila was raging, soldiers of the
United States Army, accompanied by men of Filipino
Guerrilla Forces arrested Aurelio Alvero for treason and
seized and took certain papers from his house. He filed
a petition, in which he protested against the procedure

of the government in the seizure of said documents,
and asked for the documents to be returned to him but
was denied.
Alvero asked for the reconsideration of said order but
was gain denied. Herein petitioner now claims that the
respondent judges, in denying the petition for the
return of said documents, acted without jurisdiction
and committed a grave abuse in the exercise of their
discretion, alleging that even the seizure of documents
by means of a search warrant legally issued which
constitutes a violation of his rights under the
Constitution.
HELD:
The court ruled YES and cited the ruling in Agnello vs
United States: "The most important exception to the
necessity for a search warrant is the right of search and
seizure as an incident to a lawful arrest. A lawful arrest
may be made either while a crime is being committed
or after its commission. The right to search includes in
both instances that of searching the person of him who
is arrested, in order to find and seize things connected
with the crime as its fruits or as the means by which it
was committed."
The purpose of the constitutional provisions against
unlawful searches and seizures is to prevent violations
of private security in person and property, and unlawful
invasions of the sanctity of the home, by officers of the
law acting under legislative or judicial sanction, and to
give remedy against such usurpations when
attempted. But it does not prohibit the Federal
Government from taking advantage of unlawful
searches made by a private person or under authority
of state law.
FELICIANO GALVANTE vs. HON. ORLANDO C.
CASIMIRO
G.R. No. 162808 April 22, 2008
ISSUE:
Can the respondents be criminally liable under article
129 of the revised penal code?
FACTS:
Respondents pointed their firearms to petitioner; went
near the owner type jeep owned by petitioner and
conducted a search. Respondents saw a .38 pistol
under the floormat of the jeep and asked petitioner of
the MR of the firearm. Due to fear that respondents'
long arms were still pointed to them, petitioner
searched his wallet and gave the asked document.
Immediately, the policemen (respondents) left them
without saying anything bringing with them the
firearm.
The RTC found that "the action of the policemen who
conducted the warrantless search in spite of the
absence of any circumstances justifying the same
intruded into the privacy of the accused and the
security of his property.
12 | JMC COLLEGE OF LAW
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Unaware of the RTC decision, Ombudsman dismissed
the criminal complaint for illegal search. It found that
the allegations of the complainant failed to establish
the factual basis of the complaint, it appearing that the
incident stemmed from a valid warrantless arrest.
HELD:
NO. The conduct of a warrantless search is not a
criminal act for it is not penalized under the Revised
Penal Code (RPC) or any other special law. What the
RPC punishes are only two forms of searches: Art. 129.
Search warrants maliciously obtained and abuse in the
service of those legally obtained, and Art. 130.
Searching domicile without witnesses.
Petitioner did not allege any of the elements of the
foregoing felonies; rather, he accused private
respondents of conducting a search on his vehicle
without being armed with a valid warrant. This
situation, while lamentable, is not covered by Articles
129 and 130 of the RPC.
The remedy of petitioner against the warrantless
search conducted on his vehicle is civil, under Article
32, in relation to Article 2219 (6) and (10) of the Civil
Code.
Ombudsman properly dismissed the complaint for
illegal search, although the reason for dismissing (valid
warrantless arrest) the same is rather off the mark. The
same should have been dismissed by the reason that it
is not cognizable by the Ombudsman as illegal search
is not a criminal offense.
December 4, 2017 - Article 130 - SEARCHING
DOMICILE WITHOUT WITNESS
OLACO, Jan-Lawrence P.
PAPA VS MAGO
G.R. NO. L-27360, FEBRUARY 28, 1968
ISSUE:
Whether or not the seizure of the goods were valid.
FACTS:
Martin Alagao, head of the counter-intelligence unit of
the Manila Police Department, acting upon a reliable
information that a certain shipment of personal effects,
allegedly misdeclared and undervalued, would be
released the following day from the customs zone of
the port of Manila and loaded on two trucks, and upon
orders of petitioner Ricardo Papa, Chief of Police of
Manila and a duly deputized agent of the Bureau of
Customs, conducted surveillance at gate No. 1 of the
customs zone. When the trucks left gate No. 1 the
counter-intelligence unit went after the trucks and
intercepted them at the Agrifina Circle, Ermita, Manila.
The load of the two trucks consisting of nine bales of
goods, and the two trucks, were seized on instructions
of the Chief of Police.
Remedios Mago was the owner of the goods seized.
She hired the trucks owned by Valentin Lanopa to
transport, the goods from said place to her residence.

She claims that the goods were seized without search
warrant issued by a competent court. Further, the Chief
of Police Ricardo Papa denied the request of counsel
for Remedios Mago that the bales be not opened and
the goods contained therein be not examined and that
then Customs Commissioner Jacinto Gavino had
illegally assigned appraisers to examine the goods
because the goods were no longer under the control
and supervision of the Commissioner of Customs.
HELD:
Yes. It is the settled rule that the Bureau of Customs
acquires exclusive jurisdiction over imported goods,
for the purposes of enforcement of the customs laws,
from the moment the goods are actually in its
possession or control, even if no warrant of seizure or
detention had previously been issued by the Collector
of Customs in connection with seizure and forfeiture
proceedings. The Chief of the Manila Police
Department, Ricardo G. Papa, having been deputized
in writing by the Commissioner of Customs, could, for
the purposes of the enforcement of the customs and
tariff laws, effect searches, seizures, and arrests, and it
was his duty to make seizure, among others, of any
cargo, articles or other movable property when the
same may be subject to forfeiture or liable for any fine
imposed under customs and tariff laws. He could
lawfully open and examine any box, trunk, envelope or
other container wherever found when he had
reasonable cause to suspect the presence therein of
dutiable articles introduced into the Philippines
contrary to law; and likewise to stop, search and
examine any vehicle, beast or person reasonably
suspected of holding or conveying such article as
aforesaid. It cannot be doubted, therefore, that
petitioner Ricardo could lawfully effect the search and
seizure of the goods in question. The Tariff and
Customs Code authorizes him to demand assistance of
any police officer to effect said search and seizure, and
the latter has the legal duty to render said assistance.
Petitioner his companion policemen had authority to
effect the seizure without any search warrant issued by
a competent court. The Tariff and Customs Code does
not require said warrant in the instant case. The Code
authorizes persons having police authority under
Section 2203 of the Tariff and Customs Code to enter,
pass through or search any land, inclosure, warehouse,
store or building, not being a dwelling house; and also
to inspect, search and examine any vessel or aircraft
and any trunk, package, or envelope or any person on
board, or to stop and search and examine any vehicle,
beast or person suspected of holding or conveying any
dutiable or prohibited article introduced into the
Philippines contrary to law, without mentioning the
need of a search warrant in said cases. 16 But in the
search of a dwelling house, the Code provides that said
"dwelling house may be entered and searched only
upon warrant issued by a judge or justice of the peace.
. . ." Hence, the seizure of the goods were valid.
EDUARDO QUINTERO VS. NATIONAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION
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G.R. NO. L-35149 JUNE 23, 1988
ISSUE:
Whether or not the evidence being seized were
admissible.
FACTS:
Petitioner Eduardo Quintero disclosed that certain
persons had distributed money to some delegates of
the Con-Con to influence the delegates in the
discharge of their functions. As an offshoot of this
disclosure, Delegate Quintero delivered to the Con-
Con the aggregate amount of the "payola" he himself
had received the amount of P11, 150.00 in cash.
Quintero, however, did not reveal the names of the
persons who gave him the money; and he begged at
that time not to be made to name names. However,
pressure mounted on Delegate Quintero to reveal the
identities of the people behind the "payola" scheme.
Hence, Quintero released from his hospital bed in San
Juan de Dios Hospital a sworn statement addressed to
the Committee on Privileges of the Con-Con,
mentioning the names of the persons who gave him
the "payola." Also, In his privilege speech, he said that
"in that same evening of January 6,1972, after the
dinner was over, when we were still inside the
Malacañang grounds on our way to our cars, one of
the delegates made this announcement: "The
envelopes are ready. They will be distributed in a
couple of days." Hours after Delegate Quintero's
statement was made public, then President Ferdinand
E. Marcos went on the air as well as on TV to denounce
Mr. Quintero, and he averred that he "shall not rest
until I have unmasked this pretender, his master-minds
and accomplices." In the evening of the same day that
Mr. Marcos issued the afore-quoted statement, the
agents of the respondent National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI, for short) raided the house of
Delegate Quintero, on the basis of Search Warrant No.
7 issued also on 31 May 1972 by respondent Judge
Elias Asuncion of the Court of First Instance of Manila.
NBI agents seized bundles of money amounting to
P379, 000.00. On 1 June 1972, the NBI filed with the
City Fiscal of Pasay a criminal complaint for direct
bribery against Delegate Quintero.
HELD:
No. Disregarding for a moment the absence of
"probable cause," the search itself that was conducted
by the NBI agents who raided the house of petitioner,
pursuant to the questioned search warrant, was highly
irregular. The two (2) occupants of the house who
witnessed the search conducted, Generoso Quintero
and Pfc. Alvaro Valentin, were closeted in a room where
a search was being made by a member of the raiding
party, while the other NBI agents were left to
themselves in the other parts of the house, where no
members of the household were in a position to watch
them, and thus they conducted a search on their own.
Such a procedure, wherein members of a raiding party
can roam around the raided premises unaccompanied
by any witness, as the only witnesses available as
prescribed by law are made to witness a search
conducted by the other members of the raiding party

in another part of the house, is held to be violative of
both the spirit and the letter of the law, which provides
that "no search of a house, room, or any other premises
shall be made except in the presence of at least one
competent witness, resident of the neighborhood."
Another irregularity committed by the agents of
respondent NBI was their failure to comply with the
requirement of Sec. 10, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court
which provides that "The officer seizing property under
the warrant must give a detailed receipt for the same
to the person on whom or in whose possession it was
found, or in the absence of any person, must, in the
presence of at least one-witness, leave a receipt in the
place in which he found the seized property." The
receipt issued by the seizing party in the case at bar,
showed that it was signed by a witness, Sgt. Ignacio
Veracruz. This person was a policeman from the Manila
Metropolitan Police (MMP), who accompanied the
agents of respondent NBI during the conduct of the
search, The requirement under the aforequoted Rule
that a witness should attest to the making of the
receipt, was not complied with. This requirement of the
Rules was rendered nugatory, when the one who
attested to the receipt from the raiding party was
himself a member of the raiding party. The
circumstances prevailing before the issuance of the
questioned search warrant, and the actual manner in
which the search was conducted in the house of the
petitioner, all but imperfectly, and yet, strongly suggest
that the entire procedure, from beginning to end, was
an orchestrated movement designed for just one
purpose — to destroy petitioner Quintero's public
image with "incriminating evidence," and, as a corollary
to this, that the evidence allegedly seized from his
residence was "planted" by the very raiding party that
was commanded to "seize" such incriminating
evidence.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. YOLANDA
G.R. NO. 89373. MARCH 9, 1993.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the evidence was properly obtained by
the police.
FACTS:
A police raiding team armed with a search warrant
went to the brgy. captain for them to be accompanied
in serving the said warrant at the residence of the
accused, Yolanda Gesmundo. The police was allowed
to enter the house upon the strength of the warrant
shown to the accused. The accused begged the police
not to search and to leave the house. However, the
police still searched the house and was led to the
kitchen. She pointed a metal basin on top of a table as
the hiding place of died marijuana flowering tops
contained in a plastic bag marked ISETANN. The police
also recovered from a native “uway” cabinet dried
marijuana flowering tops wrapped in 3 pieces of
komiks paper. According to the accused, when the
police arrived at her house, she saw Sgt. Yte and PFC
Jose Luciano. She invited Sgt. Yte to enter her house
while Luciano was left in the jeep that was parked near
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the house. While inside the house Yte showed the
accused something he claimed as a search warrant,
when someone coming from the kitchen uttered “eto
na” They proceeded to the kitchen and saw Luciano
holding a plastic bag with four other companions. They
confronted the accused and insisted that the bags
belonged to her. Accused denied the accusation and
told them that she doesn’t know anything about it. She
was made to sign a prepared document. She was
brought to the police station and was detained.
HELD:
No. The claim that the marijuana was planted was
strengthened as the police violated sec 7, rule 126 rules
of the court provides no search of a house, room or
any other premise shall be made except in the
presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any
member of his family or in the absence of the latter, in
the presence of two (2) witnesses of sufficient age and
discretion residing in the same locality. This
requirement is mandatory to ensure regularity in the
execution of the search warrant. Violation of said rule
is in fact punishable under Article 130 of the Revised
Penal Code.
The document (PAGPAPATUNAY) was inadmissible to
the court as the accused was not informed of her right
not to sign the document neither was she informed
that she has the right to the assistance of a counsel and
the fact that it may be used as evidence against her. It
was not proved that the marijuana belonged to her.
Not only does the law require the presence of
witnesses when the search is conducted, but it also
imposes upon the person making the search the duty
to issue a detailed receipt for the property seized. He
is likewise required to deliver the property seized to the
judge who issued the warrant, together with a true and
accurate inventory thereof duly verified under oath.
Again, these duties are mandatory and are required to
preclude substitution of the items seized by interested
parties. Hence, the guilt of the accused was has not
been established she is acquitted from the crimes
charged.
December 5, 2017 - Article 131 - PROHIBITION,
INTERRUPTION, AND DISSOLUTION OF PEACEFUL
MEETINGS
ROMBLON, Shirley Kris M.
FERNANDO IGNACIO and SIMEON DE LA CRUZ, VS
THE HONORABLE NORBERTO ELA
[G.R. No. L-6858. May 31, 1956.]
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent mayor violated Article 131
by not granting the petition to hold the public meeting
in the part of the public plaza as was requested.
FACTS:
A permit to hold a public meeting at the public plaza
of Sta. Cruz, Zambales, together with the kiosk, was
sought on behalf of the Watch Tower Bible and Tract
Society (commonly known as Jehovah’s Witnesses).

The respondent mayor gave them permission to use
the northwestern part of the plaza, instead of the
section of the plaza near the kiosk. It appears that the
public plaza, particularly the kiosk, is located at a short
distance from the Roman Catholic Church. The
proximity of said church to the kiosk has caused some
concern on the part of the authorities regarding peace
and order. This is especially so considering that the
tenets of petitioners’ congregation are derogatory to
those of the Roman Catholic Church.
HELD:
The right to freedom of speech and to peacefully
assemble, though guaranteed by our Constitution, is
not absolute, for it may be regulated in order that it
may not be “injurious to the equal enjoyment of others
having equal rights, nor injurious to the right of the
community or society,” and this power may be
exercised under the “police power” of the state, which
is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the
good order or safety and general welfare of the people.
Thus, the action taken by the respondent who refused
to allow the use of the kiosk, part of the public plaza,
by the members of the Watch Tower Bible and Tract
Society, whose tenets and principles are derogatory to
those professed by the Catholics, is not
unconstitutional as an abridgement of the freedom of
speech, assembly, and worship, considering that in
view of the proximity of the kiosk to the Catholic
church, such meeting, if allowed, might result in the
happening of untoward incidents and disturbance of
peace and order.
NELSON NAVARRO VS. MAYOR ANTONIO
VILLEGAS
G.R. NO. L-31687 FEBRUARY 26, 1970
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondents act on denying the
request of the petitioner violates the petitioners’ Right
to peaceable assembly and right to the equal
protection of the law in violation of Article 131 of the
Revised Penal Code.
FACTS:
On February 24, 1970, the petitioner, acting in behalf
of the Movement of a Democratic Philippines, wrote a
letter to the respondent, the Mayor of the city of
Manila, applying to hold a rally at Plaza Miranda
February 26, 1970, from 4-11pm.On the same day, the
respondent wrote a reply, denying his request on the
grounds that,the have temporarily adopted the policy
of not issuing any permit for the use of Plaza Miranda
for rallies or demonstration during weekdays due to
the events that happened from the past week. On the
same letter, the respondent gave the petitioner an
option to use the Sunken Garden near Intamuros for
its rally, and for it to be held earlier for it to end before
dark. The petitioner filed suit contesting the Mayor’s
action on the ground that it violates the petitioner’s
right to peaceable assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances (ART. 3, sec 1(8))
and of the petitioner’s right to the equal protection of
the law (art. 3, sec. 1).
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HELD:
The right of peaceable assemble is subject to
regulation under the police power of the state. The
right to freedom of speech and peaceful assembly,
though granted by the Constitution, is not absolute for
it may be regulated in order that it may not be injurious
to the equal enjoyment of others having an equal right
of community and society, This power may be
exercised under the police power of the state, which is
the power of the state, which is the power to prescribe
regulations to promote the health, morals, peace,
education, and good order, safety and general welfare
of the people. While the privilege of the citizen to use
streets and parks for communication may be regulated
in the interest of all, said privilege is not absolute. It
must be exercised insubordination to the general
comfort and convenience and in consonance with
peace and good order, but it must not guise of
regulation be abridged or denied.
PRIMICIAS VS. FUGOSO
L-18000. JAN 27, 1948
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Mayor Violated Article 131 of the
RPC in refusing to issue permit hence violating
freedom of assembly.
FACTS:
This case is an action of mandamus instituted by
petitioner Cipriano Primicias, manager of the
Coalesced Minority Parties, against respondent Manila
City Mayor, Valeriano Fugoso, to compel the latter to
issue a permit for the holding of a public meeting at
the Plaza Miranda on Nov 16, 1947. The petitioner
requested for a permit to hold a “peaceful public
meeting”. However, the respondent refused to issue
such permit because he found “that there is a
reasonable ground to believe, basing upon previous
utterances and upon the fact that passions, specially on
the part of the losing groups, remains bitter and high,
that similar speeches will be delivered tending to
undermine the faith and confidence of the people in
their government, and in the duly peace and a
disruption of public order.” Respondent based his
refusal to the Revised Ordinances of 1927 prohibiting
as an offense against public peace, and penalizes as a
misdemeanor, "any act, in any public place, meeting, or
procession, tending to disturb the peace or excite a
riot; or collect with other persons in a body or crowd
for any unlawful purpose; or disturb or disquiet any
congregation engaged in any lawful assembly."
Included herein is Sec. 1119, Freeuse of Public Place.
HELD:
Yes. Supreme Court states that the freedom of speech,
and to peacefully assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances, are fundamental
personal rights of the people recognized and
guaranteed by the constitution. However, these rights
are not absolute. They can be regulated under the
state’s police power – that they should not be injurious
to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights,

nor to the rights of the community or society. The
Court holds that there can be 2 interpretations of Sec.
1119: 1) the Mayor of the City of Manila is vested with
unregulated discretion to grant or refuse, to grant
permit for the holding of a lawful assembly or meeting,
parade, or procession in the streets and other public
places of the City of Manila ;and 2) The right of the
Mayor is subject to reasonable discretion to determine
or specify the streets or public places to be used with
the view to prevent confusion by overlapping, to
secure convenient use of the streets and public places
by others, and to provide adequate and proper
policing to minimize the risk of disorder. The court
favored the second construction since the first
construction is tantamount to authorizing the Mayor
to prohibit the use of the streets. Under our democratic
system of government no such unlimited power may
be validly granted to any officer of the government,
except perhaps in cases of national emergency. It is to
be noted that the permit to be issued is for the use of
public places and not for the assembly itself. The Court
holds that the assembly is lawful and thus cannot be
struck down. Any public officer or employee is in
violation if Article 131 if the RPC if he or she shall
prohibit or hinder any person from addressing, either
alone or together with others, any petition to the
authorities for the correction of abuses or redress of
grievances. Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify
suppression of free speech and assembly. It is the
function of speech to free men from the bondage of
irrational fears. To justify suppression of free speech
there must be reasonable ground to fear that serious
evil will result if free speech is practiced. There must be
reasonable ground to believe that the danger
apprehended is imminent. There must be reasonable
ground to believe that the evil to be prevented is a
serious one. The fact that speech is likely to result in
some violence or in destruction of property is not
enough to justify its suppression. There must be the
probability of serious injury to the state. PETITION IS
GRANTED.
BAYAN, ET AL., VS. EDUARDO ERMITA, ET AL.,
G.R. NO. 169838, APRIL 25, 2006
ISSUE:
Whether or not policemen violated Article 131 in
relation to BP 880 by dispersing BAYAN, KARAPATAN,
KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS in their rally.
FACTS:
The petitioners, Bayan, et al., alleged that they are
citizens and taxpayers of the Philippines and that their
right as organizations and individuals were violated
when the rally they participated in on October 6, 2005
was violently dispersed by policemen implementing
Batas Pambansa No. 880.
Petitioners contended that Batas Pambansa No. 880 is
clearly a violation of the Constitution, Article 131 of the
RPC:
Prohibition, interruption, and dissolution of peaceful
meetings, and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights and other human rights treaties of
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which the Philippines is a signatory. They argue that
B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one can stage a
public assembly regardless of the presence or absence
of a clear and present danger. It also curtails the choice
of venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of
expression clause as the time and place of a public
assembly form part of the message which the
expression is sought. Furthermore, it is not content-
neutral as it does not apply to mass actions in support
of the government. The words “lawful cause,”
“opinion,” “protesting or influencing” suggest the
exposition of some cause not espoused by the
government. Also, the phrase “maximum tolerance”
shows that the law applies to assemblies against the
government because they are being tolerated. As a
content-based legislation, it cannot pass the strict
scrutiny test. This petition and two other petitions were
ordered to be consolidated on February 14, 2006.
During the course of oral arguments, the petitioners, in
the interest of a speedy resolution of the petitions,
withdrew the portions of their petitions raising factual
issues, particularly those raising the issue of whether
B.P. No. 880 and/or CPR is void as applied to the rallies
of September 20, October 4, 5 and 6, 2005.
HELD:
Section 4 of Article III of the Philippine Constitution
provides that no law shall be passed abridging the
freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or
the right of the people peaceably to assemble and
petition the government for redress of grievances. The
right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of
grievances, together with freedom of speech, of
expression, and of the press, is a right that enjoys
dominance in the sphere of constitutional protection.
For this rights represent the very basis of a functional
democratic polity, without which all the other rights
would be meaningless and unprotected.
However, it must be remembered that the right, while
sacrosanct, is not absolute. It may be regulated that it
shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others
having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the
community or society. The power to regulate the
exercise of such and other constitutional rights is
termed the sovereign “police power,” which is the
power to prescribe regulations, to promote the health,
morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and
general welfare of the people.
B.P. No 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies
but a restriction that simply regulates the time, place
and manner of the assemblies. B.P. No. 880 thus readily
shows that it refers to all kinds of public assemblies
that would use public places. The reference to “lawful
cause” does not make it content-based because
assemblies really have to be for lawful causes,
otherwise they would not be “peaceable” and entitled
to protection. Neither the words “opinion,”
“protesting,” and “influencing” in of grievances come
from the wording of the Constitution, so its use cannot
be avoided. Finally, maximum tolerance is for the
protection and benefit of all rallyist and is independent
of the content of the expression in the rally.

Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the
ground of clear and present danger to public order,
public safety, public convenience, public morals or
public health. This is a recognized exception to the
exercise of the rights even under the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and The International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
December 6, 2017 - Article 132 - INTERRUPTION OF
RELIGIOUS WORSHIP
VILLAHERMOSA, Alexand Rhea M.
US VS. BUENAVENTURA BALCORTA
G.R. NO. 8722, September 10, 1913
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused is liable for "interruption
of religious worship".
FACTS:
The accused entered a private house, uninvited, where
services of the Methodist Episcopal Church were being
conducted between ten and twenty persons, and
threatened the group with a club, interrupting or the
disturbing the divine service. The Court of First Instance
of Nueva Ecija sentenced the defendant/appellant, to
three years six months and twenty-one days of prision
correccional, and a fine of 625 pesetas, together with
other accessory penalties provided by law.
HELD:
YES. The Spanish Constitution provided for a state
religion but also guaranteed the privilege of freely
practicing, both in private and public. However, only
those followers of the state religion are allowed to
practice in public. It is under this constitution the Penal
Code of Philippines of 1884 was promulgated, it
provided consequences against the violation or crime
against the state religion specifically disturbing, by
means of violence, threats, etc., their ceremonies when
conducted in cemeteries or other places were such
ceremonies may be lawfully authorized. (Art. 225.)
The change of sovereignty and the enactment of the
fourteenth paragraph of section 5 of the Philippine Bill
caused the complete separation of church and state,
and the abolition of all special privileges and all
restrictions theretofore conferred or imposed upon
any particular religious sect, looking equally to all
religious sects. The articles of the Penal Code referring
equally to all religious sects are of two, article 223 and
571.
This article recognizes the freedom of religion and
worship of all mankind however violations against this
incur subsequent penalties. But like any other
constitutions no penalty was attached in this article. It
says that "the penalty . . . shall be imposed upon any
person who . . . shall force some other person to
perform an act of worship . . ."
The offense falls within the provisions of article 223 and
571 of the Penal Code. However records failed to
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establish the intent of the accused in committing the
act, it was not proven that religious hatred prompted
the accused to act as he did. He simply threatened to
assault them with a club if they will not stop the
religious service. The offense appears to be simply that
of disturbing the religious service, punishable under
article 571.
It is further alleged that the people thus dispersed by
the defendant were not holding religious services, as
they were simply reading some verses out of the Bible.
We have been unable to find any provision of law
which requires religious services to be conducted in
approved orthodox style in order to merit its
protection against interference and disturbances. As
stated in Hull vs. State (120 Ind., 153): It makes no
difference that the method of worship of those
assembled was singular or uncommon. The protection
of the statute is extended to all, irrespective of creed,
opinion, or mode of worship.
Persons who meet for the purpose of religious worship,
by any method which is not indecent and unlawful,
have a right to do so without being molested or
disturbed.
December 7, 2017 – Article 133 – OFFENDING THE
RELIGIOUS FEELINGS
VILLARIN, Paulo Jose S.
PEOPLE VS. PROCORPIO REYES, ET AL.
GR No. L-40577, Aug 23 1934
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendants violated Article 133 of
the Revised Penal Code.
FACTS:
In the Barrio of Macalang, Tarlac there is a chapel
where it is customary to hold a Pabasa. While the
pabasa was going between 11 and 12 o clock midnight,
the defendants Procorpio Reyes and company started
to construct a barbed wired fence in front of the
chapel. The chairman of the committee in charge of the
pabasa tried to persuade them to refrain from carrying
out their plans, because it was already late at night and
it was during the holy week. An altercation ensued
thus, a complaint was filed against the defendants.
HELD:
NO. it is noted that Article 133 of the revised penal
code punishes acts “notoriously offensive to the
feelings of the faithful”. The construction of the fence,
even though irritating and vexatious is not an act
designated as “notoriously offensive to the feelings of
the faithful.” It is urged that the act of building a fence
was innocent and was simply to protect the property
rights of the owners. Therefore, appellants are
acquitted of a violation of Article 133 but was found
guilty of art 287 of the same code.
 CRIMINAL LAW II | CASE DIGESTS

TITLE THREE – CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC HELD:

ORDER No. The court held that the presumption of innocence
does not carry with it the full enjoyment of civil and
political rights.
December 8, 2017 – Article134 – REBELLION OR
Also, since coup d’etat cases are punishable by
INSURRECTION
reclusion perpetua, the rule that no person charged by
ALILIAN, Enna B.
crimes and offenses punishable by such shall be
admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong was
POMEROY V DIRECTOR OF PRISONS
applicable in this case. It is uncontroverted that
G.R. Nos. L-14284-14285, February 24, 1960
petitioner’s application for bail and for release was
ISSUE:
denied. The determination that petitioner’s guilt was
Whether or not the CFI erred in ordering the release of
strong justified his detention as a valid curtailment of
the petitioners.
his right to provisional liberty.
FACTS:
Moreover, leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all
William Pomeroy and Celia Mariano were convicted
prisoners, at the discretion of the authorities or upon
with the complex crime of rebellion with murder, arson
court orders. Petitioner failed to establish that the
and robbery committed in pursuance of the rebellion.
discretion was gravely abused.
They entered prison and began serving their sentence.
Thereafter, said convicts filed a petition invoking
December 9, 2017 – Article 135 – PENALTY FOR
subsequent cases wherein the Court declared that the
REBELLION, INSURRECTION OR COUP D’ETAT
acts of violence committed in pursuance of rebellion
BANUELOS, Kelvinn L.
give rise only to simple rebellion. CFI Court ordered the
release of the petitioners.
G.R. Nos. L-6025-26 July 18, 1956
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. AMADO V.
HELD:
HERNANDEZ, ET AL.
Yes. The rule adopted by the Court is that judicial
CONCEPCION, J.
doctrines have only prospective operation and do not
apply to cases previously decided. The sentence meted
LEGAL ISSUE:
out was the one provided by law for rebellion which
W/N Rebellion should be complexed with other crimes
herein applicants were indicted, at the time of their
committed on such occasion.
conviction. It was only 4 years after petioners’
conviction that the Court declared that the acts of
FACTS:
violence committed in pursuance of rebellion did not
That on or about March 15, 1945, and for some time
give rise to a complex crime in People v Hernandez,
before the said date and continuously thereafter until
May 30 1964.
the present time, in the City of Manila, Philippines, and
the place which they had chosen as the nerve center of
CFI erred in ordering the release of the petitioners.
all their rebellious activities in the different parts of the
Philippines, HERNANDEZ, conspiring, confederating,
December 8, 2017 – Article134-A – COUP D’ETAT
and cooperating with each other, as well as with the
ALILIAN, Enna B.
thirty-one (31) Defendants charged in criminal cases
and also with others whose whereabouts and identities
TRILLANES IV V PIMENTEL, SR.
are still unknown.
G.R. No. 179817, June 27, 2008

The HERNANDEZ and their co-conspirators, being then

ISSUE:
officers and/or members of, or otherwise associated
Whether or not the court erred in denying petitioner’s
with the Congress of Labor Organizations (CLO)
motion to be allowed to leave from imprisonment.
formerly known as the Committee on Labor
Organization (CLO), an active agency, organ, and
FACTS:
instrumentality of the Communist Party of the
Petitioner was arrested and charged with coup d’etat
Philippines (P.K.P.), with central offices in Manila and
defined under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code
chapters and affiliated or associated labor unions and
based on his acts of storming into the Oakwood
other ‘mass organizations’ in different places in the
Premier Apartments and publicly demanding the
Philippines, and as such agency, organ, and
resignation of the President and key national officials.
instrumentality, fully cooperates in, and synchronizes
Subsequently, petitioner won a seat in the Senate
its activities with the rebellious activities of the
causing him to file an "Omnibus Motion for Leave of
‘Hukbong Magpalayang Bayan, (H.M.B.) and other
Court to be allowed to Attend Senate Sessions and
organs, agencies, and instrumentalities of the
Related Requests" invoking that since he was not
Communist Party of the Philippines (P.K.P.) to thereby
convicted yet, he must still be presumed to be
assure, facilitate, and effect the complete and
innocent. Further, he pleaded for the same liberal
permanent success of the armed rebellion against the
treatment accorded other detention prisoners who
Republic of the Philippines.
have also been charged with non-bailable offenses.

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‘Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan’ or ‘Hukbalahaps’
made armed raids, sorties and ambushes, attacks
against police, constabulary and army detachments as
well as innocent civilians, and as a necessary means to
commit the crime of rebellion, in connection therewith
and in furtherance thereof, have then and there
committed acts of murder, pillage, looting, plunder,
arson, and planned destruction of private and public
property to create and spread chaos, disorder, terror,
and fear so as to facilitate the accomplishment of the
aforesaid purpose.
The prosecution maintains that Hernandez is charged
with, and has been convicted of, rebellion complexed
with murders, arsons and robberies, for which the
capital punishment, it is claimed, may be imposed,
although the lower court sentenced him merely to life
imprisonment. However, the defense contends, among
other things, that rebellion cannot be complexed with
murder, arson, or robbery.
HELD:
NO. It is true that treason and rebellion are distinct and
different from each other. This does not detract,
however, from the rule that the ingredients of a crime
form part and parcel thereof, and, hence, are absorbed
by the same and cannot be punished either separately
therefrom or by the application of Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code. Besides there is more reason to
apply said rule in the crime of rebellion than in that of
treason, for the law punishing rebellion (Article 135,
Revised Penal Code) specifically mentions the act of
engaging in war and committing serious violence
among its essential elements — thus clearly indicating
that everything done in the prosecution of said war, as
a means necessary therefor, is embraced therein —
unlike the provision on treason (Article 114, Revised
Penal Code) which is less explicit thereon.
It is urged that, if the crime of assault upon a person in
authority or an agent of a person in authority may be
committed with physical injuries (U. S. vs. Montiel, 9
Phil., 162), homicide (People vs. Lojo, 52 Phil., 390) and
murder (U. S. vs. Ginosolongo, 23 Phil., 171; U. S. vs.
Baluyot, 40 Phil., 385), and rape may be perpetrated
with physical injuries (U. S. vs. Andaya, 34 Phil., 690),
then rebellion may, similarly, be complexed with
murder, arson, or robbery. The conclusion does not
follow, for engaging in war, serious violence, physical
injuries and destruction of life and property are
inherent in rebellion, but not in assault upon persons
in authority or agents of persons in authority or in rape.
The word “rebellion” evokes, not merely a challenge to
the constituted authorities, but, also, civil war, on a
bigger or lesser scale, with all the evils that go with it,
whereas, neither rape nor assault upon persons in
authority connotes necessarily, or even generally,
either physical injuries, or murder.
Political crimes are those directly aimed against the
political order, as well as such common crimes as may
be committed to achieve a political purpose. The
decisive factor is the intent or motive. If a crime usually
regarded as common like homicide, is perpetrated for
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the purpose of removing from the allegiance “to the
Government the territory of the Philippines Islands or
any part thereof,” then said offense becomes stripped
of its “common” complexion, inasmuch as, being part
and parcel of the crime of rebellion, the former
acquires the political character of the latter.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. FEDERICO
GERONIMO alias Cmdr. OSCAR, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-8936 October 23, 1956
REYES, J. B. L., J.
LEGAL ISSUE:
W/N accused Geronimo should only be guilty of simple
rebellion only.
FACTS:
On or about January 31, 1953, at barrio of Santa Rita,
Del Gallego, Camarines Sur a group of HMBS with
Federico Geronimo alias Commander Oscar ambushed
and fired upon an Army Patrol headed by Cpl.
Bayrante, resulting in seriously wounding of Pfc.
Paneracio Torrado and Eusebio Gruta a civilian.
Also, on or about February 1954 at barrio Cotmo, San
Fernando, Camarines Sur, a group of four HMBS led by
accused Commander Oscar with evident
premeditation, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
killed one Policarpio Tipay a barrio lieutenant.
On October 18, 1954, the trial court rendered
judgment finding the accused guilty of the complex
crime of rebellion with murders, robberies, and
kidnappings; and giving him the benefit of the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea of guilty,
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, to pay a fine of P10,000, to indemnify the
heirs of the various persons killed, as listed in the
information, in the sum of P6,000 each, and to pay the
proportionate costs of the proceedings.
From this judgment, accused Federico Geronimo
appealed, raising the sole question of whether the
crime committed by him is the complex crime of
rebellion with murders, robberies, and kidnappings, or
simple rebellion.
HELD:
YES. As in treason, where both intent and overt act are
necessary, the crime of rebellion is integrated by the
coexistence of both the armed uprising for the
purposes expressed in article 134 of the Revised Penal
Code, and the overt acts of violence described in the
first paragraph of article 135. That both purpose and
overt acts are essential components of one crime, and
that without either of them the crime of rebellion
legally does not exist, is shown by the absence of any
penalty attached to article 134. It follows, therefore
that any or all of the acts described in article 135, when
committed as a means to or in furtherance of the
subversive ends described in article 134, become
absorbed in the crime of rebellion, and cannot be
regarded or penalized as distinct crimes in themselves.
In law they are part and parcel of the rebellion itself,

and cannot be considered as giving rise to a separate
crime that, under article 48 of the Code, would
constitute a complex one with that of rebellion.
The majority of the Court found no cogent reason for
limiting “commission of serious violence” in article 135
to hostilities against the Government’s armed forces
exclusively; for in that case, the former expression
would be redundant and mere duplication of
“engaging in combat” with loyal troops, also described
in the same article. If the infliction of “serious violence”
was separately expressed in the law, it is because the
violence referred to is that inflicted upon civilians.
Again, to restrict “serious violence” to acts short of
homicide, is to unwarrantedly assume that the broad
term “violencia grave” is used in the limited sense of
“lesiones graves”, which in our Penal Code has a
specialized signification. In truth, if physical injuries
constitute grave violence, so would killing necessarily
be, if not more. Additionally, it may be observed that
rebellion is by nature a crime of masses or multitudes,
involving crowd action that cannot be confined a priori
within predetermined bounds.
And we have already pointed out in the Hernandez
resolution that to admit the complexing of the crime of
rebellion with the felonies committed in furtherance
thereof, would lead to these undesirable results: (1) to
make the punishment for rebellion heavier than that of
treason, since it has been repeatedly held that the
latter admits no complexing with the overt acts
committed in furtherance of the treasonous intent,
and, in addition, requires two witnesses to every overt
act which is not true in the case of rebellion; (2) to
nullify the policy expressed in article 135 (R.P.C.) of
imposing lesser penalty upon the rebel followers as
compared to their leaders, because under the
complexing theory every rebel, leader or follower, must
suffer the heavier penalty in its maximum degree; (3)
to violate the fundamental rule of criminal law that all
doubts should be resolved in favor of the accused: “in
dubiis reus est absolvendus”, “nullum crimen, nulla
poena, sine lege.”
Of course, not every act of violence is to be deemed
absorbed in the crime of rebellion solely because it
happens to be committed simultaneously with or in the
course of the rebellion. If the killing, robbing, etc. were
done for private purposes or profit, without any
political motivation, the crime would be separately
punishable and would not be absorbed by the
rebellion. But ever then, the individual misdeed could
not be taken with the rebellion to constitute a complex
crime, for the constitutive acts and intent would be
unrelated to each other; the individual crime would not
be a means necessary for committing the rebellion as
it would not be done in preparation or in furtherance
of the latter. This appears with utmost clarity in the
case where an individual rebel should commit rape;
certainly the latter felony could not be said to have
been done in furtherance of the rebellion or facilitated
its commission in any way. The ravisher would then be
liable for two separate crimes, rebellion and rape, and
the two could not be merged into a juridical whole.
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JUAN PONCE ENRILE vs. HON. OMAR U. AMIN
G.R. No. 93335 September 13, 1990
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.
ISSUE:
W/N the crime of Rebellion can be complexed with the
special penal law
FACTS:
On or about the 1st day of December 1989, at
Dasmariñas Village, Makati, Metro Manila and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, JUAN PONCE
ENRILE, having reasonable ground to believe or
suspect that Ex-Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan has
committed a crime, did then and there unlawfully,
feloniously, willfully and knowingly obstruct, impede,
frustrate or delay the apprehension of said Ex. Lt. Col.
Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan by harboring or concealing
him in his house.
On March 21, 1990, ENRILE filed a Motion for
Reconsideration and to Quash/Dismiss the Information
on the grounds that:
(a) The facts charged do not constitute an offense; and
(b) The pending charge of rebellion complexed with
murder and frustrated murder against Senator Enrile as
alleged co-conspirator of Col. Honasan, on the basis of
their alleged meeting on December 1, 1989 preclude
the prosecution of the Senator for harboring or
concealing the Colonel on the same occasion under PD
1829.
The prosecution in this Makati case alleges that the
petitioner entertained and accommodated Col.
Honasan by giving him food and comfort on December
1, 1989 in his house. Knowing that Colonel Honasan is
a fugitive from justice, Sen. Enrile allegedly did not do
anything to have Honasan arrested or apprehended.
And because of such failure the petitioner prevented
Col. Honasan's arrest and conviction in violation of
Section 1 (c) of PD No. 1829.
Judge Amin sustained the charge of violation of PD No.
1829 notwithstanding the rebellion case filed against
the petitioner on the theory that the former involves a
special law while the latter is based on the Revised
Penal Code or a general law.
HELD:
NO. The doctrine of absorption is applicable in the case
at bar. If a person cannot be charged with the complex
crime of rebellion for the greater penalty to be applied,
neither can he be charged separately for two (2)
different offenses where one is a constitutive or
component element or committed in furtherance of
rebellion.
The petitioner is now facing charges of rebellion in
conspiracy with the fugitive Col. Gringo Honasan.
Necessarily, being in conspiracy with Honasan,
petitioners alleged act of harboring or concealing was
for no other purpose but in furtherance of the crime of
rebellion thus constitute a component thereof. it was

motivated by the single intent or resolution to commit
the crime of rebellion.
As held in People v. Hernandez, supra:
In short, political crimes are those directly aimed
against the political order, as well as such common
crimes as may be committed to achieve a political
purpose. The decisive factor is the intent or motive.
The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. It is
described as a vast movement of men and a complex
net of intrigues and plots. (People v. Almasan [CA] O.G.
1932). Jurisprudence tells us that acts committed in
furtherance of the rebellion though crimes in
themselves are deemed absorbed in the one single
crime of rebellion. (People v. Geronimo, 100 Phil. 90
[1956]; People v. Santos, 104 Phil. 551 [1958]; People v.
Rodriguez, 107 Phil. 659 [1960]; People v. Lava, 28
SCRA 72 [1969]). In this case, the act of harboring or
concealing Col. Honasan is clearly a mere component
or ingredient of rebellion or an act done in furtherance
of the rebellion. It cannot therefore be made the basis
of a separate charge. The case of People v. Prieto 2 (80
Phil., 138 [1948]) is instructive:
In the nature of things, the giving of aid and comfort
can only be accomplished by some kind of action. Its
very nature partakes of a deed or physical activity as
opposed to a mental operation. (Cramer v. U.S., ante)
This deed or physical activity may be, and often is, in
itself a criminal offense under another penal statute or
provision. Even so, when the deed is charged as an
element of treason it becomes identified with the latter
crime and cannot be the subject of a separate
punishment, or used in combination with treason to
increase the penalty as article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code provides. Just as one cannot be punished for
possessing opium in a prosecution for smoking the
Identical drug, and a robber cannot be held guilty of
coercion or trespass to a dwelling in a prosecution for
robbery, because possession of opium and force and
trespass are inherent in smoking and in robbery
respectively, so may not a defendant be made liable for
murder as a separate crime or in conjunction with
another offense whereas in this case, it is averred as a
constitutive ingredient of treason.
December 11, 2017 – Article 136 – CONSPIRACY
AND PROPOSAL TO COMMIT COUP D'ETAT,
REBELLION OR INSURRECTION
VOSOTROS, Jules Andre B.
THE UNITED STATES v. SIMEON FIGUERAS ET AL
G.R. No. 1282. September 10, 1903.
MAPA, J.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendants are guilty of the crime
of conspiracy
FACTS:
The judgment of the Court of First Instance from which
the defendants appealed finds them guilty of the crime
of conspiracy under section 1 of Act No. 292.
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There were three witnesses: Paulino Legaspi, Laureano
Martinez, and Petronilo Portugal.
Petronilo Portugal’s testimony was disregarded. He
testifies that he was invited by Paulino Legaspi to rebel
against the Government, and that he was given to
understand by Legaspi that there were many persons
who intended to conspire, but the witness did not
know whether the accused were implicated in this
conspiracy.
Paulino Legaspi testifies that various persons, some
forty more or less in number, were conspiring to
overthrow the constituted Government, and states that
he knows that the defendants were engaged in this
conspiracy because he heard them say so in their
conversations. Called upon to repeat the words which
he heard them say, he stated the following: "What a life
this is, so full of misery, constantly increasing. When
will our wretchedness end? When will the authorities
remedy it? What shall we do?" He does not state that
he heard anything beyond this, and it appears that he
relies solely upon these words, used by the defendants,
as a basis for his assertion that they were conspiring.
As to other matters this witness testifies solely from
hearsay.
The second witness, Laurenao Martinez, the owner of
the said house where the meeting was held, averred
that it is improbable that the defendants should select
his house, for the purpose of meeting together to
conspire, to read and comment upon correspondence
relating to the conspiracy, and to consider the matter
of contributions and arms collected for the purposes
thereof, as this witness testifies, doing all this in his
presence, without the slightest caution or care, when it
appears from the testimony of the witness himself that
not only was he not a party to the conspiracy but that
he had not even been requested to join it. From this it
follows necessarily that the conspirators could not
know whether they could count upon his consent and
adhesion or not, and it is incredible that the defendants
should discuss so grave and delicate a matter with such
an absolute disregard of the most rudimentary
precautions — precautions which the most ordinary
prudence would counsel in such cases — as would
appear to be the case from the testimony of the
witness Martinez. Martinez further said that it is also
improbable that Martinez, who had no interest in the
conspiracy, he being, according to his own testimony,
an entire outsider, would have permitted such criminal
meetings to be held in his house, thus exposing himself
to disagreeable consequences.
A letter which Martinez states that he abstracted from
the pocket of the defendant Bermudes, was attached
to the record as evidence for the prosecution.
HELD:
No. The insufficiency of the evidence for the
prosecution it is unnecessary to consider the weight to
be attributed to the testimony of the witnesses for the
defense, which, however, tends to demonstrate the
innocence of the defendants.

The letter submitted might perhaps have some value
as evidence if it were shown:
(1)That the words and phrases used in the letter have
a conventional meaning; and if so, then the ordinary
meaning of the words and phrases employed;
(2)The authenticity of this letter.
Nothing in this connection has been proven, nor was
any attempt made to introduce such evidence at the
trial and in the absence of such important data the
value of this letter as evidence must depend exclusively
upon the testimony of Laureano Martinez, whose
credibility, as we have already stated, appears
exceedingly doubtful. The terms of the letter itself are
such that, given their natural and ordinary meaning,
they do not even remotely show the existence of any
conspiracy.
The court finds that it is at least strange that Martinez,
although he succeeded in getting possession of the
letter on the night of Monday, March 9, did not deliver
it to the governor of the province until the night of
Wednesday, the 11th, if, as he testifies, his sole purpose
in stealing it was to discover and denounce the
conspiracy. There is nothing in the case, supposing that
such was his purpose, to satisfactorily explain such a
delay, and it is even more strange that it should not
have occurred to the witness to read the letter. He had
it in his possession for a considerable length of time,
and it would have been natural for him to be interested
in reading it, either for the purpose of assuring himself
that it was the same letter he proposed to purloin and
not some other, or else for the purpose of determining,
by acquainting himself with its contents, of which he
had no knowledge, whether or not it was sufficient to
support the very grave charge which he proposed to
lodge with the Government authorities of the province.
Above all, the fact that the other witness for the
prosecution, Paulino Legaspi, who, according to the
testimony of Martinez, is the one who delivered this
letter to the defendant Bermudes, not only fails to say
a single word about it but testifies in such a way that it
may reasonably be inferred from his testimony as a
whole that he was wholly ignorant of the existence of
the letter, his statements thus being an implicit denial
of the assertions of Martinez in this regard.
The court finds that the guilt of the defendants not
having been established by the evidence, they are
entitled to an acquittal.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. AMADO V.
HERNANDEZ, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-6025 May 30, 1964
-----------------------------
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BAYANI
ESPIRITU, ET AL
G.R. No. L-6026 May 30, 1964
ISSUE:
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Does his or anyone's membership in the Communist
Party per se render Hernandez or any Communist
guilty of conspiracy to commit rebellion under the
provisions of Article 136 of the Revised Penal Code?
FACTS:
On or about March 15, 1945, and for some time before
the said date and continuously thereafter, the said
accused, conspiring, confederating and cooperating
with each other, as well as with the thirty-one (31)
defendants charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 19071,
14082, 14270, 14315 and 14344, the said accused and
their other co-conspirators, being then high ranking
officers and/or members of, or otherwise affiliated with
the Communist Party of the Philippines (P.K.P.), which
is now actively engaged in an armed rebellion against
the Government of the Philippines thru act theretofore
committed and planned to be further committed in
Manila and other places in the Philippines, and of
which party the "Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng
Bayan"(H.M.B.) otherwise or formerly known as the
"Hukbalahaps" (Huks), unlawfully and did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously help, support,
promote, maintain, cause, direct and/or command the
"Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan" (H.M.B.) or the
"Hukbalahaps" (Huks) to rise publicly and take arms
against the Republic of the Philippines, or otherwise
participate in such armed public uprising, for the
purpose of removing the territory of the Philippines
from the allegiance to the government and laws
thereof as in fact that to attain the said purpose by then
and there making armed raids, sorties and ambushes,
attacks against police, constabulary and army
detachments as well as innocent civilians, and as a
necessary means to commit the crime of rebellion, in
connection therewith and in furtherance thereof, have
then and there committed acts of murder, pillage,
looting, plunder, arson, and planned destruction of
private and public property to create and spread chaos,
disorder, terror, and fear so as to facilitate the
accomplishment of the aforesaid purpose.
The said accused conspiring among themselves and
with several others as aforesaid, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously organized, established, led and/or
maintained the Congress of Labor Organizations (CLO),
formerly known as the Committee on Labor
Organizations (CLO), with central offices in Manila and
chapters and affiliated or associated labor unions and
other "mass organizations" in different places in the
Philippines, as an active agency, organ, and
instrumentality of the Communist Party of the
Philippines (P.K.P.) and as such agency, organ, and
instrumentality, to fully cooperate in, and synchronize
its activities — as the CLO thus organized, established,
led and/or maintained by the herein accused and their
co-conspirators, has in fact fully cooperated in and
synchronized its activities with the activities of the
"Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan" (H.M.B.) and other
organs, agencies, and instrumentalities of the
Communist Party of the Philippines (P.K.P.), to thereby
assure, facilitate, and effect the complete and
permanent success of the above-mentioned armed
rebellion against the Government of the Philippines.

HELD:
No. The advocacy of Communism or Communistic
theory and principle is not to be considered as a
criminal act of conspiracy unless transformed or
converted into an advocacy of action.
ART. 136. Conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion
or insurrection. — The conspiracy and proposal to
commit rebellion or insurrection shall be punished,
respectively, by prision correccional in its maximum
period and a fine which shall not exceed 5,000 pesos,
and by prision correccional in its medium period and a
fine not exceeding 2,000 pesos.
In the very nature of things, mere advocacy of a theory
or principle is insufficient unless the communist
advocates action, immediate and positive, the actual
agreement to start an uprising or rebellion or an
agreement forged to use force and violence in an
uprising of the working class to overthrow constituted
authority and seize the reins of Government itself.
Unless action is actually advocated or intended or
contemplated, the Communist is a mere theorist,
merely holding belief in the supremacy of the
proletariat a Communist does not yet advocate the
seizing of the reins of Government by it. As a theorist
the Communist is not yet actually considered as
engaging in the criminal field subject to punishment.
Only when the Communist advocates action and actual
uprising, war or otherwise, does he become guilty of
conspiracy to commit rebellion.
Mere membership in the Communist Party or in the
CLO renders the member liable, either of rebellion or
of conspiracy to commit rebellion, because mere
membership and nothing more merely implies
advocacy of abstract theory or principle without any
action being induced thereby; and that such advocacy
becomes criminal only if it is coupled with action or
advocacy of action, namely, actual rebellion or
conspiracy to commit rebellion, or acts conducive
thereto or evincing the same. On the other hand,
membership in the HMB (Hukbalahap) implies
participation in an actual uprising or rebellion to
secure, as the Huks pretend, the liberation of the
peasants and laboring class from thraldom. By
membership in the HMB, one already advocates
uprising and the use of force, and by such membership
he agrees or conspires that force be used to secure the
ends of the party. Such membership, therefore, even if
there is nothing more, renders the member guilty of
conspiracy to commit rebellion punishable by law.
The leader of the CLO therefore, namely Hernandez,
cannot be considered as a leader in actual rebellion or
of the actual uprising subject of the accusation.
Hernandez, as President of the CLO therefore, by his
presidency and leadership of the CLO cannot be
considered as having actually risen up in arms in
rebellion against the Government of the Philippines, or
taken part in the conspiracy to commit the rebellion as
charged against him in the present case; he was merely
a propagandist and indoctrinator of Communism, he
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was not a Communist conspiring to commit the actual
rebellion by the mere fact of his presidency of the CLO.
December 12, 2017 – Article 137 – DISLOYALTY OF
PUBLIC OFFICERS OR EMPLOYEES
[NO CASE FOUND]
December 12, 2017 – Article 138 – INCITING TO
REBELLION OR INSURRECTION
[NO CASE FOUND]
December 12, 2017 – Article 139 – SEDITION
DUQUE, Francis Lester
PEOPLE vs. GRACIANO L. CABRERA, ET AL.
G.R. No. 17748 - March 4, 1922
ISSUE:
WON it is necessary that the offender should be a
private citizen in the crime of sedition.
FACTS:
Policemen of city Manila arrested a woman who was a
member of the household of a Constabulary soldier
stationed at Santa Lucia Barracks. The next day,
Artemio Mojica, police officer posted in the street of
Calle Real had an encounter with various Constabulary
soldiers which resulted in the shooting of private
Macasinag, constabulary who was mortally wounded
and eventually died. The next day in, a rumor spread
among the soldiers in Santa Lucia Barracks that
policeman Mojica was allowed to continue on duty
These incidents was considered by some of the
Constabulary soldiers as an outrage committed by the
policemen, and it instantly gave rise to friction between
members of Manila police department and member of
the Philippine Constabulary. Constabulary soldier
endangered a deep feeling of resentment which was
soon converted into a desire for revenge against the
police force of the city of Manila. At about 7 o'clock in
the evening of the same day, corporal Ingles
approached private Nicolas Torio who was then the
man in charge of quarters, and asked him to let the
soldiers out through the window. Private Torio was
easily was persuaded. Some 70 armed soldier went out.
They divided into two groups. One platoon of
Constabulary Soldier fired in the direction of the
intersection of Calles Real where an American
policeman Driskill was stationed with his friend
Jacumin. A street car happened to stop. Without
considering that the passengers in the car were
innocent passersby, the Constabulary squad fired a
volley into the car, killing one passenger wounding
three civilian. Some minutes later, Captain William E.
Wichman, assistant chief of police, riding in a
motorcycle driven by policeman Saplala, arrived and a
volley of shorts by Constabulary soldiers were fired
resulted in the instantaneous death of Wichman and
Saplala. About the same time, a police patrol came, the
Constabulary soldiers fired at them which resulted in
the death of patrolmen Trogue and Sison. Another
platoon arranged themselves in a firing line on the east
side of Calle General Luna and fired upon the

motorcycle occupied by Sergeant Armada and driven
by policeman Policarpio who were just passing. As a
result the two policemen was mortally wounded. The
same platoon fired several volleys indiscriminately into
the Luneta police station, and the office of the secret
service. The next day Colonel Lucien R. Sweet of the
Constabulary officers, and the fiscals of the city of
Manila, commenced an investigation. Sergeant
Graciano L. Cabrera admitted to have participated in
the shooting. The defendants were charged with the
crime of sedition and found guilty by the court. Hence
this petition. Counsel contend that it is necessary that
the offender should be a private citizen and the
offended party a public functionary, and that what
really happened in this instance was a fight between
two armed bodies of the Philippine Government.
HELD:
No. Act No 292 - Sedition Law makes no distinction
between the persons to which it applies when the
wording of said law states that "it makes all persons
guilty of sedition who rise publicly and tumultuously in
order to obtain by force or outside of legal methods
any one of vie objects, including that of inflicting any
act of hate or revenge upon the person or property of
any official or agent of the Insular Government or of
Provincial or Municipal Government."
PEOPLE vs. NARCISO UMALI, ET AL
G.R. No. L-5803 - November 29, 1954
ISSUE:
WON the trial court is correct in finding Narciso Umali
guilty of complex crime of rebellion.
FACTS:
Narciso Umali and Marcial Punzalan were old time
friends belonged to the same political faction and even
campaigning for each other. Umali was then a
congressman while Punzalan was a Mayor. Narciso
Umali regarded himself as the political head and leader
in Tiaong, became jealous because of his (Punzalan's)
fast growing popularity among the people of Tiaong
who looked to him instead of Umali for political
guidance, leadership, and favors.
On 1951 election, Punzalan ran for reelection. To
oppose him, and to clip his political wings and
definitely blast his ambition for continued power and
influence in Tiaong, Umali picked Epifanio Pasumbal,
his trusted leader. Amado Mendoza, star witness for
the prosecution, testified that on the eve of the
election, at the house of Pasumbal's father, then being
used as his electoral headquarters, he heard Umali
instruct Pasumbal to contact the Huks through
Commander Abeng so that Punzalan will be killed,
Pasumbal complying with the order of his Chief (Umali)
went to the mountains and held a conference with
Commander Abeng. It would seem that Umali and
Pasumbal had a feeling that Punzalan was going to win
in the elections the next day, and that his death was
the surest way to eliminate him from the electoral fight.
In the evening of the same day, Mendoza heard
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Pasumbal report to Umali about his conference with
Commander Abeng, saying that the latter was
agreeable to the proposition and had even outlined
the manner of attack.
Day following the election, Punzalan win over
Pasumbal. He was told by Umali to come with him, and
Pasumbal and the three boarded a jeep toward the
Tiaong Elementary School and once there he
(Mendoza) was left at the school premises with
instructions by Umali to wait for Commander Abeng
and the Huks and point to them the house of Punzalan.
After waiting for sometime, Abeng and his troops
numbering about fifty, armed with garands and
carbines, arrived and after explaining his identity and
his mission to Abeng, Mendoza had led them
Punzalan's house and then walked toward his home,
leaving the Huks who proceeded to lie flat in a canal.
Before reaching his house, he already heard shots, so,
he evacuated his family. His wife Catalina incidentally
saw Congressman Umali holding a revolver, in the
company of Huk Commander Torio and about 20
armed men. Afterwards they saw Umali and his
companions leave.
HELD:
No. The crime committed was not rebellion but rather
that of sedition. The purpose of the raid and the act of
the raiders in rising publicly and taking up arms was
not exactly against the Government as defined in
Article 134 of the RPC but rather, the object was to
attain by means of force, intimidation, etc. to inflict an
act of hate or revenge upon the person or property of
a public official, namely, Punzalan was then Mayor of
Tiaong punishable uder Article 139 of the RPC.
December 13, 2017 – Article 140 – PENALTY FOR
SEDITION
[NO CASE FOUND]
December 13, 2017 – Article 140 – CONSPIRACY TO
COMMIT SEDITION
DOSDOS, Xicilli Krishna
THE UNITED STATES vs. MAXIMINO PLANAS
G.R. No. 6867 December 23, 1911
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendant is liable for the crime of
conspiracy to commit sedition.
FACTS:
On the 1st day of September, 1910, an uprising in the
Philippine Islands, and having for its object the
overthrow of the Government of the Philippine Islands,
and provincial and municipal governments of the
Province of Nueva Vizcaya and other provinces in the
Philippine Islands, took place in and about the
township of Solano in the Province of Nueva Vizcaya.
Defendant, Maximino Planas, was the president of the
town of Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya. On the 3rd day of
September, 1910, the said Maximino Planas called
together the policemen of the said town of Bambang

and said them, "The insurrectos have entered Solano
and seized money from the treasury, burned the
papers, and made prisoners of the padres. Now you
must bring your arms to my house so that I can deliver
them to the issurrectos when they reach here and you
must all be ready to join the insurrectos when they
bring because I am captain of insurrectos, and when
they come we will kill the Americans Bennett and Scott
and the Romanista padre, and burn the convent. Do
not tell anything of this to the Americans or the
insurrectos will kill you when they come," or words to
that effect.
On the 4th day of September, 1910, between 9 and 10
o'clock, the councilmen of Bambang assembled at the
presedencia of said town in obedience to the call or
bandillo which had been published the previous
evening in said town by the defendant. At this meeting
there were present the councilmen: Proceso Sierra,
Martin Apno, Marcelino Alvarez, Angel Malonoy,
Santiago Corales, and Francisco Pugayan, and
President Planas, the accused. And that the accused
then told the assembled councilmen that the
insurrectos had entered Solano, seized the municipal
funds, burned the papers, and made prisoners of the
Romanista padres. "Prepare your people with arms,
bolos, spears, and arrows, and when the insurrectos
arrive in this town be ready to join them, then we will
kill the Americans Bennett and Scott and the
Romanista padre," or words to that effect.
Also, in the house of the councilman Martin Apno, of
the town of Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya, the accused had
a conversation with the aforementioned Councilman
Martin Apno in which the accused said "Do you know
what has happened in Solano? The insurrectos have
entered there and taken the money and burned the
papers," and that said councilman Apno must prepare
bolos, lances, and other arms and when the insurrectos
entered be prepared to join them and that after they
would kill Mr. Bennett and Mr. Scott and the Roman
padre of the town of Bambang, Nueva Viscaya.
HELD:
Yes.
Many witnesses were presented both by the
government and the defendant. The facts in the
present case bear a very close relation to the facts in
the cases of U. S. vs. Mandac (No. 6763), and U.S. vs.
Isidro Olaño (No. 6882).
The Court found that the facts were conclusively and
overwhelmingly proven by the testimony of the
prosecution which consisted of the evidence of four
policemen of the town of Bambang, Pantaleon
Pugayan, Pedro Sierra, Santiago Angela, and Emeterio
Marquez; three councilmen of said town whose names
were Proceso Sierra, Martin Apno, and Angel Malanoy,
and the municipal treasurer of Bambang, Ventura
Bernal, and his clerk Martiniano Mirralles. The
policemen testified that they assembled, four in
number, at about 4 o'clock in the afternoon in the
presidencia of Bambang by order of the defendant on
the 3d of September, 1910, and that the defendant
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then told them to deliver their arms to his house as he,
the defendant, was a captain of the insurrectos and
that he (the defendant) would deliver said arms to the
insurrectos when they entered the town of Bambang.
The defendant also told the four policemen that the
insurrectos had already entered Solano, seized the
municipal funds and burned the papers, and that when
they (the insurrectos) reached Bambang to be ready to
join them and that they would then kill the two
Americans, Bennett and Scott, and the Romanpadre
and burn the convent. On the next day, the 4th of
September, when six councilmen assembled in
thepresidencia of Bambang in obedience to his order
the defendant repeated substantially the same
conversation as he had with the policemen. He told the
councilmen to prepare their people with arms of all
kinds, bolos, lances, and arrows, and be ready to join
the insurrectos when they reached Bambang, after
which they (the insurrectos) would kill the Americans
Scott and Bennett, and the Romanista padre, and burn
the convent. He also told the councilmen that the
insurrectos had already entered Solano, seized the
municipal funds and burned the papers, and that when
they (the insurrectos) entered Bambang, they, the
councilmen and their people, would hear the salvos of
the police at the presidencia and this would be the
signal to join forces with the insurrectos.
From the foregoing, the Court held that the findings of
fact made by the lower court are in accordance with
such evidence, and show that the defendant was guilty
of the crime charged beyond peradventure of doubt,
and that the sentence imposed by the lower court is in
accordance with the law.
December 14, 2017 - Article 142 – INCITING TO
SEDITION
PANIZA, Lyndzelle Jane D.
PEOPLE vs. ISAAC PEREZ
G.R. No. L-21049 December 22, 1923
MALCOLM, J.:
ISSUE:
Whether or not Perez has uttered seditious words
which tend to incite others.
FACTS:
Isaac Perez, the municipal secretary of Pilar, Sorsogon,
and one Fortunato Lodovice, a citizen of that
municipality, happened to meet in the presidencia of
Pilar, they became engaged in a discussion regarding
the administration of Governor-General Wood, which
resulted in Perez shouting a number of times: "The
Filipinos, like myself, must use bolos for cutting off
Wood's head for having recommended a bad thing for
the Filipinos, for he has killed our independence."
HELD:
Yes. In the words of law, Perez has uttered seditious
words. He has made a statement and done an act
which tended to instigate others to cabal or meet
together for unlawful purposes. He has made a

statement and done an act which suggested and
incited rebellious conspiracies. He has made a
statement and done an act which tended to stir up the
people against the lawful authorities. He has made a
statement and done an act which tended to disturb the
peace of the community and the safety or order of the
Government. Since, the Governor-General is an
executive official appointed by the President of the
United States and holds in his office at the pleasure of
the President, a seditious attack on the Governor-
General is an attack on the rights of the Filipino people
and on American sovereignty.
PEOPLE VS. NABONG
G. R. No. 36426, November 03, 1932
STREET, J.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Nabong’s speech tended to instigate
others to cabal and meet together for unlawful
purposes.
FACTS:
Antonio D. Ora, the head of the communists in the
Philippine Islands, died and a necrological service in his
memory was held. Nabong, an attorney, delivered a
speech in such service criticizing the members of the
Constabulary, using words substantially to the
following effect:
"They committed a real abuse in seizing the flag. The
members of the Constabulary are bad because they
shoot even innocent women, as it happened in Tayug.
In view of this, we ought to be united to suppress that
abuse. Overthrow the present government and
establish our own government, the government of the
poor. Use your whip so that there may be marks on
their sides."
HELD:
Yes. The language used by Nabong clearly imported an
overthrow of the Government by violence, and it
should be interpreted in the plain and obvious sense in
which it was evidently intended to be understood. The
word "overthrow" could not have been intended as
referring to an ordinary change by the exercise of the
elective franchise. It was the purpose of Nabong,
beyond a doubt, to incite his hearers to the overthrow
of organized government by unlawful means. The
words used by Nabong manifestly tended to induce
the people to resist and use violence against the
agents of the Constabulary and to instigate the poor
to cabal and meet together for unlawful purposes.
They also suggested and incited rebellious
conspiracies, thereby tending to stir up the people
against the lawful authorities and to disturb the peace
of the community. It is not necessary, in order to be
seditious, that the words used should in fact result in a
rising of the people against the constituted
authorities. The law is not aimed merely at actual
disturbance, and its purpose is also to punish
utterances which may endanger public order.
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ESPUELAS VS PEOPLE
G.R. NO. L-2990, DECEMBER 17, 1951
BENGZON, J:
ISSUE:
Whether or not Espuelas was liable of scurrilous libel
under Art. 142 of the RPC against the Government of
the Philippines.
FACTS:
In the town of Tagbilaran, Bohol, Oscar Espuelas had
his picture taken, making it to appear as if he were
hanging lifeless at the end of a piece of rope
suspended form the limb of the tree, when in truth and
in fact, he was merely standing on a barrel. After
securing copies of his photograph, Espuelas sent
copies of the same to Free Press, the Evening News, the
Bisayas, Lamdang of general circulation and other local
periodicals in the Province of Bohol but also
throughout the Philippines and abroad, for their
publication with a suicide note or letter, wherein he
made to appear that it was written by a fictitious
suicide, stating his dismay in the administration of
President Roxas, pointing out the situation in Central
Luzon and Leyte, and directing his dear wife to write to
President Truman and Churchill of US and tell them
that in the Philippines the government is infested with
many Hitlers and Mussolinis and for this reason he is
ashamed that he cannot hold high brows to the world
with such dirty government.
HELD:
Yes. A published writing which calls our government
one of crooks and dishonest persons ("dirty") infested
with Nazis and Fascists i.e. dictators, and which reveals
a tendency to produce dissatisfaction or a feeling
incompatible with the disposition to remain loyal to
the government, is a scurrilous libel against the
Government. The violent and provocative statements
made by Espuelas against the state was neither
constructive nor with reason. It, instead, went beyond
the ambit of criticism legally permitted since it had the
dangerous tendency of appealing to the common
mind and suggesting or inciting rebellious conspiracies
and riots against the duly constituted government.
December 15, 2017 – Article 143 – ACTS TENDING
TO PREVENT THE MEETING OF THE ASSEMBLY
AND SIMILAR BODIES
ALAMEDA, Manuel
PEOPLE VS ALIPIT
55 Phil 170- August 22, 1922
ISSUE:
Whether or not the chief of police and municipal
president are liable under Article 143 for preventing
the meeting of the municipal council.
FACTS:
The municipal council held an extraordinary meeting
which was presided over by vice-president Basa

because the hour fixed had come without the president
being present. While the meeting was being held, the
accused Victorio Alemus, then the chief of police of
that municipality, entered the room, saying that he had
an order from the president to arrest vice-president
Basa. Basa answered that he had not committed any
crime. Dominador Delfino, one of the councilors
present, succeeded in persuading the chief of police to
wait until the meeting was over. A few minutes
thereafter president Alipit arrived at the municipal
building and after taking one of the revolvers in the
police office, fired a shot in the air, entered
immediately the room where the meeting was being
held and said in a loud voice to the chief of police who
was there: "Arrest him, arrest him," pointing out the
vice-president. The chief of police obeyed the order,
holding the vice-president by the arm and taking him
to the jail, president Alipit following them with the
revolver in his hand. Shortly afterwards, councilor
Delfino asked president Alipit if they could continue
the meeting to the end, to which Alipit answered:
"Whoever dare continue holding the meeting will be
arrested." the councilors then dispersed, leaving the
premises.
HELD:
Any stranger, even if he be the municipal president
himself or the chief of the municipal police, must
respect the meeting of the municipal council which for
the time being, at least, raises the presumption that no
defect exists to render it illegal. That meeting of the
municipal council was entitled too this respect on the
part of the defendants and the aforesaid presumption
was effective as to them.
December 16, 2017 – Article 144 – DISTURBANCE OF
PROCEEDINGS
RIVERA, Marynit P.
LOPEZ V. DE LOS REYES
G.R. No L-3436, November 5, 1930
ISSUE:
Whether or not the act of Candido Lopez could be
made the basis for contempt proceedings and for
criminal prosecution
FACTS:
On October 23, 1929, Candido Lopez attacked and
assaulted, without any justification, the Honorable Jose
D. Dimayuga, who was then and is now a member of
the House of Representatives of the Philippine Islands
while said Representative was going to the hall of the
House of Representative to attend to the sessions. As
a result of the attack and assault, Representative
Dimayuga was unable to attend the sessions on that
day and those of the two days next following by reason
of the threats which Mr. Candido Lopez made against
the said Representative.
HELD:
Yes. The implied power to punish for contempt of the
National Assembly is coercive in nature. The power to
punish crime is punitive in character. Thus, the same
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act could be made the basis for contempt proceedings
and for criminal prosecution.
December 17, 2017 – Article 145 – VIOLATION OF
PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITY
TADO, Diann Kathelline A.
MANUEL MARTINEZ Y FESTIN vs. THE
HONORABLE JESUS P. MORFE OF THE COURT OF
FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, and THE CITY
WARDEN OF MANILA
G.R. No. L-34022, March 24, 1972
ISSUE:
Whether Article 145 of the Revised Penal Code applies
in this case
FACTS:
Petitioner Martinez y Festin alleged that on June 10,
1971, an information against him for falsification a
public document was filed. Its basis was his stating
under oath in his certificate of candidacy for delegate
to that Constitutional Convention that he was born on
June 20, 1945, when in truth and in fact he knew that
he was born on June 20, 1946.
He was arrested by the City Sheriff in the afternoon of
September 6, 1971. At the time of the filing of the
petition he was confined at the City Jail in the custody
of respondent City Warden of Manila. He was on his
way to attend the plenary session of the Constitutional
Convention. Such arrest was against his will and over
his protest.
As for petitioner Fernando Bautista, Sr., 10 it was
alleged that he is a duly elected and proclaimed
delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention. Two
criminal complaints was filed by a defeated delegate-
aspirant for alleged violation of Section 51 of the
Revised Penal Code in that they gave and distributed
free of charge food, drinks and cigarettes at two public
meetings, one held in Sablan and the other in Tuba,
both towns being in Province of Benguet.
Before a warrant of arrest in said criminal cases could
be issued, petitioner in a motion of August 14, 1971
invoked the privilege of immunity from arrest and
search, pursuant to Section 15 of Republic Act No.
6132, otherwise known as the 1971 Constitutional
Convention Act, in relation to Sec. 15, Article VI of the
Constitution and Article 145 of the Revised Penal Code.
HELD:
NO. Their reliance on the constitutional provision
which for them should be supplemented by what was
provided for in the Revised Penal Code is futile. There
is no justification then for granting their respective
pleas.
As is made clear in Section 15 of Article VI, the
immunity from arrest does not cover any prosecution
for treason, felony and breach of the peace.
 CRIMINAL LAW II | CASE DIGESTS

Certainly then from the explicit language of the substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent.
Constitution, even without its controlling The peaceable character of an assembly could be lost,
interpretation as shown by the debates of the however, by an advocacy or disorder. If assembly is to
Constitutional Convention to be hereinafter discussed, be held in school premises, permit must be sought
petitioners cannot justify their claim to immunity. Nor from its school authorities who are devoid to deny such
does Article 145 of the Revised Penal Code come to request. In granting such permit, there may be
their rescue. Such a provision that took effect in 1932 conditions as to the time and place of an assembly to
could not survive after the Constitution became avoid disruption of classes or stoppage of work of non-
operative on November 15, 1935. academic personnel. However, in violation of terms,
penalty incurred should not be disproportionate to the
The repugnancy between such an expansion of the offense.
congressional immunity and the plain command of the
Constitution is too great to be overcome, even on the December 19, 2017 – Article 147 – ILLEGAL
assumption that the penalty to which a public officer ASSOCIATION
will be subjected in the event that he did arrest one NASH, Regina Mercado
entitled thereto for an offense punishable by less than
reclusion temporal suffices to widen its scope.
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR
HABEAS CORPUS OF SERAFIN G. CRUZ. SERAFIN
There is, to be sure, a full recognition of the necessity
G. CRUZ vs. GEN. ROMEO GATAN of the
to have members of Congress, and likewise delegates
Philippine Constabulary (PC) Camp Olivas, San
to the Constitutional Convention, entitled to the
Fernando, Pampanga
utmost freedom to enable them to discharge their vital
G.R. No. L-44910 November 29, 1976
responsibilities, bowing to no other force except the
dictates of their conscience. Necessarily the utmost
ISSUE:
latitude in free speech should be accorded them. When
Whether or not the detention of Serafin Cruz was legal
it comes to freedom from arrest, however, it would
under Art. 147 RPC.
amount to the creation of a privileged class, without
justification in reason, if notwithstanding their liability
FACTS:
for a criminal offense, they would be considered
Serafin G. Cruz was arrested by PC agents on August
immune during their attendance in Congress and in
30, 1976, at the Baguio Checkpoint along Kennon
going to and returning from the same.
Road, Baguio City, and brought to Camp Olivas, San
Fernando, Pampanga, under the command of
respondent Gen. Romeo Gatan, for custodial
DECEMBER 18, 2017 – Article 146 – ILLEGAL
interrogation. On October 22, 1976, a petition for the
ASSEMBLIES
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus was filed in his
PACQUIAO, Jose Paolo P.
behalf wherein it was claimed that the said Serafin Cruz
is held incommunicado; that he is restrained of his
MALABANAN VS. RAMENTO
liberty without due process of law and is in the custody
G.R. NO. L-62270 MAY 21, 1984
of the respondent not by virtue of a judgment or court
ISSUE:
order; that he is not a member of any subversive
Whether Article 146 of the Revised Penal Code applies
organization covered by Proclamation No. 1081 and
in this case
falls within the class of persons to whom the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus has not been suspended.
FACTS:
Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student
The Court issued the writ of habeas corpus returnable
Council of the Gregorio Araneta University Foundation.
to the Court on Friday, November 12, 1976 at 3:00 p.m.
They were granted a permit to hold a meeting to
and required the respondent to make a return of the
protest the merger of two units of the university. On
writ not later than Wednesday, November 10, 1976.
the scheduled date, the students continued their
meeting beyond the scheduled time and held it in a
Admitting that the petitioner has been arrested and
different place from that indicated in the permit. They
detained, the respondent justifies such arrest and
expressed in a vehement language their opposition to
detention as having been legally ordered by the
the merger and as a result, classes and office work was
President of the Philippines in the exercise of his
disturbed. Petitioners were placed under preventive
powers under martial law claiming that Serafin G. Cruz
suspension. On appeal, they were found guilty of
was arrested by virtue of Arrest, Search, and Seizure
holding an illegal assembly and oral defamation.
Order No. 4122, dated August 28, 1976, issued by the
Secretary of National Defense, for violation of Art. 147
HELD:
of the Revised Penal Code (Illegal Associations), Serafin
NO. Petitioners only invoke their rights to peaceable
G. Cruz being the "Over-all Commander and
assembly and free speech which they are entitled to do
Contractor General of the Bataan Defenders
so. Their exercise to discuss matters affecting their
Command," an unregistered veterans outfit, at the time
welfare or involving public interest is not subjected to
of his arrest. It is further claimed that his continued
previous restraint or subsequent punishment unless
detention is the free will and volition of the petitioner
there be a showing of clear and present danger to a
who expressed fears that he might be harmed or

28 | JMC COLLEGE OF LAW


injured by some members of the "Bataan Defenders
Command" if he were free from custody while the
mastermind and legal counsel of the association, one
Atty. Cecilio Baylon Buenafe, has not yet been arrested.
On November 17, 1976, counsel, who filed the petition
in behalf of Serafin G. Cruz, filed a comment on the
return saying, among others, that after November 12,
1976, he talked with Serafin G. Cruz and the latter
avowed his preference to stay within the confines of
Camp Olivas, notwithstanding the subsequent arrest of
the said Atty. Cecilio Baylon Buenafe, thus rendering
the issues raised in the petition unnecessary and/or
irrelevant. Then, at the hearing of the case, Serafin G.
Cruz manifested to the Court that he prefers to stay
under protective custody. Under the circumstances,
there is no other recourse but to dismiss the case.
But, be that as it may, under General Order No. 2-A, as
amended, the President of the Philippines, pursuant to
Proclamation No. 1081, dated September 21, 1972,
ordered the Secretary of National Defense "to arrest or
cause the arrest and take into custody and to hold
them until otherwise ordered released by me or by my
duly designated representative: 1. Such persons as may
have committed crimes and offenses in furtherance or
on the occasion of or incident to or in connection with
the crimes of insurrection or rebellion as defined in
Articles 134 to 138 of the Revised Penal Code, and
other crimes against public order as defined in Articles
146, 147, 148, 149, 151, 153, 154, 155, and 156 of the
same Code; ...
HELD:
Yes it was legal when they arrested and detained Cruz
by virtue of an Arrest, Search, and Seizure Order issued
by the Secretary of National Defense for violation of
Article 147 of the Revised Penal Code pursuant General
Order No. 2-A, as amended. The declaration of martial
law and the consequent suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus with respect to persons
reasonably believed or charged to be engaged in the
disorder.
December 20, 2017 – Article 148 – DIRECT ASSAULT
DAHIROC, Janice L.
RIVERA v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 138553, JUN 30, 2005
ISSUE:
Whether or Not Rivera is guilty of the crime of direct
assault?
FACTS:
Police Inspector Edward M. Leygo and SPO1 Joseph
Basquial were conducting patrols on board in Shilan,
Benguet. They came upon a truck which was unloading
sacks of chicken dung at the stall of Enrique Totoy
Rivera along the highway since Municipal Ordinance
No. I-91 prohibits the unloading of chicken dung along
the highway, Inspector Leygo asked the driver to stop
unloading the manure and return the truck from where
it came. The driver complied. After a while, Enrique
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Rivera asked the driver to drive back to Shilan, Benguet
and unload the sacks of chicken dung and not follow
the police’s orders. The driver followed Rivera’s order
and drove back to Shilan Benguet while Rivera was
following closely behind in his own car. Inspector
Leygo gave chase to the truck. Leygo was able to
intercept the truck and force it to stop. Leygo inquired
why they insisted on defying the ban on the loading
and unloading of manure. Rivera then alighted from his
vehicle and uttered insulting words such as: “babalian
kita ng buto”, “Ilalampaso kita”, and “Pulis lang kayo”.
Leygo then approached Rivera and said that he was
going to arrest him for violating the Municipal
Ordinance. Rivera then assumed fighting stance and
punched Leygo in his lower lip. They grappled for a
while and with the help of fellow police officers, Rivera
was finally arrested.
HELD:
YES. Direct assault may be committed by two ways:
first, by any person or persons who, without a public
uprising, shall employ force or intimidation for the
attainment of any of the purposes enumerated in
defining the crimes of rebellion and sedition; second,
by any person or persons who, without a public
uprising, shall attack, employ force, or seriously
intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of his
agents, while engaged in the performance of official
duties, or on occasion of such performance.
It is evident that this case falls under the second mode.
It is evident that the assault happened when Leygo was
engaged in the actual performance of his official
duties. He was wearing the designated police uniform
and was on board a police car conducting a routinary
patrol when he first came upon the truck unloading
chicken manure. Since the loading and unloading of
chicken manure is prohibited by an ordinance, Leygo
has every right to order the accused to stop. When
accused defied such a lawful order, it is only natural
that Leygo would stop them from doing so. Under the
circumstances, it simply defies reason to argue that
Leygo was not in the performance of his lawful duties
as a police officer when the assault upon him was
perpetrated by the petitioner.
Aggravating circumstances
1. The assault is committed with a weapon
2. When the offender is a public officer or employee
3. When the offender lays hand upon a person in
authority
GELIG V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO. 173150/ JUL 28, 2010
ISSUE:
Whether or Not Lydia C. Gelig is liable for the crime of
Direct Assault.
FACTS:

Lydia C. Gelig and Gemma B. Micarsos were public
school teachers at the Nailo Elementary School. Lydia’s
son, Roseller, was a student of Gemma. Lydia
confronted Gemma during class after learning that
Gemma called Roseller "sissy". Gemma tried to calm
Lydia down but failed to do so. As Gemma tried to go
the Principal office, Lydia pushed Gemma causing her
to fall and hit a wall divider. Gemma experienced
abdominal pain and after 42 days she suffered
incomplete abortion. Lydia was convicted in the RTC
for the crime of direct assault with unintentional
abortion. Lydia was then acquitted before the CA for
the crime of direct assault but was held liable for slight
physical injuries. Unsatisfied with the ruling, Lydia
brought he case before the SC.
HELD:
Yes. This case falls under the second mode of Direct
Assault which has the following elements: 1. that the
offender (a) makes an attack, (b) employs force, (c)
makes a serious intimidation, or (d) makes a serious
resistance. 2. That the person assaulted is a person in
authority or his agent. 3. That at the time of the assault
the person in authority or his agent (a) is engaged i the
actual performance of official duties, or (b) that he is
assaulted by reason of the past performance of official
duties. 4. That the offender knows that the one he is
assaulting is a person in authority or his agent in the
exercise of his duties. 5. That there is no public uprising.
Gemma being a public school teacher, belongs to the
class of persons in authority expressly mentioned in
Article 152 of the RPC. Since the assault happened
while Gemma was overseeing the class, she is in the
actual performance of her official duties. That being
the case, all of the requisites of the crime of Direct
Assault are present. As such, Lydia is guilty of Direct
Assault. However, Lydia is not guilty of indirect
abortion since the prosecution failed to prove that the
act of pushing is the proximate cause of the abortion.
The interval of time 42 days, is too lengthy to prove
that the discharge of the fetus from the womb of
Gemma was a direct outcome of the assault.
December 21, 2017 – Article 149 – INDIRECT
ASSAULT
[NO CASE FOUND]
December 21, 2017 – Article150 – DISOBEDIENCE TO
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
IBABAO, Konrad Stephen P.
UY KHEYTIN ET. AL., VS ANTONIO VILLAREAL
GR NO. 16009, SEP 21, 1920
ISSUE:
Whether the Books, Papers, and other properties
seized may be returned.
FACTS:
Ramon Gayanilo, a constabulary, applied for a search
warrant, stating in his application; “That in the house of
Chino Uy Kheytin, under the writing desk in his store,
there is kept a certain amount of opium.” Upon that
application, a search warrant was issued.
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On April 30th, respondent and accompanied by some
of his subordinates, searched the house of petitioner
Uy and found 60 small cans of opium. They wanted to
search the bodega but Uy denied that it was his.
Wanting to be sure, Torralba placed a guard in the
premises to ensure nothing was removed from the
premises. Later, they found out thru one Segovia that
Uy was renting the bodega. There, Torralba resumed
the search and found and seized other articles such as
opium pipes, containers, books and papers.
Uy then filed a criminal complaint for violation of the
Opium law and filed a petition in the Court of First
Instance, for the return of the private papers, books
and other property which the Constabulary seized
illegally and in violation of the constitutional rights of
the defendants.
HELD:
Yes. Although in the issuance of the search warrant, the
Judge did not comply with the requirements of Sec. 98
of General Orders No. 58, the petitioners are not
entitled to the return of the opium and its
paraphernalia which was found under said warrant.
However, the seizure of the petitioner’s books, letters,
telegrams, and other articles which have no inherent
relation with opium and the possession of which is not
forbidden by law, was illegal and in violation of the
petitioner’s constitutional rights.
Hence, Art. 150 may not apply when the papers or
documents may be used in evidence against the
owner, because it would be equivalent to compelling
him to be a witness against himself.
JEAN ARNAULT VS. LEON NAZARENO
G.R. NO. L-3820, JULY 18, 1950
ISSUE:
Whether the senate can impose penalty against those
who refuse to answer its questions in a congressional
hearing in aid of legislation.
FACTS:
The Philippine Government, through the Rural
Progress Administration, bought two estates known as
Buenavista and Tambobong for the sums of P4,500,000
and P500,000, respectively. Of the first sum, P1,000,000
was paid to Ernest H. Burt, a nonresident American,
thru his attorney-in-fact in the Philippines, the
Associated Estates, Inc., represented by Jean L. Arnault.
A Special Committee, be, as it hereby is, created,
composed of five members to be appointed by the
President of the Senate to investigate the Buenavista
and Tambobong Estate deals. It shall be the duty of the
said Committee to determine whether the said
purchase was honest, valid, and proper and whether
the price involved in the deal was fair and just, the
parties responsible therefor, and any other facts the
Committee may deem proper in the premises. Said
Committee shall have the power to conduct public

hearings; issue subpoena or subpoena duces tecum to
compel the attendance of witnesses or the production
of documents before it; and may require any official or
employee of any bureau, office, branch, subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality of the Government to assist
or otherwise cooperate with the Special Committee in
the performance of its functions and duties. Said
Committee shall submit its report of findings and
recommendations within two weeks from the adoption
of this Resolution.
Jean L. Arnault, a lawyer who delivered a partial of the
purchase price to a representative of the vendor.
During the Senate investigation, Arnault refused to
reveal the identity of said representative, at the same
time invoking his constitutional right against self-
incrimination. The Senate adopted a resolution
committing Arnault to the custody of the Sergeant-at-
Arms and imprisoned “until he shall have purged the
contempt by revealing to the Senate the name of the
person to whom he gave the P440,000, as well as
answer other pertinent questions in connection
therewith.” Arnault petitioned for a writ of Habeas
Corpus
HELD:
When Arnault refused to divulge the identity of the
person to whom he gave an amount of P440.000,
whose identity the Senate investigating committee
believed him to know, the Senate pronounced him
guilty of contempt and ordered his imprisonment until
he would be willing to identify such person.
It is the inherent right of the Senate to impose penalty
in carrying out their duty to conduct inquiry in aid of
legislation. But it must be herein established that a
witness who refuses to answer a query by the
Committee may be detained during the term of the
members imposing said penalty, but the detention
should not be too long as to violate the witness’ right
to due process of law.
December 22, 2017 – Article 151 - DISOBEDIENCE TO
THE PERSON IN AUTHORITY
IBABAO, Konrad Stephen P.
PEOPLE VS CHAN FOOK
G.R. NO. 16968, OCTOBER 6, 1921
ISSUE:
Whether accused is guilty for the crime of resistance
and disobedience to the public authority.
FACTS:
Accused is a Chinese subject and a passenger of a US
military transport South Bend which arrived in Manila
on April 6, 1920. The immigration authorities has
allowed the appellant to land, he left the boat on the
same day. Appellant then went back to the pier No. 1
to get his baggage the following day, Customs agent
Cruz searched the baggage of the accused and found
postcards of indecent characters. He later then tried to
search the body of the accused, which the accused
objected. A disputed took place, after showing the
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accused his police badge, the accused still resisted and
struck the agent on the stomach. The agent then struck
the accused on the neck and Agent Jacinto intervened
and explained that the inspector was a custom agent
searching for contraband, and appellant resisted no
further and allowed him to be searched.
Chan Fook was then prosecuted for the crime of
resistance and disobedience to the public authority,
and sentenced by the Court of First Instance of Manila
to two months and one day of arresto mayor and to
pay a fine of 1,301 pesetas and the costs of the action,
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
HELD:
No, that the right to be secured against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated. It is urged
that the object of searching the person of the accused
was to find whether he had with him any contraband.
It was too late to look for any contraband. He had
already been searched when he left the boat. The
accused had reached his destination, spending the
night in the house where he had taken lodging. It is
not, therefore, reasonable to believe that when he
returned to pier No. 1 the next day, he had about his
body any contraband. Thus the search made by the
agent Cruz appears to be unreasonable.
A person in authority, his agent or a public officer who
exceeds his power cannot be said to be in the exercise
of the functions of his office. The law that defines and
establishes his powers does not protect him for
anything that has not been provided for.
"The scope of the respective powers of public officers
and their agents is fixed. If they go beyond it and they
violate any recognized rights of the citizens, then the
latter may resist the invasion, specially when it is clear
and manifest. The resistance must be coextensive with
the excess, and should not be greater than what is
necessary to repel the aggression.
EDMUNDO SIONZON V. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 202692, NOVEMBER 12, 2014
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner violated Article 151 of the Revised
Penal Code when he resisted the officer placing him
under arrest.
FACTS:
A checkpoint was established along Roxas Boulevard
in Malate on June 11, 2006. P/Insp. Aguilar et. al., where
manning the checkpoint when they saw a red Ford
Ranger with plate number XAE 988 driven by petitioner
Sydeco. They then proceeded to flagged the swerving
pick up and asked the petitioner to alight from the
vehicle. Petitioner, who the police claimed was smelling
liquor, denied of being drunk, shouted and talked
rudely to the Policemen. Petitioner blurted out “Putang
Ina Mo, bakit mo ako hinuhuli.” Respondents, proceed
to subdue the petitioner and was arrested and brought
to Manila Hospital to be examined for liquor. Petitioner
on the other hand, claimed to be a victim of physical

injuries, robbery and arbitrary detention against P/Insp.
Aguilar.
The MTC and the RTC, rendered judgment finding
petitioner guilty of violation of RA 4136 and violation
of Article 151 of the Revised Penal Code of resisting
arrest.
HELD:
No. Swerving is not necessarily indicative of imprudent
behavior as defined in Sec. 48 of RA 4136 – No person
shall operate a motor vehicle on any highway recklessly
or without reasonable caution or so as to endanger the
property or the safety or rights of any person or so as
to cause excessive or unreasonable damage to the
highway.
Nothing in the records indicate that the area was a "no
swerving or overtaking zone." Moreover, the swerving
incident, if this be the case, occurred at around 3:00
a.m. when the streets are usually clear of moving
vehicles and human traffic, and the danger to life, limb
and property to third persons is minimal. The men
manning the checkpoint in the subject area and during
the period material appeared not to have performed
their duties as required by law, or at least fell short of
the norm expected of peace officers. They spotted the
petitioner’s purported swerving vehicle. They then
signaled him to stop which he obeyed. But they did not
demand the presentation of the driver’s license or issue
any ticket or similar citation paper for traffic violation
as required under the particular premises by Sec. 29 of
RA 4136, which specifically provides:
SECTION 29. Confiscation of Driver’s License. – Law
enforcement and peace officers of other agencies duly
deputized by the Director shall, in apprehending a
driver for any violation of this Act or any regulations
issued pursuant thereto, or of local traffic rules and
regulations x x x confiscate the license of the driver
concerned and issue a receipt prescribed and issued by
the Bureau therefor which shall authorize the driver to
operate a motor vehicle for a period not exceeding
seventy-two hours from the time and date of issue of
said receipt.
There can be no quibble that P/Insp. Aguilar and his
apprehending team are persons in authority or agents
of a person in authority manning a legal checkpoint.
But surely petitioner’s act of exercising one’s right
against unreasonable searches to be conducted in the
middle of the night cannot, in context, be equated to
disobedience let alone resisting a lawful order in
contemplation of Art. 151 of the RPC. As has often
been said, albeit expressed differently and under
dissimilar circumstances, the vitality of democracy lies
not in the rights it guarantees, but in the courage of
the people to assert and use them whenever they are
ignored or worse infringed. Moreover, there is, to
stress, nothing in RA 4136 that authorized the
checkpoint-manning policemen to order petitioner
and his companions to get out of the vehicle for a
vehicle and body search. And it bears to emphasize
that there was no reasonable suspicion of the
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occurrence of a crime that would allow what
jurisprudence refers to as a "stop and frisk" action.
December 23, 2017 – Article 152 – PERSONS IN
AUTHORITY AND AGENTS OF PERSONS IN
AUTHORITY
IBABAO, Konrad Stephen P.
PEOPLE VS FELIX BENITEZ
G.R. NO. 48396, SEPTEMBER 11, 1942
ISSUE:
Whether or not a division superintendent of schools is
a person in authority.
FACTS:
Felix Benitez, a special agent in the office of the
Provincial Governor punched D’Artagnan Williams, a
Division Superintendent of School in Negros
Occidental for his supposed acts or remarks that
caused an outrage or offense to the Provincial
Governor in connection with the appointment of
teachers.
On an indictment for assault upon a person in
authority, defendant was found guilty and sentenced
to from 6 months and 1 day to 4 years, 2 months and
1 day of prision correccional and to pay a fine of P500
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
HELD:
Under the law (section 917 of the Revised
Administrative Code), a division superintendent of
schools is given the power of general superintendence
over schools and school interests in his division, with
the right to appoint municipal school teachers and to
fix their salaries, and further, since education is a state
function and public policy demands an adequate
protection of those engaged in the performance of this
commission, we believe and so hold that a division
superintendent of schools should be regarded as a
person in authority.
RUBEN DEL CASTILLO VS PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 185128, JANUARY 30, 2012
ISSUE:
Whether the search warrant issued to conduct search
and the seizure of illegal drugs found by the barangay
tanod in the nipa hut are admissible as evidence.
FACTS:
Operatives of the Cebu City Police conducted a
surveillance at the house of the petitioner. After which,
they secured a search warrant from the RTC and on
September 13, 1997, the same police went to Mabolo
Cebu City to serve the search warrant.
The residence were the petitioner resided was a two-
storey
house. The police officers went upstairs where they met
the wife of the accused and told her that they will
implement the search. But as soon as they can search
the area, the accused fled the scene to a Nipa House.

SP03 Masnayon then requested the aid of the
Barangay Tanods to conduct a search. This time, they
conducted the search at the residence of the petitioner
and the nipa hut, where they found several articles of
four (4) packs of crystalline substance which was later
tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or
shabu.
And information was filed against the petitioner and
the RTC found the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable
charge of violating section 16, Article 3 of R.A. 6425
which the CA affirmed, hence the petition.
HELD:
No. The requisites for the issuance of a search warrant
are: (1) probable cause is present; (2) such probable
cause must be determined personally by the judge; (3)
the judge must examine, in writing and under oath or
affirmation, the complainant and the witnesses he or
she may produce; (4) the applicant and the witnesses
testify on the facts personally known to them; and (5)
the warrant specifically describes the place to be
searched and the things to be seized.
In the present case, Search Warrant No. 570-9-1197-
24] specifically designates or describes the residence
of the petitioner as the place to be searched.
Incidentally, the items were seized by a barangay tanod
in a nipa hut, 20 meters away from the residence of the
petitioner. The confiscated items, having been found in
a place other than the one described in the search
warrant, can be considered as fruits of an invalid
warrantless search, the presentation of which as an
evidence is a violation of petitioner's constitutional
guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizure.
Having been established that the assistance of the
barangay tanods was sought by the police authorities
who effected the searched warrant, the same barangay
tanods therefore acted as agents of persons in
authority. Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code defines
persons in authority and agents of persons in authority
as:
x x x any person directly vested with jurisdiction,
whether as an individual or as a member of some court
or governmental corporation, board or commission,
shall be deemed a person in authority. A barangay
captain and a barangay chairman shall also be deemed
a person in authority. The police officers, as well as the
barangay tanods were acting as agents of a person in
authority during the conduct of the search. Thus, the
search conducted was unreasonable and the
confiscated items are inadmissible in evidence.
Wherefore, Petitioner is Acquitted.
December 24, 2017 – Article 153 – TUMULTS AND
OTHER DISTURBANCES OF PUBLIC ORDER
IBABAO, Konrad Stephen P.
PEOPLE VS BACOLOD
G.R. No. L-2578, July 31, 1951
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ISSUE:
Whether the lower court erred in granting the motion
to quash on the ground of double jeopardy.
FACTS:
Ladislao Bacolod, then a member of the PC Patrol in
the municipality of Santa Fe, Cebu, fired his sub-
machine gun thereby hitting Consorcia Pasinio at the
back of the right side of her body. That the same
caused a serious disturbance in a public place by firing
his sub-machine gun which wounded Pasinio, thereby
causing panic among the people present in the town
fiesta.
Accused Bacolod was charged with two informations;
one charging him of the crime of serious physical
injuries thru reckless imprudence and the other is
serious disturbance in a public place by firing a sub-
machine gun.
His counsel de oficio moved to quash this second
information, invoking double jeopardy by reason of the
first information which the lower court granted
prompting the People to appeal.
HELD:
Yes. It will be observed that both informations have
one common element: defendant’s having fired a sub-
machine gun, however the two informations do not
describe the same offense. One is a crime against
persons; but the other is an offense against public
peace and order.
The first is punished under article 263 of the Revised
Penal Code and the latter under article 153 referring to
individuals disturbing public gatherings or peaceful
meetings.
The proof establishing the first would not establish the
second, it being necessary to show, besides the willful
discharge of firearm, that there was a dance in the
tennis court in connection with the town fiesta, and
that the people in attendance became panicky and
terrified.
Therefore, the appealed resolution is reversed and the
record is remanded for further proceedings.
December 25, 2017 – Article 154 – UNLAWFUL USE
OF MEANS OF PUBLICATION AND UNLAWFUL
UTTERANCES
[NO CASE FOUND]
December 25, 2017 – Article 155 – ALARMS AND
SCANDALS
PACQUIAO, Jose Luis P.
PEOPLE V. DORIQUEZ
GR No. L-24444-45, July 29, 1968
ISSUE:
Whether or not accused Doriquez was placed in double
jeopardy by charging the offense of discharge of
firearm.

FACTS:
Accused Doriquez was charged with the offense of
grave oral defamation before the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo. Six days later, Doriquez was indicted
before the same court for discharge of firearm. Upon
arraignment, he pleaded not guilty to the two
indictments.
Subsequently, he moved to dismiss both information.
One of his contentions is that the institution of criminal
action for discharge of firearm places him in double
jeopardy for he had already been in jeopardy once in
the municipal court of Batad, Iloilo which dismissed,
without his consent, the information charging him with
the offense of alarm and scandal based on the same
facts. The court denied the motion to dismiss. The
motion for reconsideration was also denied. Hence,
this appeal.
HELD:
No. For double jeopardy to attach in his favor, the
accused must prove, among other things, that there is
"identity of offenses." It is altogether evident, however,
that the offense of discharge of firearm is not the crime
of alarm and scandal, nor is it an attempt or a
frustration of the latter felony. Neither may it be
asserted that every crime of discharge of firearm
produces the offense of alarm and scandal. Nor could
the reverse situation be true, for the less grave felony
of discharge of firearm does not include or subsume
the offense of alarm and scandal which is a light felony.
Although the indictment for alarm and scandal filed
under Article 155 of the Revised Penal Code and the
information for discharge of firearm instituted under
article 258 of the same Code are closely related in fact
(as the two apparently arose from the same factual
setting, the firing of a revolver by the accused being a
common element), they are definitely diverse in law.
Firstly, the two indictments do not describe the same
felony - alarm and scandal is an offense against public
order while discharge of firearm is a crime against
persons. Secondly, the indispensable element of the
former crime is the discharge of a firearm calculated to
cause alarm or danger to the public, while the grava
men of the latter is the discharge of a firearm against
or at a certain person, without intent to kill.
The plea of double jeopardy cannot therefore be
accorded merit, as the two indictments are perfectly
distinct in point of law howsoever closely they may
appear to be connected in fact. It is a cardinal rule that
the protection against double jeopardy may be
invoked only for the same offense or identical offense.
The instant appeal is premature, and the present
appeal is dismissed. This case is hereby ordered
remanded to the court of origin for immediate trial on
the merits.
December 26, 2017 – Article 156 – DELIVERY OF
PRISONERS FROM JAIL
DIZON, Roxan Danica G.
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ALBERTO AND INTIA VS HON. DELA CRUZ AND
ORBITA
G.R. No. L-31839, June 30, 1980
ISSUE:
Whether or not Governor Cledera and Esmeralda can
be held liable under Article 156 of the Revised Penal
Code
FACTS:
Respondent Judge Dela Cruz directed petitioners
Provincial Fiscal and Assistant Provincial Fiscal of
Camarines Sur to amend the information filed in
Criminal Case No. 9414 of the CFI of Camarines Sur
entitled, People of the Philippines versus Eligio Orbita,
so as to include as defendants Governor Armando
Cledera and Assistant Provincial Warden Jose
Esmeralda of Camarines Sur. In said case, Orbita, a
provincial guard, was prosecuted for infidelity in the
custody of a prisoner for the escape of detention
prisoner, Pablo Denaque. In the course of the trial, the
defense alleged that Esmeralda received a written note
from Governor Cledera asking him to send in five
prisoners which party included Denaque, who was then
under the custody of Orbita, to his house in Taculod,
Canaman, Camarines Sur to work in the construction
which made Denaque's escape possible, and thus,
Esmeralda and Gov. Cledera should be equally guilty of
the offense with Orbita.
HELD:
No. The offense of delivering prisoners from jails as
defined in Article 156 is usually committed by an
outsider who: (1) removes from jail any person therein
confined or (2) helps him escape. To remove means to
take away a person from the place of his confinement,
with or without the active compensation of the person
released. To help in the escape of a person confined in
any jail or penal institution means to furnish that
person with the material means such as a file, ladder,
rope, etc. which greatly facilitate his escape. If the
offender is a public officer who has custody or charge
of the prisoner, he is liable for infidelity in the custody
of prisoners defined and penalized under Article 223 of
the Revised Penal Code. Since Gov. Cledera as
governor, is the jailer of the province and Jose
Esmeralda is the assistant provincial warden, they
cannot be prosecuted for the escape of Pablo Denaque
under Article 156 of the Revised Penal Code.
December 27, 2017 – Article 157 – EVASION OF
SERVICE OF SENTENCE
ALAMEDA, Manuel F.
TANEGA V MASAKAYAN
GR No. L-27191, February 28, 1967
ISSUE:
WON Prescription of sentence has commenced
FACTS:
Petitioner was convicted of slander by the City Court of
Quezon City. She was found guilty once again by the
Court of First Instance where she was sentenced to 20

days of arresto menor, to indemnify the offended
party, Pilar B. Julio, in the sum of P100.00, with the
corresponding subsidiary imprisonment, and to pay
the costs. The Court of First Instance of Quezon City,
on January 11, 1965, directed that execution of the
sentence be set for January 27, 1965. On petitioner's
motion, execution was deferred to February 12, 1965,
at 8:30 a.m. At the appointed day and hour, petitioner
failed to show up. This prompted the respondent
judge, on February 15, 1965, to issue a warrant for her
arrest, and on March 23, 1965 an alias warrant of arrest.
Petitioner was never arrested. Petitioner moved to
quash the warrants of arrest of February 15, 1965 and
March 23, 1965. (Ground: Penalty has prescribed. On
December 19, 1966, the respondent judge ruled that
"the penalty imposed upon the accused has to be
served", rejected the plea of prescription of penalty
and, instead, directed the issuance of another alias
warrant of arrest. Hence, the present petition.
HELD:
NO. Arresto menor and a fine of P100.00 constitute a
light penalty. By Article 92 of the Revised Penal Code,
light penalties "imposed by final sentence" prescribe in
one year. The period of prescription of penalties — so
the succeeding Article 93 provides — "shall commence
to run from the date when the culprit should evade the
service of his sentence". Elements of evasion of service
of sentence are: the offender is a convict by final
judgment; he "is serving his sentence which consists in
deprivation of liberty"; he evades service of sentence
by escaping during the term of his sentence.
Article 157: provides for a higher penalty if such
"evasion or escape shall have taken by means of
unlawful entry, by breaking doors, windows, gates,
walls, roofs, or floors or by using picklocks, false keys,
disguise, deceit, violence or intimidation, or through
connivance with other convicts or employees of the
penal institution, ... " Code, which does not cover evasion of service of
evasion of sentence is but another expression of the
term "jail breaking"
Petitioner was never placed in confinement and the
prescription of penalty does not run in her favor.
DEL CASTILLO VS. TORRECAMPO
GR NO 13903, December 18, 2002
ISSUE:
Whether the penalty imposed upon Del Castillo had
prescribed
FACTS:
Del Castillo was charged for violation of Section
178(nn) of the 1978 Election Code. The trial court found
him guilty beyond reasonable doubt and sentenced
him to suffer an indeterminate sentence of
imprisonment of 1 year as minimum to 3 years as
maximum. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.
During the execution of judgment on October 14,
1987, petitioner was not present. The presiding Judge
issued an order of arrest and the confiscation of his
bond. Petitioner was never apprehended. 10 years
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later, petitioner filed a motion to quash the warrant of
arrest on the ground that the penalty imposed upon
him had already prescribed. The motion was denied by
the trial court.
HELD:
No. Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code provides when
the prescription of penalties shall commence to run.
Under said provision, it shall commence to run from
the date the felon evades the service of his sentence.
Pursuant to Article 157 of the same Code, evasion of
service of sentence can be committed only by those
who have been convicted by final judgment by
escaping during the term of his sentence. As correctly
pointed out by the Solicitor General, "escape" in legal
parlance and for purposes of Articles 93 and 157 of the
RPC means unlawful departure of prisoner from the
limits of his custody. Clearly, one who has not been
committed to prison cannot be said to have escaped
therefrom. In the instant case, petitioner was never
brought to prison. In fact, even before the execution of
the judgment for his conviction, he was already in
hiding. Now petitioner begs for the compassion of the
Court because he has ceased to live a life of peace and
tranquility after he failed to appear in court for the
execution of his sentence. But it was petitioner who
chose to become a fugitive. The Court accords
compassion only to those who are deserving.
Petitioner’s guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt
but he refused to answer for the wrong he committed.
He is therefore not to be rewarded therefor.
PEOPLE VS ABILONG
G.R. NO. L-1960, NOVEMBER 26, 1948
ISSUE:
Whether the lower court erred in imposing a penalty
on the accused under article 157 of the Revised Penal
"destierro."
FACTS:
That on or about the 17th day of September, 1947,in
the City of Manila, Philippines, Florentino Abilong, the
accused, being then a convict sentenced and ordered
to serve destierro during which he should not enter any
place within the radius of 100 kilometers from the City
of Manila for attempted robbery, evaded the service of
said sentence by going beyond the limits made against
him and commit vagrancy.
HELD:
It is clear that the word "imprisonment" used in the
English text is a wrong or erroneous translation of the
phrase "sufriendo privacion de libertad" used in the
Spanish text. It is equally clear that although the
Solicitor General impliedly admits destierro as not
constituting imprisonment, it is a deprivation of liberty,
though partial, in the sense that as in the present case,
the appellant by his sentence of destierro was deprived
of the liberty to enter the City of Manila. Under the case
of People vs. Samonte, as quoted in the brief of the
Solicitor General that "it is clear that a person under
sentence of destierro is suffering deprivation of his

liberty and escapes from the restrictions of the penalty
when he enters the prohibited area."
US VS. LOO HOE
G.R. NO. 12473, SEPTEMBER 18, 1917
ISSUE:
WON the penalties for jail breaking under Article 127
is applicable to sentence executed by deportation.
FACTS:
Loo Hoe was found guilty of a violation of the Opium
Law and was sentenced to be deported. The sentence
was executed. However, he returned to the Philippine
Islands, in violation of the terms of said sentence.
A complaint was filed by the deputy prosecuting
attorney and Loo hoe was brought to trial, and upon
arraignment plead guilty and was sentenced to be
imprisoned for a period of four months, and at the
termination of said sentence of imprisonment, to be
again deported and to pay the costs.
HELD:
No.
If the defendant who has been sentenced to
imprisonment breaks jail, the executive departments of
the Government may do two things:
a. It may, in proper cases, proceed against him under
article 127 and other provisions of the Penal Code; and
b. it may simply arrest him and return him to jail.
Whether the executive department of the Government
will pursue one or the other of these statutory
remedies lies within the discretion of that department
of the Government.
The violation of the judgment of deportation by the
appellant is not punishable as contempt under section
232. The judgment of deportation was final. The
sentence had been duly executed. The court had lost
all jurisdiction over the defendant in that case. The
judgment was executed by the executive department
of the Government; and if the defendant has escaped
the penalty imposed by the court, the executive
department of the Government has its remedy by
enforcing the terms of the sentence again.
The SC is also of the opinion that none of the
provisions of article 127 of the Penal Code is applicable
to the present case. The penalties for jail breaking
under said article (127) cannot be applied to the acts
of the defendant.
BASILONIA v. VILLARUZ
GR Nos. 191370-71, Aug 10, 2015
ISSUE:
WON the penalty of imprisonment already prescribed
and the civil liability arising from the crime already
extinguished.
FACTS:
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On June 19, 1987, a decision was promulgated against
Basilonia et al in a criminal case for murder of Atty.
Isagani Roblete.
Almost two decades passed from the entry of
judgment, on May 11, 2009, Roblete, claiming to be the
son of the deceased victim, Atty. Roblete, filed a
Motion for Execution of Judgment alleging, among
others, that despite his request to the City Prosecutor
to file a motion for execution, the judgment has not
been enforced because said prosecutor has not acted
upon his request.
The trial court granted the motion for execution and
ordered the bondsmen to surrender Basilonia et al.
Due to petitioners' failure to appear in court after the
expiration of the period granted to their bondsmen,
the bail for their provisional liberty was ordered
forfeited and the sheriff issued the writ of execution.
Basilonia et al contended that trial court has no more
jurisdiction to order the execution of judgment since
the penalty has already prescribed.
HELD:
Evasion of service of sentence is an essential element
of prescription of penalties. The culprit should escape
during the term of imprisonment in order for
prescription of penalty imposed by final sentence to
commence to run. The period of prescription of
penalties as provided in Article 93 states - "shall
commence to run from the date when the culprit
should evade the service of his sentence."
Article 157 of the Revised Penal Code explains the
concept of evasion of service of sentence:
ART. 157. Evasion of service of sentence. - The penalty
of prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods shall be imposed upon any convict who shall
evade service of his sentence by escaping during the
term of his imprisonment by reason of final judgment.
However, if such evasion or escape shall have taken
place by means of unlawful entry, by breaking doors,
windows, gates, walls, roofs, or floors, or by using
picklocks, false keys, disguise, deceit, violence or
intimidation, or through connivance with other
convicts or employees of the penal institution, the
penalty shall be prision correccional in its maximum
period.
Elements of evasion of service of sentence are:
1. the offender is a convict by final judgment;
2. he "is serving his sentence which consists in
deprivation of liberty; and
3. he evades service of sentence by escaping during the
term of his sentence.
By the express terms of the statute, a convict evades
"service of his sentence" by "escaping during the term
of his imprisonment by reason of final judgment." That
escape should take place while serving sentence, is

emphasized by the provisions of the second sentence
of Article 157 which provides for a higher penalty if
such "evasion or escape shall have taken place by
means of unlawful entry, by breaking doors, windows,
gates, walls, roofs, or floors, or by using picklocks, false
keys, disguise, deceit, violence or intimidation, or
through connivance with other convicts or employees
of the penal institution.." Indeed, evasion of sentence
is but another expression of the term "jail breaking."
Thus, one who has not been committed to prison
cannot be said to have escaped therefrom. "Escape" in
legal parlance and for purposes of Articles 93 and 157
of the RPC means unlawful departure of prisoner from
the limits of his custody. It applies only to those who
are convicted by final judgment and are serving
sentence which consists in deprivation of liberty, and
that the period for prescription of penalties begins only
when the convict evades service of sentence by
escaping during the term of his sentence.
This is not applicable in the case at bar. For the longest
time, they were never brought to prison or placed in
confinement despite being sentenced to imprisonment
by final judgment. Prescription of penalty of
imprisonment does not run in their favor. Thus, the trial
court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
assuming jurisdiction over the motion for execution
and in eventually granting the same.
PARULAN VS. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS
G.R. NO. L-28519, FEBRUARY 17, 1968
ISSUE:
WON the CFI of Manila with jurisdiction to try and
decide the case and to impose the sentence upon
Parulan for evasion of service of sentence.
FACTS:
Parulan was serving life imprisonment (commuted to
20 years by the President) in Muntinlupa. In Oct 1964,
he was transferred to Fort Bonifacio. He escaped in the
same month, but was recaptured in Manila.
He was prosecuted for the crime of evasion of service
of sentence, penalized under Art. 157 of the RPC. The
CFI in Manila found him guilty and sentenced him
accordingly.
He filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus directed
to the Director of Bureau of Prisons, praying that the
latter be ordered “to release immediately and without
delay the body of the petitioner from unlawful and
illegal confinement.” Parulan contended that his
confinement illegal because the sentence of conviction
imposed upon him for the crime of evasion of service
of sentence was rendered by a court without
jurisdiction over his person and of the offense with
which he was charged.
HELD:
Yes. Transitory or continuing offenses are crimes where
some acts material and essential to the crime occur in
one province and some in another. The court of either
37 | JMC COLLEGE OF LAW
CRIMINAL LAW II | CASE DIGESTS
province where any of the essential ingredients of the
crime took place has jurisdiction to try the case. There
are, however, crimes which although all the elements
thereof for its consummation may have occurred in a
single place, yet by reason of the very nature of the
offense committed, the violation of the law is deemed
to be continuing.
When the prisoner in his attempt to evade the service
of the sentence imposed upon him by the courts and
thus defeat the purpose of the law, moves from one
place to another; for, in this case, the act of the escaped
prisoner is a continuous or series of acts, set on foot by
a single impulse and operated by an unintermittent
force, however long it may be. It may not be validly said
that after the convict shall have escaped from the place
of his confinement the crime is fully consummated, for,
as long as he continues to evade the service of his
sentence, he is deemed to continue committing the
crime, and may be arrested without warrant, at any
place where he may be found. The right of arrest
without a warrant is founded on the principle that at
the time of the arrest, the escapee is in the continuous
act of committing a crime — evading the service of his
sentence.
December 28, 2017 – Article 158 – EVASION OF
SERVICE OF SENTENCE ON THE OCCASION OF
DISORDER, CONFLAGRATIONS, EARTHQUAKES,
OR OTHER CALAMITIES.
ALILIAN, Enna B.
LOSADA v ACENAS
GR No. L-810, March 31, 1947
ISSUE:
WON the said inmates were entitled to the deduction
of their sentence provided in Art 98 in accordance with
Art 158 RPC
FACTS:
The Justice of Peace ordered the release of the four (4)
inmates who remained in the penal colony and did not
try to escape during the war.
HELD:
No. The special allowance for loyalty authorized by
articles 98 and 158 of the Revised Penal Code refers to
those convicts who, having evaded the service of their
sentences by leaving the penal institution, give
themselves up within two days. As these petitioners
were not in that class, because they had not escaped,
they had no claim to that allowance.
December 30, 2017 – Article 159 – OTHER CASES OF
EVASION OF SERVICE OF SENTENCE
Arances, Javy Ann G.
PEOPLE VS SANARES
G.R. NO. L-43499, January 11, 1936
Justice Recto
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused should be acquitted or
that the penalty be reduced.

FACTS:
Isidoro Sanares y Caerne was charged in the Court of
First Instance of Manila. The accused was granted by
His Excellency, the Governor-General, a conditional
pardon remitting the unexecuted portion of the
sentence of imprisonment of six years and one
imposed upon him for the crime of theft. Upon
accepting the condition of such pardon, to wit: that he
shall not again violate any of the penal laws of the
Philippine Islands, the said accused willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously violated the condition of such pardon
by then and there committing the crime of estafa for
which he was finally sentenced to suffer three months
and eleven days of imprisonment.
Upon arraignment, the accused pleaded guilty and the
court forthwith ordered his recommitment for the
unexpired portion of his former sentence. The accused
appealed from this judgment and prays that he be
acquitted or that the penalty be reduced.
The record shows that the conditional pardon whose
conditions were violated by the accused referred to a
penalty of six years and one day of prision, of which
two years, five months and twenty-two days had been
served by the accused. The penalty remitted by the
pardon was, therefore, three years, seven months and
eight days.
HELD:
Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the
penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period
shall be imposed upon the convict who, having been
granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive,
shall violate any of the conditions of such pardon.
However, if the Penalty remitted by the granting of
such pardon be higher than six years, the convict shall
then suffer the unexpired portion of his original
sentence."
The second part of the article just quoted is
inapplicable to the case at bar because the unexpired
portion of the penalty remitted by reason of the
condition pardon granted the accused does not
exceed six years. The first part thereof, which imposes
the penalty or prision correccional in its minimum
period upon the convict who, having been granted
conditional pardon, shall violated any of its conditions,
is, therefore, applicable. The duration of this penalty is
from six months and one day to two years and four
months. Inasmuch as the mitigating circumstance of
having pleaded guilty should be considered in favor of
the accused, and there being no aggravating
circumstance, the penalty should be imposed in its
minimum period which ranges from six months and
one day to one year, one month and ten days of prision
correccional. The benefits afforded by the
Indeterminate Sentence Law are not applicable to the
accused, by express provision thereof.
TORRES VS GONZALES
G.R. NO. 76872, July 23, 1987
Justice Feliciano
ISSUE:
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Whether or not conviction of a crime by final judgment
of a court is necessary before the petitioner can be
validly rearrested and recommitted for violation of the
terms of his conditional pardon and accordingly to
serve the balance of his original sentence.
FACTS:
In 1978, Torres was convicted of estafa and in 1979, he
was pardoned by the president with the condition that
he shall not violate any penal laws again and that
should this condition be violated, he will be proceeded
against in the manner prescribed by law. Petitioner
accepted the conditional pardon and was
consequently released from confinement. In 1982,
Torres was charged with multiple crimes of estafa. In
1986, Gonzales petitioned for the cancellation of
Torres’ pardon. Hence, the president cancelled the
pardon. Torres appealed the issue before the Supreme
Court averring that the Executive Department erred in
convicting him for violating the conditions of his
pardon because the estafa charges against him were
not yet final and executory as they were still on appeal.
HELD:
In proceeding against a convict who has been
conditionally pardoned and who is alleged to have
breached the conditions of his pardon, the Executive
Department has two options: (1) Section 64 (i) of the
Revised Administrative Code, a purely executive act,
not subject to judicial scrutiny, or (2) Article 159 of the
Revised Penal Code, a judicial act consisting of trial for
and conviction of violation of a conditional pardon.
Where the President opts to proceed under Section 64
(i) of the Revised Administrative Code, no judicial
pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is
necessary, much less conviction therefor by final
judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be
recommended for the violation of his conditional
pardon.
Under article 159 of the Revised Penal Code, parolee
or convict who is regarded as having violated the
provisions thereof must be charged, prosecuted and
convicted by final judgment before he can be made to
suffer the penalty prescribed.
In the case at bar, President has chosen to proceed
against the petitioner under Section 64 (i) of the
Revised Administrative Code. That choice is an exercise
of the President’s executive prerogative and is not
subject to judicial scrutiny.
December 31, 2017 – Article 160 – COMMISSION OF
ANOTHER CRIME DURING SERVICE OF PENALTY
IMPOSED FOR ANOTHER PREVIOUS OFFENSE
BANUELOS, Kelvinn L.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs.
ANTONIO
YABUT
G.R. No. 39085 September 27, 1933
BUTTE, J.

LEGAL ISSUE:
Whether or not Quasi-Recidivism of Article 160 is not
applicable for YABUT.
FACTS:
On or about the 1st day of August, 1932, in the City of
Manila, the accused Antonio Yabut, then a prisoner
serving sentence in the Bilibid Prison, in said city, did
then and there, with intent to kill, wilfully and
treacherously, assault and use personal violence upon
one Sabas Aseo, another prisoner also serving
sentence in Bilibid, by then and there hitting the said
Sabas Aseo suddenly and unexpectedly from behind
with a wooden club, without any just cause, thereby
fracturing the skull of said Sabas Aseo and inflicting
upon him various other physical injuries on different
parts of the body which caused the death of the latter
about twenty-four (24) hours thereafter.
At the time of the commission of this offense, the said
Antonio Yabut was a recidivist, he having previously
been convicted twice of the crime of homicide and
once of serious physical injuries, by virtue of final
sentences rendered by competent tribunals.
Upon arraignment, YABUT pleaded not guilty. We
reject the testimony of Yabut that it was Prisoner
Villafuerte, the squad leader of their brigade, not
YABUT, who gave the fatal blow to the deceased Aseo.
The testimonies of Santiago Estrada, resident physician
of the Bureau of Prisons and Dr. Pablo Anzures of the
Medico Legal Department of the University of the
Philippines, clearly establish that the death of Aseo was
caused by subdural and cerebral hemorrhages
following the fracture of the skull resulting from the
blow on the head of Aseo. They further confirm the
testimony of the four eyewitnesses that the deceased
was struck from behind.
YABUT places much stress upon the word "another"
appearing in the English translation of the headnote of
article 160 and would have us accept his deduction
from the headnote that article 160 is applicable only
when the new crime which is committed by a person
already serving sentence is different from the crime for
which he is serving sentence. Inasmuch as the
appellant was serving sentence for the crime of
homicide, the appellant contends the court below
erred in applying article 160 in the present case which
was a prosecution for murder (involving homicide).
HELD:
Yes, Article 160 still applies. The language is plain and
unambiguous. There is not the slightest intimation in
the text of article 160 that said article applies only in
cases where the new offense is different in character
from the former offense for which the defendant is
serving the penalty.
It is familiar law that when the text itself of a statute or
a treaty is clear and unambiguous, there is neither
necessity nor propriety in resorting to the preamble or
headings or epigraphs of a section of interpretation of
the text, especially where such epigraphs or headings
39 | JMC COLLEGE OF LAW
CRIMINAL LAW II | CASE DIGESTS
of sections are mere catchwords or reference aids
indicating the general nature of the text that follows.
A mere glance at the titles to the articles of the Revised
Penal code will reveal that they were not intended by
the Legislature to be used as anything more than
catchwords conveniently suggesting in a general way
the subject matter of each article. Being nothing more
than a convenient index to the contents of the articles
of the Code, they cannot, in any event have the effect
of modifying or limiting the unambiguous words of the
text. Secondary aids may be consulted to remove, not
to create doubt.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BETH
TEMPORADA.
G.R. No. 173473 December 17, 2008
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
LEGAL ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 160 should not be considered
as an “attending circumstances” in relation to the
application of Indeterminate Sentence Law.
FACTS:
From September 2001 to January 2002, Rosemarie
"Baby" Robles, Bernadette Miranda, Nenita Catacotan
and Jojo Resco and Beth Temporada, all employees of
the Alternative Travel and Tours Corporation (ATTC),
recruited and promised overseas employment, for a
fee, to complainants Rogelio Legaspi, Jr. as technician
in Singapore, and Soledad Atle, Luz Minkay, Evelyn
Estacio and Dennis Dimaano as factory workers in
Hongkong.
The accused and appellant were then holding office at
Dela Rosa Street, Makati City but eventually transferred
business to Discovery Plaza, Ermita, Manila. After
complainants had submitted all the requirements
consisting of their respective application forms,
passports, NBI clearances and medical certificates, the
accused and appellant, on different dates, collected
and received from them placement fees in various
amounts, viz: a) from Rogelio Legaspi, Jr. – 57,600.00;
b) from Dennis Dimaano – P66,520.00; c) from Evelyn
Estacio – P88,520.00; d) from Soledad Atle – P69,520.00
and e) from Luz Minkay – P69,520.00.
As none of them was able to leave nor recover the
amounts they had paid, complainant lodged separate
criminal complaints against accused and appellant
before the City Prosecutor of Manila. On November 29,
2002, Assistant City Prosecutor Restituto Mangalindan,
Jr. filed six (6) Informations against the accused and
appellant, one for Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale
under Article 38 (a) of the Labor Code as amended, and
the rest for five (5) counts of estafa under Article 315
paragraph 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code.
There is an argument that the incremental penalty rule
should not be considered as analogous to a modifying
circumstance stems from the erroneous interpretation
that the "attending circumstances" mentioned in
Section 1 of the ISL are limited to those modifying

circumstances falling within the scope of Articles 13
and 14 of the RPC.
HELD:
YES. While we affirm the conviction for the five (5)
counts of estafa, we find, however, that the CA
erroneously computed the indeterminate penalties
therefor. The CA deviated from the doctrine laid down
in People v. Gabres; hence its decision should be
reversed with respect to the indeterminate penalties it
imposed. The reversal of the appellate court’s Decision
on this point does not, however, wholly reinstate the
indeterminate penalties imposed by the trial court
because the maximum terms, as determined by the
latter, were erroneously computed and must
necessarily be rectified.
Section 1 of the ISL is again quoted below –
SECTION 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence
for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or
its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused
to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of
which shall be that which, in view of the attending
circumstances, could be properly imposed under the
rules of said Code, and the minimum which shall be
within the range of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by the Code for the offense; x x x
The plain terms of the ISL show that the legislature did
not intend to limit "attending circumstances" as
referring to Articles 13 and 14 of the RPC. If the
legislature intended that the "attending
circumstances" under the ISL be limited to Articles 13
and 14, then it could have simply so stated. The
wording of the law clearly permits other modifying
circumstances outside of Articles 13 and 14 of the RPC
to be treated as "attending circumstances" for
purposes of the application of the ISL, such as quasi-
recidivism under Article 16051 of the RPC. Under this
provision, "any person who shall commit a felony after
having been convicted by final judgment, before
beginning to serve such sentence, or while serving the
same, shall be punished by the maximum period of the
penalty prescribed by law for the new felony."
This circumstance has been interpreted by the Court as
a special aggravating circumstance where the penalty
actually imposed is taken from the prescribed penalty
in its maximum period without regard to any generic
mitigating circumstances. Since quasi-recidivism is
considered as merely a special aggravating
circumstance, the penalty next lower in degree is
computed based on the prescribed penalty without
first considering said special aggravating circumstance
as exemplified in People v. Manalo and People v.
Balictar.
The question whether the incremental penalty rule is
covered within the letter and spirit of "attending
circumstances" under the ISL was answered in the
affirmative by the Court in Gabres when it ruled therein
that the incremental penalty rule is analogous to a
modifying circumstance.
Article 315 of the RPC pertinently provides –
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ARTICLE 315. Swindling (Estafa). – Any person who shall
defraud another by any of the means mentioned
hereinbelow shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prisión correccional in its maximum
period to prisión mayor in its minimum period, if the
amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not
exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the
latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall
be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year
for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty
which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years.
In such cases, and in connection with the accessory
penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose
of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall
be termed prisión mayor or reclusión temporal, as the
case may be. x x x
Under Gabres, prisión correccional maximum to prisión
mayor minimum is the prescribed penalty55 for estafa
when the amount defrauded exceeds P22,000.00. An
amount defrauded in excess of P22,000.00 is effectively
considered as a special aggravating circumstance in
the sense that the penalty actually imposed shall be
taken from the prescribed penalty in its maximum
period without regard to any generic mitigating
circumstances. Consequently, the penalty next lower in
degree is still based on the prescribed penalty without
in the meantime considering the effect of the amount
defrauded in excess of P22,000.00.
What is unique, however, with the afore-quoted
provision is that when the amount defrauded is
P32,000.00 or more, the prescribed penalty is not only
imposed in its maximum period but there is imposed
an incremental penalty of 1 year imprisonment for
every P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00, provided that
the total penalty which may be imposed shall not
exceed 20 years. This incremental penalty rule is a
special rule applicable to estafa and theft. In the case
of estafa, the incremental penalty is added to the
maximum period of the prescribed penalty (or to
anywhere from 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8
years) at the discretion of the court, in order to arrive
at the penalty actually imposed (i.e., the maximum
term, within the context of the ISL).
This unique characteristic of the incremental penalty
rule does not pose any obstacle to interpreting it as
analogous to a modifying circumstance, and, hence,
falling within the letter and spirit of "attending
circumstances" for purposes of the application of the
ISL. Under the wording of the ISL, "attending
circumstances" may be reasonably interpreted as
referring to such circumstances that are applied in
conjunction with certain rules in the Code in order to
determine the penalty to be actually imposed based on
the prescribed penalty of the Code for the offense. The
incremental penalty rule substantially meets this
standard. The circumstance is the amount defrauded in
excess of P22,0000.00 and the incremental penalty rule
is utilized to fix the penalty actually imposed. At its
core, the incremental penalty rule is merely a
 CRIMINAL LAW II | CASE DIGESTS

mathematical formula for computing the penalty to be

actually imposed using the prescribed penalty as
starting point.

Thus, it serves the same function of determining the

penalty actually imposed as the modifying
circumstances under Articles 13, 14, and 160 of the
RPC, although the manner by which the former
accomplishes this function differs with the latter. For
this reason, the incremental penalty rule may be
considered as merely analogous to modifying
circumstances.
Besides, in case of doubt as to whether the incremental
penalty rule falls within the scope of "attending
circumstances" under the ISL, the doubt should be
resolved in favor of inclusion because this
interpretation is more favorable to the accused
following the time-honored principle that penal
statutes are construed strictly against the State and
liberally in favor of the accused.56 Thus, even if the
Dissenting Opinion’s interpretation is gratuitously
conceded as plausible, as between Gabres and the
dissent’s interpretation, Gabres should be sustained
since it is the interpretation more favorable to the
accused.

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 CRIMINAL LAW II | CASE DIGESTS

TITLE FOUR – CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC Regional Assistant Monitoring Services as nonexistent
INTEREST and its alleged Executive Director, herein petitioner, as
not in any capacity connected with the Office of the
President. From these premises it is rational to
January 1, 2018 – Article 161 – COUNTERFEITING
conclude that the documents in question, which
THE GREAT SEAL OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
purport to have been signed by then President Marcos,
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, FORGING THE SIGNATURE
are bogus documents. The trial court and Court of
OR STAMP OF THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE
Appeals correctly found petitioner to be the author of
BURGOS, Paul Zandrix A.
the forgery. The presumption is that the possessor and
user of a falsified document is the forger thereof.
GAMIDO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. Nos. 111962-72 December 8, 1995
Petitioner also argues that he should have been
MENDOZA, J.:
charged under only one information because there was
only one intent "to discharge the imagined functions
ISSUE:
of a non-existent office." The argument has no merit.
Whether or not the charge of violation of Art. 161 of
The documents in this case were forged on different
the Revised Penal Code (RPC) was proper.
dates. One act was not done to commit another. There
is therefore no basis for considering the various acts as
FACTS:
constituting only one crime of forgery.
On March 25, 1985, then Executive Assistant Juan C.
Tuvera issued Memorandum Circular No. 1281.
January 2, 2018 – Article 162 – USING FORGED
Following the issuance of this memorandum, the
SIGNATURE OR COUNTERFEIT SEAL OR STAMP
Presidential Security Command and the Office of the
[NO CASE FOUND]
President, through the Malacañang Complaints and
Investigation Office (CIO), investigated petitioner. On
January 2, 2018 – Article 163 – MAKING AND
September 27, 1985, upon the invitation of Atty.
IMPORTING AND UTTERING FALSE COINS
Quirino Sagario, CIO Hearing Officer, petitioner
DAHIROC, Janice L.
appeared and presented the 11 documents, claiming
that President Ferdinand E. Marcos had signed them in
THE UNITED STATES VS. AGUSTIN BASCO
his (petitioner's) presence. The lone witness for the
G.R. NO. L-2747 APRIL 11, 1906
prosecution, Melquiades T. de la Cruz, Presidential
Staff Director of the Malacañang Records Office (MRO),
ISSUE:
testified that there were no copies of the documents
Whether or not the case constitutes the crime of
on file in his office and that the signatures thereon did
counterfeiting money.
not appear to be those of the former President. For his
part, petitioner said that he was the Executive Director
FACTS:
of the Presidential Regional Assistant Monitoring
It was proved at the trial of this case that the defendant
Services, or PRAMS, having been appointed by then
attempted to pay for a package of cigarettes which he
President Marcos and that his appointment and the
bought at a certain store with what appeared to be
related documents, subject of the prosecution, had
silver coin, but which, as a matter of fact, was a
been signed by the former President in petitioner's
Philippine copper cent. He insisted that the owner of
presence.
the store should accept the same as a peseta, that is to
say, a twenty cent piece. The latter refused to accept it
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila found him
upon noticing what the real value and denomination of
guilty and charged him with 11 counts of violation of
the coin was. The defendant again insisted that the
Art. 161 of the RPC by forging the signature of the
money be accepted and the owner of the store refused
President of the Philippines on 11 different documents
to do so. As a result of such refusal a quarrel ensued
and making it appear that the documents were
between them. A policeman then interfered, and upon
genuine official documents of the Republic of the
being informed of what had happened, placed the
Philippines. He was sentenced to suffer the
defendant under arrest and took him to the police
indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1)
station, where several Mexican and Japanese coins
day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14)
were found in his possession together with a roll of
years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as
Philippine copper cents, the latter being silver plated,
maximum, in each of these eleven (11) criminal cases,
and identical with the coin which he had attempted to
or a total of eighty (80) years up to one hundred fifty-
pass at the store as a twenty-cent piece. Upon an
four (154) years. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA)
examination of these plated coins it was found that
affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, this petition.
they were genuine Philippine copper cents, which
apparently and been whitened with quicksilver to give
HELD:
them the color and brightness of silver. The defendant
YES, the petition has no merit.
having been asked as to where he had obtained the
said coins, first answered that he had received them as
Melquiades T. de la Cruz, Director of the Malacañang
change, but later admitted that he had silvered them
Records Office, testified that his office did not have a
himself.
record of the documents. For his part Executive
Secretary Juan C. Tuvera declared the Presidential

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HELD:
No. The Attorney-General, in his brief filed in this court,
contends that these facts do not constitute the crime
of counterfeiting money, but that of estafa, and for this
reason asks that the defendant be acquitted of the
crime charged in the complaint without prejudice to
the filing of another complaint against him for estafa.
There can be no counterfeiting of money when, as in
this case, no spurious or clipped coin was used. The
coins in question were genuine copper cents and bore
their original designs and inscriptions. The defendant
did not make or attempt to make any alteration in the
designs and inscriptions of the said coins. All that he
did was to give them the appearance of silver pieces
for the purpose of passing them as twenty-cent coins.
He did not, however, attempt to imitate the peculiar
design of such coins. The acts committed by the
defendant for the purpose of defrauding third persons
by deceiving them us to the real value of the coins in
question constitute the crime of estafa and not of
counterfeiting money. There were not legal grounds
upon which a charge for this latter offense could be
based. The judgment appealed from is hereby reversed
and the defendant acquitted of the charge of
counterfeiting money contained in the complaint, and
the Attorney-General is directed to present another
complaint against him for the crime of estafa. It is
ordered that the Mexican and Japanese coins found in
the possession of the defendant be returned to him.
The costs of both instances are declared de oficio. After
the expiration of ten days from the date of final
judgment, let the case be remanded to the Court of
First Instance from whence it came for proper
procedure.
January 3, 2018 – Article 164 – MUTILATION OF
COINS - IMPORTATION AND UTTERANCE OF
MUTILATED COINS
DELA PEÑA, Clarisse J.
PEOPLE V TIN CHING TING
GR L-4620 JANUARY 30,1952
ISSUE:
Whether or not the coins in this case are mutilated.
HELD:
Mutilation is to diminish by ingenuous means the
metal in the coin. One who mutilates a coin does not
do so for the sake of mutilating, but to take advantage
of the metal abstracted; he appropriates a part of the
metal of the coin. Hence, the coin diminishes in
intrinsic value. One who utters said mutilated coin
receives its legal value, much more than its intrinsic
value. It is indispensable that the mutilated coin be of
legal tender.
(Note: The copy of the full text of the case cannot be
found; only the ruling)
January 4, 2018 – Article 165 – SELLING OF FALSE OR
MUTILATED COIN, WITHOUT CONNIVANCE
DELFIN, Jennica Gyrl G.
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PEOPLE V GO PO
GR. NO. 42697, VL.J. 393, AUGUST 1985
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Chinaman may be convicted of
illegal possession of false coin?
FACTS:
A Chinese merchant was paid by purchaser of goods in
the former’s store a false 50-centavo coin. He placed it
in his drawer. During a search by some constabulary
officers, the false coin was found in the drawer.
HELD:
No. Article 165 requires three things as regards
possession of false coins, namely: (1) possession ; (2)
intent to utter; and (2) knowledge that the coin is false.
The fact that the Chairman received it in payment of
his goods and placed it in his drawer shows that he did
not know that such coin was false.
January 5, 2018 – Article 166 – FORGING TREASURY
OR BANK NOTES OR OTHER DOCUMENTS
PAYABLE TO BEARER; IMPORTING, AND UTTERING
SUCH FALSE OR FORGED NOTES AND DOCUMENTS
DIZON, Roxan Danica G.
US VS GARDNER
G.R. No. 1468, March 14, 1904
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendant can be held liable for
falsification of notes or documents equivalent to
current money payable to bearer
FACTS:
Gardner ordered Jameson to buy a bottle of mucilage
and blue pencil. That night, while passing by a tailor
shop, Gardner handed Jameson a bill asking him to
change it for silver and promised to give him half its
value. Jameson cashed the bill and received 25 pesos.
Gardner also had another bill on which he had pasted
a number "10". Gardner tried to pass Confederate $10
in a Filipino drug store. The Chinaman Ah Fun had
given 25 pesos in exchange for an American bill upon
which the number 10 had been pasted. He did not
observe the defect in the bill at first, but observed it
afterwards and immediately went to the people station
to file a complaint. Some other night, Gardner through
the witness Klip also attempted to pass a one-dollar bill
raised to a ten in a house of prostitution. It was shortly
after returned to him saying that it was bad.
HELD:
Yes. The falsification of bank notes and of documents
of credit payable to bearer and issued by the State, to
which class the two certificates in question belong, is
an act severely punished by the law as tending to bring
such documents into discredit and because such
offenses produce a lack of confidence on the part of
the holders of said documents to the prejudice of the
interest of society and of the State, and for this reason
the law punishes this crime more severely than it does

the counterfeiting of money, in consideration of the
fact that it is easier to counterfeit such certificates,
notes, and documents of credit payable to bearer than
to make counterfeit coin, and that the profit which is
derived therefrom by the forger of such documents is
greater and the incentive for the commission of such a
crime more powerful.
DEL ROSARIO VS PEOPLE
G.R. No. L-16806, December 22, 1961
ISSUE:
Whether or not said act constitutes a violation of
Article 166 of the Revised Penal Code
FACTS:
Sergio del Rosario, Alfonso Araneta and Benedicto del
Pilar were accused of counterfeiting Philippine treasury
notes. They have shown to Apolinario del Rosario
Philippine one-peso and two-peso bills and induced
him to believe that the same were counterfeit paper
money manufactured by them, although in fact they
were genuine treasury notes of the Philippine
Government one of the digits of each of which had
been altered and changed. They obtained P1,700.00
from said complainant for the purpose of financing the
manufacture of more counterfeit treasury notes of the
Philippines.
HELD:
Yes. It is not disputed that a portion of the last digit 9
of Serial No. F-79692619, had been erased and
changed so as to read 0 and that similar erasures and
changes had been made in the penultimate digit 9 in
Serial No. F-79692691, in the last digit in Serial No. D-
716326, and in the last digit 9 of Serial No. D-716329.
The possession of genuine treasury notes of the
Philippines any of "the figures, letters, words or signs
contained" in which had been erased and or altered,
with knowledge of such notes, as they were used by
petitioner herein and his co-defendants in the manner
adverted to above, is punishable under Article 168, in
relation to Article 166 (1), of the Revised Penal Code.
TECSON VS CA
G.R. No. 113218, November 22, 2001
ISSUE:
Whether or not Tecson can be held liable for the illegal
possession and use of counterfeit US dollar notes
FACTS:
On April 26, 1990 a test-buy operation was ordered by
Atty. Pio Chan, Jr., Chief of the Investigation Staff of the
Central Bank, which resulted in the purchase from
Tecson of one US dollar note for Two Hundred Pesos
that was found to be counterfeit. Consequently, a team
to conduct a buy-bust operation was formed. During
such occasion, Tecson was introduced to Pedro Labita
and Johnny Marqueta as persons interested in buying
US dollar notes. Apparently convinced, the man drew
ten pieces of US $100 dollar notes from his wallet.
Upon such, the two introduced themselves as Central
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Bank operatives and apprehended Tecson. The trial
court found Tecson guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the offense as defined in Art. 168 and penalized in Art.
166 paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. The Court
of Appeals affirmed the decision. Hence this petition.
HELD:
Yes. The prosecution established, through the
testimonies of Pedro Labita and Johnny Marqueta, that
a buy-bust operation was conducted by the combined
agents of the Central Bank of the Philippines and the
US Secret Service, and that the petitioner was therein
caught in flagrante delicto in the possession of and in
the act of offering to sell counterfeit US dollar notes.
The testimony of Pedro Labita which was corroborated
by Johnny Marqueta and the presentation during the
trial of the ten counterfeit US $100 dollar notes, which
were confiscated from the petitioner when he was
arrested, proved beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of
the petitioner for the crime of illegal possession and
use of fake US dollar notes under Article 168 of the
Revised Penal Code. The decision of the Court of
Appeals was affirmed.
January 7, 2018 – Article 167 – COUNTERFEITING,
IMPORTING, AND UTTERING INSTRUMENT NOT
PAYABLE TO BEARER
[NO CASE FOUND]
January 7, 2018 – Article 168 – ILLEGAL POSSESION
AND USE OF FALSE TREASURY OR BANK NOTES
AND OTHER INSTRUMENTS OF CREDIT
DUQUE, Francis Lester M
THE UNITED STATES vs. JUAN DE LEON, ET AL.
G.R. No. 1934, April 29, 1905
ISSUE:
WON it is necessary to convict the accused that the
latter know the bill was a counterfeit at the time it was
uttered.
FACTS:
Juan de Leon and Albino de Leon, the accused in this
case, were found guilty in the CFI of the crime of
uttering a counterfeit bank note under Art 292 of the
Penal Code.
It appears that the accused were brothers, and that
Juan de Leon having paid a debt with a counterfeit 50-
peso note of the Spanish-Filipino Bank, and the
creditor having expressed some doubt as to the
genuineness of the note, the said Albino de Leon
assured him that the said note was good, and
promised that if it should prove to be counterfeit he
himself would make good the loss. It was further
shown that the note was in fact counterfeit and that
the said Albino de Leon refused to make good the
amount as he had promised.
HELD:
Yes. Under Article 292 of the Penal Code, to sustain a
conviction of the crime of uttering a counterfeit bank
note it must affirmatively appear that the accused
knew that the note was counterfeit at the time it was

uttered.
Here, It was not proven that Albino was aware that the
note in question was counterfeit when he aided his
brother in uttering it, and guilty knowledge of this fact
being an essential element of the crime, Albino should
not have been convicted either as principal or
accomplice.
PEOPLE VS. NICASIO BARRAQUIA
C.A. NO. 50, APRIL 13, 1946
ISSUE:
WON the evidence is sufficient to find accused
convicted for the crime charged.
FACTS:
The witness for the prosecution Maximo Pascasio
testified that: Nicasio went to his office to change a
bank note of ten-peso denomination; he did not
change it because he saw that it was not genuine; he
ordered that a policeman be called; when he told
accused that the bank note was a counterfeit, the
accused kept silent; accused had occasion to go away
before the arrival of the policeman, but he preferred to
remain and waited for the policeman; accused
admitted to the policeman that he is the owner of the
bank note, and the policeman brought him for
investigation to the municipal building without
offering any resistance.
Other witness Vicente C. Reventar, cashier of the
provincial treasury of Laguna, testified that: he can
distinguish a counterfeit from a genuine one; in his
opinion, ten peso bill is a counterfeit because the
printing is somewhat blurred and the paper is very
oily.
At the investigation, accused explained that the bank
note was passed to him in a game of cara y cruz. Upon
his own testimony accused appears to be an illiterate
laborer, who does not know how to read or write. He
testified that he happened to know that the bill a
counterfeit only when the postmaster of Calamba
informed him so, but for himself he cannot distinguish
a counterfeit note from a genuine one.
HELD:
No. The only evidence presented by the prosecution to
the effect that the bank note in question was a
counterfeit is the testimony of Reventar who stated
that the printing of the bill is somewhat blurred and
the paper is very oily. The SC do not believe that these
two circumstances may be considered as enough basis
for declaring the bill in question as falsified. The fact
that the printing is somewhat blurred may be
attributed to the overuse of an old printed matter, or
that the bank bill is oily is not an evidence of a
counterfeit bill, because any bank note may become
oily by impregnation with an oily liquid. According to
the decision of the lower court, the subject bill bears
No. D462691D. No evidence has been presented that
this number does not check with the genuine one
issued with the same number. Furthermore, even if the
subject ten peso bill was counterfeited bank note, it
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was not prove that appellant had knowledge of the fact
before the postmaster of Calamba called a policeman.
PEOPLE VS. CAMOLO DIGORO ALIAS
PANONDIONGAN.
G.R. NO. L-22032, MARCH 4, 1966
ISSUE:
WON the RTC is correct in finding accused guilty under
Article 168 of the RPC.
FACTS:
On 1961, Camolo Digoro was charged with Article 168
of the RPC. The information was read as follows: That
said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, with intent to possess, have in his
possession, custody and control, 100-peso bill, 20-
peso bill, 10-peso bill, 5-peso bill, 2-peso bill and 1-
Peso bill denominations in resemblance or similitude
to a genuine treasury or bank notes issued by the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines.
A decision was rendered finding accused guilty by the
trial court. The accused appealed his case., on the
ground that the information does not charge an
offense.
HELD:
No. Possession of false treasury or bank notes alone
without anything more, is not a criminal offense. For it
to constitute an offense under Article 168 of the
Revised Penal Code the possession must be with intent
to use said false treasury or bank notes. The subject law
is clear: Under ART. 168. Illegal possession and use of
false treasury or bank notes and other instruments of
credit.— …any person who shall knowingly use or have
in his possession, with intent to use any of the false or
falsified instruments referred to in this section, shall
suffer the penalty next lower in degree than that
prescribed in said articles.
It follows that an information, as in this case, alleging
possession of false treasury and bank notes without
alleging intent to use the same but only "intent to
possess" them, charges no offense. Wherefore, the
case is remanded for new prosecution under an
appropriate and valid information.
January 8, 2018 – Article 169 – HOW FORGERY IS
COMMITTED
FLORENTINO, Kimberly A.
THE UNITED STATES VS ALONSO P. GARDNER
G.R. NO. 1468, MARCH 14, 1904
ISSUE:
Whether or not forgery was committed.
FACTS:
Accused was charged with falsification of silver
certificates by pasting little pieces of paper, on each
one of which the figure “10” appears, over the figure
“1’, which showed the true value of the certificate and
by obliterating with a pencil the number “1” whenever

it appeared on the corners or sides of the certificates
for the purpose appear that each one of them was
worth $10 instead of $1, and by this means the sum of
25 Mexican pesos was fraudulently obtained in
exchange for one of the said bills or certificates.
HELD:
Yes. Article 289 of the Penal Code provides that those
who falsify bank notes or other instruments or
documents payable to bearer, or coupons thereof, the
issue of which has been authorized by law, or those
who introduce such in the Philippine Islands, shall be
punished.
The silver certificates in the record are documents
payable to bearer or documents of credit duly issued
by virtue of the Federal laws in force in the United
States, and are included as instruments payable to
bearer.
THE UNITED STATES vs MARIANO SOLITO
GR. NO. L-12546 August 25, 1917
ISSUE:
Whether or not accused is guilty of forging, uttering
and passing an altered obligation of the Government
of the Philippine Islands.
FACTS:
Accused was the correspondence clerk and acting chief
clerk in the office of the division superintendent of
schools in the municipality of Dumaguete. With that he
was intrusted and authorized to open letters of an
official character addressed to the office. It was the
custom of the director of Education to forward to
division superintendents of schools checks for the
reimbursement for travel expenses and for the
payment of the salary of employees. On April 19, 1915
a Treasury Warrant was issued to Alvah D. Riley for the
sum of P657.53 from the Auditor of the Philippine
Islands for payment. Accused then presented the said
warrant to the municipal treasurer for payment,
bearing the indorsement of Alvah D. Riley and received
the amount stated therein. Alvah D. Riley contended
that he never had in his possession the said warrant,
nor had ever seen the same, that he did not indorse the
same by writing his name at the back, that his signature
which appears at the back of the said warrant was not
his.
HELD:
Yes. The said warrant was a check issued by the
Government of the Philippine Islands and, an
obligation of the Government of the Philippine Islands.
It was originally made payable to Alvah D. Riley, or to
his order. When it was indorsed as above indicated, it
became a check or warrant payable to “bearer”. The
indorsement made a material alteration in said warrant.
The indorsement changed said check from one
payable to Alvah D. Riley, or to one to whom he
ordered it paid, to one payable to bearer. The
indorsement of the accused had the effect of erasing
the phrase “or order” upon the face of the warrant.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS RAFAEL
BALMORES
85 Phil. 493 FEBRUARY 16, 1950
ISSUE:
Whether or not accused committed forgery under
Article 169 of the Revised Penal Code.
FACTS:
Accused was charged for attempted estafa through
falsification of security by tearing off at the bottom in
a cross-wise direction a portion of a genuine 1/8 unit
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes ticket thereby
removing the true and real unidentified number of
same and substituting and writing in ink at the bottom
on the left side of said ticket the figure or number
074000 thus making the said ticket bear the said
number 074000, which is a prize-winning number in
the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes draw last June 29,
1947, and presenting the said ticket so falsified on said
date, September 22, 1947, in the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office for the purpose of exchanging the
same for the corresponding cash that said number had
won, fraudulently pretending in said Office that the
said 1/8 unit of a Philippine Charity Sweepstakes ticket
is genuine and that he is entitled to the corresponding
amount of P359.55 so won by said ticket in the
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes draw on said date, June
29, 1947, but the said accused failed to perform all the
acts of execution which would have produced the
crime of estafa thru falsification of a security as a
consequence by reason of some causes other than his
spontaneous desistance.
HELD:
Yes. The alteration, or even destruction, of a losing
sweepstakes ticket could cause no harm to anyone and
would not constitute a crime were it not for the
attempt to cash the ticket so altered as a prize-winning
number. The penalty imposed by article 166 for the
forging or falsification of "treasury or bank notes or
certificates or other obligations arid securities" is
reclusion temporal in its minimum period and a fine
not to exceed P10,000, if the document which has been
falsified, counterfeited, or altered is an obligation or
security of the United States or of the Philippine
Islands. In this case the ticket in question was owned
by the government of the Philippine Islands.
January 9, 2018 – Article 170 – FALSIFICATION OF
LEGISLATIVE DOCUMENTS
[NO CASE FOUND]
January 9, 2018 – Article 171 – FALSIFICATION OF
PUBLIC DOCUMENTS BY A PUBLIC EMPLOYEE OR
NOTARY OR ECCLESIASTIC MINISTER
IBABAO, Konrad Stephen P.
PEOPLE V. PO GIOK TO
G.R. NO L-7236, April 30, 1955

ISSUE:
Whether Defendant violated Article 171 by forging a
public document.
FACTS:
Defendant forge a public document namely the
residence certificate No. A-1618529 and
misrepresenting to the said representative of the City
Treasurer that his name is Antonio Perez along with his
birth place and citizenship when in fact he is a Chinese
national.
The CFI of Cebu charged defendant with the crime of
falsification of a public document. Accused then filed a
motion to quash on the grounds that the information
did not allege that the document allegedly falsified and
that he had the wrongful intent to injure a third person.
The lower court then dismissed the case on the
grounds that the information filed did not alleged the
intent and disclosure of the facts in the documents
allegedly falsified.
Defendant also contended that he cannot be charged
with violation of Article 171 since the falsified
document was committed by a public employee who
wrote the untrue facts.
HELD:
Yes, although it is true that it was the employee who
wrote the untrue facts, it was the defendant who
induced him to do so by supplying the facts making
him the principal of the crime by inducement.
The court also held that the obligation on the part of
the accused to disclose the truth as to the facts that
should appear in a residence certificate to be issued to
him, is inherent in the very nature and purpose of said
document. Hence, defendants falsification of the
information need not be alleged in the information for
him to be convicted of the crime. Since under
Commonwealth Act No. 465, for the purpose of
establishing his true and correct identity, he thereby
committed falsification as principal by induction in
making false statement in the narration of fact.
Therefore, the court reversed and remanded the case
back to the lower court for further proceedings.
SPS. REVELO AND CORAZON VILLAMAR V.
PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 178652, 12/8/10
ISSUE:
Whether accused falsified a public document.
FACTS:
On April 20, 1967, Elena Mananton sold a parcel of land
to her 9 children. On June 6, 1983, some of her children
sold Land to Simplicio. However, Modesta and Felipe
did not participate in the sale. Simplicio then sold the
parcel of land to his daughter Corazon who is married
to Petitioner Revelo.
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They registered the deed of sale in the Office of the
Provincial Assessor of Lingayen which was signed and
notarized which was dated Nov. 23, 1989. In the deed
it was made to appear that all of Elena’s children signed
it. The signatures of Modesta and Felipe were forged.
On Sept. 7, 2000, an information was filed charging
petitioner with falsification of public documents.
Petitioner maintained that they could not be guilty
since it was not them who prepared the document. It
was left in the assessors office which they were told to
come back and once they came back it was already
signed. They contended that they did not act with
intent to falsify and that they acted in good faith.
HELD:
Yes. Petitioners were the authors and mastermind since
falsification is presumed from the fact that they actually
benefited from it. In Maliwat v. CA, the Supreme Court
held that in the absence of satisfactory explanation, the
one found in possession of and who used a forged
document and made use of it, taking advantage and
profiting thereby, the clear presumption is that he is
the material author of the falsification.
January 10, 2018 – Article 172 – FALSIFICATION BY
PRIVATE INDIVIDUAL AND USE OF FALSIFIED
DOCUMENTS
LAZO, Joseph Artfel T. II
THE UNITED STATES, v. DAMIAN OVERA (alias
KIM CUAN),
11 Phil 596
ISSUE:
WON a counterfeiting a ticket is considered a
falsification of a private document.
FACTS:
Damian Orera (alias Kim Cuan) was convicted by the
Court of First Instance of the city of Manila, of the crime
of having falsified a Chinese theater ticket which
entitled the bearer thereof to admission to a
performance held in the theater by counterfeiting and
simulating the signature and rubric of Eng Ning on the
said ticket,
The accused was sentenced to be imprisoned at the
Insular Prison of Bilibid for the period of six months and
one day, to pay a fine of 625 pesetas, Philippine
currency, and the costs of the suit, from which
judgment the accused appealed.
HELD:
YES
That the court below did not err in qualifying such
ticket as a document in order to prosecute and punish
the crime of falsification, the subject-matter of the
complaint, because if, according to the authority cited
by the appellant, a document is "a deed, instrument or
other duly authorized paper by which something is
proved, evidenced or set forth," and a private

document is, according to another authority cited by
the same appellant, "every deed or instrument
executed by a private person, without the intervention
of a public notary or of other person legally authorized,
by which document some disposition or agreement is
proved, evidenced or set forth," it follows that the
ticket in question, being an authorized document
evidencing an agreement for the rent of a place in a
theater to enable the possessor to witness a theatrical
performance, is a private document.
PEOPLE VS MANANSALA
105 Phil 1253
ISSUE:
WON the person being in possession of the tvr is
presumed to be the author of the falsification
FACTS:
Felix Manansala, Accused was apprehended by del
Rosario of Manila Police Department (MPD) for driving
outside of his authorized route. Upon presenting the
Traffic Violations Report (TVR) del Rosario noticed that
the TVR was altered.It was later found that the
alterations consisted of erasing the number “III” and
the word “three” after the word Pending cases and
replacing the figures with “I” and “one”this changed
the original meaning of the TVR which previously
stated 3 pending cases to only 1 pending case.
At the investigation, the accused admitted having
made the alterations in question, in order to hide his
previous pending traffic violation cases and thereby
avoid immediate arrest should he be caught
committing a fourth traffic violation
HELD:
YES.
The falsified Traffic Violations Report(TVR) in question
was issued to the accused and the records show that it
was in his possession and had been used as a
temporary drivers permit from its issuance to the time
he was caught by del Rosario upon commission of his
4th violation. It is an established rule that when a
person has in his possession a falsified document and
makes use of the same, the presumption is that such
person is the forger. The accused also had sufficient
motive to commit the falsification as MPD policy is to
arrest a person upon the 4th traffic violation. Hence, he
had the strongest temptation to make in his TVR
appear that he had only committed 1 infraction.
PEOPLE VS DOMINGO
49 PHIL 28
ISSUE:
WON the acts of the accused constitute a falsification
of public documents
FACTS:
Benita Domingo and company were accused of the
crime of estafa through falsification of public
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documents after they had defrauded a Moises Bunzon
for an amount of P5,000.
The property (fishpond) in question is under the
administration of Josefa de Leon. Accused Benita
Domingo approached the administrator (representing
herself as a Realty broker) after learning that de Leon
was looking for a buyer of the property. Domingo later
stated that she had found a buyer and asked if she
could have temporary possession of the Title deed and
other related documents to the property.The
documents were later handed to Domingo on the
promise that it would be returned later in the
afternoon. However, that promise was broken.
Shortly, Sanchez learned his property was being
mortgaged by accused Modesto and company
(comrades of Domingo) but upon confrontation he
was merely told that he did not have possession of the
documents Modesto and Company later approached a
certain Moises Bunzon and pretended to be Josefa de
Leon and representing the owner of the property.
They sold the subject property for P5000 to Bunzon
with the option of buying back the property.
This transaction criminally defrauded and injured
Moises Buzon
HELD:
YES
The crime charged in the information and conclusively
established by the evidence. The crime could hot have
been committed if its perpetrators had not been in
possession of the certificate of title is obvious and it
has been proven beyond a shadow of doubt that the
appellant was the person who obtained the certificate
from Sanchez. It is true that there is no direct evidence
that she delivered it to the two women who signed the
deed, but in view of the fact that she offered no
explanation as to what she did with the certificate and
even denied that she received it, there is no escape
from the inference that she placed the certificate in the
hands of her confederates. If she had not been a co-
conspirator, she would have revealed the name of the
party to whom the certificate was delivered. Her
position is analogous to that of a person who
immediately after a larceny has been committed is
found in possession of the stolen goods and offers no
explanation
SIQUIAN VS PEOPLE
171 SCRA 223
ISSUE:
WON Siquian was guilty of falsification of public
documents
FACTS:
Jesusa Carreon went to the office of Manuel Siquian,
the municipal mayor of Isabela, to apply for a job in the
office of the mayor. Siquian later appointed her as a
clerk in the office of the municipal secretary and even
said that her salary would be included in the budget.

Accompanying her appointment is the certification,
among others, of the availability of funds through a
form issued by Siquian and addressed to the CSC,
pursuant to the requirements of the latter.
It should be noted that the Municipal council of
Isabela, failed to enact the annual budget for the
municipality for the Fiscal Year 1975-76. As such, the
annual budget for the previous Fiscal Year 1974-75,
was deemed re-enacted.
No such position (that assigned to Carreon) existed
then. Carreon worked for five months and was
supposed to receive her salary of P120. She
approached the municipal treasurer to ask for the
money but the latter said that there was no money yet.
She then sued Siquian for falsification of a public
document.
HELD:
YES.
He was found guilty under par 4 of art 171,“making
untruthful statements in a narration of facts”; the
elements of which are:
(a) That the offender makes in a document untruthful
statements in a narration of facts;
(b) That he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth
of the facts narrated by him; and
(c) That the facts narrated by the offender are
absolutely false.
In this case, all the elements for falsification were met
especially when Siquian stated that funds were
available for the position to which Jesusa Carreon was
appointed when he knew that, in reality, the position
itself did not even exist and no funds had been
appropriated. It is further bolstered by the fact that
when the budget was deemed re-enacted, there is no
such position as Clerk to the Municipal Secretary, the
position to which Carreon was appointed. And there is
also no appropriation made in the Annual Budget for
the Fiscal Year 1974-75 for such position, thus
rendering Siquian's statement in his certification utterly
false. Siquian also had the legal obligation to disclose
the truth of such facts.
He also took advantage of his official position in
falsifying the document. Abuse of public office is
considered present when the offender falsifies a
document in connection with the duties of his office
which consist of either making or preparing or
otherwise intervening in the preparation of a
document. In this case, Siquian was charged with the
duty of issuing the certification necessary for the
appointment of Carreon. Lastly, the existence of a
wrongful intent to injure a third person is not necessary
when the falsified document is a public document.
January 11, 2018 – Article 173 – FALSIFICATION OF
WIRELESS, CABLE, TELEGRAPH, AND TELEPHONE
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MESSAGES, AND USE OF SAID FALSIFIED
MESSAGES
MERCADO-NASH, Regina
US V. ROMERO
17 Phil. 76
ISSUE:
Whether or not Romero was guilty of falsifying
telegraph message.
FACTS:
On April 24, 1908, the accused Joaquin Romero who
was a postmaster and telegraph operator send two
telegrams for transmission. He reduced the words of
the telegraph messages by twelve and eight words,
respectively. He was not authorized to do so by the
senders. Romero pocketed the differences in the prices
charged in the sums of P0.72 and P.48, respectively.
On August 24, 1908, the provincial fiscal filed a
complaint with the Court of First Instance in Tarlac,
charging Romero with the crime of falsification of
telegrams. This crime is punishable under Article 300
of the Penal Code (now Art. 173 of the Revised Penal
Code). He was a government employee and engaged
in the service of sending or receiving wireless, cable,
telegraph or telephone messages.
The defendant Joaquin Romero admitted that he
changed the wording of the telegrams which he
received by omitting several words in each of them;
and the record of the cause shows no proof of his
allegation that he made an error in recounting the
amount received for each telegram, owing to the
number of words they contained, and that he was
obliged to diminish the number of words of each of
them.
HELD:
Yes, Romero had violated the crime of falsification of
telegrams. The crime is provided for and punished by
Article 303 in connection with Article 300 of the Penal
Code, which article 303 reads: “A public official in
charge of the telegraph services who shall originate or
falsify a telegraphic message shall incur the penalty of
prision correctional in its medium and maximum
degrees.”
January 13, 2018 – Article 174 – FALSE MEDICAL
CERTIFICATES, FALSE CERTIFICATES OF MERITS OR
SERVICE, ETC.
OLACO, Jan-Lawrence P.
UNITED STATES VS. JUAN ANGEL MICHELENA
(4 Phil 492)
ISSUE:
Whether or not the crime of falsification of certification
of merit was committed.
FACTS:
In an application to the Civil Service Board for
examination, a document printed in accordance with

the form prescribed by said Board, and in that part
thereof which contains recommendations of the
applicant. The certificate No. 3 appears to be
subscribed by Frank N. West, the latter having neither
subscribed it nor written the contents thereof, the
same not being correct in some respects, as regards
the age of the party certifying and the length of time
which he knew the candidate recommended. The
candidate, now the defendant, failed to present himself
for examination, notwithstanding having in his
possession the ticket of admission.
HELD:
YES. The crime was fully proven. The act done by the
defendant is simply the falsification of a certificate of
merit. The court sentenced Juan Angel Michelena to
two months and one day of arresto mayor, crediting
him with one-half of the time of his detention already
suffered, and the costs in both instances.
THE UNITED STATES vs. RUFINO DELOSO
(11 Phil 180)
ISSUE:
Whether or not the crime of falsification of certification
of merit was committed.
FACTS:
Rufino Deloso, in order to take part in the municipal
elections that were to be held about the first (1st) of
December, 1904. in the town of Jimenez, called at that
municipal building and stated under oath to the
municipal secretary, that he was a resident of the said
town, and that at the date of the next municipal
election, he would have resided therein for a period of
six months; and that he was in every way entitled to
vote. Subsequently, At the municipal elections held at
the town of Oroquieta, in the same province, on the
fifth (5th) of December 1905, the said Deloso was
elected by a majority vote to the office of municipal
president. The election was protested by several
residents of the town on the ground that the successful
candidate had no legal residence therein. In his
defense, Deloso stated under oath on the 4th of
January, 1906, before Vicente Fortich, notary public of
Oroquieta, that he had been, and was at the time a
resident of the said town, and that he had resided
therein from the month of April, 1902, until the above-
mentioned date; that he was a candidate for the
municipal presidency of Oroquieta at the elections of
December, 1903, that, although he paid frequent visits
to the pueblo of Jimenez, he always returned to
Oroquieta, the place where he resided; that he never
vote for municipal officers in the pueblo of Jimenez. A
complaint was filed by the provincial fiscal charging
Rufino Deloso with the crime of falsification of official
documents.
HELD:
YES. The document offered in evidence issued by the
municipal secretary of Jimenez is not, strictly speaking,
a public document, but it belongs to the class of
documents that the falsification of which is covered
under the falsification of a certificate of merit. The said
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document or certificate was used with the knowledge
that its contents were false, in that Deloso was not a
resident of Jimenez. The falsity of the statement made
by him to the municipal secretary of said pueblo, was
proven by another notarial document executed by the
said Deloso who also stated under oath, that he was a
resident of Oroquieta both before and after the year
1904; it is therefore unquestionable that the accused
was liable.
DANILO CALIVO CARIAGA vs. EMMANUEL D.
SAPIGAO and GINALYN C. ACOSTA
G.R. No. 223844, June 28, 2017
ISSUE:
Whether or not the crime of falsification of certification
of merit was committed.
FACTS:
A Complaint Affidavit filed by Cariaga before the Office
of the Provincial Prosecutor (OPP) accusing
respondents Emmanuel D. Sapigao (Sapigao) and
Ginalyn C. Acosta of the crimes of Falsification of Public
Documents, False Certification, and Slander by Deed,
defined and penalized under Articles 171, 174, and 359
of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). In the said complaint,
Cariaga alleged that respondents, in their respective
capacities as Barangay Chairman and Secretary of Brgy.
Carosucan Sur, Asingan, Pangasinan, made two (2)
spurious entries in the barangay blotter: (1) stating that
an unnamed resident reported that someone was firing
a gun inside Cariaga's compound, and that when
Sapigao went thereat, he was able to confirm that the
gunfire came from inside the compound and was
directed towards the adjacent ricefields and (2) stating
that a concerned but unnamed resident reported to
Sapigao that Cariaga and his companions attended the
funeral march of former Kagawad Rodrigo Calivo, Sr.
(Calivo, Sr.) with firearms visibly tucked in their waists.
Accordingly, the police authorities used the blotter
entries to obtain a warrant for the search and seizure
operation made inside Cariaga's residence and cattle
farm which resulted in the confiscation of a firearm and
several ammunitions, the criminal case for illegal
possession of firearms consequently filed against him
but was dismissed by the Regional Trial Court claiming
that the statements in the blotter entries were
completely false and were made to dishonor and
discredit him. Sagipao and Acosta raised their
defenses, Sapigao denied the accusations against him,
maintaining that the blotter entries were true, as he
personally witnessed their details whereas Acosta
averred that she was merely performing her duties as
Barangay Secretary when she certified as true copies
the photocopies of the aforesaid blotter entries
requested by the police authorities. The OPP dismissed
the complaint for lack of probable cause. It found that
the questioned blotter entries were all made in good
faith and merely for recording purposes; done in the
performance of respondents' official duties; and based
on personal knowledge of what actually transpired.
Cariaga filed a petition for review before the Office of
the Regional State Prosecutor (ORSP) but affirmed the
OPP's ruling. The ORSP pointed out that Acosta's mere

authentication of the photocopies of the blotter entries
cannot be equated to issuing a false certification so as
to indict her of such crime.
HELD:
NO. The court affirmed the ORSP ruling that the mere
act of authenticating photocopies of the blotter entries
cannot be equated to committing the crime of False
Certification under the law. Hence, the ORSP correctly
found no probable cause to indict respondents of the
said crimes.
January 14, 2018 – Article 175 – USING FALSE
CERTIFICATES
PACQUIAO, Jose Luis P.
NEGROS MERCHANTS ENTERPRISES INC. VS.
CHINA BANKING CORPORATION
GR NO. 150918 (AUGUST 17, 2007)
ISSUE:
Whether or not the complaint should be dismissed
because of using a false and unauthorized certificate
FACTS:
Petitioner NMEI, through its President and General
Manager, Jacinto Tan Jr., applied for an P8 million
Credit Accommodation with respondent CBC. The loan
was secured by a real estate mortgage over its
properties. Subsequently, NMEI, through Tan, applied
for an additional Case-to-Case Loan. Both loans were
respectively paid in 1996.
Petitioner NMEI re-availed the P8M credit line and
failed to settle the obligation. The latter, through its
counsel Atty. Diaz, sent two letters to respondent
requesting a detailed statement of account and to hold
in abeyance any legal action. The latter replied that said
statement could not be released without proper board
resolution or authorization. The petitioner’s properties
were extrajudicially foreclosed and sold in public
auction, with respondent as the highest bidder.
Petitioner filed a Complaint for Annulment of
Foreclosure Sale with Damages and Preliminary
Injunction. Respondent CBC moved to dismiss the
same on the ground that petitioner failed to show by
clear and convincing evidence that it is entitled to the
relief sought in the complaint. The RTC of Bacolod
denied respondents Motion to Dismiss. Petitioner later
filed an Amended Complaint impleading Tan and his
spouse, Corazon Tan, as well as respondents Bacolod
Branch Manager Ainalea Cortez. Respondent again
sought to dismiss the amended complaint for failure to
state cause of action and for failure to comply with the
rules on non-forum shopping.
In the CA, it held that the Amended Complaint should
have been dismissed because the accompanying
certification against forum shopping which was signed
by petitioner's corporate secretary, Amelito Lizares,
was defective, for lack of authorization from the board
of directors.
HELD:
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Yes. In the instant case, Lizares was not authorized to
file the complaint for and in behalf of petitioner
corporation. Thus, the complaint is not deemed filed
by the proper party in interest and should be
dismissed. There was no allegation that petitioner
NMEI, through a board resolution, authorized Lizares
to execute the verification and certification of non-
forum shopping. Moreover, no such board resolution
was appended to the complaint or amended
complaint.
In Tamondong v. CA, it was held that if a complaint is
filed for and in behalf of the plaintiff who is not
authorized to do so, the complaint is not deemed filed.
An unauthorized complaint does not produce any legal
effect. Hence, the court should dismiss the complaint
on the ground that it has no jurisdiction over the
complaint and the plaintiff.
January 15, 2018 – Article 176 – MANUFACTURING
AND POSSESSION OF INSTRUMENTS OR
IMPLEMENTS FOR FALSIFICATION
PACQUIAO, Jose Paolo P.
US VS. ANGELES
6 PHIL. 435 (SEPTEMBER 11, 1906)
ISSUE:
Whether or not Angeles is liable under Article 176 of
the Revised Penal Code
FACTS:
The evidence is sufficient to show that the defendant
Modesto Angeles, manufactured a seal in imitation of
the seal of the municipality of Lipa, in the Province of
Batangas, for the purpose of using it in the making of
false certificates of the transfer by him of live stock.
HELD:
YES. A person who manufactured a seal in imitation of
the seal of Lipa, Batangas, for making false certificates
for the transfer of livestock, is guilty of making
instrument for falsification of certificates. The
falsification of one of these documents is punished, as
we have just held in the case of the United States v.
Florentino Sayson 1 (4 Off. Gaz., 572).
PEOPLE VS. MAGPALE
G.R. NO. L-46656 (JUNE 26, 1940)
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court erred in applying article 176
of RPC
FACTS:
A criminal complaint was lodged against Felipe
Magpale in the justice of the peace court of San Jose,
Province of Nueva Ecija, charging him with a violation
of Article 176. That, on or about the 25th day of March,
1938, in the municipality of San Jose, Nueva Ecija,
Philippine Islands, and within the jurisdiction of this
court, the above-named accused did then and there
willfully, feloniously, knowingly and without lawful

purpose, have in his possession, custody and control
one brand of the municipal government of San Jose,
Nueva Ecija, to wit: ,with the intent of using it for
falsifying the official brand of the said municipality of
San Jose, Nueva Ecija, in public documents, to wit:
Certificate of Ownership of Large Cattle. All contrary to
law.
HELD:
NO. Article 176 of the Revised Penal Code provides as
follows:
ART. 176. Manufacturing and possession of
instruments or implements for falsification. — The
penalty of prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods and a fine not to exceed 10,000
pesos shall be imposed upon any person who shall
make or introduce into the Philippine Islands any
stamps, dies, marks, or other instruments or
implemented intended to be used in the commission
of the offenses of counterfeiting or falsification
mentioned in the preceding sections of this chapter.
Appellant himself admits that the ordered the
questioned iron brand to be made, wherefore, he is
criminally liable for the making thereof. (Article 176,
Revised Penal Code.) It also appears that the said brand
is an exact imitation of that owned and used by the
municipality of San Jose, Nueva Ecija, to brand its own
large cattle and to counterbrand large cattle belonging
to its inhabitants.
January 16, 2018 – Article 177 – USURPATION OF
AUTHORITY OR OFFICIAL FUNCTIONS
PANIZA, Lyndzelle Jane D.
PEOPLE VS. HILVANO
G.R. No. L-8583. July 31, 1956
BENGZON, J.:
ISSUE:
Whether or not Hilvano, a public officer, be held liable
for the crime of usurpation of authority or official
functions under Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code.
FACTS:
Francisco Hilvano, the councilor of the municipality of
Villareal, Samar, acted in place of the Mayor of said
municipality as he was designated by the latter when
the latter departed for Manila on official business. Vice-
Mayor Juan Latorre then served written notices to the
Municipal Councilors, including Hilvano, that he was
assuming the duties of the absent Mayor. When
Hilvano refused invoking that he was designated by
the Mayor, Vice-Mayor sent a telegram to the
Executive Secretary informing such controversy. The
latter replied by letter, that under sec. 2195 of the
Revised Administrative Code it was the Vice-Mayor
who should discharge the duties of the Mayor during
the latter’s temporary absence. Vice-Mayor also
sought the opinion of the Provincial Fiscal who also
had the same view with the Executive Secretary. Shown
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these official pronouncements, Hilvano still refused to
surrender the position and held it for about a month;
appointed some policemen, solemnized marriages,
and received the salary for mayor.
Hilvano was charged with usurpation of authority and
official functions under Article 177 of the R.P.C. On his
appeal, Hilvano contended that he committed no
usurpation of authority because he was a public officer
and that such crime may only be committed by private
individuals.
HELD:
Yes, Hilvano, a public officer, was liable for the crime of
usurpation of authority and official functions.
There was actually no reason to restrict the operation
of Article 177 to private individuals. For one thing it
applies to “any person”; and where the law does not
distinguish, the court should not distinguish.
Furthermore, contrary to Hilvano’s assumption that
Articles 238-241 of the Revised Penal Code penalize all
kinds of usurpation of official functions by public
officers, said articles merely punish interference by
officers of one of the three departments of
government (legislative, executive and judicial) with
the functions of officials of another department. Said
articles do not cover usurpation of one officer or
employee of a given department of the powers of
another officer in the same department.
There was no excuse for Hilvano. In the beginning he
might have pleaded good faith, invoking the
designation by the Mayor; but after he had been
shown the letter of the Executive Secretary and the
opinion of the provincial fiscal, he had no right
thereafter stubbornly to stick to the position.
PEOPLE VS. LIDRES
G.R. No. L-12495, July 26, 1960
BARRERA, J.:
ISSUE:
Whether or not Lidres was guilty of Usurpation of
Official Functions under Republic Act No. 10.
FACTS:
Joseta Diotay and Dionisio Lidres filed an application
as a substitute teacher of the second grade class of
Biasong Elementary School when Echavez, the original
teacher of said class, filed and granted a maternity
leave.
Diotay was appointed as a substitute teacher and
began teaching. However, before the said
appointment, Diotay was requested by the supervising
teacher to sign an agreement to take over Echavez'
position on a "50-50" basis, that is, the period from
January to March, 1954 would be equally divided
between her and Lidres.

On the strength of the agreement, Lidres, armed with
a prepared letter of resignation for the signature of
Diotay, appeared at the school and asked Diotay to
sign it but the former refused. Despite the refusal of
Diotay, Lidres took over her class.
Accordingly, Lidres was charged with the crime of
usurpation of official function with deliberate intent
and without pretense of official position under
Republic Act No. 10
HELD:
No. Republic Act 10 was intended as an emergency
measure, to cope with the abnormal situation created
by the subversive activities of seditious organizations
at the time of its passage in September, 1946. Hence,
the elimination of the element of pretense of official
position required under Article 177 of the Revised
Penal Code, and the elevation of the penalty
from prision correccional in its minimum and medium
periods to not less 2 years nor more than 10 years. And
since it was neither alleged in the information nor
proved during the trial that Lidres was a member of
said seditious organizations engaged in subversive
activities, he could not be held liable or found guilty
under Republic Act. No. 10.
Granting, arguendo, that Republic Act No. 10 was an
amendment to Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code
and not merely an implementation thereof or an
emergency measure as stated, the subsequent
enactment of Republic Act No. 379 effective June 14,
1949, would constitute an amendment thereof by
restoring the element of pretense of official position in
the offense of usurpation of official functions, originally
required by Article 177 prior to its amendment by the
latter Act. Under Republic Act No. 379 then, the law in
force at the time of the commission of the alleged
offense by Lidres, pretense of official position was an
essential element of the crime of usurpation of official
functions. But the information specifically charges that
Lidres committed the offense "without pretense of
official position". Under circumstances, the facts
alleged in the information failed to constitute an
offense. Neither can defendant be convicted of
usurpation of authority, as distinguished from
usurpation of official functions, under the first
paragraph of Article 177, as amended by said Republic
Act No. 379, namely, that of representing to be an
officer, agent, or representative of any department or
agency of the Philippine Government or of any foreign
government, inasmuch as the information does not
charged the same.
RUZOL vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. Nos. 186739-960, April 17, 2013
VELASCO, JR., J.:
ISSUE:
Whether Ruzol was guilty of Usurpation of Official
Functions.
FACTS:
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Leovegildo R. Ruzol, the Municipal Mayor of General
Nakar, Quezon, was accused of usurpation of official
functions for issuing 221 Permits to Transport salvaged
forest products under the alleged “pretense of official
position and without being lawfully entitled to do so”,
since such authority, as ruled by the Sandiganbayan,
belonged solely to the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources.
HELD:
No. The DENR is not the sole government agency
vested with the authority to issue permits relevant to
the transportation of salvaged forest products,
considering that, pursuant to the general welfare
clause, LGUs may also exercise such authority. Also, as
can be gleaned from the records, the permits to
transport were meant to complement and not to
replace the Wood Recovery Permit issued by the DENR.
In effect, Ruzol required the issuance of the subject
permits under his authority as municipal mayor and
independently of the official functions granted to the
DENR. The records were likewise bereft of any showing
that Ruzol made representations or false pretenses
that said permits could be used in lieu of, or at the least
as an excuse not to obtain, the Wood Recovery Permit
from the DENR.
January 17, 2018 – Article 178 – USING FICTITIOUS
NAME AND CONCEALING TRUE NAME
RIVERA, Marynit P.
US v. TO LEE PIU
G.R. No. 11522, September 26, 1916
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused should be convicted of the
crime of using a false name
FACTS:
The appellant To Lee Piu was charged with using a false
name. He came to the Philippine Islands in 1911 and
presented a section six certificate wherein his name
appears to be To Lee Piu. Thereafter, he attached to an
application for a passport the name Toribio Jalijali. Said
application was accompanied by the affidavits of two
witnesses and by a baptismal certificate showing that a
person by that name was born in the Philippine Islands
in 1878. On the trial there was no denial of the fact that
appellant signed the name Toribio Jalijali to the
application for a passport. According to the defendant,
he was born in the Philippine Islands as Toribio Jalijali.
He went to China at an early age. Feeling doubtful as
to his ability to prove his right to reenter, he applied to
the American consul at Canton for a section six
certificate. On such application, he stated that his name
was Toribio Jalijali. Upon being told by the clerk of the
consulate that it was not necessary to put his surname
in such application, he wrote therein the Christian
name Toribio alone. The charge is prosecuted on the
theory that To Lee Piu is the appellant's correct name
and that the name Toribio Jalijali is false.

HELD:
Yes. It is established beyond reasonable doubt that the
appellant used the name of another person for the
purpose of deceiving Government and, by that
deception, to obtain a passport. He came to the
Philippine Islands as a Chinese person traveling for
curiosity and pleasure. He so represented himself to
the American consul at Canton and, by that
representation, obtained a section six certificate. In his
application for that certificate he stated that he was a
Chinese person, and that his name was To Lee Piu .He
came to the Philippine Islands upon those
representations; and, by virtue of the certificate
obtained thereby, was permitted to enter the country.
Desiring to return to China, or travel in other parts of
the world and, at the same time, be permitted to return
to the Philippine Islands at will, he sought to obtain a
passport as a citizen of the Philippine Islands under the
sovereignty of the United States. In order to
accomplish his purpose it was necessary for him to
show to the authorities of the Philippine Islands issuing
passport that he was in fact a citizen of the Philippine
Islands and as such entitled to a passport. He
thereupon took unto himself a Filipino name, one not
his own, and made his application for a passport
attaching to his application the name Toribio Jalijali.
ONG HOCK LIAN alias JULIAN ONG v. REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. L-21197, May 19, 1966
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ong Hock Lian is guilty of violating the
Anti-Alias Law
FACTS:
Ong Hock Lian alias Julian Ong, a citizen of the
Republic of China filed a petition for naturalization
pursuant to the Naturalization Law. The Solicitor
General appealed from the decision of the Court of
First Instance of which it granted the petition for
naturalization. Moreover, appellant contends that the
lower court erred in in not holding that appellee uses
an alias without court authority and in violation of the
Anti-Alias Law.
HELD:
Yes. Under the law, except as a pseudonym for literary
purposes, no person shall use any name different from
the one with which he was christened or by which he
has been known since childhood, or such substitute
name as may have been authorized by a competent
court (Section 1, Commonwealth Act 142). Aside from
the name "Ong Hock Lian," appellee is using the alias
"Julian Ong." There is no evidence that appellee has
been baptized with the latter name or that he has been
known by it since childhood, or that the court has
authorized the use thereof. Appellee has therefore
committed a violation of the Anti-Alias Law.
January 18, 2017 – Article 179 – ILLEGAL USE OF
UNIFORMS OR INSIGNIA
[NO CASE FOUND]
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January 18, 2018 – Article 180 – FALSE TESTIMONY
AGAINST A DEFENDANT
SALVERON, Jan Ione R.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS DIONISIO
MANEJA
G.R. NO. L-47684, JUNE 10, 1941
ISSUE:
From what date should the period of prescription be
computed for the crime of false testimony under article
180 of the Revised Penal Code?
FACTS:
This case was an appeal by Dionisio Maneja who was
accused of giving a false testimony in a criminal case
no. 1872 on December 16, 1933 as the lower court
held, or from the time the decision of the Court of
Appeals in the aforesaid case became final in
December 1938.
HELD:
The period of prescription shall commence to run from
the day on which final judgment is served in the
principal case. Considering that the penalties provided
therefor in article 180 of the Revised Penal Code are, in
every case, made to depend upon the conviction or
acquittal of the defendant in the principal case, the act
of testifying falsely does not therefore constitute an
actionable offense until the principal case is finally
decided. And before an act becomes a punishable
offense, it cannot possibly be discovered as such by the
offended party, the authorities or their agents.
January 19, 2018 – Article 181 – FALSE TESTIMONY
FAVORABLE TO THE ACCUSED
SANTOALLA, Stephanie M.
PEOPLE V. REYES
(C.A., 48 O.G. 1837)
ISSUE:
Whether or not the false testimony in favor of
defendant need not directly influence the decision of
acquittal.
FACTS:
The accused was the star witness in a prosecution for
robbery against Jemenia. Before the trial, the accused
executed an affidavit in which he manifested that he
was not interested in the prosecution of the case and
that he wanted to give the accused “a chance to earn
his living wisely and in the honest way.” The fiscal
refused to ask for the dismissal of the case. When the
case was called for trial, the accused who was asked to
identify Jemenia, testified that he could not remember
anymore the face of Jemenia. After further questions
failed to elicit other data, the case against Jemenia was
dismissed by the court, resulting in his acquittal.
HELD:
The contention of the defense that the acquittal of
Jemenia was due to the failure if the fiscal to call other

witnesses who could have properly identified Jemenia,
is irrelevant. It is not necessary that the testimony given
by the witness should directly influence the decision of
acquittal, it being sufficient that it was given with the
intent to favor the accused.
U.S. V. SOLIMAN
36 PHIL. 5
ISSUE:
Whether or not Soliman is guilty of violating Article 181
of the Revised Penal Code.
FACTS:
Soliman, testifying in his own behalf in the course of
another criminal case in which he, with several others,
was charged with estafa, swore falsely to certain
material allegations of fact. He testified falsely that a
sworn statement offered in evidence in support of the
charge of estafa, which was in effect an extrajudicial
confession of his guilt, had not been executed
voluntarily, and that its execution had not been
procured by the police by the use of force, intimidation
and prolonged torture.
HELD:
It must not be forgotten that the right of an accused
person to testify in his own behalf is secured to him,
not that he may be enabled to introduce false
testimony into the record, but to enable him to spread
upon the record the truth as to any matter within his
knowledge which will tend to establish his innocence.
January 21, 2018 – Article 182 – GIVING FALSE
TESTIMONY IN CIVIL CASES
TADO, Diann Kathelline A.
THE UNITED STATES vs. ISIDORO ARAGON
G.R. No. L-2709 December 28, 1905
ISSUE:
Whether the accused is guilty of giving false testimony
in a civil case
FACTS:
This was an action for the crime of giving false
testimony. Isidoro Aragon is accused of the crime of
false testimony in a civil case.
On February 23 1904, E.H Warner filed a complaint for
forcible entry and unlawful detainer against the tenants
of his estate. The accused was summoned as witness
to appear before the justice of the peace court of
manila, and after having been duly sworn, testified that
he does not remember or have no recollection of
forcible entry or detainer suits on the Pasay or Pineda
Estate prior to the four last years.
It was alleged that all his statements are absolutely
false, and are essential to the case at issue as they were
made. He well knew that at that time there were
brought in the justice of the peace court at Pineda
when he was filing that office many actions for forcible
entry and detainer, instituted by Agustin J. Montilla
against tenants of the estate.He received an order from
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the CFI asking for a list of forcible entry and detainer
actions and the accused himself signed three lists
which was forwarded to the CFI, among other orders
of the CFI to the accused.
HELD:
During the examination of the defendant as a witness
in the cause in which it is alleged he gave false
testimony he was asked certain questions with
reference to the existence of certain facts. His answers
invariably were that he did not remember, or that he
had no recollection concerning those facts. His answers
invariably were that he did not remember, or that he
had no recollection concerning those facts. The
prosecuting attorney proved the existence of the facts
with reference to which the defendant was questioned,
but failed to prove that the statements of the
defendant with reference to those facts were false. The
mere fact that the defendant had had to do in the year
1896 with certain facts and relations was not sufficient
to prove that he stated a falsehood when he stated in
December, 1904, that he had "no recollection with
reference to such facts or relations." The evidence
adduced during the trial fails, in our judgment, to show
that the defendant testified falsely or gave false
testimony as was charged in the complaint.
In order that a defendant may be convicted under
article 321 of the Penal Code for giving false testimony,
the following facts must be shown:
First. The testimony must be given in a civil cause.
Second. The testimony must relate to the issues
presented in said cause.
Third. The testimony must be false.
Fourth. The false testimony must be given by the
defendant knowing the same to be false.
Fifth. Such testimony must be malicious and given with
an intent to affect the issues presented in said cause.
The evidence adduced during the trial of this case is
not sufficient to show that the defendant committed
the crime charged in the complaint. The judgment of
the inferior court is therefore reversed and the said
cause is hereby ordered to be dismissed.
ARK TRAVEL EXPRESS, INC. vs. The Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Branch 150, HON. ZEUS ABROGAR, VIOLETA
BAGUIO and LORELEI IRA
[G.R. No. 137010. August 29, 2003]
ISSUE:
Whether Article 182 is violated
FACTS:
Ark Travel Express, Inc. (Ark Travel for brevity) filed with
the City Prosecutor of Makati a criminal complaint for
False Testimony in a Civil Case under Article 182 of the
Revised Penal Code against herein private respondents
Violeta Baguio and Lorelei Ira.
It was alleged that on or about the 19th day of
February, 1996, the accused gave false testimony upon

a material fact in Civil Case No. 95-1542, relative to a
complaint for Collection of sum of money, torts and
damages filed by Ark Travel Express, Inc. (Ark Inc. for
short) against New Filipino Maritime Agencies, Inc.
(NFMA, Inc. for short). During the trial of said civil case,
the accused testified under oath that the claims of ARK,
Inc. supported by a statements of accounts (Exhibit E
to GG) sent to and received by defendant-corporation
NFMA, Inc. is baseless and/or been paid, which
testimony as accused very well knew and ought to
know, by reason of accused's position as cashier, was
false inasmuch as the claim based on the statement of
accounts of ARK, Inc. are, in truth and in fact, valid, legal
and unpaid accounts of NFMA, Inc. with ARK Travel
Inc., herein represented by private complainant MA.
PAZ ALBERTO, to the damage and prejudice of the
latter.
HELD:
To constitute the crime of False Testimony in a Civil
Case under Article 182 of the Revised Penal Code, the
following requisites must concur:
1. The testimony must be given in a civil case;
2. The testimony must relate to the issues presented in
the case;
3. The testimony is false;
4. The false testimony must be given by the defendant
knowing the same to be false; and
5. Such testimony must be malicious and given with
and intent to affect the issues presented in the case.
There is no doubt that the first two requisites are extant
in this case. The records show that Ark Travel filed a
complaint for collection of sum of money, torts and
damages against New Filipino Maritime Agencies, Inc.
(NFMAI) and Angelina T. Rivera with the Regional Trial
Court of Makati (Branch 137). In said civil case, private
respondents were presented by NFMAI as witnesses.
They executed their respective sworn statements and
testified before the trial court that NFMAI has no
outstanding obligation with Ark Travel as the same had
been paid in full.
The existence of the last three requisites is quite
dubious. The falsity of the subject testimonies of
private respondents is yet to be established. It is noted
that at the time of the filing of the criminal complaints,
the civil case filed by Ark Travel is still pending decision.
Ark Travel has yet to prove the validity of its monetary
claims and damages against NFMAI. It is only after trial
that the RTC can assess the veracity or falsity of the
testimony and correspondingly render a decision.
Thus, the civil case is so intimately connected with the
subject crime that it is determinative of the guilt or
innocence of the respondents in the criminal cases. In
other words, whether or not the testimonies of private
respondents in the civil cases are false is a prejudicial
question.
January 22, 2018 – Article 183 – FALSE TESTIMONY
IN OTHER CASES AND PERJURY IN SOLEMN
AFFIRMATION
UNAS, Nor-Aiza R.
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US V. JURADO
(31 Phil 491)
ISSUE:
Whether or not Jurado committed the crime of perjury.
FACTS:
On July 9, 1913, the acting provincial fiscal of Cebu,
Dionisio Jacosalem, proceeded to investigate the
matter of the robbery of some tins of opium,
committed in the house of Francisco Jurado by
Alejandro Albao, a municipal policeman, through
threats and intimidation and by availing himself of his
office. This opium belonged to Vicente Lizarraga who
had taken it to the said house to sell it to some
residents of the town. Lizarraga, the owner of the drug,
stated that Francisco Jurado was present, among
others, at the time of the robbery; but when Jurado was
called to testify as an eyewitness to the crime he denied
that he was at home on the night of the robbery, as he
was then in a cinematograph with his family. He further
testified that he did not know either Vicente Lizarraga
or Alejandro Albao. Such was his testimony given
under oath before the provincial fiscal Jacosalem, but
in the proceedings brought against Ciriaco Singson for
robbery, commenced on September 24,1913, Jurado,
testifying as a witness for the defense, stated under
oath that he had known Vicente Lizarraga since the
month of June, 1913, and that he was already
acquainted with Alejandro Albao on the date of the
crime.
In order that a witness, in testifying under oath before
a public official authorized to administer same commit
the crime of perjury and incur the penalty prescribed
by section 3 of Act No. 1697, it is necessary and
indispensable that he testify to and.declare under oath
with regard to some material matter which he does not
believe to be true, or that such false testimony tend to
establish something which conflicts with the truth of an
essential or important fact which has been proven by
the evidence; because, if the false testimony of the
witness is not important, essential, or material to the
principal matter under investigation, it can not
properly be held that the crime of perjury has been
committed.
RULING:
No. The principal object of the investigation was to find
out whether Alejandro Albao had actually been in
Jurado's house where Lizarraga was that night with
several tins of opium for sale, and whether on that
occasion Albao, availing himself of his office of
municipal policeman, by intimidation with a revolver,
succeeded in compelling Lizarraga to deliver to him the
tins of opium which Lizarraga was carrying and which
Albao seized, took away with him and appropriated to
himself, and which have not yet been recovered.
Jurado, the owner of the house where the robbery was
committed, testified that he learned from Isabelo
Alburo that Lizarraga had in fact been in the house with
tins of opium for sale, but that witness did not see them

because he was that night in the cinematograph with
his family. This testimony is not contradicted by any
evidence in the record. For lack of sufficient proof of
the falsity of that statement by the owner of the house,
the defendant Jurado, for it was not proven that it was
false and, as he certainly was in his own house on the
said night of the robbery, it cannot be held that, in
testifying as he did, he perjured himself.
January 23, 2018 – Article 184 – OFFERING FALSE
TESTIMONY IN EVIDENCE
VILLAHERMOSA, Alexand Rhea M.
SORIANO VS. CABAIS
( GR NO. 157175, June 21, 2007)
ISSUE:
Whether or not perjury was committed under article
184?
FACTS:
Hilario P. Soriano, petitioner, is the President of the
Rural Bank of San Miguel, Inc. (RBSM). On the other
hand, Zenaida A. Cabais, respondent, is the comptroller
designated by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) to
oversee the bank’s operations.
Eventually, the RBSM was closed and placed under
receivership by the BSP. Thereupon, petitioner filed
with the Court of Appeals a petition for review. In the
course of the proceedings, respondent executed two
affidavits stating that:
13. About a week before RBSM declared a "bank
holiday" on January 4, 2000, RBSM on December 27,
1999 and December 29, 1999, paid Forcecollect
Professional Solution, Inc. and Surecollect Professional
Solution, Inc., entities owned/controlled by Mr. Soriano
and other RBSM officers (Annexes "14" and "15")
P5.300 million and P5.750 million (Annexes "16" and
"17"), respectively, without any supporting documents,
as payment of 25% collection fee;2 x x x (Affidavit
dated February 17, 2000)
8. RBSM paid Manager Check Nos. 0000040071 and
0000040079 in cash on December 27 and 29, 1999,
respectively, as evidenced by the attached Debit
Advances of even dates (Annexes "1-B" and "2-B"
respectively).3 x x x (Affidavit dated March 22, 2000)
On April 6, 2000, petitioner filed with the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Manila a complaint for perjury
defined and penalized by Articles 183 and 184 of the
Revised Penal Code against respondent. Petitioner
alleged that respondent committed perjury by
narrating false statements in her affidavits.
HELD:
The petition lacks merit.
The fact of issuance and payment by RBSM of said
checks to Forcecollect and Surecollect is furthermore
bolstered by the Certifications issued by RBSM
Accountant, Narciso Adriano (p. 39), RBSM Branch
Accountant for Plaridel, Carmina Capule (p. 40), and
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PDIC’s Assisting Deputy Receiver, Mauricia
Manzanares (p. 41).
It can be gleaned from the foregoing that the
averments of respondent in her subject Affidavits are
true. Nevertheless, granting for the sake of argument
that the statements of respondent in her Affidavits are
false, still, there exists no reasonable ground to indict
her under Articles 183 and 184 of the Revised Penal
Code. It bears stressing that one element of perjury is
a willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood. Such
element is absent in the instant case. Respondent’s
contention that said Manager’s Checks were issued
and paid by RBSM to Forcecollect and Surecollect, are
duly supported by RBSM records which she has
perused and examined in her capacity as duly
designated BSP Comptroller for RBSM. Thus,
respondent believes in good faith that what she
mentioned in her Affidavits are true. It must be noted
that good faith is a defense in perjury (People of the
Philippines v. Abaya, 74 Phil. 59). For the same reasons,
respondent cannot likewise be prosecuted under
Article 184 of the Revised Penal Code.
January 24, 2018 – Article 185 – MACHINATION IN
PUBLIC AUCTIONS
VILLARIN, Paulo Jose S.
VICENTE DIAZ VS. RUPERTO KAPUNAN
DECEMBER 8, 1923
ISSUE:
Whether or not attorney Kapunan Violate Article 542
of the Penal Code(Now Article 185 of the Revised Penal
Code).
FACTS:
Vicente Diaz and Secundino de Mendezona formed a
partnership and entered into extensive business
transactions in the Province of Leyte. The capital of the
partnership was P380,000. Unfortunately, however, the
business failed to prosper, with the result that on
liquidation, it was found to have suffered a loss of
P67,000. When Diaz and Mendezona came to settle up
their affairs, they eventually formulated a document of
sale and mortgage in which Mendezona recognized a
debt in favor of Diaz in the sum of P80,000 and an
additional sum of P10,000 owing to Diaz, laid upon the
hacienda "Mapuyo," and to be paid within the term of
one year. When the year had expired Mendezona was
not to be found and his family was unable to meet the
payment. There followed the usual proceedings for
foreclosure and sale, which, after considerable delay,
resulted in the hacienda's being offered for sale at
public auction.
At the time fixed for the sale, December 23, 1922, there
appeared Vicente Diaz, accompanied by his lawyer
Emilio Benitez, and Attorney Ruperto Kapunan. Luis
Velarde, the deputy sheriff of Leyte, is authority for the
statement that Kapunan told him that he, Kapunan,
was ready to bid on the property up to P16,000 in order
to assist the Mendezona family which was in financial
straits. At any rate, the bidding was opened by

Kapunan offering P12,000 for the property and with
Diaz and Kapunan raising the bids until finally Diaz
offered P12,500. There the bids stopped on account of
Diaz and Kapunan entering into the agreement, of
decisive importance, which we next quote in full:
We, Vicente Diaz and Ruperto Kapunan, both being the
bidders at the auction held for the sale of the
properties of Secundino Mendezona, do hereby
agreed that Don Ruperto Kapunan should withdraw his
bid and refrain from bidding at the said auction as he
does hereby withdraw his bid, and in consideration
thereof, the said Mr. Diaz offers him a premium of one
thousand pesos (P1,000) which, out of consideration to
said Don Vicente Diaz, Mr. Kapunan accepts and has,
for this reason, refrained from bidding in competition
with said Mr. Diaz.
Following the termination of the sheriff's sale, Diaz on
December 26, 1922, gave Kapunan P500 of the P1,000
mentioned in the above quoted document. Diaz
further followed the usual procedure to take over the
property of Mendezona pursuant to his bid of P12,500,
which covered the amount of the mortgage with its
accumulated interest and with the judicial expenses.
RULING:
YES. Article 542 punishes "any person who shall solicit
any gift or promise as a consideration for agreeing to
refrain from taking part in any public auction." The
crime is consummated by the mere act of soliciting a
gift or promise for the purpose of abstaining from
taking part in the auction. Not permitting our minds to
be confused by the varied explanations of Diaz and
Kapunan, the document formulated by them and
hereinbefore quoted, demonstrates that Kapunan, on
the promise of Diaz to pay P1,000, refrained from
further participation in the sale of the property of
Mendezona, which is exactly the situation covered by
article 542 of the Penal Code.
Public policy discountenances combinations or
agreements on the part of bidders at execution sales,
the objects and effects of which are to stifle
competition. The courts will consider an agreement
between a judgment creditor and one claiming an
interest in the thing about to be sold under an
execution, that neither shall bid against the other, as
void, unless all parties concerned know of the
arrangement and consent thereto. Execution sales
should be open to free and full competition, in order
to secure the maximum benefit for the debtor. Article
542 of the Penal Code is, therefore, a wise provision
even though rarely invoked, and should be used to
discourage the stifling of bids at judicial sales.
PATERNO OUANO
VS.
COURT OF APPEALS AND FRANCISCO ECHAVEZ
GR No. L-40203 August 21, 1990
ISSUE:
Whether Ouano committed machinations in public
auction punishable under the Article 185 of the Revised
Penal Code.
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FACTS:
The appellate proceedings at bar treat of a parcel of
land registered under RFC (DBP). Said property was
offered for bidding for the second time because the
first bidding was nullified due to Ouano’s protest. It
appears that prior to the second bidding, Ouano and
Echavez orally agreed that only Echavez would make a
bid, and that if it was accepted, they would divide the
property in proportion to their adjoining properties. To
ensure success of their enterprise, they also agreed to
induce the only other party known to be interested in
the property-a group headed by a Mrs. Bonsucan to
desist from presenting a bid. They broached the matter
to Mrs. Bonsucan's group. The latter agreed to
withdraw, as it did in fact withdraw from the sale; and
Ouano's wife paid it P2,000 as reimbursement for its
expenses.
RULING:
YES. These acts constitute a crime, as the Trial Court
has stressed. Ouano and Echavez had promised to
share in the property in question as a consideration for
Ouano's refraining from taking part in the public
auction, and they had attempted to cause and in fact
succeeded in causing another bidder to stay away from
the auction. in order to cause reduction of the price of
the property auctioned In so doing, they committed
the felony of machinations in public auctions defined
and penalized in Article 185 of the Revised Penal Code
That both Ouano and Echavez did these acts is a matter
of record, as is the fact that thereby only one bid that
of Echavez was entered for the 'land in consequence of
which Echavez eventually acquired it. The agreement
therefore being criminal in character, the parties not
only have no action against each other but are both
liable to prosecution and the things and price of their
agreement subject to disposal according to the
provisions of the criminal code. This, in accordance
with the so-called pari delicto principle set out in the
Civil Code.
January 25, 2018 – Article 186 – MONOPOLIES AND
COMBINATIONS IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE
VOSOTROS, Jules Andre B.
THE UNITED STATES v. CANDIDO FULGUERAS
G.R. No. 2176
April 18, 1905
ISSUE:
Whether or not Fulgueras committed the acts as
mentioned under article 186 of the revised penal code
on monopolies and combinations in restraint of trade
FACTS:
In the months of March to July, 1904, Fulgueras
attributed to himself a supernatural power pretending
to hold a commission from a powerful chief in Manila.
He went about distributing papers and proclamations
to the people of Oroquieta, Province of Cagayan de
Misamis, spreading subversive and fanatical ideas, and
with orders from his alleged chief to lower the prices

of needful commodities and to reform the customs
otherwise they would be under the penalty of being
visited with flood and calamities.
By these machinations and deceits the defendant
succeeded in deceiving ignorant people and causing
them to provide themselves with instruments of
measure larger than they formerly had and different
from the regular size and also succeeded in making
them lower the prices of commodities of everyday life,
all with violation of law.
HELD:
Yes. The court held in this case that this spreading of
false rumors or making use of any other artifice to
restrain free competition in the market constitutes the
acts as mentioned under Article 186 of the Revised
Penal Code.
The court found all these charges well proven and
sentenced the defendant to the penalty of six months’
arresto mayor and to pay a fine of 5,000 pesetas, in
accordance with the provisions of article 544 of the
Penal Code (now Article 186 of the RPC).
January 26, 2018 – Article 187– IMPORTATION AND
DISPOSITION OF FALSELY MARKED ARTICLES OR
MECHANDISE MADE OF GOLD, SILVER, OTHER
PRECIOUS METALS OR THEIR ALLOYS
DOSDOS, Xicilli Krishna P.
[NO CASE FOUND]
January 26, 2018 – Article 188 – INFRINGEMENT - RA
8293 (SUBSTITUTED FOR ART. 188 OF THE RPC)
CEBALLOS, Jesus C.
GSELL v. YAP-JUE
G.R. No. 4720, Jan. 19, 1909
ISSUE:
Whether or not Yap-Jue infringed on the patent of
Gsell.
FACTS:
Gsell obtained a patent for manufacturing canes and
umbrellas with a curved handle by means of a lamp or
blowpipe fed with mineral oil or petroleum. Yap-Jue
made similar products using the same process but
instead of using “a lamp or blowpipe fed with mineral
oil or petroleum,” he used a lamp fed with alcohol.
HELD:
Yes, he did. The Court held that alcohol is an equivalent
or substitute for mineral oil or petroleum, in
connection with blast lamps or blowpipes. It is a well-
known fact at the time when the patent was issued to
Gsell. The use of a blast lamp or blowpipe fed with
petroleum or mineral oil, rather than one fed with
alcohol, is an unessential part of the patented process
the use of which was prohibited by the court in a prior
proceeding.
The Doctrine of “Mechanical Equivalents” provides that
the inventor of an ordinary machine is protected
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against all mere formal alterations and against the
substitution of mere mechanical equivalents. It
protects the patentee from colorable invasions of his
patent under the guise of substitution of some part of
his invention by some well-known mechanical
equivalent.
Human ingenuity would be taxed beyond its powers in
preparing a grant of a patent so comprehensive in its
terms, "as to include within the express terms of its
detailed description every possible alternative of form,
size, shape, material, location, color, weight, etc., of
every wheel, rod, bolt, nut, screw, plate, and other
component parts of an invention."
ASIA BREWERY, INC. V. CA AND SAN MIGUEL
CORP
GR NO. 104533 JULY 5, 1993
FIRST ISSUE:
Does ABI's BEER PALE PILSEN label or "design" infringe
upon SMC's SAN MIGUEL PALE PILSEN WITH
RECTANGULAR MALT AND HOPS DESIGN?
HELD:
NO. On the other hand, the dominant feature of ABI's
trademark is the name: BEER PALE PILSEN, with the
word "Beer" written in large amber letters, larger than
any of the letters found in the SMC label.
The trial court perceptively observed that the word
"BEER" does not appear in SMC's trademark, just as the
words "SAN MIGUEL" do not appear in ABI's
trademark. Hence, there is absolutely no similarity in
the dominant features of both trademarks.
Neither in sound, spelling or appearance can BEER
PALE PILSEN be said to be confusingly similar to SAN
MIGUEL PALE PILSEN. No one who purchases BEER
PALE PILSEN can possibly be deceived that it is SAN
MIGUEL PALE PILSEN. No evidence whatsoever was
presented by SMC proving otherwise
Besides the dissimilarity in their names, the following
other dissimilarities in the trade dress or appearance of
the competing products abound:
(1) The SAN MIGUEL PALE PILSEN bottle has a slender
tapered neck. The BEER PALE PILSEN bottle has a fat,
bulging neck.
(2) The words "pale pilsen" on SMC's label are printed
in bold and laced letters along a diagonal band,
whereas the words "pale pilsen" on ABI's bottle are half
the size and printed in slender block letters on a
straight horizontal band. (See Exhibit "8-a".).
(3) The names of the manufacturers are prominently
printed on their respective bottles. SAN MIGUEL PALE
PILSEN is "Bottled by the San Miguel Brewery,
Philippines," whereas BEER PALE PILSEN is "Especially
brewed and bottled by Asia Brewery Incorporated,
Philippines."

(4) The SAN MIGUEL PALE PILSEN bottle cap is
stamped with a coat of arms and the words "San
Miguel Brewery Philippines" encircling the same.
The BEER PALE PILSEN bottle cap is stamped with the
name "BEER" in the center, surrounded by the words
"Asia Brewery Incorporated Philippines."
(5) On the back of ABI's bottle is printed in big, bold
letters, under a row of flower buds and leaves, its
copyrighted slogan:
"BEER NA BEER!"
Whereas SMC's bottle carries no slogan.
(6) The back of the SAN MIGUEL PALE PILSEN bottle
carries the SMC logo, whereas the BEER PALE PILSEN
bottle has no logo.
(7) Finally, there is a substantial price difference
between BEER PALE PILSEN (currently at P4.25 per
bottle) and SAN MIGUEL PALE PILSEN (currently at
P7.00 per bottle). One who pays only P4.25 for a bottle
of beer cannot expect to receive San Miguel Pale Pilsen
from the storekeeper or bartender.
Second Issue: whether ABI is passing off its BEER PALE
PILSEN as SMC's SAN MIGUEL PALE PILSEN.
HELD:
NO. The amber color is a functional feature of the beer
bottle. As pointed out by ABI, all bottled beer produced
in the Philippines is contained and sold in amber-
colored bottles because amber is the most effective
color in preventing transmission of light and provides
the maximum protection to beer.
As was ruled in California Crushed Fruit Corporation vs.
Taylor B. and Candy Co., 38 F2d 885, a merchant cannot
be enjoined from using a type or color of bottle where
the same has the useful purpose of protecting the
contents from the deleterious effects of light rays. That
the ABI bottle has a 320 ml. capacity is not due to a
desire to imitate SMC's bottle because that bottle
capacity is the standard prescribed under Metrication
Circular No. 778, dated 4 December 1979, of the
Department of Trade, Metric System Board. With
regard to the white label of both beer bottles, ABI
explained that it used the color white for its label
because white presents the strongest contrast to the
amber color of ABI's bottle; it is also the most
economical to use on labels, and the easiest to "bake"
in the furnace.
No one can have a monopoly of the color amber for
bottles, nor of white for labels, nor of the rectangular
shape which is the usual configuration of labels.
Needless to say, the shape of the bottle and of the label
is unimportant. What is all important is the name of the
product written on the label of the bottle for that is
how one beer may be distinguished form the others.
BIRKENSTOCK ORTHOPEADIE GMBH AND CO. KG
V. PHILIPPINE SHOE EXPO MARKETING CORP.
GR. NO. 194307 NOV. 20, 2013
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ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject marks should be allowed
registration in the name of Birkenstock.
FACTS:
Philippine Shoe Expo Marketing Corp. (PSEMC) was the
registered owner of the trademark “Birkenstock and
Device” since October 21, 1993 in the Philippines.
Birkenstock Orthopeadie GMBH and Co.
KG(Birkenstock), a German company, and has been
using “Birkenstock” since 1774 by its inventor, Johan
Birkenstock. In 1994, Birkenstock applied for trademark
registration of “Birkenstock” before the Intellectual
Property Office (IPO) in the Philippines. This was
opposed by PSEMC. During the pendency of the
registration proceedings, PSEMC failed to file the
required 10th Year Declaration of Actual Use (10th Year
DAU) for “Birkenstock and Device” on or before
October 21, 2004. Failure to file the 10th Year DAU
constitutes abandonment of the trademark and will
result in the automatic cancellation of the certificate of
registration.
The Bureau of Legal Affairs (BLA) found that the mark,
“Birkenstock”, of Birkenstock was not popular in the
Philippines and that PSEMC did not lose their right over
the mark for non-filing of the 10th Year DAU due to
their continued use of the product. The decision of the
BLA was reversed by the Director General of the IPO
(DG-IPO) citing that PSEMC’s failure to file the DAU.
The CA reversed the decision of the DG-IPO and
adopted the BLA’s ruling.
HELD:
The Supreme Court held in the affirmative. It affirmed
the decision of DG-IPO that non-filing of the DAU is an
automatic cancellation of the registration and
constitutes abandonment of the mark.
The SC also appreciated the evidence provided by
Birkenstock, though photocopies , that “Birkenstock” is
a popular mark in the world and thus entitled to
protection under Philippine Laws. It emphasized that
registration of a trademark, by itself, is not a mode of
acquiring ownership.1âwphi1 If the applicant is not the
owner of the trademark, he has no right to apply for its
registration. Registration merely creates a prima facie
presumption of the validity of the registration, of the
registrant’s ownership of the trademark, and of the
exclusive right to the use thereof. Such presumptionis
rebuttable and must give way to evidence to the
contrary. It is not the application or registration of a
trademark that vests ownership, but it is the ownership
of a trademark that confers the right to register the
same. A trademark is an industrial property over which
its owner is entitled to property rights which cannot be
appropriated by unscrupulous entities that, in one way
or another, happen to register such trademark ahead
of its true and lawful owner. The presumption of
ownership accorded to a registrant must then
necessarily yield to superior evidence of actual and real
ownership of a trademark.
The Court also finds that the registration of PSEMC of

the mark was in bad faith since it is very remote that
two persons did coin the same or identical marks. To
come up with a highly distinct and uncommon mark
previously appropriated by another, for use in the
same line of business, and without any plausible
explanation, is incredible. The field from which a
person may select a trademark is practically unlimited.
As in all other cases of colorable imitations, the
unanswered riddle is why, of the millions of terms and
combinations of letters and designs available,
[respondent] had to come up with a mark identical or
so closely similar to the [petitioner’s] if there was no
intent to take advantage of the goodwill generated by
the Birkenstock mark. Being on the same line of
business, it is highly probable that the PSEMC knew of
the existence of “BIRKENSTOCK” and its use by the
Birkenstock, before PSEMC appropriated the same
mark and had it registered in its name.
January 27, 2018 – Article 189 – INFRINGEMENT,
UNFAIR COMPETITION, FRAUDULENT
DESIGNATION OF ORIGIN, FALSE DESCRIPTION,
FRAUDULENT REGISTRATION.
FUENTES, Arczft Ran Z.
COFFEE PARTNERS, INC. V. SAN FRANCISCO
COFFEE ROASTERY, INC.
G.R. NO. 169504 MARCH 3, 2010
ISSUE:
Whether petitioners use of the trademark SAN
FRANCISCO COFFEE constitutes infringement of
respondent’s trade name SAN FRANCISCO COFFEE &
ROASTERY, INC.
FACTS:
Respondent San Francisco Coffee Roastery, Inc. is a
local corporation engaged in wholesale and retail sale
of coffee. It registered its business name SAN
FRANCISCO COFFEE & ROASTERY, INC. with the
Department of Trade and Industry in June 1995. On the
other hand, petitioner Coffee Partners, Inc. is a local
corporation engaged in the business of establishing
and maintaining coffee shops in the country. It
registered its name on January 2001 under a franchise
agreement with Coffee Partners Ltd., a business entity
established under British Virgin Islands to use CPL’s
designed trademarks like SAN FRANCISCO COFFEE. In
1998, respondent formed a joint venture agreement
with Boyd Coffee USA and later on embarked in setting
up coffee shops in malls and commercial
establishments around Metro Manila. In June 2001,
respondent discovered that petitioner was about to
open a coffee shop under the name SAN FRANCISCO
COFFEE in Libis, Quezon City. According to respondent,
petitioners shop caused confusion in the minds of the
public as it bore a similar name and it also engaged in
the business of selling coffee. Respondent sent a letter
to petitioner demanding that the latter stop using the
name SAN FRANCISCO COFFEE. Respondent also filed
a complaint with the Bureau of Legal Affairs-
Intellectual Property Office (BLA-IPO) for infringement
and/or unfair competition with claims for damages.
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HELD:
Yes. Petitioners SAN FRANCISCO COFFEE trademark is
clear infringement of respondent’s SAN FRANCISCO
COFFEE & ROASTERY, INC. trade name. The descriptive
words San Francisco Coffee are precisely the dominant
features of respondent’s trade name. Petitioner and
respondent are engaged in the same business of
selling coffee. Whether wholesale or retail. The
likelihood of confusion is higher in cases where the
business of one corporation is the same or
substantially the same as that of another corporation.
In this case, the consuming public will likely be
confused as to the source of the coffee being sold at
petitioner’s coffee shops. Respondent has acquired an
exclusive right to use of the trade name SAN
FRANCISCO COFFEE & ROASTERY, INC. since the
registration of the business name with the DTI in 1995.
Thus, respondent’s use of its trade name from then on
must be free from any infringement by similarity. Of
course, this does not mean that respondent has
exclusive use of the geographic word SAN FRANCISCO
or generic word COFFEE. Geographic or generic words
are not, per se, subject to exclusive appropriation. It is
only the combination of the words SAN FRANCISCO
COFFEE, which is respondent’s trade name in its coffee
business, that is protected against infringement on
matters related to the coffee business to avoid
confusing or deceiving the public.
DIAZ V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND LEVI
STRAUSS INC.
G.R. NO. 180677 FEBRUARY 18, 2013
ISSUE:
WON there was infringement of trademarks
committed by Diaz in this case.
FACTS:
Levi Strauss and Company (Levi’s), a foreign
corporation had been engaged in the apparel business.
It is the owner of trademarks and designs of Levi’s jeans
like LEVI’S 501, the arcuate design, the two-horse
brand, the two-horse patch, the two-horse patch with
pattern arcuate, and the composite tab arcuate. After
receiving information that Diaz was selling counterfeit
LEVI’S 501 jeans in his tailoring shops in Almanza and
Talon, Las Piñas City, Levi’s Philippines hired a private
investigation group to verify the information.
Surveillance and the purchase of jeans from the
tailoring shops of Diaz established that the jeans
bought from the tailoring shops of Diaz were
counterfeit or imitations of LEVI’S 501. Levi’s
Philippines then sought the assistance of the NBI for
purposes of applying for a search warrant against Diaz
to be served at his tailoring shops. NBI agents searched
the tailoring shops of Diaz and seized several fake
LEVI’S 501 jeans from them. Levi’s Philippines claimed
that it did not authorize the making and selling of the
seized jeans; that each of the jeans were mere
imitations of genuine LEVI’S 501 jeans by each of them
bearing the registered trademarks, like the arcuate
design, the tab, and the leather patch; and that the
seized jeans could be mistaken for original LEVI’S 501

jeans due to the placement of the arcuate, tab, and
two-horse leather patch.
In his defense, the accused interposed that he did not
manufacture Levi’s jeans, and that he used the label "LS
Jeans Tailoring" in the jeans that he made and sold;
that the label "LS Jeans Tailoring" was registered with
the Intellectual Property Office; that his shops received
clothes for sewing or repair; that his shops offered
made-to-order jeans, whose styles or designs were
done in accordance with instructions of the customers;
that since the time his shops began operating in 1992,
he had received no notice or warning regarding his
operations; that the jeans he produced were easily
recognizable because the label "LS Jeans Tailoring,"
and the names of the customers were placed inside the
pockets, and each of the jeans had an "LSJT" red tab;
that "LS" stood for "Latest Style;" and that the leather
patch on his jeans had two buffaloes, not two horses.
The RTC found him guilty of the said crime.
HELD:
No. Diaz used the trademark "LS JEANS TAILORING"
for the jeans he produced and sold in his tailoring
shops. His trademark was visually and aurally different
from the trademark "LEVI STRAUSS & CO" appearing
on the patch of original jeans under the trademark
LEVI’S 501. The word "LS" could not be confused as a
derivative from "LEVI STRAUSS" by virtue of the "LS"
being connected to the word "TAILORING", thereby
openly suggesting that the jeans bearing the
trademark "LS JEANS TAILORING" came or were
bought from the tailoring shops of Diaz, not from the
malls or boutiques selling original LEVI’S 501 jeans to
the consuming public.
The prosecution also alleged that the accused copied
the "two horse design" of the petitioner-private
complainant but the evidence will show that there was
no such design in the seized jeans. Instead, what is
shown is "buffalo design." Again, a horse and a buffalo
are two different animals which an ordinary customer
can easily distinguish.
The prosecution further alleged that the red tab was
copied by the accused. However, evidence will show
that the red tab used by the private complainant
indicates the word "LEVI’S" while that of the accused
indicates the letters "LSJT" which means LS JEANS
TAILORING. Again, even an ordinary customer can
distinguish the word LEVI’S from the letters LSJT.
DY V. PHILIPS ELECTRONICS
G.R. NO. 186088 MARCH 22, 2017
ISSUE:
Whether the registration of the trademark of PHILITES
will defraud and cause unfair competition and
infringement of trademark to PHILIPS.
FACTS:
On 12 April 2000, petitioner PHILITES filed a trademark
application covering its fluorescent bulb, incandescent
light, starter and ballast. After publication, respondent
Philips Electronics filed a Verified Notice of Opposition
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alleging that the registration of such will cause to
mislead the public as to the origin, nature, quality, and
characteristic of the goods on which it is affixed and it
is tantamount to fraud as it seeks to register and obtain
legal protection for an identical or confusingly similar
mark that clearly infringes upon the established rights
of PHILIPS over its registered and internationally well-
known mark.
HELD:
Yes. Applying the dominancy test in the instant case, it
shows the uncanny resemblance or confusing similarity
between the trademark applied for by respondent with
that of petitioner's registered trademark. An
examination of the trademarks shows that their
dominant or prevalent feature is the five-letter "PHILI",
"PHILIPS" for petitioner, and "PHILITES" for
respondent. The marks are confusingly similar with
each other such that an ordinary purchaser can
conclude an association or relation between the marks.
The consuming public does not have the luxury of time
to ruminate the phonetic sounds of the trademarks, to
find out which one has a short or long vowel sound. At
bottom, the letters "PHILI'' visually catch the attention
of the consuming public and the use of respondent's
trademark will likely deceive or cause confusion. Most
importantly, both trademarks are used in the sale of
the same goods, which are light bulbs.
Applying the holistic test, entails a consideration of the
entirety of the marks as applied to the products,
including the labels and packaging, in determining
confusing similarity. A comparison between
petitioner's registered trademark "PHILIPS'' as used in
the wrapper or packaging of its light bulbs and that of
respondent's applied for trademark "PHILITES" as
depicted in the container or actual wrapper/packaging
of the latter's light bulbs will readily show that there is
a strong similitude and likeness between the two
trademarks that will likely cause deception or
confusion to the purchasing public. The fact that the
parties' wrapper or packaging reflects negligible
differences considering the use of a slightly different
font and hue of the yellow is of no moment because
taken in their entirety, respondent's trademark
"PHILITES" will likely cause confusion or deception to
the ordinary purchaser with a modicum of intelligence.
 CRIMINAL LAW II | CASE DIGESTS

TITLE FIVE – CRIMES RELATIVE TO OPIUM Simon denied the accusation against him, claiming that
AND OTHER PROHIBITED DRUGS on the day of question, he was picked up by the police
at their house while watching TV. He was told that he
was a pusher so he attempted to alight from the jeep
January 28, 2018 – RA 6425 – CRIMES RELATED TO
but he was handcuffed instead. When they finally
OPIUM AND OTHER PROHIBITED DRUGS
reached the camp, he was ordered to sign some papers
DOSDOS, Xicilli Krishna P.
and, when he refused, he was boxed in the stomach
eight or nine times by Sgt. Pejoro. He was then
compelled to affix his signature and fingerprints on the
US VS AH SING
documents presented to him. He denied knowledge of
36 PHIL 978
the marked money or the 4 teabags of dried marijuana
leaves, and insisted that the marked money came from
ISSUE:
the pocket of Pejoro. Moreover, the reason why he
Whether or not accused Ah Sing is liable to illegal
vomited blood was because of the blows he suffered
importation of Opium.
at the hands of Pejoro.
FACTS:
Dr. Evelyn Gomez-Aguas, a resident physician of
Ah Sing is a fireman at the steamship Shun Chang, a
Romana Pangan District Hospital, declared that she
foreign vessel which arrived in the port of Cebu from
treated appellant for three days due to abdominal pain,
Saigon. He bought 8 cans of opium in Saigon, brought
but her examination revealed that the cause for this
them on board and had them in his possession during
ailment was appellant’s peptic ulcer. She did not see
the said trip. The 8 cans of opium were found in the
any sign of slight or serious external injury, abrasion or
ashes below the boiler of the steamer's engine by
contusion on his body.
authorities who made a search upon anchoring on the
port of Cebu. The defendant confessed that he was the
Simon was sentenced to suffer the penalty of life
owner of the opium and that he had purchased it in
imprisonment, to pay a fine of twenty thousand pesos
Saigon. He dis not confess, however, as to his purpose
and to pay the costs.
in buying the opium. He did not say that it was his
intention to import the prohibited drug.
Simon then seek the reversal of the judgement
RULING:
RULING:
Yes. As stated in the Opium Law, we expressly hold that
No. To sustain a conviction for selling prohibited drugs,
any person who unlawfully imports or brings any
the sale must be clearly and unmistakably established.
prohibited drug into the Philippine Islands, when the
To sell means to give, whether for money or any other
prohibited drug is found under this person's control on
material consideration. It must, therefore, be
a vessel which has come direct from a foreign country
established beyond doubt that appellant actually sold
and is within the jurisdiction limits of the Philippines, is
and delivered two tea bags of marijuana dried leaves
guilty of the crime of illegal importation of opium,
to Sgt. Lopez, who acted as the poseur-buyer, in
unless contrary circumstances exist or the defense
exchange for two twenty-peso bills.
proves otherwise.
After careful review, the Court held that there were 2
tea bags of marijuana that was sold and there were 2
note:
other tea bags of marijuana confiscated. Thus, Simon
Possession of Opium on board a vessel is punishable
should be charged of selling for the 2 tea bags of
when Philippine port is its destination.
marijuana only.
When a foreign steamer anchored in any of our ports
However, there is an overlapping error in the
after arriving direct from a foreign country, mere
provisions on the penalty of reclusion perpetua by
possession of Opium therein is punishable.
reason of its dual imposition, that is, as the maximum
of the penalty where the marijuana is less than 750
PEOPLE VS. MARTIN SIMON
grams, and also as the minimum of the penalty where
the marijuana involved is 750 grams or more. The same
ISSUE:
error has been committed with respect to the other
Whether or not the conviction of accused Simon for
prohibited and regulated drugs provided in said
the violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No.
Section 20. To harmonize such conflicting provisions in
6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 was proper.
order to give effect to the whole law, the court hereby
hold that the penalty to be imposed where the quantity
FACTS:
of the drugs involved is less than the quantities stated
Accused Martin Simon was charged with a violation of
in the first paragraph shall range from prision
Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425 or the
correccional to reclusion temporal, and not reclusion
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. He sold tea bags of
perpetua. This is also concordant with the fundamental
marijuana to a Narcotics Command (NARCOM)
rule in criminal law that all doubts should be construed
poseur-buyer. The confiscated 4 tea bags, weighing a
in a manner favorable to the accused.
total of 3.8 grams, when subjected to laboratory
The court held that Republic Act No. 6425, as now
examination, were found positive for marijuana.
amended by Republic Act No. 7659, has unqualifiedly
adopted the penalties under the Revised Penal Code in

63 | JMC COLLEGE OF LAW


their technical terms, hence with their technical
signification and effects. In fact, for purposes of
determining the maximum of said sentence, the court
have applied the provisions of the amended Section 20
of said law to arrive at prision correccional and Article
64 of the Code to impose the same in the medium
period. Such offense, although provided for in a special
law, is now in effect punished by and under the Revised
Penal Code. Correlatively, to determine the minimum,
the court applied first part of the aforesaid Section 1
which directs that “in imposing a prison sentence for
an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its
amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to
an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of
which shall be that which, in view of the attending
circumstances, could be properly imposed under the
rules of said Code, and the minimum which shall be
within the range of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by the Code for the offense.”
Thus, in the case at bar, appellant should be begrudged
the benefit of a minimum sentence within the range of
arresto mayor, the penalty next lower to prision
correccional which is the maximum range have fixed
through the application of Articles 61 and 71 of the
Revised Penal Code. For, with fealty to the law, the
court may set the minimum sentence at 6 months of
arresto mayor, instead of 6 months and 1 day of prision
correccional.
JULIUS CACAO Y PRIETO VS. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
[G.R. NO. 180870, 610 SCRA 636, JANUARY 22,
2010]
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a proper chain of custody in
the instant case.
FACTS:
On October 14, 2004, at around 7:45 in the evening,
Police Officer 3 (PO3) Celso Pang-ag of the Intelligence
and Operation Section of the Laoag City Police Station
received a telephone call from an informant about a
drug session being held inside Room 5 of the Starlight
Hotel located at Barangay 5, Ablan Avenue, Laoag City.
Acting on the information, PO3 Pang-ag, together with
PO2 Jonel Mangapit, went immediately to the Starlight
Hotel to determine the veracity of the report. Upon
arrival at the target area, PO3 Pang-ag and PO2
Mangapit approached the lady clerk manning the
information counter of Starlight Hotel and inquired
about the alleged drug session at Room 5 of the hotel.
The lady clerk informed PO3 Pang-ag and PO2
Mangapit that the roomboy of the hotel was about to
deliver a softdrink to Room 5 and they could follow him
if they [so wish]. Thus, PO3 Pang-ag and PO2 Mangapit
followed the roomboy to Room 5. Upon arrival, the
roomboy knocked at the door and a woman, later
identified as Mylene, opened the door wide enough to
enable the police officers to look inside.
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PO3 Pang-ag and PO2 Mangapit saw petitioner seated
on top of the bed sniffing shabu while Joseph Canlas
was on the floor assisting petitioner sniffing shabu. At
this juncture, PO3 Pang-ag and PO2 Mangapit arrested
petitioner and Joseph and confiscated from them the
drug paraphernalia, glass tooter, scissors, lighters and
plastic sachets. PO2 Mangapit frisked petitioner and
recovered from him one plastic sachet containing
shabu.
After informing petitioner and Joseph of their
constitutional rights, PO3 Pang-ag and PO2 Mangapit
brought them to the Laoag City Police Station and
turned them over to the police officer on duty while
the confiscated items were turned over to SPO3 Loreto
Ancheta.
The Philippine National Police (PNP) laboratory
conducted an examination on the specimen recovered
from appellant and his companion which tested
positive for shabu.
On October 15, 2004, two separate informations were
filed against Joseph Canlas y Naguit and Cacao
indicting them for violation of Section 11, Article II of
RA 9165 before the RTC of Laoag City.
Both RTC and CA convicted petitioner.
RULING:
No. As a general rule, factual findings and conclusions
of the trial court and the CA are entitled to great weight
and respect and will not be disturbed on appeal.
However, if there is any indication that the trial court
overlooked certain facts or circumstances which would
substantially affect the disposition of the case, the
Supreme Court will not hesitate to review the same. In
this case, the Court finds it imperative to review the
factual findings of the trial court because of certain
inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses on material points.
A. The testimonies of the prosecutions principal
witnesses are inconsistent as to who delivered the
prohibited drug to the evidence custodian.
In this case, PO3 Celso Pang-ag (Pang-ag) and PO2
Jonel Mangapit (Mangapit) both testified that it was
the latter who brought the item confiscated from
petitioner to the evidence custodian, SPO3 Loreto
Ancheta (Ancheta). However, the foregoing assertions
are totally at odds with the testimony of Ancheta, the
evidence custodian. The latter denied that it was
Mangapit who delivered the item allegedly recovered
from Cacao. Instead, he repeatedly and categorically
declared that it was SP03 Balolong (Balolong) from
whom he received the plastic sachet of shabu.
Contrary to the findings of the appellate court, The
Court is of the considered view that this contradiction
is not so inconsequential or minor but a discrepancy
touching on substantial and significant matter which
could well affect the credibility of the witnesses.

B. The prosecution failed to satisfactorily establish that
the item presented in court was the same item
confiscated from Cacao.
The patent inconsistency between the testimonies of
Mangapit and Pang-ag, on one hand, and the
testimony of Ancheta on the other hand, necessarily
leads us to doubt that the plastic sachet of shabu
identified in court is the same item that was allegedly
seized and confiscated from petitioner. If the version of
Mangapit is to be believed, then the most lamentable
aspect pertains to his failure to identify the seized item
with certainty. For sure Mangapit, who is the most
competent person to make the proper identification
being the officer who confiscated the item from Cacao,
never actually identified the same.
The only other person who could have identified the
subject drug is Pang-ag. However, the Court cannot
lend credence to his supposed identification, the same
not being also positive, certain and unequivocal.
Besides, there is no showing that this witness actually
saw the shabu at the time it was allegedly seized from
petitioner. In fact, Pang-ag is even incompetent to
make the identification since from all indications, he
has never been in possession of it.
Moreover, considering the testimony of Ancheta, it was
Balolong who forwarded the seized item. It must be
noted that Balolong was never presented to testify in
this case. Thus, there is no evidence to prove that what
was turned over to the evidence custodian by Balolong
and later presented in court was the same substance
recovered from petitioner. The failure to establish the
chain of custody is fatal to the prosecution’s case.
Note:
Essential in a drug-related case is that the identity of
the dangerous drug be established beyond reasonable
doubt Since the dangerous drug constitutes the corpus
delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence is vital
to a judgment of conviction, it behooves upon the
prosecution to establish and prove with certainty that
the dangerous drug presented in court as evidence
against the accused is the same item recovered from
his possession.
The failure to establish the chain of custody is fatal to
the prosecution’s case. There can be no crime of illegal
possession of a prohibited drug when nagging doubts
persist on whether the item confiscated was the same
specimen examined and established to be the
prohibited drug.
Presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duty cannot by itself override the constitutional right
of the accused to be presumed innocent unless
overcome by strong, clear and compelling evidence.
PEOPLE VS PAGADUAN
(GR NO 179029, 12 AUGUST 2010)
ISSUE:
Whether or not the integrity of the evidence was
preserved.
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FACTS:
Buy-bust operation was conducted by PO3 Almarez,
SPO1 Balido and Captain de Vera. Ruper Pagaduan was
arrested and plastic sachet of what appears to be
shabu was marked, request for laboratory examination
was done the same day. The plastic sachet was turned
over to PNP Crime Laboratory two days after. He was
found guilty by the court and the same was affirmed
by CA
Pagaduan contents among others that the prosecution
failed to show an unbroken chain of custody in the
handling of the seized drug. He claims that there was
no evidence to show when the marking were done.
RULING:
No. The Supreme Court acquitted Pagaduan. The
prosecution failed to show that the illegal drug
presented in the court is the same illegal drug actually
recovered from the Pagaduan. Strict compliance with
the prescribed procedure is required because of the
illegal drug’s unique characteristic rendering it
indistinct, not readily identifiable, and easily open to
tampering alteration or substitution either by accident
or otherwise.
Resolution:
We recognize that the strict compliance with the
requirements of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 may not
always be possible under field conditions; the police
operates under varied conditions, and cannot at all
times attend to all the niceties of the procedures in the
handling of confiscated evidence. For this reason, the
last sentence of the implementing rules provides that
non-compliance with these requirements under
justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not
render void and invalid such seizures of and custody
over said items[.] Thus, noncompliance with the strict
directive of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 is not
necessarily fatal to the prosecutions case; police
procedures in the handling of confiscated evidence
may still have some lapses, as in the present case.
These lapses, however, must be recognized and
explained in terms of their justifiable grounds, and the
integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence seized
must be shown to have been preserved
In the present case, the prosecution did not bother to
offer any explanation to justify the failure of the police
to conduct the required physical inventory and
photograph of the seized drugs. The apprehending
team failed to show why an inventory and photograph
of the seized evidence had not been made either in the
place of seizure and arrest or at the nearest police
station (as required by the Implementing Rules in case
of warrantless arrests). We emphasize that for the
saving clause to apply, it is important that the
prosecution explain the reasons behind the procedural
lapses, and that the integrity and value of the seized
evidence had been preserved. In other words, the
justifiable ground for noncompliance must be proven
 CRIMINAL LAW II | CASE DIGESTS

as a fact. The court cannot presume what these

grounds are or that they even exist.

The second link in the chain of custody is its turnover

from the apprehending team to the police station. PO3
Almarez testified that the appellant was brought to the
Diadi Police Station after his arrest. However, he failed
to identify the person who had control and possession
of the seized drug at the time of its transportation to
the police station. In the absence of clear evidence, we
cannot presume that PO3 Almarez, as the poseur
buyer, handled the seized sachet to the exclusion of
others – during its transfer from the place of arrest and
confiscation to the police station. The prosecution
likewise failed to present evidence pertaining to the
identity of the duty desk officer who received the
plastic sachet containing shabu from the buy-bust
team. This is particularly significant since the seized
specimen was turned over to the PNP Crime
Laboratory only after two days. It was not, therefore,
clear who had temporary custody of the seized items
during this significant intervening period of time.
Although the records show that the request for
laboratory examination of the seized plastic sachet was
prepared by Captain de Vera, the evidence does not
show that he was the official who received the marked
plastic sachet from the buy-bust team.

As for the subsequent links in the chain of custody, the

records show that the seized specimen was forwarded
by PO3 Almarez to the PNP Crime Laboratory on
December 29, 2003, where it was received by PO2
Dulnuan, and later examined by PSI Quintero.
However, the person from whom PO3 Almarez
received the seized illegal drug for transfer to the crime
laboratory was not identified. As earlier discussed, the
identity of the duty desk officer who received the
shabu, as well as the person who had temporary
custody of the seized items for two days, had not been
established.
The procedural lapses mentioned above show the
glaring gaps in the chain of custody, creating a
reasonable doubt whether the drugs confiscated from
the appellant were the same drugs that were brought
to the crime laboratory for chemical analysis, and
eventually offered in court as evidence. In the absence
of concrete evidence on the illegal drugs bought and
sold, the body of the crime the corpus delicti has not
been adequately proven. In effect, the prosecution
failed to fully prove the elements of the crime charged,
creating reasonable doubt on the appellants criminal
liability.

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 CRIMINAL LAW II | CASE DIGESTS

TITLE SIX – CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC to obtain a prize. Its elements are: (1) a consideration;
MORALS (2) chance: (3) a prize, or some advantage or inequality
in amount or value which is in the nature of prize.
January 30, 2018 – Article 195 – ACTS PUNISHABLE
MARTIN VILLAMOR and VICTOR BONAOBRA VS
IN GAMBLING AND BETTING
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
ROMBLON, Shirley Kris M
G.R. No. 200396 MARCH 22, 2017
U.S. v. JAIME FILART AND HILARIO SINGSON
ISSUE:
G.R. No. L-10263 March 13, 1915
Whether or not the petitioners’ conviction for violation
Moreland, J.
of RA 9287 as collector or agent under Section 3(c) for
Villamor, and as coordinator, controller, or supervisor
ISSUE:
under Section 3(d) for Bonaobra, should be upheld.
Whether or not the defendants conducted lottery

FACTS:
FACTS:
Villamor was charged as a collectior with violation of
Filart and Singson took part in a lottery or raffle of an
Section 3(c) of RA 9287 for collecting and soliciting
automobile, which was the property of Filart. The
bets for an illegal numbers game locally known as
winner was determined in the following manner: The
"lotteng” and possessing a list of various numbers, a
numbers composing the 450, each written on a
calculator, a cellphone, and cash.Another Information
separate piece of paper, were placed together in a box
was filed in the same court charging Bonaobra as an
and thoroughly mixed. A boy was selected who placed
operator or manager with violation of the same law on
his hand in the box and drew out a number. This he
the same day and place. The prosecution testified that
delivered to a person who unfolded the paper and read
PD Penaflor received a call from an informant
the number in a loud voice while Filart, with a list of the
regarding an ongoing illegal numbers game at
450 numbers referred to, struck from the list the
Barangay Francia, Virac, Catanduanes, specifically at
number corresponding to that drawn from the box.
the residence of Bonaobra. They proceeded to the
This was repeated until all of the numbers were drawn
latter's residence and upon arrival, they saw petitioners
from the box and stricken from the list. It was agreed
in the act of counting bets, described by the Bicol term
that the last number drawn from the box should be the
“revisar,” which means collating and examining
winning number and that the owner of that number
numbers placed in “papelitos,” which are slips of paper
should win the automobile.
containing bet numbers, and counting money
bets.When they entered the gate of fee compound,
Both defendants were charged for violating the
they introduced themselves as police officers and
following provisions of the law:
confiscated the items found on the table consisting of
cash amounting to P1,500.00 in different
Section 7 of Act No. 1757 provides, as follows:
denominations, the “papelitos,” a calculator, a cellular
The playing at and the conducting of any game of
phone, and a pen. Petitioners were then brought to
monte, jueteng, or any form of lottery or policy . . . is
Camp Francisco Camacho where they were
hereby prohibited, and any person taking any part
investigated for illegal gambling. Subsequently, a case
therein . . . shall be punished as provided in section 3
was filed against the petitioners before the Office of
hereof. . . . .
the Provincial Prosecutor. The version of the defense
This section also provides that:
asserted that the evidence were inadmissible because
the police officers had no search warrant when they
It shall be no defense to any criminal action under this
barged into Barnoabra's compound and therefore the
section that the defendant acted as the agent of
conviction should not be upheld.The RTC gave
another or that he had no interest in the result.
credence to the testimonies of the arresting officers
and held that petitioners were caught in flagrante
HELD:
delicto committing an illegal numbers game locally
Yes. The facts of record place this case within the
known as “lotteng” a variant of Last Two. CA affirmed
definition generally given of a lottery. A lottery is said
the decision of the RTC. Hence, this petition.
to be “a species of gaming, which may be defined as a
scheme for the distribution of prizes by chance among
RULING:
persons who have paid, or agreed to pay, a valuable
No. The Court finds that the right of the petitioners
consideration for the chance to obtain a prize.” It was
against unreasonable searches and seizures was
held in the case of Equitable Loan Co. vs. Waring, 117
violated by the arresting officers when they barged
Ga., 599, that three elements enter into a lottery
into Bonaobra’s compound without a valid warrant of
scheme: (1) A consideration; (2) chance: (3) a prize, or
arrest or a search warrant. While there are exceptions
some advantage or inequality in amount or value
to the rule requiring a warrant for a valid search and
which is in the nature of prize.
seizure, none applies in the case at bar. Consequently,
the evidence obtained by the police officers is
Doctrine:
inadmissible against the petitioners, the same having
A lottery is defined as a scheme for the distribution of
been obtained in violation of the said right.After a
prizes by chance among persons who have paid, or
judicious review of the records of the case, the Court
agreed to pay, a valuable consideration for the chance

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finds that there was no valid warrantless arrest on
petitioners. It was not properly established that
petitioners had just committed, or were actually
committing, or attempting to commit a crime and that
said act or acts were done in the presence of the
arresting officers. In this case, the prosecution failed to
clearly establish the acts that constitute the offense of
illegal gambling as a collector or an agent.The
prosecution merely relied on the alleged illegal
gambling paraphernalia found and confiscated inside
the house of Bonaobra and not on the specific overt
acts that constitute the offense.All told, the evidence
purportedly seized from the Bonaobra compound is
inadmissible in evidence since it was obtained in
violation of Section 3(2), Article III of the 1987
Constitution, Since the alleged illegal gambling
paraphernalia is the very corpus delicti of the crime
charged, the Court acquits petitioners.
"EL DEBATE," INC., VS
JOSE TOPACIO, Director of Posts
G.R. No. L-19982 December 29, 1922
ISSUE:
Whether or not the guessing contest of El Debate a
"lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme depending in
whole or in part upon lot or chance" within the
meaning of the law.
FACTS:
El Debate, a newspaper of the City of Manila, published
a full page announcement regarding two contests.The
first contest is for the award of prizes for the nearest
approximate guesses as to the total number of votes
that will be cast for any of the winning candidates for
Carnival Queen either in the provinces or in Manila. The
second contest is for the award for the nearest
approximate guesses as to the total number of votes
that the Queen elect will receive for the Carnival
queenship. Any subscriber to El Debate may participate
in these two contests by paying in advance at least the
amount of the subscription of a quarter.But payment is
to be strictly in advance and the estimate or guess
must be explained.The Director of Posts, following the
advice of the Attorney-General, refused to admit the
issues of El Debate, containing the advertisement, to
the mails, for the reason that it fell within the provisions
of the Administrative Code concerning non-mailable
matter. Not satisfied with the ruling of the Director of
Posts, the publishers of El Debate have had recourse to
these original proceedings in mandamus to settle the
controversy between the newspaper and the
Government. El Debate argued that it was a guessing
game and not lottery thus Director of Posts must grant
the issues containing such advertisements.
RULING:
Yes. It is similar. "Neither of these contests is a
"legitimate business enterprise." In each thousands
invest small sums in the hope and expectation that luck
will enable them to win large returns. A comparatively
small percentage of the participants will realize their
expectations, and thousands will get nothing. They are,
in effect, lotteries, under the guise of 'guessing
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contests'. The Meeting, therefore, the issues in the
case, we rule that the Director of Posts acted advisedly
in refusing the use of the mails for the issue of El
Debate which contained the announcement of its
guessing contest, and that said contests is a lottery, or
gift enterprise depending in part upon lot or chance,
within the meaning of the Postal Law.The general rule
is that guessing competitions or contests are lotteries
within the statutes prohibiting lotteries. Indeed, it is
very difficult, if not impossible, for the most ingenious
and subtle mind to devise any scheme or plan short of
a gratuitous distribution of property, which will not be
held to be in violation of the Gambling Law, and
repugnant to the Postal law. It is for the courts to look
beyond the fair exterior, to the substance, in order to
unmask the real element and the pernicious tendencies
which the law is seeking to prevent.The purpose of El
Debate in devising its advertising scheme was to
augment its circulation and thus to increase the
number of newspaper readers in the Philippines —
which is commendable. But the advertisement carries
along with it a lottery scheme — which is not
commendable.Open the door of chance but a little, for
one scheme, however ingeniously and meritoriously
conceived, to pass through, and soon the whole
country will be flooded with lotteries.
January 31, 2018 – Article 196 – IMPORTATION, SALE
AND POSSESSION OF LOTTERY TICKETS OR
ADVERTISEMENTS
ALAMEDA, Manuel F.
THE UNITED STATES vs. EMILIO SANTOS REYES,
ET AL.,
G.R. No. L-7260 August 21, 1912
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendant violated Sec.3, Act No.
1523.
FACTS:
These defendants were charged with a violation of an
Section 3, Act No. 1523, to prohibit the importation,
sale, giving away, use and possession of lottery tickets
and lottery advertising matter. The defendant, Emilio S.
Reyes, was by occupation a printer; that during the
months of March, April, May and June, 1911, he printed
a large number of lottery tickets, alleged to be lottery
tickets of the Royal Lottery of Colombo; that a number
of said lottery tickets were found in his private
residence and others in his place of business; that the
tickets which the defendant Reyes had delivered to the
defendant Dominga Trinidad were later found in the
possession of the said Dominga Trinidad and the other
codefendant, Teodoro Fidel. The attorney for the
appellant maintains in his brief that said Act No. 1523
did not provide a punishment for the possession of
lottery tickets of the Philippine Islands or of lottery
tickets made in the Philippine Islands. He further
argues that the tickets were printed by the defendant
Reyes for one Miguel Soler and that he had nothing to
do with said lottery tickets, except to print them under
his contract with Soler. Soler was not called as a witness
during the trial of the cause. The defendant Reyes
admitted that he had printed the tickets; that he was in

possession of the same; that a part of them were found
hidden in his house and that he had given to his
codefendant, Dominga Trinidad, a number of said
tickets for a certain sum of money.
HELD:
In view of the fact that the defendant, Emilio Santos
Reyes, gave to his co-defendant, Dominga Trinidad,
certain of said lottery tickets, and in view of the fact
that he had hidden away in his private residence
certain of said lottery tickets, we are of the opinion that
his possession of the same has not been satisfactorily
explained, and that his possession of said lottery tickets
is in violation of said section 3.
U.S. VS MARCELO JOSE
GR NO. 11566 AUG 10, 1916
ISSUE:
Did the defendants violate Section 3 of Act No. 1523?
FACTS:
The mercantile firm of Marcelo Jose & Co., composed
of Marcelo Jose and Tan Bo, was located at No. 200
Calle Harris, Olongapo. Both members of this firm were
arrested on the night of May 16, 1915, and placed in
confinement. About 2 or 3 o'clock in the afternoon of
the following day, May the 17th, the store was
searched by the authorities and a one-tenth part of a
Macao lottery ticket was found therein. At the time this
search was made neither of the owners of the store was
present. Tan Bo, the managing partner, testified that
this lottery ticket was sent to him by a friend in Amoy
and that when he received it he put it in an envelope
and placed it in the drawer and that his partner,
Marcelo Jose, had never seen it. The appellant, Marcelo
Jose, testified that, although he is a member of the
mercantile firm of Marcelo Jose & Co., he knew nothing
of the existence of the lottery ticket until he saw it in
the court of the justice of the peace, and that he lived
in Manila and went to Olongapo only when the
business required his presence. Section 3 of Act No.
1523 provides that it shall be unlawful for any person
to sell, give away, use or have possession of, with intent
to sell, give away or use, any lottery ticket.
HELD:
If the defendant can establish that he did not know of
the existence of the lottery ticket within his premises,
the presumption is destroyed and the defendant must
be acquitted.It is a general rule that, when ay of the
prohibited drugs, enumerated in section 31 of the
Opium Law, are found upon the premises occupied by
a person accused of using the same, there can be no
conviction under said section unless it affirmatively
appears that he knowingly had the prohibited article
on the premises, or that the animus possidendi in fact
existed together with his alleged apparent possession
or control of such article. But direct proof of facts of
this nature, in a criminal proceeding, is rarely
forthcoming, except in cases of confession, and their
existence may and usually must be inferred from the
varying circumstances in each particular case. When a
full, satisfactory, and sufficient explanation of the
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presence of a prohibited drug on the premises at the
time of the seizure is given, which is entirely consistent
with the allegation of the defendant to the effect that
he did not have the same in his possession, there can
be no conviction and the accused must be acquitted.
The testimony of both this appellant and Tan Bo stands
uncontradicted and the Government did not attempt
to impeach the credibility of these witnesses.
February 1, 2018 – Article 197 – BETTING IN SPORTS
CONTESTS
ALILIAN, Enna B.
[NO CASES FOUND]
February 1, 2018 – Article 198 – ILLEGAL BETTING
ON HORSE RACES
ARANCES, Javy Ann G.
[NO CASES FOUND]
February 2, 2018 – Article 199 – ILLEGAL
COCKFIGHTING
BANUELOS, Kelvinn L.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs.
MARIANO AYOSO, TEODORICO VALENZUELA,
ALFONSO DESOYO and FELIPE DE LA CRUZ.
G.R. No. L-18762 April 27, 1967
Ponente: MAKALINTAL, J.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the ordinance regarding cockfighting
is valid.
FACTS:
On July 21, 1960, accused-appellants MARIANO
AYOSO, ET AL., were charged with the crime of ILLEGAL
COCKFIGHTING before the Municipal Court of Bogo.
That on or about 2:45 o'clock in the afternoon, more or
less of July 21, 1960 at the cockpit of Tan Sim,
Poblacion Bogo, Cebu, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, did then and there, willfully, feloniously,
unlawfully and knowingly with unlawful purpose,
indulge themselves in illegal cockfighting commonly
known as "Tari-Tari", wherein money P25 is used as bet
on a day, Thursday, which is not permitted by law
though the place is a licensed cockpit. This act is a
gross violation of Article 199 of the Revised Penal
Code, Section 1.
The accused filed a motion to quash, claiming that the
facts alleged in the complaint do not constitute an
offense because cockfighting is authorized in Bogo on
Thursdays under the provisions of Ordinance No. 18,
Series of 1960, enacted and approved by the Municipal
Council of Bogo.
HELD:
NO. The municipal ordinance is invalid.
Thus, the issue boils down to whether Republic Act No.
938, as amended, gives local government, blanket
authority to permit cockfighting at any time and for as

long as said governments may wish it. Upon mature
deliberation, we hold that the answer must be in the
negative.
To begin with, repeals and even amendments be
implication are not favored, whereas an affirmative
answer would entail a vital amendment, amounting for
all practical purposes, to a repeal, of sections 2285 and
2286 of the Revised Administrative Code.
Secondly, grants of power to local governments are to
be constructed strictly, and doubts in the interpretation
thereof should be resolved in favor of the national
government and against the political subdivisions
concerned.
Thirdly, it is a matter of common knowledge that
cockfighting is one of the most wide-spread vices of
our population, and that the government has always
shown a grave concern over the need of effectively
curbing its evil effects. The theory of petitioner herein
presupposes that the Republic of the Philippines has
completely reversed its position and chosen instead, to
place the matter entirely at the discretion of local
governments. We should not, and cannot adopt, such
promise except upon a clear and unequivocal
expression of the will of Congress, which insofar as said
premise is concerned is not manifest from the
language used in Republic Act No. 938, as amended.
Lastly, "cockpits" and "cockfighting" are regulated
separately be our laws. Thus, Section 2243 (i) of the
Revised Administrative Code empowers municipal
councils "to regulate cockpits". Yet, the authority of
said councils over cockfighting, is found in sections
2285 and 2286 of said Code, not in said section 2243
(i). Similarly, Article 199 of the Revised Penal Code
punishes, not illegal "cockpits" but "illegal
cockfighting." What is more, participation in cockfights
"on a day other than those permitted by law" is dealt
with in said article separately from participation in
cockfights "at a place other than a licensed cockpit".
So too, the authority of local governments, under
Republic Act No. 938, as amended, "to regulate ... the
establishment, maintenance, and operation of ...
cockpits" does not necessarily connote the power to
regulate "cockfighting", except insofar as the same
must take place in a duly licensed "cockpit". Again, the
first and second proviso in Section 1 of said Act,
regulating the distance of cockpits and places of
amusements therein mentioned from 'any public
building, schools, hospitals and churches' and the third
proviso of the same section, prohibiting the admission
of minors to some of those places of amusement,
suggest that the authority conferred in said provision
may include the power to determine the location of
cockpits, conditions to be observed for the protection
of persons therein, the number of cockpits that may be
established in each municipality and or by each
operator, the minimum age of the individual who may
be admitted therein, and other matters of similar
nature — as distinguished from the days on which
cockfighting shall be held and the frequency thereof.
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In short, we are of the opinion that the city ordinances
relied upon by petitioner herein authorizing
cockfighting on Thursdays, are invalid.
February 3, 2018 – Article 200 – GRAVE SCANDAL
BURGOS, Paul Zandrix A.
US vs. SAMANIEGO
G.R. No. 5115. November 29, 1909.
MORELAND, J. :
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused committed Grave Scandal.
FACTS:
That on and for many weeks prior to the 27th day of
November, 1907, in the city of Manila, Philippine
Islands, the said Juana Benedicto de Perez was a
married woman, and that said Manuel Samaniego
knew that she was married and united in the bonds of
matrimony with and was the legitimate consort of Jose
Perez Siguenza; that during the period of time above
expressed the said Manuel Samaniego and Juana
Benedicto de Perez, willfully, illegally, and criminally
and scandalously, without having any matrimonial tie
between them, habitually appeared together in public
places and frequented together places of recreation,
suspicious places, vacant houses, and houses of bad
repute, in the daytime as well as in the nighttime; and
lewdly and indecently went to bed together in the
house of the husband of the said Juana Benedicto de
Perez during the late hours of the night, dressed only
in their night clothes, and indecorously, indecently, and
immodestly embraced each other and caressed each
other in the presence of the family, children, and
servants of the said husband of Juana Benedicto de
Perez; all with public scandal and with scandal to the
community, and with shame and humiliation to the
husband and family of the said Juana Benedicto de
Perez.
RULING:
NO. The acts complained of lack many of the elements
essential to bring them within the purview of the article
of the Penal Code invoked by the prosecution. Every
act that was in anywise public fails entirely of those
qualities which offend modesty and good morals by
"grievous scandal or enormity." The occurrence at the
residence on the night of the 6th of November did not
have that publicity which is required by the article of
the Penal Code referred to. (U.S. v. Catajay, 6 Phil. Rep.,
398; supreme court of Spain, April 13, 1885, December
14, 1903, and January 27, 1908; Viada, vol. 3, p. 130.)
The evidence introduced on the reopening adds
nothing to the case already made by the prosecution.
The case was reopened for a particular purpose and
the evidence to be introduced, if any, was restricted to
a particular condition, viz, the "publicity or nonpublicity
of the acts charged in the complaint." On the
reopening, evidence was presented by the prosecution
in relation to the alleged occurrence between the
defendants in Plaza Palacio. Concerning this incident

testimony had already been given on the trial by the
witness Rafael Perez. Testimony was also given on the
reopening by the same witness as to an occurrence
between the defendants one morning in the Botanical
Garden. In relation to this same event he had already
given his testimony on the trial. His evidence as to
these two events given on the reopening of the case is
wholly inconsistent with, if not absolutely contradictory
of, his testimony in relation to the same events given
on the trial. Such testimony can have no weight.
The other testimony given on the reopening by this
witness and the testimony of the witness Amadeo
Pacheco can have no bearing or weight in the decision
of this case because such testimony relates to acts and
relations between the defendants which are not
"charged in the complaint" and concerning which no
evidence whatever had been offered on the trial.
In the judgment of this court the evidence fails to show
the defendants guilty of the crime charged.
US vs. CATAJAY
G.R. No. 2785. August 23, 1906.
CARSON, J. :
ISSUE:
WON the accused committed Grave Scandal.
FACTS:
The trial court found be accused guilty of the crime of
public scandal in violation of the provisions of article
441 of Penal Code. PUBLIC SANDAL. — Article 441 of
the Penal Code construed. Held, That it is an essential
element of the crime defined and penalized therein
that the acts complained of resulted in a grave public
scandal. It appears, however, that the acts complained
of were committed at night, in a private house, and at
a time when no one was present except the accused,
the mistress of the house, and one servant, and we are
of opinion that these circumstances do not constitute
that degree of publicity which is an essential element
of the crime defined and penalized in article 441 of the
Penal Code. The correct construction of this article well
stated by Viada in his commentary on article 457 of the
Penal Code of Spain, which exactly corresponds with
the article in question:
"Constitute the crime provided all those acts contrary
to decency and good manners that, for their publicity,
have been subject to public scandal for people who
have accidentally witnessed. Although the article does
not say it, it is evident that it is a precise condition for
this crime to exist that offense to modesty and good
habits is public: if the offense did not have this
character, it is clear that it would not produce the
serious scandal nor the transcendence required by the
article, and therefore, no longer subject to the sanction
of the same, but the most benign of No. 2 of Article
586, which punishes as inmates a simple offense
against public order, with the arrest penalty of one to
ten days and a fine of 5 to 50 pesetas, to those who
with any kind of acts offended the moral and good
custom without committing a crime. When the act,
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then, offensive to modesty is publicly committed,
should be assessed as a crime, since this same publicity
is what produces the serious scandal that is punished:
in another case, the provision cited Article 586 is the
one that should apply." (Viada comments to the Penal
Code of 1870, fourth edition, volume 3, page 130.)
*translated via translate.google.com
RULING:
YES. There can be no doubt that the accused
committed the offense defined and penalized in No. 2
of the article 571 of the Penal Code, which corresponds
with the above-mentioned number 2 of article 586 of
the Penal Code of Spain, and provides that a penalty of
from one of ten days’ arrest and a fine of from 15 to
125 pesetas shall be imposed upon those who, by
exhibiting prints or engravings, or by means of other
acts, shall offend against good morals and custom
without committing a crime.
Since this is a lesser offense that the one charged in the
complaint, and is included therein, we find him guilt of
a violation of the provisions of the said article and,
reversing the sentence of the trial court, we impose
upon the accused, Jose Catajay, the penalty of the ten
days’ imprisonment (arresto), and the payment of a
fine of 125 pesetas, and the costs of the trial in both
instances. After the expiration of ten days from the
date of final judgment let the cause be remanded to
the lower court for proper procedure. So ordered.
February 4, 2018 – Article 201 – IMMORAL
DOCTRINES, OBSCENE PUBLICATIONS AND
EXHIBITIONS, AND INDECENT SHOWS
CEBALLOS, Jesus C.
FERNANDO V. CA
G.R. NO. 159751 DEC. 6, 2006
ISSUE:
Whether or not Fernando was guilty of selling and
distributing obscene materials.
FACTS:
Gaudencio E. Fernando owned Gaudencio E. Fernando
Music Fair and Rudy Estorninos was its attendant.
Philippine National Police Criminal Investigation and
Detection Group in the National Capital Region (PNP-
CIDG NCR), acting on reports that the store sold and
distributed pornographic materials, raided the store by
virtue of a search warrant. The raid yielded twenty five
(25) VHS tapes and ten (10) different magazines.
Fernando contends that his Mayor’s permit was
expired and thus not the lawful owner of the store.
HELD:
Yes, he is guilty of Art. 201.
In order to be liable under Art. 201, it must be proven
that (a) the materials, publication, picture or literature
are obscene; and (b) the offender sold, exhibited,
published or gave away such materials. Necessarily,
that the confiscated materials are obscene must be
proved.

The following guidelines as to what is obscene was
adopted by the Court:
(1) whether to the average person, applying
contemporary standards would find the work, taken as
a whole, appeals to the prurient interest;
(2) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently
offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by
the applicable state law; and
(3) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
The Supreme Court noted the reasoning of the trial
court as to the obscene nature of one of the VHS tapes
confiscated: “The tape exhibited indecent and immoral
scenes and acts. Her dancing movements excited the
sexual instinct of her male audience. The motive may
be innocent, but the performance was revolting and
shocking to good minds.”
Furthermore, Art. 201 does not require that a person
be caught in the act of selling, giving away or
exhibiting obscene materials to be liable, for as long as
the said materials are offered for sale, displayed or
exhibited to the public.
PEOPLE V. KOTTINGER
G.R. NO. L-20569 OCTOBER 29, 1923
ISSUE:
Whether or not the photos of naked native women in
the post cards were obscene.
FACTS:
Kottinger was manager of Camera Supply Co where
several post cards were confiscated due to their
alleged obscenity. The post cards showed photos of
naked native women from non-Christian areas in the
Philippines.
HELD:
No, they do not. The tests used by the Court as to
whether a material is considered obscene were the
following: 1) whether the tendency of the matter
charged as obscene, is to deprave or corrupt those
whose minds are open to such immoral influences and
into whose hands a publication or other article charged
as being obscene may fall; and 2) Whether it shocks the
ordinary and common sense of men.
The Court ruled that the pictures merely depict persons
as they actually live, without attempted presentation of
persons in unusual postures or dress. That pictures
portraying the inhabitants of the country in native
dress and as they appear and can be seen in the
regions in which they live, are not obscene or indecent.
Dr. Beyer, a professor from University of the Philippines
also testified that that none of the pictures represented
poses which he had not observed on various occasions,
and that the costumes worn by the people in the
pictures are the true costumes regularly worn by them.
February 5, 2018 – Article 202 – VAGRANCY AND
PROSTITUTES
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CRIMINAL LAW II | CASE DIGESTS
DAHIROC, Janice L.
PEOPLE VS. SITON, ET AL.,
GR 169364, 18 SEPT. 2009
ISSUE:
Does Article 202 (2), RPC on vagrancy violate the equal
protection clause?
FACTS:
Respondents Evangeline Siton and Krystel Kate
Sagarano were charged with vagrancy pursuant to Art.
202 (2) of the RPC in two separate Informations.
Accused were found wandering and loitering around
San Pedro and Legaspi Streets of Davao City, without
any visible means to support herself nor lawful and
justifiable purpose. Respondents filed separate
Motions to Quash on the ground that Art. 202 (2) is
unconstitutional for being vague and overboard. The
municipal trial court denied the motions, directed
respondents to file their respective counter-affidavits,
and declared that the law on vagrancy was enacted
pursuant to the State’s police power (or the power of
promoting public welfare by restraining and regulating
the use of liberty and property) and justified by the
Latin maxim “salus populi est suprema lex” (which calls
for the subordination of individual benefit to the
interest of the greater number). Respondents filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition with the RTC
challenging the constitutionality of the anti-vagrancy
law and claiming that Art 202 (2) violated the equal
protection clause. The RTC granted the petition of the
herein respondents and declared Art. 202 (2)
unconstitutional.
HELD:
No. Article 202 (2) of the RPC does not violate the equal
protection clause; neither does it discriminate against
the poor and the unemployed. Offenders of public
order laws are punished not for their status, as for
being poor or unemployed, but for conducting
themselves under such circumstances as to endanger
the public peace or cause alarm and apprehension in
the community. Being poor or unemployed is not a
license or a justification to act indecently or to engage
in immoral conduct.
U.S. VS HART, ET AL.,
G.R. NO. 8848 NOVEMBER 21, 1913
ISSUE:
Whether or not Hart, Miller and Natividad have
committed the act of Vagrancy.
FACTS:
Hart, Miller and Natividad were accused of Gambling
and Vagrancy where they all appealed.
Hart had ran gambling games in his saloon ever night
one in Angeles and one in the Bario of Tacondo. He
also operated a hotel Angeles in which he did a
business. He was also a proprietor He raised hogs
which he sold to the Army garrison at Camp
Stotsenberg. He was also authorized to sell several
 CRIMINAL LAW II | CASE DIGESTS

hundered hectarcs of land owned by one Carrillo in For these reasons, the defendants are ACQUITTED, with
Tacondo. With the power of an attorney, he furnished the costs de oficio.
the same property and paid for the 1st public school in
Tacondo.

Miller had the reputation of being a gambler and that

he was fined for gambling and was seen in houses of
prostitution. Miller was discharged from the Army last
year. He had the position of Sergeant and received a
rating as "excellent" on being discharged. He had a
partnership with one Buckered and invested P1000.
The business netted him P300 per month.

Natividad was also a gambler. During his visits to

saloons, he sometimes acted as a banker. His
occupancy is that of a tailor which was sufficient
enough to support his family.

HELD:
Defendants are AQUITTED
Act No. 519 states that:
"(1) Every person having no apparent means of
subsistence, who had the physical ability to work, and
who neglects to apply himself or herself to some lawful
calling; (2) every person found loitering about saloons
or dram shops or gambling housed, or tramping or
straying through the country without visible means of
support; (3) every person known to be a pickpocket,
thief, burglar, ladrone, either by his own confession or
by his having been convicted of either said offenses,
and having no visible or lawful means of support when
found loitering about any gambling house, cockpit, or
in any outlying barrio of a pueblo; (4) every idle or
dissolute person of associate of known thieves or
ladrones who wanders about the country at unusual
hours of the night; (5) every idle person who lodges in
any barn, shed, outhouse, vessel, or place other than
such as is kept for lodging purposed, without the
permission of the owner or a person entitled to the
possession thereof; (6) every lewd or dissolute person
who lives in and about houses of ill fame; every
common prostitute and common drunkard, is a
vagrant."

It is insisted by the Attorney General (AG) that visible

means of support, which are evident in the occupations
of the accused, would not be a bar to the conviction
under any one of the last four (4) clauses of the said
act. The AG contends that "visible means of support"
only applies to those "staying through the country".
The courts decided that the mere missing of the
punctuation cannot hold bar the argument of the AG,
since the intention of the legislators was to prevent
"loitering". It was stated that loitering was idling or
wasting one's time. The time spent in saloons drum
shops, and gambling houses is anything but that.

The three defendants were earning a living by

legitimate means in a degree of comfort higher than
the average. Their sole offense was gambling, which
the legislature has yet to make a subject of penal law.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

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 CRIMINAL LAW II | CASE DIGESTS

TITLE SEVEN – CRIMES COMMITTED BY A functions when he was permitted to draft motions. And
PUBLIC OFFICERS as in the performance thereof he accepted, even
solicited, monetary reward, he certainly guilty as
charged. The receipt of bribe money is just as
February 6, 2018 – Article 203 – WHO ARE
pernicious when committed by temporary employees
PUBLIC OFFICERS
as when committed by permanent officials.
DELA PEÑA, Clarisse J

FELICIANO MANIEGO y CATU, petitioner, vs. THE

AMELIA CARMELA CONSTANTINO ZOLETA,
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Petitioner,
G.R. No. L-2971 April 20, 1951
vs.THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN [FOURTH
DIVISION] and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
ISSUE:
Respondents.
Whether or not Maniego is considered a public officer.
G.R. No. 185224 July 29, 2015
FACTS:
ISSUE:
Feliciano Maniego was employed as a laborer to work
Whether or not the petitioners, as public officers, were
as the person in charge of delivering summons and
correctly charged with the crime of malversation.
subpoenas in the Municipal Court of Manila.
Nevertheless, Maniego was permitted to write motions
FACTS:
for dismissal of prescribed traffic cases against
The case stemmed from an anonymous complaint filed
offenders without counsel, and to submit them to the
against the petitioner, Mary Ann Gadian, and Sheryll
court for action, without passing through the regular
Desiree Tangan before the Office of the Ombudsman-
clerk.
Mindanao (Ombudsman) for participating in the
scheme of questionable grants and donations to
Sometime in 1947, a certain Felix Rabia was
fictitious entities using provincial funds. As a result of
subpoenaed in connection with a traffic violation. The
this complaint, the Commission on Audit (COA)
said crime has prescribed without Rabia being
conducted a special audit in Sarangani Province.
prosecuted but then Maniego informed Rabia that he
Among the irregularities discovered by the Special
is penalized with a P15 fine; that Maniego can fix this if
Audit Team was a ₱20,000.00 financial assistance given
Rabia can pay him P10. Maniego pocketed the P10.00
to Women in Progress (WIP), a cooperative whose
and for this he was later charged for violating Article
members were mostly government personnel or
210 of the Revised Penal Code which provides in part:
relatives of the officials of Sarangani Province.
Any public officer who shall agree to perform an act
The COA Special Audit Team submitted its report to
constituting a crime, in connection with the
the Ombudsman which, in turn, conducted a
performance of his official duties, in consideration of
preliminary investigation. Thereafter, the Ombudsman,
any offer, promise, gift or present received by such
through the Office of the Special Prosecutor, charged
officer, personally or through the mediation of another,
the petitioner, Vice-Governor Felipe Constantino,
shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its
Violeta Bahilidad, Maria Camanay, and Teodorico Diaz
minimum and medium periods and fine of not less
with malversation of public funds by falsification of
than the value to the penalty corresponding to the
public documents defined and penalized under Article
crime agreed upon if the same shall have been
217 in relation to Article 171(2) and Article48 of the
committed.
Revised Penal Code, as amended, before the
Maniego assails the charge. He avers, among others,
Sandiganbayan in an Information which reads:
that he is not a public officer as he was merely hired as
an ordinary government employee.
That on January 24, 2002 or prior or subsequent
thereto in Sarangani, Philippines, and within the
HELD:
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Felipe
Yes. Maniego is considered a public officer under
Katu Constantino, a high-ranking public officer, being
Article 203 of the Revised Penal Code which includes
the Vice-Governor of the Province of Sarangani, Maria
all persons “who, by direct provision of law, popular
D. Camanay, Provincial Accountant, Teodorico F. Diaz,
election or appointment by competent authority, shall
Provincial Board Member, Amelia Carmela C. Zoleta,
take part in the performance of public functions in the
Executive Assistant III, all accountable public officials of
Philippine Government, or shall perform in said
the Provincial Government of Sarangani, by reason of
government or any of its branches, public duties as an
the duties of their office, conspiring and confederating
employee, agent or subordinate official or any rank or
with Violita Bahilidad, private individual, the public
class.” That definition is quite comprehensive,
officers, while committing the offense in relation to
embracing as it does, every public servant from the
office, taking advantage of their respective positions,
highest to the lowest. For the purposes of the Penal
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
Code, it obliterates the standard distinction in the law
take, convert and misappropriate the amount of
of public officers between “officer” and “employee”.
TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (₱20,000.00), Philippine
Further, even assuming that Article 203 can’t be
Currency, in public funds under their custody, and for
applied, although Maniego was originally engaged as
which they are accountable, by falsifying or causing to
a laborer, he was temporarily performing public

74 | JMC COLLEGE OF LAW


be falsified the corresponding Disbursement Voucher
No. 101-2002-01-822 and its supporting documents,
making it appear that financial assistance had been
sought by Women In Progress, Malungon, Sarangani,
represented by its President, Amelia Carmela C. Zoleta,
when in truth and in fact, the accused knew fully well
that no financial assistance had been requested by the
said group and her association, nor did Amelia Carmela
C. Zoleta and her association receive the
aforementioned amount, thereby facilitating the
release of the above-mentioned public funds in the
amount of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS
(₱20,000.00)through encashment by the accused at
Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) Check No. 36481
dated January 24, 2002 issued in the name of the
Violeta Bahilidad, which amount they subsequently
misappropriated to their personal use and benefit and
despite demand, the said accused failed to return the
said amount to the damage and prejudice of the
government and the public interest of the aforesaid
sum.
HELD:
Malversation may be committed by appropriating
public funds or property; by taking or misappropriating
the same; by consenting, or through abandonment or
negligence, by permitting any other person to take
such public funds or property; or by being otherwise
guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such
funds or property.
The elements common to all acts of malversation
under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, are the following: (a) that the offender be a
public officer; (b) that he had custody or control of
funds or property by reason of the duties of his office;
(c) that those funds or property were public funds or
property for which he was accountable; and (d) that he
appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented, or
through abandonment or negligence, permitted
another person to take them. All these elements have
been established by the prosecution.
First, it is undisputed that all the accused, except
Bahilidad, are all public officers. A public officer is
defined in the Revised Penal Code as "any person who,
by direct provision of the law, popular election, or
appointment by competent authority, shall take part in
the performance of public functions in the Government
of the Philippine Islands, or shall perform in said
Government or in any of its branches public duties as
an employee, agent, or subordinate official, of any rank
or class. Constantino was the Vice-Governor of
Sarangani Province, while the petitioner, Camanay, and
Diaz were occupying the positions of Executive
Assistant (at the Office of the Vice-Governor),
Provincial Accountant, and Provincial Board Member,
respectively.
Second, the funds misappropriated are public in
character, as they were funds belonging to the
Province of Sarangani.
Third, Vice-Governor Constantino and Camanay were
accountable public officers. Under the Government
Auditing Code of the Philippines, an accountable
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CRIMINAL LAW II | CASE DIGESTS
public officer is a public officer who, by reason of his
office, is accountable for public funds or property. The
Local Government Code expanded this definition with
regard to local government officials.
Finally, Vice-Governor Constantino and Camanay
appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented, or
through abandonment or negligence, permitted
another person to take the public funds when they
signed Disbursement Voucher No. 101-2002-01-822.
The term voucher, when used in connection with
disbursement of money, implies some instrument that
shows on what account or by what authority a
particular payment has been made, or that services
have been performed which entitle the party to whom
it is issued to payment. Corollarily, when an authorized
person approves a disbursement voucher, he certifies
to the correctness of the entries therein, among others:
that the expenses incurred were necessary and lawful,
the supporting documents are complete, and the
availability of cash therefor. He also attests that the
person who performed the services or delivered the
supplies, materials, or equipment is entitled to
payment.
February 7, 2018 – Article 204 – KNOWINGLY
RENDERING UNJUST JUDGMENT
DELFIN, Jennica Gyrl G.
QUINTIN STA. MARIA vs. HON. ALBERTO UBAY
A.M. No. 595-CFI December 11, 1978
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent judge may be held liable
under Art 204 of the Revised Penal Code.
FACTS:
Quintin R. Sta Maria, attorney-in-fact of Valeriana Sta
Maria, filed with the Supreme Court a letter-complaint
against Judge Q. Ubay for violating the provisions of
Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code when he
knowingly rendered an unjust judgment by
promulgating a decision contrary to the decisions of
the Supreme Court in previous related proceedings,
violating section 11 of Article X of the 1973
Constitution, falsifying his decision in order to make it
appear that he rendered the same within the statutory
three-month period and putting ever obstacle to the
approval of their Record on appeal in spite of lack of
opposition duly filed on time. The letter-complaints
were indorsed by the Assistant to the Judicial
Consultant to the respondent Judge for comment. In
another letter complaint, Atty. Paz Palanca, branch
clerk of Clerk of respondent judge in his sala, was also
charged with infidelity in the custody of judicial records
and, with putting all obstacles to the approval of their
Record on Appeal. Sta. Maria states that the
respondent Judge in awarding to the plaintiffs (in Civil
Case C-2052) in toto what they prayed for in their
complaint and amended complaint did so in bad faith
and with full knowledge that said plaintiffs are not
entitled thereto.

HELD:
No. the Court reiterates the ruled that in order that a
judge may be held liable for knowingly rendering an
unjust judgment, it must be shown beyond doubt that
the judgment is unjust in the sense that it is contrary
to law or is not supported by the evidence and the
same was made with conscious and deliberate intent
to do an injustice. The rule requires that the judgment
should be unjust for being contrary to law and for not
being supported by the evidence. In the case at bar, to
determine whether or not the decision of the
respondent Judge in Civil Case C-2052 constitutes an
unjust judgment would involve more than a mere
cursory reading of the decision itself or its comparison
with this Court's decisions invoked by the complainant.
To delve into the different factors bearing on the issues
raised in Civil Case C-2052 considered by the
respondent Judge in arriving at his conclusions set
forth in the decision in question for purposes of
ascertaining the factual, legal and jurisprudential bases
of the said decision, would be tantamount to pre-
empting the Court of Appeals of its appellate
jurisdiction over the case, considering that the same is
pending before it. Indeed, this Court stated in Gahol vs.
Hon. Riodique that "only after the appellate court
holds in a final judgment that a trial judge's alleged
errors were committed deliberately and in bad faith
may a charge of knowingly rendering an unjust
decision be levelled against a trial judge." For, through
an appeal, an aggrieved party can always point out, for
rectification by the appellate court, the errors in the
alleged unjust judgment affecting him. The rule also
requires that the judgment should be rendered by the
judge with conscious and deliberate intent to do an
injustice. In the case at bar, the complainant failed to
show any unmistakable indication that bad faith
motivated the alleged unjust actuations of the
respondent judge in Civil Case C-2052. Absent, thus,
any positive evidence on record that the respondent
Judge rendered the judgment in question with
conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice, the
compliant must fall.
BAN HUA U. FLORES V OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN AND ATTY. ENRIQUE L. FLORES, JR.
GR NO. 136769, SEPT. 17, 2002
ISSUE:
Whether the Office of the Ombudsman committed
grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint
against private respondent for violation of Article 204
of the Revised Penal Code and Section 3 (e) of RA 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.
FACTS:
A complaint against the Ban Hua Flores for accounting
and turnover of corporate funds of UBS Marketing was
instituted by Johnny K. H. Uy with the Securities and
Exchange Commission. Petitioner moved for the
dismissal of the case on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction which was denied. Likewise denied was the
appeal filed with the SEC en banc. A judgment was
rendered in favor of the complainant. Petitioner Flores
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and company then appealed to the SEC en banc which
reversed the decision except the order of accounting.
A criminal complaint was then filed by the petitioner
alleging that Hearing Officer Enrique Flores rendered
an unjust judgment under Art. 204 of the RPC and
violating Sec. 3 of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act) which was dismissed by the Office of
Ombudsman for insufficiency of evidence ratiocinating
that there was no showing that the decision was
rendered maliciously and deliberately to do an injustice
to the complainant and that the error was committed
in good faith pursuant to the principle of regularity in
the performance of official functions. It was well settled
that a judicial officer, when required to exercise his
judgment or discretion is not criminally liable for any
error which he commits provided he acts in good faith.
Even though the complainant had been
inconvenienced because of the decision of the
respondent, such inconvenience did not amount to
causing undue injury under Sec. 3 of RA 3019, not only
because there is no showing of evident bad faith or
inexcusable negligence but because the decision
appealed to the SEC en banc was immediately
corrected, hence said decision did not become final
and executory. Petitioner moved for the
reconsideration which was likewise denied. Hence this
petition where petitioner contends that public
respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing the complaint, alleging that the decision
was not made in good faith since the case did not
involve a complex question of law but was a plain
violation of simple rules of procedure and that
petitioner and her family suffered undue injury as
result of the decision, making respondent liable under
Sec. 3 of RA 3019.
HELD:
No. There is grave abuse of discretion where the
respondent acts in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or
despotic manner in the exercise of his judgment,13 as
when the assailed order is bereft of any factual and
legal justifications. In this case, the Court found that the
assailed resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman
dismissing the complaint against private respondent
was legally justified. This is so because before one can
be held liable under Article 204 of the Revised Penal
Code and Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, the person subject
of the complaint must be shown to have committed
the act in bad faith. It was held in Guerrero vs. Villamor,
296 SCRA 88, 98 (1998), that a judge will be held liable
for rendering an unjust judgment where he acts in bad
faith, malice, revenge or some other similar motive. In
Ingco vs. Sandiganbayan, 272 SCRA 563, 574 (1997),
the Court clearly indicated, as one of the elements of
the offense under Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, that the
public officer complained of should have acted with
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. In this case, the Office of the
Ombudsman did not find private respondent in bad
faith, hence, the important element for the above
offenses is wanting. Notice should also be made of the
fact that under Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code,
the offender must be a judge. In this case, the alleged
offender is a hearing officer of the SEC. Neither does

the assailed resolution lack factual justification because
petitioner failed to overcome the burden of proof to
show private respondent’s bad faith.
February 8, 2018 – Article 205 – JUDGMENT
RENDERED THROUGH NEGLIGENCE
DIZON, Roxan Danica G.
EVANGELISTA VS BAES
61 SCRA 475 DECEMBER 26, 1974
ISSUE:
Whether or not a judge may be held liable for abuse of
discretion
FACTS:
Judge Baes is charged with knowingly, or by reason of
inexcusable negligence or ignorance, rendering unjust
orders.
In CAR Case No. 959 Judge De Guzman authorized
landholder Jose Tan Kapoe to eject his tenant Silvestre
Masa. On May 8, 1963 Masa's counsel moved to
reconsider; Judge Macalino, then the presiding judge,
ordered the clerk of court to furnish a copy of the
motion to Tan Kapoe's counsel. As no opposition to the
motion was interposed, Judge Macalino reconsidered
Judge De Guzman's decision, and rendered on
February 20, 1964 a decision denying the petition for
ejectment of Masa and adjudging a leasehold system
of tenancy between Tan Kapoe and Masa. Three and a
half years later, Judge Macalino, on petition of Masa,
rendered a supplemental decision fixing the rental on
the holding. On April 2, 1968 Tan Kapoe moved for
reconsideration of not only the supplemental decision
but also the decision of February 20, 1964. Judge Baes
granted Tan Kapoe's motion for reconsideration, with
the justification that Judge De Guzman's prior decision
had become final and executory allegedly because the
motion for its reconsideration that was granted by
Judge Macalino was fatally defective for lack of proof
of service.
Judge Baes' justification for his orders of June 11, 1968
and October 8, 1969 was rejected in Masa vs. Baes, et
al., L-29784, May 21, 1969, 28 SCRA 263, where this
Court held, inter alia, that the alleged non-service upon
Tan Kapoe of a copy of Masa's motion to reconsider
Judge De Guzman's decision "is belied by the record"
and that Tan Kapoe was in estoppel to deny his receipt
of a copy of the motion for reconsideration.
HELD:
While Judge Baes acted in abuse of discretion in
issuing the orders complained of, it does not
necessarily follow that he acted in bad faith or that his
abuse of discretion signifies ignorance of the law in his
part. Abuse of discretion signifies ignorance of the law
on his part. Abuse of discretion by a trial court does
not necessarily mean ulterior motive, arbitrary conduct
or willful disregard of a litigant's rights.
YARANON VS JUDGE RUBIO
66 SCRA 67 August 7, 1975
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ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Rubio can be held liable for an
error in judgment
FACTS:
This is an administrative complaint against respondent
Judge Antonio Rubio of the Municipality of Inopacan
Leyte for alleged (1) incompetence and/or ignorance
of the law and (2) delaying justice. Complainant, Atty.
Yaranon filed a charge of estafa with respondent's
court against the spouses Puzon, his tenants or
overseers who had earlier filed a case against him and
his wife for reinstatement, which said complainant
eventually lost. Complainant accused said tenants with
having failed to account for agricultural items given to
them in trust. After due trial wherein the only witness
of complainant was himself, respondent acquitted the
accused. Complainant charges that said decision of
acquittal constitutes knowingly rendering an unjust
and/or unfair decision.
HELD:
The Court was satisfied that absent any evidence of ill-
motive or improper consideration, the same cannot by
itself prove the charge laid against respondent. The
decision discusses creditably the evidence of the
parties and the Court see no indication therein of any
untoward factor that could have induced respondent
to be unfair to complainant. The latter may have a
different view of his case, but mere error of judgment,
assuming its existence, and the Court hold that here
there was none, cannot serve as basis for a charge of
knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, there being
no proof or even allegation of bad faith.
TOMAS CLAUDIO MEMORIAL COLLEGE, INC. vs
COURT OF APPEALS and PEDRO NATIVIDAD
G.R. No. 152568 February 16, 2004
ISSUE:
Whether the CA committed a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction when it
modified the decision of the NLRC and ordered the
petitioner to pay backwages to the private respondent.
FACTS:
Private respondent Pedro Natividad was working with
petitioner Tomas Claudio Memorial College (TCMC) as
"Liason Officer" of the school. On June 10, 1996, the
private respondent was arrested by the Morong police
authorities, without any warrant therefore, for violation
of the Dangerous Drugs Act. A criminal complaint was
later filed against him. A preliminary investigation was
conducted which found probable cause to hold him for
trial. The court, on the said date, issued a warrant for
the private respondent’s arrest. The records were
elevated to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of
Rizal. In the interim, the petitioner sent a Memorandum
to the private respondent informing him that his
employment was already terminated.
On July 5, 1996, the private respondent posted a bail
bond. He did not, however, file any complaint against

the petitioner with the NLRC on account of his
dismissal.
On October 2, 1996, the State Prosecutor issued a
Resolution dismissing the criminal complaint filed
against the private respondent for lack of merit.
On November 21, 1996, the private respondent was
arrested anew by police authorities. The Morong Chief
of Police filed a criminal complaint for violation of
Section 27, Article III of Rep. Act No. 6425. On February
17, 1997, an Information therefore was filed with the
RTC. On said date, the private respondent posted a bail
bond and was released from detention.
On June 11, 1997, the private respondent filed a
complaint with the NLRC against the petitioner for
illegal dismissal.
On November 10, 1998, Acting Executive Labor Arbiter
Ramos, rendered a decision dismissing the complaint
for lack of legal basis.
The private respondent appealed the decision to the
NLRC which affirmed the same. However, on certiorari
with the Court of Appeals, the appellate court affirmed,
with modification, the decision of the NLRC, holding
that although there was a valid cause for the private
respondent’s dismissal, the petitioner did not follow
the procedure for the termination of his employment.
The CA ordered the petitioner to pay backwages to the
private respondent from June 13, 1996 up to the
finality of the said decision.
The petitioner assails the decision of the CA in this
Court. Among his contentions was that:
The Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion and
authority when it knowingly rendered a decision which
is bias, unfair & unjust, a violation of Art. 205 of the
Revised Penal Code in relation to Sec (2) (e) of RA 3019
(anti-graft law), hence the decision is void.
HELD:
No.
The public respondent acts without jurisdiction if he
does not have the legal power to determine the case.
There is excess of jurisdiction when the public
respondent, being clothed with the power to
determine the case, oversteps his authority as
determined by law. There is a grave abuse of discretion
where the public respondent acts in a capricious,
whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise
of its judgment as to be equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction.
In Santos v. NLRC, the Court explained that:
The normal consequences of a finding that an
employee has been illegally dismissed are, firstly, that
the employee becomes entitled to reinstatement to his
former position without loss of seniority rights and
secondly, the payment of backwages corresponding to
the period from his illegal dismissal up to actual
reinstatement. The statutory intent on this matter is
clearly discernible. Reinstatement restores the
employee who was unjustly dismissed to the position
from which he was removed, that is, to his status quo
ante dismissal, while the grant of backwages allows the
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same employee to recover from the employer that
which he had lost by way of wages as a result of his
dismissal. The two forms of relief are distinct and
separate, one from the other.
The payment of backwages is generally granted on the
ground of equity. It is a form of relief that restores the
income that was lost by reason of the unlawful
dismissal; the grant thereof is intended to restore the
earnings that would have accrued to the dismissed
employee during the period of dismissal until it is
determined that the termination of employment is for
a just cause. The award of backwages is not
conditioned on the employee’s ability or inability to, in
the interim, earn any income. While it may be true that
on June 11, 1996, the private respondent was detained
, the State Prosecutor found no probable cause for the
detention of the private respondent and resolved to
dismiss the case. The private respondent has not yet
been convicted by final judgment. Indeed, he is
presumed innocent until his guilt is proved beyond
reasonable doubt.
In fine, the Court found and held that the Decision of
the CA is in accord with law.
February 9, 2018 – Article 207 – MALICIOUS DELAY
IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
Duque, Francis Lester M
RENATO ALVARO RUPERTO vs. JUDGE TIRSO F.
BANQUERIGO, respondent.
A.M. No. MTJ-98-1154. August 26, 1998
ISSUE:
WON Judge Banquerigo can be held liable under Art
207.
FACTS:
Complainant alleges that this administrative case
stems from respondent Judge ruling in a case he filed
against the spouses Anselmo and Pacita Mojillo, for
ejectment with damages, The Mojillo spouses failed to
file their answer to the complaint within the
reglementary period. Since the case falls under the
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, herein
complainant filed a motion with the trial court to
summarily decide the case in accordance with the
aforesaid Rule. Respondent judge, however, failed to
act on the motion and, worse, he further granted
therein defendant spouses an additional ten days
within which to file their answer. The case was set for
hearing on December 14, 1995, and, thereafter, it was
again reset to March 14, 1996.
Respondent Judge in his comment stressed that he was
only an acting judge of the MCTC which had
jurisdiction over the cases in question and that he was
reporting to that court which had 226 pending cases,
only twice a week. The subject ejectment case was filed
in August, 1995. Considering that there were several
cases filed with said MCTC, the case was set for hearing
on March 14, 1996 allegedly as agreed upon by the
parties and their counsel. He claims that his failure to
act on the motion of complainant to decide the case in

accordance with Section 6 of the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure was because, in the interest of
justice and equity, he believed that said motion should
be set for hearing.
HELD:
No. The Court held that although Judge Banquerigo
failed to comply with what is specifically required as a
judicial duty. The ejectment case filed by complainant
against the defendant spouses therein clearly falls
under the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. SEC. 6.
(Effect of failure to answer) hereof provides-- Should
the defendant fail to answer the complaint within the
period, the court, motu proprio, or on motion of the
plaintiff, shall render judgment as may be warranted by
the facts alleged in the complaint and limited to what
is prayed for therein...
The court however, believe that respondent judge
should be merely reprimanded, in view of the fact that
he was not only detailed to the court where the cases
herein involved were pending, but also to other courts.
Such multiple assignments, in one way or another,
affected his efficient handling of cases. In addition,
there was no showing of malice, corrupt motives or
improper considerations on the part of respondent
judge which would justify the imposition of a more
severe penalty, or that he has heretofore been found
guilty of any administrative offense.
RAFAEL SALCEDO vs. MUNICIPAL JUDGE DAVID
ALFECHE, JR., respondent.
A.M. No. 267-MJ June 30, 1975
ISSUE:
WON Respondent Judge can be held liable as charged.
FACTS:
An administrative complaint of malicious delay in the
administration of justice filed by Rafael Salcedo against
Judge Alfeche, Jr. due to his absence from his official
position on March 5, 1971, as a consequence of which
a cash bond posted by complainant, then accused in a
pending criminal case, could not be accepted, with the
result that he was detained overnight. Respondent in
his answer claim that his absence on March 5, 1971 was
due to his having taken a vacation leave and he did not
have to report until March 6, 1971.
HELD:
No. The matter was referred to the then Executive
Judge Emigdio V. Nietes, who in his report and
recommendation stated the following: "Respondent
judge had noted in his daily time record his absence
from his station. In the absence of the municipal judge,
it is a provision in the rules of Court that the accused
may put up his bond before the municipal mayor who
is authorized to order his release in case of such bond,
reporting to the municipal judge on his return to the
office the release made. It is clear though that
immediately after he took cognizance of the fact that
the accused was apprehended and ready to put up his
bail, he immediately ordered his release on March 6
when he reported to the office the next day. In other
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words, after he had knowledge of the apprehension of
the accused or his being detained, on the first
opportunity he immediately released him. There was
no motive why respondent Judge could be accused of
having wantonly prejudiced the right of the
complainant, he recommended the dismissal of the
charges.
JOHAN L.H. WINGARTS and OFELIA A. WINGARTS
vs. JUDGE SERVILLANO M. MEJIA
A.M. No. MTJ-94-1012 March 20, 1995
ISSUE:
WON respondent judge can be held liable for Article
207 of the RPC "Malicious Delay in the Administration
of Justice
FACTS:
Complainant Johan L.H. Wingarts was the accused in
MTC for malicious mischief. Respondent judge is
charged with malicious delay in the administration of
justice because the case Malicious Mischief allegedly
dragged for one year and four months.
HELD:
No. A perusal of the records reveal that while there was
a delay in hearing the case, such a delay does not
appear to be malicious nor deliberate. Firstly, while the
case appears to have been filed only on February 1,
1993, it was remanded back to respondent's sala
sometime in June 1993 and was set for hearing on July
9, 1993. Secondly, the postponements were all on
account of the absence or unavailability of the fiscal
and/or the defense counsel and not of the Judge's own
making. While Judges should not allow the parties to
control the proceedings in their Court, in the case of
respondent, he had no alternative but to grant the
postponements if only to better serve the ends of
justice. On January 10, 1994, he had to reset the
hearing as the assigned fiscal was still in the USA. On
April 21, 1994, respondent Judge issued an Order
giving the prosecution fifteen days within which to file
its position paper and thereafter, the case is deemed
submitted for decision. Counting fifteen (15) days from
April 21, 1994, the case was deemed submitted for
decision last May 6, 1994. It was decided on June 8,
1994 or barely a month after it was deemed submitted
for decision. Obviously, therefore there was no delay in
deciding the case. If at all, the delay was in the hearing
of the case and for apparently excusable grounds.
February 10, 2018 – Article 207 – PROSECUTION OF
OFFENSES; NEGLIGENCE AND TOLERANCE
FLORENTINO, Kimberly A.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS NICOLAS L. MINA
G.R. NO. L-45312 JUNE 13, 1938
ISSUE:
Whether accused violated Article 208 of the Revised
Penal Code.
FACTS:

Accused was the chief of police in Asingan,
municipality of Pangasinan. He was charged in
breached of his official duty by maliciously defaulted in
the prosecution and punishment of the violators of law
prohibiting and penalizing the game of chance called
“jueting” in that he failed to file the corresponding
criminal actions against Juan Lazo as Jueting collector.
HELD:
Yes. Under Article 208 of the Revised Penal Code, any
public officers or officer of the law, who, in dereliction
of the duties of his office, shall maliciously refrain from
instituting prosecution for the punishment of the
violators of law, or shall tolerate the commission of
offenses shall be punished.
In this case, the accused being the chief of police was
proven to have failed to prosecute the jueting collector
who was caught possessing jueting lists, was held
liable.
BEATRIZ RAMOS VDA DE BAGATUA, ET AL. VS
PEDRO A. REVILLA AND LEONIAS S. LOMBOS
G. R. NO. L- 12247 AUGUST 26, 1958
ISSUE:
Whether the City Attorney and Assistant City Attorney
are liable under Article 208 of the Revised Penal Code.
FACTS:
Upon the death of her husband, Ramos donated a
parcel of land to her children. When her children
decided to subdivide the lot among themselves they
engaged the services of a real estate broker. However,
Rodrigo Bagatua accused Pangilinan real estate broker
of estafa before the City Attorney of Quezon city for
allegedly inducing them to sign papers supposedly
necessary for the subdivision of the lot that turned out
to be a deed of sale.
Upon receipt of said complaint, the Assistant City
Attorney, acting for the City Attorney, conducted a
preliminary investigation, during that time both parties
were duly represented by counsel. After the
presentation of testimonies and documentary
evidence the Assistant City Attorney recommended for
the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit.
Accordingly the complaint was dismissed.
Complainants filed a petition for mandamus seeking to
compel the City Attorney and the Assistant City
Attorney to file an information against Pangilinan for
estafa contending that in dismissing the complaint,
respondents committed grave abuse of discretion.
HELD:
No. The court held that the fiscal as a prosecuting
officer, is under no compulsion to file information
based upon complaint, where he is not convinced that
the evidence gathered or presented would warrant the
filing of an action in court. Respondents are not liable.
HILARIO SORIANO VS OMBUDSMAN SIMEON V.
MARCELINO ET. AL
G.R. NO. 163178 JANUARY 30, 2009
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ISSUE:
Whether Garcia violated Article 208 of the Revised
Penal Code.
FACTS:
Petitioner filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Manila an affidavit of complaint against Mely Palad a
bank examiner of Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas for
falsification of public document and use of falsified
document. Assistant City Prosecutor recommended
that Palad be charged in court for falsification of Public
document. First Assistant City Prosecutor
recommended the approval of the resolution.
However, upon the motion of Palad to reconsider, First
Assistant City Prosecutor recommended the reopening
of the case. Respondent approved the
recommendation to re open the case. However, in an
Indorsement, Garcia forwarded the complete records
of the case to the Chief State Prosecutor of the
Department of Justice. In September 2002, petitioner
filed an Affidavit- Compalint against Garcia for
violation of Article 208 of the Revised Penal Code.
HELD:
No, The court held in citing the case of US vs Mendoza,
23 PHIL 194 that “ The crime committed by the law
violator must be proved first. If the guilt of the law
violator is not proved, the person charged with
dereliction of duty under Article 208 of the Revised
Penal Code is not liable”.
In taking into the account of the aforementioned
jurisprudence and elements of the offense charged, it
is clear that the filing of the instant suit is still
premature considering the questioned controversy
against Palad is still pending. Even the element of
malice and deliberate intent to favor the violator of law
cannot be entrenched without Palad’s guilt for the
alleged defiance having been pronounced first.
February 12, 2018 – Article 209 – BETRAYAL OF TRUST
BY AN ATTORNEY OR SOLICITOR- REVELATION OF
SECRETS
FUENTES, Arczft Ran Z.
MA. LUISA HADJULA V. ATTY. ROCELES F.
MADIANDA
A.C. NO. 6711 (JULY 3,2007)
ISSUE:
WON there was a violation of Article 209 (2) Revealing
any of the secrets of his client learned by his in this
professional capacity.
FACTS:
Hadjula and Atty. Madianda were used to be friends as
they were colleagues at Bureau of Fire Protection
where Atty. Madianda was the Chief Legal Officer and
Hadjula was the Chief Nurse. Sometime in 1998,
Hadjula approached respondent for some legal advice.
She alleged that in their discourse, it was supposed to
be kept confidential as she disclosed personal secrets
and produced copies of a marriage contract, birth
certificate and a baptismal certificate, only to be

informed later that respondent will refer the case to her
another lawyer friend. Hadjula alleged that was
malicious because after respondent heard her case and
her secrets to she refused to take the case. Eventually,
Hadjula filed for administrative and criminal complaint
against Atty. Madianda for violation of Article 209 of
the RPC because those secrets and information were
later on used against her in a administrative case at the
Office of the Ombudsman.
HELD:
Yes. However, the Supreme Court did not upheld the
case as punishable under the Revised Penal Code even
though Atty. Madianda was found indeed to have
breached his duties of preserving the confidence of a
client. The SC reiterated in this manner: The
seriousness of the respondent’s offense
notwithstanding, the Court feels that there is room for
compassion, absent compelling evidence that the
respondent acted with ill-will. Without meaning to
condone the error of respondent’s ways, what at
bottom is before the Court is two former friends
becoming bitter enemies and filing charges and
counter-charges against each other using whatever
convenient tools and data were readily available.
Unfortunately, the personal information respondent
gathered from her conversation with complainant
became handy in her quest to even the score. At the
end of the day, it appears clear to us that respondent
was actuated by the urge to retaliate without perhaps
realizing that, in the process of giving vent to a
negative sentiment, she was violating the rule on
confidentiality. Thus, Atty. Madianda was only
REPRIMANDED by the SC in this case.
February 12, 2018 – Article 210 – DIRECT BRIBERY
IBABAO, Konrad Stephen P.
PEOPLE V. JOSELITO C. BARROZO
A.C. NO. 10207 (JULY 21, 2015)
ISSUE:
Whether the act of the accused constitute direct
bribery.
FACTS:
Disbarment Case against former Assistant Public Pros.,
Joselito C. Barrozo. Jen Valeriano, was a respondent in
several cases of estafa and was assigned to
respondent. According to Valeriano, Respondent
would resolve her cases in her favor in exchange for
P20,000.00. Hence, Valeriano went to the Office of the
State Prosecutor to report the matter. NBI then
conducted an entrapment operation where
respondent was caught red handed receiving the
P20,000.00. Sandiganbayan sentenced respondent to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of 4 years, 2 months
and 1 day of prision correccional to 9 years, 4 months
and 1 day prision mayor and a fine of P60,000.00 In
October 2013 the Office of the Bar Confidant received
a letter from Wat & Co. of Hongkong that their office
received a letter from respondent asking for long
service payment. Wat & Co. found out about
respondent’s conviction on the internet and asked the
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OBC if respondent is qualified to practice law.
Prompted by this letter, OBC recommended the
disbarment of respondent.
HELD:
Yes. Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court,
one of the grounds for the suspension or disbarment
of a lawyer is his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude. And with the finality of respondent's
conviction for direct bribery, the next question that
needs to be answered is whether direct bribery is a
crime that involves moral turpitude.
The elements of Direct Bribery:
1. the offender is a public officer;
2. the offender accepts an offer or promise or receives
a gift or present by himself or through another;
3. such offer or promise be accepted or gift or present
be received by the public officer with a view to
committing some crime, or in consideration of the
execution of an act which does not constitute a crime
but the act must be unjust, or to refrain from doing
something which it is his official duty to do; and
4. the act which the offender agrees to perform or
which he executes is connected with the performance
of his official duties.
To consider a crime as one involving moral turpitude,
the act constituting the same must have been "done
contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.
[It must involve] an act of baseness, vileness, or
depravity in the private duties which a man owes his
fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to the
accepted and customary rule of right and duty
between man and woman, or conduct contrary to
justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.
Respondent's conduct in office fell short of the
integrity and good moral character required of all
lawyers, specially one occupying a public office.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Joselito C. Barrozo is hereby
DISBARRED and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from
the Roll of Attorneys.
UNITED STATES V. RUFINO SANCHEZ
G.R. NO. 9102 (NOVEMBER 5, 1913)
ISSUE:
Whether the crime committed in this case is direct
bribery.
FACTS:
A municipal policeman pretended to arrest a person
who had in his possession a substance which he had
purchased as opium but proved to be only molasses.
The policeman knew the character of this substance
and, with this knowledge, threatened to have the said
person prosecuted for a violation of the Opium Law
unless he paid him P500. P150 was finally agreed upon
as the price which the policeman would accept to turn

him loose. Sometimes afterward Lua discovered that
what he had purchased and had been deprived of by
the two policemen was not opium at all, and the
present case is a consequence of his complaint to the
authorities.
The appellant, Rufino Sanchez contends that the crime
established by the above facts is not robbery, but
bribery.
In United States v. Gimenea (24 Phil. Rep., 464), this
court said: "Viada, vol. 2, p. 642, in discussing article
381, says that to constitute the crime of bribery as
provided in this article, four things are necessary:
(1) That the defendant be a public officer according to
the meaning of this term in article 401;
(2) that he has received either personally or through
another gifts or presents or accepted offers or
promises;
(3) that such reception of gifts or presents or
acceptance of offers or promises has been for the
purpose of executing a crime; and
(4) that the act constituting the crime relates to the
exercise of the office which the public officer
discharges.
HELD:
No. The money was not delivered to the two policemen
for the purpose of executing a crime. Had Lua been
allowed to retain possession of the molasses no law
would have been violated, nor would the two
policemen have been guilty or a noncompliance with
their official duties. Several reasons are advanced as to
why the acts of the policemen did not constitute
robbery all based upon the misconception of the
injured person as to the nature of the substance which
he had purchased as opium. It is quite true that had the
latter been aware of the true state of affairs he would
not have permitted the appellant and his companion
to force him to pay them the P150. But the guilt of the
appellant is not contingent upon the conception or
misconception of Lua as to the true state of affairs.
In the case of United States v. Flores (19 Phil. Rep., 178),
the court laid down the following doctrine: "A
policeman who, knowing that a person has committed
no crime for which he could be lawfully arrested and
tried, nevertheless arrests such person, falsely accusing
him of a crime, and then by means of threats of
presentation and imprisonment, thus playing upon his
ignorance and fear, obtains money from the said
person, secures such money by force and intimidation
and commits the crime of robbery as defined by the
Penal Code.
FEBUARY 13, 2018 – ARTICLE 211 – INDIRECT
BRIBERY
LAZO, Joseph Artfel T.
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LEONOR FORMILLEZA,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN
ISSUE:
WON the accused is guilty of indirect bribery under
article 211
FACTS:
Petitioner Formilleza has been with government
service for around 20 years as the personnel supervisor
of the regional office of the National Irrigation
Administration. (NIA)
On the other hand, Mrs. Mutia was an employee of NIA
for 7 years. Sometime in December 1983, her
appointment was terminated. Taking steps to either
obtain permanency or at least a renewed appointment
she was told to approach the petitioner who
determined if an employee is to be appointed or
promoted. However, petitioner refused to attend to
her papers unless she was given some money.
Mrs. Mutia reported the problem with the Philippine
Constabulary, Who later took steps for an entrapment.
The entrapment was a success after Mrs. Mutia handed
the marked money under the table to which petitioner
accepted the money.
Petitioner was found positive of ultra-violet powder.
Powder used in the marked money.
HELD:
No, The essential ingredient of indirect bribery as
defined in Article 211 of the Revised Penal Code is that
the public officer concerned must have accepted the
gift or material consideration. There must be a clear
intention on the part of the public officer to take the
gift so offered and consider the same as his own
property from then on, such as putting away the gift
for safekeeping or pocketing the same. Mere physical
receipt unaccompanied by any other sign,
circumstance or act to show such acceptance is not
sufficient to lead the court to conclude that the crime
of indirect bribery has been committed. To hold
otherwise will encourage unscrupulous individuals to
frame up public officers by simply putting within their
physical custody some gift, money or other property.
Moral certainty, not absolute certainty, is needed to
support a judgment of conviction, Moral certainty is a
certainty that convinces and satisfies the reason and
conscience of those who are to act upon a given
matter. 14 Without this standard of certainty, it may
not be said that the guilt of the accused in a criminal
proceeding has been proved beyond reasonable
doubt.
GREGORY JAMES POZAR, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
respondent.
ISSUE:
WON the money given was a bribe to corrupt the city
probation officer
FACTS:

Petitioner Pozar, is an American Citizen and Permanent
resident of the Philippines, Charged with the crime of
corruption of a public official. After he feloniously gave
to the city probation officer 100pesos upon his
application for probation.
RULING:
The court deduce that the procedure for processing
petitioner's application for probation in the Probation
Office at Angeles City was not precise, explicit and clear
cut And since the accused petitioner is a foreigner and
quite unfamiliar with probation rules and procedures,
there is reason to conclude that petitioner was
befuddled, if not confused so that his act of providing
and advancing the expenses for whatever
documentation was needed further to complete and
thus hasten his probation application, was
understandably innocent and not criminal.
The facts and circumstances on record amply justify
and support the claim of the defense as against the
conjectures, speculation and supposition recited in the
decision of the trial court and quoted with approval in
the appealed decision under review. The Government's
own evidence as indicated in the Post-Sentence
Investigation Report that the giving of the one
hundred pesos ( P100.00) was done in good faith, is
vital for it belies petitioner's criminal intent. There
being no criminal intent to corrupt the Probation
Officer, the accused petitioner is entitled to acquittal of
the crime charged. We hold and rule that the
prosecution has not proved the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt.
ATTY. ENRICO M. CABRERA
vs.
JUDGE JAMES B. PAJARES
ISSUE:
WON respondent judge accepted the money on
account of his office.
FACTS:
On Jan, 1985,Petitioner Enrico Cabrera denounced
Respondent Judge Pajares for having allegedly asked
money from him in connection with his case.
Petitioner was advised by his counsel to accommodate
any request for money from the respondent so that he
would not be unduly hard on the complainant. And
during the course of the case, The Respondent Judge,
told petitioner needed money. To which, petitioner
gave P1000 the next day. However, after two months
the Respondent Judge told him once again that he
needed money. It was then when the petitioner
decided to report to the authorities.
Acting on the report, NBI staged an entrapment and
used marked money. The entrapment succeeded when
the judge took the marked money from the
complainant.
RULING:
There is reason to believe that the respondent judge
accepted the money and that he knew it was being
given to him by reason of his office.
The evidence shows that after receiving the envelope
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with the money, the respondent judge did not really try
to return it to Cabrera, as he claims he did, but that
instead he placed it between the pages of his diary
Second, the plan to entrap the respondent appears to
have been cleared with the Executive Judge, Hon. Juan
B. Llaguno, before whom the complainant swore to his
statement and It is not likely that Judge Llaguno would
approve the 'frame-up' of a colleague
Investigating Justice Mendoza's above statement and
analysis of the evidence and a review of the records
fully support the finding that "respondent Judge
accepted the money and that he knew it was being
given to him by reason of his office." The Court has
time and again stressed that members of the judiciary
should display not only the highest integrity but must
at all times conduct themselves in such manner as to
be beyond reproach and suspicion.
But the Court is constrained to disapprove his
recommendation as to the first charge of indirect
bribery which is fully supported by the evidence that
respondent Judge "be suspended from office for 2
years and 4 months, taking into consideration the
penalty prescribed in art. 211 of the Revised Penal
Code." The penalty of 2 years and 4 months
imprisonment provided for the criminal offense of
indirect bribery may not be equated with the penalty
of separation from the judicial service which is the
proper applicable administrative penalty by virtue of
respondent Judge's serious misconduct prejudicial to
the judiciary and the public interest.
ACCORDINGLY, respondent Judge is hereby dismissed
from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement
benefits and pay and with prejudice to reinstatement
in any branch of the government or any of its agencies
or instrumentalities.
FEBUARY 14, 2018 – ARTICLE 212 – CORRUPTION OF
PUBLIC OFFICIALS
NASH, Regina M.
MORFE V MUTUC, 22 SCRA 424
January 31, 1968
Fernando, J.
Plaintiff-appellee: Jesus P. Morfe (Judge of CFI)
Defendants-appellants: Amelito R. Mutuc (Executive
Secretary) et al.
ISSUE/S:
Whether the periodical submission of SAL for public
officers is:
1. An oppressive exercise of police power;
2. Violative of due process and an unlawful invasion of
the right to privacy implicit in the ban against
unreasonable search and seizure construed together
with the prohibition against self-incrimination;
3. An insult to the personal integrity and official dignity
of public officials.
FACTS:
• The Law: Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act of 1960
(RA No. 3019)
• Every public officer within 30 days after its approval

or after his assumption of office “and within the month
of January of every year thereafter”, as well as upon
termination of his position, shall prepare and file with
the head of the office to which he belongs, “a true
detailed and sworn statement of assets and liabilities,
including a statement of the amounts and sources of
his income, the amounts of his personal and family
expenses and the amount of income taxes paid for the
next preceding calendar year”.
• Plaintiff Morfe, a judge of a CFI, contends that the
periodical submission “within the month of January of
every other year thereafter” of their sworn statement
of assets and liabilities (SAL) is violative of due process
as an oppressive exercise of police power and as an
unlawful invasion of the constitutional right to privacy
implicit on the ban against unreasonable search and
seizure construed together with the prohibition against
self-incrimination.
• Executive Secretary and DOJ Sec:
• Acceptance of public position = voluntary
assumption of obligation
• Merely seeks to adopt a reasonable measure of
insuring the interest of general welfare in honest and
clean public service and is therefore a legitimate
exercise of police power.
• CFI of Pangasinan held that the requirement exceeds
the permissible limit of the police power and is thus
offensive to the due process clause
RULING:
Decision reversed.
RATIO:
1. Presumption of validity
• Plaintiff asserted that the submission of SAL was a
reasonable requirement for employment so a public
officer can make of record his assets and liabilities
upon assumption of office. Plaintiff did not present
evidence to rebut the presumption of validity.
• “If the liberty involved were freedom of the mind or
the person, the standard for the validity of
governmental acts is much more rigorous and
exacting, but where the liberty curtailed affects the
most rights of property, the permissible scope of
regulatory measure is wider.” (Ermita-Malate Hotel v.
Mayor of Manila)
1. Exercise of Police power and the defense provided
by the Due Process Clause
• “inherent and plenary power in the state which
enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort,
safety and welfare of society” (Justice Malcolm)
• The power of sovereignty, the power to govern men
and things within the limits of its domain (Justice
Taney, going beyond curtailment of rights)
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• Anyone with an alleged grievance regarding the
extension of police power to regulatory action
affecting persons in public or private life can invoke the
protection of due process.
• It has been held that due process may be relied upon
by public official to protect the security of tenure which
in a limited sense is analogous to property. Therefore
he could also use due process to strike down what he
considers as an infringement of his liberty.
• Under the Constitution, the challenged provision is
allowable as long as due process is observed.
• The standard for due process is REASONABLENESS.
Test: Official action must not outrun the bounds of
reason and result in sheer oppression.
• “It would be to dwell in the realm of abstractions and
to ignore the harsh and compelling realities of public
service with its ever-present temptation to heed the
call of greed and avarice to condemn as arbitrary and
oppressive a requirement as that imposed upon public
officials and employees to file such sworn statement of
assets and liabilities every two years after having done
so upon assuming office…There was therefore no
unconstitutional exercise of police power.”
1. Right to privacy
• Right to be let alone
• “It cannot be said that the challenged statutory
provision calls for disclosure of information which
infringes on the right of a person to privacy. It cannot
be denied that the rational relationship such a
requirement possesses with the objective of a valid
statute goes very far in precluding assent to an
objection of such character. This is not to say that a
public officer, by virtue of position he holds, is bereft
of constitutional protection; it is only to emphasize that
in subjecting him to such a further compulsory
revelation of his assets and liabilities, including the
statement of the amounts of personal and family
expenses, and the amount of income taxes paid for the
next preceding calendar year, there is no
unconstitutional intrusion into what otherwise would
be a private sphere.”
1. Unreasonable Search and Seizure
• The constitutional guarantee against unreasonable
search and seizure does not give freedom from
testimonial compulsion.
1. Right against self-incrimination
• We are not aware of any constitutional provision
designed to protect a man’s conduct from judicial
inquiry, or aid him in fleeing from justice.
1. Insult to personal integrity and official dignity

• Only congressional power or competence, not the
wisdom of the action taken, mey be the basis for
declaring a statute invalid.
OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN v. Rainier Espina
GR No. 213500, Mar 15, 2017
ISSUE:
Whether or not Espina should be held administratively
liable for the charges imputed against him? Was he
guilty of graft and corruption due to gross negligence
in signing procurement documents without proper
inspection.
FACTS:
On July 11 and 17, 2012, petitioner the Fact-Finding
Investigation Bureau (FFIB) of the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for the Military and Other Law
Enforcement Offices (MOLEO) filed before the
Ombudsman an affidavit-complaint and a
supplemental complaint, respectively, charging Espina
and several other PNP officers and private individuals
for: (a) violation of Republic Act No. (RA) 7080 Anti -
Graft and Corruption Practices Act, RA 3019, RA 9184
and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR), and
Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification of
Public Documents under Article 217 in relation to
Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC); and (b)
Grave Misconduct and Serious Dishonesty; arising from
alleged anomalies that attended the Philippine
National Police's (PNP) procurement of 40 tires, and
repair, refurbishment, repowering, and maintenance
services of a total of 28 units of V-150 Light Armored
Vehicles (LAVs), and the related transportation and
delivery expenses of 18 units of LAYs between August
and December 2007.It averred that the PNP did not
comply with the bidding procedure prescribed under
RA 9184 and its IRR, in that: (a) copies of the bid
documents were not furnished to possible bidders; (b)
no pre-procurement and pre-bid conferences were
held; (c) the invitation to bid was not published in a
newspaper of general circulation; (d) the procuring
agency did not require the submission of eligibility
requirements as well as the technical and financial
documents from the bidders; and (e) no post
qualification was conducted. Further, it claimed that
there were "ghost deliveries," i.e., the tires were never
delivered to the PNP and no repair and refurbishment
works were actually performed on the LAVs.
In a Joint Resolution dated December 19, 2012, the
Ombudsman found probable cause to indict Espina
and several other PNP officers for violation of Section
3 (e) of RA 3019, Section 65 (b) (4) of RA 9184, and for
Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification
under Article 217 in relation to Article 171 of the RPC.
The Ombudsman also found them guilty of Grave
Misconduct and Serious Dishonesty and, accordingly,
recommended their dismissal from government
services.
Misconduct generally means wrongful, improper or
unlawful conduct motivated by a premeditated,
obstinate or intentional purpose. It is intentional
wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or
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standard of behavior and to constitute an
administrative offense, the misconduct should relate to
or be connected with the performance of the official
functions and duties of a public officer. It is a
transgression of some established and definite rule of
action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross
negligence by a public officer.
RULED:
Rainier A. Espina is GUILTY of GROSS NEGLECT OF
DUTY. Accordingly, he is DISMISSED from government
service with all the accessory penalties.
FEBUARY 15, 2018 – ARTICLE 213 – FRAUDS AGAINST
THE PUBLIC TREASURY AND SIMILAR OFFENSES
OLACO, Jan-Lawrence P.
SOLEDAD V. GANADEN VS. GREGORIO N.
BOLASCO
Adm. Matter No. P-124, May 16, 1975
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Bolasco is liable under Article 213
of the RPC.
FACTS:
Gregorio N. Bolasco, who was Deputy Provincial Sheriff
of the Court of First Instance of Zambales is charged by
complainant, Soledad V. Ganaden, a stenographer of
the same court, with dishonesty by demanding P13.00
as sheriff's fee in civil case, entitled "Carmen Flores vs.
Leonardo Frondarina," but issuing therefor a receipt for
a lesser amount and by issuing a private receipt for
P50.00 to plaintiff Paulino Padua in a civil case for the
service of a writ of execution but failed to make a
return of said writ. Bolasco was also charged with
misconduct by delaying the service of summons upon
Paulita Esteban and entrusting its service to her
nephew, Atty. Eduardo Balaoing, Jr..
HELD:
YES. Bolasco committed illegal exaction penalized by
paragraph 2(b) of Article 213 of the RPC for failure to
issue receipts for money collected by him officially.
In this case, on two occasions, Bolasco received certain
amounts in connection with the performance of his
duties as deputy sheriff without issuing the
corresponding official receipts. First, was on February
3, 1971, counsel for plaintiff in a civil case gave
respondent P12.60 for sheriff’s fee for service of the
complaint and summons thereof upon the defendants.
Bolasco received said amount before the summons to
be served were delivered to him for service, in spite of
the standing instruction from the clerk of court and the
provincial sheriff not to accept any payment if no
official receipts are available. Bolasco did not issue the
official receipt even after he had received the booklet
of official receipts February 5 or 6, 1971. Lastly,
respondent also received, again without issuing the
corresponding official receipt, P50.00 from plaintiff for
service of a writ of execution issued in connection in
another civil case. Proof of receipt of said amount is
respondent's private receipt. Hence, a collecting officer

should issue official receipts and not mere private
receipts.
ARIEL C. VALLEJO vs HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS
G.R. No. 156413 April 14, 2004
ISSUE:
Whether or not Vallejo is liable
FACTS:
Ariel Vallejo is a lawyer in the Register of Deeds of the
province of Isabela. Franklin M. Javier, a National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) agent, filed a sworn
application for search warrant before the Regional Trial
Court of Iligan which briefly requests that a Search
Warrant be issued on the Office of the Registry of
Deeds, Provincial Capitol, Alibaga, Iligan for the
purpose of seizing the following documents:
01. Undetermined number of FAKE LAND TITLES,
Official Receipts in the Cashier's Office, Judicial Form
No. 39 known as Our Primary Entry Book under no. 496
and other pertinent documents related therewith;
02. Blank Forms of Land Titles kept inside the drawers
of every table of employees of the Registry of Deeds;
03. Undetermined number of Land Transfer
transactions without the corresponding payment of
Documentary Stamps and Capital Gains Tax.
That all of the said documents are being used or
intended to be used in the commission of a felony that
is FALSIFICATION OF LAND TITLES under Article 171
RPC, Article 213 RPC and R.A. 3019 (Anti-Graft) and are
hidden or being kept in the said office.
HELD:
NO. The charged imputed upon Vallejo should be
dismissed and the seized items be returned.
The questioned warrant in this case is a scatter-shot
warrant for having been issued for more than one
offense - Falsification of Land Titles under Article 171
and Article 213 of the RPC, and violation of Rep. Act
No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act. A warrant must be issued upon
probable cause in connection with one specific offense.
In fact, a careful perusal of the application for the
warrant shows that the applicant did not allege any
specific act performed by the petitioner constituting a
violation of any of the aforementioned offenses. Thus,
the questioned warrant must be struck down for
having been issued in contravention of the 1987
Constitution, the Rules of Criminal Procedure, and
existing jurisprudence consequently the charged
against Vallejo must be dismissed.
FEBUARY 16, 2018 – ARTICLE 214 – OTHER FRAUDS
PACQUIAO, Jose Luis P.
FRANCISCO AND LENLIE LECAROZ V.
SANDIGANBAYAN AND PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 130872 (MARCH 25, 1999)
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ISSUE:
Whether or not accused Francisco and Lenlie Lecaroz
are guilty of Estafa through falsification of public
documents, and thereby convicting them also under
Article 214 of the Revised Penal Code
FACTS:
Francisco Lecaroz is the Municipal Mayor of Santa Cruz,
Marinduque. Lenlie Lecaroz, the former’s son, was the
outgoing chairman of Kabataang Barangay (KB) of
Santa Cruz and member of Sangguniang Bayan (SB)
representing the federation of KBs. Jowil Red won as
Chairman of Barangay Santa Cruz in the 1985 KB
elections. Lenlie did not run as candidate as he was no
longer qualified, having passed the age limit.
Jowil Red was appointed by President Marcos as
member of SB of Santa Cruz, representing the
federation of KBs. He received his appointment powers
when President Aquino was already in power. However,
he was not allowed by Mayor Lecaroz to sit as sectoral
representative in the SB. Subsequently, Mayor Lecaroz
prepared and approved on different dates the
payment to Lenlie Lecaroz of payrolls covering period
of January 1987 to January 1987.
Red assumed position of KB presidency upon
expiration of term of Lenlie Lecaroz. It was alleged that
Lenlie continued to receive salary even after his term
has expired. The Sandiganbayan convicted the
accused, on 13 Information for Estafa through
Falsification of Public Documents, and perpetual
special disqualification from public office in
accordance with Article 214 of the Revised Penal Code.
HELD
No. The offenses of which petitioners were convicted
under Article 171, paragraph 4, of The Revised Penal
Code, are intentional felonies for which liability
attaches only when it is shown that the malefactors
acted with criminal intent or malice. If what is proven is
mere judgmental error on the part of the person
committing the act, no malice or criminal intent can be
rightfully imputed to him. There was no criminal intent
demonstrated to justify petitioner’s conviction.
Moreover, the decision of the Sandiganbayan of the
accused’s perpetual special disqualification from public
office in accordance with Article 214 of the Revised
Penal Code, does not stand.
Petitioners have been convicted for falsification of
public documents through an untruthful narration of
facts under Article 171, paragraph 4, of The Revised
Penal Code. For the offense to be established, the
following elements must concur: (a) the offender
makes in a document statements in a narration of facts;
(b) the offender has a legal obligation to disclose the
truth of the facts narrated; (c) the facts narrated by the
offender are absolutely false; and, (d) the perversion of
truth in the narration of facts was made with the
wrongful intent of injuring a third person. The first and
third elements of the offense have not been
established in this case.
UNITED STATES V. FLORENCIO TORRIDA

G.R. NO. 7450, 7451 AND 7452 (SEPTEMBER 18,
1912)
ISSUE
Whether or not the penalty under Article 214 is
applicable to accused Torrida.
FACTS
Torrida, as part of his councilman duties in the town of
Aparri, Cagayan Province, gave directions to his
subordinates that the death of all large animals must
be reported by the owners to him as councilman. These
orders were conveyed to the people as directed.
Several individuals lost their carabaos. Upon the
receipt of this information, appellant Torrida informed
these owners that they must pay a fine of P5 for each
animal, these fees to be turned into the municipality by
him. The owners, believing that the municipality had
provided for the payment of such fines, turned over to
the appellant five pesos for each animal that died.
There was no provision whatever made by the
municipality or any other entity for the imposition of
such fines. These facts clearly constitute the crime of
Estafa as defined and penalized in paragraph 1, article
535, in relation with paragraphs 1, article 534, Penal
Code. Torrida was charged with three separates crimes
of Estafa in three separate actions, tried and found
guilty in each case.
HELD
Yes. When the councilor, Torrida in this case, takes
advantage of his official position in committing Estafa,
the disqualification mentioned in Article 399 (now
Article 214 of the Revised Penal Code) is a part of the
penalty to be imposed.
The fact that the appellant was councilman at the time
placed him in a position to commit these crimes. If he
had not been councilman, he could not have induced
the injured parties to pay these alleged fines. It was on
account of his being councilman that the parties
believed that he had the right to collect fines and it was
for this reason that they made the payments. It is true
that he had no right to either impose or collect any
fines whatsoever. It is also true that a municipal
councilman is not an official designated by law to
collect public fines. But these facts do not destroy or
disprove the important fact that the accused did by
taking advantage of his public position, deceive and
defraud the injured parties out of the money which
they paid him.
UNITED STATES V. JUSTO DACUYCUY
G.R. NO. L-3873 (OCTOBER 18, 1907)
ISSUE
Whether or not accused Dacuycuy is liable under
Article 214 of the Revised Penal Code.
FACTS
On December 1906, the provincial fiscal of Ilocos Norte
filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of said
province accusing Justo Dacuycuy of the crime of
Estafa, stating that the said accused, being a public
official and taking advantage of his office of councilor
for the municipality of Bacarra, Ilocos Norte, received
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the sum of P39 from the residents of his district, for the
purpose of investing the money in cedulas, and failed
to invest said sum in cedulas or return the same to the
owners thereof, and misapplied it and converted it to
his own use to the prejudice of the several residents.
The court sentenced Dacuycuy to the penalty of two
months and one day of arresto mayor, to suffer the
accessory penalties, to indemnify the individuals
residing in the barrio of Oangagan, town of Bacarra of
said province. From this sentence the accused has
appealed.
In his testimony, the accused Dacuycuy confessed to
having received from several residents of the barrio,
the said sum of P39 to purchase an equal number of
cedulas, but denied that he had gone over to the said
barrio in order to collect taxes, and further stated that
he was there enjoying a vacation when the residents
handed him the money for the purchase of their
respective cedulas, but that he was unable to get the
cedulas because at the municipal treasury one person
was not permitted to take out a cedula for another.
HELD
No. Since the councilor committed the crime of Estafa
as a private individual, it is not proper to impose on
him the penalty provided by Article 399 (now Article
214) of the Revised Penal Code for public officers,
because he received the money not on the exercise of
his functions as a councilor.
When a public officer commits a common crime
independent of his official functions and does acts that
are not connected with the duties of his office, he
should be punished with the penalty which the law
imposes on the private individual who violates its
provisions, without taking into account the official
character with which the guilty party is invested.
February 17, 2018 – Article 215 – PROHIBITED
TRANSACTIONS
[NO CASE FOUND]
February 17, 2018 – Article 216 – POSSESSION OF
PROHIBITED INTEREST BY A PUBLIC OFFICER
PANIZA, Lyndzelle Jane D.
THE UNITED STATES v. CLEMENTE UDARBE
G.R. No. 9945. November 12, 1914
ARAULLO, J.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Municipal President Urdabe became
interested in any business in which it was his official
duty to intervene.
FACTS:
Urdabe was appointed as the Municipal President of
the Municipality of Magsingal and while on duty as
said president, the Municipal Council on and under his
presidency, approved and passed Regulation No. 7 for
the leasing of fishponds in the said municipality.
When the auction for the different sections of said
fishponds was held in the town hall of the municipality,
it was recorded that Urdabe, who presided over the

auction, took part in the bidding for one particular
section of the fishponds and that section was
adjudicated to him as the highest bidder for the sum
of two pesos a year.
HELD:
Yes. Municipal President Urdabe became interested
and took direct part in the leasing of property of the
Municipality of Magsingal, wherein he had to intervene
by reason of his office as president of said Municipality,
and he has therefore openly violated the provisions of
Section 28 of the Municipal Code which states that:
"No municipal officer shall be directly or indirectly
interested in any contract work, or cockpits, or any
other permitted games and amusements, or business
of the municipality, or in the purchase of any real estate
or any other property belonging to the corporation.”
MACARIOLA v. ASUNCION
Adm. Case No. 133-J. May 31, 1982
MAKASIAR, J.:
ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Asuncion intervened in his
official capacity in the transactions of Traders
Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc.
FACTS:
Judge Asuncion rendered a decision pertaining to a
partition of the estate of Francisco Diaz. One of the lots
of the said estate was sold to the spouses Galapon. A
year after, spouses Galapon sold such lot to Traders
Manufacturing and Fishing Industries Inc. wherein, at
the time of the sale, Judge Asuncion was the
stockholder’s president of the corporation.
Consequently, Bernardita Macariola, one of the heirs of
Diaz and who was against of the partition of the estate,
contended that Judge Asuncion intervened in his
official capacity in the business or transactions of
Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc.
when he rendered the decision concerning the
partition of the estate.
HELD:
No. There was no showing that Judge Asuncion
participated or intervened in his official capacity in the
business or transactions of the Traders Manufacturing
and Fishing Industries, Inc.
The business of the corporation in which Judge
Asuncion participated has obviously no relation or
connection with his judicial office. The business of said
corporation is not that kind where Judge Asuncion
intervenes or takes part in his capacity as Judge of the
Court of First Instance. As was held in one case
involving the application of Article 216 of the Revised
Penal Code which is a prohibition on public officers
against directly or indirectly becoming interested in
any contract or business in which it is his official duty
to intervene," (I)t is not enough to be a public official
to be subject to this crime: it is necessary that by reason
of his office, he has to intervene in said contracts or
transactions; and, hence, the official who intervenes in
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contracts or transactions which have no relation to his
office cannot commit this crime."
February 18, 2018 – Article 217 – MALVERSATION OF
PUBLIC FUNDS OR PROPERTY - PRESUMPTION OF
MALVERSATION
RIVERA, Marynit P.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. LICERION P.
SENDAYDIEGO, JUAN SAMSON AND ANASTACIO
QUIRIMIT
G.R. NO. L-33254 JANUARY 20, 1978
ISSUE:
Whether or not Samson is guilty of malversation under
Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code
FACTS:
In 1969, Sendaydiego, the provincial treasurer of
Pangasinan, in conspiracy with Samson, an employee
of a lumber and hardware store in Dagupan City, used
6 forged provincial vouchers to evidence fictitious sales
of construction materials in order to embezzle from the
road and bridge fund the total sum of P57,048.23.
Samson hand-carried the vouchers and followed-up
their processing in the offices of the provincial
government and received the cash payments.
HELD:
Yes. Samson is a co-principal in the six crimes of
malversation because he conspired with the provincial
treasurer in committing those offenses. The trial court
correctly ruled that a private person conspiring with an
accountable public officer in committing malversation
is also guilty of malversation.
CECILIA U. LEGRAMA v. SANDIGANBAYAN and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 178626, June 13, 2012
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner Cecilia Legrama is guilty of
the crime of malversation under Article 217 of the
Revised Penal Code
FACTS:
The Office of the Provincial Auditor of the Commission
on Audit (COA) for the Province of Zambales issued
PAO Office No. 96-09 directing an Audit to conduct an
examination of the cash and account of petitioner
Cecilia Legrama, the Municipal Treasurer of the
Municipality of San Antonio, Zambales. After the audit,
the COA prepared a Special Cash Examination Report
on the Cash and Accounts of Ms. Cecilia U. Legrama.
The report contained the findings that petitioners cash
accountability was short of P289,022.75 and that there
was an unaccounted Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA)
in the amount of P863,878.00, thereby showing a total
shortage in the amount of P1,152,900.75. Included in
the shortage is the amount of P709,462.80,
representing the total amount of various sales invoices,
chits, vales, and disbursement vouchers, which were
disallowed in the audit for lack of supporting
documents. From the total amount of the shortage,

petitioner was able to restitute the initial amount of
P60,000.00. Petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan
failed to consider the testimonial and documentary
exhibits presented to support her claim that she did
not appropriate or misappropriate for her use and
benefit the subject fund nor did she allow her co-
accused to use the said fund without the proper
acknowledgment such as receipts, vales or sign chits.
Petitioner maintains that she has satisfactorily
explained the shortage on the basis of the
documentary evidence submitted.
HELD:
Malversation may be committed by appropriating
public funds or property; by taking or misappropriating
the same; by consenting, or through abandonment or
negligence, by permitting any other person to take
such public funds or property; or by being otherwise
guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such
funds or property. The essential elements common to
all acts of malversation under Article 217 of the Revised
Penal Code are:
(a) That the offender be a public officer;
(b) That he had the custody or control of funds or
property by reason of the duties of his office;
(c) That those funds or property were public funds or
property for which he was accountable; and
(d) That he appropriated, took, misappropriated or
consented, or through abandonment or negligence,
permitted another person to take them.
In the case at bar, after the government auditors
discovered the shortage and informed petitioner of the
same, petitioner failed to properly explain or justify the
shortage that was subject to her accountability.
Petitioner denied that she put the amount involved to
personal use and presented various sales invoice, chits,
vale forms, and disbursement voucher to prove her
claim. Petitioner even went further by testifying that
the total amount of P681,000.00 appearing in a
disbursement voucher were cash advances given to the
mayor during the height of the Mt. Pinatubo eruption.
However, the date when the eruption occurred was
way before the period subject of the audit.
Undoubtedly, all the elements of the crime are present
in the case at bar. Hence, the petitioner is guilty of the
crime of malversation under Article 217 of the RPC.
February 21, 2018 – Article 218 – FAILURE OF
ACCOUNTABLE OFFICER TO RENDER ACCOUNTS
ROMBLON, Shirley Kris M.
FLORENCIO B. CAMPOMANES vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
DECEMBER 19,2006
ISSUE:
Whether or not Campomanes is guilty of failure to
render accounts as defined in Article 218 of the Revised
Penal Code.
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FACTS:
During the period material to the Information of this
case, accused Cecilio G. Hechanova was the Chairman
of the Philippine Sports Commission (PSC) and
Florencio B. Campomanes was the President of the
Federation International Des Echecs (FIDE), a private
international organization with offices at Lausanne,
Switzerland. On 6 March 1991,the Philippine Sports
Commission submitted to FIDE a bid offer to host the
30th Chess Olympiad of 1992 in Manila.The PSC’s bid
offer was accepted by FIDE, and accordingly the
Philippine government thru the PSC was granted the
right to organize and host the 30th World Chess
Olympiad in Manila from June 6-25, 1992. From
October 1990 to June 1992 the PSC, also complying
with its obligations under the bid offer, remitted to
FIDE – received in FIDE’s behalf by its President,
Florencio Campomanes – the total amount of
P12,876,008.00 in connection with the 30th World
Chess Olympiad in Manila. The amount of
P12,876,008.00 was acknowledged as having been
received by FIDE as shown by a letter dated December
22, 1995 of Willy Iclicki, FIDE Treasurer. The
Commission on Audit (COA) conducted an audit of the
PSC’s transactions from March 1990 up to June 1992.
The COA team noticed irregularities in the claims
payable to the FIDE. The irregularities consisted of the
lack of acknowledgment receipts and of accounting
liquidation attached to the disbursement vouchers.
The COA defined an acknowledgment receipt as an
official receipt evidencing that the FIDE received the
funds from the PSC. The COA invited the PSC officials
to an exit conference on 27 October 1993. During the
conference, the COA submitted its team’s findings to
the PSC and requested for the PSC’s comment on the
matter. In the absence of the PSC’s comment, the COA
prepared SAO Report No. 93-27. The report stated that
the FIDE, through Campomanes, received P12,876,008
without acknowledgment and without liquidation.
Hechanova and Campomanes were charged as of fail
to render account on the disbursement thereof, within
the period provided for by law and the rules and
regulations of the Commission on Audit. The
Sandiganbayan acquitted Hechanova on the basis of
proof beyond reasonable doubt while convicted
Campomanes of the crime of failure to render accounts
as defined in Article 218 in relation to Article 222 of the
Revised Penal Code.
RULING:
NO. There are four elements of the crime under Article
218. First, the offender is a public officer. Second, he
must be an accountable officer for public funds or
property. Third, the offender is required by law or
regulation to render accounts to the COA, or to a
provincial auditor. Fourth, he fails to render an account
for a period of two months after such accounts should
be rendered. Campomanes is clearly not a public
officer. He is the president of the FIDE, a private foreign
corporation with whom the PSC, through Hechanova,
negotiated to conduct the 1992 Chess Olympiad and
Congress in Manila. The Sandiganbayan acknowledged
that Campomanes is not a public officer. So the
Sandiganbayan applied Article 222 of the Revised

Penal Code in relation to Article 218. The
Sandiganbayan’s decision, however, failed to specify
any law or regulation requiring Campomanes to render
accounts to the COA. Therefore Campomanes was
acquitted because of the failure of the prosecution to
prove all the elements of Article 218, in relation to
Article 222, of the Revised Penal Code. Because of this
failure, The Supreme Court deem it unnecessary to rule
on the other issues raised by both parties.
ALOYSIUS DAIT LUMAUIG vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 166680, July 7, 2014, 729 SCRA 191
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the acquittal under RA 3019(Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) is a bar to his
conviction under Art. 218 of Revised Penal Code.
(2) Whether prior demand is a requisite for conviction
under Article 218 of the Revised Penal Code.
FACTS:
In 1994, Mayor Lumauig of Alfonso Lista obtained a
cash advance of P101,736.00 intended for the payment
of freight and insurance coverage of 12 units of
motorcycles to be donated to the municipality by the
City of Manila. However, instead of motorcycles, he was
able to secure two buses and five patrol cars. It never
came to his mind to settle or liquidate the amount
advanced since the vehicles were already turned over
to the municipality. He claimed that he was neither
informed or did he receive any demand from COA to
liquidate his cash advances. It was in 2001 while he was
claiming for separation pay when he came to know he
still has an unliquidated cash advance. And so as not
to prolong the issue, he paid the amount of
P101,736.00 to the municipal treasurer, for which
reason, the incumbent Mayor Prudenciano executed
an Affidavit of Desistance. The Sandiganbayan
acquitted Lumauig for the violation of RA 3019(Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) but convicted him for
the felony of Accountable Officer to Render Accounts
under Art. 218 of the Revised Penal Code.
HELD:
(1) NO, acquittal from violation of RA 3019 is not a bar
against conviction for Article 218 of the RPC. It is
undisputed that the two charges stemmed from the
same incident. However, the Supreme Court has
consistently held that the same act may give rise to two
or more separate and distinct charges. The elements of
the felony punishable under Article 218 of the RPC are:
(1) that the offender is a public officer whether in the
service or separated therefrom.
(2) that he must be an accountable officer for public
funds or property.
(3) that he is required by law or regulation to render
accounts to the COA or to a provincial auditor; and
(4) that he fails to do so for a period of two months
after such account should be rendered.
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(2) NO, demand is not element of the offense and that
it is sufficient that there is a law or regulation requiring
the public officer to render an account.
Since Lumauig received the subject cash advance
sometime in 1994, he was, thus, required to liquidate
the same on or before January 20, 1995. Further, to
avoid liability under Article 218, he should have
liquidated the cash advance two months from the time
it was due, or on before March 20, 1995. In the case at
bar, Lumauig liquidated the subject cash advance only
on June 4, 2001. Hence, as correctly found by the
Sandiganbayan, he was liable for violation of Article
218 because it took him over six years before settling
his accounts.
Considering the two mitigating circumstances of
voluntary surrender and return or full restitution of the
funds, Lumauig is sentenced to a straight penalty of
four months and one day of arresto mayor.
HERMES E. FRIAS, SR.
VS.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO. 171437 OCTOBER 4, 2007
ISSUE:
Whether or not Frias is guilty with violation of Art.218
of the Revised Penal Code despite the fact that he did
not benefited from the disallowed cash advances.
FACTS:
Frias, on behalf of the Municipality of Capas, made cash
advances amounting to P50,000 and P950,000 (or a
total of P1,000,000). These cash advances were
allocated for the maintenance of economic enterprises
and the augmentation of the general fund.
The Commission on Audit found these purposes too
vague. Thus, they disallowed the cash advances due to
petitioner's failure to indicate a specific legal purpose.
COA notified Frias, municipal treasurer Panganiban
and municipal accountant Domingo of the
disallowance of the municipality's cash advances and
directed them to settle the P1,000,000. Neither
Panganiban nor Domingo returned the amount.
Hence, Abesamis requested petitioner to settle the
disallowed cash advances. Petitioner, however, refused
for the reason that he gave the proceeds of the cash
advances to Panganiban. COA, mindful of petitioner's
predicament, pointed out that the cash advances were
made under his authority. Moreover, the checks were
payable to him (as payee) and he admitted receipt
thereof. For this reason, even if he gave the proceeds
to Panganiban, he was still required to return the
P1,000,000.
Notwithstanding COA's demand, petitioner did not
account for the cash advance. Thus, COA
recommended the filing of this criminal complaint
against petitioner.In his defense, petitioner argued that
he was not liable for the cash advances because he did
not derive any benefit from them. Panganiban alone
benefited from the cash advances as she used the
P1,000,000 to settle her existing deficiencies with the

Commission on Audit (COA). Petitioner pointed out
that the COA, upon Abesamis' recommendation, also
filed a criminal complaint against Panganiban.
RULING:
YES. The Sandiganbayan found petitioner guilty as
charged due to the concurrence of the following
elements:
1. petitioner was a public officer;
2. he was an officer accountable for public funds or
property;
3. he was required by law or regulation to render
accounts to the COA or provincial auditor and
4. he failed to render an account for the period of two
months after such accounts should have been
rendered.
According to the Sandiganbayan, in spite of the fact
that Panganiban alone benefited from the disallowed
cash advances, petitioner, as municipal mayor, was
responsible and accountable for it.Moreover,
petitioner was liable to return the proceeds to the
Government in view of his failure to account for the
cash advances. Therefore Hermes E. Frias Sr. is guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Article 218 of
the Revised Penal Code.
February 22, 2018 – Article 219 – FAILURE OF A
RESPONSIBLE PUBLIC OFFICER TO RENDER
ACCOUNTS BEFORE LEAVING THE COUNTRY
[NO CASE FOUND]
February 22, 2018 – Article 220 – ILLEGAL USE OF
PUBLIC FUNDS OR PROPERTY
SANTOALLA, Stephanie M.
PEOPLE VS MONTEMAYOR
5 SCRA 929, AUGUST 30, 1962
ISSUE:
WON there is a diversion of the funds from the
purpose for which they had been originally
appropriated by law or ordinance.
FACTS:
Zosimo Montemayor then, and until now, President of
the Mindanao Agricultural College, a government
institution established and existing under the
provisions of law, order the accused Ciriaco Ducusin to
use the students' property deposits for the purchase of
supplies and materials needed by the college, and the
latter, then the property custodian of said college and
who had been keeping said fund under his
administration, by virtue of said instruction and order,
spend and apply the amount of P1,911.64 out of said
fund for the purchase of 9991.8 gallons of gasoline,
965.1 gallons of crude oil and 131.5 gallons of SAE 30
for the use of said college, thereby applying said
amount to a public use other than that for which it was
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appropriated by Resolution No. 18 of the Board of
Trustees of said college namely, for the payment of the
losses and breakages of college instrument and
equipment incurred by students.
HELD:
No crime committed if amounts received are applied
to a public use.
To constitute the crime of illegal use of public funds,
there must be a diversion of the funds from the
purpose for which they had been originally
appropriated by law or ordinance (Revised Penal Code,
Article 220).
In the case at bar the students' payments had not been
so appropriated, because the resolution of the college
authorities that the amounts paid by the students
should be later refunded nowhere implied that the
repayment was to be made precisely out of the moneys
received, and as the refund could be made out of any
available funds of the College, there was no
appropriation for a particular purpose that was
violated by the accused.
PARUNGAO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN,
197 SCRA 173, May 15, 1991
Considering that the evidence presented in the
malversation case is the same evidence that will be
presented in the event that a technical malversation
charge is later filed, the Court deems it best to pass upon
the issue of whether or not petitioner is indeed guilty of
illegal use of public funds.
ISSUE:
Is Parungao guilty of Illegal use of public funds?
FACTS:
OSCAR PARUNGAO, Municipal Treasurer of Porac, was
charged with malversation for appropriating and
converting to his own personal use and benefit the
amount of P185,250.00.
Parungao entered a plea of not guilty. During the
pretrial conference, he admitted that he received from
the Ministry of Public Works and Highways the amount
of P185,250 known as the fund for construction,
rehabilitation, betterment and improvement (CRBI) for
the concreting of Barangay Jalung Road located in
Porac, Pampanga. In his defense, he accounted for the
P185,250 fund, and after hearing, the respondent
Sandiganbayan rendered a decision acquitting the
petitioner of the crime of malversation of public funds
but convicting him of the crime of illegal use of public
funds.
But while the accused could be deemed to have fully
accounted for the amount in question, the fact sticks
out from the evidence that he allowed the use of part
of the funds for a purpose other than what it was
intended. The said amount of P185,250.00 was
specifically allotted for the concreting of the barangay
Jalung road in Porac, Pampanga. Instead of applying it
fully to that particular project, he gave P59,154.41 of it
to the municipal mayor of Porac to pay the labor
payrolls of the different barangays of the municipality,
resulting in the non-completion of the project. He

thereby violated the following provision of Article 220
of the Revised Penal Code.
HELD:
A comparison of the two articles reveals that their
elements are entirely distinct and different from the
other. In malversation of public funds, the offender
misappropriates public funds for his own personal use
or allows any other person to take such public funds
for the latter’s personal use. In technical malversation,
the public officer applies public funds under his
administration not for his or another’s personal use,
but to a public use other than that for which the fund
was appropriated by law or ordinance. Technical
malversation is, therefore, not included in nor does it
necessarily include the crime of malversation of public
funds charged in the information. Since the acts
constituting the crime of technical malversation were
not alleged in the information, and since technical
malversation does not include, or is not included in the
crime of malversation of public funds, he cannot
resultantly be convicted of technical malversation.
The Court has unequivocably ruled that in the absence
of law or ordinance appropriating the CRBI fund for the
concreting of the Barangay Jalung Road, the petitioner
cannot be declared guilty of the crime of illegal use of
public funds.—the use thereof for another public
purpose (there, for the payment of wages of laborers
working on projects other than the Barangay Jalung
Road) will not make Parungao guilty of violation of
Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code.
ABDULLA vs. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 150129, April 6, 2005
ISSUE:
Is there a presumption of criminal intent in illegal use
of funds or property cases?
FACTS:
Convicted by the Sandiganbayan of the crime of illegal
use of public funds, Abdulla is before the Court on
petition for review under Rule 45. Appellant’s co-
accused, Aguil and Darkis, were both acquitted. Only
appellant was found guilty and sentenced by the
Sandiganbayan. Upon motion for reconsideration, the
Sandiganbayan amended Abdulla’s sentence by
deleting the temporary special disqualification
imposed upon her. Still dissatisfied, appellant, now
before this Court, persistently pleas innocence of the
crime charged.
RULING:
No. The presumption of criminal intent will not
automatically apply to all charges of technical
malversation because disbursement of public funds for
public use is per se not an unlawful act. Here, appellant
cannot be said to have committed an unlawful act
when she paid the obligation of the Sulu State College
to its employees in the form of terminal leave benefits
such employees were entitled to under existing civil
service laws. In the absence of any presumption of
unlawful intent, the burden of proving by competent
evidence that appellant’s act of paying the terminal
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leave benefits of employees of the Sulu State College
was done with criminal intent rests upon the
prosecution.
Appellant herein, who used the remainder of the forty
thousand pesos (P40,000.00) released by the DBM for
salary differentials, for the payment of the terminal
leave benefits of other school teachers of the Sulu
State College, cannot be held guilty of technical
malversation in the absence, as here, of any provision
in RA 6688 specifically appropriating said amount for
payment of salary differentials only. In fine, the third
and fourth elements of the crime defined in Article 220
of the Revised Penal Code are lacking in this case.
Acquittal is thus in order.
YSIDORO vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
GR 192330, November 14, 2012
ISSUE:
Whether or not he approved the diversion of the
subject goods to a public purpose different from their
originally intended purpose
FACTS:
This case is about a municipal mayor charged with
illegal diversion of food intended for those suffering
from malnutrition to the beneficiaries of
reconsideration projects affecting the homes of victims
of calamities.
Polinio told Garcia that the SFP still had sacks of rice
and boxes of sardines in its storeroom. And since she
had already distributed food to the mother volunteers,
what remained could be given to the CSAP
beneficiaries.
Garcia and Polinio went to petitioner Arnold James M.
Ysidoro, the Leyte Municipal Mayor, to seek his
approval. After explaining the situation to him, Ysidoro
approved the release and signed the withdrawal slip
for four sacks of rice and two boxes of sardines worth
P3,396.00 to CSAP.
She also pointed out that the Supplemental Feeding
Implementation Guidelines for Local Government Units
governed the distribution of SFP goods. Thus, Ysidoro
committed technical malversation when he approved
the distribution of SFP goods to the CSAP beneficiaries.
The evidence shows that on November 8, 2000 the
Sangguniang Bayan of Leyte enacted Resolution 00-
133 appropriating the annual general fund for 2001.
This appropriation was based on the executive budget
which allocated P100,000.00 for the SFP and
P113,957.64 for the Comprehensive and Integrated
Delivery of Social Services which covers the CSAP
housing projects.
The Sandiganbayan held that Ysidoro applied public
property to a pubic purpose other than that for which
it has been appropriated by law or ordinance.
RULING :
The crime of technical malversation as penalized under
Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code has three
elements: a) that the offender is an accountable public
officer; b) that he applies public funds or property

under his administration to some public use; and c)
that the public use for which such funds or property
were applied is different from the purpose for which
they were originally appropriated by law or ordinance.
The creation of the two items shows the Sanggunian’s
intention to appropriate separate funds for SFP and the
CSAP in the annual budget.
Since the municipality bought the subject goods using
SFP funds, then those goods should be used for SFP’s
needs, observing the rules prescribed for identifying
the qualified beneficiaries of its feeding programs. The
target clientele of the SFP according to its manual are:
1) the moderately and severely underweight pre-
school children aged 36 months to 72 months; and 2)
the families of six members whose total monthly
income is P3,675.00 and below.
Ysidoro disregarded the guidelines when he approved
the distribution of the goods to those providing free
labor for the rebuilding of their own homes. This is
technical malversation. If Ysidoro could not legally
distribute the construction materials appropriated for
the CSAP housing beneficiaries to the SFP
malnourished clients neither could he distribute the
food intended for the latter to CSAP beneficiaries.
February 24, 2018 – Article 221 – FAILURE TO MAKE
DELIVERY OF PUBLIC FUNDS OR PROPERTY
[NO CASE FOUND]
February 24, 2018 – Article 222 – OFFICERS INCLUDED
IN THE PRECEDING PROVISIONS
UNAS, Nor-Aiza R.
ALFREDO L. AZARCON v. SANDIGANBAYAN,
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and JOSE C.
BATAUSA
G.R. No. 116033 February 26, 1997
ISSUE:
Whether or not Azarcon is considered a public officer
by reason of his designation by the BIR as a depositary
of distrained property.
FACTS:
Petitioner Alfredo Azarcon owned and operated an
earth-moving business, hauling "dirt and ore." His
services were contracted by the Paper Industries
Corporation of the Philippines (PICOP). Occasionally,
he engaged the services of sub-contractors like Jaime
Ancla whose trucks were left at the former's premises.
From this set of circumstances arose the present
controversy. It appears that on May 25, 1983, a Warrant
of Distraint of Personal Property was issued by the
Main Office of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR)
addressed to the Regional Director (Jose Batausa) or
his authorized representative of Revenue Region 10,
Butuan City commanding the latter to distraint the
goods, chattels or effects and other personal property
of Jaime Ancla, a sub-contractor of accused Azarcon
and, a delinquent taxpayer. The Warrant of
Garnishment was issued to accused Alfredo Azarcon
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ordering him to transfer, surrender, transmit and/or
remit to BIR the property in his possession owned by
taxpayer Ancla.
Along with his co-accused Jaime Ancla, Petitioner
Azarcon was charged before the Sandiganbayan with
the crime of malversation of public funds or property
under Article 217 in relation to Article 222 of the
Revised Penal Code.
HELD:
No. The Solicitor General contends that the BIR, in
effecting constructive distraint over the truck allegedly
owned by Jaime Ancla, and in requiring the petitioner
Alfredo Azarcon who was in possession thereof to sign
a pro forma receipt for it, effectively designated
petitioner a depositary and, hence, citing U.S. vs.
Rastrollo, a public officer. This is based on the theory
that
(t)he power to designate a private person who has
actual possession of a distrained property as a
depository of distrained property is necessarily implied
in the BIRs power to place the property of a delinquent
tax payer (sic) in distraint as provided for under
Sections 206, 207 and 208 (formerly Sections 303, 304
and 305) of the National Internal Revenue Code, (NIRC)
x x x.
We disagree. The case of U.S. vs. Rastrollo is not
applicable to the case before us simply because the
facts therein are not identical, similar or analogous to
those obtaining here. While the cited case involved a
judicial deposit of the proceeds of the sale of attached
property in the hands of the debtor, the case at bench
dealt with the BIRs administrative act of effecting
constructive distraint over alleged property of taxpayer
Ancla in relation to his back taxes, property which was
received by petitioner Azarcon. In the cited case, it was
clearly within the scope of that courts jurisdiction and
judicial power to constitute the judicial deposit and
give the depositary a character equivalent to that of a
public official. However, in the instant case, while the
BIR had authority to require petitioner Azarcon to sign
a receipt for the distrained truck, the NIRC did not
grant it power to appoint Azarcon a public officer.
FLORENCIO B. CAMPOMANES v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 161950 December 19, 2006
ISSUE:
Whether or not Campomanes is guilty of failure to
render accounts as defined in Article 218 in relation to
Article 222 of the Revised Penal Code.
FACTS:
Florencio B. Campomanes was the President of the
Federation International Des Echecs (FIDE), a private
international organization with offices at Lausanne,
Switzerland. The Philippine Sports Commission
submitted to FIDE a bid offer to host the 30th Chess
Olympiad of 1992 in Manila. The PSC’s bid offer was
accepted by FIDE. The PSC, also complying with its
obligations under the bid offer, remitted to FIDE –
received in FIDE’s behalf by its President, Florencio
Campomanes – the total amount of P12,876,008.00 in

connection with the 30th World Chess Olympiad in
Manila.
The Commission on Audit (COA) conducted an audit of
the PSC’s transactions from March 1990 up to June
1992. During the audit, the COA team requested for the
journal and checks and disbursements issued by the
PSC pertaining to the P12 million appropriated to
defray the organization, administration, and hosting of
the Chess Olympiad and Congress. The COA team
noticed irregularities in the claims payable to the FIDE.
The irregularities consisted of the lack of
acknowledgment receipts and of accounting
liquidation attached to the disbursement vouchers.
HELD:
No. Campomanes is clearly not a public officer. He is
the president of the FIDE, a private foreign corporation
with whom the PSC, through Hechanova, negotiated to
conduct the 1992 Chess Olympiad and Congress in
Manila. The Sandiganbayan acknowledged that
Campomanes is not a public officer and applied Article
222 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Article 218.
The Sandiganbayan enumerated the elements of the
crime as applied to Campomanes thus:
1. That the offender is [a] private individual.
2. That he has charge of any insular (now national),
provincial, or municipal funds, revenues, or property or
[is an] administrator or depository of funds, property
attached, seized, or deposited by public authority, even
if such property belongs to a private individual.
3. That he is required by law or regulation to render
accounts to the Commission on Audit, or to a
provincial auditor.
4. That he fails to do so for a period of two months
after such accounts should be rendered.
Campomanes admitted that he received funds from
the PSC, through Hechanova. The exhibits show
Campomanes’ signatures in the respective
disbursement vouchers issued by the PSC and FIDE’s
letters to PSC acknowledging receipt of the funds.
Moreover, Campomanes has not rendered an
accounting of the funds even after he received a letter
dated 19 January 1994 from COA Chairman Pascasio S.
Banaria demanding that Campomanes refund or
submit a detailed accounting to the COA covering the
liquidation of the funds that the FIDE received.
The Sandiganbayan’s decision, however, failed to
specify any law or regulation requiring Campomanes
to render accounts to the COA.
The COA has the authority to demand an accounting
from the FIDE if there is a law which requires the PSC
to ask the FIDE to render an accounting, or if the PSC
expressly required the FIDE to render an accounting as
a condition for funding the Chess Olympiad and
Congress. Absent such law or contractual obligation,
the COA does not have the authority to audit the
accounts of non-governmental entities receiving
subsidy or equity from the government, like the FIDE.
In the same manner, non-governmental entities
receiving subsidy or equity from the government, like
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the FIDE, are not obliged to render an accounting to
the COA if no law or contract requires them to do so.
In the present case, the absence of the conditions
contained in Section 2(1)(d) of Article IX-D of the 1987
Constitution prevents the creation of an obligation on
the FIDE’s part to render an accounting to the PSC or
the COA. Consequently, Campomanes, as
representative of the FIDE which has no legal
obligation to render an accounting, cannot be liable
under Article 222 of the Revised Penal Code.
February 26, 2018 – Article 223 – CONNIVING WITH
OR CONSENTING TO EVASION
VILLAHERMOSA, Alexand Rhea M.
US vs. LEON BANDINO
G.R. No. L-9964 February 11, 1915
ISSUE:
Whether or not Accused Leon Bandino was guilty of
'connivance or consenting to evasion'?
FACTS:
On December 4, 1912, the municipal president of
Antipolo, Province of Rizal, filed a written complaint in
the justice of the peace court of the said pueblo,
charging Leon Bandino with the crime of faithlessness
in the custody of prisoners committed with reckless
negligence. Said Leon Bandino, accused, a municipal
policeman having under his care and guard one Juan
Lescano, who was serving a sentence in the municipal
jail of the said pueblo, did, with great carelessness and
unjustified negligence, grant him permission to go and
buy some cigarettes near the place where he was held
in custody. The prisoner, taking advantage of the
confusion in the crowd there, fled from the custody of
the accused.
HELD:
Article 358 of the Penal Code prescribes that "any
public officer guilty of connivance in the escape of a
prisoner in his custody shall be punished," etc. In the
existence and commission of the crime of faithlessness
in the custody of prisoners, it is essential that there
should have been, on the part of the custodian,
connivance in the escape of the prisoner. If the public
officer charged with guarding the fugitive did not
connive with him, then he did not violate the law and
is not guilty of the crime of faithlessness in the
discharge of his duty to guard the prisoner.
It may perhaps be true that the accused had no
knowledge that the prisoner Lescano would escape,
and that he did not permit him to do so, but it is
unquestionable that he did permit him to go out of the
municipal jail, thus affording him an opportunity to get
away with ease. Therefore the prisoner's escape was
effected through the tolerance of his custodian, and is
deemed also to have been by connivance with the
latter.
According to the rules established by the courts, there
is real and actual evasion of service of a sentence when
the custodian, failing intentionally or maliciously to
perform the duties of his office, and conniving with the

prisoners, permits him to obtain a relaxation of his
imprisonment and to escape the punishment of being
deprived of his liberty, thus making the penalty
ineffectual, although the convict may not have fled,
and where the prisoner's leaving the jail and his
evasion of service of the sentence were effected with
the consent and tolerance of the custodian, or rather
in agreement and connivance with him.
Even though the accused committed the crime of
faithlessness with carelessness, in violation of
regulations or with culpable negligence, the case
should not be dismissed nor should the crime go
unpunished.
March 8, 2018 – Article 226 – REMOVAL,
CONCEALMENT OR DESTRUCTION OF
DOCUMENTS
ALILIAN, Enna B.
ZAPANTA V PEOPLE
G.R. NOS. 192698-99 APRIL 22, 2015
ISSUE:
WoN accused was guilty of violating Art 226 RPC
FACTS:
Accused, as employees of Registry of deeds, caused
the disappearance and re-issuance of TCT NO. T-
285369, and deleting the encumbrance annotated in
TCT No. T-256662, thereby affording unwarranted
benefits to one First Oriental Ventures, Inc., the owner
of TCT No. T-285369, to the damage and prejudice of
Manuel Ang, Sr., the mortgagee in TCT No. 256662.
RULING:
Yes. An accused may be held criminally liable of
Infidelity in the Custody of Documents under Article
226 of the RPC, provided that the following elements
are present:
1. The offender must be a public officer
2. There must be a document abstracted, destroyed or
concealed
3. Such documents are entrusted to the public officer
by reason of his office
4. There was a damage to public interest or a third
person
Said elements are present in the case at bar.
The act of the said public officers of the Registry of
deeds caused damage to Dr. Ang and eroded public
trust and confidence in the Register of Deeds.
Further, citing the case of Kataniag v. People,25 the
Sandiganbayan wrote that damage under Art. 226 of
the RPC may also consist in mere alarm to the public
or in the alienation of its confidence in any government
agency. The Sandiganbayan added that Atty. Gadia's
act of concealing TCT No. T-256662 constituted a
breach of trust in the official care of the said certificate
of title.
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ATTY MANZANARIS V PEOPLE
G.R. NO. L-64750 JANUARY 30, 1984
ISSUE:
WoN Sandiganbayan was right in finding accused
guilty even though the latter did not act in bad faith
FACTS:
Atty Manzanaris as the Clerk of Court was found by the
Sandiganbayan to be guilty of Violation of Art 226 of
RPC for giving the certificate of title to one accused in
the Court where he was working. Atty Manzanaris
argued that he did it with a lawful and commendable
motive.
RULING:
No. To warrant a finding of guilt of the crime of
infidelity in the custody of documents, the act of
removal as a mode of committing the offense, should
be coupled with criminal intent or illicit purpose. This
calls to mind the oft-repeated maxim "Actus non facit,
nisi mens sit rea”.
February 28, 2018 – Article 231 – OPEN
DISOBEDIENCE
VOSOTROS, Jules Andre B.
THE LAW FIRM OF CHAVEZ MIRANDA AND
ASEOCHE, REPRESENTED BY ITS FOUNDING
PARTNER, FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, vs. ATTY.
JOSEJINA C. FRIA
G.R. No. 183014 August 7, 2013
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Fria is guilty of acts violating
article 231 Open Disobedience of the RPC.
FACTS:
Atty. Josejina C. Fria (Atty. Fria), Branch Clerk of Court
of the RTC of Muntinlupa City, Branch 203, was charged
for the crime of Open Disobedience under Article 231
of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
The Law Firm was engaged as counsel by the plaintiff
in Civil Case No. 03-110 instituted before Branch 203.
On July 29, 2005, judgment was rendered in favor of
the plaintiff (July 29, 2005 judgment), prompting the
defendant in the same case to appeal. However, Branch
203 disallowed the appeal and consequently ordered
that a writ of execution be issued to enforce the
foregoing judgment. Due to the denial of the
defendant’s motion for reconsideration, the July 29,
2005 judgment became final and executory.
In its Complaint-Affidavit dated February 12, 2006, The
Law Firm alleged that as early as April 4, 2006, it had
been following up on the issuance of a writ of
execution to implement the July 29, 2005 judgment.
However, Atty. Fria vehemently refused to perform her
ministerial duty of issuing said writ.
In her Counter-Affidavit dated June 13, 2006, Atty. Fria
posited that the draft writ of execution (draft writ) was
not addressed to her but to Branch Sheriff Jaime
Felicen (Felicen), who was then on leave. Neither did
she know who the presiding judge would appoint as
special sheriff on Felicen’s behalf. Nevertheless, she

maintained that she need not sign the draft writ since
on April 18, 2006, the presiding judge issued an Order
stating that he himself shall sign and issue the same.
On July 31, 2006, the prosecutor issued a
Memorandum recommending, inter alia, that Atty. Fria
be indicted for the crime of Open Disobedience. The
corresponding Information was thereafter filed before
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Branch
80 (MTC.
The MTC ordered the dismissal of Criminal Case No.
46400 for lack of probable cause. It found that aside
from the fact that Atty. Fria is a judicial officer, The Law
Firm failed to prove the existence of the other elements
of the crime of Open Disobedience. In particular, the
second element of the crime, i.e., that there is a
judgment, decision, or order of a superior authority
made within the scope of its jurisdiction and issued
with all legal formalities, unlikely existed since the
Court already declared as null and void the entire
proceedings in Civil Case No. 03-110 due to lack of
jurisdiction. In this regard, the MTC opined that such
nullification worked retroactively to warrant the
dismissal of the case and/or acquittal of the accused at
any stage of the proceedings.
HELD:
No. The criminal case is dismissed for lack of probable
cause.
Under Section 5(a) of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, a trial court judge may immediately dismiss
a criminal case if the evidence on record clearly fails to
establish probable cause, viz:
Sec. 5. When warrant of arrest may issue. – (a) By the
Regional Trial Court. – Within ten (10) days from the
filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall
personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor
and its supporting evidence. He may immediately
dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails
to establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause,
he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment
order if the accused has already been arrested
pursuant to a warrant issued by the judge who
conducted preliminary investigation or when the
complaint or information was filed pursuant to section
6 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the existence of
probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to
present additional evidence within five (5) days from
notice and the issue must be resolved by the court
within thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint
of information.
It must, however, be observed that the judge’s power
to immediately dismiss a criminal case would only be
warranted when the lack of probable cause is clear.
In this regard, so as not to transgress the public
prosecutor’s authority, it must be stressed that the
judge’s dismissal of a case must be done only in clear-
cut cases when the evidence on record plainly fails to
establish probable cause – that is when the records
readily show uncontroverted, and thus, established
facts which unmistakably negate the existence of the
elements of the crime charged. On the contrary, if the
evidence on record shows that, more likely than not,
the crime charged has been committed and that
respondent is probably guilty of the same, the judge
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should not dismiss the case and thereon, order the
parties to proceed to trial. In doubtful cases, however,
the appropriate course of action would be to order the
presentation of additional evidence.
Applying these principles to the case at bar would lead
to the conclusion that the MTC did not gravely abuse
its discretion in dismissing Criminal Case No. 46400 for
lack of probable cause. The dismissal ought to be
sustained since the records clearly disclose the
unmistakable absence of the integral elements of the
crime of Open Disobedience. While the first element,
i.e., that the offender is a judicial or executive officer,
concurs in view of Atty. Fria’s position as Branch Clerk
of Court, the second and third elements of the crime
evidently remain wanting.
March 2, 2018 – Article 234 – REFUSAL TO
DISCHARGE ELECTIVE OFFICE
[NO CASE FOUND]
March 4, 2018 – Article 238 – ABANDONMENT OF
OFFICE OR POSITION
ALAMEDA, Manuel
SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF SAN ANDRES v CA
GR No. 118883 January 16, 1998
ISSUE
1. Whether Antonio’s resignation was complete.
2. W/N respondent abandoned his membership in the
SB.
FACTS:
Antonio, priate respondent, was elected barangay
captain of Sapang Palay Catanduanes on March 1989.
He was later elected president of the Association of
Barangay Council(ABC) for the Municiplity of San
Andres Catanduanes. Pursuant to the Local
Government Code of 1983, he was appointed by the
President as Member of the Sanguniang Bayan of the
sid municipality. Meanwhile, DILG Sec. declared the
election for the president of the Federation of the
Association of Barangay Council(FABC) void for lack of
quorum. As a result, the provincial council was
reorganized. DILG Sec then designated private
respondent as a temporary member of the Sanguniang
Panlalawigan of Catanduanes effective on 15 June
1990. Because of his designation, private respondent
tendered his resignation as a member of the
Sanguniang Bayan dated 14 June 1990 to the Mayor of
San Andres Catanduanes. Copies of his letters were
also forwarded to the provincial governor, DILG and
the municipal treasurer. Subsequently, Aquino then the
Vice President of ABC was appointed by the provincial
governor as member of the Sanguniang Bayan in place
of private respondent. Aquino assumed office on 18
July 1980 after taking his oath. Subsequently, the ruling
of the DILG annulling the election of the FABC
president was reversed by the Supreme Court and
declared the appointment of private respondent void
for lacking the essential qualification of being the
president of FABC. On 31 March 1992, private

respondent wrote to the Sanguniang Bayan(SB) of San
Andres regarding his re-assumption of his original
position. SB refused.
HELD
The resignation was not complete for lack of
acceptance thereof of the proper authority however, an
office may still be deemed relinquished through
voluntary abandonment which needs no acceptance. In
Ortiz vs Comelec, resignation is defined as the “act of
giving up of an ifficer by which he declines his office
andrenounces the further right to use it”. It can be
express or implied. To constitute a complete and
operative resignation the folloving must be present. (1)
an intention to relinquish a part of the term; (b) an act
of relinquishment; and (c) an acceptance by the proper
authority. In the case at bar, there was no evidence that
the private respondent’s resignation was accepted by
the proper authority. Although the Local Government
Code of 1983 was silent as to who specifically should
accept the resignation it provides that the position
shall be deemed vacated only upon acceptance of
resignation and should be acted upon by the
Sangunian concerned. The resignation letter was
tendered to the mayor and copies were sent to the
governor, DILG and the municipal treasurer but none
of them expressly acted on it. Furthermore, under
established jurisprudence, resignations, in the absence
of statutory provisions as to whom it should be
submitted, should be submitted to the appointing
power. Therefore, the resignation should have been
submitted to the president or to the DILG as the
president’s alter ego. Tackling the second issue,
abandonment has been defined as the voluntary
relinquishment of an office by the holder, with the
intention of terminating his possession and contro
thereof. It is a species of resignation. While resignation
is the formal relinquishment, abandonment is the
voluntary relinquishment by non-user. There are 2
essential elements of abandonment : (1) an intention
to abandon and (2) an overt act by which intention is
carried on. In the case at bar, the first element was
manifested on the following instances: (1) private
respondent’s failure to perform his function as SB; (2)
his failure to collect the corresponding renumeration
for the position, (3)his failure to object to the
appointment of Aquino as his replacement to SB and
(4) his prolonged failure to initiate any act to reassume
his post in the SB after SC had nullified his designation
as member of Sanguniang Panlalawigan. The second
element was demonstrated by the following: (1) his
letter of resignation, (2) his assumption of office as
member of the Sanguniang Panlalawigan, (3) his
faithful discharge of his duties and functions of SP and
(4) his recept of renumeration for such post.
JOSON III VS SANTOS
G.R. NO. 91548 JULY 13, 1990
ISSUE:
Whether or not the office of Vice-Governor of Nueva
Ecija was rendered vacant by the voluntary resignation.
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FACTS:
The controversy originated from the indefinite sick
leave that the incumbent Governor of Nueva Ecija,
Eduardo L. Joson, had to take on December 7, 1989,
thus creating a temporary vacancy in his Office. As Vice
Governor, Nario took over as Acting Governor
pursuant to the Local Government Code l. 1 But as fate
would have it, Nario himself fell ill shortly afterwards,
and so executed a "waiver" of his "right" to the office
of Governor. Joson forthwith took his oath as Acting
Governor, on December 19, 1989. Four (4) days later,
apparently feeling that his illness had worsened, Nario
sent a letter to the Secretary of local Governments
tendering his resignation as Vice- Governor of Nueva
Ecija
RULING:
The decided weight of authority is that "apart from
legal provision, . . . mere presentation of resignation
does not work a vacancy, and a resignation is not
complete until accepted by proper authority;" Clearly,
a public officer cannot abandon his office or position
before his resignation is accepted, but the incumbent
official would not be in a position to determine the
acceptance of his resignation unless he has been duly
notified therefor. This is not to say that a public officer
may not resign. Mechem says that he "'may certainly
resign, but without acceptance his resignation is
nothing, and he remains in office.' He is, therefore, so
far as the rights of third persons are concerned, not
only still clothed with authority, but is subject to the
burdens of the office, and he may be compelled to
perform the duties, and is liable for their non-
performance, as before. In our jurisprudence," this
Court has held, "acceptance is necessary for
resignation of a public officer to be operative and
effective, otherwise the officer is subject to the penal
provisions of Article 238 of the Revised Penal Code
REPUBLIC vs. WINSTON T. SINGUN
G.R. No. 149356 March 14, 2008
ISSUE:
WON Singuin is considered as resigned in his post.
FACTS:
Singuin was the former Chief Trade and Industry
Development Specialist of DTI-RO2, Cagayan Province.
In a letter dated 20 October 1999, he wrote Regional
Director Hipolito signifying his intention to apply for an
8 month leave of absence starting 16 November 1999
until 31 July 2000 and to retire from the service on 1
August 2000. On 4 November 1999, respondent filed
his application for leave of absence and early
retirement. Director Hipolito denied the request.
Director Hipolito endorsed the application to Assistant
Secretary Maglaya for comment. But without waiting
for Assistant Secretary Maglaya’s comment, he again
filed an application for leave of absence but for a
shorter period (16 November 1999 to 14 January 2000)
and signified his intention to resign effective at the
close of office hours on 14 January 2000.
According to Director Hipolito, he immediately
approved respondents application for leave of absence

and resignation and he reiterated said approval in a
memorandum dated the same day. Director Hipolito
also notified Regional Director Soria of the CSC of his
acceptance of respondents resignation.
Undersecretary Ordoez detailed respondent to the
Office of the Undersecretary for Regional Operations
effective 17 January 2000.
On January 14, 2000, respondent informed Director
Hipolito that he was reconsidering his earlier letter of
resignation and that he decided to wait until he could
qualify for early retirement.
But according to Atty. Soria, respondent was
considered resigned effective 14 January 2000 because
(1) of respondents voluntary written notice informing
Director Hipolito that he was relinquishing his position
and the effectivity date of said resignation and (2)
Director Hipolitos acceptance of respondents
resignation in writing which indicated the date of
effectivityof the resignation. His letter withdrawing his
resignation did not automatically restore him to his
position because Director Hipolito should first approve
the withdrawal before it becomes effective.
Singuin informed Undersecretary Ordoez that his
application for resignation was made under duress
because it was imposed by Director Hipolito as a
condition for the approval of his application for leave
of absence. His original intention was to resign on 1
August 2000 after completing 15 years of service in the
government it was also ineffective because he was not
notified of its acceptance for he did not receive a copy
of his approved resignation letter and Director
Hipolitos memorandum accepting his application for
resignation.
Singuin demanded from Director Hipolito the payment
of his salaries and other benefits from 1 December
1999 to 31 March 2000.
Director Hipolito answered that he was considered
resigned as of 14 January 2000 because the detail
order made no mention that its issuance meant that
the acceptance of the resignation was revoked.
HELD:
To constitute a complete and operative resignation
from public office, there must be: (a) an intention to
relinquish a part of the term; (b) an act of
relinquishment; and (c) an acceptance by the proper
authority.[29]
In our jurisdiction, acceptance is necessary for
resignation of a public officer to be operative and
effective. Without acceptance, resignation is nothing
and the officer remains in office.[30] Resignation to be
effective must be accepted by competent authority,
either in terms or by something tantamount to an
acceptance, such as the appointment of the
successor.[31] A public officer cannot abandon his
office before his resignation is accepted, otherwise the
officer is subject to the penal provisions of Article
238[32] of the Revised Penal Code.[33] The final or
conclusive act of a resignations acceptance is the
notice of acceptance.[34] The incumbent official would
not be in a position to determine the acceptance of his
resignation unless he had been duly notified therefor.
In this case, the Court of Appeals and the CSC declared
that there was nothing in the records to show that
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respondent was duly informed of the acceptance of his
resignation. There was no indication that respondent
received a copy of his 12 November 1999 application
for leave of absence and resignation as accepted by
Director Hipolito. Neither was there any indication that
respondent received Director Hipolitos 12 November
1999 Memorandum informing him of the acceptance
of his resignation. Therefore, we affirm the ruling of the
Court of Appeals that respondents resignation was
incomplete and inoperative because respondent was
not notified of the acceptance of his resignation.
Until the resignation is accepted, the tender or offer to
resign is revocable.[36] And the resignation is not
effective where it was withdrawn before it was
accepted.[37]
In this case, since respondents resignation was not
finally and conclusively accepted as he was not duly
notified of its acceptance, respondent could validly
withdraw his resignation. There was no need for
Director Hipolito to accept the withdrawal of
resignation since there was no valid acceptance of the
application of resignation in the first place.
Undersecretary Ordoez also validly issued the detail
order as respondent had not effectively resigned from
DTI-RO2.
March 4, 2018 – Article 240 – USURPATION OF
EXECUTIVE FUNCTIONS
ARANCES, Javy Ann G.
PEOPLE VS HILVANO
GR NO. L-8583, JUL 31, 1956
PONENTE: JUSTICE BENGZON
ISSUE:
Whether or not defendant Francisco Hilvano, can be
charged of usurpation of executive functions.
FACTS:
On September 22, 1952, When Mayor Fidencio Latorre
of Villareal, Samar, departed for Manila on official
business, designated the herein defendant Francisco
Hilvano, councilor, to discharge the duties of his office.
Later, Vice-Mayor Juan Latorre found Hilvano acting in
the place of the Mayor; he served written notices to the
corresponding municipal officers, including Hilvano,
that he (Juan Latorre) as Vice-Mayor was assuming the
duties of the absent mayor. However, Hilvano refused
to yield, arguing that the Mayor had designated him.
Whereupon the Vice-Mayor sent a telegram to the
Executive Secretary informing the latter of the
controversy. Also, sought the opinion of the Provincial
Fiscal, who by letter (Exhibit D), replied that the Vice-
Mayor had the right to the office. Wherefore Francisco
Hilvano was prosecuted and after trial was convicted of
usurpation of public authority under Republic Act No.
10. He appealed in due time.
HELD:
Article 240 of the Revised Penal Code to read as
follows:
“Usurpation of executive functions. — Any judge who
shall assume any power pertaining to the executive
authorities, or shall obstruct the latter in the lawful

exercise of their powers, shall suffer the penalty of
arresto mayor in its medium period to prision
correccional in its minimum period.”
Thus, a councilor who assumes a power pertaining to
the mayor or obstructs him in the lawful exercise of his
power is not liable under Article 240, because only a
judge can commit usurpation of executive functions.
The councilor is liable under Article 177 of the Code, if
he assumes the power of the mayor.
March 5 2018 – Article 241 – USURPATION OF
JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS
BANUELOS, Kelvinn L.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FRANCISCO
HILVANO
G.R. No. L-8583 JULY 31, 1956
ISSUE:
Whether or not Francisco Hilvano is guilty of
usurpation.
FACTS:
On September 22, 1952, When Mayor Fidencio Latorre
of Villareal, Samar, departed for Manila on official
business, designated the herein defendant Francisco
Hilvano, councilor, to discharge the duties of his office.
Later, Vice-Mayor Juan Latorre found Hilvano acting in
the place of the Mayor; he served written notices to the
corresponding municipal officers, including Hilvano,
that he (Juan Latorre) as Vice-Mayor was assuming the
duties of the absent mayor.
However, Hilvano refused to yield, arguing that the
Mayor had designated him. Whereupon the Vice-
Mayor sent a telegram to the Executive Secretary
informing the latter of the controversy. Also, sought
the opinion of the Provincial Fiscal, who by letter
(Exhibit D), replied that the Vice-Mayor had the right to
the office. Wherefore Francisco Hilvano was
prosecuted and after trial was convicted of usurpation
of public authority under Republic Act No. 10. He
appealed in due time.
Hilvano contented that Articles 238-241 of the Revised
Penal Code penalize all kinds of usurpation of official
functions by public officers.
HELD:
Yes. But in violation of Article 177 not Article 238 to
241.
Hilvano’s contention is untenable.
Said articles (Article 238-241) merely punish
interference by officers of one of the three
departments of government (legislative, executive and
judicial) with the functions of officials of another
department Said articles (Articles 238-241) do not
cover usurpation of one officer or employee of a given
department of the powers of another officer in the
same department. For instance, the exercise by a
bureau employee of the powers of his director.
There is no excuse for Defendant-Appellant. In the
beginning he might have pleaded good faith, invoking
the designation by the Mayor; but after he had been
shown the letter of the Executive Secretary and the
opinion of the provincial fiscal, he had no right
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thereafter stubbornly to stick to the position. He was
rightfully convicted.
JOSE REYES y VACIO, vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES.
G.R. Nos. 177105-06 August 12, 2010
ISSUE:
Whether or not Reyes is guilty of usurping the judicial
functions as provided by Art. 241.
FACTS:
On February 20, 1986, the IAC promulgated its decision
in AC-G.R. CV No. 02883, granting Belen’s appeal:
declaring as null and void and without any effect
whatsoever the deed of sale executed by and between
appellant Belen Lopez vda. De Guia and defendant
Carlos de Guia.
On November 8, 1988, Belen, through her daughter
and attorney-in-fact, Melba G. Valenzuela (Melba),
filed in the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB) a complaint for ejectment
and collection of rents against the tenants, entitled
Belen Lopez Vda. De Guia thru her Attorney-in-Fact,
Melba G. Valenzuela vs. Paulino Sacdalan, Romeo
Garcia, Numeriano Bautista, Leonardo Sacdalan and
Santiago Sacdalan and docketed as DARAB Case No.
034-BUL’88.
On March 16, 1993, the JOSE REYES, as Provincial
Adjudicator, rendered a decision in DARAB Case No.
034-BUL’88 entitled Belen Lopez vda. De Guia thru her
Attorney-in-Fact, Melba G. Valenzuela v. Paulino
Sacdalan, Romeo Garcia, Numeriano Bautista,
Leonardo Sacdalan and Santiago Sacdalan,11
dismissing Belen’s complaint for ejectment and
collection of rents and affirming the respective TCTs of
the tenants.
On May 13, 1998, the Office of the Ombudsman filed
two informations in the Sandiganbayan, one charging
the petitioner with a violation of Section 3 (e) of RA
3019, and the other with usurpation of judicial
functions under Article 241 of the Revised Penal Code.
Criminal Case No. 24656
That on or about 16 March 1993, or immediately prior
or subsequent thereto, in Malolos, Bulacan, Philippines,
above-named accused Jose V. Reyes, a public officer
being then employed as Provincial Adjudicator of the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB) in Malolos, Bulacan, while in the performance
of his official function as such and taking advantage
thereof, with full knowledge of a Decision in AC-GR CV-
02883 of the Court of Appeals, which declared Belen
de Guia as the true owner of the lands litigated in said
case, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously disregard, obstruct and ignore the said final
and executory decision of the Court of Appeals, by
rendering a decision in DARAB Case No. 034-Bul-88
thereby favoring and emboldening the tenants-
respondents in said DARAB case to unlawfully continue
occupying the lands of Belen de Guia, the complainant,

to her damage and prejudice, as well as to the public
interest.
Arraigned on August 8, 2000, the petitioner, assisted
by counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to each
information.
After trial, on January 15, 2007, the Sandiganbayan
rendered its assailed decision,22 finding the petitioner
guilty of both charges; and sentencing him to suffer:
(a) in Criminal Case No. 24655 (for violation of Section
3 (e) of RA 3019), an indeterminate sentence of
imprisonment from six years and one month, as
minimum, to 10 years as maximum, with perpetual
disqualification from holding public office; and (b) in
Criminal Case No. 24656 (for usurpation of judicial
functions under Article 241 of the Revised Penal Code),
imprisonment of four months of arresto mayor.
The Sandiganbayan denied the petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration on March 15, 2007.
On appeal, the petitioner insists that his rendition of
the decision did not amount to the felony of
usurpation of judicial functions.
HELD:
NO. Reyes did not commit any usurpation. Hence, not
guilty.
Article 241 of the Revised Penal Code states:
xxx The penalty of arresto mayor in its medium period
to prision correcional in its minimum period shall be
imposed upon any officer of the executive branch of
the government who shall assume judicial powers or
shall obstruct the execution of any order or decision
rendered by any judge within his jurisdiction.
In usurpation of judicial function, the accused, who is
not a judge, attempts to perform an act the authority
for which the law has vested only in a judge.44
However, the petitioner’s task as Provincial Adjudicator
when he rendered judgment in DARAB Case No. 034
BUL’88 was to adjudicate the claims of the opposing
parties. As such, he performed a quasi-judicial function,
closely akin to the function of a judge of a court of law.
He could not be held liable under Article 241 of the
Revised Penal Code, therefore, considering that the
acts constitutive of usurpation of judicial function were
lacking herein.
March 6, 2018 – Article 243 – ORDERS OR REQUEST
BY EXECUTIVE OFFICERS TO ANY JUDICIAL
AUTHORITY
CEBALLOS, Jesus C.
BORRROMEO V. MARIANO
G.R. NO. 16808 JANUARY 3, 1921
ISSUE:
WON the transfer of Judge Borromeo by the Governor-
General was valid.
FACTS:
Andres Borromeo was appointed as judge of the 24th
Judicial District (JD) on July 1, 1914. Said appointment
was accepted by Borromeo on the same date. On
February 25, 1920, he was transferred to the 21st JD
without his consent. Under the Administrative Code,
Judges of First Instance are appointed by the
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Governor-General with the consent of the Philippine
Senate to serve until they reach the age of 65 years.
HELD:
No, it was not.
Under the Administrative Code, ”a Judge of First
Instance can be removed from office by the Governor-
General only if in the judgment of the Supreme Court
sufficient cause shall exist involving serious misconduct
or inefficiency in office..”
Relatedly, Art. 243 of the Revised Penal Code states
that “Orders or request by executive officers to any
judicial authority. – Any executive officer who shall
address any order or suggestion to any judicial
authority with respect to any case or business coming
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of justice
shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not
exceeding 500 pesos.”
It was noted that although the appointment of a judge
lies with the Executive Department (by the Governor-
General with the consent of the Senate), the power to
remove, transfer or discipline the judges lies with the
Judiciary. The power of the Executive ceases upon the
consent of the judge to the position, to allow such
action by the Executive could be used to discipline the
judge or as an indirect means of removal thus would
violate the separation of powers between a coordinate
and equal branch of the government.
March 7, 2018 – Article 245 – ABUSES AGAINST
CHASTITY
DELA PEÑA, Clarisse J
G.R. NO. L-9768 FEBRUARY 20, 1915
THE UNITED STATES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
VS.
EULALIO MORELOS, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
ISSUE:
Whether or not proof of solicitation is necessary when
the illicit relations were consummated.
FACTS:
The appellant, as acting warden, was in charge of the
prisoners in the Tondo police station. Among them was
a woman named Tomasa Clemente. On the night of
18th of September 1913, he entered the cell of the
woman and had illicit relations with her.
The appellant argues that the proof fails to show that
he solicited a woman in his custody. It was proven,
however, that his illicit relations were consummated.
HELD:
No. It would be a strange interpretation to place upon
said law, that a failure in the proof to show a
"solicitation" was sufficient to relieve the defendant
from responsibility, when the act solicited was
consummated.
G.R. No. L-28144 August 26, 1927
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
plaintiff-appellee,
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vs.
VICENTE MARIANO, defendants-appellant.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the crime of abuse against chastity is
included in those cases in which criminal liability is
extinguished by the marriage of the accused with the
offended party.

FACTS:
The accused was charged with the crime of abuse
against chastity, and after trial the Court of First
Instance of Manila convicted him of said crime,
sentencing him to three years, six months and twenty-
one days prision correccional with the accessories of
the law and the costs of the action.
The accused appealed to this court from said
judgment. On August 3, 1927, he filed a motion
praying for the dismissal of the case as he had married
the offended party, according to the marriage
certificate attached to said motion.

HELD:
Yes. The intention of our Legistature in enacting said
Act No. 1773 was that the married of the accused or
convict with the offended party should extinguish the
criminal liability in the cases of seduction, abduction
and rape and those involving offenses included in said
crimes, such as frustrated or attempted seduction,
abduction or rape. This is clear and logical. If the
liability for a crime is extinguished in the graver cases,
it must be extinguished, and for a stronger reason, in
the lesser crimes.
Now then, if the crime of abuse against chastity is not
denominated rape, it is only for lack of the intention to
lie, both crimes being identical in every other respect,
though of different degrees of gravity. For this reason,
in regard to the kind of crimes for which the Legislature
wished to provide extinction liability by reason of
marriage, abuse against chastity cannot but be held
included to the crime of rape without misinterpreting
the intention of the law, or thwarting its lofty and
wholesome purposes.
We therefore conclude that the crime of abuse against
chastity is included in the crime of rape mentioned in
section 2 of Act No. 1773 and, consequently, to
marriage of the accused with the offended party in the
present case has extinguished his criminal liability.

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TITLE EIGHT – CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS
March 8, 2018 – Article 246 – PARRICIDE
DELFIN, JENNICA GYRL G.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. PILUS SUBANO
GR. NO L-48143, SEPTEMBER 30, 1942
ISSUE:
Whether or not Pilus Subano is guilty of parricide.
FACTS:
Pilus Subano had a quarrel with his wife, Bankalot,
when the latter refused to work in their kaingin. Their
quarrel resumed the following day when Bankalot
refused to accompany Pilus to Macasin River to catch
fish. Bankalot’s father, Ebol and father of Pilus’ other
wife, Biwang, noticed that he went home alone that day
and that there were bloodstains on his bolo and on its
scabbard. Pilus explained that the bloodstains were
from the fish he had just cut. Ebol asked Pilus where his
daughter was but the latter disclaimed any knowledge
of her. Four days later, Bankalot’s body was found in
the middle of Macasin River. The incident was reported
to Lieutenant Olivares to whom the case was reported.
During trial, Pilus denied killing his wife.
HELD:
No. The facts duly established that Pilus is the author
of the crime but what he committed was homicide and
not parricide. From the testimony of Ebol, father of the
deceased, it appears that the defendant has three
wives and that the deceased was the last in point of
time. Although the practice of polygamy is approved
by custom among these non-Christians, polygamy,
however, is not sactioned by the Marriage Law which
merely recognizes tribal marriage rituals. The
deceased, under our law, is not thus the lawful wife of
the defendant and this precludes conviction for the
crime of parricide.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MANUEL MACAL
Y BOLASCO
G.R. NO. 211062, JANUARY 13, 2016
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in finding
the accused guilty of the crime of parricide.
2. Whether or not the proper penalty is reclusion
perpetua.
FACTS:
Manuel and Auria Macal are married and begot 2
children. Auria’s mother, Angeles, claimed that they
were all living together in Tacloban. Angeles testified
that she was walking home with her children, including
Auria after playing bingo at a local peryahan. Along the
way, with some of their friends, their group met Manuel
who joined them in walking back in their house. When
they arrived, the group proceeded to the living room
except for Auria and Manuel who went straight to their
bedroom. Shortly thereafter, Angeles heard her
daughter screaming for help. They immediately tried
opening the locked door. When it was opened, they
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saw a bloodied Auria on one side of the room. Next to
her was Manuel, who was trying to stab himself with
the use of an improvised weapon. Auria was
immediately taken to the hospital but was pronounced
dead on arrival. On the other hand, Manuel, managed
to escape before the police could reach the crime
scene. In his defense, Manuel claimed that he did
stabbed his wife but it was not intentional. He only did
that out of anger because he saw his wife conversing
with a man inside their bedroom. The Regional Trial
Court convicted Manuel of the crime of Parricide and
held that they were not convinced that the stabbing
incident was purely accidental. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision.
HELD:
1. No. Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is
killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused; (3) the
deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other
ascendants or other descendants, or the legitimate
spouse of the accused. Among the three requisites, the
relationship between the offender and the victim is the
most crucial. This relationship is what actually
distinguishes the crime of parricide from homicide. In
parricide involving spouses, the best proof of the
relationship between the offender and victim is their
marriage certificate. Oral evidence may also be
considered in proving the relationship between the
two as long as such proof is not contested. In this case,
the spousal relationship between Auria and the
accused-appellant is beyond dispute. As previously
stated, the defense already admitted that Auria was the
legitimate wife of the accused-appellant during the
pre-trial conference. Such admission was even
reiterated by the accused-appellant in the course of
trial of the case. Nevertheless, the prosecution
produced a copy of the couple's marriage certificate
which the defense admitted to be a genuine and
faithful reproduction of the original.
2. Yes. Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code provides
that the imposable penalty for parricide is reclusion
perpetua to death. With the enactment of Republic Act
No. 9346 (RA 9346), the imposition of the penalty of
death is prohibited. Likewise significant is the provision
found in Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code stating
that in the absence of mitigating and aggravating
circumstances in the commission of the crime, the
lesser penalty shall be imposed. Applying these to the
case at bar and considering that there are no
mitigating and aggravating circumstances present, the
penalty of reclusion perpetua was correctly imposed by
the RTC and CA.
March 9, 2018 – Article 247 – DEATH OR PHYSICAL
INJURIES INFLICTED UNDER EXCEPTIONAL
CIRCUMSTANCES
DIZON, Roxan Danica G.
PEOPLE VS BITUANAN
G.R. No. 34510 August 31, 1931
ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused is entitled to the privilege
under Art 423 of of the Penal Code (source of Art . 247
of the RPC)
FACTS:
Moro Bituanan and Mora Sabay were married by Datu
Alon according to Moro customs and usages.
According to the same customs and usages, the Datu
divorced the couple. Twenty days afterwards, Bituanan
caught Sabay and Ali Sabpa sleeping on the same bed.
Thereupon, Bituanan attacked Ali Sabpa and Sabay,
killing the former and wounding the latter.
In the Court of First Instance of Cotabato, Judge
Natividad found Bituanan guilty of the crime of
murder. It is the sole contention of counsel for the
accused, on appeal, that the decision of the lower court
should be modified by applying article 423 of the Penal
Code to the admitted facts. Said article provides that
"Any husband who, having surprised his wife in the act
of adultery, shall kill her or her paramour in the act, or
shall inflict any serious physical injuries upon either,
shall suffer the penalty of destierro."
HELD:
The marriage of Bituanan and Sabay, performed
according to the rites of the Mohammedan religion,
was valid. Granting, without necessarily having to
decide, that Bituanan and Sabay were, accordingly, not
legally divorced, it only need be said that there is no
evidence in the record showing that Bituanan surprised
Sabay and Ali Sabpa in the act of adultery when he
killed the latter. The privilege given in article 423 of the
Penal Code extends solely to the case of a husband
who surprises his wife in the act of actual adultery, that
is, actual carnal knowledge with her paramour. The
article does not apply to a husband who catches his
wife sleeping with another man on the same bed.
PEOPLE VS GONZALES
G.R. No. 46310 October 31, 1939
ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code
is applicable in this case
FACTS:
Marciano Gonzales , on returning to his house from the
woods, surprised his wife, Sixta Quilason, and Isabelo
Evangelio in the act, told her that the man was the very
one who used to ask rice and food from them, and
counseled her not to repeat the same faithlessness. His
wife, promised him not to do the act again. The
accused left the house and went to see his carabaos.
Upon returning to his house in the afternoon, and not
finding his wife there, he looked for her and found her
with Isabelo near the toilet of his house in a place
covered with underbush, who was standing and
buttoning his drawers, immediately took to his heels.
The accused went after him, but unable to overtake
him, he returned to where his wife was and, completely
obfuscated, attacked her with a knife without intending
to kill her. Thereafter, he took pity on her and took her
dead body to his house.
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The accused contends that he was entitled to the
privilege afforded by article 247 of the Revised Penal
Code.
HELD:
The accused cannot avail himself of the aforesaid
article, because the privilege there granted is
conditioned on the requirement that the spouse
surprise the husband or the wife in the act of
committing sexual intercourse with another person;
the accused did not surprise his wife in the very act or
carnal intercourse, but after the act, if any such there
was, because from the fact that she was rising up and
the man was buttoning his drawers, it does not
necessarily follow that a man and a woman had
committed the carnal act.
PEOPLE VS ABARCA
G.R. No. 74433 September 14, 1987
ISSUE:
Whether or not Abarca is entitled to the provisions of
Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code
FACTS:
One day in 1984, Francisco Abarca, through a
peephole, caught his wife having sexual intercourse
with one Khingsley Paul Koh inside the Abarca
residence. The two also caught Abarca looking at them
and so Koh grabbed his pistol and thereafter Abarca
fled. One hour later, Abarca, armed with an armalite,
went to the gambling place where Koh usually stays
and then and there shot Koh multiple times. Koh died
instantaneously. However, two more persons were shot
in the adjacent room. These two other persons survived
due to timely medical intervention.
Eventually after trial, Abarca was convicted of the
complex crime of murder with frustrated double
murder.
HELD:
Yes. Abarca is entitled to the provisions of Article 247
of the Revised Penal Code which provides:
Any legally married person who, having surprised his
spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with
another person, shall kill any of them or both of them
in the act or immediately thereafter, or shall inflict
upon them any serious physical injury, shall suffer the
penalty of destierro.
Article 247 prescribes the following elements: (1) that
a legally married person surprises his spouse in the act
of committing sexual intercourse with another person;
and (2) that he kills any of them or both of them in the
act or immediately thereafter. These elements are
present in this case.
Even though one hour had already lapsed from the
time Abarca caught his wife with Koh and the time he
killed Koh, the killing was still the direct by-product of
Abarca’s rage. Therefore, Abarca is not liable for the
death of Koh.
However, Abarca is still liable for the injuries he caused

to the two other persons he shot in the adjacent room
but his liability shall not be for frustrated murder. In the
first place, Abarca has no intent to kill the other two
persons injured. He was not also committing a crime
when he was firing his gun at Koh – it being under Art.
247. Abarca was however negligent because he did not
exercise all precaution to make sure no one else will be
hurt. As such, he shall be liable for less serious physical
injuries through simple negligence for the injuries
suffered by the two other persons who were in the
adjacent room when the incident happened.
PEOPLE VS OYANIB
G.R. Nos. 130634-35 March 12, 2001
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused is entitled to the privilege
under Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code
FACTS:
Manolito and Tita were married and had two children.
Due to marital differences, they separated with
Manolito keeping custody of their children. Tita lived
nearby, renting a room at the second floor of Edgardo
Lladas' house. Manolito exerted efforts towards
reconciliation for the sake of their children, but to no
avail. Tita was very reluctant to reconcile instead, she
was open about her relationship with other men and
would flaunt it in front of Manolito. One instance,
Manolito chanced upon Tita and Jesus in a very
intimate situation by a hanging bridge. He confronted
them and reminded Tita that she was still his wife. They
ignored him and threatened to kill him. On September
4, 1995, Manolito went to the house where Tita was
staying to inform the latter of the meeting at the school
about the failing grades of their child. Upon reaching
the house, he heard "sounds of romance" (kissing)
coming from the inside. He opened the door lock using
a hunting knife and caught Tita and Jesus having sexual
intercourse, Jesus on top of Tita, with his pants on his
knees. Jesus kicked Manolito in the cheek but the latter
immediately stabbed the former. Lladas, upon hearing
a commotion on the second floor of his house, went to
check and found Manolito stabbing Jesus while sitting
on the latter's stomach. Tita was sprawled on the floor
with her duster smeared with blood.She died on the
way to the hospital. Jesus and Tita died of multiple stab
wounds. Accused surrendered and admitted killing his
wife and her paramour but invoked the exceptional
circumstance under Article 247 of RPC. The trial court
convicted him of homicide and parricide with 2
mitigating circumstances: passion/obfuscation and
voluntary surrender.
HELD:
Yes. He invoked Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code
as an absolutory and an exempting cause. "An
absolutory cause is present 'where the act committed
is a crime but for reasons of public policy and
sentiment there is no penalty imposed.”
Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code prescribes the
following essential elements for such a defense: (1) that
a legally married person surprises his spouse in the act
of committing sexual intercourse with another person;
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(2) that he kills any of them or both of them in the act
or immediately thereafter; and (3) that he has not
promoted or facilitated the prostitution of his wife (or
daughter) or that he or she has not consented to the
infidelity of the other spouse.
The Court found the accused to have acted within the
circumstances contemplated in Article 247 of the
Revised Penal Code. Admittedly, accused-appellant
surprised his wife and her lover in the act of sexual
intercourse.
To the mind of the court, what actually happened was
that accused chanced upon Jesus at the place of his
wife. He saw his wife and Jesus in the act of having
sexual intercourse. Blinded by jealousy and outrage,
accused stabbed Jesus who fought off and kicked the
accused. He vented his anger on his wife when she
reacted, not in defense of him, but in support of Jesus.
Hence, he stabbed his wife as well several times.
Accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza surrendered to
the police when a call for him to surrender was made.
March 9, 2018 – Article 248 – MURDER
DOSDOS, Xicilli Krishna P.
G.R. No. L-4116 February 25, 1982
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EPIFANIO O.
VALERIO, JR., and DOMINGO ELEPAÑO
FACTS:
The case revolves around a plot of murder of an eight-
year old boy for insurance. The persistence in the
criminal design was evident from the fact that when the
insured eight-year-old waif disappeared, another
hapless substitute, whose name is unknown to this day,
was taken... to replace the first intended victim.
Sometime in August 1972, Amador Castro brought
home a boy whom he met in a Pantranco bus during a
flood. "I will live with you to take care of the cows" said
the boy.
On November 8, 1972, accused VALERIO, one Celestino
de la Cruz and Amador Castro, while at the latter's yard
at Bo. Tamayo, San Carlos City, conferred about
obtaining life insurance on the boy living with Castro,
who would be subsequently killed so that the policy
proceeds could be "divided 50-50"
In accordance with the aforementioned plan, and upon
instructions of VALERIO, Castro had the boy baptized
as "Amador Castro, Jr." at the San Carlos City Roman
Catholic Church with Celestino de la Cruz as "ninong".
VALERIO waited outside the church during the
ceremony.
On January 16, 1973, the insured boy left the Castro
household after losing money, through gambling,
given to him by Castro's wife to buy something. Castro
then informed De la Cruz and VALERIO about the de-
parture of the boy but the latter told him "easy ka lang,
steady... ka lang, we will substitute a boy for him".
VALERIO then gave Amador Castro a boy, who began
staying with the Castros beginning March 6, 1973.
Thereafter, VALERIO, Castro and De la Cruz planned
the killing of the new boy at Lido Beach, Cavite.
VALERIO and de la Cruz told Castro that if the plan

were to be executed in Pangasinan, they would be
"mabubuko".
On March 13, 1973, Castro, his wife, their three
children, the new boy, VALERIO, De la Cruz and
accused Domingo ELEPAÑO, as driver of the jeep, went
to Lido Beach in Cavite. According to Castro's
testimony on the witness stand, he, VALERIO, and De
la Cruz together with the... new boy went swimming.
When they reached a depth of four feet, Celestino de
la Cruz who was at the back of the boy hit the latter's
head with a piece of iron. Castro was at the left side of
the boy while VALERIO was at the boy's right side. De
la Cruz then held the boy by the... neck and submerged
him in water. VALERIO and Castro left De la Cruz and
the boy in the water. Upon instructions of De la Cruz,
Castro reported the new boy's "loss" to the life saver in
Lido Beach. Later, the life saver found the new boy, who
was brought to the Bautista Hospital... at Cavite City.
The boy was pronounced lifeless and was not
examined anymore. The cadaver was thereafter
brought to Funeraria Popular, Manila, where it was
examined by NBI agents. Thereafter, Castro filed a
death claim on the insurance of "Amador Castro, Jr.",
which was denied because the fingerprints of the boy
insured were different from the boy who was killed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused Valerio and Elepano are
liable for murder.
RULING:
Yes, both are liable.
From inception to execution, Valerio’s active
participation was evident. He authored the idea of
securing insurance on the boy's life, killing him and
thereafter collecting the insurance proceeds.
VALERIO was with Castro and the boy when the latter
was taken swimming to deeper waters. Those were the
categorical testimonies of Castro and ELEPAÑO.
According to ELEPAÑO, VALERIO also assisted in
funeral arrangements. VALERIO was at the vigil of the
boy until the latter was... buried. VALERIO contributed
P100.00 for burial expenses.
But in so far as ELEPAÑO is concerned, we find the
evidence of the prosecution insufficient to establish his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The only evidence
linking him to the crime is found in Castro's Statement
given to the NBI on April 25, 1973, Exhibit "1". Castro,...
however, repudiated under oath and in open Court his
said Statement in so far as ELEPAÑO is concerned and
stressed that ELEPAÑO had nothing to do with the
killing.
Treachery, as alleged in the Information, must be
considered qualifying and must be appreciated against
the accused. The killing of a child is murder even if the
manner of attack was not shown.[63] The qualifying
circumstances of treachery or "alevosia" exists in the
commission of the crime of murder when an adult
person illegally attacks a child of tender years and
causes his death.
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Evident premeditation is satisfactorily established if it
is proved that the accused had deliberately planned to
commit the crime and had persistently and...
continuously followed it notwithstanding that he had
ample and sufficient time to allow his conscience to
overcome the determination of his will, if he had
desired it, after meditation and reflection. It con-
templates cold and deep meditation and tenacious
persistence in the... accomplishment of the criminal
act.[65] In the case at bar, from the time the insurance
was taken in November, 1972, and even after the boy
insured got lost, the culprits did not relent in the
pursuit of their scheme for money culminating in the...
killing of the substitute boy and the filing of a death
claim with the Cardinal Life Insurance Corporation.
In deciding every criminal case, the civil responsibility
incurred by the accused, consequent upon his criminal
liability, must be declared because every person
criminally liable is also civilly liable.
March 9, 2018 – Article 249 – HOMICIDE
DUQUE, Francis Lester M
[G.R. No. CA-263. August 19, 1948.]
People v. TIMOTEO PENESA, Defendant-Appellant.
FACTS:
Timoteo Penesa and Rosario Aguillon lived, as husband
and wife, Their daughter and five children of Rosario
by her late husband lived with them. Due to continuous
wrangles between Timoteo and Rosario’s children by
her late husband, both agreed to part. Timoteo left the
house. The following day, Timoteo returned to the
house and asked Rosario to live with him in another
place. The request was refused. Santiago Cerrado, a
cousin of Rosario, came to the house and, upon seeing
Timoteo, asked the latter why he was there after they
had agreed to live apart. Angered by this remark,
Timoteo unsheated his bolo and assaulted Santiago.
Crescencio Doro, the eldest son of Rosario, who tried
to prevent another blow upon Santiago and had made
a remark similar to that of Santiago before the latter
came to the house, was also assaulted by Timoteo. At
this juncture, Rosario went down through the stairway,
preceded by Santiago. Crescencio and Timoteo
grappled for the possession of the bolo and both fell
to the floor. A brother of Rosario appeared upon the
scene and snatched the bolo and a dagger from the
hands of Timoteo. As a result of the assault upon
Santiago Cerrado, three wounds were inflicted upon
him, one on the left forearm and another under the left
axilla. They were not serious but the one in the left
palm was serious and, if the hemorrhage was not
stopped, it would have resulted in Crescencio’s death.
Trial court found Timoteo Penesa guilty of frustrated
homicide.
ISSUE:
WON Timoteo has intent to kill
HELD:
No. The SC ruled that when Timoteo went to the house
of Rosario, it was not with the intention to kill anybody,

for he went there to entreat Rosario Aguillon to live
with him in another house. The bolo with which the
appellant inflicted was one ordinarily used by farm
laborers. The dagger was carried for self-defense. The
wounds inflicted upon the offended parties by the
appellant were caused indiscriminately and not
deliberately. Appellant’s purpose in going to the
house, and not the kind of weapons he carried, nor the
parts of the victims’ bodies on which the wounds were
inflicted indiscriminately, is indicative and
determinative of his intent. The accused was convicted
only of slight physical injuries.
G.R. No. L-17666 June 30, 1966
ISIDORO MONDRAGON vs. PEOPLE
FACTS:
While complainant Serapion Nacionales was opening
the dike of his ricefield, he heard a shout from afar
telling him not to open the dike, Nacionales continued
opening the dike, and the same voice shouted again,
"Don't you dare open the dike." When he looked up,
he saw Isidoro Mondragon coming towards him.
Nacionales informed appellant that he was opening
the dike because he would plant the next morning.
Without much ado appellant punched the compalinant
but the latter was able to dodge. Petitioner then drew
his bolo and struck complainant on different parts of
his body. Complainant backed out, unsheathed his
own bolo, and hacked appellant on the head and
forearm and between the middle and ring fingers in
order to defend himself. Trial court found the
petitioner guilty of attempted homicide
ISSUE:
WON the facts established do not show that petitioner
has the intent to kill
HELD:
Yes. SC finds that the intention of the petitioner to kill
the offended party has not been conclusively shown. It
may be assumed that the petitioner drew his bolo and
hit the offended party with it only when the offended
party had shown a defiant attitude, considering that
the complainant himself had a bolo, as in fact the
offended party had also drawn his bolo and hit the
petitioner with it.
Pertinent testimony is as follows (Petitioner was asked):
QUESTION: In other words you want to tell us that you
will do everything you could to stop Nacionales
digging the canal, because you need water? ANSWER
- Yes, sir, because I need the water.
The answer of the petitioner is not a categorical
statement of an intention on his part to kill the
offended party. The term "will do everything" has a
broad meaning and it should be construed in a manner
as to give the petitioner the benefit of the doubt as to
what he really meant to do. 1Petitioner was guilty only
of less serious physical injuries.
The intent to kill being an essential element of the
offense of frustrated or attempted homicide, said
element must be proved by clear and convincing
evidence. That element must be proved with the same
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degree of certainty as is required of the other elements
of the crime. The inference of intent to kill should not
be drawn in the absence of circumstances sufficient to
prove such intent beyond reasonable doubt (People vs.
Villanueva, 51 Phil. 488).
G.R. No. 1509 February 16, 1904
THE UNITED STATES vs. NICOLAS GLORIA,
defendant-appellant.
Intent to kill is a conclusive presumption when death
resulted.
FACTS:
Nicolas Gloria had a quarrel with Tiburcio de la Cruz
which was followed by a fight. In the course of the
struggle, Gloria inflicted upon Cruz with a pocketknife
he was carrying, a wound in the left side of the trunk
above the abdomen, from which wound the said Dela
Cruz died. Romualdo Asuncion testified that the
deceased himself told him that the wound had been
inflicted by Nicolas Gloria. In view of the evidence for
the prosecution, the judge decided that the facts
constituted the crime of assault (lesiones) or physical
injuries.
ISSUE:
WON the judge is correct finding the accused guilty of
lesiones since there be no clear showing of intent to
kill.
HELD:
No. The crime must be classified as homicide and not
as assault (lesiones), notwithstanding the opinion of
the trial judge. All acts punished by the law are
presumed to be voluntarily in the absence of proof to
the contrary. With respect to crimes of personal
violence, the penal law looks particularly to the
material results following the unlawful act and holds
the aggressor responsible for all the consequences
thereof.
G.R. No. L-2095 , January 28, 1950
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FAUSTO
CLAMANIA
FACTS:
Apolinario Inciso and Modesto Delantar, two witnesses
for the prosecution, testified in substance that on the
night of September 26, 1942, in barrio Lawaan,
Balangiga, Samar, they were forced by the accused at
the point of a revolver to accompany him to the beach.
At the beach they saw Juan Grafil and Apolinario Gahoy
in a boat with their hands tied behind their backs. With
Apolinario Inciso at helm, Delantar and the accused
rowed the boat with the victims on board to Can-usod
Island. There, Grafil and Gahoy were taken ashore and
beaten to death by Fausto Clamania with an oar. After
Grafil and Gahoy were killed the accused ripped their
abdomens to let out the bowels, attached stones as
weights to the bodies, tied the bodies to the craft, and
then hauled them to deep water where they were
released.
As above stated, the defendant admitted the above

testimony, except that which says he had a firearm and
coerced the prosecution witnesses into following him.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the accused is liable for murder.
2. Whether or not the aggravating circumstances of
nighttime, uninhabited place and ensañamiento found
by the trial court were erroneously appreciated.
RULING:
Yes, accused Clamania is liable for murder.
The Court agree with the Solicitor General that the
aggravating circumstances of nighttime, uninhabited
place and ensañamiento found by the trial court, have
been erroneously appreciated. Nocturnity is absorbed
by treachery by which the killing is qualified; there is no
proof that Can-usod Island was uninhabited, and the
disemboweling of the deceased was not an
unnecessary mutilation or deliberate and wanton
augmentation of the suffering of the offended parties.
For when the disemboweling was affected, the victims
were already dead, and the operation was conceived
solely for the purpose of facilitating the sinking of the
cadavers and preventing their discovery.
G.R. No. 121828, June 27, 2003
PEOPLE vs, PILOLA
FACTS:
On February 5, 1988 11:30 pm: Elisa Rolan was inside
their store waiting for her husband to arrive. Joselito
Capa and Julian Azul, Jr. were drinking beer. Although
already drunk, Edmar Aguilos and Odilon Lagliba
joined them. Edmar had a heated argument with Julian.
Elisa pacified Edmar and advised them to go home as
she was already going to close up. Edmar and Odilon
left then returned to block Joselito and Julian. Edmar
took off his eyeglasses and punched Julian in the face.
Elisa shouted: “Tama na. Tama na” but she was ignored
as they continued until they reached the end of the
street. Odilon positioned himself on top of a pile of
hollow blocks and watched as Edmar and Julian
swapped punches. As Joselito tried to stop the fight,
Odilon pulled out his knife with his right hand and
stepped down from his perch. He placed his left arm
around Joselito’s neck, and stabbed him. Ronnie and
Rene Gayot Pilola, who were across the street, saw their
gangmate Odilon stabbing the victim and decided to
join the fray. Ronnie took a knife from the kitchen of
Teresita and rushed together with Pilola to the scene
and stabbed Joselito. As Joeslito was stabbed 11 times
(6 fatal stab wounds), he fell in the canal. Odilon and
Pilola fled while Ronnie went after Julian who ran dear
life. When Julian noticed that Ronnie was no longer
running after him, he looked back and saw Ronnie pick
up a piece of hollow block and bashed Joselito’s head.
Then, Ronnie got a piece of broken bottle and struck
Joselito once more before fleing from the scene.
Joselito died on the spot. Elisa rushed to Joselito’s
house and informed his wife and brother of the
incident.
Agripina Gloria, a female security guard, saw Ronnie
repeatedly stabbed Joselito and fled towards the
direction of the mental hospital. She did not see
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Odilon.
Elisa cross-examination had an inconsistency, she
stated that it was Edmar who struck the victim (before
it was Ronnie)
RTC: Pilola GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
Murder qualified by treachery and sentenced to
reclusion perpetua
ISSUE:
Whether or not Pilola is guilty of murder.
HELD:
YES. Rene Gayot Pilola GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of murder is AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION
The identity of the person who hit the victim with a
hollow block is of de minimis importance. Elisa’s
testimony is corroborated by the autopsy report of Dr.
Bienvenido Muñoz. No showing of any improper
motive on the part of a witness to testify falsely against
the accused or to falsely implicate the latter in the
commission of the crime. The trial court gave credence
and full probative weight to Elisa’s testimony.
There is conspiracy when two or more persons agree
to commit a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy
as a mode of incurring criminal liability must be proved
separately from and with the same quantum of proof
as the crime itself. Conspiracy need not be proven by
direct evidence. After all, secrecy and concealment are
essential features of a successful conspiracy. It may be
inferred from the conduct of the accused before,
during and after the commission of the crime, showing
that they had acted with a common purpose and
design. Conspiracy may be implied if it is proved that
two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the
accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each
doing a part so that their combined acts, though
apparently independent of each other, were, in fact,
connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of
personal association and a concurrence of sentiment.
There may be conspiracy even if an offender does not
know the identities of the other offenders, and even
though he is not aware of all the details of the plan of
operation or was not in on the scheme from the
beginning. One need only to knowingly contribute his
efforts in furtherance of it. One who joins a criminal
conspiracy in effect adopts as his own the criminal
designs of his co-conspirators. If conspiracy is
established, all the conspirators are liable as co-
principals regardless of the manner and extent of their
participation since in contemplation of law, the act of
one would be the act of all. Each of the conspirators is
the agent of all the others.
The mere presence of an accused at the situs of the
crime will not suffice. There must be intentional
participation in the transaction with a view to the
furtherance of the common design and purpose. Even
if two or more offenders do not conspire to commit
homicide or murder, they may be held criminally liable
as principals by direct participation if they perform
overt acts which mediately or immediately cause or

accelerate the death of the victim. Art. 4. Criminal
liability. – Criminal liability shall be incurred:
o 1. By any person committing a felony (delito)
although the wrongful act done be different from that
which he intended.
Art. 18. Accomplices. – Accomplices are the persons
who, not being included in Article 17, cooperate in the
execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous
acts.
o To hold a person liable as an accomplice, two
elements must concur:
1. the community of criminal design; that is, knowing
the criminal design of the principal by direct
participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose;
2. the performance of previous or simultaneous acts
that are not indispensable to the commission of the
crime
Accomplices come to know about the criminal
resolution of the principal by direct participation after
the principal has reached the decision to commit the
felony and only then does the accomplice agree to
cooperate in its execution. Accomplices do not decide
whether the crime should be committed; they merely
assent to the plan of the principal by direct
participation and cooperate in its accomplishment
However, where one cooperates in the commission of
the crime by performing overt acts which by
themselves are acts of execution, he is a principal by
direct participation, and not merely an accomplice.
Odilon all by himself initially decided to stab the victim.
However, while Odilon was stabbing the victim, the
appellant and Ronnie agreed to join. All the overt acts
of Odilon, Ronnie and the Pilola before, during, and
after the stabbing incident indubitably show that they
conspired to kill the victim. Since the victim is not yet
dead, the crime is not yet consummated so Pilola is a
principal by direct participation.
Alibi is a weak, if not the weakest of defenses in a
criminal prosecution, because it is easy to concoct but
hard to disprove. To serve as basis for acquittal, it must
be established by clear and convincing evidence. For it
to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he
was absent from the scene of the crime at the time of
its commission, but also that it was physically
impossible for him to have been present then. Pilola
knew that he was charged for the stabbing but instead
of surrendering to the police authorities, he evaded
arrest and this flight is evidence of his guilt.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of
the crimes against persons, employing means,
methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend
directly and specially to insure its execution, without
risk to himself arising from the defense which the
offended party might make. The essence of treachery
is the swift and unexpected attack on the unarmed
victim without the slightest provocation on his part -
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attack on the unarmed victim was sudden. The
aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior
strength is absorbed by treachery.
March 10, 2018 – Article 250 – PENALTY FOR
FRUSTRATED PARRICIDE, MURDER OR HOMICIDE.
FLORENTINO, Kimberly A.
UNITED STATES VS CANDIDO POBLETE
GR NO. L-4354. MARCH 25, 1908
ISSUE:
Whether the court can imposed penalty lower than
what was being prescribed by law?
FACTS:
On the morning of May 19, 1907, a 19 year old woman
together with her two companions were walking in the
direction of the church. Unexpectedly they met the
accused when they are nearing the parish house who
immediately seized the victim and attacked her chest,
back, sides, arms and thighs.Although she fell to the
ground senseless the accused continued attacking her.
The victim's companions attempted to help but they
were also attacked by the accused. The victim
sustained sixteen wounds but through the assistance
of a military surgeon in the hospital she was able to
survived. The wounds healed in about three weeks.
HELD:
Yes. After taking into consideration the circumstances
of the deed, and in the present case the trivial nature
of the wounds inflicted upon the injuref party, which
were cured in less than one month, Article 407 of the
Penal Code (Article 250 RPC) authorizes courts to
punish, within their rational discretion, the crime of
frustrated murder with a penalty lower by one degree,
imposing in its medium grade the penalty of presidio
correccional in its maximum degree to presidio mayor
in its medium grade, which is the penalty next lower to
that imposed by Article 65 of the Penal Code ( Article
50 RPC).
March 10, 2018 – Article 251 – DEATH CAUSED IN A
TUMULTUOUS AFFRAY
FUENTES, Arczft Ran Z.
[NO CASE FOUND]
March 10, 2018 – Article 252 – PHYSICAL INJURIES
INFLICTED IN A TUMULTUOUS AFFRAY
IBABAO, Konrad Stephen P.
[NO CASE FOUND]
March 10, 2018 – Article 253 – GIVING ASSISTANCE
TO SUICIDE
LAZO, Joseph Artfel T.
[NO CASE FOUND]
March 15, 2018 – Article 254 – DISCHARGE OF
FIREARMS

NASH, Regina Mercado
GERONIMO DADO vs. PEOPLE (G.R. NO. 131421)
November 18, 2002
ISSUE:
Whether accused is guilty of homicide instead of illegal
discharge of firearm only.
FACTS:
The present case is a petition for review under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court assailing the decision of the Court
of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Kudarat finding the Geronimo Dado and
Francisc o Eraso guilty of the crime of homicide. The
information charged both Dado and Eraso with murder
allegedly committed by said the accused armed with
firearms, with intent to kill, with evident premeditation
and treachery, and shot Silvestre Balinas thereby in
flicting gunshot wounds upon the latter which caused
his instant death.The antecedent facts as narrated by
prosecution witnesses Alfredo Balinas and Rufo Alga
wereas follows:
On the night of May 25, 1992, the Esperanza, Sultan
Kudarat Police Station formed three teams to intercept
some cattle rustlers. The Team composed of the
petitioner SPO4Geronimo Dado and CAFGU members
Francisco Eraso, AflredoBalinas and Rufo Alga
waitedbehind a large dike. Alfredo Balinas and Rufo
Alga, who were both armed with M14 armalite rifles,
were positioned between the petitioner, who was
armed with a caliber .45 pistol, andaccused Francisco
Eraso, who was carrying an M16 armalite rifle. At
around 11:00 of that sameevening, the team saw
somebody approaching at a distance of 50 meters.
When he was about 5 meters away from the team,
Alfredo Balinas noticed that Francisco Eraso was
making some movements. Balinas told Eraso to wait,
but before Balinas could beam his flashlight, Eraso
firedhis M16 armalite rifle at the approaching man.
Immediately thereafter, petitioner fired a singleshot
from his .45 caliber pistol. The victim turned out to be
Silvestre ―Butsoy‖ Balinas, thenephew of Alfredo
Balinas. Eraso embraced Alfredo Balinas to show his
repentance for his deed.
HELD:
In convicting the petitioner, both the trial court and the
Court of Appeals found that conspirac yattended the
commission of the crime. The Court of Appeals ruled
that petitioner Dado and accused Eraso conspired in
killing the deceased, thus, it is no longer necessary to
establish who caused the fatal wound in as much as
conspiracy makes the act of one conspirator the act of
all. Although the agreement need not be directly
proven, circumstantial evidence of such agreement
must nonetheless be convincingly shown. In the case
at bar, petitioner and accused Eraso’s seemingly
concerted and almost simultaneous acts were more of
a spontaneous reaction rather than the result of a
common plan to ki ll the victim. Evidently, the
prosecution failed to prove that the metallic fragments
found in the fatal wound of the victim were particles of
a .45 caliber bullet that emanated from the .45 caliber
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pistol fired by petitioner. Hence, the Supreme Court set
aside the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the
conviction of petitioner for the crime of homicide and
acquitted the petitioner of the crime charged on the
ground of reasonable doubt. A new decision was
entered finding petitioner Geronimo Dado guilty of the
crime of illegal discharge of firearm and sentenced him
to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of
arresto mayor, as minimum, to two (2) years and eleven
(11) months of prision correccional, as maximum
penalty.
March 11, 2018 – Article 255 – INFANTICIDE
OLACO, Jan- Lawrence P.
PEOPLE VS. JOSEFINA BANDIAN
G.R. NO. 45186 SEPTEMBER 30, 1936
FACTS:
One morning, Valentin Aguilar saw his neighbor,
Josefina Bandian, got to a thicket apparently to
respond to the call of nature. Few minutes later,
Bandian emerged from the thicket with her clothes
stained with blood both in the front and back,
staggering and visibly showing signs of not being able
to support herself. Rushing to her aid, he brought her
to her house and placed her on the bed. He called on
Adriano Comcom to help them Comcom saw he body
of a newborn babe near a path adjoining the thicket
where the appellant had gone a few moments before.
She claimed it was hers. Dr. Emilio Nepomuceno
declared that the appellant gave birth in her own house
and three her child into the thicket to kill it. The trial
court gave credit to this opinion.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Bandian is guilty of infanticide
HELD:
No. Infanticide and abandonment of a minor, to be
punishable, must be committed willfully or consciously,
or at least it must be the result of a voluntary, conscious
and free act or omission. The evidence does not show
that the appellant, in causing her child’s death in one
way or another, or in abandoning it in the thicket, did
so willfully, consciously or imprudently. She had no
cause to kill or abandon it, to expose it to death,
because her affair with a former lover, which was not
unknown to her second lover, Kirol, took place three
years before the incident; her married life with Kirol—
she considers him her husband as he considers him his
wife—began a year ago; as he so testified at the trial,
he knew of the pregnancy and that it was his and that
they’ve been eagerly awaiting the birth of the child. The
appellant, thus, had no cause to be ashamed of her
pregnancy to Kirol.
Apparently, she was not aware of her childbirth, or if
she was, it did not occur to her or she was unable, due
to her debility or dizziness, which cause may be
considered lawful or insuperable to constitute the
seventh exempting circumstance, to take her child
from the thicket where she had given it birth, so as not
to leave it abandoned and exposed to the danger of

losing its life. If by going into the thicket to pee, she
caused a wrong as that of giving birth to her child in
that same place and later abandoning it, not because
of imprudence or any other reason than that she was
overcome by strong dizziness and extreme debility, she
could not be blamed because it all happened by mere
accident, with no fault or intention on her part. The law
exempts from liability any person who so acts and
behaves under such circumstances (Art. 12(4), RPC).
Thus, having the fourth and seventh exempting
circumstances in her favor, she is acquitted of the crime
that she had been accused of.
PEOPLE VS SEVERA JACA AND PROCESO
RASALAN
G.R. NO. L-34866 AUGUST 18, 1931
FACTS:
On November 1930, the above-named accused, Severa
Jaca and Proceso Rasalan, aiding and abetting each
other for the purpose of concealing the dishonor of
said Severa Jaca, did willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously put to death the child which she had given
birth to, before it was 3 days old. Having heard the
case, the Court of First Instance (CFI) acquitted Severa
Jaca, but convicted Proceso Rasalan of the crime
charged and sentenced him to life imprisonment.
Proceso Rasalan appealed from this sentence.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the penalty imputed upon Rasalan was
correct.
HELD:
YES. There is no dispute about the fact that Severa
Jaca's new-born baby die a violent death; this has been
sufficiently proved. The evidence for the prosecution
points to Proceso Rasalan as the offender, that two
eyewitnesses, both of them related to the appellant,
the first by consaguinity and the second by affinity,
testified that Rasalan wrapped up the baby in a cloth
which asphyxiated it — resulting in its death. Tomas
Jaca, the appellant's father-in-law, testified that when
the latter handed to him the corpse of the newly-born
child in order that he might secretly throw it into the
river, the accused revealed to him that he, Rasalan, had
killed it in order to conceal the dishonor of Severa Jaca.
The defendant questions the veracity of these three
witnesses, alleging that they had a grievance against
him and his family. The grievance mentioned was not
sufficient to make the witnesses tell a falsehood in
accusing their own relative of so serious crime.
Moreover, as it has been established in the record that
the crime charged was committed, and that the
defendant committed it; that, inasmuch as he is not an
ascendant of the dead child, he has incurred, according
to the law the penalty for murder and is guilty of this
crime. Hence, the penalty imputed is correct as against
to Rasalan.
March 12, 2018 – Article 256 – INTENTIONAL
ABORTION
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PACQUIAO, Jose Luis P.
UNITED STATES V. MARIANO BOSTON
G.R. NO. L-4795 (NOVEMBER 23, 1908)
ISSUE:
Whether or not accused Boston should be liable of
Intentional Abortion
FACTS:
In this case, the child was born three months in
advance of the full period of gestation. The accused
Boston, believing that the child in the womb of the
woman was a sort of a fish-demon (which he called a
balat), gave to her a portion composed of herbs, for
the purpose of relieving her of this alleged fish-demon.
Two hours after, she gave premature birth to a child.
After the birth of the child, Boston, with the permission
and aid of the husband and the brother of the infant
child, destroyed it by fire in order to prevent its doing,
which the Boston believed it was capable of doing.
HELD:
Yes. The guilt of appellant is conclusively established
by the evidence of record, the testimony of the
witnesses for the prosecution leaving no room for
reasonable doubt. These facts constitute, in our
opinion, prima facie proof of the intent of the accused
in giving the herb potion to the mother of the child,
and also of the further fact that the herb potion so
administered to her was the cause of its premature
birth. The defense wholly failed to rebut this testimony
of this prosecution and we are of opinion, therefore,
that the trial court with which he was charged beyond
a reasonable doubt.
PEOPLE V. FILOMENO SALUFRANIA
G.R. NO. L-50884 (MARCH 30, 1988)
ISSUE
Whether or not Salufrania should be liable with the
complex crime of Parricide with Intentional Abortion
FACTS
The accused Salufrania was found guilty by the trial
court of the complex crime of Parricide with Intentional
Abortion. Several witnesses were presented by the
prosecution and the defense throughout the trial.
Pedro Salufrania, son of the accused, was one of the
witnesses of the prosecution which stated that he saw
his father box his pregnant mother on the stomach
and, once fallen on the floor, his father strangled her
to death; that he saw blood ooze from the eyes and
nose of his mother and that she died right on the spot
where she fell.
HELD
No. The accused Salufrania should not be held guilty
of the complex crime of Parricide with Intentional
Abortion but of the complex crime of Parricide with
Unintentional Abortion. The elements of Unintentional
Abortion are as follows:
1. That there is a pregnant woman.

2. That violence is used upon such pregnant
woman without intending an abortion.
3. That the violence is intentionally exerted.
4. That as a result of the violence the fetus dies,
either in the womb or after having been expelled
therefrom.
The Solicitor General's brief makes it appear that
appellant intended to cause an abortion because he
boxed his pregnant wife on the stomach which caused
her to fall and then strangled her. We find that
appellant's intent to cause an abortion has not been
sufficiently established.
Mere boxing on the stomach, taken together with the
immediate strangling of the victim in a fight, is not
sufficient proof to show an intent to cause an abortion.
In fact, appellant must have merely intended to kill the
victim but not necessarily to cause an abortion.
The evidence on record, therefore, establishes beyond
reasonable doubt that accused Filomeno Salufrania
committed and should be held liable for the complex
crime of parricide with unintentional abortion.
March 12, 2018 – Article 257 – UNINTENTIONAL
ABORTION
PACQUIAO, Jose Paolo P.
U.S VS. JEFFREY
15 PHIL 394 MARCH 5, 1910
ISSUE:
W/N Jeffrey was liable under Art. 257 of the RPC
FACTS:
On the evening of March 1, 1909, while Teodorica
Saguinsin was in a Chinese shop situated in Guadalupe,
municipality of San Pedro Macati, Rizal Province, a man
named D. B. Jeffrey appeared therein, and, without any
apparent reason whatever, struck the woman three
times on the hip with a bottle that he was carrying, in
consequence of which the woman fell to the ground
with an abundant hemorrhage from the womb; she
was immediately taken to her home in a carretela, and
being three months pregnant she had a miscarriage on
the following day, according to the examination made
by the president of the municipal board of health. The
woman was ill and unable to attend to her usual duties
for forty-five days.
HELD:
Yes. Even though it was not the criminal intent of the
defendant to cause the abortion, the fact that, without
any apparent reason whatever, he maltreated
Teodorica Saguinsin, presumably not knowing that she
was pregnant, as author of the abuse which caused the
miscarriage, he is liable not only for such maltreatment
but also for the consequences thereof, to wit, for the
abortion; and it was also proven that on the said
occasion the defendant was drunk, which circumstance
explains how he came to strike the woman with a bottle
without any known motive. It does not appear that he
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is a habitual drunkard. The penalty of prision
correccional as fixed by the aforesaid article should be
imposed upon him in the minimum degree, there
being no aggravating circumstance to counteract its
effect.
PEOPLE VS. GENOVES
G.R. NO. L-42819, APRIL 15, 1935
ISSUE:
W/N there can be a complex crime of homicide with
abortion
FACTS:
In the morning of the 28th of May, 1934, appellant and
deceased Soledad Rivera were laborers in adjoining
cane fields. Soledad claimed that the yoke of the plow
which appellant was repairing belonged to her and
tried to take it by force. Appellant struck her with his
fist, causing her to fall to the ground. She got up and
returned to the fray, whereupon she received another
blow with the fist on the left cheek which caused her
again to fall to the ground. Immediately after the
incident deceased proceeded to the municipal
building, a distance of about four kilometers, and
complained to the chief of police about the
maltreatment. At the time Soledad was heavy with
child, and as she complained to the chief of police of
pain in the abdomen, she was seen by the president of
the sanitary district. According to testimony deceased
was in good health the day before.
From the time of the incident there was hemorrhage
and pain which were symptoms of premature delivery.
Deceased remained in this condition until June 10,
1934. On that date the condition culminated in the
painful and difficult premature delivery of one of the
twin babies that she way carrying, but the other baby
could be delivered. Both babies were dead.
HELD:
Yes. Appellant was convicted in the Court of First
Instance of Occidental Negros of the complex crime of
homicide with abortion.
The first assignment of error is the contention of
appellant that the death of the offended party was not
the direct result of the assault upon her by the
defendant. It is generally known that a fall is liable to
cause premature delivery, and the evidence shows a
complete sequel of events from the assault to her
death. The accused must be held responsible for the
natural consequences of his act.
The other defense is that the accused did not strike the
deceased, but this fact is clearly established by the
prosecution. We find the mitigating circumstances of
lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as that
inflicted and provocation, as the offended party by
force induced the appellant to use force on his part.
The abortion in this case is unintentional abortion
denounced by article 257 of the Revised Penal Code.

On the whole case, the period of confinement is fixed
at twelve years and one day to fourteen years, eight
months and one day of reclusion temporal.
GELIG VS. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 173150, JULY 28, 2010
ISSUE:
W/N the petitioner can be convicted of Unintentional
Abortion.
FACTS:
On July 17, 1981, at around 10:00 oclock in the
morning, Lydia confronted Gemma after learning from
Roseller that Gemma called him a sissy while in class.
Lydia slapped Gemma in the cheek and pushed her,
thereby causing her to fall and hit a wall divider. As a
result of Lydias violent assault, Gemma suffered a
contusion in her maxillary area, as shown by a medical
certificate issued by a doctor in the Bogo General
Hospital. However, Gemma continued to experience
abdominal pains and started bleeding two days after
the incident. On August 28, 1981, she was admitted in
the Southern Islands Hospital and was diagnosed, to
her surprise, to have suffered incomplete abortion.
Accordingly, a medical certificate was issued.
HELD:
No. The prosecutions success in proving that Lydia
committed the crime of direct assault does not
necessarily mean that the same physical force she
employed on Gemma also resulted in the crime of
unintentional abortion. There is no evidence on record
to prove that the slapping and pushing of Gemma by
Lydia that occurred on July 17, 1981 was the proximate
cause of the abortion. While the medical certificate of
Gemmas attending physician, Dr. Susan Jaca (Dr. Jaca),
was presented to the court to prove that she suffered
an abortion, there is no data in the document to prove
that her medical condition was a direct consequence
of the July 17, 1981 incident. It was therefore vital for
the prosecution to present Dr. Jaca since she was
competent to establish a link, if any, between Lydias
assault and Gemmas abortion. Without her testimony,
there is no way to ascertain the exact effect of the
assault on Gemmas abortion.
It is worth stressing that Gemma was admitted and
confined in a hospital for incomplete abortion on
August 28, 1981, which was 42 days after the July 17,
1981 incident. This interval of time is too lengthy to
prove that the discharge of the fetus from the womb
of Gemma was a direct outcome of the assault. Her
bleeding and abdominal pain two days after the said
incident were not substantiated by proof other than
her testimony. Thus, it is not unlikely that the abortion
may have been the result of other factors.
March 12, 2018 – Article 258 – ABORTION
PRACTICED BY THE WOMAN HERSELF OR BY HER
PARENTS.
PANIZA, Lyndzelle Jane D
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[NO CASE FOUND]
March 13, 2018 – Article 259 – ABORTION
PRACTICED BY A PHYSICIAN OR MIDWIFE AND
DISPENSING OF ABORTIVES
RIVERA, Marynit P.
[NO CASE FOUND]
March 14, 2018 – Article 260 – RESPONSIBILITY OF
PARTICIPANTS IN A DUEL
ROMBLON, Shirley Kris M
[NO CASE FOUND]
March 13, 2018 – Article 261 – CHALLENGING TO A
DUEL
SALVERON, Jan Ione R.
PEOPLE VS RAMY VALLES
G.R. NO. 110564. JANUARY 28, 1997
ISSUE:
Is the crime of challenging to a duel committed?
FACTS:
The victim, Elmer Porcullo, [4]who was a worker of Sta.
Monica Canning Corporation went there to collect his
salary with two of his co-employees, Rizza Pelegrino
and Paulita Palencia. Upon reaching the gate of Sta.
Monica. Rizza and Paulita were allowed by the security
guards to enter the compound of the company, but
not Porcullo who was prohibited by the accused Ramy
Valles, a security guard of the company, since the
former was only wearing "sando" and pants and had
no identification card to present which was in violation
of the company rules requiring employees to enter the
company's premises in proper uniform. Porcullo then
approached Valles not only once but four times
insisting to get inside the compound of the company,
it was at the third and fourth time that Porcullo got
mad and started insulting Valles. Porcullo berated
Valles and challenged him to go out of the compound
and have a fist fight with him. Porcullo then pointed his
finger at Valles and said “Putang ina mo, akala mo sino
ka, hindi mo ba alam na ex-army ako?”
When Porcullo turned and walked away from Valles,
the latter without warning shot Porcullo. He turned
sideways to look at his wound but, again, he was shot
by the accused. The victim sustained two (2) gunshot
wounds, one on the left buttock and the other was
below the right armpit.
HELD:
NO. The act of berating and challenging Valles to a
fistfight apparently incited the fury of the accused-
appellant, and, at this instance, Porcullo should
naturally expect and anticipate the possible
consequences of his rebellious acts like the consequent
retaliation by the accused-appellant against his life. He
courted obvious danger, and when it came, it can not
be defined as sudden, unexpected and unforeseen. It

entitled Valles to the mitigating circumstance of
obfuscation.
March 14, 2018 – Article 262 – MUTILATION
SANTOALLA, Stephanie M.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SAMUEL BORCE
G.R. No. 124131 April 22, 1998
FACTS:
Samuel Borce was convicted for Rape and Frustrated
Murder.
For Rape:
That on April 29, 1994, at around 8:30 o'clock in the
morning, at the hill of the western part of Bariquir,
Barangay San Antonio, Municipality of Bangued,
Province of Abra, Philippines with lewd design and with
the use of deadly weapon, raped REGINA BAGA against
her will and consent and this was repeated for the
second time around, to the great damage and
prejudice.
For Frustrated Murder:
That on April 29, 1994, at around 8:30 o'clock in the
morning, at the hill of the western part of Barangay San
Antonio, Municipality of Bangued, Province of Abra,
Philippines SAMUEL BORCE, hack the face of one
REGINA BAGA, inflicting multiple hack wounds on her
face, by reason of the timely medical attendance
rendered to said victim which prevented her death.
ISSUE:
WON the crime of Mutilation under Article 262 is
committed?
HELD:
No. Crime of Rape was committed.
In fine, relevant to the case at bar, when the crime of
rape is committed "with the use of a deadly weapon,"
the penalty prescribed is reclusion perpetua to death.
The death penalty is imposed when by reason or on
the occasion of rape, the victim has suffered
"permanent physical mutilation."
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659 reads:
Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. —
Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use
of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the
penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the
victim has become insane, the penalty shall be death.
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of
rape is committed with any of the following attendant
circumstances:
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the
victim has suffered permanent physical mutilation.The
imposition of the death penalty on accused-appellant
by the trial court on each count of rape has been
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premised on the infliction of three scars on the victim's
face.
The phrase "permanent physical mutilation" has not
been defined in the law. Neither Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, as so amended by Republic Act
No. 7659, nor any of the chapters in Title Eleven,
entitled "Crimes against Chastity," provides any further
clue on the meaning that should be given to the term.
In Title Eight on "Crimes against Persons,"14 the Code
simply states in Article 262 thereof that —
Art. 262. Mutilation. — The penalty of from reclusion
temporal
to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any
person who shall intentionally mutilate another by
depriving him, either totally or partially, of some
essential organ for reproduction.
Any other intentional mutilation shall be punished by
prision mayor in its medium and maximum periods.
No specific ascription having been given by the law to
the word, "mutilation" must perforce be understood in
its generic sense and ordinary usage. Webster15
defines mutilation as cutting off or permanently
destroying a limb or an essential part thereof. Black16
defines the term, in its criminal law concept, as one that
would deprive a person of the use of any of those limbs
which may be useful to him in fight, the loss of which
amounts to mayhem.
A thorough reading of the records of the case would
fail to disclose that accused-appellant inflicted the
wounds on the victim deliberately to maim her. It
would, in fact, appear that the victim sustained the
wounds only as a result of a clear attempt by appellant
to kill her and cover-up his misdeeds. The injury thus
borne by private complainant should not be taken as a
circumstance which would raise the penalty to death
for the crime of rape but should instead rightly be
taken up and absorbed in the crime of frustrated
murder.
March 14, 2018 – Article 263 – SERIOUS PHYSICAL
INJURIES
TADO, Diann Kathelline A.
US VS ANDRES VILLANUEVA GR. NO. 10606, SEP
11, 1915. 31 PHIL. 412
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused is guilty
FACTS:
Villanueva is charged "while quarreling with his
opponent, Isidoro Benter, with having suddenly
snatched the bolo which the latter was carrying at his
belt and with it inflicting upon him a wound in the palm
of the right hand that incapacitated the aggrieved
party from performing work for more than thirty days
and which rendered the said principal member entirely
useless."
But it turns out that Villanueva was not Benter's
opponent nor was there any quarrel between the two.
Neither did Villanueva inflict any wound upon Benter.

The latter injured himself by an accident arising out of
his own act.
Benter testified that he agreed to take Villanueva to the
town of Pola in his boat. At the landing, Villanueva took
hold of the bolo which complainant carried at his belt.
The complainant tried to retain it and that in doing so
he caught it by the blade and cut himself in the palm
of the right hand; that without a word being said the
complainant left.
Benter was able to testify that the wound delayed in
healing for more than forty days.
The trial court opined that the act constitutes lesiones
graves by reckless negligence under Article 568 of the
Penal Code.
RULING:
NO.
The law speaks of a person who by reckless
imprudence commits an act which, if maliciously
performed, would constitute a grave felony. (Art. 568,
Penal Code.) But the act of the accused in the case at
bar does not constitute a felony, grave, or menos
grave, nor is it a misdemeanor. The only act which he
performed was to take, or attempt to take, from its
sheath the bolo which Benter was carrying at his belt,
and that was an act which is not defined in any law as
being a crime ov misdemeanor.
The defendant did not wound Benter. It was the latter
who, by his own act in catching hold of the edge of the
blade of the bolo, wounded himself, or as is said in the
judgment appealed from, the bolo, by its edge or by
its own weight, in slipping from Benteu's hand into the
scabbard because he did not grasp it firmly, wounded
Benter; the bolo did this, not the defendant.
The crime of lesiones graves (physical injuries) which
the trial court understands to be committed without
malice or with reckless imprudence is thus classified in
article 416 of the Penal Code: "Any person who shall
wound, beat, or assault another * * * shall suffer: 1. * *
*. 2. The penalty of prision etc., if in consequence of the
physical injuries inflicted the injured person shall have
lost an eye or any principal member, etc."
The defendant did not wound, beat, or assault Benter;
consequently he cannot be guilty of the crime of
inflicting serious physical injuries, not even by reckless
imprudence.
S/SGT. CORNELIO PAMAN, PETITIONER, V.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
G.R. NO. 210129, JULY 05, 2017
ISSUE:
Whether or not Paman is guilty
FACTS:
On October 14, 2004, at about 1:20 p.m., Ursicio
Arambala (Arambala) was on board a motorcycle
traversing Roxas Street, Pagadian City towards the
direction of the Southern Mindanao Colleges Main
Campus. When he was nearing the intersection of
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Roxas and Broca Streets in Pagadian City, a multicab
driven by S/Sgt. Cornelio Paman (Paman), a military
personnel, crossed his path and collided with his
motorcycle. Arambala was thrown from his motorcycle
thus hitting his head on the road pavement. Emilda
Salabit, who was then standing beside the road, saw
Arambala being thrown away after the collision; she
went to Arambala and hailed a tricycle and rushed him
to the hospital.
A Computed Tomography Scan report shows that
Arambala suffered hematoma at the cerebral portion
of his brain. After his confinement at the Mercy
Community Hospital on October 15, 2004, Arambala
was again admitted on October 24, 2004 at the
Zamboanga del Sur Provincial Hospital due to erratic
blood pressure and slurring speech caused by the
hematoma.
On February 21, 2005, an Information for the crime of
reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical
injuries was filed.
The MTCC found Paman guilty.
The RTC reversed MTCC decision. RTC pointed out that
Arambala was the cause of the collision since he
already saw the multicab driven by Paman ahead of
time; that he had the opportunity to take precaution to
avoid the accident, but he failed to do so.
The CA reversed RTC decision.
RULING:
YES.
A perusal of the records of this case clearly shows that
it was Paman who was at fault since he was driving at
the wrong side of the road when the collision
happened. The CA observed that the evidence
indubitably shows that before the collision, Arambala's
motorcycle was cruising along its rightful lane when
S/Sgt. Paman's multicab suddenly crossed his
(Arambala) path coming from his left side using the
wrong lane to cross the said intersection. The accident
would not have happened had S/Sgt. Paman, the
multicab driver, stayed on his lane and did not overtake
the vehicle of the private complainant Ararnbala.
Paman's act of driving on the wrong side of the road,
in an attempt to overtake the motorcycle driven by
Arambala, and suddenly crossing the path which is
being traversed by the latter, is sheer negligence. It is
a settled rule that a driver abandoning his proper lane
for the purpose of overtaking another vehicle in an
ordinary situation has the duty to see to it that the road
is clear and he should not proceed if he cannot do so
in safety. If, after attempting to pass, the driver of the
overtaking vehicle finds that he cannot make the
passage in safety, the latter must slacken his speed so
as to avoid the danger of a collision, even bringing his
car to a stop if necessary.20 This rule is consistent with
Section 4l(a) of the Land Transportation and Traffic
Code.

Here, Paman was violating a traffic regulation, i.e.,
driving on the wrong side of the road, at the time of
the collision. He is thus presumed to be negligent at
the time of the incident, which presumption he failed
to overcome. For failing to observe the duty of
diligence and care imposed on drivers of vehicles
abandoning their lane, Paman, as correctly held by the
CA, must be held liable.
Nevertheless, there is a need to modify the penalty
imposed by the CA.
Under Article 263(4) of the RPC, the penalty for serious
physical injuries, when the injuries inflicted caused
incapacity for more than 30 days, is arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correccional in its
minimum period; the maximum period of the
foregoing penalty - prision correccional in its minimum
period - is merely a correctional penalty and, thus,
should be considered a less grave felony.
Accordingly, pursuant to Article 365 of the RPC, Paman
should be sentenced to suffer the penalty of arresto
mayor in its minimum and medium periods or from
one (1) month and one (1) day to four (4) months. Since
the maximum term of imprisonment in this case, i.e.,
four (4) months, does not exceed one (1) year, the
provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law find no
application and Paman should be meted a straight
penalty taken from arresto mayor in its minimum and
medium periods. In view of the lack of any mitigating
or aggravating circumstances in this case, Paman
should be made to suffer the straight penalty of
imprisonment of two (2) months and one (1) day of
arresto mayor.
March 14, 2018 – Article 264 – ADMINISTERING
INJURIOUS SUBSTANCES OR BEVERAGES
UNAS, Nor-Aiza R.
US V. CHIONG SONGCO
G.R. NO. L-6503 FEBRUARY 27, 1911
ISSUE:
Whether or not Songco is guilty of administering
injurious substance or beverage as contemplated in
Article 264 of the Revised Penal Code.
FACTS:
The defendant and appellant threw the contents of a
bottle of sulphuric acid into the face and on the body
of the complaining witness, inflicting wounds which
resulted in the illness of the injured man for more than
thirty days. It was further proven that the attack was
made treacherously, as that circumstance is defined in
article 10 of the Penal Code, it having been made at
night, from behind the shelter of a sheet of zinc, and at
a time when the victim was wholly unprepared to make
any defense, he not having any reason to anticipate an
assault so unexpected and unusual.
HELD:
No. The trial court found the defendant guilty of the
crime of lesiones defined in subsection 4 of article 416
read together with article 417 of the Penal Code,
marked with the aggravating circumstance of the
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nocturnity, and sentenced him to imprisonment for 1
year and 1 day. But the commission of the crime having
been marked with the qualifying circumstance of
treachery, the special penalty prescribed in the last
paragraph of article 416 should have been inflicted,
that is to say, the penalty of prision correccional in its
minimum and medium degree. The penalty should
have been imposed in its medium degree, the
commission of the offense not having been marked by
aggravating or extenuating circumstances, the
aggravating circumstance of nocturnity as found by
the trial court being taken into consideration in the
finding of the existence of the qualifying circumstance
of alevosia.
We should add that the crime as committed is not in
any wise related to the offices defined and penalized in
article 417 of the code, as found by the trial court, the
provisions of which clearly relate to the use of poisons
and the like in an entirely different manner.
The sentence imposed by the trial court is therefore
reversed, and instead thereof, we sentence the
defendant and appellant to two years of prision
correccional, together with the accessory penalties
prescribed by law, and to the payment of the cost of
both instances.
March 14, 2018 – Article 265 – LESS SERIOUS
PHYSICAL INJURIES
VILLAHERMOSA, Alexand Rhea M.
CARLITO PENTECOSTES, JR. VS. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO. 167766 APRIL 7, 2010
ISSUE:
Whether or not the crime of “Less Serious Physical
Injuries” was committed in this case
FACTS:
On September 2, 1998, Rudy Baclig was drinking with
his brother-in-law. After consuming ½ bottle of gin, he
left and went to the house of a certain Siababa to buy
coffee and sugar. He was accompanied by his four-
year-old son. On their way there, a gray automobile
coming from the opposite direction passed by them.
After a while, he noticed that the vehicle was moving
backward towards them. When the car was about two
arms’ length from where they were, it stopped and he
heard the driver of the vehicle call him by his nickname
Parrod. Rudy came closer, but after taking one step, the
driver, which he identified as the petitioner, opened the
door and while still in the car drew a gun and shot him
once, hitting him just below the left armpit. Rudy
immediately ran at the back of the car, while petitioner
sped away. After petitioner left, Rudy and his son
headed to the seashore. Rudy later went back to the
place where he was shot and shouted for help. The
people who assisted him initially brought him to the
Municipal Hall of Gonzaga, Cagayan, where he was
interrogated by a policeman who asked him to identify
his assailant. He informed the policeman that
petitioner was the one who shot him. After he was
interrogated, he was later brought to the Don Alfonso

Ponce Memorial Hospital at Gonzaga, Cagayan. The
following day, he was discharged from the hospital.
On June 1, 1999, an Information was filed by the
Provincial Prosecutor of Aparri, Cagayan, charging the
petitioner of frustrated murder. Duly arraigned,
petitioner pleaded Not Guilty to the crime as charged.
The RTC rendered a Decision finding petitioner guilty
of the crime of Attempted Murder. The CA found him
only guilty of less serious physical injuries.
HELD:
This Court also concurs with the conclusion of the CA
that petitioner is guilty of the crime of less serious
physical injuries, not attempted murder.
The principal and essential element of attempted or
frustrated murder is the intent on the part of the
assailant to take the life of the person attacked. Such
intent must be proved in a clear and evident manner
to exclude every possible doubt as to the homicidal
intent of the aggressor. In the present case, intent to
kill the victim could not be inferred from the
surrounding circumstances. Petitioner only shot the
victim once and did not hit any vital part of the latter’s
body. If he intended to kill him, petitioner could have
shot the victim multiple times or even ran him over
with the car. Favorably to petitioner, the inference that
intent to kill existed should not be drawn in the
absence of circumstances sufficient to prove this fact
beyond reasonable doubt.
When such intent is lacking but wounds are inflicted
upon the victim, the crime is not attempted murder but
physical injuries only. Since the Medico-Legal
Certificate issued by the doctor who attended Rudy
stated that the wound would only require ten (10) days
of medical attendance, and he was, in fact, discharged
the following day, the crime committed is less serious
physical injuries only. The less serious physical injury
suffered by Rudy is defined under Article 265 of the
Revised Penal Code, which provides that "Any person
who inflicts upon another physical injuries not
described as serious physical injuries but which shall
incapacitate the offended party for labor for ten (10)
days or more, or shall require medical attendance for
the same period, shall be guilty of less serious physical
injuries and shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor.
March 15, 2018 – Article 266 – SLIGHT PHYSICAL
INJURIES AND MALTREATMENT
VILLARIN, Paulo Jose
GEORGE BONGALON vs PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 169533
March 20, 2013
FACTS:
May 11, 2002, Jayson Dela Cruz (Jayson) and Roldan,
his older brother, both minors, joined the evening
procession for the Santo Niño at Oro Site in Legazpi
City; that when the procession passed in front of the
petitioner’s house, the latter’s daughter Mary Ann
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Rose, also a minor, threw stones at Jayson and called
him "sissy"; that the petitioner confronted Jayson and
Roldan and called them names like "strangers" and
"animals"; that the petitioner struck Jayson at the back
with his hand, and slapped Jayson on the face; that the
petitioner then went to the brothers’ house and
challenged Rolando dela Cruz, their father, to a fight,
but Rolando did not come out of the house to take on
the petitioner; that Rolando later brought Jayson to the
Legazpi City Police Station and reported the incident;
that Jayson also underwent medical treatment at the
Bicol Regional Training and Teaching Hospital; that the
doctors who examined Jayson issued two medical
certificates attesting that Jayson suffered contusions.
On his part, the petitioner denied having physically
abused or maltreated Jayson. He explained that he only
talked with Jayson and Roldan after Mary Ann Rose
and Cherrylyn, his minor daughters, had told him about
Jayson and Roldan’s throwing stones at them and
about Jayson’s burning Cherrylyn’s hair. He denied
shouting invectives at and challenging Rolando to a
fight, insisting that he only told Rolando to restrain his
sons from harming his daughters.
To corroborate the petitioner’s testimony, Mary Ann
Rose testified that her father did not hit or slap but only
confronted Jayson, asking why Jayson had called her
daughters "Kimi" and why he had burned Cherrlyn’s
hair. Mary Ann Rose denied throwing stones at Jayson
and calling him a "sissy." She insisted that it was instead
Jayson who had pelted her with stones during the
procession. She described the petitioner as a loving
and protective father.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Petitioner is guilty of Child Abuse
or Slight Physical Injuries.
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled that the petitioner is guilty of
Slight Physical Injuries under Article 266 of the Revised
Penal Code. The Court disagreed that the petitioner in
striking the back of Jayson with his hands constituted
child abuse. he records did not establish beyond
reasonable doubt that his laying of hands on Jayson
had been intended to debase the "intrinsic worth and
dignity" of Jayson as a human being, or that he had
thereby intended to humiliate or embarrass Jayson.
The records showed the laying of hands on Jayson to
have been done at the spur of the moment and in
anger, indicative of his being then overwhelmed by his
fatherly concern for the personal safety of his own
minor daughters who had just suffered harm at the
hands of Jayson and Roldan. With the loss of his self-
control, he lacked that specific intent to debase,
degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of a
child as a human being that was so essential in the
crime of child abuse.
Considering that Jayson’s physical injury required five
to seven days of medical attention, the petitioner was
liable for slight physical injuries under Article 266 of the
Revised Penal Code

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS RUSTICO TILOS
FACTS:
Geralyn Narciso, the 12-year old daughter of the
victim, was on her way to a neighbors house to watch
a betamax movie when she came upon accused-
appellant inflicting fist blows on her father. From a
distance of about 15 meters, she saw accused-
appellant holding the victim by the nape with his right
hand, and boxing him on the abdomen with his left
hand. Geralyn called to her mother, Florida Narciso, for
help and the latter arrived and pulled the victim away
from accused-appellant. While Florida was hugging the
victim, accused-at-large Mateo Mahinay came from
behind them and struck the victim three times: on the
left eye, the right eye, and the nape. The victim fell to
the ground. Florida sought the help of two bystanders,
Mercy Siquijod and Paniong Agustino, in bringing the
victim home. Teotimo Narciso died two days later.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused-appellants are guilty of
conspiracy to murder.
RULING:
The Supreme Court held that accused-appellant is
guilty of slight physical injuries only. In People vs.
Laurio, 200 SCRA 465 (1991), the Court held that where
conspiracy to murder is not proved, and the gravity or
duration of the physical injury resulting from the
fistblows by the accused on the victim was not
established by the evidence, the accused is presumed,
and is held, liable for slight physical injuries under
Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code
ARTICLE 266-A TO 266-D AS AMENDED BY RA 8353
Republic Act No. 8353 (ANTI-RAPE LAW) - AN ACT
EXPANDING THE DEFINITION OF THE CRIME OF RAPE,
RECLASSIFYING THE SAME AS A CRIME AGAINST
PERSONS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE ACT NO.
3815, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE
REVISED PENAL CODE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
PEOPLE VS ORITA
GR no. 88724, April 3, 1990
FACTS:
March 20, 1983 Early Morning: Cristina S. Abayan, 19-
year old freshman student at the St. Joseph's College,
arrived at her boarding house after her classmates
brought her home from a party. She knocked at the
door of her boarding house when a frequent visitor of
another boarder held her and poked a knife to her
neck. Despite pleading for her release, he ordered her
to go upstairs with him. Since the door which led to the
1st floor was locked from the inside, they used the back
door to the second floor. With his left arm wrapped
around her neck and his right hand poking a "balisong"
to her neck, he dragged her up the stairs. When they
reached the second floor, he commanded herwith the
knife poked at her neck, to look for a room. They
entered Abayan's room. He then pushed her hitting her
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head on the wall. With one hand holding the knife, he
undressed himself. He then ordered her to take off her
clothes. Scared, she took off her T-shirt, bra, pants and
panty. He ordered her to lie down on the floor and then
mounted her. He made her hold his penis and insert it
in her vagina. Still poked with a knife, she did as told
but since she kept moving, only a portion of his penis
entered her. He then laid down on his back and
commanded her to mount him. Still only a small part
of his penis was inserted into her vagina. When he had
both his hands flat on the floor. She dashed out to the
next room and locked herself in. When he pursued her
and climbed the partition, she ran to another room
then another then she jumped out through a window.
Still naked, she darted to the municipal building, 18
meters in front of the boarding house and knocked on
the door. When there was no answer, she ran around
the building and knocked on the back door. When the
policemen who were inside the building opened the
door, they found her naked sitting on the stairs crying.
Pat. Donceras, took off his jacket and wrapped it
around her. Pat. Donceras and two other policemen
rushed to the boarding house where they heard and
saw somebody running away but failed to apprehend
him due to darkness. She was taken to Eastern Samar
Provincial Hospital where she was physically examined.
Her vulva had no abrasions or discharges.
• RTC: frustrated rape
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was frustrated rape.
HELD:
NO. RTC MODIFIED. Guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of rape and sentenced to reclusion
perpetua as well as to indemnify the victim in the
amount of P30,000
• Correlating Art. 335 and Art. 6, there is no debate that
the attempted and consummated stages apply to the
crime of rape.
• Requisites of a frustrated felony are:
(1) that the offender has performed all the acts of
execution which would produce the felony
(2) that the felony is not produced due to causes
independent of the perpetrator's will
• attempted crime the purpose of the offender must be
thwarted by a foreign force or agency which intervenes
and compels him to stop prior to the moment when he
has performed all of the acts which should produce the
crime as a consequence, which acts it is his intention to
perform
o If he has performed all of the acts which should result
in the consummation of the crime and voluntarily
desists from proceeding further, it can not be an
attempt.
• in the crime of rape, from the moment the offender
has carnal knowledge of his victim he actually attains

his purpose and, from that moment also all the
essential elements of the offense have been
accomplished. Any penetration of the female organ by
the male organ is sufficient. Entry of the labia or lips of
the female organ, without rupture of the hymen or
laceration of the vagina is sufficient to warrant
conviction. Necessarily, rape is attempted if there is no
penetration of the female organ
• The fact is that in a prosecution for rape, the accused
may be convicted even on the sole basis of the victim's
testimony if credible. Dr. Zamora did not rule out
penetration of the genital organ of the victim.
PEOPLE VS BENJIE RESURRECCION
GR no. 185389
FACTS:
On 20 June 2001, BENJIE was charged before the RTC
with Rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353. He
allegedly raped AAA, an 11 year-old girl.
Dr. Marlyn Valdez-Agbayani examined AAA and found
that the victim had no laceration in her external organ
or her hymen. The former also testified that there were
no spermatozoa in the victim’s vagina. Despite these
findings, Dr. Valdez-Agbayani clarified that if the
hymen of a woman is elastic and so thin, as in AAA’s
case, laceration may not be present. As to the absence
of spermatozoa in the victim’s vagina, Dr. Valdez-
Agbayani said that it was possible that the victim
washed her genitalia, especially since she was
examined only after two days following the alleged
rape incident.
BENJIE was convicted by the RTC, which was
subsequently affirmed by the CA. Upon appeal to the
SC, BENJIE points out that 1) the testimony of AAA on
how he allegedly raped her was highly improbable, and
2) the negative findings of spermatozoa and laceration
must acquit him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not BENJIE guilty of rape?
HELD:
Yes. This Court itself, in its desire to unveil the truth as
borne out by the records, has painstakingly pored over
the transcripts of stenographic notes of this case, and
like the RTC, finds the victim’s testimony of the incident
candid and straightforward, indicative of an untainted
and realistic narration of what transpired on that fateful
day.
BENJIE tries to discredit the victim's testimony by
questioning the odd position at which the rape was
done. While BENJIE’s position, i.e., covering AAA’s
mouth with his left hand and pinning her down with
the right hand, may be considered difficult, such does
not exclude the possibility that rape can be
consummated under said situation. Depraved
individuals stop at nothing in order to accomplish their
purpose. Perverts are not used to the easy way of
satisfying their wicked cravings. It should be noted that
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the victim was a very young and fragile 11-year-old,
who was easy to be subdued by an abuser who was
used to manual labor and was already 18 or 19 years
old.
In his last-ditch effort to be exculpated, BENJIE calls
this Court’s attention to the medical findings that no
sperm cells were present in the victim’s vagina just two
days following the rape. He intimates that no rape
occurred because of the absence of the sperm cells.
This contention is not well-taken. The absence of
spermatozoa in the victim’s genitalia does not negate
rape, the slightest penetration even without emission
being sufficient to constitute and consummate the
offense. The mere touching of the labia of the woman’s
pudendum or lips of the female organ by the male
sexual organ consummates the act.
PEOPLE VS. GACUSAN
G.R. NO. 207776, APRIL 26, 2017
FACTS:
An information for rape was filed before the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 43 of Dagupan City against
Gacusan.
The information provided:
That at around 11 [0]’clock in the evening of October
14, 2009 in Brgy. [Inmalog], San Fabian, Pangasinan,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then
and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
carnal knowledge [of AAA], a 15 year old minor, by
having sexual intercourse with her, against her will and
consent, to her damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY to Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended by [Republic Act No.] 8353.
Upon arraignment, Gacusan pleaded not guilty to the
charge. Gacusan is the common-law partner of the
mother of the victim. The mother of the victim moved
in with Gacusan, however, the victim’s mother died
within 8 months of their common-law relationship.
When BBB was still alive, AAA slept in a separate room
in Gacusan’s house. When BBB died, AAA began
sleeping beside Gacusan because of her fear of ghosts.
At around 10:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. of October 14, 2009,
“AAA was trying to sleep beside [Gacusan] when” she
felt Gacusan’s hand touching her private parts inside
her shorts. DDD, Gacusan’s 19-year old son, was
sleeping on a folding bed in the same room. AAA said
that she did not attempt to remove Gacusan’s hand
because she was already used to it.1 Gacusan “brought
out his penis and inserted it through the leg opening
of [AAA]’s shorts. During this time, AAA was on her
back while [Gacusan] was on his side, facing her and
trying to lift her leg. Gacusan was able to penetrate
AAA’s vagina then proceeded to do a ‘“push and pull’
movement”. When AAA felt Gacusan’s penis inside her,
she got up to go to the bathroom to urinate.
Thereafter, “AAA went back to sleep beside [Gacusan].

According to AAA, although she felt pain when
Gacusan raped her, “she did not shout [because] she
was . . . afraid of him . . . [S]he was afraid to lose [a]
family and she depended on [Gacusan for] support[.]
She also claimed that she “was already 15 years old [on
the date of the alleged rape] and had been living with
[Gacusan] for five years. AAA confessed that Gacusan
was already molesting her two (2) years after BBB’s
death.
The Regional Trial Court convicted Gacusan of simple
rape.
The trial court also ruled that in rape committed by a
father to his daughter, it is the father’s moral
ascendancy that replaces violation and intimidation.
Thus, this principle “applies in the case of a sexual
abuse of a stepdaughter by her stepfather and of a
goddaughter by a godfather in the sacrament of
confirmation.” Furthermore, the medico-legal findings
were consistent with AAA’s testimony that she was
raped. Hence, there is a sufficient basis to conclude
that the essential requisites of carnal knowledge have
been established.
The Court of Appeals ruled that “in incestuous rape or
those committed by the common law spouse of the
victim’s parent, evidence of force and intimidation is
not necessary to secure a conviction.” “[I]n rape
committed by an ascendant, close kin, a step parent or
a common law spouse of a parent, moral ascendancy
takes the place of force and intimidation.”Furthermore,
AAA’s testimony and positive identification of Gacusan
as the person who raped her, as well as the medical
findings confirming the rape, prevail over the bare
denials of Gacusan.
Gacusan filed an appeal alleging failure of the
prosecution to prove that he employed force, threat, or
intimidation in raping AAA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Gacusan is guilty of rape
HELD:
Yes. Sections 266-A and 266-B of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353 or the
Anti-Rape Law of 1997, provide that:
Article 266-A. Rape; When And How Committed. –
Rape is Committed-
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of
a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
Through force, threat, or intimidation;
… appellant’s lustful desires… Actual force or intimidation
Article 266-B. Penalties. – Rape under paragraph 1 of
the next preceding article shall be punished by
reclusion perpetua. (Emphasis supplied)
AAA admitted that despite the pain she felt, she neither
protested nor shouted at the time of the rape incident
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The testimony of AAA reveals that the reason she did
not shout during the alleged rape was that she was
afraid of losing a family. It is reasonable to assume that
she was terrified of losing someone who provided her
support after losing her biological mother. She testified
that she could not find comfort from her grandmother.
“[D]ifferent people react differently to a given type of
situation, and there is no standard form of human
behavioral response when one is confronted with a
strange, startling or frightful experience.” One person
may react aggressively, while another may show cold
indifference. Also, it is improper to judge the actions of
children who are victims of traumatic experiences “by
the norms of behavior expected under the
circumstances from mature people.” From AAA’s view,
it appeared that the danger of losing a family was more
excruciating than physical pain.
Furthermore, a victim should never be blemished for
her lack of resistance to any crime especially as heinous
as rape. Neither the failure to shout nor the failure to
resist the act equate to a victim’s voluntary submission
to the appellant’s lust.
Recent cases reiterating that moral ascendancy
replaces violence or intimidation in rape committed by
a close-kin cited People v. Corpuz. In Corpuz, the
accused was the live-in partner of the victim’s mother.
The victim, AAA, was 13 years old when accused
Corpuz started raping her. The repeated rape incidents
made AAA pregnant.
In People v. Fraga, accused Fraga raped the daughters
of his common-law partner. Fraga tried evading his
conviction by shifting from his defense of alibi to lack
of force or intimidation. While this Court affirmed
Fraga’s conviction since force and intimidation was
sufficiently proven, it also emphasized that:
[A]ccused-appellant started cohabiting with
complainants’ mother in 1987. As the common-law
husband of their mother, he gained such moral
ascendancy over complainants that any more
resistance than had been shown by complainants
cannot reasonably be expected. (Emphasis provided)
In People v. Robles,accused Robles raped his common-
law wife’s daughter. This Court affirmed his conviction
and likened Robles’ moral ascendancy over the victim
to that of a biological father; thus:
Moral ascendancy and influence by the accused,
stepfather of the 12 year-old complainant, and threat
of bodily harm rendered complainant subservient to
need not even be employed for rape to be committed
where the over powering influence of a father over his
daughter suffices. (Emphasis provided, citation
omitted)
Gacusan had moral ascendancy over AAA.

TITLE NINE – CRIME AGAINST PERSONAL
LIBERTY AND SECURITY
March 15, 2018 – Article 267 – SERIOUS ILLEGAL
DETENTION
VOSOTROS, Jules Andre B.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS RUBEN ABLAZA
G.R. NO. L-27352 OCTOBER 31, 1969
ISSUE:
a. Whether or not Ablaza committed kidnapping with
serious illegal detention.
b. Whether or not there was an error of considering
motor vehicle as aggravating circumstance attending
the commission of the crime.
FACTS:
Accused Ruben Ablaza forcibly took her from her
aunt's place in Caloocan City and brought her to a
house in a barrio in Hagonoy, Bulacan, where she was
criminally abused by her abductor. After her rescue by
the Philippine Constabulary men, a criminal case for
forcible abduction with rape was filed against Ablaza.
While that case in Bulacan was still pending, Annabelle
Huggins, who was sweeping the front of her aunt's
house in Makati, Rizal, was again grabbed by two men
and forcibly taken to a taxicab where a third man, who
turned out to be Ablaza, was waiting. Then the vehicle
sped away before anybody could come to the aid of
the struggling girl. Inside the cab, Annabelle was
seated at the rear between Ablaza and a companion;
her head was pressed down to the floor of the taxi, with
Ablaza covering her mouth with his hand to prevent
her from crying out for help. She was first brought to
the house of Ablaza's compadre in Caloocan, but then,
informed that the police were already in their pursuit,
she was moved to the house of another compadre,
where she was kept for a week. Later, at the instance of
Ablaza, Annabelle was taken to Bulacan to ask for the
complaint against him be dropped. This did not
materialize, because when they were inside the
Malolos municipal building Annabelle's uncle, in
company of Constabulary men, came and took her. She
also testified that for the duration of her detention the
accused and his compadres were always guarding her
to prevent her escape.
The CFI of Rizal, in its decision dated March 7, 1967,
found the accused guilty of kidnapping with serious
illegal detention, attended by the aggravating
circumstance of use of motor vehicle, and was
sentenced to death. Hence, this automatic review of
the decision of the CFI of Rizal.
HELD:
a. Yes. Ablaza’s contention that he should be adjudged
of abduction with rape rather than kidnapping with
serious illegal detention bears no merit. He stood trial
for kidnapping with serious illegal detention, and the
deprivation of the complainant’s liberty, which is the
essential element of the offense was duly proved and
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other crimes committed in the course of the victim’s
confinement is immaterial to the case. The kidnapping
became consummated when the victim as actually
deprived of her freedom which makes it proper to
prosecute the accused under Article 267 of the RPC.
The surrounding circumstance make it clear that the
main purpose of Ablaza in detaining Huggins was to
coerce her to withdraw her previous charges against
him.
The Court also finds no reason not to believe the
judgment of the trial judge giving credence to
Huggins’ declaration. The records of the case are
convincing that the complainant’s testimony on the
facts of the kidnapping rang of truth. Not only that her
narration was coherent, plausible and unshattered by
the defense counsel’s cross examination, but also no
motive has been adduced by Huggins, who, since the
first incident in 1962, had got married and, therefore,
would have wanted least public exposure of her
harrowing experiences, would come out and undergo
another legal scrutiny of her unfortunate encounters
with the accused, other than her desire to tell the truth.
b. No. The said contention is untenable. Contrary to the
protestation of the accused, the fact of use of motor
vehicle which facilitated the taking away of the
complainant and her consequent detention was
established not only by her declaration in court but
also by the accused’s own admission that he took away
Huggins from her Aunt’s residence in Makati by taxi
cab.
Considering the extant evidence on record, the Court
fully agree with the decision of the trial court’s decision
that the accused Reuben Ablaza committed the crime
of kidnapping with serious illegal detention attended
by aggravating circumstance of the use of motor
vehicle. The Court thus confirms the death penalty
imposed by the lower court.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS DIMA
MONTANIR, RONALD NORVA AND EDUARDO
CHUA
G.R. NO. 187534 APRIL 4, 2011
ISSUE:
Whether or not herein appellants are guilty for
violating Article 267 on Serious Illegal Detention.
FACTS:
Josie Herrera, Robert Uy, Alicia a.k.a. Alice Buenaflor,
together with appellants Ronald Norva and Eduardo
Chua, concocted a plan to kidnap Rafael Mendoza, and
after several days of conducting surveillance on their
intended victim, on January 5, 1998, they decided to
kidnap Rafael in Ali Mall, Cubao, Quezon City.
However, the intended kidnapping failed, because
Rafael did not show up at the said place. On February
5, 1998, a second attempt was made, but they
encountered an accident before they could even
execute their original plan.

Around 5:30 a.m. of February 17, 1998, Alicia called up
Rosalina Reyes, a partner of Rafael, to tell her that she
wanted to meet her and Rafael at Jollibee, BBB,
Valenzuela City to settle the former's loan of
P350,000.00. She requested Rosalina to bring the land
title which she was given as collateral for the said loan.
Rosalina and Rafael arrived at Jollibee ahead of Alicia.
Eventually, around 9:15 a.m. of the same date, Alicia
showed up outside the store aboard a car. She was with
appellant Ronald Norva. Alicia motioned Rosalina and
Rafael to approach the car, which the two did as
requested. While inside the vehicle, Alicia introduced
appellant Ronald as her cousin. Later on, Alicia
informed Rosalina and Rafael that she would pay them
at her place.
When the car passed by the street where Alicia's house
was located, Rosalina asked the former where they
were going. Alicia answered that they had to drop by
the house of her financier who agreed to redeem her
title and substitute as her creditor. Trusting Alicia,
Rosalina and Rafael did not protest. They finally
reached a house in Ciudad Grande, Valenzuela City.
Thereafter, appellant Ronald alighted from the vehicle
and talked to a man inside a store, later identified as
Jonard Mangelin. The gate of the house was then
opened by appellant Dima. The car proceeded to the
garage and Rosalina and Rafael were asked to go
inside the house. Rosalina followed Alicia, while Rafael
trailed Rosalina as they entered through a kitchen
door. They passed by a man (Jessie Doe) who was
washing his hands in the sink. While Rosalina was
walking behind Alicia, she suddenly heard a dull moan
coupled with the sound of stomping feet. She looked
back at the direction where the sounds came from and
saw Rafael being forcibly dragged inside a room. She
decided to look for Rafael and on her way, she saw
Jessie Doe place his hand on Rafael's mouth and poke
a gun at him. Rafael struggled to get free. Rosalina
pleaded with Jessie Doe to have pity on Rafael because
of his existing heart ailment.
Appellant Ronald rushed towards her, poked a gun at
her mouth, tied her to a bed and warned her not to
make any noise. He told her that all they want is her
money, upon which, Rosalina said that if they really
wanted money, they should untie Rafael, who then
appeared to be on the verge of having a heart attack.
Rosalina was untied and she immediately rushed to
Rafael and began pumping his chest. She asked Jonard,
who had just entered the room, to help her pump
Rafael's chest while she applied CPR on the latter.
Jonard did as told. While CPR was being administered,
appellant Dima started removing all of Rafael's
personal belongings, which include his ring, wallet,
watch and other items inside his pocket, and passed
them on to appellant Ronald.
Afterwards, appellant Ronald instructed Jonard to take
Rosalina to another room. While inside the room where
she was brought, Rosalina begged Jonard to help her
escape. Jonard was moved by Rosalina's plea and
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agreed to help her. During their conversation, Jonard
told Rosalina that two women had tipped them off as
the kidnap victims. When asked who they were, Jonard
refused to reveal their identities.
Rosalina was transferred to the master's bedroom
around 12:00 noon because certain female visitors
arrived. After the visitors left, Rosalina was returned to
the room where she was previously taken. Rosalina
asked Jonard about Rafael's condition, to which he
replied that Rafael would be brought to the hospital. A
little later, at around 1 p.m., Jonard went to check on
Rafael and confirmed that he was still alive.
Around 2:00 p.m., Rosalina heard the sound of
someone being pummelled. Feeling nervous, she
asked Jonard the whereabouts of Rafael and was told
that he was brought to the hospital. But unknown to
Rosalina, Rafael had just died and his body was placed
inside the trunk of a car.
Around 6:30 p.m., Rosalina was informed that she will
be brought to another safe house. She was taken to a
car and placed at the back seat, together with Jonard
and three other men, later identified as Larry, Jack and
Boy. The driver of the car was appellant Ronald.
Appellant Ronald instructed Jonard to cover Rosalina's
head with a jacket which Jonard did. As they were
about to leave, the man seated beside Ronald started
to talk. Rosalina recognized the voice of Robert. She
then lifted the jacket covering her head and was able
to confirm that the one talking was Robert. Rosalina
cried, Robert, Robert, why did you do this, we did not
do anything to you and Robert responded,
Pasensiyahan na lang tayo.
By 10:00 p.m., they arrived at a certain house in Pandi,
Bulacan where there was no electricity. Thus, they lit
candles for illumination. Rosalina found the house
familiar and concluded that it was Alicia's. Rosalina was
brought to a room on the second floor and while inside
the room, she was told by one of the men guarding her
that one of the leaders wanted to talk to her. Per the
leader's instruction, the guard put out the candle light.
The man then seated himself beside Rosalina and
warned her against escaping as they were a large and
armed group. Rosalina recognized the voice as that of
Robert's. Before he left the room, Robert gave
instructions to Jonard and the other men inside.
Meanwhile, the group started digging a pit at the back
of the same house near the swimming pool.
Around 3:00 a.m. of the following day (February 18),
the group buried Rafael's body in the pit. Thereafter,
Robert instructed appellant Ronald to tell Jonard that
the latter should kill Rosalina, which Jonard refused to
do. Nonetheless, Robert instructed Jonard and the
others to guard Rosalina well, as he himself would deal
with her upon his return.
Rosalina heard the car leave around 5:00 a.m. of the
same day. Sensing that Jonard was sympathetic to her,
Rosalina begged him again to help her escape for the
sake of her children.

When electricity was restored around 8 p.m., one of the
men guarding Rosalina turned off the light inside the
room. The room was only illuminated by a light coming
from the hallway. Rosalina saw a person wearing a wig
and sunglasses enter the room. Rosalina recognized
him as Robert. Trying to mimic a woman by
modulating his voice, Robert told her that Rafael was
in the hospital and that he could still sign a check. He
asked Rosalina the whereabouts of the other land titles
and the identities of the other financiers whom she
knew. Rosalina replied in the negative. Robert angrily
poked a gun at her and shouted, That's impossible, and
then left the room. He gave instructions to his
members and left.
At 9:00 p.m., Jonard went to Rosalina and told her
about Robert's order to kill her, which caused the latter
to panic and cry. She then implored the help of Jonard
for her escape. Afterwards, Jonard went to his
companions Larry, Jack and Boy and told them that he
would help Rosalina escape. His companions
immediately cocked their guns and an argument
ensued. Rosalina talked to them and begged them all
to spare her life. One of Jonard's companions told
Rosalina that if they would allow her to escape, they
too would get into trouble. Taking advantage of the
situation, Rosalina suggested that all of them should
escape. They all agreed to escape in the early morning.
Around 5:00 a.m., Rosalina, Jonard, Larry, Jack and Boy
left the safe house. They walked through a rice field for
about 30 minutes and then boarded a jeepney bound
for Balagtas, Bulacan. From Balagtas, they took a bus
going to Cubao and arrived at 7:30 a.m. Rosalina
pawned her pieces of jewelry for P1,500.00 and gave
the P1,000.00 to Larry, Jack and Boy. The three told
Jonard to stay with Rosalina so that she would have a
witness and, in case Rosalina would further need their
help, left their address with Jonard.
When the three left, Rosalina immediately called
Rafael's brother Tito, and related what happened to her
and his brother. When Tito asked Jonard which hospital
Rafael was brought to, Jonard revealed to Rosalina that
Rafael died at the safe house in Ciudad Grande,
Valenzuela City. Rosalina called her lawyer, Atty.
Teresita Agbi and asked her to meet them at Farmer's,
Cubao. When Atty. Agbi arrived, she accompanied
them to the Department of Interior and Local
Government (DILG) where an investigation was
conducted.
The following day, at 4:00 a.m., two groups from the
DILG were formed to arrest Alicia, Josie, the appellants,
and Robert. Alicia and Josie were not at their homes,
while appellants Ronald and Dima were arrested at the
residence of Robert. While at the DILG office, Rosalina
positively identified appellants Ronald and Dima as her
kidnappers. Meanwhile, Jonard accompanied the
police authorities to the safe house in Pandi, Bulacan
and showed them where the body of Rafael was buried.
The remains of Rafael was later on exhumed.
HELD:
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Yes. First of all, it must be emphasized that the crime
committed by the appellants, as ruled by the trial court
and affirmed by the CA, is the special complex crime of
Kidnapping with Homicide.
Republic Act No. 7659, Article 267 of the Revised Penal
Code, now provides:
Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. - Any private
individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any
other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death:
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more
than three days.
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public
authority.
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been
inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained; or if
threats to kill him shall have been made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor,
except when the accused is any of the parents, female
or a public officer;
In People v. Ramos, the court held that Where the
person kidnapped is killed in the course of the
detention, regardless of whether the killing was
purposely sought or was merely an afterthought, the
kidnapping and murder or homicide can no longer be
complexed under Art. 48, nor be treated as separate
crimes, but shall be punished as a special complex
crime under the last paragraph of Art. 267, as amended
by RA No. 7659.
In a special complex crime, the prosecution must
necessarily prove each of the component offenses with
the same precision that would be necessary if they
were made the subject of separate complaints. As
earlier mentioned, R.A. No. 7659 amended Article 267
of the Revised Penal Code by adding thereto this
provision: "When the victim is killed or dies as a
consequence of the detention, or is raped, or is
subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the
maximum penalty shall be imposed; and that this
provision gives rise to a special complex crime.
In the cases at bar, it specifically alleges that the victim
Marijoy was raped "on the occasion and in connection"
with her detention and was killed "subsequent thereto
and on the occasion thereof. "Considering that the
prosecution was able to prove each of the component
offenses, appellants should be convicted of the special
complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention with homicide and rape. It appearing from
the overwhelming evidence of the prosecution that
there is a "direct relation, and intimate connection"
between the kidnapping, killing and raping of Marijoy,
rape cannot be considered merely as an aggravating
circumstance but as a component offense forming part
of the herein special complex crime.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS FELIPE
MIRANDILLA JR.
G.R. NO. 186417 JULY 27, 2011
ISSUE:
Whether or not Mirandilla is guilty of the special
complex crime of kidnapping and illegal detention with
rape.
FACTS:
AAA went out of the dancing hall to buy candies in a
nearby store. While making her way back through the
crowd, a man grabbed her hand, his arm wrapped her
shoulders, with a knifes point thrust at her right side.
She will come to know the mans name at the police
station, after her escape, to be Felipe Mirandilla, Jr. He
told her not to move or ask for help. Another man
joined and went beside her, while two others stayed at
her back, one of whom had a gun.
They slipped through the unsuspecting crowd, walked
farther as the deafening music faded into soft sounds.
After a four-hour walk through the grassy fields, they
reached the Mayon International Hotel, where they
boarded a waiting tricycle. Upon passing the Albay
Cathedral, the others alighted, leaving AAA alone with
Mirandilla who after receiving a gun from a
companion, drove the tricycle farther away and into the
darkness. Minutes later, they reached the Gallera de
Legazpi in Rawis.
Mirandilla dragged AAA out of the tricycle and pushed
her inside a concrete house. At gunpoint he ordered
her to remove her pants.[6] When she defied him, he
slapped her and hit her arms with a gun, forced his
hands inside her pants, into her panty, and reaching
her vagina, slipped his three fingers and rotated them
inside. The pain weakened her. He forcibly pulled her
pants down and lifting her legs, pushed and pulled his
penis inside.[7] Sayang ka, she heard him whisper at
her,[8] as she succumbed to pain and exhaustion.
When AAA woke up the following morning, she found
herself alone. She cried for help, shouting until her
throat dried. But no one heard her. No rescue came.
At around midnight, Mirandilla arrived together with
his gang. Pointing a gun at AAA, he ordered her to
open her mouth; she sheepishly obeyed. He forced his
penis inside her mouth, pulling through her hair with
his left hand and slapping her with his right. After
satisfying his lust, he dragged her into the tricycle and
drove to Bogtong, Legazpi. At the roads side,
Mirandilla pushed her against a reclining tree, gagged
her mouth with cloth, punched her arm, thigh, and lap,
and pulled up her over-sized shirt. Her underwear was
gone. Then she felt Mirandillas penis inside her vagina.
A little while, a companion warned Mirandilla to move
out. And they drove away.
They reached a nipa hut and AAA was thrown inside.
Her mouth was again covered with cloth. Mirandilla,
with a gun aimed at her point blank, grabbed her shirt,
forced her legs open, and again inserted his penis into
her vagina.
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The following evening, Mirandilla and his gang
brought AAA to Guinobatan, where she suffered the
same fate. They repeatedly detained her at daytime,
moved her back and forth from one place to another
on the following nights, first to Bonga, then back to
Guinobatan, where she was locked up in a cell-type
house and was raped repeatedly on the grassy field
right outside her cell, then to Camalig, where they
caged her in a small house in the middle of a rice field.
She was allegedly raped 27 times.
One afternoon, in Guinobatan, AAA succeeded in
opening the door of her cell. Seeing that Mirandilla and
his companions were busy playing cards, she rushed
outside and ran, crossed a river, got drenched, and
continued running. She rested for awhile, hiding
behind a rock; she walked through the fields and
stayed out of peoples sight for two nights. Finally, she
found a road and followed its path, leading her to the
house of Evelyn Guevarra who brought her to the
police station. It was 11 January 2001.
AAA was in foul smell, starving and sleepless. Evelyn
Guevarra gave her a bath and the police gave her food.
When the police presented to her pictures of
suspected criminals, she recognized the mans face she
was certain it was him. He was Felipe Mirandilla, Jr., the
police told her.
HELD:
Yes. Mirandilla is guilty of the special complex crime of
kidnapping and illegal detention with rape.
Mirandilla admitted in open court to have had sexual
intercourse with AAA, which happened almost nightly
during their cohabitation. He contended that they were
live-in partners, entangled in a whirlwind romance,
which intimacy they expressed in countless passionate
sex, which headed ironically to separation mainly
because of AAAs intentional abortion of their first child
to be a betrayal in its gravest form which he found hard
to forgive.
In stark contrast to Mirandillas tale of a love affair, is
AAAs claim of her horrific ordeal and her flight to
freedom after 39 days in captivity during which
Mirandilla raped her 27 times.
The accused bare invocation of sweetheart theory
cannot alone, stand. To be credible, it must be
corroborated by documentary, testimonial, or other
evidence. Usually, these are letters, notes, photos,
mementos, or credible testimonies of those who know
the lovers.
The sweetheart theory as a defense, however,
necessarily admits carnal knowledge, the first element
of rape. Effectively, it leaves the prosecution the
burden to prove only force or intimidation, the
coupling element of rape. Love, is not a license for lust.
This admission makes the sweetheart theory more
difficult to defend, for it is not only an affirmative
defense that needs convincing proof; after the
prosecution has successfully established a prima facie

case, the burden of evidence is shifted to the accused,
who has to adduce evidence that the intercourse was
consensual.
A prima facie case arises when the party having the
burden of proof has produced evidence sufficient to
support a finding and adjudication for him of the issue
in litigation.
Burden of evidence is that logical necessity which rests
on a party at any particular time during the trial to
create a prima facie case in his favour or to overthrow
one when created against him.
AAA was able to prove each element of rape
committed under Article 266-A, par. 1(a) of the Revised
Penal Code, that (1) Mirandilla had carnal knowledge
of her; (2) through force, threat, or intimidation. She
was also able to prove each element of rape by sexual
assault under Article 266-A, par. 2 of the Revised Penal
Code: (1) Mirandilla inserted his penis into her mouth;
(2) through force, threat, or intimidation.
Likewise, kidnapping and serious illegal detention is
provided for under Article 267 of the Revised Penal
Code:
Article 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention.
Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain
another, or in any manner deprive him of his liberty,
shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death;
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more
than three days. xxx
Notably, however, no matter how many rapes had
been committed in the special complex crime of
kidnapping with rape, the resultant crime is only one
kidnapping with rape. This is because these composite
acts are regarded as a single indivisible offense as in
fact R.A. No. 7659 punishes these acts with only one
single penalty. In a way, R.A. 7659 depreciated the
seriousness of rape because no matter how many
times the victim was raped, like in the present case,
there is only one crime committed the special complex
crime of kidnapping with rape.
EGAP MADSALI, SAJIRON LAJIM AND MARON
LAJIM VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO. 179570 FEBRUARY 4, 2010
ISSUE:
Whether or not herein appellants committed acts
constituting serious illegal detention as enshrined in
Article 267 of the RPC
FACTS:
On July 1, 1994, around 3:30 o'clock in the afternoon,
fifteen-year-old AAA and her aunt Inon Dama were
fetching water in a cave in Barangay (Brgy.) Malitub,
Bataraza, Palawan. Suddenly, Sajiron arrived, running
towards them and carrying a badong (bolo). They tried
to run away, but Sajiron overtook them. He held the
hair of AAA and told her, Sara, you go with me. If you
will not go with me, I will kill you. Inon Dama came to
AAA's rescue, but Sajiron tried to hack her. Luckily, she
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was able to shield herself with a plastic container. AAA
was crying while she held her aunt's hand. Sajiron then
drew his gun, which was tucked in his waist, pointed it
at Inon Dama and said, If you will not go, I will shoot
you. Inon Dama went home and reported the incident
to AAA's mother.
When Inon Dama left the place, Maron, Sajiron's father,
suddenly appeared with a gun and told AAA to come
with them. When AAA refused, Sajiron and Maron tied
her hands behind her back, covered her mouth with a
piece of cloth, and brought her to the forest. There,
AAA was untied and undressed, leaving only her bra
on. While Sajiron was undressing AAA, she pleaded
with him not to abuse her, but Sajiron told her that if
she would submit to his desire, her life would be
spared. Sajiron held her breast, touched her private
parts and inserted his sex organ inside her vagina. AAA
resisted, but to no avail. She felt pain and she noticed
blood on her private parts. She was sexually abused
three times on the ground, where she was made to lie
down on a bed of leaves.
During the entire time that AAA was being abused by
Sajiron, Maron stood guard and watched them. They
left the forest at around 10:00 o'clock in the morning
of the following day and brought AAA to the house of
Egap, where she was detained in a room. Sajiron
instructed Egap to guard AAA and to shoot her if she
would attempt to escape.
On July 2, 1994, AAAs mother came to get AAA, but
Egap refused and threatened to kill her daughter if she
would report the matter to the authorities. Out of fear
of losing her daughter, she went home and did not
report the incident to the police authorities.[6] Egap
asked AAA if she wanted to marry Sajiron, but she
refused. AAA was then forced to sign an unknown
document, which she was not able to read.
Nine days after the abduction, or on July 11, 1994,
upon instruction of Egap, AAA and Sajiron were
married by Imam Musli Muhammad. The marriage was
solemnized against AAA's will and without the
presence of her parents. After the marriage, AAA and
Sajiron lived in the house of Egap, together with the
latter's wife, children and mother-in-law.
AAA stayed in one room with Sajiron. While detained,
AAA did not try to escape, because her house was very
far from the place where she was held captive, and her
captors threatened to kill her and her family if she
would attempt to escape. During her detention, Sajiron
abused her twice every night. She was free to roam
within the vicinity of the house but she was usually
accompanied by Egap's wife who served as her guard.
She was also guarded and threatened by Egap's sons.
She got pregnant after some time.
HELD:
Yes. Herein appellants are guilty of violating Article 267
pertaining to serious illegal detention.
In the case at bar, the trial court found AAA's testimony
credible. The trial court held that AAA's testimony was
clear, categorical and consistent. She remained

steadfast in her assertions and unfaltering in her
testimony given in court on the unfortunate incident.
The trial court found that AAA positively identified
Sajiron and Maron as her abductors and narrated how
she was taken and thrice raped by Sajiron in the forest.
Delay in reporting an incident of rape due to death
threats does not affect the credibility of the
complainant, nor can it be taken against her. The
charge of rape is rendered doubtful only if the delay
was unreasonable and unexplained. BBB explained that
she did not immediately report the abduction, rape
and detention of her daughter to the authorities,
because Egap threatened to kill AAA, who was then in
his custody.
Further, BBB testified that, on another occasion, Egap
threatened to kill her if she dared to report the matter
to the authorities. True enough, when Egap learned
that she did what he forbade her to do, he made good
his threat and shot her at the back.Thus, BBB's delay in
reporting the incident for five months should not be
taken against her.
It is highly improbable that a young girl, such as AAA,
would concoct a horrid story and impute to the
accused a crime so grave and subject herself and her
family to the humiliation and invasive ordeal of a public
trial just to avenge the alleged non-payment of the
dowry, unless she be impelled by a genuine desire to
expose the truth, vindicate her honor and seek justice
she so greatly deserves.
Neither is the Court convinced of the sweetheart
theory, the defense of the accused, by alleging that
AAA and Sajiron were engaged for three years prior to
their elopement and marriage. If there were indeed
romantic relationship between AAA and Sajiron, as the
latter claims, her normal reaction would have been to
cover up for the man she supposedly loved. On the
contrary, AAA lost no time in reporting the incident to
the National Bureau of Investigation, right after she
was rescued by the authorities.
The accusatory portion of the information alleges that
AAA was taken and carried away by Sajiron and Maron
against her will and brought to the forest; and, on the
occasion thereof, Sajiron -- by means of force, threat,
violence and intimidation -- had carnal knowledge of
AAA.
The elements of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code
are:
(1) the offender is a private individual;
(2) he kidnaps or detains another or in any other
manner deprives the latter of his liberty;
(3) the act of detention or kidnapping is illegal; and
(4) in the commission of the offense, any of the
following circumstances are present:
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(a)the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than 3
days; or
(b)it is committed by simulating public authority; or
(c)any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the
person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are
made; or
(d)the person kidnapped or detained is a minor,
female, or a public officer.
In the case at bar, Sajiron and Maron, who are private
individuals, forcibly took and dragged AAA, a minor, to
the forest and held her captive against her will. The
crime of serious illegal detention consists not only of
placing a person in an enclosure, but also of detaining
him or depriving him in any manner of his liberty. For
there to be kidnapping, it is enough that the victim is
restrained from going home. Its essence is the actual
deprivation of the victim's liberty, coupled with
indubitable proof of the intent of the accused to effect
such deprivation.
In the present case, although AAA was not actually
confined in an enclosed place, she was clearly
restrained and deprived of her liberty, because she was
tied up and her mouth stuffed with a piece of cloth,
thus, making it very easy to physically drag her to the
forest away from her home.
March 15, 2018 – Article 268 – SLIGHT ILLEGAL
DETENTION
ALAMEDA Jr., Manuel F.
PEOPLE VS SALIENTE, ET AL.
G.R. NO. L-2427 JUNE 28, 1949
FACTS:
at about 9 o'clock in the evening , the defendants came
to the house of Telesfora Alentejo where Telesfora's
niece, Juana Briones, was then staying. Telling Juana
that they had come for by her by order of their "chief,"
they asked her to go along with them and when she
refused she was threatened by defendant Montilla with
a bolo and by defendant Saliente with a pistol and then
taken against her will to the latter's house in the barrio
of Tambis, about two kilometers away. It would appear
that the defendants were accompanied by some
soldiers, although these were neither named nor
identified. Once in Saliente's house, defendants let
Juana know that what they had told her in private so
that he could persuade her into marrying him. Juana
retorted that she did not want to marry anybody. Juana
was kept in Saliente's house for two nights and one
day. On the third day, Juana was able to persuade the
defendants to take her to the house of her brother,
Brigido Enclona, so that they could talk the matter over
with him. There they were joined by Montilla's father
who, in behalf of his son, asked for Juana's hand in
marriage. As Juana turned a deaf ear to the proposal,
the trio took their departure, leaving her in the house
of her brother.c In the evening of that same day,
however, the defendants came back and, complaining

that Juana had fooled them, they forcibly took her
downstairs. Montilla then led her away, while Saliente
stayed behind to wait for Enclona, who, was then
absent. Meeting Enclona on the road, Juana warned
him that Saliente was lying in wait for him with the
intention of doing him harm. On hearing this, Enclona
ran away, while Montilla, on his part, left Juana to
herself and went back to rejoin Saliente. The
defendants Montilla admitted having taken Juana from
the house of her aunt, but put up the defense that this
was done with her consent, since they had long been
sweethearts and had, on the day in question,
exchanged notes regarding their elopement.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the crime of slight illegal detention is
tenable in the case at bar.
HELD:
Yes. The crime committed is that of slight illegal
detention under the third paragraph of article 268 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act
No. 18, approved on September 25, 1946, it appearing
that the defendants voluntarily released Juana Briones
within three days from the commencement of her
detention without having attained the purpose
intended and before the institution of the criminal
action against them. The penalty prescribed is prision
mayor in its minimum and medium periods and a fine
not exceeding P700. As the crime was committed with
the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity and
dwelling, not compensated by any mitigating
circumstances, the said penalty should be imposed in
its maximum period.
LUIS ASISTIO v. LOURDES P. SAN Diego
GR No. L-21991
Mar 31, 1964
FACTS:
That on or about the 26th day of December, 1962,
Luisito Asistio et, al., being private individuals with the
exception of the accused VICTORINO ARANDA and
LORENZO MENESES who are public officers, conspiring
together, confederating with and mutually helping and
aiding one another, with threats to kill the person of
CHUA PAO alias "SO NA", and for the purpose of
extorting ransom in the amount of TWENTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00) from the said CHUA
PAO alias "SO NA" or from his wife did, then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap, detain and
deprive the person of the said CHUA PAO alias "SO
NA" of his liberty, to his damage and
prejudice.Petitioners applied for bail on the ground
that the record of the ex parte investigation conducted
by the fiscal showed, from the testimony of the
offended party himself, Chua Pao alias So Na, that the
latter was (a) voluntarily released by his captors (b)
within 24 hours from seizure and (c) without any
ransom being, in fact, paid. But the respondent judge
denied the application for bail.
ISSUE:
whether or not the last paragraph of Article 268 applies
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not only to slight illegal detention but also to
kidnapping and serious illegal detention penalized by
Article 267.
HELD:
That kidnapping under Article 267 depended solely on
the circumstances in which the kidnapping took place,
irrespective of the end sought by the kidnapper; That
the third paragraph of Article 268 already existed in the
original version, and plainly was not intended to apply
to crimes under Article 267; Article 268 then described
two variants of dig illegal detention;
(a) Slight detention where none of the circumstances
specified in Article 267 was present (Article 268, par.
142), penalized by prision mayor;
(b) Slight detention where, in addition to the absence
of any of the circumstances mentioned in Article 267,
there were, besides three other circumstances, the
voluntary release of the kidnappee within 3 days from
seizure, plus the fact that the purpose intended
(whatever it should be, ransom, marriage, disclosure of
secrets, etc.) was not attained, plus the third fact that
the release was effected before the institution of
criminal proceedings against the culprit or culprits.
Clearly, therefore, Articles 267 and 268 were originally
mutually exclusive.
Thus, the last paragraph of article 268 applies to slight
illegal detention only not to Article 267. Articles 267
and 268 are independent of each other.
March 16, 2018 – Article 269 – UNLAWFUL ARREST
ALILIAN, Enna B.
G.R. NO. 138859-60
FEBRUARY 22, 2001
ALVAREZ ARO YUSOP VS. THE HONORABLE
SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the cases against
him - violation of RA 3019, and unlawful arrest of the
RPC, grounded on the lack of preliminary investigation.
Ombudsman denied the motion.
ISSUE:
WoN preliminary injunction was required in cases of
unlawful arrests
HELD:
No. A preliminary investigation was not required
because unlawful arrest under Article 269 of the
Revised Penal Code was punishable by arresto mayor -
imprisonment of one month and one day to six
months. The Rules of Court requires only such
investigation before an information for an offense
punishable by at least four years, two months and one
day may be filed in court.
G.R. No. L-44335
July 30, 1936
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs.
KAGUI MALASUGUI

FACTS:
The accused was charged with the crime of robbery
and homicide after the victim, while still sprawled on
the ground with blood all around, dying, said the name
of the accused as the one who attacked him, thus
prompting the officials to immediately search the
accused. With the accused was found the victim’s
identification card and pocketbook containing P92 in
bills. The accused was thereafter arrested.
ISSUE:
WoN the arresting officer violated Art 269 RPC
unlawful arrest
HELD:
No. The right to be secure from unreasonable search
may, like every right, be waived and such waiver may
be made either expressly or impliedly. The appellant
was then charged with the crime, imputed to him by
Tan Why before the latter's death, of having assaulted
the "deceased; that he was then also known to be
carrying much money; and that a few moments before
he was brought to Lieutenant Jacaria, and shortly after
the assault on Tan Why, he was able to redeem two
pairs of bracelets from two persons to whom he had
pledge them several months before. These are
circumstances which undoubtedly warranted his arrest
without a previous judicial warrant. This is so because
under the law, members of Insular Police or
Constabulary as well as those of the municipal police
and of chartered cities like Manila and Baguio, and
even of townships (secs. 848, 2463, 2564, 2165 and
2383 of the Revised Administrative Code) may make
arrests without judicial warrant, not only when a crime
is committed or about to be committed in their
presence but also when there is reason to believe or
sufficient ground to suspect that one has been
committed and that it was committed by the person
arrested by them. An arrest made under said
circumstances is not unlawful but perfectly justified;
and the agent of authority who makes the arrest does
not violate the provisions of article 269 of the Revised
Penal Code which defines and punishes unlawful arrest.
March 16, 2018 – Article 270 – KIDNAPPING AND
FAILURE TO RETURN A MINOR
ARANCES, Javy Ann
PEOPLE VS AIDA MARQUEZ
GR NO. 181440, APRIL 13, 2011
PONENTE: JUSTICE LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
ISSUE:
Whether or not defendant Aida Marquez should be
charged of Kidnapping and failure to return a minor.
FACTS:
According to the complainant, Carolina Cunanan
Merano (Merano), she met Marquez at the beauty
parlor where she was working as a beautician, whom
she easily trusted because Marquez was close to her
employers and was nice to her and her co-employees.
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On September 6, 1998, after a trip to a beach in Laguna,
Marquez allegedly borrowed Meranos then three-
month old daughter Justine Bernadette C. Merano
(Justine) to buy her some clothes, milk and food.
Merano said she agreed because it was not unusual for
Marquez to bring Justine some things whenever she
came to the parlor. When Marquez failed to return
Justine in the afternoon as promised, Merano went to
her employer’s house to ask them for Marquez’s
address. However, Merano said that her employers just
assured her that Justine will be returned to her soon.
But a few months have passed and Merano discovered
through Modesto Castillos that Marquez sold Justine
to him and his wife and that they gave Marquez Sixty
Thousand Pesos (P60,000.00) supposedly for Merano
who was asking for money. Castillo even gave Merano
a photocopy of the handwritten Kasunduan dated May
17, 1998, wherein Merano purportedly gave Justine to
the Castillo spouses.
HELD:
A reading of the charge in the information shows that
the act imputed to Marquez was not the illegal
detention of a person, but involves her deliberate
failure to restore a minor baby girl to her parent after
being entrusted with said baby’s custody. Contrary to
Marquez’s assertions, therefore, she was charged with
violation of Article 270, and not Article 267, of the
Revised Penal Code. The Revised Penal Code considers
it a crime when a person who has been entrusted with
the custody of a minor later on deliberately fails to
return said minor to his parent or guardian. This may
be found in Article 270, which reads:
Art. 270. Kidnapping and failure to return a minor. The
penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon
any person who, being entrusted with the custody of a
minor person, shall deliberately fail to restore the latter
to his parents or guardians.
This crime has two essential elements:
1. The offender is entrusted with the custody of a minor
person; and
2. The offender deliberately fails to restore the said
minor to his parents or guardians.
This Court, in elucidating on the elements of Article
270, stated that while one of the essential elements of
this crime is that the offender was entrusted with the
custody of the minor, what is actually being punished
is not the kidnapping but the deliberate failure of that
person to restore the minor to his parents or guardians.
As the penalty for such an offense is so severe, the
Court further explained what deliberate as used in
Article 270 means: “Indeed, the word deliberate as
used in Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code must
imply something more than mere negligence - it must
be premeditated, headstrong, foolishly daring or
intentionally and maliciously wrong.” (Emphasis ours.)
PEOPLE VS GENEROSO JO, ET AL.

GR NO. L-69236, AUGUST 19, 1986
PONENTE: JUSTICE MELENCIO-HERRERA
ISSUE:
Whether the court erred in charging Roca, one of the
defendants, with Kidnapping and failure to return a
minor under Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code but
convicted him of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal
Detention under Article 267 (4) [supra] of the same
Code.
FACTS:
Complainant Elisa Casal Jo was married to accused
Generoso Jo on July 27, 1969. They begot three
children, namely, Eligen, Allan and Riza, whose ages at
the time of the subject incident were 9 years old, 7
years old and 6 years old, respectively.
Sometime in December 1975, the couple separated. On
July 27, 1980, Elisa met Felipe Lapitan, a witch-doctor.
Lapitan told Elisa that Generoso had hired him to kill
her, that he had already set in motion the evil spirit
which would put an end to her life in a few days; and
that the effect of the evil spirit would be averted if she
would submit herself for treatment. Helpless and not
knowing what to do, Elisa believed the witch-doctor
and consented to submit for treatment. Lapitan
conducted an 'oracion' or strange prayer on her and
then let her drink a glass of water concoction. Accused
Felipe Lapitan and Virgilio Roca took her three children
on a jeep to the Tacloban Wharf. Lapitan made them
board a motorboat with him while Virgilio Roca sent
them off. The boat left for Samar before noon.
On August 9, 1980, Capt. Angelo Marcos, Station
Commander of the La Paz Police Station filed a criminal
complaint for kidnapping of minors against Felipe
Lapitan, Virgilio Roca and Ceferino Lopez.
HELD:
The offense as charged, which is Kidnapping and
Failure to Return a Minor under Article 270 of the
Revised Penal Code, is necessarily included in the
offense proved, which is Kidnapping and Serious Illegal
Detention of a minor under Article 267 (4) of the same
code, inasmuch as the essential ingredients of the
offense charged constitute or form a part of those
constituting the offense proved. Thus, deliberate
failure to restore a minor under one's custody and
kidnapping of a minor who is not in custody both
constitute deprivation of liberty. Consequently, ROCA
can be convicted of the offense proved included in that
which is charged. Besides, there is authority to the
effect that paragraph 1 of Article 270 might have been
superseded by Article 267, as amended, which
punishes as serious illegal detention the kidnapping of
a minor, regardless of the purpose of the detention.
PEOPLE VS BERNARDO
GR NO. 144316, MARCH 11, 2002
PONENTE: JUSTICE MELO
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ISSUE:
Whether defendant Bernardo should be charged of
Article 270 - Kidnapping and failure to return a minor.
FACTS:
On May 13, 1999, 12-year old Maria Roselle Tolibas y
Aguada and her 15-day old sister, Rosalyn Tolibas,
were with their mother, Rosita Tolibas y Aguada, at the
Fabella Memorial Hospital for medical check up. While
Rosita was undergoing medical checkup inside the
hospital, her two daughters waited at the lobby.
Roselle was seating on a bench with her 15-day old
sister on her lap when the appellant sat beside her.
Appellant befriended Roselle. After a while, the
appellant gave P3.00 to Roselle and asked her to buy
ice water. The appellant took the 15-day old baby from
Roselle and assured her that she (accused) would take
care of her (Roselles) sister, while she was buying ice
water. Roselle was not able to find ice water for sale
and on her way back to the hospital, she saw the
accused running away with her baby sister. She chased
the appellant and when she caught up with her, the
appellant told her that she was running after her
(Roselle’s) mother. Roselle did not believe the
appellant and she held and pulled the appellants skirt
to prevent her from getting away with her (Roselles)
baby sister, but the appellant persisted in running with
Roselle holding on to the appellants skirt. Roselle
shouted for help, thereby attracting the attention of
Emerento Torres, a Barangay Kagawad.
Appellant contends that there was no deliberate failure
on her part to restore the minor Rosalyn Tolibas to her
parents or guardians, stating that the charge filed
against her was a mere overreaction on the part of the
prosecution witnesses to her act of going out of the
hospital to look for the mother of the child.
HELD:
Yes. The essential element of the crime of kidnapping
and failure to return a minor is that the offender is
entrusted with the custody of the minor, but what is
actually being punished is not the kidnapping of the
minor but rather the deliberate failure of the custodian
of the minor to restore the latter to his parents or
guardians. Indeed, the word deliberate as used in
Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code must imply
something more than mere negligence - it must be
premeditated, headstrong, foolishly daring or
intentionally and maliciously wrong.
When Roselle entrusted Roselyn to appellant before
setting out on an errand for appellant to look for ice
water, the first element was accomplished and when
appellant refused to return the baby to Roselle despite
her continuous pleas, the crime was effectively
accomplished. In fine, we agree with the trial courts
finding that appellant is guilty of the crime of
kidnapping and failure to return a minor.
March 17, 2018 – Article 272 – SLAVERY
BURGOS, Paul Zandrix A.

US VS. CABANAG
G.R. NO. 3241 MARCH 16, 1907
TRACEY, J.:
ISSUE:
Whether or not Cabanag committed slavery.
FACTS:
An Igorot orphan girl called Gamaya, 13 years of age
was taken from the possession of her grandmother by
one Buyag, also an Igorot; whether this was done with
or against the will of the grandmother is not altogether
clear in the evidence. It was testified by a witness that
Buyag came to the house and took her away, although
the grandmother objected, saying "Do not take off that
little girl," but not speaking when she went away. The
man brought her to his house, about a half mile distant,
where she was not confined, but on the contrary was
allowed to go back alone to her grandmother, with
whom she would spend a little while, returning the
same day. She testified that on last evening, the
grandmother was angry and did not wish her to go, but
did not prevent her. According to her recollection she
remained with Buyag, in the vicinity of her
grandmother's residence, some two or three months.
Buyag testified that more than two years before, in
order to help the family after the father's death and for
the purpose of keeping the child at home, he had
bought her for three pigs, twenty-five hens, two
measures of rice, and a cloak worth two pigs, from her
mother, with whom she remained until the third year,
when (her mother presumably having died) she was
brought away by one Eusebio, at the instance of
himself and another Igorot named YogYog, who had
furnished part of the purchase price. Together they
instructed Eusebio to sell her for a carabao and 50
pesos. Eusebio, in the Province of Nueva Vizcaya, and
sold her to the accused, Tomas Cabanag, for 100 pesos.
Cabanag had previously been instructed to buy a girl
by one Mariano Lopez to whom after a few days
Gamaya was delivered in return for the price, which
appears to have been 200 pesos. In his hands she
remained for about two months until she was taken
away by an officer of Constabulary. Afterwards this
prosecution was instituted. Although Gamaya made
objection to leaving the house of Cabanag she appears
to have gone without actual constraint and at no time
in any of these places was she physically restrained of
her liberty; she was not under lock or key or guard,
went into the street to play, returned at will, and was
not punished or ill used in any way, but was employed
about the household tasks; in short, she appears to
have been treated by Mariano Lopez as a household
servant and to have been well earned for while in the
custody of the accused.
It is proved in the case that it is an Igorot custom to
dispose of children to pay the debts of their fathers,
the transaction in the native language being termed a
sale, and the defendant appears to have engaged in
the business of buying in Nueva Vizcaya children to sell
in the lowlands of Isabela.
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RULING:
No. The judge below quotes the Bill of Rights of the
Philippines contained in the act of Congress of July 1,
1902, declaring that "neither slavery nor involuntary
servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof
the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist in
said Islands." This constitutional provision is self-acting
whenever the nature of a case permits and any law or
contract providing for servitude of a person against his
will is forbidden and is void. For two obvious reasons,
however, it fails to reach the facts before us:
First. The employment or custody of a minor with the
consent or sufferance of the parents or guardian,
although against the child's own will, cannot be
considered involuntary servitude. Second. We are
dealing not with a civil remedy but with a criminal
charge, in relation to which the Bill of Rights defines no
crime and provides no punishment. Its effects cannot
be carried into the realm of criminal law without an act
of the legislature.
To sum up this case, there is no proof of slaver or even
of involuntary servitude, inasmuch as it has not been
clearly shown that the child has been disposed of
against the will of her grandmother or has been taken
altogether out of her control. If the facts in this respect
be interpreted otherwise, there is no law applicable
here, either of the United States or of the Archipelago,
punishing slavery as a crime. The child was not
physically confined or restrained so as to sustain a
conviction for illegal detention, nor are the acts of the
accused brought within any of the provisions of the law
for the punishment of offenses against minors;
consequently the conviction in this case must be
reversed, in accordance with the recommendation of
the Attorney-General, with costs de oficio, and the
prisoner is acquitted.
REYES VS. ALOJADO
G.R. NO. L-5671 AUGUST 24, 1910
TORRES, J.:
ISSUE:
Whether or not slavery was committed by Reyes.
FACTS:
On or about January 22, 1905, Veronica Alojado
received, as a loan, from Benito de los Reyes that the
sum P67 .60, for the purpose of paying a debt she
owed to Olimpia Zaballa. It was agreed between
Alojado and Reyes that the debtor should remain as a
servant in the house and in the service of her creditor,
without any renumeration whatever, until she should
find some one who would furnish her with the said sum
where with to repeat the loan. The defendant, Veronica
Alojado, afterwards left the house of the plaintiff, on
March 12, 1906, without having paid him her debt, nor
did she do so at any subsequent date, notwithstanding
his demands. The plaintiff, therefore, on the 15th of
march, 1906, filed suit in the court of the justice of the
peace of Santa Rosa, La Laguna, against Veronica
Alojado to recover the said sum or, in a contrary case,
to compel her to return to his service. The trial having

been had, the justice of the peace, on April 14, 1906,
rendered judgment whereby he sentenced the
defendant to pay to the plaintiff the sum claimed and
declared that, in case the debtor should be insolvent,
she should be obliged to fulfill the agreement between
her and the plaintiff. The costs of the trial were
assessed against the defendant.
The defendant appealed from the said judgment. The
defendant, in her written answer of August 15, 1906, to
the aforesaid complaint, denied the allegations
contained in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the complaint and
alleged that, although she had left the plaintiff's
service, it was because the latter had paid her no sum
whatever for the services she had rendered in his
house. The defendant likewise denied the conditions
expressed in paragraph 4 of the complaint, averring
that the effects purchased, to the amount of P11.97,
were in the possession of the plaintiff, who refused to
deliver them to her. She therefore asked that she be
absolved from the complaint and that the plaintiff be
absolved from the complaint the wages due her for the
services she had rendered.
RULING:
YES. The duty to pay the said sum, as well as that of
P11.97 delivered to the defendant in small amounts
during the time that she was in the plaintiff's house, is
unquestionable, inasmuch as it is a positive debt
demandable of the defendant by her creditor. (Arts.
1754, 1170, Civil Code.) However, the reason alleged by
the plaintiff as a basis for the loan is untenable, to wit,
that the defendant was obliged to render service in his
house as a servant without remuneration whatever and
to remain therein so long as she had not paid her debt,
inasmuch as this condition is contrary to law and
morality. (Art. 1255, Civil Code.)
Domestic services are always to be remunerated, and
no agreement may subsist in law in which it is
stipulated that any domestic service shall be absolutely
gratuitous, unless it be admitted that slavery may be
established in this country through a covenant entered
into between the interested parties.
When legal regulations prohibit even a usurious
contract and all abuses prejudicial to subordinates and
servant, in connection with their salaries and wages, it
will be understood at once that the compact whereby
service rendered by a domestic servant in the house of
any inhabitant of this country is to be gratuitous, is in
all respects reprehensible and censurable; and
consequently, the contention of the plaintiff, that until
the defendant shall have paid him her debt she must
serve him in his house gratuitously is absolutely
inadmissible.
March 17, 2018 – Article 273 – EXPLOITATION OF
CHILD LABOR
CEBALLOS, Jesus C.
[NO CASE FOUND]
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March 18, 2018 – Article 274 – SERVICES RENDERED
UNDER COMPULSION IN PAYMENT OF DEBT
DAHIROC, Janice L.
[NO CASE FOUND]
March 18, 2018 – Article 275 – ABANDONMENT OF
PERSONS IN DANGER AND ABANDONMENT OF
ONE'S OWN VICTIM
DELA PEÑA, Clarisse J
G.R. NO. 93475 JUNE 5, 1991
ANTONIO A. LAMERA, PETITIONER,
VS.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.
ISSUE:
Whether or not prosecution for negligence under
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code is a bar to
prosecution for abandonment under Article 275 of the
same Code.
FACTS:
At around 8:30 o'clock in the evening of 14 March
1985, along Urbano Street, Pasig, Metro Manila, an
owner-type jeep, then driven by petitioner, allegedly
"hit and bumped" a tricycle then driven by Ernesto
Reyes resulting in damage to the tricycle and injuries
to Ernesto Reyes and Paulino Gonzal. The petitioner
abandoned them and failed to help or render
assistance to them, without justifiable reason.
As a consequence thereof, two informations were filed
against petitioner: (a) an Information for reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property with
multiple physical injuries under Article 365 and; b) an
Information for violation of paragraph 2 of Article 275
of the Revised Penal Code on Abandonment of one's
victim.
On June 1987 the MTC of Pasig rendered its decision
in finding the petitioner guilty of the crime of
Abandonment of one's victim as defined and penalized
under paragraph 2 of Article 275 of the Revised Penal
Code. Petitioner appealed from said Decision to the
RTC of Pasig. In the meantime, on 27 April 1989,
petitioner was arraigned for violation of Article 365. He
entered a plea of not guilty.
He filed a petition for review in the CA but which was
denied. He raised before the SC that that he cannot be
penalized twice for an “accident” and another for
“recklessness.” He maintained that since he is facing a
criminal charge for reckless imprudence, which offense
carries heavier penalties under Article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code, he could no longer be charged
under Article 275, par. 2, for abandonment for failing
to render to the persons whom he has accidentally
injured.
HELD:
No, because said Articles penalize different and distinct
offenses. The protection against double jeopardy is

only for the same offense. A simple act may be an
offense against two different provisions of law and if
one provision requires proof of an additional fact
which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction
under one does not bar prosecution under the other.
Since the informations were for separate offenses —
the first against a person and the second against public
peace and order — one cannot be pleaded as a bar to
the other under the rule on double jeopardy.
The rule on double jeopardy, which petitioner has, in
effect, invoked, does not, therefore, apply pursuant to
existing jurisprudence. Hence, the petition should be
dismissed for lack of merit.
March 18, 2018 – Article 276 – ABANDONING A
MINOR
DELFIN, Jennica Gyrl G.
PEOPLE VS. BANDIAN
G.R. NO. 45186, SEPTEMBER 30, 1936
FACTS:
One morning, Josefina Bandian went to a thicket to
respond to the call of nature. After a while, Bandian
went out of the thicket with her clothes stained with
blood. She showed signs of not being able to support
herself. She was seen by her neighbor Valentin Aguilar
who asked the help of Adriano Comcom to bring her
to her house. When Comcom rushed to aid Bandian,
he saw a newborn baby near a path adjoining the
thicket where Bandian was seen moments before.
When asked if the baby was hers, she responded in the
affirmative. Dr. Emilio Nepomoceno testified that
Bandian gave birth in her house and thereafter threw
the baby to kill it. The Solicitor-General maintains that
Bandian may be guilty only of abandoning a minor
under Article 276 of the Revised Penal Code, the
abandonment having resulted in the death of the
minor allegedly abandoned. The trial court gave credit
to the opinion of Dr. Nepomoceno.
ISSUE:
Was the crime infanticide or abandonment of minor?
HELD:
No crime was committed since the fourth and seventh
exempting circumstance are present in this case. Dr.
Nepomuceno himself affirmed that the wounds found
in the body of the child were not caused by the hand
of man but by bites animals, the pigs that usually
roamed through the thicket where it was found.
Infanticide and abandonment of a minor, to be
punishable, must be committed willfully or consciously,
or at least it must be result of a voluntary, conscious
and free act or omission. Even in cases where said
crimes are committed through mere imprudence, the
person who commits them, under said circumstances,
must be in the full enjoyment of his mental faculties, or
must be conscious of his acts, in order that he may be
held liable. In this case, she had no cause to kill or
abandon it, because her affair with a former lover,
which was not unknown to her second lover, Luis Kirol,
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took place three years before the incident. Kirol
testified at the trial that he knew that Bandian was
pregnant, he believed from the beginning that the
child carried by Bandian in her womb was his, and that
he and she had been eagerly waiting for the birth of
the child. Therefore, Bandian had no cause to be
ashamed of her pregnancy to Kirol.
March 18, 2018 – Article 277 – ABANDONMENT OF
MINOR BY PERSON ENTRUSTED WITH HIS
CUSTODY; INDIFFERENCE OF PARENTS
DIZON, Roxan Danica G.
DE GUZMAN VS PEREZ
G.R. NO. 156013
JULY 25, 2006
FACTS:
Petitioner Roberto De Guzman and private respondent
Shirley Aberde became sweethearts while studying law
in the University of Sto. Tomas. Their studies were
interrupted when Shirley became pregnant. She gave
birth to Robby Aberde de Guzman. Shirley and Roberto
never got married. In 1991, Roberto married another
woman with whom he begot two children.
Roberto sent money for Robby’s schooling only twice
— the first in 1992 and the second in 1993. In 1994,
when Robby fell seriously ill, Roberto gave Shirley
P7,000. Other than these instances, Roberto never
provided any other financial support for his son.
Shirley worked in Taiwan for two years. However, she
reached the point where she had just about spent all
her savings to provide for her and Robby’s needs. The
child’s continued education thus became uncertain.
Despite his fabulous wealth, however, Roberto failed to
provide support to Robby. On June 15, 2000, Shirley
filed a criminal complaint for abandonment and
neglect of child under Article 59(2) and (4) of PD 603 .
ISSUE:
Whether or not Roberto alone may be charged for
abandonment and neglect of child under Article 59 (2)
and (4) of PD 603
HELD:
Yes. Article 59(4) of PD 603 provides that:
Art. 59 .Crimes. – Criminal liability shall attach to any
parent who:
(4) Neglects the child by not giving him the education
which the family’s station in life and financial
conditions permit.
The crime has the following elements:
(1) the offender is a parent;
(2) he or she neglects his or her own child;
(3) the neglect consists in not giving education to the
child and
(4 the offender’s station in life and financial condition
permit him to give an appropriate education to the

child.
There is a prima facie showing from the evidence that
Roberto is in fact financially capable of supporting
Robby’s education. The notarized GIS of the RNCD
Development Corporation indicates that petitioner
owns P750,000 worth of paid-up shares in the
company.
The crime may be committed by any parent. Liability
for the crime does not depend on whether the other
parent is also guilty of neglect. The law intends to
punish the neglect of any parent, which neglect
corresponds to the failure to give the child the
education which the family’s station in life and financial
condition permit. The irresponsible parent cannot
exculpate himself from the consequences of his
neglect by invoking the other parent’s faithful
compliance with his or her own parental duties.
The "neglect of child" punished under Article 59(4) of
PD 603 is also a crime (known as "indifference of
parents") penalized under the second paragraph of
Article 277 of the Revised Penal Code.
March 19, 2018 – Article 278 – EXPLOITATION OF
MINORS/ REPUBLIC ACT 7610 (Special Protection
of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act)
DOSDOS, Xicilli Krishna P.
G.R. No. 203114, June 28, 2017
VIRGILIO LABANDRIA AWAS vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
AAA, a Grade III pupil declared that [petitioner] is the
boyfriend of her sister. Sometime in January 2010,
[petitioner] was in their house in Valenzuela City.
[Petitioner] called her and brought her inside the room.
[Petitioner] touched her vagina. [Petitioner] made her
lie down beside him and again touched her vagina.
Thereafter, [petitioner] put on his shoes and warned
her not to tell her mother and father about the
incident.
AAA was wearing leggings and panty at the time of the
incident. Petitioner never removed anything from her
when he touched her. At the time of the incident, they
were the only person (sic) inside the room. Her father
and other siblings were then asleep in another room
while his brother was downstairs.
AAA's brother came to know about the incident when
he saw her crying in a corner of their house. Her
brother told her mother about the incident. Her
mother called a police and petitioner was later
apprehended. Her mother gave her statements at the
police station.
On January 25, 2010, Ortiz, a medico-legal officer of
the PNP Crime Laboratory, received a request for
Physical/Genital Examination on the person of AAA. His
examination states: "ano-genital examination reveals
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essentially normal gross findings." He observed that
AAA's hymen was annular, thin with central orifice and
no abnormality noted. There was no evidence of any
sexual abuse because of his findings that AAA's genital
organ is normal.
As mentioned, the RTC found the petitioner guilty of
acts of lasciviousness as defined in Article 336 of the
Revised Penal Code and penalized pursuant to Section
5(b), Article III of Republic Act No. 7610.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the acts committed by the accused are
considered as an lascivious acts which is penalized
under section 5, Republic Act 7610.
RULING:
YES.
The acts committed by the petitioner against AAA
constituted acts of lasciviousness. The elements of acts
of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal
Code are, to wit: (1) the offender commits any act of
lasciviousness or lewdness; (2) the act is done under
any of the following circumstances: (a) by using force
or intimidation, or (b) when the offended party is
deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious or (c)
when the offended party is under 12 years of age; and
(3) the offended party is another person of either sex.
Such acts are punished as sexual abuse under Republic
Act No. No. 7 610, whose elements under Section 5 of
the law are namely: (1) the accused commits the acts
of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct; (2) the act
is performed with· a child exploited in prostitution or
subjected to other sexual abuse; and (3) the child,
whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.
Section 2(h) of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of Republic Act No. No. 7610 defines
lascivious conduct as:
The intentional touching, either directly or through
clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner
thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object
into the genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person,
whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent to
abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade or arouse or gratify
the sexual desire of any person, bestiality,
masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or
pubic area of a person.
G.R. NO. 198732 , JUNE 10, 2013
CHRISTIAN CABALLO VS. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
AAA, then 17 years old, met Caballo, then 23 years old,
in her uncle’s place in Surigao City. Her uncle was a
choreographer and Caballo was one of his dancers.
During that time, AAA was a sophomore college
student at the University of San Carlos and resided at
a boarding house in Cebu City. On January 17, 1998,
Caballo went to Cebu City to attend the Sinulog
Festival and there, visited AAA. After spending time
together, they eventually became sweethearts.

Sometime during the third week of March 1998, AAA
went home to Surigao City and stayed with her uncle.
In the last week of March of the same year, Caballo
persuaded AAA to have sexual intercourse with him.
This was followed by several more of the same in April
1998, in the first and second weeks of May 1998, on
August 31, 1998 and in November 1998, all of which
happened in Surigao City, except the one in August
which occurred in Cebu. In June 1998, AAA became
pregnant and later gave birth on March 8, 1999.
During the trial, the prosecution asserted that Caballo
was only able to induce AAA to lose her virginity due
to promises of marriage and his assurance that he
would not get her pregnant due to the use of the
"withdrawal method." Moreover, it claimed that
Caballo was shocked upon hearing the news of AAA’s
pregnancy and consequently, advised her to have an
abortion. She heeded Caballo’s advice; however, her
efforts were unsuccessful. Further, the prosecution
averred that when AAA’s mother confronted Caballo to
find out what his plans were for AAA, he assured her
that he would marry her daughter.
Opposed to the foregoing, Caballo claimed that during
their first sexual intercourse, AAA was no longer a
virgin as he found it easy to penetrate her and that
there was no bleeding. He also maintained that AAA
had (3) three boyfriends prior to him. Further, he
posited that he and AAA were sweethearts who lived-
in together, for one (1) week in a certain Litang Hotel
and another week in the residence of AAA’s uncle.
Eventually, they broke up due to the intervention of
AAA’s parents. At a certain time, AAA’s mother even
told Caballo that he was not deserving of AAA because
he was poor. Lastly, he alleged that he repeatedly
proposed marriage to AAA but was always rejected
because she was still studying.
In a Decision dated April 1, 2003, the RTC found
Caballo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of
Section 10(a), Article VI of RA 7610, in relation to
Section 2 of the Rules on Child Abuse Cases.
On January 28, 2011, the CA dismissed the appeal and
affirmed with modification the RTC’s ruling, finding
Caballo guilty of violating Section 5(b), Article III of RA
7610. Caballo filed a motion for reconsideration which
was, however, denied on September 26, 2011. Hence,
the instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused is guilty under Section 5,
Article III of RA 7610.
RULING:
Yes.
As it is presently worded, Section 5, Article III of RA
7610 provides that when a child indulges in sexual
intercourse or any lascivious conduct due to the
coercion or influence of any adult, the child is deemed
to be a "child exploited in prostitution and other sexual
abuse." In this manner, the law is able to act as an
effective deterrent to quell all forms of abuse, neglect,
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cruelty, exploitation and discrimination against
children, prejudicial as they are to their development.
In this relation, case law further clarifies that sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct under the coercion or
influence of any adult exists when there is some form
of compulsion equivalent to intimidation which
subdues the free exercise of the offended party’s free
will. Corollary thereto, Section 2(g) of the Rules on
Child Abuse Cases conveys that sexual abuse involves
the element of influence which manifests in a variety of
forms. It is defined as:
The employment, use, persuasion, inducement,
enticement or coercion of a child to engage in or assist
another person to engage in, sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct or the molestation, prostitution, or
incest with children.
To note, the term "influence" means the "improper use
of power or trust in any way that deprives a person of
free will and substitutes another’s objective."
Meanwhile, "coercion" is the "improper use of x x x
power to compel another to submit to the wishes of
one who wields it."
In view of the foregoing, the Court observes that
Caballo’s actuations may be classified as "coercion"
and "influence" within the purview of Section 5, Article
III of RA 7610:
First, the most crucial element is AAA’s minority. It is
undisputed that AAA was only 17 years old at the time
of the commission of the crime and is hence,
considered a child under the law. In this respect, AAA
was not capable of fully understanding or knowing the
import of her actions and in consequence, remained
vulnerable to the cajolery and deception of adults, as
in this case.
Based on this premise, jurisprudence settles that
consent is immaterial in cases involving a violation of
Section 5, Article III of RA 7610; as such, the argument
that AAA and Caballo were sweethearts remains
irrelevant. The Malto ruling is largely instructive on this
point:
For purposes of sexual intercourse and lascivious
conduct in child abuse cases under RA 7610, the
sweetheart defense is unacceptable. A child exploited
in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse
cannot validly give consent to sexual intercourse with
another person.
The language of the law is clear: it seeks to punish
"those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution
or subjected to other sexual abuse."
Unlike rape, therefore, consent is immaterial in cases
involving violation of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610.
The mere act of having sexual intercourse or
committing lascivious conduct with a child who is
exploited in prostitution or subjected to sexual abuse
constitutes the offense. It is a malum prohibitum, an
evil that is proscribed.
A child cannot give consent to a contract under our
civil laws. This is on the rationale that she can easily be
the victim of fraud as she is not capable of fully
understanding or knowing the nature or import of her

actions. The State, as parens patriae, is under the
obligation to minimize the risk of harm to those who,
because of their minority, are as yet unable to take care
of themselves fully. Those of tender years deserve its
protection.
The harm which results from a child’s bad decision in a
sexual encounter may be infinitely more damaging to
her than a bad business deal. Thus, the law should
protect her from the harmful consequences of her
attempts at adult sexual behavior. For this reason, a
child should not be deemed to have validly consented
to adult sexual activity and to surrender herself in the
act of ultimate physical intimacy under a law which
seeks to afford her special protection against abuse,
exploitation and discrimination. (Otherwise, sexual
predators like petitioner will be justified, or even
unwittingly tempted by the law, to view her as fair
game and vulnerable prey.) In other words, a child is
presumed by law to be incapable of giving rational
consent to any lascivious act or sexual intercourse.
Second, coupled with AAA’s minority is Caballo’s
seniority. Records indicate that Caballo was 23 years
old at the time of the commission of the offense and
therefore, 6 years older than AAA, more or less. The
age disparity between an adult and a minor placed
Caballo in a stronger position over AAA so as to enable
him to force his will upon the latter. Third, Caballo's
actions effectively constitute overt acts of coercion and
influence.1âwphi1 Records reveal that Caballo
repeatedly assured AAA of his love for her, and even,
promised to marry her. In addition, he also guaranteed
that she would not get pregnant since he would be
using the "withdrawal method" for safety. Irrefragably,
these were meant to influence AAA to set aside her
reservations and eventually give into having sex with
him, with which he succeeded.
Fourth, at least, with respect to the parties' first sexual
encounter, it is observed that the brash and
unexpected manner in which Caballo pursued AAA to
her room and pressed on her to have sex with him,
effectively placed her in, to a certain extent, a position
of duress .. An important factor is that AAA refused
Caballo's incipient advances and in fact, asked him to
leave. However, AAA eventually yielded. Thus, it stands
to reason that she was put in a situation deprived of
the benefit of clear thought and choice. In any case, the
Court observes that any other choice would,
nonetheless, remain tarnished due to AAA's minority
as above-discussed.
Hence, considering that Caballo's acts constitute
"coercion" and "influence" within the context of the
law, and that AAA indulged in sexual intercourse
and/or lascivious conduct with Caballo due to the
same, she is deemed as a "child exploited in
prostitution and other sexual abuse"; as such, the
second element of the subject offense exists.
In fine, finding all elements to be present, the Court
hereby sustains Caballo's conviction for violation of
Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610.
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G.R. NO. 173988, OCTOBER 8, 2014
FELINA ROSALDES VS. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
On February 13, 1996, seven year old Michael Ryan
Gonzales, then a Grade 1 pupil at Pughanan
Elementary School located in the Municipality of
Lambunao, Iloilo, was hurriedly entering his classroom
when he accidentally bumped the knee of his teacher,
petitioner Felina Rosaldes, who was then asleep on a
bamboo sofa. Roused from sleep, petitioner asked
Michael Ryan to apologize to her. When Michael did
not obey but instead proceeded to his seat, petitioner
went to Michael and pinched him on his thigh. Then,
she held him up by his armpits and pushed him to the
floor. As he fell, Michael Ryan’s body hit a desk. As a
result, he lost consciousness. Petitioner proceeded to
pick Michael Ryan up by his ears and repeatedly
slammed him down on the floor. Michael Ryan cried.
After the incident, petitioner proceeded to teach her
class. During lunch break, Michael Ryan, accompanied
by two of his classmates, Louella Loredo and Jonalyn
Gonzales, went home crying and told his mother about
the incident. His mother and his Aunt Evangeline
Gonzales reported the incident to their Barangay
Captain, Gonzalo Larroza who advised them to have
Michael Ryan examined by a doctor. Michael Ryan’s
aunt and Barangay Councilman Ernesto Ligante
brought him to the Dr. Ricardo Y. Ladrido Hospital
where he was examined by Dr. Teresita Castigador.
They, likewise, reported the incident to the Police
Station. The medical certificate issued by Dr. Teresita
Castigador reads, in part:
1. Petechiae and tenderness of both external ears 1x2
cm. and 1x1 cm.;
2. Lumbar pains and tenderness at area of L3-L4;
3. Contusions at left inner thigh 1x1 and 1x1 cm.;
4. Tenderness and painful on walking especially at the
area of femoral head.
The petitioner was criminally charged with child abuse
in the Regional Trial Court in Iloilo City (RTC), and the
case was assigned to Branch 27 of that court. The
information alleged as follows: The Provincial
Prosecutor of Iloilo, upon approval and Directive of the
Deputy OMBUDSMAN for the Visayas accuses FELINA
ROSALDES of the crime of VIOLATION OF CHILD
ABUSE LAW (Section 10 (a) of R.A. 7610), committed as
follows:
That on or about the 13th day of February 1996, in the
Municipality of Lambunao, Province of Iloilo,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being a
public school teacher in Grade 1 of Pughanan
Elementary School, with a Salary Grade below 26,
under the DECS, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously maltreat her pupil Michael Ryan
Gonzales, a seven year old child, by pinching him on
different parts of his body, and thereafter slumping

him to the ground, thereby causing Michael Ryan
Gonzales to lose his consciousness and has suffered
injuries on different parts of his body. CONTRARY TO
LAW.
On June 26, 2003, the RTC rendered judgment
convicting the petitioner of child abuse.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction of the
petitioner through its assailed decision promulgated
on May 11, 2005, with a modification of the penalty.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the acts of the petitioner constitute
child abuse penalized under Section 10 (a) of Republic
Act No. 7610[,] and not under the Revised Penal Code.
RULING:
YES.
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 7610 defines child abuse
thusly:
(b) "Child abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether
habitual or not, of the child which includes any of the
following:
(1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty,
sexual abuse and emotional maltreatment;
(2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades
or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as
a human being;
(3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for
survival, such as food and shelter; or
(4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an
injured child resulting in serious impairment of his
growth and development or in his permanent
incapacity or death.
In the crime charged against the petitioner, therefore,
the maltreatment may consist of an act by deedsor by
words that debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic
worth and dignity of a child as a human being. The act
need not be habitual. The CA concluded that the
petitioner "went overboard in disciplining Michael
Ryan, a helpless and weak 7-year old boy, when she
pinched hard Michael Ryan on the left thigh and when
she held him in the armpits and threw him on the
floor[; and as] the boy fell down, his body hit the desk
causing him to lose consciousness [but instead] of
feeling a sense of remorse, the accused-appellant
further held the boy up by his ears and pushed him
down on the floor." On her part, the trial judge said
that the physical pain experienced by the victim had
been aggravated by an emotional trauma that caused
him to stop going to school altogether out of fear of
the petitioner, compelling his parents to transfer him
to another school where he had to adjust again. Such
established circumstances proved beyond reasonable
doubt that the petitioner was guilty of child abuse by
deeds that degraded and demeaned the intrinsic worth
and dignity of Michael Ryan as a human being.
It was also shown that Michael Ryan’s physical
maltreatment by the petitioner was neither her first or
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only maltreatment of a child. Prosecution witness
Louella Loredo revealed on cross examination that she
had also experienced the petitioner’s cruelty.The
petitioner was also convicted by the RTC in Iloilo City
(Branch 39) in Criminal Case No. 348921 for
maltreatment of another child named Dariel Legayada.
Such previous incidents manifested that the petitioner
had "a propensity for violence," as the trial judge stated
in her decision of June 26, 2003.
Thirdly, the petitioner submits that the information
charging her with child abuse was insufficient in form
and substance, in that the essential elements of the
crime charged were not properly alleged therein; and
that her constitutional and statutory right to due
process of law was consequently violated.
The penalty for the child abusecommitted by the
petitioner is that prescribed in Section 10(a) of
Republic Act No. 7610, viz:
Section 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or
Exploitation and Other Conditions Prejudicial to the
Child's Development. –
(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child
abuse, cruelty or exploitation or to be responsible for
other conditions prejudicial to the child's development
including those covered by Atiicle 59 of Presidential
Decree No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the
penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period.
“The CA revised the penalty fixed by the R TC by
imposing the indeterminate penalty of four years, two
months and one day of prision correccional, as
minimum, to 10 years and one day of prision mayor, as
the maximum, on the ground that the offense was
aggravated by the petitioner being a public
schoolteacher. It cited Section 3 l(e) of Republic Act No.
7610, which commands that the penalty provided in
the Act "shall be imposed in its maximum period if the
offender is a public officer or employee." Her being a
public schoolteacher was alleged in the information
and established by evidence as well as admitted by her.
The revised penalty was erroneous, however, because
Section 10 (a) of Republic Act No. 7610 punishes the
crime committed by the petitioner with prision mayor
in its minimum period, whose three periods are six
years and one day to six years and eight months, for
the minimum period; six years, eight months and one
day to seven years and four months, for the medium
period; and seven years, four months and one day to
eight years, for the maximum period. The maximum of
the indeterminate sentence should come from the
maximum period, therefore, and the Court fixes it at
seven years, four months and one day of prision mayor.
The minimum of the indeterminate sentence should
come from prision correccional in the maximum
period, the penalty next lower than prision mayor in its
minimum period, whose range is from four years, two
months and one day to six years.1âwphi1 Accordingly,
the minimum of the indeterminate sentence is four
years, nine months and 11 days, and the maximum is

seven years, four months and one day of prision
mayor.”
G.R. NO. 193854 ; 24 SEPTEMBER 2012
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. DINA DULAY
FACTS:
On 3 July 2005, AAA was introduced to the accused
during the wake of a relative of AAA. Thereafter, the
accused convinced AAA to accompany her at a wake at
GI San Dionisio, Paranaque City. However, before they
went to the wake, they went to look for the boyfriend
of the accused. They went to Bulungan Fish Port were
they found the boyfriend of the accused. They
proceeded to the kubuhan, located at the back of the
Bulungan Fish Port. Upon arrival, the accused suddenly
pulled AAA inside a room where a man known only as
“Speed” was waiting. AAA saw “Speed” give the
accused some money, then the latter left. “Speed”
wielded a knife and tied AAA’s hands to the papag and
raped her. AAA asked for appellant’s help when she
saw the latter peeping into the room while she was
being raped, but appellant did not do so. After the
rape, “Speed” and appellant told AAA not to tell
anyone what had happened or else they would get
back at her. AAA, accompanied by her sister and
mother filed a complaint for Rape. The RTC rendered a
decision finding the accused guilty as a co-principal by
indispensable cooperation for the crime of Rape.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused should be held liable as a
co-principal for the crime of Rape
HELD:
No, in order to be considered as a principal by
indispensable cooperation, one must participate in the
criminal resolution, a conspiracy or unity in criminal
purpose and cooperation in the commission of the
offense by performing another act without which it
would not have been accomplished. The Supreme
Court held that the accused did not participate in the
criminal resolution of the crime of Rape but merely
delivered AAA to “Speed”.
However, the accused is still liable for violation of
Section 5 (a), Article III of R.A. 7610 or a) Those who
engage in or promote, facilitate or induce child
prostitution which include, but are not limited to, the
following: (1) Acting as a procurer of a child prostitute.
MALTO V. PEOPLE
GR 16473 , SEPTEMBER 21, 2007
FACTS:
Sometime during the month of November 1997 to
1998, Malto seduced his student, AAA, a minor, to
indulge in sexual intercourse several times with him.
Prior to the incident, petitioner and AAA had a “mutual
understanding” and became sweethearts. Pressured
and afraid of the petitioner’s threat to end their
relationship, AAA succumbed and both had sexual
intercourse.
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Upon discovery of what AAA underwent, AAA’s mother
lodged a complaint in the Office of the City Prosecutor
of Pasay City. Assistant City Prosecutor charged the
petitioner in an Information a violation of Section 5(a),
Article III, RA 7610. During the month of November
1997 up to 1998, in Pasay City, Michael John. Z. Malto,
a professor, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take advantage and exert influence,
relationship and moral ascendancy and induce and/or
seduce his student at Assumption College,
complainant, AAA, a minor of 17 years old, to indulge
in sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct for several
times with him as in fact said accused has carnal
knowledge.
The trial court found the evidence for the prosecution
sufficient to sustain petitioner’s conviction and
rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for violation of Article III, Section
5(a), par. 3 of RA 7610, as amended and sentenced him
to reclusion temporal.
In a decision, the appellate court affirmed his
conviction even if it found that his acts were not
covered by paragraph (a) but by paragraph (b) of
Section 5, Article III of RA 7610; and thereby sentenced
to an indeterminate penalty prision mayor.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in sustaining petitioner’s
conviction on the grounds that there was no rape
committed since their sexual intercourse was
consensual by reason of their “sweetheart” relationship
RULING:
NEGATIVE. Petitioner is wrong. Petitioner violated
Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610, as amended. The
first element of Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610
pertains to the act or acts committed by the accused.
The second element refers to the state or condition of
the offended party. The third element corresponds to
the minority or age of the offended party. Since all
three elements of the crime were present, the
conviction of petitioner was proper.
Consent of the child is immaterial in criminal cases
involving violation of Sec. 5, Art. III of RA 7610.
Petitioner claims that AAA welcomed his kisses and
touches and consented to have sexual intercourse with
him. They engaged in these acts out of mutual love and
affection. The sweetheart theory applies in acts of
lasciviousness and rape, felonies committed against or
without the consent of the victim. It operates on the
theory that the sexual act was consensual. It requires
proof that the accused and the victim were lovers and
that she consented to the sexual relations.
For purposes of sexual intercourse and lascivious
conduct in child abuse cases under RA 7610, the
sweetheart defense is unacceptable. A child exploited
in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse
cannot validly give consent to sexual intercourse with
another person. A child cannot give consent to a
contract under our civil laws. This is on the rationale
that she can easily be the victim of fraud as she is not
capable of fully understanding or knowing the nature
or import of her actions. The State, as parens patriae, is

under the obligation to minimize the risk of harm to
those who, because of their minority, are as yet unable
to take care of themselves fully. Those of tender years
deserve its protection.
The harm which results from a child’s bad decision in a
sexual encounter may be infinitely more damaging to
her than a bad business deal. Thus, the law should
protect her from the harmful consequences of her
attempts at adult sexual behavior. For this reason, a
child should not be deemed to have validly consented
to adult sexual activity and to surrender herself in the
act of ultimate physical intimacy under a law which
seeks to afford her special protection against abuse,
exploitation and discrimination. In other words, a child
is presumed by law to be incapable of giving rational
consent to any lascivious act or sexual intercourse.
To provide special protection to children from all forms
of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation and
discrimination, and other conditions prejudicial to their
development; provide sanctions for their commission
and carry out a program for prevention and deterrence
of and crisis intervention in situations of child abuse,
exploitation, and discrimination. As well as to intervene
on behalf of the child when the parents, guardian,
teacher or person having care or custody of the child
fails or is unable to protect the child against abuse,
exploitation, and discrimination or when such acts
against the child are committed by the said parent,
guardian, teacher or person having care and custody
of the same.
The best interest of children shall be the paramount
consideration in all actions concerning them, whether
undertaken by public or private social welfare
institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities,
and legislative bodies, consistent with the principles of
First Call for Children as enunciated in the United
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. Every
effort shall be exerted to promote the welfare of
children and enhance their opportunities for a useful
and happy life.
March 19, 2018 – Article 279 – ADDITIONAL
PENALTIES FOR OTHER OFFENSES
DUQUE, Francis Lester M.
G.R. NO. 179090 JUNE 5, 2009
LEONILO SANCHEZ ALIAS NILO VS. PEOPLE
FACTS:
Private complainant is VVV, a minor. FFF, VVV's father,
was leasing a portion of the fishpond owned by
Escolastico. Appellant, one of the heirs of escolastico
went to FFF’s house to inquire about the whereabouts
of the latter’s, MMM, FFF's wife told appellant that FFF
was not around. Right then and there, appellant told
them to leave the place and started destroying the
house. MMM got angry and told appellant that he
could not just drive them away since the contract for
the use of the fishpond was not yet terminated. VVV
left to fetch a barangay tanod but failed to do so. On
her way back to their house, she saw appellant with a
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gallon of gasoline, headed to their house. Appellant
warned VVV then to better pack up her family’s things
because he would burn their house.
Upon reaching their house, VVV saw her brother, BBB,
get a piece of wood to defend themselves and their
house from appellant. However, appellant approached
BBB, grabbed the piece of wood and started beating
him with it. At the sight, VVV approached appellant and
pushed him. Irked by what she did, appellant turned to
her and struck her with the piece of wood three (3)
times. As a result, the wood broke into several pieces.
MMM restrained BBB, telling him not to fight back.
After which, appellant left, bringing with him the gallon
of gasoline. The RTC finds the accused guilty of R.A.
7610.
ISSUE:
WON appellant can be charged with additional
penalties for other offenses violated which is PD 603.
HELD:
Yes. Here, the applicable laws are Par 09, Article 59 of
P.D. No. 603 (Inflicts cruel and unusual punishment
upon the child or deliberately subjects him to
indignation and other excessive chastisement that
embarrass or humiliate him) and Section 10(a) of R.A.
No. 7610 which provides: SECTION 10. Other Acts of
Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and Other
Conditions Prejudicial to the Child's Development. —
(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child
abuse, cruelty or exploitation or be responsible for
other conditions prejudicial to the child's development
including those covered by Article 59 of Presidential
Decree No. 603...
In the case of Araneta v. People, SC held that the
provision punishes not only those enumerated under
Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, but also four
distinct acts, i.e., (a) child abuse, (b) child cruelty, (c)
child exploitation and (d) being responsible for
conditions prejudicial to the child’s development. The
prosecution need not prove that the acts of child
abuse, child cruelty and child exploitation have
resulted in the prejudice of the child because an act
prejudicial to the development of the child is different
from the former acts. Moreover, it is a rule in statutory
construction that the word "or" in Section 10 of R.a
7610 is a disjunctive term signifying dissociation and
independence of one thing from other things
enumerated.
March 19, 2018 – Article 280 – QUALIFIED TRESPASS
TO DWELLING
FLORENTINO, Kimberly A.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
VS
AURELIO LAMAHANG
G.R. NO. L-43530
AUGUST 3, 1935
ISSUE:
What was the crime committed by the accused?

FACTS:
At early dawn of March 2, 1935,a policeman was
patrolling along the streets of the city of Iloilo caught
the accused in the act of making an opening with an
iron bar on the wall of a store of cheap goods. At the
time the owner of the store was sleeping inside. The
accused had only succeeded in breaking one board
and in unfastening another from the wall when the
policeman showed up, who instantly arrested him and
placed him under custody.
HELD:
The court was of the opinion and held that under
consideration the crime committed was attempted
trespass to dwelling. Under Article 280 of the Revised
Penal Code, this offense is committed when a private
person shall enter the dwelling of another against the
latter's will. The accused armed with an iron bar forced
the wall of the said store by breaking a board and
unfastening another for the purpose of entering the
store and the accused did not succeed due to the
presence of the policeman. Under the circumstances of
this case the prohibition of the owner or inmate is
presumed.
SALVADOR MARZALADO VS PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 152997, NOVEMBER 10,2004
ISSUE:
Whether the accused violated article 280 of the Revised
Penal Code?
FACTS:
Accused was charged with violation of article 280 of
the Revised Penal Code when he forcibly entered the
leased unit of Cristina Albano. Accused claimed that
when he was on his way home he saw water in a
continuous stream flowing out of Albano's unit. He
searched for Albano but he did not find her so he asked
for the assistance of the Barangay Tanods and went
inside the unit and found an open faucet, with water
flooding on the floor.
HELD:
No. The Court ruled that as certified by Barangay
Lupon secretary, the unit rented by Albano was forcibly
opened by the owner because of the strong water
pressure coming out of the faucet. Since Albano and
her children already left, nobody was left to attend the
unit. Clearly accused acted for the justified purpose of
avoiding further flooding and damage to his mother's
property. No criminal intent could be clearly imputed
to accused for the remedial action he had taken. There
was an exigency that had to be addressed to avoid
damage to the leased unit.
March 20, 2018 – Article 281 – OTHER FORMS OF
TRESPASS.
FUENTES, Arczft Ran Z.
[NO CASES FOUND]
March 20, 2018 – Article 282 – GRAVE THREATS
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IBABAO, Konrad Stephen P.
RONNIE CALUAG V. PEOPLE
G.R. NO.: 171511, MARCH 4, 2009
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner’s action constitutes to grave
threats.
FACTS:
Complainants Nestor and his wife Julia Denido
inquired to Caluag and Sentillas why their guests were
mauled during their earlier drinking spree. Caluag
butted in and said, “bakit kasama ka ba doon?” And
boxed and mauled Nestor. The victims quickly went
back to their house. Julia, on her way to the baranggay
hall to report the incident, was confronted by Caluag
and poked and threatened her with a gun to her
forehead and said, “saan ka pupunta? Gusto mo ito?”
Despite the threats, she was able to report the crime.
Soon after, 2 informations was filed against petitioner;
1) for grave threats, and 2) for light physical injuries.
The MTC, RTC found the petitioner guilty of the crime
grave threats and slight physical injuries. Hence the
appeal.
HELD:
Yes, the SC uniformly found petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of grave threats and slight physical
injury. Under article 282 of the Revised Penal Code –
any person who shall threaten another with the
infliction upon the person, honor or property of the
latter or of his family of any wrong amounting to a
crime, shall suffer;
(2) the penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not
exceeding 500 pesos if the threat shall not have been
made under subject to a condition.
In this case, the act of pointing a gun to her forehead
clearly enounces a threat to kill. Thus, action speaks
louder than words considering it be taken in to context
the earlier surrounding circumstances.
March 23, 2018 – Article 284 – BOND FOR GOOD
BEHAVIOR
NASH, Regina Mercado
[NO CASE FOUND]
March 23, 2018 – Article 285 – OTHER LIGHT
THREATS
OLACO, Jan-Lawrence P.
US V. ANDRES V. ESTRADA
GR NO. 4418, MAR 26, 1908
FACTS:
Cecilia went inside a billiard room, seeing this,
Anastasio Delgado, who was also present inside the
billiard room said to his friend, who was by his side "
Are women allowed to come into billiard rooms?
Cecilia took offense on the remark made and hot
words passed between her and the said Delgado.

Thereafter, Andres V. Estrada, the woman's husband,
took part in the quarrel and notwithstanding the fact
that Delgado had left the place, hiding himself in the
next house, the accused also went out and returned
shortly thereafter provided with a revolver and
commenced to look for Delgado who, fearing injury,
returned to his home. Moreover, his friends told him to
stay hidden because the accused was looking for him
in order to kill him. The court sentenced Estrada for a
higher penalty and he appealed for a lower one.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused Estrada liable for other
light threats and be awarded with a lower penalty.
HELD:
YES. The court stated that the act complained do not
constitute a crime but simply a misdemeanor for
uttering threats. A person who, in the heat of anger,
threatened to kill another without persisting in the idea
involved in his threat is liable only under the paragraph
2 of Article 285 of the Revised Penal Code.
Furthermore, Flaviano Delgado, testifies that the
accused and his wife, after the information had been
filed, called at the house of the witness to implore
pardon, Estrada alleging that the threat was uttered
without premeditation, and that it was done
unintentionally. Hence, the accused Estrada is only
liable for other light threats and consequently his
penalty must be lowered.
RONNIE CALUAG VS PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 171511, MARCH 4, 2009
FACTS:
Nestor learned that two of his guests from an earlier
drinking spree were mauled. At that time, Caluag and
Sentillas were drinking at the store owned by the son
of Sentillas. When Nestor inquired from several people
what happened, Caluag butted in and replied “Bakit
kasama ka ba roon?”and immediately boxed him
without warning. Nestor retaliated but he was
overpowered by Caluag and Sentillas. Julia, wife of
Nestor, saw Caluag and Sentillas box her husband.
Although she tried to pacify them, they did not listen
to her. To avoid his assailants, Nestor ran to his house.
Julia followed him. In the evening, same day, Nestor
told his wife to report the boxing incident to the
barangay authorities. Thereafter, Julia and her son
Rotsen were on their way to their barangay hall, she
encountered Caluag, who blocked her way at the alley
near her house. Caluag confronted Julia with a gun,
poked it at her forehead, and said “Saan ka pupunta,
gusto mo ito?” Despite this fearful encounter, she was
still able to proceed to the barangay hall where she
reported the gun-poking incident to the barangay
authorities.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Caluag is liable for other light threats
under Article 285 of the RPC.
HELD:
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NO. The court stated that Under the Revised Penal
Code, there are three kinds of threats: grave threats
(Article 282), light threats (Article 283) and other light
threats (Article 285). In grave threats, the wrong
threatened amounts to a crime which may or may not
be accompanied by a condition. In light threats, the
wrong threatened does not amount to a crime but is
always accompanied by a condition. In other light
threats, the wrong threatened does not amount to a
crime and there is no condition. In the instant case,
Julia Denido left her house to go to the barangay hall
to report the mauling of her husband which she
witnessed earlier in the afternoon. On her way there,
Caluag confronted her and pointed a gun to her
forehead, while at the same time saying “Saan ka
pupunta, gusto mo ito?” Considering what transpired
earlier between petitioner and Julia’s husband,
Caluag’s act of pointing a gun at Julia’s forehead clearly
announces a threat to kill or to inflict serious physical
injury on her person. Taken in the context of the
surrounding circumstances, the uttered words do not
go against the threat to kill or to inflict serious injury
evinced by petitioners accompanying act. Article 285,
par. 1 (other light threats) is inapplicable since it
presupposes that the threat to commit a wrong will not
constitute a crime. That the threat to commit a wrong
will constitute or not constitute a crime is the
distinguishing factor between grave threats on one
hand, and light and other light threats on the other.
Given the surrounding circumstances, the offense
committed falls under Article 282, par. 2 (grave threats)
since: (1) killing or shooting someone amounts to a
crime, and (2) the threat to kill was not subject to a
condition.
March 21, 2018 – Article 286 – GRAVE COERCIONS
PACQUIAO, Jose Luis P.
ALEJANDRO V. BERNAS
GR NO. 179243 (SEPTEMBER 7, 2011)
ISSUE
Whether or not grave coercion can be committed
through intimidation alone without violence
FACTS
Petitioner Alejandro is a lessee-purchaser of a
condominium unit in Pasig City, under the Contract of
Lease with Option to purchase with lessor-seller
Oakridge Properties, Inc. (OPI). Alejandro sub-leased
the unit to other petitioners (Firdausi, Abbas and
Francisco) to be used as a law office. However, a defect
in the air-conditioning unit prompted petitioners to
suspend payments until the problem is fixed by the
management. Instead of addressing the defect, OPI
instituted an action for ejectment before the MTC.
During the pendency of the case, respondent Atty.
Bernas ordered the unit to be padlock. Subsequently,
petitioners filed a complaint for grave coercion against
respondents Atty. Bernas, Atty SIa-Bernas, Amor and
Aguilar. Petitioners claimed that the padlocking of the
unit was illegal, felonious and unlawful which

prevented them from entering the premises.
Petitioners also alleged that said padlocking and the
cutting off of facilities had unduly prejudiced them and
thus constituted grave coercion. Moreover, there was
sufficient intimidation by the mere presence of the
security guards.
HELD
No. The second element of grave coercion is absent in
this case.
For grave coercion to lie, the following elements must
be present:
1. That a person is prevented by another from doing
something not prohibited by law, or compelled to
do something against his will, be it right or wrong;
2. That the prevention or compulsion is effected by
violence, threats or intimidation; and
3. That the person who restrains the will and liberty of
another has no right to do so, or in other words, that
the restraint is not made under authority of law or in
the exercise of any lawful right.
In this case, the mere presence of the security guards
is insufficient to cause intimidation to the petitioners.
There is intimidation when one of the parties is
compelled by a reasonable and well-grounded fear of
an imminent and grave evil upon his person or
property, or upon the person or property of his spouse,
descendants or ascendants, to give his consent.
Material violence is not indispensable for there to be
intimidation. Intense fear produced in the mind of the
victim which restricts or hinders the exercise of the will
is sufficient.
In the crime of grave coercion, violence through
material force or such a display of it as would produce
intimidation and, consequently, control over the will of
the offended party is an essential ingredient.
Moreover, it was not alleged that the security guards
committed anything to intimidate petitioners, nor was
it alleged that the guards were not customarily
stationed there and that they produced fear on the part
of petitioners. To determine the degree of the
intimidation, the age, sex and condition of the person
shall be borne in mind. Here, the petitioners who were
allegedly intimidated by the guards are all lawyers who
presumably know their rights.
In this case, the crime of unjust vexation is the proper
complaint filed instead of the grave coercion against
respondents.
UNITED STATES V. MENA
GR NO. 4812 (OCTOBER 30, 1908)
ISSUE
Whether or not defendant Mena is liable for grave
coercion
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FACTS
Three carabaos of defendant Mena trespassed upon
the rice paddies of complainant Flora, doing
considerable damage thereto. The latter took
possession of the animals and refused to return them
to Mena without compensation for the damage done.
Mena was still unable to pay. Flora and his son set out
to take the carabaos to the justice of the peace, for the
purpose of depositing them in his care until the
question of damages could be settled in his court. On
the road to the justice of the peace, they met
defendant Mena in company with some other persons.
By refusal to surrender them to the defendant or his
friends, defendant Mena drew his bolo, rushed at
Flora’s, cut the mecate by which the son was leading
the carabao, and with threats of bodily injury,
compelled him to turn the other loose; and then with
further threats of bodily injury, compelled Flora himself
to turn loose the carabao which he was riding.
HELD
Yes. The acts committed by the defendant clearly fall
within the foregoing definition of the crime of grave
coercion. With violence he compelled the complaining
witness to do that which he did not desire to do — that
is to say, to turn over the possession of the carabaos.
It is a maxim of the law that no man is authorized to
take the law into his own hands and enforce his rights
with threats of violence, except in certain well-defined
cases, where one acts in the necessary defense of one’s
life, liberty, or property, against unlawful aggression,
and manifestly the defendant can not successfully
maintain that his action was taken in defense of life,
liberty, or property.
The defendant was guilty of the crime of grave
coercion unless he was lawfully authorized to enforce
his demand when the complaining witness refused
compliance therewith.
March 22, 2018 – Article 287 – LIGHT COERCIONS
PACQUIAO, Jose Paolo P.
ONG CHIU KWAN VS. PEOPLE
GR NO. 113006
November 23, 2000
ISSUE:
W/N the court was proper in finding petitioner guilty
for violating Art. 287 par. 2 or unjust vexation of the
RPC
FACTS:
Assistant City Prosecutor Andres M. Bayona of Bacolod
filed with the Municipal Trial Court, Bacolod City an
information charging petitioner with unjust vexation
for cutting the electric wires, water pipes and
telephone lines of "Crazy Feet," a business
establishment owned and operated by Mildred Ong.
That on April 24, 1990, at around 10:00 in the morning,
Ong Chiu Kwan ordered Wilfredo Infante to "relocate"
the telephone, electric and water lines of "Crazy Feet,"
because said lines posed as a disturbance. However,

Ong Chiu Kwan failed to present a permit from
appropriate authorities allowing him to cut the electric
wires, water pipe and telephone lines of the business
establishment.
After due trial, on September 1, 1992, the Municipal
Trial Court found Ong Chiu Kwan guilty of unjust
vexation, and sentenced him to "imprisonment for
twenty days." On appeal, both the RTC and CA affirmed
such decision by the MTC. Hence, this petition.
HELD:
Yes. Unjust Vexation is any conduct which annoys,
vexes, disturbs or irritates another, provided there was
no force, threat, violence or intimidation.
In the present case, petitioner admitted having ordered
the cutting of the electric, water and telephone lines of
complainant’s business establishment because these
lines crossed his property line. He failed, however, to
show evidence that he had the necessary permit or
authorization to relocate the lines. Also, he timed the
interruption of electric, water and telephone services
during peak hours of the operation of business of the
complainant. Thus, petitioner’s act unjustly annoyed or
vexed the complainant. Consequently, petitioner Ong
Chiu Kwan is liable for unjust vexation.
MADERAZO VS. PEOPLE
GR NO. 165065
SEPTEMBER 26, 2006
ISSUE:
W/N Maderazo is guilty of unjust vexation under art.
287 of the RPC
FACTS:
Verutiao (offended party) had been the lessee of a stall
in the Biliran public market and paid a monthly rental
of P200.00. She was allowed to finish the construction
of the market stall with the permission of the Municipal
Mayor and the Municipal Treasurer.
She spent P24, 267.00 for the construction of the
market stall but was not reimbursed by the
Municipality of her expenses.
Verutiao and the Municipality entered into a one-year
lease contract, renewable every year with a monthly
rental of P400.00. It is also provided that, any violation
of the conditions therein agreed shall be sufficient
cause for its cancellation, notwithstanding the fact that
the contract has not yet expired.
The Municipality partially paid her P10, 000.00 of her
total expenses in the construction of the market stall.
However, considering that she had not been fully
reimbursed of her expenses for the construction of the
stall, she did not pay her rent.
Verutiao closed her stall and proceeded to Mindanao
where she spent the Christmas holidays and returned
a month after. She and her husband received a letter-
order from Mayor Melchor Maderazo, directing her to
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vacate the stall within twenty-four (24) hours because
of her failure to pay the rentals for the stall and the
cancellation of the lease contract.
Mayor Maderazo padlocked the leased premises. The
locks were opened on the authority of the Mayor. The
contents of the market stall were inventoried by Victor
Maderazo and taken to the police station for
safekeeping
HELD:
Yes. In unjust vexation, being a felony by dolo, malice
is an inherent element of the crime. Good faith is a
good defense to a charge for unjust vexation because
good faith negates malice. The paramount question to
be considered is whether the offender’s act caused
annoyance, irritation, torment, distress or disturbance
to the mind of the person to whom it is directed. The
main purpose of the law penalizing coercion and unjust
vexation is precisely to enforce the principle that no
person may take the law into his hands and that our
government is one of law, not of men. It is unlawful for
any person to take into his own hands the
administration of justice.
In the present case, the overt acts of petitioners Mayor
Melchor Maderazo and Victor Maderazo, Jr., on
January 27, 1997, annoyed, irritated and caused
embarrassment to her. It was petitioner Melchor
Maderazo who ordered petitioner Victor Maderazo, Jr.
to have the stall reopened, to conduct an inventory of
the contents thereof, and to effect the transportation
of the goods to the police station. Petitioner Victor
Maderazo, who was a Sangguniang Bayan member,
obeyed the order of the Mayor.
Although Verutiao was not at her stall when it was
unlocked, and the contents thereof taken from the stall
and brought to the police station, the crime of unjust
vexation was nevertheless committed. For the crime to
exist, it is not necessary that the offended party be
present when the crime was committed by said
petitioners. It is enough that the private complainant
was embarrassed, annoyed, irritated or disturbed when
she learned of the overt acts of the petitioners. Indeed,
by their collective acts, petitioners evicted Verutiao
from her stall and prevented her from selling therein,
hence, losing income from the business.
March 22, 2018 – Article 288 – OTHER SIMILAR
COERCIONS
PANIZA, Lyndzelle Jane D
[NO CASE FOUND]
March 22, 2018 – Article 289 – FORMATION,
MAINTENANCE, AND PROHIBITION OF
COMBINATION OF CAPITAL OR LABOR THROUGH
VIOLENCE OR THREATS
RIVERA, Marynit P.
G.R. No. L-1340
October 13, 1947
HERMOGENES MORTERA and CANLUBANG

WORKERS' UNION (CLO)
vs.
THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS,
CANLUBANG SUGAR ESTATE and BISIG NG
CANLUBANG (NLU)
ISSUE:
Whether or not peaceful picketing is prohibited
FACTS:
The Bisig ng Canlubang Union (BCU) demanded from
the Canlubang Sugar Estate (CSE) the salary increase of
its employees and other benefits. CSE refused and so
BCU staged a strike. A case was filed which the Court
of Industrial Relations (CIR) ordered the striking union
to return to work and that any employee who shall fail
to return to their post shall be substituted by CSE with
a new employee. The CIR also prohibited any form of
picketing while the case is pending. CSE was ordered
to accept the returning employees and to maintain
status quo. Both parties complied.
RULING:
NO. Peaceful picketing is part of freedom of speech
and, therefore, cannot be prohibited. Picketing in a
peaceful and and orderly manner is absolutely legal. It
cannot be prohibited for it is part and parcel of the
freedom of speech guaranteed by the Constitution.
March 23, 2018 – Article 290 – DISCOVERING
SECRETS THROUGH SEIZURE OF
CORRESPONDENCE
ROMBLON, Shirley Kris M.
[NO CASE FOUND]
March 23, 2018 – Article 291 – REVEALING SECRETS
WITH ABUSE OF OFFICE
SALVERON, Jan Ione R.
[NO CASE FOUND]
March 24, 2018 – Article 292 – REVELATION OF
INDUSTRIAL SECRETS
SANTOALLA, Stephanie M.
AIR PHILIPPINES CORPORATION, Vs. PENNSWELL,
INC.
G.R. No. 172835, December 13, 2007
FACTS:
Pennswell sold and delivered to Air Philippines
Corporation industrial chemicals, solvents, and special
lubricants amounting to P450,000.00. When Air
Philippines refused to pay the obligation, Pensswell
filed a collection case before RTC Makati. In its Answer,
Air Philippines alleged that: it refused to pay because
it was defrauded in the amount of P600,000.00 by
Pennswell for its previous sale of 4 items; said items
were misrepresented by Pennswell as belonging to a
new line, but were in truth and in fact, identical with
products it had previously purchased from Pennswell;
and, Pennswell merely altered the names and labels of
such goods. During the trial, Air Philippines filed a
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motion to compel Pennswell to give a detailed list of
the chemical components and the ingredients used for
the products that were sold. Pennswell opposed the
motion for production, contending that the requested
information was a trade secret that it could not be
forced to disclose.
ISSUE:
Whether the court of appeals ruled in accordance with
prevailing laws and jurisprudence when it upheld the
ruling of the trial court that the chemical components
or ingredients of respondents products are trade
secrets or industrial secrets that are not subject to
compulsory disclosure.
HELD:
Yes
A trade secret is defined as a plan or process, tool,
mechanism or compound known only to its owner and
those of his employees to whom it is necessary to
confide it. The definition also extends to a secret
formula or process not patented, but known only to
certain individuals using it in compounding some
article of trade having a commercial value.
A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern,
device, or compilation of information that:
(1) is used in one's business; and
(2) gives the employer an opportunity to obtain an
advantage over competitors who do not possess the
information.
Generally, a trade secret is a process or device intended
for continuous use in the operation of the business, for
example, a machine or formula, but can be a price list
or catalogue or specialized customer list.
It is indubitable that trade secrets constitute
proprietary rights. The inventor, discoverer, or
possessor of a trade secret or similar innovation has
rights therein which may be treated as property, and
ordinarily an injunction will be granted to prevent the
disclosure of the trade secret by one who obtained the
information "in confidence" or through a "confidential
relationship." American jurisprudence has utilized the
following factors to determine if an information is a
trade secret, to wit:
(1) the extent to which the information is known
outside of the employer's business;
(2) the extent to which the information is known by
employees and others involved in the business;
(3) the extent of measures taken by the employer to
guard the secrecy of the information;
(4) the value of the information to the employer and to
competitors;
(5) the amount of effort or money expended by the
company in developing the information; and
 CRIMINAL LAW II | CASE DIGESTS

(6) the extent to which the information could be easily
or readily obtained through an independent source.
The chemical composition, formulation, and
ingredients of respondents special lubricants are trade
secrets within the contemplation of the law.
That trade secrets are of a privileged nature is beyond
quibble. The protection that this jurisdiction affords to
trade secrets is evident in our laws. The Securities
Regulation Code, expressly provides that the court may
issue an order to protect trade secrets or other
confidential research, development, or commercial
information belonging to the debtor. Moreover, the
Securities Regulation Code is explicit that the Securities
and Exchange Commission is not required or
authorized to require the revelation of trade secrets or
processes in any application, report or document filed
with the Commission. This confidentiality is made
paramount as a limitation to the right of any member
of the general public, upon request, to have access to
all information filed with the Commission.
Revised Penal Code endows a cloak of protection to
trade secrets under the following articles:
Art. 291. Revealing secrets with abuse of office. The
penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 500
pesos shall be imposed upon any manager, employee
or servant who, in such capacity, shall learn the secrets
of his principal or master and shall reveal such secrets.
art. 292. revelation of industrial secrets. the penalty of
prision correccional in its minimum and medium
periods and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos shall be
imposed upon the person in charge, employee or
workman of any manufacturing or industrial
establishment who, to the prejudice of the owner
thereof, shall reveal the secrets of the industry of
the latter.
other confidential programs and information from
competitors. Notably, it was in a labor-related case that
this Court made a stark ruling on the proper
determination of trade secrets.
In the case at bar, petitioner cannot rely on Section 77
of Republic Act 7394, or the Consumer Act of the
Philippines, in order to compel respondent to reveal
the chemical components of its products. While it is
true that all consumer products domestically sold,
whether manufactured locally or imported, shall
indicate their general make or active ingredients in
their respective labels of packaging, the law does not
apply to respondent. Respondents specialized
lubricants -- namely, Contact Grease, Connector
Grease, Thixohtropic Grease, Di-Electric Strength
Protective Coating, Dry Lubricant and Anti-Seize
Compound -- are not consumer products. Consumer
products, as it is defined in Article 4(q),[ refers to
goods, services and credits, debts or obligations which
are primarily for personal, family, household or
agricultural purposes, which shall include, but not be
limited to, food, drugs, cosmetics, and devices. This is
not the nature of respondents products. Its products
are not intended for personal, family, household or
agricultural purposes. Rather, they are for industrial
use, specifically for the use of aircraft propellers and
engines.
What is clear from the factual findings of the RTC and
the Court of Appeals is that the chemical formulation
of respondents products is not known to the general
public and is unique only to it. Both courts uniformly
ruled that these ingredients are not within the
knowledge of the public.

Jurisprudence has consistently acknowledged the

private character of trade secrets. There is a privilege
not to disclose ones trade secrets. Foremost, this Court
has declared that trade secrets and banking
transactions are among the recognized restrictions to
the right of the people to information as embodied in
the Constitution. We said that the drafters of the
Constitution also unequivocally affirmed that, aside
from national security matters and intelligence
information, trade or industrial secrets (pursuant to the
Intellectual Property Code and other related laws) as
well as banking transactions (pursuant to the Secrecy
of Bank Deposits Act), are also exempted from
compulsory disclosure.

Significantly, our cases on labor are replete with

examples of a protectionist stance towards the trade
secrets of employers. For instance, this Court upheld
the validity of the policy of a pharmaceutical company
prohibiting its employees from marrying employees of
any competitor company, on the rationalization that
the company has a right to guard its trade secrets,
manufacturing formulas, marketing strategies and

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TITLE TEN – CRIME AGAINST PROPERTY
March 25, 2018 – Article 293 – WHO ARE GUILTY OF
ROBBERY
TADO, Diann Kathelline A.
G.R. No. L-12453 July 15, 1918
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PEDRO LAHOYLAHOY and MARCOS MADANLOG,
defendants-appellants.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused committed Robbery with
Multiple Homicide
FACTS:
In 1912, the complaint the two children were staying
with Juana, their grandmother, in a house some
distance removed from that occupied by Roman and
Rosa and located farther back from the shore. The
grandfather, Francisco, had gone to the beach. After
the grandmother and the children had gone to rest on
a mat where they slept together, the two accused
appeared and demanded money of Juana. She gave
them P100 in money in response to this demand, and
the accused then required the three to leave the house
and go in the direction of the sea. A further demand
was made upon the old woman for money, which
demand she was unable to comply with. Lahoylahoy
then struck her with a bolo just below her breast, killing
her instantly. The two children, being greatly
frightened, they ran away separately for some distance
and remained hidden during the night in the bushes.
The next morning the children made their way to the
house where the old couple had lived, which was
vacant. Going in that direction they stopped at the
house of their sister, the wife of the defendant
Madanlog. When they went a little later to the house
where their parents had lived, the fact was revealed
that Francisco, Roman, and Rosa had also been killed.
All the bodies were collected and buried early in the
morning by the two accused, assisted by Eugenio
Tenedero, son-in-law of Lahoylahoy. The two children
Miguela and Bartolome say that they were threatened
with death if they should make complaint.
At the trial the two children gave a very consistent
account of the robbery and of the murder of their
grandmother.
They were charged crime of robbery with multiple
homicide
HELD: No.
An important question arises upon the matter of the
complaint in connection with the proof as to the
ownership of the property which was taken by the
accused. The part of the complaint here material to be
considered reads as follows:
Xxx According to the proof the person robbed was
Juana; while the complaint charges that the property
taken belong to Roman Estriba. Subsection 5 of section
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6 of General Orders No. 58 declares that a complaint
or information shall show, among others things, the
names of the persons against whom, or against whose
property, the offense was committed, if known. The
complaint in this case therefore properly contained an
averment as to the ownership of the property; and
upon principle, in charging the crime of robbery
committed upon the person, the allegation of the
owner's name is essential.
It is elementary that in crimes against property,
ownership must be alleged as matter essential to the
proper description of the offense.
To constitute larceny, robbery, embezzlement,
obtaining money by false pretenses, malicious
mischief, etc., the property obtained must be that of
another, and indictments for such offenses must name
the owner; and a variance in this respect between the
indictment and the proof will be fatal. It is also
necessary in order to identify the offense. Xxx
Now a complaint charging the commission of the
complex offense of robbery with homicide must
necessarily charge each of the component offenses
with the same precision that would be necessary if they
were made the subject of separate complaints.
To permit a defendant to be convicted upon a charge
of robbing one person when the proof shows that he
robbed an entirely different person, when the first was
not present, is violative of the rudimentary principles
of pleading; and in addition, is subject to the criticism
that the defendant is thereby placed in a position
where he could not be protected from a future
prosecution by a plea of former conviction or acquittal.
If we should convict or acquit these defendants today
of the robbery which is alleged to have been
committed upon the property of Roman Estriba, it is
perfectly clear that they could be prosecuted tomorrow
for robbery committed upon the property of Juana;
and the plea of former jeopardy would be of no avail.
It is evident that, by reason of the lack of conformity
between the allegation and the proof respecting the
ownership of the property, it is impossible to convict
the two accused of the offense of robbery committed
by them in this case; and therefore they cannot be
convicted of the complex offense of robbery with
homicide, penalized in subsection (1) of article 503 of
the Penal Code. No such difficulty exists, however, with
respect to the quadruple homicide committed upon
the persons named in the complaint; and in conformity
with the provisions of article 87 of the Penal Code, the
penalties corresponding to all these crimes must be
severely imposed. This court has already held in United
States vs. Balaba (37 Phil. Rep., 260), that where more
than one offense (not complex offenses) are charged
in the complaint, and the accused fails to demur or ask
for a severance, the penalties corresponding to all of
the offenses which are charged and proved may be
imposed. The doctrine announced in that case applies
with even greater propriety offenses in one complaint.
(See sec. 11, General Orders No. 58.)

The acts causing the violent death of the four deceased
must be qualified as homicide, as the record does not
satisfactorily show how and in what manner they were
executed.
G.R. NO. 200922 JULY 18, 2012
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE,
VS.
CESAR CONCEPCION Y BULANIO, APPELLANT,
ISSUE:
Whether the crime committed was Theft or Robbery
FACTS:
The crime of robbery with homicide under Article 294
of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) against Cesar
Concepcion y Bulanio (Concepcion).
At around 11:00 o’clock a.m. of May 25, 2004, while
private complainant Jennifer Acampado was at the
corner of Mother Ignacia Street, Quezon City and at
another street which she could not remember and
seemed to be deserted at that time, a male person
riding at the back of the driver of a motorcycle whom
she later identified in open court as accused Cesar
Concepcion, snatched her brown Avon bag with black
strap which at that time, was placed on her left
shoulder. The black motorcycle with white covering at
the back side and with plate number which is not
visible to the eye, came from behind her. As the
motorcycle sped away, the accused even raised and
waved the bag that he snatched from Jennifer who was
unable to do anything but just cry and look at the
snatcher so much so that she recognized him in the
process.
Meanwhile, while prosecution witness Joemar de
Felipe was driving his R & E Taxi, in the same vicinity,
he witnessed the subject snatching incident. As the
accused was waving the bag at Jennifer, he blew his
horn. Ogardo drove faster so that de Felipe gave a
chase and kept on blowing his horn. Eventually,
Ogardo lost control of the motorcycle and it crashed in
front of his taxi, sending its two occupants to the
pavement. De Felipe immediately alighted from the
taxi with the intention to arrest the snatchers. At that
juncture, some policemen from the Kamuning Police
Station 10, EDSA, Kamuning, Quezon City, arrived.
HELD: Theft
Article 293 of the RPC defines robbery as a crime
committed by "any person who, with intent to gain,
shall take any personal property belonging to another,
by means of violence against or intimidation of any
person, or using force upon anything."
Theft, on the other hand, is committed by any person
who, with intent to gain but without violence against
or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall
take the personal property of another without the
latter’s consent.
By definition in the RPC, robbery can be committed in
three ways, by using: (a) violence against any person;
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(b) intimidation of any person; and/or (c) force upon
anything. Robbery by use of force upon things is
provided under Articles 299 to 305 of the RPC.
The prosecution failed to establish that Concepcion
used violence, intimidation or force in snatching
Acampado’s shoulder bag. Acampado herself merely
testified that Concepcion snatched her shoulder bag
which was hanging on her left shoulder. Acampado did
not say that Concepcion used violence, intimidation or
force in snatching her shoulder bag. Given the facts,
Concepcion’s snatching of Acampado’s shoulder bag
constitutes the crime of theft, not robbery.
Concepcion’s crime of theft was aggravated by his use
of a motorcycle in committing the crime.
March 24, 2018 – Article 294 – ROBBERY WITH
VIOLENCE AGAINST OR INTIMIDATION OF
PERSONS – PENALTIES
UNAS, Nor-Aiza R.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. CESAR
CONCEPCION Y BULANIO
G.R. NO. 200922
JULY 18, 2012
ISSUES:
Whether or not the snatching of the shoulder bag in
this case is robbery as contemplated in Article 294 of
the Revised Penal Code.
Whether or not Concepcion employ violence or
intimidation upon persons, or force upon things, as
contemplated under Article 294, when he snatched
Acampado’s shoulder bag.
FACTS:
At around 11:00 o’clock a.m. of May 25, 2004, while
Jennifer Acampado was at the corner of Mother Ignacia
Street, Quezon City and at another street which she
could not remember and seemed to be deserted at
that time, a male person riding at the back of the driver
of a motorcycle whom she later identified in open court
as accused Cesar Concepcion, snatched her brown
Avon bag with black strap which at that time, was
placed on her left shoulder. The black motorcycle with
white covering at the back side and with plate number
which is not visible to the eye, came from behind her.
As the motorcycle sped away, the Concepcion even
raised and waved the bag that he snatched from
Jennifer who was unable to do anything but just cry
and look at the snatcher so much so that she
recognized him in the process.
HELD:
NO. The prosecution failed to establish that
Concepcion used violence, intimidation or force in
snatching Acampado’s shoulder bag. Acampado
herself merely testified that Concepcion snatched her
shoulder bag which was hanging on her left shoulder.
Acampado did not say that Concepcion used violence,
intimidation or force in snatching her shoulder bag.
Given the facts, Concepcion’s snatching of Acampado’s
shoulder bag constitutes the crime of theft, not

robbery. Concepcion’s crime of theft was aggravated
by his use of a motorcycle in committing the crime.
Under Article 14(20) of the RPC, the use of a motor
vehicle as a means of committing a crime is a generic
aggravating circumstance. Thus, the maximum period
of the penalty for the crime of theft shall be imposed
upon Concepcion due to the presence of a generic
aggravating circumstance and the absence of any
mitigating circumstance.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ARMANDO
REGALA
G.R. NO. 130508
APRIL 5, 2000
ISSUE:
Whether or not Regala committed the crime of robbery
with rape as contemplated in Article 294 of the Revised
Penal Code.
FACTS:
On September 11, 1995, at about 9:00 oclock in the
evening at Barangay Bangon, Aroroy, Masbate, then
16-year old victim Nerissa Tagala and her grandmother
(Consuelo Arevalo) were sleeping, when appellant
Armando Regala and his two other companions
entered the formers house. Regala and his companions
entered the house through the kitchen by removing
the pieces of wood under the stove. Regala went to the
room of Nerissa and her grandmother and poked an
8-inch gun on them, one after the other. Nerissa and
her grandmother were hogtied by Regala and his
companions. Thereafter, Nerissa was raped by Regala
in bed while her grandmother was on the floor. After
the rape, Regala and his two companions counted the
money which they took from the "aparador."
HELD:
YES. There was sufficient evidence to establish the
identity of accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the
crime.
Nerissa positively recounted the incident on the
witness stand. She was sleeping with her grandmother
in the latters house when Regala, together with the
unidentified companions entered the house. Regala
pointed a gun, about 8 inches long, at her
grandmother, and then at her, and hogtied both of
them. Regala took off her panty and her shorts, and
removed his own "porontong" pants, and made sexual
intercourse ("itot") with her while she was hogtied in
bed. Her grandmother was at the floor. She saw the
aparador of her grandmother being opened. She could
not shout because the gun was pointed at her, and she
was afraid. Two companions of Regala entered the
room as she was being raped. Two rings and money
was taken by Regala and his companions. After raping
her in bed, Nerissa saw Regala counting the money
taken from the aparador. Thereafter, she was brought
to the kitchen, still hogtied, and raped again. On cross-
examination, Nerissa stated that although there was no
electricity, and the light in the house was already off,
she was able to see the face of Regala because at the
time Regala was counting the money, one of his
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companions was holding the flashlight "beamed to the
money" and there was "some reflection" on the face of
Regala. She remembered the face of Regala because of
an earring on his left ear which he was wearing when
presented at the police line-up.
Consuelo Arevalo testified and corroborated the
testimony of her granddaughter. On cross-
examination, Consuelo Arevalo declared that she was
able to see Regala because he used her flashlight, and
he took off the mask he was wearing; she recognized
Regala because of his earring and his flat top hair cut.
The Court gives its approbation to the finding of the
trial court that the evidence was sufficient to clearly
establish the identity of Armando Regala as the person
who, with two companions, committed the crime of
robbery accompanied by rape on the night of
September 11, 1995. Nerissa Tagala positively
identified Armando Regala because at the time he was
counting the money on her bed, the other companion
of the accused beamed the flashlight towards the
money and there was a reflection on the face of Regala.
Although the three intruders were wearing masks
when they entered the house, they removed their
masks later.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. NORBERTO
VILLAGRACIA, ELMER PAGLINAWAN, ALFONSO
PASTORAL, NELSON LEDESMA, NIXON LEDESMA,
AND WILFREDO GAMPA
G.R. NO. 94311
SEPTEMBER 14, 1993
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused committed robbery with
rape as contemplated in Article 294 of the Revised
Penal Code.
FACTS:
On the 23rd day of September 1987, at Barangay
Pamampangin, Municipality of Lopez, Province of
Quezon, Philippines, the accused, armed with short
firearms of unknown caliber and a fan knife and
forming a band, with intent to gain and with force upon
things, by means of force, intimidation and violence
and taking advantage of nighttime, conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping one
another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously enter the house of spouses Thelma
Villasanta and Cenon Villasanta, and once inside, take,
steal and carry away therefrom the latter’s personal
properties. On the occasion thereof said accused,
conspiring and confederating together and mutually
helping one another, by means of force, threats,
violence and intimidation and with lewd design, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take
turn in having carnal knowledge of said Thelma
Villasanta, against the latter's will.
HELD:
YES. The law uses the phrase "when the robbery shall
have been accompanied by rape" which means that the
offender must have the intent to take the personal

property belonging to another with intent to gain, and
such intent must precede the rape.
In this case, appellants employed violence against and
intimidation of persons when they divested the
Villasanta spouses of cash and other valuables. Three
of the appellants were armed with short firearms and
the other three carried fan knives.
April 3, 2018 – Article 295 – ROBBERY WITH
PHYSICAL INJURIES, COMMITTED IN AN
UNINHABITED PLACE AND BY A BAND, OR WITH
THE USE OF FIREARM ON A STREET, ROAD OR
ALLEY
VILLAHERMOSA, Alexand Rhea M.
PEOPLE vs. APDUHAN JR. ET.AL.
G.R. No. L-19491
August 30, 1968
ISSUE:
Whether or not the penalties under Article 295 is
applicable in this case.
FACTS:
On the 23rd day of May, 1961, at about 7:00 o'clock in
the evening, in the Municipality of Mabini, Bohol, the
accused and five (5) other persons,all of them armed
with different unlicensed firearms, daggers, and other
deadly weapons by means of violence, the dwelling
house of the spouses Honorato Miano and Antonia
Miano, which was also the dwelling house of their
children, the spouses Geronimo Miano and
Herminigilda de Miano. Once inside the said dwelling
house, the above-named accused with their five (5)
other companions, did attack, hack and shoot
Geronimo Miano and another person by the name of
Norberto Aton, who happened to be also in the said
dwelling house, thereby inflicting upon the said two (2)
persons physical injuries which caused their death; they
took and carried away from said dwelling house cash
money amounting to Three Hundred Twenty-two
Pesos (P322.00). Act committed was contrary to the
provisions of Art. 294, par. 1, of the Revised Penal Code
with the special aggravating circumstance that the
crime was committed by a band with the use of
unlicensed firearms (Art. 296, Rev. Penal Code), and
other aggravating circumstances – committed in the
dwelling, at nighttime and with abuse of superior
strength.
RULING:
The disposition of the question at hand necessitates a
discussion of the interrelation among articles 294, 295
and 296 of the Revised Penal Code. As previously
stated, art. 295 provides that if any of the classes of
robbery described in subdivisions 3, 4, and 5 of art. 294
is committed by a band, the offender shall be punished
by the maximum period of the proper penalty.
Correspondingly, the immediately following provisions
of art. 296 define the term "band", prescribe the
collective liability of the members of the band, and
state that "when any of the arms used in the
commission of the offense be in unlicensed firearm, the
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penalty to be imposed upon all the malefactors shall
be the maximum of the corresponding penalty
provided by law." Viewed from the contextual relation
of articles 295 and 296, the word "offense" mentioned
in the above-quoted portion of the latter article
logically means the crime of robbery committed by a
band, as the phrase "all the malefactors" indubitably
refers to the members of the band and the phrase "the
corresponding penalty provided by law" relates to the
offenses of robbery described in the last three
subdivisions of art. 294 which are all encompassed
within the ambit of art. 295. Evidently, therefore, art.
296 in its entirety is designed to amplify and modify
the provision on robbery in band which is nowhere to
be found but in art. 295 in relation to subdivisions 3, 4,
and 5 of art. 294. Verily, in order that the aforesaid
special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed
firearm may be appreciated to justify the imposition of
the maximum period of the proper penalty it is a
condition sine qua non that the offense charged be
robbery committed by a band within the
contemplation of art. 295. To reiterate, since art. 295,
does not apply to subdivision 1 and 2 of art. 294, then
the special aggravating factor in question, which is
solely applicable to robbery in band under art. 295,
cannot be considered in fixing the penalty imposable
for robbery with homicide under art. 294(1), even if the
said crime was committed by a band with the use of
unlicensed firearms.
March 26, 2018 – Article 296 – DEFINITION OF A
BAND AND PENALTY INCURRED BY THE MEMBERS
THEREOF
VILLARIN, Paulo Jose S.
PEOPLE VS PANCHO PELAGIO ET AL.
G.R. No. L-16177 May 24 1967
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused are liable under Article 296
of the Revised Penal Code.
FACTS:
Pancho Pelagio came to visit the spouses Jose Guico
and Evelyn Villanueva asking to borrow money for the
hospital expenses for his wife who has just delivered a
child. Upon hearing the conversation between Pelagio
and Guico Armando Manalang took advantage of the
situation informed Pelagio of a robbery he was
planning with some other friends who were later
revealed as Jose Guico, Oscar Caymo and Arcadio
Balmeo.
Pancho Pelagio, Oscar Caymo, Armando Manalang and
Arcadio Balmeo set out for the execution of their plan.
They all walked together towards Aling Nena's
residence although before reaching the place, Caymo
ordered Manalang to hail and hold a taxi which the
latter did. Then, too, only Balmeo and Caymo actually
entered the victim's premises because, as was earlier
agreed upon, Pancho Pelagio acted as the lookout for
the two and he simply posted himself by the gate of
the said house.
Caymo and Balmeo gained entrance to the house

through its back kitchen door which they found to be
open. Once inside, Caymo drew his gun and sought out
its occupants. Only an old woman, Mrs. Severina de
Gloria, however, was in at the time. Caymo then
pointed the gun at the old lady and intimidated her
into producing all the money and jewelry she could. All
in all, the pair got about P437 in cash, three pieces of
jewelry worth about P205.00 and a watch worth about
P300.00. After they had taken the above items, Caymo
ordered Mrs. de Gloria to lie face downward, covered
her with a blanket, and cautioned her against moving
or otherwise sounding out an alarm. The two then went
down the house and out into the street. At the gate,
however, they failed to find Pancho Pelagio.
From G. Villanueva Street where the victim's house was
located, Caymo and Balmeo walked till they got to the
corner of F. Fernando street where they found
Armando Manalang waiting for them in a taxi. Caymo
and Balmeo then rode on it.
As the taxi was about to leave, however, a jeep from
the opposite direction blocked its way and as the two
vehicles were thus stopped, a man alighted from the
jeep and started to walk towards the taxi. When the
stranger was very near the taxi already, Manalang
instructed Caymo to shoot at the man as the latter was
a police officer. Whereupon, Caymo leveled several
shots at the latter, about six in all; and the man, who
was later identified as Patrolman Francisco Trinidad of
the Pasay Police Department, fell dead.
From the scene of the shooting, Manalang, Caymo and
Balmeo went direct to a house in Buendia Street owned
by Manalang's sister where they changed clothes and
hid the death weapon and the money and jewelry they
had robbed. Shortly thereafter, Caymo and Balmeo
proceeded to a house in Blumentritt where they met
Pancho Pelagio whom they called to account for his
absence at the gate during the robbery. The latter
explained that he had to scamper away before Caymo
and Balmeo had gone down because he, Pelagio, saw
someone slip out of the house apparently to summon
the police.
RULING: NO.
When Arcadio Balmeo and Oscar Caymo hurried out of
the victim's house after the robbery, Pancho Pelagio
had evidently fled from his lookout post because the
pair, Balmeo and Caymo, failed to locate him at the
gate where he was supposed to have stationed himself.
To be sure, the said decision itself renders the account
that it was only Balmeo and Caymo who walked
together from the said house to the corner of
Villanueva and F. Fernando Streets where then they
saw Armando Manalang waiting for them in a taxi and
that it was only when these three had taken to the said
taxi, and the cab was about to leave, that the shooting
of Pat. Trinidad happened. When the homicide was
committed, therefore, Pancho Pelagio could not have
had the least intervention or participation as might
justify penalizing him likewise for the said killing. So far
as the records disclose, the conspirators were agreed
only on the commission of robbery; there is no
evidence that homicide besides was determined by
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them when they plotted the crime. All these warrant
the exclusion of Pancho Pelagio from any responsibility
for the said killing. (People vs. Basisten, et al., 47 Phil.
493) Considering that those who actually participated
in the robbery were only three, Pancho Pelagio
included, and only one of them was armed, the same
evidently was not "in band." (Art. 296, Revise Penal
Code) This being the case, then it would indeed be
irregular or questionable to hold Pancho Pelagio
similarly responsible as Caymo and Balmeo for the
killing of Pat. Trinidad. Under the code, it is only when
the robbery is in band that all those present in the
commission of the robbery may be punished, for any
of the assaults which its members might commit. Thus,
in People v. Pascual, G.R. No. L-4801, June 30, 1953
(unreported), we held that where three persons
committed robbery and two of them committed rape
upstairs on its occasion, while the third guarded the
owner of the house downstairs, only the two who
committed the assault should be punished for robbery
with rape while the third was liable for robbery only.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS ALFONSO
HAMIANA ET AL.
G.R. NO. L-3491-93 MAY 30 1951
MAY 30, 1951
ISSUE:
Whether or not the other members of the band are
also guilty of robbery with rape.
FACTS:
About ten o’clock in the evening of April 9, 1947, Rosita
Colantro, residing at the crossing of Atipuluan, Bago,
Negros Occidental, heard one of the appellants call for
"uncle, uncle." Rosita Colantro did not make any reply,
whereupon the appellants hammered at the walls of
her house which caused Rosita Colantro to ask what
they wanted. The appellants ordered her to light her
lamp and not to move. Rosita Colantro saw rifles aimed
at her, her house being low. The appellants asked
palay, and Rosita Colantro answered that she had a few
seedlings. Rosita Colantro was then ordered to go
down. With lamp in one hand and her small child in the
other, Rosita Colantro met Alfonso Hamiana (her
neighbor) with a bolo, Emiliano de la Cruz and Ceferino
de la Cruz, armed with rifles, and Silvino Jabin, armed
with a bolo. Undaunted by the presence of appellants,
she attempted to flee but was caught in the arm by
Anastacio Blancada. The latter ordered Rosita Colantro,
at the point of his gun, to put her child down. She was
taken by Anastacio Blancada to a place away from the
house and, throwing her down, Anastacio Blancada,
also at the point of his gun, raped her. After Anastacio
Blancada had raped Rosita Colantro, the latter
proceeded to the house of Federico Nava wherein she
stayed during the night. Accompanied by Federico
Nava, Rosita Colantro returned to her house the next
morning where she found that the appellants carried
away her palay worth P35.
RULING: NO.
The evidence shows that appellant Anastacio Blancada
caught Rosita Colantro while the latter was trying to

get away and that the rape was committed in a place
away from her house, in which the robbery was
committed. There is no positive proof in the record that
the other appellants were aware of, much less abated,
the criminal act committed by appellant Anastacio
Blancada against the person of Rosita Colantro.
Therefore, only Anastacio Blancada is guilty of robbery
with rape while the other members of the band are
only liable for simple robbery by a band.
March 25, 2018 – Article 297 – ATTEMPTED AND
FRUSTRATED ROBBERY COMMITTED UNDER
CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES
VOSOTROS, Jules Andre B.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
VS
JOSEPH BARRA
G.R. NO. 198020 JULY 10, 2013
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused is guilty of attempted
robbery with homicide
FACTS:
That on or about 11:00 P.M. of October 9, 2003, the
accused, while armed with a firearm, after gaining
entrance into the residence of his victim, with intent to
gain, by means of force and intimidation, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take and steal
money from Elmer Lagdaan y Azur; that on the
occasion of the said robbery and for the purpose of
enabling him to take and steal the money, the herein
accused, with intent to kill, did then and there
feloniously shoot said Elmer Lagdaan, thereby inflicting
upon him gunshot wound which caused his death, to
the prejudice of his heirs.
Dr. Villanueva testified that the victim sustained a
gunshot wound due to the circular and inverted edges
of the point of entry. She concluded that since there
was no point of exit, the victim was shot at close range.
Ricardo de la Peña testified that he knew appellant for
a long time. He stated that he was on his way home to
the neighboring barangay, when, at around 9:00 p.m.
on October 9, 2003, in the light of a bright moon, he
saw appellant enter the house of Lagdaan, which was
lit with a lamp, and poked a gun to the victim’s right
forehead and demanded money. De la Peña hid behind
a tree ten meters away. When the victim stated that the
money was not in his possession, appellant shot him.
He went home and reported the incident the following
morning.
Ely Asor testified that on the night of October 9, 2003,
he was on his way to the victim’s house to collect his
daily wage when he saw appellant in the yard of the
victim’s house. He inquired from appellant if the victim
was around. Appellant responded that the victim was
not around. Asor went home. It was while Asor was in
his house that he heard a gunshot. It was the following
morning that he learned that the victim died. Asor then
proceeded to report the incident.
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In his defense, appellant denied the charges against
him. Appellant claimed that he was in Batangas City,
with his brother Benjamin, visiting his sister when he
was arrested and brought to Camarines Sur and
charged with the crime of "robbery with murder."
The RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide.
The Court of Appeals only found appellant guilty of
attempted robbery with homicide.
HELD:
Yes. The accused is guilty of attempted robbery with
homicide
In People v. Quemeggen, this Court gave the requisites
to be proven by the prosecution for appellant to be
convicted of robbery with homicide, to wit:
1. The taking of personal property is committed with
violence or intimidation against persons;
2. The property taken belongs to another;
3. The taking is animo lucrandi; and
4. By reason of the robbery or on the occasion thereof,
homicide is committed.
In the case before us, appellant’s intention was to
extort money from the victim. By reason of the victim’s
refusal to give up his personal property - his money -
to appellant, the victim was shot in the head, causing
his death.
We, however, agree with the Court of Appeals that the
element of taking was not complete, making the crime
one of attempted robbery with homicide as opposed
to the crime appellant was convicted in the RTC.
Appellant is, therefore, liable under Article 297 of the
Revised Penal Code, not under Article 294 as originally
held by the RTC.
Article 297 of the Revised Penal Code states:
Article 297. Attempted and frustrated robbery
committed under certain circumstances. — When by
reason or on occasion of an attempted or frustrated
robbery a homicide is committed, the person guilty of
such offenses shall be punished by reclusion temporal
in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua, unless
the homicide committed shall deserve a higher penalty
under the provisions of this Code.
The elements to be convicted under Article 297 were
discussed in People v. Macabales, to wit:
The elements of Robbery with Homicide as defined in
Art. 297 of the Revised Penal Code are:
(1)There is an attempted or frustrated robbery.
(2)A homicide is committed.
In the present case, the crime of robbery remained
unconsummated because the victim refused to give his
money to appellant and no personal property was
shown to have been taken. It was for this reason that

the victim was shot. Appellant can only be found guilty
of attempted robbery with homicide, thus punishable
under Article 297 of the Revised Penal Code. Since the
RTC and the Court of Appeals found appellant's crime
to be aggravated by disregard of dwelling, the Court
of Appeals correctly imposed the maximum penalty of
reclusion perpetua.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
vs.
FRANCISCO HAMTIG, ET AL.,
FRANCISCO HAMTIG, EUTIQUIO HAMTIG and
MARIANO alias ALEJANDRO OSORIO,
G.R. No. L-27431 August 22, 1969
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused committed Robbery with
frustrated homicide
FACTS:
Hilaria Vda. de Hondolero, a widow, lived with her son,
Mastito, in Barrio Manloy, Carigara, Leyte. Sometime
after 8 o'clock in the evening of June 14, 1966 they
went to sleep: Hilaria and her grandson Antonio
Dandan — who decided to stay with them that evening
— occupying the only room of the house, while
Mastito lay down on a table found in the "sala" where
they had a vigil lamp.
At about three o'clock the following morning, they
were suddenly awakened by noise coming from the
kitchen. Mastito sat down on the table, took hold of his
flashlight and focused its light towards the door
leading to the kitchen from which emerged four armed
persons whom he recognized as his brother-in-law,
Francisco Hamtig, Eutiquio Hamtig, Mariano Osorio
and Francisco Gaston. As the four intruders were
advancing towards him, his mother came out of the
room where she had been sleeping and upon seeing
Francisco Hamtig she exclaimed: "It is you Kikoy."
Thereupon Francisco, who was Hilaria's son-in-law,
fired at her with a rifle hitting her in the abdominal
region. Mastito immediately went to the aid of his
mother and pulled her inside the room where the four
armed persons followed them. As they continued firing
they hit Hilaria again on the right and left arms. Mastito
then decided to counter attack, and arming himself
with a bolo he found in the room, he hacked the hand
of Francisco Gaston with it, forcing the latter to go back
to the sala. The other intruders, however, continued
firing and hit Mastito on the right forearm. During all
this time, Antonio Dandan was in hiding among the
buri bags of rice in the room. On the other hand, in
spite of their wounds, Hilaria and Mastito succeeded in
escaping through the window, and went towards the
house of Gonzalo Dandan — Antonio's father and son-
in-law of Hilaria — located around thirty meters away.
As Gonzalo Dandan was also awakened by successive
gunshots coming from the direction of the house of his
mother-in-law, he went down his house with a
flashlight. Nearby he met his mother-in-law and
Mastito — both wounded — and helped them go
upstairs. Thereafter, he went down again to look for his
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son. Near the house of his mother-in-law he focused
his flashlight towards it and was thereby able to
recognize Francisco and Eutiquio Hamtig, Mariano,
alias Alejandro Osorio and Francisco Gaston who were
then going down the house.
As stated heretofore, Antonio Dandan hid himself
behind several buri bags of rice found in the room
where he and his grandmother had slept. From that
place he later saw the four intruders drag a trunk into
the middle of the room where they forced it open and
from which Francisco Hamtig got a bag full of money
while the rest stood by, and afterwards they went
downstairs together. Antonio then jumped out of the
window and ran to his house.
Hilaria and her son were brought to the Rural Health
Officer of Capoocan, Leyte, upon whose advice they
were taken to the Leyte Provincial Hospital in Tacloban
City where the Senior Resident Physician operated
upon Hilaria. The latter, however, died on June 24, 1966
as a result of Generalized Peritonitis due to her
wounds, and secondary infection, while Mastito was
able to return home the next day.
HELD:
Yes. The accused were guilty of the crime charged.
It was found by the court that the above-named
accused, conspiring together and mutually helping one
another and all armed with guns and pointed bolos
with intent of gain and by means of violence against
and intimidation upon persons, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter the house of
one HILARIA VDA. DE HONDOLERO and MASTITO
HONDOLERO and once inside rob, steal, take and carry
away against their will and content the amount of
P1,400.00 Philippine Currency to their damage and
prejudice in the said mentioned sum and that by
reason and on the occasion of the said robbery the
above-mentioned accused in conspiracy did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot Hilaria
Vda. de Hondolero and Mastito Hondolero with the
weapons which the accused have provided themselves
for the purpose.
Thus the accused performed all the acts of execution
which would have produced the crime of Homicide as
a consequence thereof with respect to said Mastito
Hondolero but nevertheless did not produce it by
reason or causes independent of the will of the
accused, that is, the timely and able medical assistance
rendered to said Mastito Hondolero which prevented
his death.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
vs.
ADRIANO DAGUNDONG, FEDERICO BULAON,
MELCHOR LAO and RICARDO SERRANO,
ADRIANO DAGUNDONG, FEDERICO BULAON and
RICARDO SERRANO,
G.R. No. L-10398 June 30, 1960
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused were guilty of violating

Article 297 on Attempted and frustrated robbery
committed under certain circumstances.
FACTS:
On October 7, 1950, Alice Lake, more popularly known
as movie actress Anita Linda, lived at No. 13 Pasong
Tamo, Makati, Rizal, together with her son, her sister
Mrs. Mamey Lake Hewell, and the latter's children,
Josephine, Patricia, Johnny and Helen. At about 7 p.m.
of said date, Alice, who was then in her bedroom,
requested her niece Josephine, then 12 years old, to
get her a glass of milk from the kitchen. As Josephine
entered the kitchen, she suddenly came face to face
with a man holding a gun. This gunman was small in
stature, fairly built and was wearing a checkered shirt
with long sleeves, dark colored pants, gloves and army
shoes. On his head had a balangot hat, and over his
face a black mask with two holes for the eyes.
Instinctively, Josephine screamed. The gunman told
her to keep silent and to return to sala. With the gun
held against her back, the gunman followed her into
the sala, where they found Patricia. The gunman
motioned Patricia to come nearer to Josephine.
At this time, Alice and her sister, Mrs. Hewell, startled
by Josephine's scream, rushed out of the their
respective bedrooms. When they reached the sala they
came upon Josephine and Patricia, and the gunman
who had his gun stuck at Josephine's back. As Mrs.
Hewell knelt before the gunman and pleaded for her
daughters, saying: "Maawa po kayo, huwag po",
Patricia and Josephine ran to their aunt Alice. Without
compunction, the gunman levelled his gun straight at
Mrs. Hewell's face.
Meanwhile, Alice, together with her nieces, had fled
into her bedroom. Shortly thereafter, several shots, not
less than five, were heard coming from the sala. Alice
and the children screamed. Alice wanted to go out to
help her sister, but the two girls prevented her by
locking the bedroom door. A moment later, they heard
someone knock on and then kick the door to Alice's
bedroom. Then complete silence. After some minutes,
Alice heard the noise of a jeep moving away and going
towards Sta. Ana. Feeling certain that the malefactors
had left for good, Alice shouted for help. Her outcries
were heard by the driver of a passing taxicab, who lost
no time in bringing the Makati police to the scene.
Upon entering the sala, the police came upon Mrs.
Hewell's bullet—ridden body lying on the floor. In the
course of their investigation, the policemen come
across three .45 caliber empty shells about a meter
from where Mrs. Hewell lay, and four other empty
shells outside the premises. They also discovered five
slugs, three of which were extracted from the wall
leading to Alice's bedroom, and about two meters
from Mrs. Hewell's feet, and the remaining two from
the wooden cabinet which stood between the doors
leading to the sala and the kitchen. On entering Mrs.
Hewell's bedroom, the police found that it had been
ransacked. After the removal of Mrs. Hewell's corpse,
Alice went into her sister's bedroom and found it in the
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same condition as the policemen had found it, but she
did not notice anything missing therefrom.
The prosecution established by means of the testimony
of Joseph Ebrada, one of the original accused but who
was discharged in order to be a prosecution witness,
that: On October 5, 1950, Melchor Lao went to see
Ebrada in his place in Cavite, in order to borrow the
jeep which Ebrada had in turn borrowed from a certain
Terio Manimbao of Malagasang, Imus, Cavite. The jeep
bore a PI plate number. At Lao's invitation, Ebrada went
with him. They were then joined by appellants
Dagundong and Serrano in going to the New Bilibid
Prisons in Muntinglupa, Rizal. There, Lao and
appellants Serrano and Dagundong visited Pablo
Rabaton, an inmate. After thirty minutes they left and
proceeded to Makati, Rizal. Along the way, appellant
Dagundong stated that they must raise money with
which to bail out Rabaton, and if necessary to commit
robbery in order to do so. Ebrada, Lao and appellant
Serrano agreed to this proposal.
HELD:
Yes. The accused are guilty of the crime charged.
The court ruled that appellants Bulaon and Serrano are
guilty of the crime of frustrated robbery with homicide,
under Article 297, Revised Penal Code, in relation with
Article 296, Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 12 inasmuch as it has been proven
beyond reasonable doubt that they actually took part
in the commission thereof, appellant Serrano by
standing guard outside the victim's house while
appellant Dagundong inside the house and helped him
ransack the victim's room.
The Court believes, however, that the lower court erred
in finding appellant Dagundong guilty of murder. It
was established that it was he who had fired the fatal
shots at Mrs. Hewell. But though that slaying was
attended by treachery, his crime was not murder. The
term "homicide" in paragraph 1, Article 294, Revised
Penal Code, is used in its generic sense and the offense
defined therein comprehends not only robbery with
homicide in its limited sense, but also robbery with
murder. So, an offense is not taken out of the purview
of this article merely because the homicide "rises to the
atrocity of murder" (People vs. Manuel, et al., 44 Phil.,
333). And the same definition must be given to the
term as it is used in Article 297, Revised Penal Code,
which penalizes frustrated robbery with homicide.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
vs.
SILVERIO MORADOS, ET AL.,
G.R. No. L-46973 November 19, 1940
ISSUE:
Whether or not Benjamin Mendoza is guilty only of
attempted theft and not under Article 297 of the RPC
FACTS:
On the night of March 15, 1939, while Ceferino
Ricasata, Rufino Aro and Lucio Enriquez were sleeping
in the latter's hut in the sitio of Pasong Tabla, barrio of
Bagbag, municipality of Rosario, Province of Cavite, a

place where they had been treshing palay, several
malefactors suddenly assaulted them. Ricasata who
was awakened by the blows being inflicted upon his
companions, tried to flee from the hut, but his dash for
salvage was frustrated when hardly had he gone out
the hut one of the ruffians shot him hitting him in the
right thigh as a result of which he fell at a certain
distance from the hut. His companions were beaten to
unconsciousness.
The evidence shows that through an agreement made
between them, Felipe Moral who had a paltik (a
homemade gun) and a flashlight, together with Silverio
Morados, were to go to the hut to watch the inmate,
while Benjamin Mendoza - who had also a paltik - and
Florentino de los Reyes were to take away the
carabaos.
They all did their part of agreement: Morados and
Moral effected their entrance into the hut, inflicting
injuries upon Aro and killing Enriquez. While De los
Reyes and Mendoza were untying the carabaos, the
firmer heard the scream: "Naku agawin and buhay ko!"
(Oh! save my life!), which interrupted by a pistol shot.
Fearing that the might summon help, the malefactors
escape without taking the carabaos, although one of
them had already been untitled. The motive for killing
was robbery of the carabaos which were tied near the
hut, three of which belonged to the deceased (Lucio
Enriquez), and the fourth, to one Turi.
It is argued that Benjamin Mendoza did not enter the
hut and did not take part in the assault, and he should
only have been found guilty of attempted theft of large
cattle.
HELD:
No. This contention is without merit.
In U.S. vs. Landasan et al. (35 Phil., 359, 369), we
observed that "neither the divisibility of this crime
(robbery with homicide) into two crimes, nor the
divisibility of the liability of the criminals who took part
is allowable."
And in U.S. vs. Macalalad, 9 Phil., 1, and People vs.
Bautista 49 Phil., 389, 396, we held that "whenever a
homicide has been committed as a consequence or on
the occasion of a robbery, all those who took part as
principals in the commission of the robbery will also be
held guilty as principals in the complex crime of
robbery with homicide, although they did not actually
take part in the homicide, unless it clearly appeared
that they endeavored to prevent the homicide." It has
not been shown that Mendoza endeavored to prevent
the homicide.
The Solicitor-General recommends the imposition of
the death penalty in view ;of the fact that the killing of
Lucio Enriquez was qualified by treachery and attended
by the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity and
dwelling. For lack of humanity, however, the judgment
appealed from is affirmed in all respects, with costs.
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Article 297 of the Revised Penal code provides that
"When by reason or on occasion of an attempted or
frustrated robbery a homicide is committed the person
guilty is such offenses shall be punished by reclusion
temporal in its maximum period of reclusion perpetua,
unless the homicide committed shall deserve a higher
penalty under the provisions of this Code."
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
vs.
EUGENIO OLAES,
G.R. No. L-11166 April 17, 1959
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused committed the crime
charged in Article 297 of the RPC
FACTS:
Between 4:00 and 4:30 a. m. of November 9, 1954, Bus
No. 64 of the Laguna Transportation Company, driven
by one Feliciano Limosnero, with one conductor, left
the town plaza of Binan Laguna, bound for Manila.
Among the passengers were Mariano Inobio, a
resident of Bo. Almanza, Las Pinas, Rizal, Maria Argame
and Elena Loyola. When the bus reached the curve in
Bo. Almanza, Las Pinas, a man later identified by
passenger Inobio as Cosme Isip, holding a rifle or
carbine, suddenly appeared on the right side of the
road and signalled the bus to stop. Limosnero, taking
him for a prospective passenger, applied his brakes
and slowed down, but before the vehicle could come
to a complete stop, seven other men, also carrying
guns, such as, garands or carbines, emerged from the
left side of the road. Isip shouted, "Para, pasok!" The
appearance of these armed men on both sides of the
road must have affected the equanimity of Limosnero
on the wheel, and he must have forgotten to press the
clutch with his foot, resulting in the engine stalling or
stopping. Probably convinced that the eight men were
not passengers but were bent on holding-up the bus
and robbing the passengers, Limosnero started the
engine and sped away from the place despite the
shouts of the men on both sides of the road for him to
stop. Those men immediately commenced firing at the
bus which was riddled with bullets.
One of the shots grazed the head of Limosnero.
Another shot hit the passenger Maria Argame on the
back, the slug penetrating the abdominal wall and
entering the abdominal cavity. Still another shot struck
passenger Elena Loyola on the shoulder, fracturing her
right clavicle. When the bus was out of range of the
guns of the eight men on the road and they had ceased
firing, passenger Inobio on rising from his prone
position in the bus, saw driver Limosnero's wound on
the head, which was bleeding profusely, the blood
dimming his vision, and so he took over the wheel. On
reaching Zapote, an inspector of the Laguna
Transportation Company took over the wheel from
Inobio and drove the bus straight to the Las Pinas
Municipal Building where the incident and shooting
was reported to the police. Thereafter, the same bus,
with a police officer, drove straight to Manila and to
the Philippine General Hospital. Maria Argame was

pronounced dead on arrival. The fracture of the right
clavicle of Elena Loyola necessitated an operation,
which was performed, and she was confined in the
hospital for about twenty days, after which she was
discharged, though she was not completely recovered,
to continue treatment at home. The expert testimony
on her condition is that if she had not been given
prompt medical attention, she would have died from
her wound. Driver Limosnero was treated at the same
hospital for his head would and was released, but
treatment was continued by the bus company for
about a month.
HELD:
Yes. The accused is guilty of the committing the crime
provided for in Article 297 of the RPC.
After a careful study of the case, the court fully agrees
with the trial court that defendant Eugenio Olaes is
guilty. However, it will be remembered that the charge
against him was for attempted robbery with homicide
and frustrated homicide. Under this charge, as the
Solicitor General well said, he may not convicted of
consummated robbery with homicide as the trial court
did. Moreover, we agree with the prosecution that
inasmuch as no overt acts pointing to robbery or even
an attempt thereof have been established, the killing
of one passenger and the wounding of two others
should be considered as plain murder, frustrated
murder, and physical injuries respectively.
The trial court found that the aggravating
circumstances of nocturnity and in band, there being
more than three armed men in the group of
malefactors, attended the commission of the crimes.
The aggravating circumstance of in band may be
considered to qualify the act of killing of Maria as
murder, and the wounding of Elena as frustrated
murder. The evidence for the defense was to the effect
that appellant surrendered to the authorities when he
found out that he was wanted by the constabulary. This
was not refuted by the prosecution and so, it can be
regarded as a fact. This mitigating circumstance will
compensate the other aggravating circumstance of
nocturnity. The penalty for murder which is reclusion
temporal in its maximum degree to death, should
therefore be imposed in its medium period, namely
reclusion perpetua, so that in the result, we agree with
the trial court as to the penalty imposed by it.
March 25, 2018 – Article 298 – EXECUTION OF DEEDS
BY MEANS OF VIOLENCE OR INTIMIDATION
ALAMEDA Jr , Manuel F.
G.R. NO. L-28547
FEBRUARY 22, 1974
PEOPLE V. JARANILLA
FACTS:
Heman Gorriceta had just come from Ford San Pedro
in Iloilo City and was driving a Ford pickup truck
belonging to his sister.
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In front of the Elizalde Building on J.M. Basa Street, he
saw defendants Ricardo Suyo, Elias Jaranilla and Franco
Brillantes. They asked Gorriceta to bring them to
Mandurriao, a district in the city, as Jaranilla told
Gorriceta that he had to get something from his uncle’s
place. Gorriceta initially demurred but the appellants
eventually prevailed. Upon reaching Mandurriao, they
parked the pickup truck at a distance 50 – 70 meters
away from the provincial hospital and Gorriceta was
instructed to wait for the defendants as they alighted.
After twenty minutes, the three accused arrived
carrying two roosters each. They ran to the truck and
instructed Gorriceta to drive immediately as they were
being chased. Gorriceta then drove the truck to Jaro,
another city district. The four of them were on the front
seat of the truck. Gorriceta, as the driver, was on the
extreme left and to his right was Suyo. Next to Suyo
was Brillantes and on the extreme right was Jaranilla. In
the middle of the road, they were intercepted by
Policemen Ramonito Jabatan and Benjamin Castro.
Gorriceta stopped the truck near the policemn after
Jabatan fired a warning shot. Jabatan went to the right
side of the truck near Jaranilla and ordered all of them
to step out which they did not heed. Brillantes pulled
his revolver but did not fire it while Suyo did nothing.
Jaranilla, all of a sudden, shot Patrolman Jabatan. The
shooting frightened Gorriceta who immediately
started the truck and drove straight home while
Jaranilla kept on firing towards Jabatan. Jaranilla, Suyo
and Brillantes alighted in front of Gorriceta’s house
where the latter was instructed not to tell anybody
about the inicident. Gorriceta went to his room and
after a while, he heard policemen calling his name
asking him to come down. He initially hid in the ceiling
of his house and it wasn’t until 8am the following day
that he decided to come down and was brought to
police headquarters.
ISSUE:.
Whether or not defendants Suyo and Brillantes are
liable as co principal in the crime of Homicide.
Was there violence and intimidation in the taking of
roosters?
HELD:
The killing of the peace officer is characterized as
homicide because the act was made during the spur of
the moment and the treacherous mode of attack was
not consciously or deliberately adopted by the
offender. In addition, only persons who perpetrated
the killing is responsible for such action. Furthermore,
mere presence in the crime scene does not necessarily
make a person co-principal thereof. Hence, only the
accused, Elias Jaranilla, who perpetrated the killing is
responsible and liable for robbery and homicide. The
co-accused, Suyo and Brillantes, are convicted of
theft.Therefore, the decision of the lower court is
reversed and sentenced the accused, Ricardo Suyo and
Franco Brillantes, as co-principals in the crime of theft.
The crime was theft and not robbery.There was no
evidence that violence or intimidation was employed
in the taking of the roosters hence, Art. 298 of the RPC
(Robbery with violence against or intimidation) could
not be invoked. It also could not fall under Art. 299

(which penalizes robbery in an inhabited house, public
building or edifice devoted to worship) as the chicken
coop was outside Baylon’s house. Nor was it a
dependency thereof as contemplated under Art. 301.
March 27, 2018 – Article 299 – ROBBERY IN AN
INHABITED HOUSE OR PUBLIC BUILDING OR
EDIFICE DEVOTED TO WORSHIP
ALILIAN, Enna B.
G.R. No. L-2725
February 27, 1950
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
ESTEBAN SEBASTIAN Y PANGILINAN (alias
ERNING) and MAURO PANGILINAN Y SALTA,
MAURO PANGILINAN Y SALTA (appellant)
FACTS:
The appellant allegedly entered the house no. 179
Simon street, City of Manila, and by means of threat
and intimidation took, stole, and carried away cash
money, and other personal things of the inhabitants.
The appellant pleaded guilty and was convicted by the
lower court of robbery under article 299 of the RPC.
ISSUE:
WoN the lower court correctly convicted the appellant
for robbery under Art 299 RPC
HELD:
No. The fact that the information to which appellant
pleaded guilty does not allege that the robbery was
committed under any of the circumstances
enumerated in said article, such as entering the house
through an opening not intended for entrance or
egress, the breaking of doors, etc., it is now settled that
were robbery, though committed in an inhabited
house, is characterized by intimidation, this factor
"supplies the controlling qualification", so that the law
to apply is article 294 and not article 299 of the Revised
Penal Code. This is on the theory that "robbery which
is characterized by violence or intimidation against the
person is evidently graver than ordinary robbery
committed by force upon things, because where
violence and intimidation against the person is present
there is a greater disturbance of the order of society
and the security of the individual."
G.R. No. 181138
December 3, 2012
RICKY "TOTSIE" MARQUEZ, ROY BERNARDO, and
JOMER MAGALONG vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
The appellant was found guilty of robbery under Art
299 RPC for destroying the door lock of the stall of one
SONIA VALDEROSA and passing/entering thru the
same, once inside, took, robbed and carried away the
items inside the store.
ISSUE:
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WoN the Trial Court and CA correctly convicted the
appellants for robbery under Art 299 RPC
HELD:
No. The records show that the store alleged to have
been robbed by petitioners is not an inhabited house,
public building or building dedicated to religious
worship and their dependencies under Article 299 and
as defined under Article 301. From Valderosa’s
testimony, it can be deduced that the establishment
allegedly robbed was a store not used as a dwelling. In
fact, after the robbery took place, there was a need to
inform Valderosa of the same as she was obviously not
residing in the store.58 "If the store was not actually
occupied at the time of the robbery and was not used
as a dwelling, since the owner lived in a separate house,
the robbery committed therein is punished under
Article 302, not 299.
March 26, 2018 – Article 300 – ROBBERY IN AN
UNINHABITED PLACE AND BY A BAND
ARANCES, Javy Ann G.
THE UNITED STATES VS JUAN MORADA, ET AL.
G.R. NO. L-8183, NOVEMBER 19, 1912
PONENTE: JUSTICE ARELLANO
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondents should be charged of
Robbery in an uninhabited place and by a band.
FACTS:
On December 24, 1911, Juan Morada entered the shop
to get, as he did, coin amounting to P20 and various
articles such as cans of salmon and sardines, rice,
penknives, a razor and comb, all together worth P31.80
and not recovered, excepting some worth P1.17. The
owner of the shop, the Chinese Iyong, awoke and
caught up a stick, but as he did, so some things fell and
made a noise, so Morada fled. The next day a penknife,
a can of sardines, and another of salmon were found in
the possession of Librado Sugcay, who voluntarily
confessed to the municipal police sergeant of
Mambajao, the scene of the occurrence, and through
him, the other defendants were soon discovered.
Evidence of alibi having been rejected and proof of
conviction being well established, the Court of First
Instance of Misamis classified the crime as simple
robbery, but found against all the defendants the
generic aggravating circumstances of nocturnity and a
gang, and a moreover against Juan Morada, Isidro
Babano, and Librado Sugcay that of previous
conviction, and against Gil Revilla that of vagrancy.
Isidro Babano and Gil Revilla appealed from this
judgment, while Morada and Sugcay submitted to it.
Later, Babano withdrew his appeal to this court.
HELD:
Under the Penal Code of the Philippines, robbery with
force upon things, in order to be qualified, must be
committed in an uninhabited place and in a gang.

It did not think applicable to article 300, because,
according to its interpretation, the robbery is qualified
when it is committed in an uninhabited place and in a
gang, these two qualifications concurring, which does
not happen in the present case, for it does not appear
that the house wherein the robbery was perpetrated
was located in an uninhabited place.
March 26, 2018 – Article 301 – WHAT IS AN
INHABITED HOUSE, PUBLIC BUILDING OR
BUILDING DEDICATED TO RELIGIOUS WORSHIP
AND THEIR DEPENDENCIES
BANUELOS, Kelvinn L.
[NO CASE FOUND]
March 27, 2018 – Article 302 – ROBBERY IN AN
UNINHABITED PLACE OR IN A PRIVATE BUILDING
BURGOS, Paul Zandrix A.
MARQUEZ VS. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 181138 DECEMBER 3, 2012
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
ISSUE:
Whether or not all of the accused are guilty of the
crime of robbery with force upon things.
FACTS:
At around 2:30 a.m. of April 6, 2002, Marlon Mallari
(Mallari) was with petitioners and Benzon in front of
the University of the East (U.E.), Caloocan City. Marquez
suggested that the group rob the Rice-in-a-Box store
located at the corner of U.E. Marquez then got a lead
pipe and handed it to Magalong, which he and
Bernardo used to destroy the padlock of the store.
Mallari was designated as the look-out while
petitioners and Benzon entered the store and carried
away all the items inside it which consisted of rice
cookers, a blender and food items.13 They then
brought the stolen items to the house of Benzon’s
uncle. Apprehensive that Mallari might squeal, the
group promised to give him a share if they could sell
the stolen items.
At 9:30 a.m. of the same day, Valderosa received
information from the daughter of the owner of the
premises where her Rice-in-a- Box franchise store was
located, that her store had been forcibly opened and
its padlock destroyed. Upon her arrival thereat, she
discovered that the contents of her freezer were
missing along with other items inside the store. he total
value of these stolen items was approximately
P42,000.00. She reported the robbery to the police.
Meanwhile, on April 7, 2002, Mallari informed his older
brother of his involvement in the said robbery. At
around 4:00 p.m. of the next day, he again confessed
but this time to Valderosa.
Both the RTC and CA found them guilty of the crime of
robbery with force upon things. Hence, this petition.
RULING:
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Yes, the petition of the accused has no merit. ART. 302.
Robbery in an uninhabited place or in a private
building. - Any robbery committed in an uninhabited
place or in a building other than those mentioned in
the first paragraph of Article 299, if the value of the
property taken exceeds 250 pesos shall be punished by
prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods, provided that any of the following
circumstances is present:
1. If the entrance has been effected through any
opening not intended for entrance or egress;
2. If any wall, roof, floor, or outside door or window has
been broken;
3. If the entrance has been effected through the use of
false keys, picklocks, or other similar tools;
4. If any door, wardrobe, chest, or any sealed or closed
furniture or receptacle has been broken;
5. If any closed or sealed receptacle, as mentioned in
the preceding paragraph, has been removed, even if
the same be broken open elsewhere.
When the value of the property taken does not exceed
250 pesos, the penalty next lower in degree shall be
imposed.
Under Article 293 of the RPC, robbery is committed by
any person who, with intent to gain, shall take any
personal property belonging to another by using force
upon anything. When committed in an uninhabited
place or a private building with the circumstance,
among others, that any wall, roof, floor, or outside door
or window has been broken, the same is penalized
under Article 302.
Article 302 of the RPC provides that when the robbery
is committed in an uninhabited place or in a private
building and the value of the property exceeds
P250.00, the penalty shall be prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods provided that, among
other circumstances, any wall, roof, floor, or the outside
door or window has been broken. Considering that
petitioners burglarized the store of Valderosa which
was not used as a dwelling by breaking its door and
stealing property therein with a total value of
P42,000.00, the penalty that must be imposed is prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods.
PEOPLE VS. JARANILLA
G.R. NO. L-28547 FEBRUARY 22, 1974
AQUINO, J.:
ISSUE:
Whether the taking of the six roosters is covered by
article 302 of the Revised Penal Code
FACTS:
On January 9, 1966, Gorriceta was driving a pickup
truck and while going home he saw Jaranilla, Suyo, and
Brillantes. They hailed Gorriceta who stopped the truck.
Jaranilla requested to bring them to Mandurriao, a
district in another part of the city. Gorriceta demurred.

He told Jaranilla that he (Gorriceta) was on his way
home. Jaranilla prevailed upon Gorriceta to take them
to Mandurriao because Jaranilla ostensibly had to get
something from his uncle's place. So, Jaranilla,
Brillantes and Suyo boarded the pickup truck which
Gorriceta drove to Mandurriao. Upon reaching
Mandurriao, the three passengers alighted from the
truck and instructed Gorriceta to wait for them. 20
minutes had passed when they reappeared. Each of
them was carrying two fighting cocks. Jaranilla directed
Gorriceta to start the truck because they were being
chased.
While traversing the detour road, they saw the
Patrolmen Jabatan and Castro running towards them.
Gorriceta slowed down the truck after Patrolman
Jabatan had fired a warning shot and was signalling
with his flashlight that the truck should stop. Gorriceta
stopped the truck near the policeman. Jabatan
approached the right side of the truck near Jaranilla
and ordered all the occupants of the truck to go down.
They did not heed the injunction of the policeman.
Jaranilla shot Patrolman Jabatan. He immediately
started the motor of the truck and drove straight home.
Jaranilla kept on firing towards Jabatan. After reaching
Gorriceta’s home, Jaranilla warned Gorriceta not to tell
anybody about the incident. The next morning, all of
them were arrested.
RULING:
No, one essential requisite of robbery with force upon
things under Articles 299 and 302 is that the malefactor
should enter the building or dependency, where the
object to be taken is found. Articles 299 and 302 clearly
contemplate that the malefactor should enter the
building (casa habitada o lugar no habitado o edificio).
If the culprit did not enter the building, there would be
no robbery with force upon things. The term "building"
in article 302, formerly 512 of the old Penal Code, was
construed as embracing any structure not mentioned
in article 299 (meaning not an "inhabited house or
public building or edifice devoted to worship" or any
dependency thereof) used for storage and safekeeping
of personal property. As thus construed, a freight car
used for the shipment of sugar was considered a
private building. The unnailing of a strip of cloth nailed
over the door, the customary manner of sealing a
freight car, was held to constitute breaking by force
within the meaning of article 512, now article 302.
Therefore, the taking of the six roosters from their coop
should be characterized as theft and not robbery. The
assumption is that the accused were animated by
single criminal impulse. The conduct of the accused
reveals that they conspired to steal the roosters. The
taking is punishable as a single offense of theft.
PEOPLE VS. TUBOG
G.R. NO. L-26284 NOVEMBER 17, 1926
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused committed the crime of
robbery in an uninhabited place.
FACTS:
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That on or about June 22, 1926, in the muncilipality of
Jagna, Province of Bohol, Philippine Islands, and within
the jurisdiction of this court, the above-named
defendants did willingly and criminally, with intent of
gain and through force upon things, conspiring and
armed with weapons, did take, steal and carry away the
iron safe "Safe Thomas Perry & Son, Bilston" containing
the sum of P1,930 and other articles in the store, said
defendants having broken the lock of one of the doors
of the store and a part of the safe for the purpose of
opening the same, and the defendant Juan Tubog as
accessory after the fact. Upon arraignment, all accused
pleaded guilty and as to the defendant Santiago Rubi
(alias Santiago Lucero) and the appellant, as principal,
each was sentenced to ten years and one day of
presidio mayor, with the accessory penalties, and to
pay one-fourth of the costs. The defendant Juan Tubog
was sentenced to five months and ten days of arresto
mayor. From this judgment the defendant Florencio
Postrero appeals without assigning any error.
The Attorney-General then says that in the instant case,
the information does not allege that the store in which
the robbery was committed was inhabited at the time
of the commission of the crime, and that for want of
which, the penalty should be imposed under article 512
(Article 302 of the RPC) of the Penal Code.
RULING:
Yes. In the instant case, the appellant is not specifically
charged with a violation of article 508, and the
information alleges that the entrance was made by
breaking "the lock of one of the doors of the store."
The fact that entrance was made in that manner clearly
implies and carries with it the further fact that there
was no person inside the store at the time the lock was
broken, and that the defendants had to break the lock
to get into the store.
For failure of the information to allege that the store
was used occupied as "an unhabitted place" at the time
of the commission of the crime, the contention of the
Attorney-General must be sustained.
As the law now exists, the penalty for the commission
of robbery committed in "an inhabited place" comes
under article 508, and the penalty for the commission
of that crime in a store, standing alone and within itself
comes under the provisions of article 512 which
provides:
Any robbery committed in an uninhabited place or in
any building other than those mentioned in paragraph
one of article five hundred and eight shall be punished
by presidio correccional in its medium and maximum
degrees, etc.
For such reasons, the penalty of the lower court is
modified and reduced.
March 27, 2018 – Article 303 – ROBBERY OF
CEREALS, FRUITS, OR FIREWOOD IN AN
UNINHABITED PLACE OR PRIVATE BUILDING
CEBALLOS, Jesus C

PEOPLE V. RADA
GR NO. L-16988
DEC. 30, 1991
ISSUE:
WoN they were properly charged in court.
FACTS:
Rada, Bahenting and Canas were charged with the
crime of robbery in an uninhabited house, under Art.
302 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). The accused
allegedly entered a bodega owned by Bastida and
stole nine (9) sacks of palay. On arraignment, they
pleaded not guilty because the crime was supposedly
under Art. 303 of the RPC. Thereupon, they filed a
motion to quash which the court granted.
HELD:
No, they were not.
The Court held that the term rice does not only mean
hulled rice but also includes palay, as the seed is locally
known, as well as the plant itself. If the word rice
includes the grain in its original state without the hull
being taken away, then the conclusion is inevitable that
“rice” is included under the term “semilla alimenticia”
or cereal seeds.
March 27, 2018 – Article 304 – POSSESSION OF
PICKLOCKS OR SIMILAR TOOLS
DAHIROC, Janice L.
PEOPLE VS. RAMON LOPEZ
GR No. L-18766, May 20, 1965
ISSUE:
Whether or not the possession of 7 false keys
constitute the crime in article 304 of the Revised Penal
Code.
FACTS:
At 10:00 A.M. of December 21, 1960, the Chief of Police
of Bacuag, Surigao del Norte, apprehended three
suspicious-looking strangers who were loitering in
Pagao, a sitio of Bacuag. A bag which they were
carrying was confiscated with the following contents:
three carbines, caliber .30 M1; one revolver, caliber .22;
three flashlights with batteries; two carbine
ammunition magazines, fully loaded; twelve rounds of
carbine ammunition; one balisong; a screw driver;
seven false keys, one of which was a master key;
trousers; shirts; and a pair of shoes.
After an investigation the aforesaid persons Ramon
Lopez, Manuel Buico and Arturo Caniete were charged
in the Justice of the Peace Court of Bacuag with the
crime of illegal possession of firearms and, in a
separate complaint, the crime of illegal possession of
false keys. They pleaded guilty to illegal possession of
firearms, not guilty to illegal, possession of false keys.
HELD:
Article 304 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
"Art. 304. Possession of picklocks or similar tools. Any
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person who shall without lawful cause have in his
possession picklocks or similar tools specially adapted
to the commission of the crime of robbery, shall be
punished by arresto mayor in its maximum period to
prision correctional in its minimum period."
Such crime of illegal possession of picklocks or similar
tools has, accordingly, two elements: (1) possession of
picklocks or similar tools specially adapted to the
commission of the crime of robbery; (2) such
possession is without lawful cause.
The information alleged that the accused possessed,
"without lawful cause seven (7) false keys, one of which
is a picklock or master key".
A picklock a tool used in picking locks is in itself
specially adapted to the commission of robbery of the
kind provided for in Articles 299 (a) 3 and 302, par. 3 of
the Revised Penal Code:
ART. 299. Robbery in an inhabited house or public
building or Office devoted to worship. Any armed
person who shall commit robbery in an inhabited
house or public building or edifice devoted to religious
worship, shall be punished by reclusion temporal, if the
value of the property taken shall exceed 250 pesos, and
if the malefactors shall enter the house or building in
which the robbery was committed, by using false keys,
picklocks or similar tools."
Art. 302. Robbery in an uninhabited place or in a
private building. - Any robbery committed in an
uninhabited place or in a building other than those
mentioned in the first paragraph of article 299, if the
value of the property taken exceeds 250 pesos, shall be
punished by prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods provided that any of the following
circumstances is present:
"3. If the entrance has been effected through the use
of keys, picklocks or other similar tools."
Since picking of locks is one way to gain entrance to
commit robbery, a picklock is per se specially adapted
to the commission of robbery. The description in the
information of a picklock as "specially adapted to the
commission of robbery" is therefore unnecessary for its
sufficiency. Notwithstanding the omission of such
superfluous description, therefore, the charge of the
offense of illegal possession of a picklock is .valid. We
find both elements of the crime clearly alleged in the
information in question.
It follows that the term "false keys" appearing in the
information sufficiently describes such tools.
Wherefore, the order quashing the information is
hereby set aside and the case is remanded for further
trial, without costs.
March 28, 2018 – Article 305 – FALSE KEYS
DELA PEÑA, Clarisse J
G.R. No. L-4429 December 24, 1908

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
SIXTO GALURAN, ET AL., defendants. SY-TOC,
appellant.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the crime of robbery with the use false
keys was committed?
FACTS:
Galuran was a porter in the warehouse of the firm of
Smith, Bell and Co. The appellant, Sy-Yoc, quite
frequently went to the said firm in order to arrange for
the sale of certain boxes that the manufactured. On
one of these visits he proposed to Galuran that he,
Galuran, should get some of the cases of whiskey that
were stored in the warehouse and take them over to
the appellant's house, and that he would pay P16 for
each case. Sy-Yoc suggested that he take an
impression of the key of the warehouse in soap paste
and have another key made by a locksmith. Galuran
duly obtained an impression of the key and took it to
Sy-Yoc; the latter sent for a locksmith, whom he paid
for a key as soon as it was made according to the mold.
Galuran was able to open the warehouse, from which,
assisted by Dizon, he took two cases of whisky. These
cases they at once took in a carromata to the store or
establishment of Sy-Yoc, where they were surprised,
while in the act of depositing the cases in question
inside, and arrested by a secret-service agent who had
been watching them from the street and had followed
them.
HELD:
Yes. These facts, which we hold to have been proven,
clearly show the guilt of the appellant, Sy-Yoc, as the
instigator of the crime herein prosecuted. From him
came the initiative in the robbery; he was the first to
conceive the idea of its commission, and, being unable
unwilling to carry it out himself, he employed Galuran,
impelling him to the material execution of the crime by
a promise to pay him P16 for each case of whisky that
he was able to steal. The better to induce him to
commit the offense, he cleverly demonstrated how
easily he could be accomplished, instructed him as to
the best means of carrying it out, and offered him
money to pay for the false key. He thus removed all the
difficulties in the way of determination to execute, and
the actual execution of the robbery in question. These
acts constitute a real inducement made directly for the
commission of the said robbery, and place the
appellant, Sy-Yoc, in the position of principal in
accordance with paragraph 2 of article 13 of the Penal
Code.
March 28, 2018 – Article 306 – WHO ARE BRIGANDS;
PENALTY
DELFIN, Jennica Gyrl G.
PEOPLE V. LAURANTE, GR NO. 116734, MARCH
29, 1996
FACTS:
Larry Laurente together with Melvin Dagudog and
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Richard Disipulo, who are still at large, robbed
Herminiano Artana of his earnings in an undetermined
amount along F. Concepcion St., Bgy. San Joaquin,
Pasig, Metro Manila, which is a Philippine Highway. For
insuring success of their criminal act, said accused
strangled the victim with a leather belt and hit him with
a blunt instrument, causing him to sustain physical
injuries which directly caused his death. SPO1 Crsipin
Pio received a case assignment relative to Herminiano
Artana and went to the place of incident. He saw inside
the taxicab a dead man. He then conducted a crime
scene search inside the taxicab and within the vicinity,
he found a brown wallet containing a Social Security
System (SSS) ID of Larry Laurente and a leather belt
supposedly used in strangling the dead man. He
requested the SSS to secure the complete record of
Laurente. From the SSS records, the police authorities
learned that Laurente lived somewhere in Pasig;
accordingly, a follow-up team was formed to arrest
him. Several witnesses were presented by the
prosecution. On the other hand, Laurente interposed
the defense of alibi.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the crime committed was brigandage.
HELD:
No. Presidential Decree No. 532 is a modification of
Articles 306 and 307 on brigandage. This is evident
from the fact that the relevant portion thereof which
treats of highway robbery invariably uses this term in
the alternative and synonymous with brigandage, that
is, as highway robbery/brigandage. This is but in line
with previous rulings that highway robbers and
brigands are synonymous.
The main object of the Brigandage Law is to prevent
the formation of bands of robbers. The heart of the
offense consists in the formation of a band by more
than three armed persons for the purpose indicated in
Art. 306. Such formation is sufficient to constitute a
violation of Art. 306. It would not be necessary to show,
in a prosecution under it, that a member or members
of the band committed robbery or kidnapping or any
other purpose attainable by violent means. The crime
is proven when the organization and purpose of the
band are shown to be such as are contemplated by Art.
306. On the other hand, if robbery is committed by a
band, whose members were not primarily organized
for committing robbery or kidnapping, etc., the crime
would not be brigandage, but only robbery. Simply
because robbery was committed by a band of more
than three armed persons, it would not follow that it
was committed by a band of brigands. Therefore, the
coincidental fact that the robbery in the present case
was committed inside a car which, in the natural course
of things, was casually operating on a highway, is not
within the situation envisaged by Section 2(e) of the
decree in its definition of terms. Besides, that particular
provision precisely defines highway
robbery/brigandage and, as we have amply
demonstrated, the single act of robbery conceived and
committed by appellants in this case does not
constitute highway robbery or brigandage. In the
instant case, there is not a shred of evidence that

Laurente and his co-accused, or their acts, fall within
the purview of P.D. No. 532Thus, Laurente cannot be
validly convicted for highway robbery with homicide
under P.D. No 532.
March 28, 2018 – Article 307 – AIDING AND
ABETTING A BAND OF BRIGANDS (PRESIDENTIAL
DECREE NO. 532)
DIZON, Roxan Danica G.
VIERNES VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
GR No. 161970
June 30, 2006
FACTS:
On November 15, 1992, at around 7:00 in the evening,
while Josefina and her husband Ronaldo Lopango were
on board a passenger jeepney, four of eight co-
passengers declared a hold-up. Ronaldo resisted the
attempt to hold him up by one of the four by kicking
him, but another stabbed him three times causing him
to fall from the jeepney. Josefina also fell from the
jeepney upon which she brought Ronaldo to the
hospital where he died after a few minutes. Josefina
reported the incident to the police station. The trial
court found the accused guilty of highway robbery
under P.D. No. 532. It was modified on appeal by the
Court of Appeals to simple robbery.
ISSUE:
WON the accused are guilty for a violation of PD No.
532 (The Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of
1974)
HELD:
In crimes of robbery, the offender must be proven to
have unlawfully taken personal property belonging to
another, by means of violence against or intimidation
of any person, or using force upon anything.
While the general rule is that contradictions and
discrepancies between the testimony of a witness and
his sworn statement do not necessarily discredit him
since ex parte statements are generally incomplete, the
rule is not without exception as, e.g., when the
omission in the sworn statement refers to a very
important detail of the incident which the one relating
the incident as an eyewitness would not be expected
to fail to mention, or when the narration in the sworn
statement substantially contradicts the testimony in
court.
Josefina's assertion that the taking of her bag slipped
from her mind because of her husband taxes credulity
as the hold-up occurred only three hours earlier. To
forget to mention the loss of the bag maybe excusable,
but to categorically state that nothing was taken from
them when she was asked, infirms Josefina's overall
credibility.
Josefina's uncorroborated testimony is tainted with
inconsistencies on material points to thus lead the
Court to discredit it and uphold the constitutional
presumption of innocence of the accused.
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Accused-petitioner Viernes is, on reasonable doubt,
acquitted of the charge of violation of P.D. No. 532.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPPINES VS AGOMO-O ET AL
GR NO. 131829
JUNE 23,2000
FACTS:
On September 22, 1993, at around 7:30 in the evening,
a passenger jeepney driven by Rodito Lasap was
stopped by three men-Eddy Paneza and Oscar
Servando, and Ronnie Agomo-o, who, armed with a
gun,and bladed weapons announced a hold-up and
ordered the driver to turn off the engine. Ronnie
Agomo-o shot the driver Rodito Lasap. He died as a
result of multiple gunshot wounds. They had stolen a
wrist watch and cash money for a total value of three
thousand three eighty pesos from the driver and
passengers. Freddie Agrabio was also stabbed with a
bladed weapon during such event.
ISSUE:
WON the accused are guilty of highway robbery under
PD No. 532
HELD:
Accused-appellants assert that they cannot be
convicted of highway robbery as the crime was not
committed by at least four persons, as required in
Article 306 of the Revised Penal Code. However,
highway robbery is now governed by P.D. No. 532,
otherwise known as the Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway
Robbery Law of 1974. This law provides:
Sec. 2. (e).Highway Robbery/Brigandage. The seizure of
any person for ransom, extortion or other unlawful
purposes, or the taking away of the property of another
by means of violence against or intimidation of person
or force upon things or other unlawful means,
committed by any person on any Philippine Highway.
In the case of People v. Puno,it was held that P.D. No.
532 amended Art. 306 of the Revised Penal Code and
that it is no longer required that there be at least four
armed persons forming a band of robbers. The number
of offenders is no longer an essential element of the
crime of highway robbery. Hence, the fact that there
were only three identified perpetrators is of no
moment. P.D. No. 532 only requires proof that persons
were organized for the purpose of committing
highway robbery indiscriminately. The robbery must be
directed not only against specific, intended or
preconceived victims, but against any and all
prospective victims.
In this case, the accused, intending to commit robbery,
waited at the Barangay Mapili crossing for any vehicle
that would happen to travel along that road. The driver
Rodito Lasap and his passengers were not
predetermined targets. Rather, they became the
accused's victims because they happened to be
traveling at the time when the accused were there.
There was, thus, randomness in the selection of the
victims, or the act of committing robbery

indiscriminately, which differentiates this case from
that of a simple robbery with homicide.
The accused were found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violating the provisions of Section 3,
Paragraph (b) of Presidential Decree No. 532.
March 29, 2018 – Article 308 – THEFT
DOSDOS, Xicilli Krishna P.
G.R. No. L-16961, September 19, 1921
THE UNITED STATES vs. NIEVES DE VERA Y GAYTE
FACTS:
on the 20th of February, 1920, three Igorots named
Jose II, Balatan, and Pepe were on the Escolta, of this
city, trying to dispose of a bar of gold when an Ilocano
invited them to go to his house, stating that there was
a woman there who would buy the precious metal. they
accompanied the Ilocano to the house indicated by
him where they met a woman, the accused herein, who
apparently, was desirous of buying the gold and
requested them to hand it to her so that she might take
it to a silversmith and have it examined, stating that she
would return within a short time to report the result.
The Igorot Pepe, who was the owner of the bar of gold,
thereupon handed it to her, together with P200 in bank
notes which her requested to her to have changed into
silver coins were more desirable in the Mountain
Province. The woman then left the house at about 12
o'clock on that day, asking the Igorots to wait there.
But the woman did not return. They waited in vain for
hours for her and at nightfall they agreed that one of
them should remain on watch while the other two went
to the Meisic police station to report the matter. The
police acted promptly and effectively. The policeman
Jose Gonzales, assigned to take charge of the case,
soon identified the woman who had taken away the
bar of gold, by the description which the Igorots had
given him, and at a few minutes after 11 o'clock he
already was in a house on Calle Barcelona, examining
the accused as to the whereabout of the bar of gold
and the bank notes of the Igorots. As the woman gave
evasive answers, it became necessary to ask for
assistance from the office of the police, and shortly
thereafter, two other policemen, Mr. Abbot and one
Ronas, arrived, who took the woman to the house at
No. 541 Calle Regidor, followed by Gonzales and the
three Igorots. There the bar of gold divided into three
pieces was found wrapped in a handkerchief and
placed inside the water tank of a water-closet. The
accused requested one Mamerta de la Rosa to let her
have P150 which she in turn handed to the policeman.
According to Exhibit B, which is a certificate issued by
the Bureau of Science, the bar of gold delivered to the
accused weighed 559.7 grammes and was worth
P587.68 at the rate of P1.05 per gramme; whereas, the
three bars found by the police weighed only 416
grammes, and were therefore, 143.7 grammes short. Of
the P200 bank notes delivered to the accused, she
returned only P150.
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In view of the above stated facts, which appear in the
cause to have been duly proven, the accused was
sentenced by the court a quo to the penalty already
mentioned.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the evidence does not establish the
essential elements of theft.
HELD:
No.
The argument advanced in support of the contention
of the defense is that the goods misappropriated were
not taken by the accused without the consent of the
owner who had delivered them to her voluntarily, and
this element being lacking, it cannot be the crime of
theft.
It is well to remember the essential elements of the
crime of theft, as expounded in the textbooks, which
are as follows: First, the taking of personal property,
second, that the property belongs to another; third,
that the taking away be done with intent of gain;
fourth, that the taking away be done without consent
of the owner; and fifth, that the taking away be
accomplished without violence or intimidation against
persons or force upon things.
The commentators on the Spanish Penal Code, from
which ours was adopted, lay great stress on the first
element which is the taking away, that is, getting
possession, laying hold of the thing, so that, as Viada
says if, the things is not taken away, but received and
then appropriated or converted without the consent of
the owner, it may be any other crime, that of estafa for
instance, but in no way that of theft, which consists in
the taking away of the thing, that is, in removing it from
the place where it is kept by the legal owner, without
the latter's consent, of the legitimate owner.
The American decisions an textbooks on "larceny," a
crime which has the same characteristics as those oaf
theft under our Penal Code, contain abundant
illustrations of the question raised in the present case.
The intention of the owner to part with his property is
the gist and essence of the offense of theft (larceny),
and the vital point on which the crime hinges and is to
be determined.
A felonious taking necessary in the crime of larceny,
and generally speaking, a taking which is done with the
consent or acquiescence of the owner of the property
is not felonious. But is the owner parts with the
possession thereof for a particular purpose, and the
person who receives the possession avowedly for that
purpose has the fraudulent intention to make use of it
as the means of converting it to his own use, and does
so convert it, this is larceny, for in such case, the fraud
supplies the place of the trespass in the taking, or, as
otherwise stated, the subsequent felonious conversion
of the property by the alleged thief will relate back and
make the taking and conversion larceny. And it has
been said that the act goes farther than the consent,

and may be fairly said to be against it. If money is given
to a person to be applied to a particular purpose, it is
larceny for the receiver to appropriate it to his own use
which was not the purpose contemplated by the
owner. Obtaining money under the false pretense that
it is to be bet on a horse race, and with the intent at
the time to convert it to the bailee's own use, the race
being a mere sham to aid this purpose, is larceny. The
rule has been applied also to cases in which a person
takes a piece of money from another to change, and
keeps it with the unlawful intent to convert it and
refuses to deliver the money given to him or the
change therefore, on demand; and the fact that the
taking was open and from the owner is of no
consequence, if the intent to steal existed. This is so for
the reason that the delivery of money to another for
the sole purpose of getting it changed is a parting with
the custody only and not the amount does not relieve
him from liability for the larceny of the entire amount
given him.
Where the parties are engaged in a cash sale the whole
transaction is incomplete until the payment is
completed; and the possession of the goods remains
in the seller and that of the money in the buyer, until
they are simultaneously exchanged. If, in such case, the
buyer gets control of the goods and makes off with
them without paying for them, he is guilty of larceny.
And conversely if the seller gets the money and refuses
to give up the goods, it is larceny. Thus, where one
surrenders up his watch with the understanding that he
is immediately to receive 50 dollars for it, the keeping
of the watch without payment of money is larceny. And
where a tradesman handed good to a customer to
examine and the latter ran away with them, he was held
guilty of larceny. Similarly, where one unloaded onions
which he owned on the premises of a prospective
buyer, who thereupon refused to pay for the onions or
to allow the seller to remove them, it was held larceny,
as the owner never intended to part with the
possession of the onions until he received his money
therefor. One, waiting in crowd to purchase a railway
ticket, requested another nearer the ticket office to buy
a ticket for her, handing him the money to pay for it.
He made off with money and was held guilty of larceny.
For the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion, and
so hold, that the crime proven in the cause to have
been committed by the appellant by appropriating the
gold bar delivered to her for examination, and by
converting to her own use, without the consent of the
owner, the bank notes which had been handed her to
be exchanged for silver coins, is that of theft, defined
and punished in article 518, paragraph 2, of the Penal
Code. And the appealed judgment being in accordance
with law, it must be, as is hereby, affirmed with costs
against the appellant. So ordered.
G.R. No. 210760 , January 26, 2015
KYLE ANTHONY ZABALA vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
The evidence for the prosecution tends to establish
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that Zabala is a jeepney driver who earns Two Hundred
Pesos (₱200) to Four Hundred Pesos (₱400) per day on
an alternate day basis. Complainant Alas, meanwhile,
works at the Manila City Hall. It is through this job that
he was able to save the Sixty-Eight Thousand Pesos
(₱68,000) stolen by Zabala. Piñon, on the other hand,
had been the girlfriend of Zabalafor about five months
when the incident pertinent to this case occurred.
Alas testified that he and Zabalawere neighbors in San
Jose Del Monte City, Bulacan. As neighbors,he had
treated Zabala as his kumpare and would often invite
the latter to drinking sessions inside his house. At
times, he would also call Zabala to repair his vehicle,
because Zabala is also a mechanic. He would allow
Zabala to follow him to his bedroom to get cash
whenever spare parts are to be bought for the repair
of his vehicle.
Alas further testified that on June 18, 2007, at about
4:00 in the morning, he left his house to go to work.
When he returned from work, at around 11:00 in the
evening, he discovered that his money amounting to
Sixty Eight Thousand Pesos (₱68,000), which he kept in
an envelope inside his closet, was missing. During that
time, there were only five (5) persons living in their
house: Alas, his parents, his nine (9) year-old son, and
his aunt. He asked his parents and aunt if they knew
where he kept his money, but they did not know.
Witness Piñon, on the other hand, testified that in the
early morning of June 18, 2007, she and Zabala, her
boyfriend at the time, were together at a store owned
by the latter, which was six to seven steps away from
the complainant’s house. She then saw Zabala climb
the fence and scale the tree in front of the
complainant’s house, and enter the house. When he
returned, she noticed that he had a bulge in his pocket,
which she later found to be a plentiful sum of money.
Zabala then brought her home, and agreed to meet her
again at about 10:00 in the morning. They then went
to Greenhills, where Zabala bought two Nokia mobile
phones, which cost about Eight Thousand Five
Hundred Pesos (₱8,500).
On July 7, 2011, the RTC rendered its Judgment
convicting petitioner of the offense charged.
Aggrieved by the Judgment, petitioner appealed to the
CA, attributing to the lower court the following errors:
(1) there was a grave error in not giving credence to
petitioner’s version; (2) petitioner was convicted of the
crime charged despite the failure of the prosecution to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt; and (3)
petitioner cannot be convicted based on circumstantial
evidence.
In its presently assailed Decision promulgated on July
15, 2013, the CA denied the appeal and affirmed the
decision of the trial court, but with modification as to
the penalty to be imposed upon petitioner. The CA
ruled that the prosecution was able to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the guilt of the appellant through
circumstantial evidence.

The CA then found that the series of circumstances
present in this case supports a conviction, and
constitutes the basis for a reasonable inference of the
existence of the facts thereby sought to be proved.
Rejecting the defense of petitioner, the CA ruled that
he offered no evidence other than an alibi to exculpate
him from the crime charged. It then cited the rule that
alibi is a weakdefense, and cannot prevail over the
positive testimony of a truthful witness.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused is guilty for theft.
HELD:
No. The prosecution failed to establish, by
circumstantial evidence, that petitioner is guilty of
theft.
Unfortunately, in the case at bar, this Court finds that
the prosecution failed to present sufficient
circumstantial evidence to convict the petitioner of the
offense charged. We find that the pieces of evidence
presented before the trial court fail to provide a
sufficient combination of circumstances, as to produce
a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
To recall, the evidence of the prosecution purports to
establish the following narrative: first, that the
complaining witness Alas hides ₱68,000 in cash in his
closet inside their house; second, that petitioner is
aware that Alas hides money in his bedroom closet;
third, that on the night of the incident, petitioner was
with his then girlfriend, witness Piñon; fourth, that
petitioner climbed through the fence of Alas’s house,
and was able to successfully gain entrance to his house;
fifth, that petitioner later went out of the house with a
bulge in his pockets; and sixth, that later that day,
petitioner and Piñon went shopping for a cellphone.
The foregoing narration––based on the testimonies of
the two witnesses of the prosecution, even if given full
faith and credit and considered as established facts––
failsto establish that petitioner committed the crime of
theft. If at all, it may possibly constitute evidence that
petitioner committed an offense, but not necessarily
theft.
In the case before the Court,the evidence presented by
the prosecution fails to establish the corpus delicti of
theft. In Tan v. People, this Court said:
Corpus delicti means the "body or substance of the
crime, and, in its primary sense, refers to the fact that
the crime has been actually committed." The "essential
elements of theft are (1) the taking of personal
property; (2) the property belongs to another; (3) the
taking away was done with intent of gain; (4) the taking
away was done without the consent of the owner; and
(5) the taking away is accomplished without violence
or intimidation against persons or force upon things."
In theft, corpus delicti has two elements, namely: (1)
that the property was lost by the owner, and (2) that it
was lost by felonious taking.
First, nobody saw Zabala enter the bedroom of Alas,
where the money amounting to ₱68,000 was allegedly
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kept and hidden. It is interesting to note that while Alas
testified that there were other persons living in that
house, i.e. his family members, the prosecution failed
to put any of them on the witness stand, to testify that
they saw or heard something out of the ordinary at the
time the incident allegedly took place, or to explain
why nobody else was able to notice that the theft took
place while Alas was absent. Witness Piñon, meanwhile,
merely testified that she saw Zabala scale the fence of
Alas’ house and enter it. She did not actually see Zabala
enter the room of Alas, where the money was hidden.
Second, the evidence presented below is insufficient to
determine without a reasonable doubt that the
₱68,000 in cash was lost due to felonious taking, and,
more importantly, that it was petitioner who
committed the felonious taking. Even if believed in its
entirety, the testimony of witness Piñon does not show
that when petitioner left the house of Alas, he was
carrying the ₱68,000 incash which was supposedly lost.
All that Piñon saw was the bulge in petitioner’s pockets.
Piñon’s testimony can considered as evidence to prove
that when petitioner entered the house of Alas, he did
so because of his intent to commit asportation.
Third, Piñon' s testimony fails to establish that Alas'
pocket indeed contained the stolen money, as she
never actually saw what was inside the pocket of
Zabala. While she testified that later that day, they went
to buy 2 cellphones amounting to ₱8,500, she failed to
testify whether the money that Zabala used in paying
for the cellphone was retrieved from the very same
bulging pocket which she saw earlier in the day, which
would have led to the conclusion that Zabala's pocket
contained money. Failing this, what is left is the fact
that Pifion saw a bulge in Zabala's pocket, and there is
no evidence whatsoever to prove that his pocket in fact
was used to hide the money that he allegedly stole. The
trial and appellate courts committed error in accepting
as fact that Zabala's pocket contained money, when
there is a dearth of evidence to support such
allegation.
And fourth, the rule in circumstantial evidence cases is
that the evidence must exclude the possibility that
some other person committed the crime.21 In the case
here, however, the prosecution failed to prove, or even
allege, that it was impossible for some other person to
have committed the crime of theft against Alas. The
prosecution failed to adduce evidence that at the time
the theft was committed, there was no other person
inside the house of Alas, or that no other person could
have taken the money from the closet of Alas. Alas
himself admitted that there were other residents in the
house, but these persons were never presented to
prove their whereabouts at the time the incident took
place. This failure of the prosecution leads the Court to
no other conclusion but that they failed to establish
that culpability could only belong to Zabala, and not to
some other person.
Given the foregoing discussion, We find that
petit10ner was wrongfully convicted of theft.1âwphi1
In the absence of proof beyond a reasonable doubt,

the presumption of innocence must be upheld, and
thus, petitioner should be acquitted.
G.R. No. 205180, November 11, 2013
RYAN VIRAY vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
Private complainant Vedua maintains seventy-five (75)
dogs at her compound in Caridad, Cavite City. To assist
her in feeding the dogs and cleaning their cages,
private complainant employed the accused who would
report for work from 6:00 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. On October
19, 2006, at around 6:30 in the morning, accused
arrived for work. Half an hour later or at 7 o’clock,
private complainant left for Batangas. Before leaving,
she locked the doors of her house, and left the accused
to attend to her dogs. Later, at around 7:00 in the
evening, private complainant arrived home, entering
through the back door of her house. As private
complainant was about to remove her earrings, she
noticed that her other earrings worth PhP 25,000 were
missing. She then searched for the missing earrings but
could not find them.
Thereafter, private complainant also discovered that
her jacket inside her closet and her other pieces of
jewelry (rositas) worth PhP 250,000 were also missing.
A Gameboy (portable videogame console), a compact
disc player, a Nokia cellular phone and a Nike Air Cap
were likewise missing. The total value of the missing
items supposedly amounted to PhP 297,800. Private
complainant immediately checked her premises and
discovered that the main doors of her house were
destroyed. A plastic bag was also found on top of her
stereo, which was located near the bedroom. The
plastic bag contained a t-shirt and a pair of shorts later
found to belong to accused. Witness Nimfa Sarad, the
laundrywoman of Vedua’s neighbor, testified seeing
Viray at Vedua’s house at 6:00 a.m. By 11:00 a.m., she
went out on an errand and saw Viray with an
unidentified male companion leaving Vedua’s house
with a big sack.
Another witness, Leon Young, who prepares
official/business letters for Vedua, testified that he
went to Vedua’s house between 10:00 and 11:00 am of
October 19, 2006 to retrieve a diskette and saw
petitioner with a male companion descending the
stairs of Vedua’s house. He alleged that since he knew
Viray as an employee of private complainant, he simply
asked where Vedua was. When he was told that Vedua
was in Batangas, he left and went back three days after,
only to be told about the robbery.
Prosecution witness Beverly Calagos, Vedua’s stay-out
laundrywoman, testified that on October 19, 2006, she
reported for work at 5:00 a.m. Her employer left for
Batangas at 7:00 am leaving her and petitioner Viray to
go about their chores. She went home around 8:30 a.m.
leaving petitioner alone in Vedua’s house. Meanwhile,
petitioner never reported for work after that day.
For his defense, Viray averred that he did not report for
work on the alleged date of the incident as he was then
down with the flu. His mother even called up Vedua at
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5:30 a.m. to inform his employer of his intended
absence. Around midnight of October 20, 2006, Vedua
called Viray’s mother to report the loss of some
valuables in her house and alleged that Viray is
responsible for it. Petitioner’s sister and aunt
corroborated his version as regards the fact that he did
not go to work on October 19, 2006 and stayed home
sick.
After the parties rested their respective cases, the trial
court rendered a Decision dated December 5, 2009,
holding that the offense charged should have been
robbery and not qualified theft as there was an actual
breaking of the screen door and the main door to gain
entry into the house. Similarly, Viray cannot be
properly charged with qualified theft since he was not
a domestic servant but more of a laborer paid on a
daily basis for feeding the dogs of the complainant.
The trial court found that there is sufficient
circumstantial evidence to conclude that Viray was the
one responsible for the taking of valuables belonging
to Vedua. Hence, the RTC found petitioner Viray guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of robbery and sentenced
him.
In the present controversy, while the CA modified the
decision of the trial court by convicting petitioner of
qualified theft rather than robbery, the facts as found
by the court a quo were the same facts used by the CA
in holding that all the elements of qualified theft
through grave abuse of confidence were present. It is
not, therefore, incumbent upon this Court to
recalibrate the evidence presented by the parties
during trial.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused is liable only for simple
theft, not robbery nor qualified theft.
HELD:
YES.
Art. 308 in relation to Art. 310 of the RPC describes the
felony of qualified theft:
Art. 308. Who are liable for theft. – Theft is committed
by any person who, with intent to gain but without
violence against, or intimidation of persons nor force
upon things, shall take personal property of another
without the latter’s consent.
xxxx
Art. 310. Qualified Theft. – The crime of theft shall be
punished by the penalties next higher by two degrees
than those respectively specified in the next preceding
article, if committed by a domestic servant, or with
grave abuse of confidence, or if the property stolen is
motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle or consists of
coconuts taken from the premises of the plantation,
fish taken from a fishpond or fishery or property is
taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon,
volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular
accident or civil disturbance.
The crime charged against petitioner is theft qualified
by grave abuse of confidence. In this mode of qualified

theft, this Court has stated that the following elements
must be satisfied before the accused may be convicted
of the crime charged:
1. Taking of personal property;
2. That the said property belongs to another;
3. That the said taking be done with intent to gain;
4. That it be done without the owner’s consent;
5. That it be accomplished without the use of violence
or intimidation against persons, nor of force upon
things; and
6. That it be done with grave abuse of confidence.
As pointed out by both the RTC and the CA, the
prosecution had proved the existence of the first four
elements enumerated above beyond reasonable
doubt.
First, it was proved that the subjects of the offense were
all personal or movable properties, consisting as they
were of jewelry, clothing, cellular phone, a media player
and a gaming device. Second, these properties belong
to private complainant Vedua. Third, circumstantial
evidence places petitioner in the scene of the crime
during the day of the incident, as numerous witnesses
saw him in Vedua’s house and his clothes were found
inside the house. He was thereafter seen carrying a
heavy-looking sack as he was leaving private
complainant’s house. All these circumstances portray a
chain of events that leads to a fair and reasonable
conclusion that petitioner took the personal properties
with intent to gain, especially considering that, fourth,
Vedua had not consented to the removal and/or taking
of these properties.
With regard to the fifth and sixths elements, however,
the RTC and the CA diverge in their respective
Decisions.
The RTC found that the taking committed by petitioner
was not qualified by grave abuse of confidence, rather
it was qualified by the use of force upon things. The
trial court held that there was no confidence reposed
by the private complainant on Viray that the latter
could have abused. In fact, Vedua made sure that she
locked the door before leaving. Hence, Viray was
compelled to use force to gain entry into Vedua’s
house thereby committing the crime of robbery, not
theft.
The CA, on the other hand, opined that the breaking of
the screen and the door could not be appreciated to
qualify petitioner’s crime to robbery as such use of
force was not alleged in the Information. Rather, this
breaking of the door, the CA added, is an indication of
petitioner’s abuse of the confidence given by private
complainant. The CA held that "[Viray] enjoyed the
confidence of the private complainant, being the
caretaker of the latter’s pets. He was given access to
the outside premises of private complainant’s house
which he gravely abused when he forced open the
doors of the same house and stole the latter’s
belongings." Committing grave abuse of confidence in
the taking of the properties, petitioner was found by
the CA to be liable for qualified theft.
This Court is inclined to agree with the CA that the
taking committed by petitioner cannot be qualified by
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the breaking of the door, as it was not alleged in the
Information. However, we disagree from its finding
that the same breaking of the door constitutes the
qualifying element of grave abuse of confidence to
sentence petitioner Viray to suffer the penalty for
qualified theft. Instead, We are one with the RTC that
private complainant did not repose on Viray
"confidence" that the latter could have abused to
commit qualified theft.
The very fact that petitioner "forced open" the main
door and screen because he was denied access to
private complainant’s house negates the presence of
such confidence in him by private complainant.
Without ready access to the interior of the house and
the properties that were the subject of the taking, it
cannot be said that private complaint had a "firm trust"
on petitioner or that she "relied on his discretion" and
that the same trust reposed on him facilitated Viray’s
taking of the personal properties justifying his
conviction of qualified theft.
To warrant the conviction and, hence, imposition of the
penalty for qualified theft, there must be an allegation
in the information and proof that there existed
between the offended party and the accused such high
degree of confidence or that the stolen goods have
been entrusted to the custody or vigilance of the
accused. In other words, where the accused had never
been vested physical access to,or material possession
of, the stolen goods, it may not be said that he or she
exploited such access or material possession thereby
committing such grave abuse of confidence in taking
the property. Thus, in People v. Maglaya, this Court
refused to impose the penalty prescribed for qualified
theft when the accused was not given material
possession or access to the property:
Although appellant had taken advantage of his
position in committing the crime aforementioned, We
do not believe he had acted with grave abuse of
confidence and can be convicted of qualified theft,
because his employer had never given him the
possession of the machines involved in the present
case or allowed him to take hold of them, and it does
not appear that the former had any special confidence
in him. Indeed, the delivery of the machines to the
prospective customers was entrusted, not to appellant,
but to another employee.
Inasmuch as the aggregate value of the machines
stolen by appellant herein is ₱13,390.00, the crime
committed falls under Art. 308, in relation to the first
subdivision of Art.309 of the Revised Penal Code, which
prescribes the penalty of prisión mayor in its minimum
and medium periods.1âwphi1 No modifying
circumstance having attended the commission of the
offense, said penalty should be meted out in its
medium period, or from 7 years, 4 months and 1 day
to 8 years and 8 months of prisión mayor. The penalty
imposed in the decision appealed from is below this
range.
The allegation in the information that the offender is a
laborer of the offended party does not by itself,

without more, create the relation of confidence and
intimacy required by law for the imposition of the
penalty prescribed for qualified theft. Hence, the
conclusion reached by the appellate court that
petitioner committed qualified theft because he
"enjoyed the confidence of the private complainant,
being the caretaker of the latter’s pets" is without legal
basis. The offended party’s very own admission that
the accused was never allowed to enter the house
where the stolen properties were kept refutes the
existence of the high degree of confidence that the
offender could have allegedly abused by "forcing open
the doors of the same house."
Without the circumstance of a grave abuse of
confidence and considering that the use of force in
breaking the door was not alleged in the Information,
petitioner can only be held accountable for the crime
of simple theft under Art. 308 in relation to Art. 309 of
the RPC.
As for the penalty, We note with approval the
observation made by the appellate court that the
amount of the property taken was not established by
an independent and reliable estimate. Thus, the Court
may fix the value of the property taken based on the
attendant circumstances of the case or impose the
minimum penalty under Art. 309 of the RPC. In this
case, We agree with the observation made by the
appellate court in accordance with the rule that "if
there is no available evidence to prove the value of the
stolen property or that the prosecution failed to prove
it, the corresponding penalty to be imposed on the
accused-appellant should be the minimum penalty
corresponding to theft involving the value of ₱5.00."
Accordingly, We impose the prescribed penalty under
Art. 309(6) of the RPC, which is arresto mayor in its
minimum and medium periods. The circumstance of
the breaking of the door, even if proven during trial,
cannot be considered as a generic aggravating
circumstance as it was not alleged in the Information.
Thus, the Court finds that the penalty prescribed
should be imposed in its medium period, that is to say,
from two (2) months and one (1) day to three (3)
months of arresto mayor.
Lastly, We delete the order for the reparation of the
stolen property. Art. 2199 of the Civil Code is clear that
one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for
such pecuniary loss suffered by him, as he has duly
proved. Since, as aforesaid, the testimony of the private
complainant is not sufficient to establish the value of
the property taken, nor may the courts take judicial
notice of such testimony, We cannot award the
reparation of the stolen goods.
WHEREFORE, the C Decision of August 31, 2012 in CA-
G.R. CR No. 33076 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Petitioner Ryan Viray is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of SIMPLE THEFT and is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment for two (2) months
and one (1) day to three (3) months of arresto mayor.
Further, for want of convincing proof as to the value of
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the property stolen, the order for reparation is hereby
DELETED.
March 29, 2018 – Article 309 – PENALTIES FOR
THEFT
DUQUE, Francis Lester M
G.R. NO. L-30859 NOVEMBER 25, 1929
PEOPLE VS. JUAN CARPIO
FACTS:
Raymundo Silos hired automobile No. 376 known as
"Star," and was driven by the chauffeur Resurreccion
Ledesma. In one restaturant, Silos invited Ledesma to
come in with him to eat something and while they were
thus engaged, Ledesma's car No. 376 was stolen and
was not to be found when Silos and Ledesma emerged
from the restaurant. The next day the stolen car was
found, stripped of three tires with the rims. A few days
thereafter, the three tires taken from car No. 376 were
found on the "Star" car which was being driven by Juan
Carpio. When the owner of the car No. 376 asked
Carpio how his three tires came to be on Carpio's car,
the latter admitted that said three tires belonged to the
owner of the car No. 376; and they were in fact readily
identified by their numbers.
ISSUE:
WON Carpio should be guilty of theft with respect to
the tires only and not to the automobile.
HELD:
No. The gist of the offense of larceny consists in the
furtive taking and asportation of property, animo
lucrandi, and with intent to deprive the true owner of
the possession thereof. The act of asportation in this
case was undoubtedly committed with intent on the
part of the thief to profit by the act, and since he
effectively deprived the true owner of the possession
of the entire automobile, the offense of larceny
comprised the whole car. The fact that the accused
stripped the car of its tires and abandoned the machine
in a distant part of the city did not make the appellant
any less liable for the larceny of that automobile. The
deprivation of the owner and the trespass upon his
right of possession were complete as to the entire car;
and the fact that the thieves thought it wise promptly
to abandon the machine in no wise limits their criminal
responsibility to the particular parts of the car that
were appropriated and subsequently used by the
appellant upon his own car. Since subject car was less
than 1 year after being bought by the owner, it was
practically new. Upon taking judicial notice, the car
valued at 250. This put the penalty under par 3 of Art
309 with the penalty of prision correcional in its
medium and minimum period since the value of the
property is more than 200 but does not exceed 6,000
which runs from one year, eight months and twenty-
one days to two years, eleven months and ten days.
G.R. No. 158182 June 12, 2008
SESINANDO MERIDA vs. PEOPLE
FACTS:

Petitioner was charged in RTC for cutting, gathering,
collecting and removing a narra tree inside a Mayod
Property over which Tansiongco claims ownership.
Tansiongco learned that petitioner cut a narra tree in
the Mayod Property. Tansiongco reported the tree-
cutting to the DENR forester Hernandez who ordered
petitioner not to convert the felled tree trunk into
lumber. Later, Tansiongco informed Hernandez that
petitioner had converted the narra trunk into lumber.
Hernandez went to the Mayod Property and saw that
the narra tree had been cut into six smaller pieces of
lumber. Hernandez took custody of the lumber,9 and
issued an apprehension receipt to petitioner. A
complaint was filed for violation for violation of Section
68 of PD 705 known as Forestry Reform Code of the
Philippines. The trial court found petitioner guilty as
charged, sentenced him to fourteen (14) years, eight
(8) months and one (1) day to twenty (20) years of
reclusion temporal. Merida appealed before SC
contending that the penalty imposed was excessive.
ISSUE:
WON the penalty imposed by the RTC is correct.
HELD:
No. RTC is not Correct. Violation of Section 68 of PD
705 is punishable as Qualified Theft. Under Art. 309.
Penalties. - 1.) The penalty of prisión mayor in its
minimum and medium periods, if the value of the thing
stolen is more than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed
22,000 pesos; but if the value of the thing stolen
exceeds the latter amount, the penalty shall be the
maximum period... 6.) Arresto Mayor in its minimum
and medium periods, if such value does not exceed five
pesos.
The Information alleged that the lumber valued in the
amount of P20,930.40. To prove this allegation, the
prosecution relied on Hernandez's testimony that
these amounts, are his "estimates" based on
"prevailing local price." This evidence does not suffice.
To prove the amount of the property taken for fixing
the penalty imposable against the accused under
Article 309 of the RPC, the prosecution must present
more than a mere uncorroborated "estimate" of such
fact. In the absence of independent and reliable
corroboration of such estimate, courts may either
apply the minimum penalty under Article 309 or fix the
value of the property taken based on the attendant
circumstances of the case. In the case of People v.
Dator with the same set of facts, SC imposed the
minimum penalty under Article 309 (6)45 of the RPC.
Applying penalty for qualfied theft (imposed penalty
higher by two degrees) and taking into account the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the SC imposed penalty
of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to three (3) years, four (4) months and
twenty-one (21) days of prision correcional, as
maximum.
March 29, 2018 – Article 310 – QUALIFIED THEFT
FLORENTINO, Kimberly A.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
VS SYOU HU
G.R. NO. L- 45765, JANUARY 29, 1938
ISSUE:
Whether accused violated article 310 of the Revised
Penal Code?
FACTS:
Accused was living in the house of the victim, who had
sheltered him out of charity. In August of 1937, the sum
of P435 in cash was taken from the offended party
without his consent.
HELD:
Yes, article 310 of the Revised Penal Code provides that
qualified theft is committed when "grave abuse of
confidence is present," making it understood thereby
that the relation of cause and effect must exist between
the abuse of confidence and the crime. The grave
abuse of confidence does not produce the crime of
theft as effect. It is the asportation, with intent of gain,
of personal property belonging to another without the
owner's knowledge and consent, which produces it.
The relation of cause and effect, therefore does not
exist between the two concepts.The grave abuse of
confidence is a mere circumstance which aggravates
and qualifies the commission of the crime of theft. It is
not necessary for said circumstance to be
premeditated in order to be taken into consideration
as an aggravating circumstance qualifying said crime.
Its presence in the commission of the crime is
sufficient. The fact that the accused was living in the
house of the ofended party, who had sheltered him out
of charity, when he took the money belonging to his
protector, aggravates the crime committed by him,
inasmuch as he gravely abused the confidence which
the owner of the house reposed inhim upon permitting
him, out of charity, to live therein, stiffling the
sentiment of gratitude awakended in his bosom by his
benefactor's charitable act. This abuse of confidence
was all the more grave because it happened between
fellow countrymen.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
VS EDGARDO T. CRUZ
G.R. NO. 200081, JUNE 08, 2016
ISSUE:
Whether the accused violated Article 310 of the
Revised Penal Code?
FACTS:
Complainant Eduardo S. Carlos put up a business
engaged in the sale of tires, batteries and services for
wheel alignment, wheel balancing and vulcanizing.
During the infancy of the business,complainant sought
the help of the accused to tend the needs of the
business including the financial aspect. When the
business started to gain recognition and despite the
the rise of the number of clients they were serving, its
financial capital remained unimpressive. Thus, by
suspicion complainant discovered through the
accused's sister that he was stealing from the company.

When complainant checked the daily sales report
containing the list of payments and balances of
customers he found out that the remaining balances of
their customers and accused's advances totaled to P97,
984.00. At the bottom of the balance sheet was an
acknowledgement of the accused that the amounts
declared lost were actually used by him for his personal
use. Complainant also discovered other irregularities in
the business dealings of the accused.
HELD:
Yes. When theft as defined in article 308 of the Revised
Penal Code is committed with grave abuse of
confidence, the crime appreciates into qualified theft
punishable under article 310 of the same code. All the
elements of Qualified Theft are present in this case
such as;
1.) Taking of personal property
2.) That the said property belongs to another
3.) That the said taking be done with intent to gain
4.) That it be done without thebowner's consent
5.) That it be done without the use of violence or
intimidation against persons, nor of force upon things
6.) That it be done with grave abuse of confidence.
The accused was found guilty and was sentenced to
serve the penalty of reclusion perpetua and was
ordered to pay the amount of the value of the property
stolen which is P97,984.00.
ONG VS PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 190475, APRIL 10, 2013
ISSUE:
Whether accused is guilty of violating P.D. 1612 (Anti-
Fencing Law)?
FACTS:
Private complainant was the owner of 44 firestone
truck tires of which 6 were sold and 38 remained inside
the warehouse. Complainant, marked the tires using a
piece of chalk before storing them inside the
warehouse. The following day all the 38 tires were
stolen, the gate was forcibly opened. Together with his
caretaker they reported the incident to the police.
While investigation was still pending complainant
upon chance happened to inquire in a store if they
have tires that has same specifications with the ones
stolen. Accused answered in affirmative and showed it
to him. Complainant happened to notice the marking
he made during inventory. Complainant left the store
and reported the matter to the police. A buy bust team
was formed and the accused was arrested and the total
of 13 tires were confiscated.
HELD:
Yes. Fencing is defined in Section 2(a) of P.D. 1612 as
the "act of any person who, with intent to gain for
himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep,
acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell,
or in any manner deal in any article, item, object or
anything of value which he knows, or should be known
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to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the
crime of robbery or theft."
The essential elements of the crime of fencing are as
follows: (1) a crime of robbery or theft has been
committed; (2) the accused, who is not a principal or
on accomplice in the commission of the crime of
robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps,
acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells,
or in any manner deals in any article, item, object or
anything of value, which has been derived from the
proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; (3) the
accused knew or should have known that the said
article, item, object or anything of value has been
derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or
theft; and (4) there is, on the part of one accused, intent
to gain for oneself or for another.
March 31, 2018 – Article 311 – THEFT OF THE
PROPERTY OF THE NATIONAL LIBRARY AND
NATIONAL MUSEUM
FUENTES, Arczft Ran Z.
[NO CASE FOUND]
March 31, 2018 – Article 312 – OCCUPATION OF
REAL PROPERTY OR USURPATION OF REAL RIGHTS
IN PROPERTY
IBABAO, Konrad Stephen P.
US V. FUSTER
G.R. NO. 1366, NOVEMBER 18, 1903
ISSUE:
Whether accused violated article 312 of the Revised
Penal Code.
FACTS:
Accused forcibly entered and usurped the land in
questioned which was in possession of Dofia Carolina
Gomez de la Serna. Dofia Carolina herself says that this
land "does not belong to anybody," and that, although
she is occupying it, it is only because she is in
possession of it. There is, therefore, no evidence that
the land is the property of those alleged to have been
injured by the offense charged.
The defendant offered to prove, by authentic
documents, that he was the lawful owner of the land in
question. This evidence was rejected in the court
below. In this the court erred, for it unquestionably is
an error to exclude proof of the ownership of property
in litigation when, as in the case of usurpation, this
ownership constitutes a necessary and indispensable
element for the determination of the defendant's guilt
or innocence. If the defendant herein had shown that
he was the owner of the land in question, there would
have been no ground on which he could have been
convicted of the offense charged, because no one can,
in a legal sense, be guilty of the usurpation of his own
property.
HELD:
The law requires that the real property or the real right

seized be the property of another, in order that the
crime of usurpation may exist. The error of law into
which the court fell in refusing to admit the evidence
of ownership offered by the defendant, and against
which ruling the defendant duly excepted, would be a
sufficient ground for remanding the case for a new
trial. We do not, however, consider it necessary to do
this, in view of the fact that the prosecution has not
proven that the land alleged to have been usurped was
not the property of the defendant. The burden lay with
the prosecution to prove this fact, and, having failed to
do so, we must acquit the defendant, even in the
absence of any evidence in his behalf, because of the
presumption of innocence to which every defendant is
entitled until proven guilty.
We therefore reverse the judgment appealed and
acquit the defendant, with the costs of both instances
de oficio. So ordered.
QUINAO V. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 139603, JULY 14, 2000
ISSUE:
Whether petitioners are guilty of the crime of
Usurpation of Real Property.
FACTS:
On February 2, 1993 at around 9am in the morning,
accused together with their relatives, suddenly
appeared in the land in questioned owned by Francisco
Del Monte and used force, violence and intimidation
and took possession of the land claiming that it is their
inheritance from their ascendants and while there, they
gathered coconuts and made them copra.
Accused testified that they are the grandchildren of
Lorenzo Cases, and during his lifetime, he acquired the
real property in question and declared the same in his
name.
RTC rendered judgement finding accused guilty of
violation of article 312 of the Revised Penal Code. The
accused are further sentenced not to enter or intrude
upon this property rightfully adjudged to belong to
Francisco Delmonte, private complainant herein and
they are ordered under pain of imprisonment for
Contempt of Court, to Cease and Desist forever from
disturbing or molesting the peaceful and quiet
possession and ownership of the herein private
offended party over the property subject of litigation,
hence the appeal.
HELD:
The requisites of usurpation are that the accused took
possession of anothers real property or usurped real
rights in anothers property; that the possession or
usurpation was committed with violence or
intimidation and that the accused had animo lucrandi.
In order to sustain a conviction for "usurpacion de
derecho reales," the proof must show that the real
property occupied or usurped belongs, not to the
occupant or usurper, but to some third person, and
that the possession of the usurper was obtained by
means of intimidation or violence done to the person
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ousted of possession of the property.
More explicitly, in Castrodes vs. Cubelo, the Court
stated that the elements of the offense are (1)
occupation of anothers real property or usurpation of
a real right belonging to another person; (2) violence
or intimidation should be employed in possessing the
real property or in usurping the real right, and (3) the
accused should be animated by the intent to gain.
In the present case, based on the above findings and
the sketch maps submitted, it is clear that the disputed
land which is the red shaded area (Exh. "B-2") is within
the boundary of the land awarded to the complainant
in Civil Case No. 3516 [should be 3561]. The issue of
ownership over the land in question having been
decided in Civil Case No. 3516 [should be 3561] in favor
of the complainant in 1949, the same will not be
disturbed. The accused has to respect the findings of
the court., it is indeed very clear that the area claimed
by the accused encroached the area of the plaintiffs.
March 31, 2018 – Article 313 – ALTERING
BOUNDERIES OR LANDMARKS
LAZO II, Joseph Artfel T.
[NO CASES FOUND]
March 31, 2018 – Article 314 – FRAUDULENT
INSOLVENCY
NASH, Regina Mercado
G.R. No. 38618
September 15, 1933
PEOPLE VS. SY GESIONG
ISSUE:
Whether or not Sy Gesiong is guilty of fraudulent
insolvency?
FACTS:
Sy Gesiong, was convicted by the Court of First
Instance of Bohol of the crime of estafa for having
concealed or otherwise disposed of certain personal
property belonging to him for the purpose of
defrauding his creditors, and sentenced to one year of
presidio correccional, to indemnify Ignacio Molina and
Vicente Gaviola in the sum of P2,997.76 with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the
costs. From this judgment the present appeal was
taken. Appellant has assigned five errors as having
been committed by the trial court. The first error
assigned raises the question of the sufficiency of the
facts alleged in the information filed against the
appellant.The theory of the prosecution is that the facts
alleged in the information constitute the crime of
estafa defined in article 523 of the old Penal Code and
in article 314 of the Revised Penal Code. It will be
noticed that one of the essential elements of the crime
thus defined is that the absconding of the property by
the defendant must result in prejudice to his creditors.
The information filed in this case contains no such
allegation. It is true that it alleges that the defendant
fraudulently concealed his property mentioned in the
information, but such allegation is not sufficient to

fulfill the requirement of the law. A person may
fraudulently dispose of some of his property, and yet
such act may not necessarily result in prejudice to his
creditors; for he may have some other property with
which to satisfy his obligations. It is too well-settled to
require the citation of authorities that to warrant
conviction, every element of the crime must be alleged
and proved. The second assignment of error attacks
the findings of fact of the trial court. On this point, the
evidence for the prosecution shows that the goods
alleged to have been concealed and otherwise
disposed of by the appellant were shipped from Bohol
to Cebu under suspicious circumstances. Appellant
admitted having shipped the goods to Cebu, but
claimed that he did so as a commission or purchasing
agent for a firm in that city. Appellant further claimed
that he had no knowledge of the order of the court of
July 31, 1931, which was notified to him by his attorney
only on August 15, 1931; and that, besides the goods
alleged to have been fraudulently disposed of or
concealed by him, he still had in his possession
property valued at P4,600.
HELD:
No, Sy Giong was not guilty of fraudulent insolvency.
Upon a careful consideration of the facts and
circumstances of the case, the court believe that the
guilt of the appellant has not been established beyond
a reasonable doubt.
In view of the above conclusions, we do not deem it
necessary to discuss the other errors assigned by the
appellant.
The judgment appealed from was reversed, and the
defendant was acquitted with costs de oficio.
G.R. No. L-39177
February 21, 1934
PEOPLE vs. TAN DIONG (alias TANGO), PASTORA
PADLA, and EUSTAQUIO BARANDA
ISSUE:
Whether or not Tan DIong, Pastora Padla and
Eustaquio Baranda are guilty of fraudulent insolvency?
FACTS:
As appeal has been brought to reverse a judgment of
the Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental, finding
the three appellants, Tan Diong (alias Tango), Pastora
Padla, and Eustaquio Baranda, guilty of the offense of
making way with the property in fraud of creditors, in
violation of article 523 of the old Penal Code (article
314, R.P.C.), and sentencing them as follows: Tan Diong
to imprisonment for six years and one day, presidio
mayor, and Pastora Padla and Eustaquio Baranda to
imprisonment for four years, two months and one day,
presidio correccional, and requiring them to pay
proportional costs.
Prior to the acts with which we are here concerned the
appellant Tan Diong was a merchant in good standing
in the municipality of Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental.
Pastora Padla is his wife and Eustaquio Baranda is the
husband of the latter's niece. Prior to June, 1931, Tan
Diong had become indebted to various merchants of
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Cebu, and a judgment against him had been rendered
in favor of Lim Tian Ting & Co. for more than five
thousand pesos. Upon this judgment an execution had
been issued, but it realized only the sum of P198.23
from certain personal property levied upon in Tan
Diong's, store. Tan Diong and his wife had previously
owned various parcels of real property in the
municipality, but investigation showed that prior to the
events mentioned they had transferred all to their co-
defendant Eustaquio Baranda.
The proof amply shows that these conveyances were
made for the purpose of putting the property beyond
the reach of Tan Diong's creditor's, and that the
consideration mentioned in the deeds of conveyance
from Tan Diong and wife to Baranda was fictitious. No
error, in our opinion, was committed in finding the
appellant Tan Diong guilty of the offense charged.
As to Eustaquio Baranda, we note that the conveyances
by which these properties were conveyed to him were
unilateral character. Baranda did not participate in the
conveyances, and his alleged participation in the fraud
consisted only of the fact that he has asserted
ownership in the property conveyed. In our opinion,
this does not justify his conviction as a participant in
the fraud. His resolution to accept the benefit of the
fraudulent conveyances may have been formed only
after the act. His guilt as a co-conspirator in the fraud
is therefore not proved.
HELD:
The judgment appealed from is therefore reversed as
to Pastora Padla and Eustaquio Baranda, without
prejudice to the right of the creditors, or any creditor,
of Tan Diong to bring a civil action against Baranda. So
ordered, with costs de oficio against said appellants. As
to Tan Diong, the judgment appealed from is modified
by sentencing him to an indeterminate period of from
one year, prision correccional, to eight years and one
day, prision mayor; and as thus modified, the judgment
as to him is affirmed, with costs.
March 31, 2018 – Article 315 – ESTAFA (SWINDLING)
OLACO, Jan-Lawrence P.
LITO CORPUZ VS PEOPLE
G.R. No. 180016 April 29, 2014
ISSUE:
Whether or not Corpuz is guilty of the crime of Estafa
under Art. 315 of the RPC.
FACTS:
Lito Corpuz received from complainant Tangcoy pieces
of jewelry with an obligation to sell the same and remit
the proceeds of the sale or to return the same if not
sold, after the expiration of 30 days.The period expired
without Corpuz remitting anything to Tangcoy. When
Corpuz and Tangcoy met, Corpuz promised that he will
pay, but to no avail. Tangcoy filed a case for estafa with
abuse of confidence against Corpuz. However, Corpuz
argued as follows – that the proof submitted by
Tangcoy (receipt) is inadmissible for being a mere

photocopy and the fourth element of estafa or demand
is not proved.
HELD:
YES. The court agreed that the admissibility of
evidence, which was only a mere photocopy was valid,
stating that the established doctrine is that when a
party failed to interpose a timely objection to evidence
at the time they were offered in evidence, such
objection shall be considered as waived. In the instant,
Corpuz never objected to the admissibility of the said
evidence at the time it was identified, marked and
testified upon in court by Tangcoy. Corpuz also failed
to raise an objection in his comment to the
prosecution’s formal offer of evidence and even
admitted having signed the said receipt. Moreover, the
court pointed out that no specific type of proof is
required to show that there was demand. Demand
need not even be formal; it may be verbal. The specific
word “demand” need not even be used to show that it
has indeed been made upon the person charged, since
even a mere query as to the whereabouts of the
money, in this case, property, would be tantamount to
a demand. The court cited the case of Tubb vs. People,
where the complainant merely verbally inquired about
the money entrusted to the accused, the query was
tantamount to a demand. Hence, Lito Corpuz is liable
for the crime of Estafa.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. JULIE GRACE K.
VILLANUEVA
G.R. NO. 163662, FEBRUARY 25, 2015
ISSUE:
Whether or not Villanueva commit Estafa under Article
315 paragraph 2(d), of the RPC.
FACTS:
The complainant Madarang went to Villanueva's
residence and was able to sell to Villanueva five sets of
jewelry worth P 1,010,000.00. Villanueva made out nine
checks drawn against Philippine National Bank (PNB),
eight of which were postdated for the payment of such
jewelries. Madarang received the checks because of
Villanueva's assurance that they would all be honored
upon presentment. However, the draweee bank paid
only one of the eight postdated checks since the
remaining checks were dishonored by reason of
Account Closed or Drawn Against Insufficient Funds.
Villanueva denies the crime and insists on the absence
of fraud when she drew the postdated checks. She
claims that (a) the checks were issued as replacement;
(b) the checks could only be deposited or encashed
after Madarang was notified of the sufficiency of funds;
and (c) the receipt presented by the Prosecution failed
to embody the real intention of the parties. She further
contends that the checks were not executed prior to or
simultaneous with the alleged fraud and that
Madarang had instigated her to issue the checks,
hence, she cannot be held liable for estafa.
HELD:
YES. The estafa charged under Article 315 paragraph
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2(d) may be committed when: (1) the offender has
postdated or issued a check in payment of an
obligation contracted at the time of the postdating or
issuance; (2) at the time of postdating or issuance of
said check, the offender has no funds in the bank, or
the funds deposited are not sufficient to cover the
amount of the check; and (3) the payee has been
defrauded. The deceit should be the efficient cause of
the defraudation, and should either be prior to, or
simultaneous with, the act of the fraud. In the present
case, all the elements of estafa were present.
In the instant case, the first element was admitted by
Villanueva, who confirmed that she had issued the
checks to Madarang in exchange for the jewelry she
had purchased. There is no question that Madarang
accepted the checks upon the assurance of Villanueva
that they would be funded upon presentment. The
second element was also established because the
checks were dishonored upon presentment due to
insufficiency of funds or because the account was
already closed. The third element was also proved by
the showing that Madarang suffered prejudice by her
failure to collect from Villanueva the balance of P995,
000.00. In her defense, Villanueva adverts to an
agreement with Madarang whereby the latter would
deposit or encash the checks only after being informed
of the sufficiency of funds in Villanueva's account. This
defense, however, was bereft of merit because she did
not present proof of the supposed agreement. Hence,
Villanueva is guilty of estafa under Article 315
paragraph 2(d) of the RPC.
March 31, 2018 – Article 316 – OTHER FORMS OF
SWINDLING
PACQUIAO, Jose Luis P.
ESTRELLADO-MAINAR V PEOPLE
GR NO. 184320 ( JULY 29, 2015)
ISSUE
Whether or not accused Mainar is liable under Article
316, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code
FACTS
Petitioner Mainar offered for sale to Eric Naval,
portions of land located in Matina Aplaya, Davao City.
During the negotiations for this sale, the petitioner told
Naval that the title to the land she was selling had no
problems. The petitioner also informed Naval that the
area subject of the proposed sale would "still be
segregated from the mother title.”
Subsequently, representatives from JS Francisco &
Sons, Inc. (JS Francisco) demolished Naval's house. It
was only then that Naval discovered that the lot sold
to him had been the subject of a dispute between the
petitioner's family and JS Francisco. Naval demanded
from the petitioner the return of the amount he paid
for the land, as well as to pay the value of the house
demolished, but the latter refused to heed these
demands.

The prosecution charged petitioner with the crime of
other forms of swindling under Article 316, paragraph
1 of the Revised Penal Code. The MTCC found
petitioner guilty of Article 316, paragraph 2 of the RPC,
which the RTC affirmed. The petitioner Mainar
challenged the RTC ruling in the CA, but the latter
denied it.
HELD
No. The information in the present case, expressly
indicated in its caption that it is charging the petitioner
under Article 316, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal
Code. We reiterate that the Information in the present
case did not allege that the petitioner made an express
representation that the property sold is free from any
encumbrance. This Information was crafted in such a
way that only one particular crime was charged did not
constitute ground for conviction under paragraph 2,
which may be committed even by the owner of the
property.
Moreover, the petitioner cannot be charged under
Article 316 paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. The
presented pieces of evidence do not also warrant a
conviction for the crime for which the petitioner had
been charged, that is, Article 316, paragraph 1 of the
Revised Penal Code.
PEOPLE V. GALSIM
GR NO. L-14577 ( FEBRUARY 29, 1960)
ISSUE
Whether or not accused Galsim is liable under Article
316 of the Revised Penal Code
FACTS
Accused Galsim obtained a loan from Mauro Magno in
the amount of P2,500.00 payable within a period of five
years, and to secure its payment the former executed
in favor of the latter a deed of chattel mortgage
assigning and conveying by way of first mortgage a
two-story house located in the City of Manila.
Magno subsequently found out that the house in
question had already been previously mortgaged by its
owner to a certain Dela Torre. As a result, the deed of
mortgage executed by the accused in favor of Magno
was refused registration by the register of deeds.
Magno demanded the return of his money from the
accused but the latter failed to do so.
HELD
Yes. It is evident that the appellant obtained the loan
from complainant through false representation or
deceit which is one of the elements constituting the
crime of estafa. It is apparent that the complainant had
granted the loan to appellant in the belief that the
security offered was good and sufficient to guarantee
his investment because it was free from any lien or
encumbrance. Had he known that it was already
encumbered, the likelihood was that he would not
have granted the loan, which proves the fraud of which
he was a victim.
April 01, 2018 – Article 317 – SWINDLING A MINOR
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PACQUIAO, Jose Paolo P.
[NO CASE FOUND]
April 01, 2018 - Article 318 – OTHER DECEITS
PANIZA, Lyndzelle Jane D.
PEOPLE VS. GANASI
C.A., 61 O.G 3603
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ganasi was guilty of other deceits
under Article 318 and not under paragraph 1(a) of
Article 315.
FACTS:
Ganasi incurred a debt from Dacanay in the amount of
P3,500. As security for the debt, Ganasi offered to
mortgage Lot No. 1 to Dacanay. Ganasi then showed
to Dacanay a plan to the lot, and accompanied him for
an ocular inspection of the premises. Finding the land
suitable for a carpentry shop he intended to build,
Dacanay consented to the execution of a deed of
mortgage. When said obligation became due, Ganasi,
being unable to raise the amount, decided to sell the
mortgage property to Dacanay, the same to answer for
everything he owed to the latter. Thereafter, Dacanay
went to the Register of Deeds of Benguet to have his
ownership over Lot No. 1 registered. Much to his
surprise, he was informed that what Ganasi sold to him
was not Lot No. 1 but Lot No. 2 composed mostly of
uneven and hilly terrain and which was worthless for
what he intended to use it.
HELD:
Yes, Ganasi was guilty of other deceits under Article
318 and not under paragraph 1(a) of Article 315.
The Solicitor General erred in stating that the offense
comes within the purview of paragraph 1(a) of Article
315. Under such provision, the obligation to deliver
already exists, and the offender on making delivery has
altered the substance, quantity or quality of the thing
delivered. The facts of this case were not foursquare
with such provision of law. Here, Ganasi deceitfully
pointed to Dacanay one parcel of land, offering it as
security, on the strength of which deceit, Dacanay
parted with his money. The deceit practiced by Ganasi
preceded the alienation of substance, quantity or
quality in the sense intended by paragraph 1(a) of
Article 315 in Ganasi’s execution of the mortgage and
later of the sale.
Thus, the offense committed by Ganasi must perforce
come within the meaning and intendment of the
blanket provisions of Article 318 since it was not
covered by Article 315, 316 and 317.
JOVITA SALES v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-47817. August 29, 1988
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.
ISSUE:
Did the act of Sales in causing the "stop payment"

order of the checks in questions constitute the deceit
referred to in Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code?
FACTS:
Jovita Sales issued two checks, one, for the sum of P2
000.00 and another one, for the sum of P6,000.00, both
dated January 30, 1971. The said checks were issued in
favor of Renato Magdaluyo. When both checks were
presented for encashment or deposited for clearance
with Magdaluyo’s bank, they were dishonored because
Sales made a communication to her bank to issue a
"stop payment" order regarding the same.
Magdaluyo then looked for Sales and the latter
promised him the payment of the amount of the
dishonored checks in cash. However, the promise was
never fulfilled. A formal demand was subsequently
made, and when no compliance was still made, the
charge of estafa was filed.
After trial, instead of convicting Sales of the crime of
estafa under Art. 315, par. 2(d) of the Revised Penal
Code, the City Court of Pasay found her guilty of the
crime "Other deceits" under Art. 318 of the same Code.
HELD:
Yes, the act of Sales in causing the "stop payment"
order of the checks in questions did constitute the
deceit referred to in Article 318 of the Revised Penal
Code.
In estafa under Art. 315, par. 2(d), the elements are:
1) Postdating or issuance of a check in payment of an
obligation contracted at the time the check was issued;
(2) Lack or insufficiency of funds to cover the check;
and
(3) Damage to the payee thereof (People v. Sabio, 86
SCRA 568).
Sales’ act of causing the "stop payment" order of the
checks in question undoubtedly makes her liable for
the crime of estafa. It was only the failure on the part
of the prosecution to show that Sales had insufficient
funds in the bank to cover the checks in question at the
time she postdated them that prevented Sales’
conviction of the crime as charged. Since, the other
elements of the crime under Art. 315, paragraph 2(d)
were proved which included those of deceit and
damage, it was correct to convict Sales of the crime
under Article 318 (Other deceits) of the Revised Penal
Code.
GUINHAWA VS. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 162822, AUGUST 25, 2005
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Guinhawa was guilty of other deceits
under Article 318.
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FACTS:
Jaime Guinhawa was engaged in the business of selling
brand new motor vehicles under the business name of
Guinrox Motor Sales in Naga City.
On March 17, 1995, Guinhawa purchased a brand new
Mitsubishi L-300 Versa Van. When said van was
transported from Manila to Naga City it suffered an
accident. Guinhawa then repaired the van and later
offered it for sale in his showroom.
On October 1995, spouses Ralph and Josephine Silo
went to Guinhawa’s office to buy a new van and were
shown the L-300 Versa Van which was on display.
Unaware that the van had been damaged and repaired
on account of the accident, the couple decided to
purchase the van.
When the spouses noticed the defects of the van and
were informed that it had been involved in an accident
before, they filed a criminal complaint for violation of
paragraph 1, Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code
against Guinhawa.
HELD:
YES. The false or fraudulent representation by a seller
that what he offers for sale is brand new (when, in fact,
it is not) is one of those deceitful acts envisaged in
paragraph 1, Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code.
For one to be liable for other deceits under the law, it
is required that the prosecution must prove the
following essential elements:
(a) false pretense, fraudulent act or pretense other than
those in the preceding articles;
(b) such false pretense, fraudulent act or pretense must
be made or executed prior to or simultaneously with
the commission of the fraud; and
(c) as a result, the offended party suffered damage or
prejudice.
It is essential that such false statement or fraudulent
representation constitutes the very cause or the only
motive for the private complainant to part with her
property.
The provision includes any kind of conceivable deceit
other than those enumerated in Articles 315 to 317 of
the Revised Penal Code. It is intended as the catchall
provision for that purpose with its broad scope and
intendment.
April 1, 2018 – Article 316 – REMOVAL, SALE OR
PLEDGE OF MORTGAGED PROPERTY
RIVERA, Marynit P.
G.R. No. L-9892
April 15, 1957
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
FRANCISCO BASALO

ISSUE:
What is the proper penalty for the accused?
FACTS:
Francisco Basalo was charged with having unlawfully
and fraudulently sold and disposed of eighty cavans of
palay, he had mortgaged to the Philippine National
Bank, without the knowledge and consent of the
mortgagee, to the damage and prejudice of the said
bank in the sum of at least P280. Upon arraignment,
the accused interposed the defense of prescription on
the ground that more than five years had elapsed from
the time the offense was allegedly committed to the
filing of the information on June 5, 1953. Answering the
defense of prescription, the prosecution claimed that
the Bank discovered the offense only in the year 1953.
HELD:
Under Article 319, the penalty for the offense is arresto
mayor or a fine double the value of the property
involved. In other words, the fine is an alternative
penalty. In conclusion, to determine the prescriptibility
of an offense penalized with a fine, whether imposed
as a single or as an alternative penalty, such fine should
not be reduced or converted into a prison term, but
rather it should be considered as such fine under
Article 26 of the Revised Penal Code; and that for
purposes of prescription of the offense, defined and
penalized in Article 319 of the Revised Penal Code, the
fine imposable therein if correctional or afflictive under
the terms of Article 26, same Code, should be made the
basis rather than that of arresto mayor, also imposable
in said Article 319.
April 3, 2018 – Article 320 AMENDED BY PD NO 1613
ROMBLON, Shirley Kris M.
PEOPLE VS BALUNTONG
G.R. No. 182061
MARCH 15, 2010
ISSUE:
Whether or not Baluntong is guilty of Double murder
with frustrated murder or the crime of arson.
FACTS:
At around 10:30 p.m. while then 12-year old Jovelyn
Santos was sleeping in the house of her
grandmother,she was awakened by heat emanating
from the walls of the house. She thus roused her cousin
Dorecyll and together they went out of the
house.Jovelyn saw appellant putting dry hay (dayami)
around the house near the terrace where the fire
started, but appellant ran away when he saw her and
Dorecyll.
Appellants neighbor, Felicitas Sarzona,also saw
appellant near Celerinas house after it caught fire,
following which, appellant fled on seeing Jovelyn and
Dorecyll stepping out of the house, as other neighbors
repaired to the scene to help contain the flames.
Felicitas also saw Celerina, who was at a neighbors
house before the fire started, enter the burning house
and resurface with her grandsons Alvin and
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Joshua.Celerina and Alvin sustained third degree burns
which led to their death. Joshua sustained second
degree burns.
RULING:
No. Apellant is only guilty of arson.In cases where both
burning and death occur, in order to determine what
crime/crimes was/were perpetrated whether arson,
murder or arson and homicide/murder, it is de rigueur
to ascertain the main objective of the malefactor: (a) if
the main objective is the burning of the building or
edifice, but death results by reason or on the occasion
of arson, the crime is simply arson, and the resulting
homicide is absorbed; (b) if, on the other hand, the
main objective is to kill a particular person who may be
in a building or edifice, when fire is resorted to as the
means to accomplish such goal the crime committed is
murder only; lastly, (c) if the objective is, likewise, to kill
a particular person, and in fact the offender has already
done so, but fire is resorted to as a means to cover up
the killing, then there are two separate and distinct
crimes committed homicide/murder and arson.
The Court finds that there is no showing that appellants
main objective was to kill Celerina and her housemates
and that the fire was resorted to as the means to
accomplish the goal.
As reflected above, as it was not shown that the main
motive was to kill the occupants of the house, the crime
would only be arson, the homicide being a mere
consequence thereof, hence, absorbed by arson.
PEOPLE VS. CEDENIO
G.R. NO. 93485 JUNE 27, 1994
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellant should be charged by a
complex crime of arson with murder.
FACTS:
On November 26, 1986, Dorio residence was gutted
with fire. Five members of the family, then occupying
the house were burned to death. The five bodies
retrieved were those of Mario Hilario Dorio, with
wounds on the head and chest, Flora Dorio with a
wound on the leg and head almost severed, Mario
Dorio with wounds on the leg and left nipple, Nicanora
Tabanao with a wound in the stomach and infant
Dioscora with no wounds at all but charred to the bone.
Two witnesses testified that the three appellants
namely, Pedro Cedenio, Jurito Amarga and Felipe
Antipolo were seen running out of the burning house,
holding bolos stained with blood.
Another witness testified that Pedro Cedenio borrowed
from him a bolo on the night of November 26, and the
following morning, the bolo was returned to him with
a bloodstain on the handle. The accused Pedro
Cedinio, also told him “do not worry, if this incident
reaches the court, I will answer (for) everything”

The trial court found the accused-appelants guilty of
Arson with Multiple Murder as defined and penalized
under Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 1613.
RULINGS:
No. The late Mr. Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino cites
Groizard-
…when the fire is used with the intent to kill a particular
person who may be in the house and that the objective
is attained by burning the house, the crime is murder
only. When the Penal Code declares that killing
committed by means of fire is murder, it intends that
fire should be purposely adopted as a means to that
end. There can be no murder without a design to take
life. In other words, if the main object of the offender
is to kill by means of fire, the offense is murder. But if
the main objective is the burning of a building, the
resulting homicide may be absorbed by the crime of
arson.
From the evidence adduced, it is evident that after the
victims were hacked and stabbed to death, appellants
set the house afire to hide their gruesome act. Thus,
the appellant are guilty of a separate crime of four
counts of murder and arson. And not the complex
crime of arson with murder.
April 2, 2018 – Article 321 – OTHER FORMS OF
ARSON
SALVERON, Jan Ione R.
G.R. No. L-10849 April 30, 1958
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. VICTORIANO
BUENO, alias VICTOR
ISSUE:
Whether article 321 of the Revised Penal Code is
applicable in this case?
FACTS:
Victoriano Bueno was the owner of a parcel of
agricultural land covered with rice hays set fire to the
rice hays on his land in a careless and imprudent
manner without taking the necessary precautions to
prevent its spread to the neighbouring properties.
Pedro Tanap’s hut which was situated on the adjoining
land owned by Victoriano was burned, including all the
farming implements and properties kept in it and
surrounding trees belonging to Pedro. The entire loss
of said hut and properties in it in the value of five
hundred pesos (P500).
Victoriano was subsequently convicted with the crime
of arson through reckless imprudence.
HELD:
YES. Paragraph 5 of article 321 of the Revised Penal
Code which states:
When the arson consists in the burning of other
property and under the circurmstances given
hereunder, the offender shall be punished:
xxxxxxxxx
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By prision correccional in its medium period to prision
mayor in its minimum period, when the damage
caused is over 200 pesos but does not exceed 1,000
pesos, and any of the property referred to in
paragraphs (a) and (b) of the next preceding
subdivision is set on fire; but when the value of such
property does not exceed 200 pesos, the penalty next
lower in degree than that prescribed in this subdivision
shall be imposed when the property burned is a
building used as a dwelling in an uninhabited place,
and the penalty of arresto menor and a fine ranging
from fifty to one hundred per centum of the damage
caused shall be imposed, when the property burned
consists of grain fields, pasture lands, forests or
plantations shall be applied and must be read in
relation to article 365 of the same code. The issue
hinges on the penalty for the crime of Arson through
Reckless Imprudence which has resulted only in
damage to the property of another.
The applicability of the third paragraph of said Article
365 was not considered in said case. In any event, the
first paragraph of Article 365, pursuant to which "any
person who, by reckless imprudence shall commit any
act which, had it been intentional, would have
constituted a less grave felony," shall suffer the penalty
of "arresto mayor in its minimum and medium
periods," merely establishes a general rule. The same is
subject to the exception found in the third paragraph
of the same article, namely, when the execution of said
act shall have only resulted in damage to the property
of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine
ranging from an amount equal to the value of said
damage to three times such value, but which shall in
no case be less than 25 pesos." The present case is
precisely the one contemplated in said exception.
Inasmuch as the reckless and imprudent act of herein
accused has "only resulted in damage to property,"
worth, according to the complaint and the information,
P500, the maximum penalty imposable is, therefore, a
fine of P1,500, which is beyond the jurisdiction of the
Justice of the Peace Court. As a consequence, neither
was the Court of First Instance, in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction, competent to hear and decide
this case on its merits over defendant's objection. The
decision appealed from is hereby set aside and this
case is dismissed.
April 2, 2018 – Article 322 – CASES OF ARSON NOT
INCLUDED IN THE PRECEDING ARTICLES
SANTOALLA, Stephanie M.
[NO CASE FOUND]
April 3, 2018 – Article 323 – ARSON OF PROPERTY
OF SMALL VALUE
TADO, Diann Kathelline A.
[NO CASE FOUND]
April 3, 2018 – Article 324 – CRIMES INVOLVING
DESTRUCTION

UNAS, Nor-Aiza R.
[NO CASE FOUND]
April 3, 2018 – Article 325 – BURNING ONE'S OWN
PROPERTY AS MEANS TO COMMIT ARSON
VILLAHERMOSA, Alexand Rhea M.
[NO CASE FOUND]
April 3, 2018 – Article 326 – SETTING FIRE TO
PROPERTY EXCLUSIVELY OWNED BY THE
OFFENDER
VILLARIN, Paulo Jose S.
[NO CASE FOUND]
April 4, 2018 – Article 327 – WHO ARE LIABLE FOR
MALICIOUS MISCHIEF
VOSOTROS, Jules Andre B.
THE UNITED STATES
v.
CATALINO GERALE, ET AL.
G.R. No. 1768 February 17, 1905
ISSUE:
Whether or not Catalino and Bartolome are guilty of
the crime of Malicious Mischief under Article 327 of the
Revised Penal Code.
FACTS:
In the early hours of the morning of July 23, 1903, the
defendants, Catalino and Bartolome Gerale, father and
son, proceeded to the property in question, situated in
the barrio of Tanque, town of Talisay, Province of Cebu.
The defendants climbed some coconut trees which
were growing upon said property and immediately
proceeded to cut about eighty shoots and forty small
trees that were producing tuba; that when Eugenia
Bacho saw them she scolded them and asked how and
why they cut the coconut shoots on her property and
warned them not to continue damaging her property.
The defendants then becoming angry, came down out
of the trees and advanced toward her, raising their
bolos and saying, "Here we shall all die;" that as the
woman started to run, crying for help in order to bring
the neighbors to her assistance, the defendants
followed her as far as the road; that each one of the
shoots was of the value of 5 pesos and that said shoots
produced tuba to the value of 2 reales per day; that the
coconut trees which were planted on the land had
been planted about twelve years previously by said
Eugenia Bacho and her husband, Luis Abarques; that
the land was part of the hacienda of Santo Niño, the
property of the friars; that this hacienda was then
transferred to the Compania Agricola de Ultramar; that
Abarques and Bacho, after leasing the land from the
manager of said hacienda, planted therein some
coconut trees some twelve years ago, by their laborers
called mananguetes, cleaned off the land and
cultivated the same and obtained tuba from the trees
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thereon, without any opposition whatever for about
four months prior to September of said year.
HELD:
Yes. The crime of damage to property is not
determined solely by the mere act of inflicting injury
upon the property of a third person, but it must be
shown that the act had for its object the injury of the
property merely for the sake of damaging it. Without
this circumstance the essential element of the crime is
lacking and the criminal intention of the culprit cannot
be established.
The facts clearly proven in this case is that the two
defendants cut eighty cocoanut shoots, which were
producing tuba, without having any right so to do; that
they occasioned thereby serious damage to the
interests of those who planted the trees; that the
damage caused amounted to 400 pesos. The
defendants executed this act, prompted, doubtless, by
grievance, hate, or revenge, because the injured party
and her husband had leased the land from the
manager of the hacienda after Catalino Gerale, one of
the defendants and the father of the other defendant,
had been expelled from said land by the attorney of
the owners. When the injured party tried to stop the
damage they were causing to the property, defendants
threatened her and followed her as far as the road.
It is clearly proven that the defendants knew very well
that they were not the owners of the property; they had
consented to the injured party herein profiting by said
trees, extracting the tuba by means of her laborers,
mananguetes, and therefore, when the defendants cut
said shoots, they acted with malicious intention of
injuring the property of the offended party.
Therefore,, taking into consideration the provisions of
articles 83 and 92 of the Penal Code, the court
sentenced Catalino Gerale and Bartolome Gerale to
pay a fine of 400 pesos.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
RESTITUTO FALLER (alias R. Aguilar)
G.R. No. L-45964 April 25, 1939
ISSUE:
Whether or not the crime of malicious mischief may be
committed through reckless imprudence
FACTS:
Restituto Faller was charged with the crime of damage
caused to another's property maliciously and willfully.
After hearing the evidence, the Court of First Instance
of Rizal found that the damage was not cause
maliciously of and willfully, but through reckless
imprudence, and sentenced Restituto Faller, under
paragraph 3 of article 365 of the Revised Penal Code,
as principal in the crime of damage through reckless
imprudence, to pay a fine of P38 and to indemnify the
offended party Ramon Diokno in the same amount,
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

HELD:
Yes. There is a crime of malicious mischief through
reckless imprudence
Reckless imprudence is not a crime in itself. It is simply
a way of committing it and merely determines a lower
degree of criminal liability. The information alleges that
the appellant acted willfully, maliciously, unlawfully and
criminally. To this information no objection was
interposed. Negligence being a punishable criminal act
when it results in a crime, the allegation in the
information that the appellant also committed the acts
charged unlawfully and criminally includes the charge
that he acted with negligence.
SEPARATE OPINION:
If malicious mischief (art. 327, Revised Penal Code) is
an offense distinct from damage to property by
reckless imprudence (art. 365, Revised Penal Code) and
the latter is not necessarily included in the former or
the situation does not call for the application of other
exceptions laid down by this court, the conviction of
the accused under article 365 of the Revised Penal
Code, notwithstanding his prosecution under article
327 thereof, was erroneous. An accused is entitled to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him (par. 17, sec. 1, Art. III, Constitution of the
Philippines, in relation to section 15, par. 2, and section
6, par. 3, of General Orders, No. 58), and for this
purpose the law requires that a complaint or
information must charge but one offense, subject to a
single exception (sec. II, General Orders, No. 58). There
are two reasons, however, why the decision of the
lower court should be affirmed. First, because the
constitutional and legal purpose has been amply
served in this case, it appearing that the accused
himself, in the course of the trial, put up the defense
that he was at most responsible for the offense of
damage to property by reckless imprudence.
Secondly, assuming that the two offenses here are
dinstinct, I think that they are at least akin to each other
so as to justify the application of the rule laid down in
United States vs. Solis
MARIO VALEROSO
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 149718 September 29, 2003
ISSUE:
Whether or not Valeroso is guilty of the crime of
malicious mischief under article 327 of the Revised
Penal Code.
FACTS:
Valeroso was a former barangay captain of Balon
Anito, Balanga, Bataan. On August 21, 1996, the
Philippine National Bank (PNB) hired him as caretaker
of its lot situated in Porto del Sol Subdivision, Balon
Anito, Balanga, Bataan. Consequently, the petitioner
put up on the said lot a sign which reads “No
Trespassing, PNB Property” to ward off squatters.
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Sometime in April 1997, despite the sign, Mrs. Julita
Castillo, believing that the said lot was owned by her
grandparents, constructed a nipa hut thereon. She
spent P12,350 for the huts construction.
On June 5, 1997, the petitioner, together with Jorge
Valeroso, Fernando Operario, Peter Morales and
Rolando de Guzman, tore down and demolished Mrs.
Castillos hut.
She thus filed with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Bataan a criminal complaint for malicious mischief
against the petitioner.
Valeroso admitted in his counter-affidavit and during
his oral testimony that he indeed demolished the
structure of complainant Julita Castillo in his capacity
as caretaker of the owner, PNB, Republic Bank, after he
warned her and all illegal occupants to vacate the
premises even posting NO TRESPASSING signs to
indicate that the place is privately owned; he also
absolved all his co-defendants from any liability
alleging that he acted alone during the demolition of
said structure.
Valeroso admits that he deliberately demolished Mrs.
Castillos nipa hut. He, however, contends that the third
element of the crime of malicious mischief, i.e., that the
act of damaging anothers property be committed
merely for the sake of damaging it, is not present in
this case. He maintains that he demolished Mrs.
Castillos nipa hut to safeguard the interest of his
employer, the PNB, and for no other reason. His motive
was lawful and that there was no malice in causing the
damage to the private complainants property. In other
words, he did not act out of hatred, revenge or other
evil motive.
HELD:
Yes. All the elements of the crime of Malicious Mischief
under Article 327 of the Revised Penal Code are
present.
The elements of the crime of malicious mischief under
Article 327 of the Revised Penal Code are:
1. That the offender deliberately caused damage to the
property of another;
2. That such act does not constitute arson or other
crimes involving destruction;
3. That the act of damaging anothers property be
committed merely for the sake of damaging it.
Contrary to the petitioners contention, all the
foregoing elements are present in this case. First, he
admits that he deliberately demolished the nipa hut of
Mrs. Castillo. Second, the demolition does not
constitute arson or any other crime involving
destruction.
Neither can the petitioner rightfully invoke paragraph
5, Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code which states:
Art. 11. Justifying circumstances. The following do not
incur any criminal liability:

5. Any person who acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in
the lawful exercise of a right or office.
The requisites of the foregoing justifying circumstance
are:
(1)that the accused acted in the performance of a duty
or in the lawful exercise of a right; and
(2)that the injury caused or the offense committed be
the necessary consequence of the due performance of
duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office.
In this case, Valeroso deliberately demolished the
property of Mrs. Castillo without any lawful authority.
Thus, while the first requisite is present, the second is
unavailing. Valeroso was not acting in the fulfillment of
his duty when he took the law into his own hands and
summarily demolished Mrs. Castillos hut.
ROBERT TAGUINOD,
-versus-
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
G.R. No. 185833 October 12, 2011
ISSUE:
Whether or not Taguinod is guilty of the crime of
Malicious Mischief under article 327 of the Revised
Penal Code
FACTS:
Pedro Ang (private complainant) was driving his Honda
CRV (CRV) from the 3rd basement parking, while
Robert Taguinod (petitioner) was driving his Suzuki
Vitara (Vitara) from the 2nd basement parking. When
they were about to queue at the corner to pay the
parking fees, the respective vehicles were edging each
other. The CRV was ahead of the queue, but the Vitara
tried to overtake, which resulted the touching of their
side view mirrors. The side view mirror of the Vitara was
pushed backward and naturally, the side view mirror of
the CRV was pushed forward. This prompted the
private complainant's wife and daughter, namely,
Susan and Mary Ann, respectively, to alight from the
CRV and confront the petitioner.
Taguinod appeared to be hostile, hence, the private
complainant Ang instructed his wife and daughter to
go back to the CRV. While they were returning to the
car, petitioner accelerated the Vitara and moved
backward as if to hit them. The CRV, having been
overtaken by the Vitara, took another lane. Private
complainant was able to pay the parking fee at the
booth ahead of petitioner. When the CRV was at the
upward ramp leading to the exit, the Vitara bumped
the CRV's rear portion and pushed the CRV until it hit
the stainless steel railing located at the exit portion of
the ramp.
As a result of the collision, the CRV sustained damage
at the back bumper spare tires and the front bumper,
the repair of which amounted to P57,464.66.
HELD:
Yes. Taguinod is proven beyond reasonable doubt to
have committed the crime of Malicious Mischief.
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The elements of the crime of malicious mischief under
Article 327 of the Revised Penal Code are:
(1) That the offender deliberately caused damage to
the property of another;
(2) That such act does not constitute arson or other
crimes involving destruction;
(3)That the act of damaging another's property be
committed merely for the sake of damaging it.
The incident involving the collision of the two side view
mirrors is proof enough to establish the existence of
the element of hate, revenge and other evil motive.
Here, the accused entertained hate, revenge and other
evil motive because to his mind, he was wronged by
the complainant when the CRV overtook his Vitara
while proceeding toward the booth to pay their
parking fee, as a consequence of which, their side view
mirrors collided. On the same occasion, the hood of his
Vitara was also pounded, and he was badmouthed by
the complainant's wife and daughter when they
alighted from the CRV to confront him for the collision
of the side view mirrors.
These circumstances motivated the accused to push
upward the ramp complainant's CRV until it reached
the steel railing of the exit ramp.
First, the hitting of the back portion of the CRV by the
petitioner was clearly deliberate as indicated by the
evidence on record. The version of the private
complainant that the petitioner chased him and that
the Vitara pushed the CRV until it reached the stairway
railing was more believable than the petitioner's
version that it was private complainant's CRV which
moved backward and deliberately hit the Vitara
considering the steepness or angle of the elevation of
the P2 exit ramp. It would be too risky and dangerous
for the private complainant and his family to move the
CRV backward when it would be hard for him to see his
direction as well as to control his speed in view of the
gravitational pull.
Second, the act of damaging the rear bumper of the
CRV does not constitute arson or other crimes
involving destruction. Lastly, when the Vitara bumped
the CRV, the petitioner was just giving vent to his anger
and hate as a result of a heated encounter between
him and the private complainant.
April 4, 2018 – Article 328 – SPECIAL CASES OF
MALICIOUS MISCHIEF
ALAMEDA, Manuel
[NO CASE FOUND]
April 5, 2018 – Article 330 – DAMAGE AND
OBSTRUCTION TO MEANS OF COMMUNICATION
ARANCES, Javy Ann G.
[NO CASE FOUND]

April 5, 2018 – Article 331 – DESTROYING OR
DAMAGING STATUES, PUBLIC MONUMENTS OR
PAINTINGS
BANUELOS, Kelvinn L.
[NO CASE FOUND]
April 5, 2018 – Article 332 – PERSONS EXEMPT FROM
CRIMINAL LIABILITY
BURGOS, Paul Zandrix A.
INTESTATE ESTATE OF DE CARUNGCONG VS.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO. 181409. FEBRUARY 11, 2010
CORONA, J.:
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused can apply for the benefits
under article 322 of the Revised Penal Code.
FACTS:
On November 24, 1992, William Sato induced Manolita
Gonzales Vda. De Carungcong, who was already then
blind and 79 years old[,] to sign and thumbmark a
special power of attorney dated November 24, 1992 in
favor of Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato, daughter of said
accused, making her believe that said document
involved only her taxes, accused knowing fully well that
said document authorizes Wendy Mitsuko C. Sato,
then a minor, to sell, assign, transfer or otherwise
dispose of to any person or entity of her properties all
located at Tagaytay City.
Mediatrix Carungcong, the duly appointed
administratrix of the intestate estate of her deceased
mother Manolita Gonzales Vda. De Carungcong, filed
a complaint for estafa against her brother-in-law,
William Sato.
William Sato filed a motion to quash the information
alleging that he is exempt from criminal liability under
Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code. In an order
dated April 17, 2006, the trial court granted Satos
motion and ordered the dismissal of the criminal case.
Dissatisfied with the trial courts rulings, the intestate
estate of Manolita, represented by Mediatrix, filed a
petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals which,
however, in a decision dated August 9, 2007, dismissed
it. Hence, this petition.
RULING:
No. The absolutory cause under Article 332 of the
Revised Penal Code only applies to the felonies of
theft, swindling and malicious mischief. Under the said
provision, the State condones the criminal
responsibility of the offender in cases of theft,
swindling and malicious mischief. As an act of grace,
the State waives its right to prosecute the offender for
the said crimes but leaves the private offended party
with the option to hold the offender civilly liable.
However, the coverage of Article 332 is strictly limited
to the felonies mentioned therein. The plain,
categorical and unmistakable language of the
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provision shows that it applies exclusively to the simple
crimes of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. It
does not apply where any of the crimes mentioned
under Article 332 is complexed with another crime,
such as theft through falsification or estafa through
falsification.
In this case, The Information against Sato charges him
with estafa. However, the real nature of the offense is
determined by the facts alleged in the Information, not
by the designation of the offense. A reading of the facts
alleged in the Information reveals that Sato is being
charged not with simple estafa but with the complex
crime of estafa through falsification of public
documents. Since the crime with which respondent was
charged was not simple estafa but the complex crime
of estafa through falsification of public documents,
Sato cannot avail himself of the absolutory cause
provided under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code
in his favor.
DOLORES G. GOMEZ VS. HON. INTERMEDIATE
APELLATE COURT AND PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO. L-63202 APRIL 9, 1985
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused is exempt from criminal
liability under Article 322 of the Revised Penal Code.
FACTS:
On November 20, 1973, Rodrigo Gomez, husband of
accused, went to the residence of his sister Belen, in
Angeles City because there was somebody in Manila
interested in buying some pieces of jewelry. Belen,
together with Lourdes Balajadia and Rodrigo, went to
the residence of accused. At the house of Rodrigo and
Dolores Gomez and in the presence of Rodrigo and
Lourdes, Belen delivered to Dolores three pieces of
jewelry. On November 21, 1973, Milagros Gomez,
sister-in-law of Dolores, accompanied by Belen
Tiotuico, brought to her residence a pair of dangling
earrings. The four pieces of jewelry were left with
Dolores without any acknowledgment receipt as they
were relatives, under the condition that, if after two or
three days, the jewelry would be sold, Milagros would
give Dolores and Rodolfo Punongbayan P2,000.00
except for the dominic ring in which she would give
them P200.00; and if they could sell the jewelry for
more than her price, the difference would belong to
them (Dolores and Rodolfo) but should they fail to sell
the same, they would return the same.
A few days after the consignation, Belen kept on
reminding Dolores about the jewelries but Dolores
always answered that the jewelries were not yet sold.
Sensing something was wrong after she again talked
with Rodolfo in the evening of the same day, Belen
reported the matter to the Philippine Constabulary in
San Fernando, Pampanga, and asked them to look for
Dolores, Rodrigo, and Wilson. Only the dominic ring
was returned to Belen. The remaining two were
pledged to Jose Lontok. When Belen tried to redeem
 CRIMINAL LAW II | CASE DIGESTS

the 7 Karat pink ring, Lontok declined her because the SCRA 330). There is no evidence of such kind of
receipt she handed was not the original receipt. The participation. Without conspiracy, the petitioner
next day, Belen returned to Jose to redeem the jewelry cannot be held liable as she had no direct participation
and told him she had merely asked Dolores to sell it for in the commission of the crime charged. The
her. Jose promised to give her the jewelry if Willie presumption of innocence in favor of the petitioner has
would come with her and bring the original receipt. The not been successfully overcome by evidence beyond
next day when Willie and Belen came, she was able to reasonable doubt.
recover the ring after paying Jose the amount of
P25,000.00. After Wilson had given Belen the receipt of
Antonio Tambunting's Pawnshop, as to the jewelry
Dolores pledged to guarantee payment of P6,000.00,
and after she (Belen) executed an affidavit that she was
the real owner of the jewelry pledged, Belen was able
to redeem it after paying the amount of P6,000-00. As
to the pair of dangling earrings, Belen was not able to
recover the same and so she had to pay on
installments, the value thereof to Belen Tiotuico from
whom she had received the jewelry.

On February 24, 1977, the Court of First Instance of

Manila convicted Dolores Gomez of the crime of estafa
or swindling under Article 315 of the Revised Penal
Code. A motion for reconsideration filed by Dolores
Gomez was denied by the respondent court in a
resolution dated October 19, 1982.

RULING:
Yes. Both Rodrigo and Wilson were exempt from
criminal liability since they were the brothers of Belen.
In Dolores’ case, the Supreme Court ruled to acquit her
criminal charges. There are other circumstances in the
records strongly suggesting that the transactions were
between Belen and her two brothers and that the
petitioner came into the picture only because she was
the wife of one of the brothers.

In the case at bar, the evidence presented by the

people to establish the presence of conspiracy is even
murkier than the proof on the commission of the crime
itself. The factual findings of the respondent Court of
Appeals and the trial court do not show the
participation of the petitioner in the events that
followed after the pieces of jewelry were delivered to
her and her husband, Rodrigo. The records show that
the only participation of the petitioner in the
transaction was when she and her husband received
the pieces of jewelry from Belen Gomez Espiritu on
November 10 and 21, 1973 at their residence. After the
same were received, Rodrigo and Wilson Gomez took
possession of the said pieces of jewelry and disposed
of them without the knowledge of the petitioner.
Rodrigo and Wilson Gomez alone absconded with the
pieces of jewelry. As a matter of fact, the petitioner did
not even know the whereabouts of Rodrigo and Wilson
who were then in possession of the said pieces of
jewelry. The participation of petitioner Dolores in the
attempts to locate the missing brothers and to compel
them to return the jewelry to their sister is not proof of
conspiracy in a crime. It was understandable why she
was involved in looking for her own husband at the
behest of her sister-in-law. To establish conspiracy,
there must be evidence of intentional participation in
the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the
common design and purpose (People v. Agda, 111

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 CRIMINAL LAW II | CASE DIGESTS

TITLE ELEVEN – CRIMES AGAINST Pedro Pitoc, had sustained illicit relations with
CHASTITY Marciana del Basco. In a short time after the marriage,
the defendant, Pedro Pitoc, and his wife left the city of
Manila and went to Calumpit, Bulacan, to reside. Later
April 6, 2018 – Article 333 – WHO ARE GUILTY OF
Pedro Pitoc returned to Manila, leaving his wife at
ADULTERY
Calumpit, promising to return March 15, 1921. For his
CEBALLOS, Jesus C.
failure to return on March 17, 1921, his wife came to
Manila to look for him. March 17, his wife came to
PILAPIL V. IBAY-SOMERA
Manila where she found the defendant living in the
GR NO. 80116
same house and under the same roof with his former
JUNE 30, 1989
paramour, staying around her store and keeping
company with her, under circumstances which strongly
ISSUE:
tend to show that they had resumed their former
WoN Pilapil can be charged by Geiling with adultery.
relations.
FACTS:
HELD:
Imelda Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and Erich Geiling, a
Yes. The word cohabit has many different meanings,
German citizen, were married in Germany.
each depending upon the sense in which it is used.
Subsequently, Geiling filed a divorce against Pilapil in
Here, we have a law intended to prohibit a married man
Germany, which the Schoneberg Court granted on
from keeping a mistress in his dwelling or anywhere
January 15, 1986. Geiling then filed a case of adultery
else under "scandalous circumstances." Hence, the
against Pilapil at the RTC of Manila on June of 1986. He
meaning of the word cohabit here must relate and he
alleged that in 1982, Pilapil had an affair with William
confined to the subject matter of the law itself. When
Chia and Jesus Chua in 1983.
used in that sense, it should be construed to mean "to
dwell or live together as husband and wife; to live
HELD:
together as husband and wife although not legally
No, she cannot be charged.
married; to live together in the same house, claiming
Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), the
to be married; to live together at bed and board."
crime of adultery, as well as four other crimes against
(Corpus Juris, vol., 11, p. 950.)
chastity, cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn
written complaint filed by the offended spouse.
Applying the facts to such definition, it is undisputed
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the
that before his marriage to Petronila Roque, the
offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily
defendant and his coaccused were living together for
follows that such initiator must have the status,
a number of years in illicit relations. The defendants,
capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of
Pedro Pitoc, legally married Petronila Roque in the city
the filing of the criminal action.
of Manila on February 21, 1921, and together they
went to Calumpit, Bulacan, to live. In a short time he
Article 344 of the RPC thus presupposes that the
left his wife there and came to Manila, promising to
marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of the
return on March 15, twenty-three days after their
institution of the criminal action for adultery.
marriage. He never did return. March 17, his wife came
to Manila where she found the defendant living in the
In the present case, the fact that Geiling obtained a
same house and under the same roof with his former
valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of
paramour, staying around her store and keeping
Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects
company with her, under circumstances which strongly
may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as Geiling
tend to show that they had resumed their former
is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our
relations. It is, indeed, significant that the defendant
civil law on the matter of status of persons. Thus,
Pitoc would leave his wife whom he married on
Geiling ceased to be the lawful spouse of Pilapil at the
February 21, and return to Manila and go direct to, and
time he initiated the criminal complaint against Pilapil.
obtain a room in, the same house where his former
paramour was living, and violate his promise to return
April 6, 2018 – Article 334 – CONCUBINAGE
tho his newly wedded wife on March 15.
DAHIROC, Janice

Petronila Roque testified that she asked her husband if

PEOPLE VS. PEDRO PITOC AND MARCIANA DEL
that woman, meaning his coaccused, was his
BASCO
paramour, and that he answered yes, and that she
G.R. NO. 18513 SEPTEMBER 18, 1922
asked him what would be her situation and "he
answered me that he could not abandon that woman,
ISSUE:
referring to Marciana del Basco, and that I could do
Whether or not Pedro Pitoc and Marciana del Basco
anything I pleased."
cohabition constitutes the crime of concubinage.

This evidence was not denied by the defendant, Pedro

FACTS:
Pitoc. When this is considered with the defendant's
February 21, 1921, the defendant, Pedro Pitoc, was
conduct and all the other evidence, surrounding facts
legally married to Petronila Roque in the city of Manila.
and circumstances, the proof is conclusive that the
For several years prior to their marriage, the defendant,

180 | JMC COLLEGE OF LAW


defendant, Pedro Pitoc, did cohabit "with a woman
who is not his wife," and that he is guilty of the crime
charged.
They were both found guilty as charged.
BUSUEGO VS. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
MINDANAO AND ROSA BUSUEGO
G.R. NO. 196842 OCTOBER 9, 2013
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Ombudsman committed a grave
abuse of discretion in finding probable cause to indict
Alfredo and Sia for Concubinage.
FACTS:
Private respondent Rosa S. Busuego (Rosa) filed a
complaint for: (1) Concubinage under Article 334 of the
Revised Penal Code; (2) violation of Republic Act No.
9262 (Anti-Violence Against Women and Their
Children); and (3) Grave Threats under Article 282 of
the Revised Penal Code, before the Office of the
Ombudsman against her husband, Alfredo. Alfredo is
the Chief of Hospital, Davao Regional Hospital. They
have 2 children. However, their marriage turned sour.
Rosa went to the US and was eventually joined by her
2 children, Alfred and Robert. Robert eventually
returned to Davao City to study medicine. Sometime in
1997, Rosa learned that a certain Emy Sia (Sia) was
living at their conjugal home. When Rosa asked
Alfredo, he said that Sia, nurse at the Regional Hospital,
was just in a sorry plight and was allegedly raped by
Rosa's brother-in-law so he allowed her to sleep at the
maids' quarters.
In October 2005, Rosa finally learned of Alfredo's extra-
marital relationships. Robert and the housekeepers
executed a joint affidavit to support Rosa's allegations.
Rosa and the other son Alfred flew to Davao without
informing Alfredo. She gathererd and consolidated
information of her husband's sexual affairs. She also
averred that during the course of the marriage, Alfredo
physically and verbally abused her and her family.
Alfredo denied all accusations. In their subsequent
exchange of responsive pleadings, Rosa maintained
Alfredo's culpability, and naturally, Alfredo claimed
innocence.
In the course thereof, the procedural issue of Rosa's
failure to implead Sia and de Leon as respondents
cropped up. Alfredo insisted that Rosa's complaint
ought to be dismissed for failure to implead his alleged
concubines as respondents.
HELD:
No. The Ombudsman has full discretionary authority in
the determination of probable cause during a
preliminary investigation. This is the reason why
judicial review of the resolution of the Ombudsman in
the exercise of its power and duty to investigate and
prosecute felonies and/or offenses of public officers is
limited to a determination of whether there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
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of jurisdiction. Courts are not empowered to substitute
their judgment for that of the Ombudsman.
By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack
of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law,
as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility. In
this regard, petitioner failed to demonstrate the
Ombudsman's abuse, much less grave abuse, of
discretion.
The Ombudsman merely followed the provisions of its
Rules of Procedure. No information may be filed and
no complaint may be dismissed without the written
authority or approval of the ombudsman in cases
falling within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbyan, or
of the proper Deputy Ombudsman in all other cases.
Notably, Rosa's complaint contained not just the
Concubinage charge, but other charges: violation of
Republic Act No. 9262 and Grave Threats. Upon the
Ombudsman's perusal, the complaint was supported
by affidavits corroborating Rosa's accusations. Thus, at
that stage, the Ombudsman properly referred the
complaint to Alfredo for comment. Nonetheless, while
the Ombudsman found no reason for outright
dismissal, it deemed it fit to hold a clarificatory hearing
to discuss the applicability of Article 344 of the Revised
Penal Code, the issue having been insisted upon by
Alfredo.
Surely the procedural sequence of referral of the
complaint to respondent for comment and thereafter
the holding of a clarificatory hearing is provided for in
paragraph b, Section 2 and paragraphs d and f, Section
4 of Rule II, which the Court have at the outset
underscored. The Ombudsman merely facilitated the
amendment of the complaint to cure the defect
pointed out by Alfredo. The Ombudsman's primary
jurisdiction, albeit concurrent with the DOJ, to conduct
preliminary investigation of crimes involving public
officers, without regard to its commission in relation to
office, had long been settled in Sen. Honasan II v. The
Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of DOJ.
The Constitution, Section 15 of the Ombudsman Act of
1989 and Section 4 of the Sandiganbayan Law, as
amended, do not give to the Ombudsman exclusive
jurisdiction to investigate offenses committed by
public officers or employees. The authority of the
Ombudsman to investigate offenses involving public
officers or employees is concurrent with other
government investigating agencies such as provincial,
city and state prosecutors. However, the Ombudsman,
in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction over cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, may take over, at
any stage, from any investigating agency of the
government, the investigation of such cases.

In other words, respondent DOJ Panel is not precluded
from conducting any investigation of cases against
public officers involving violations of penal laws but if
the cases fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, the respondent Ombudsman may, in
the exercise of its primary jurisdiction take over at any
stage.
Thus, with the jurisprudential declarations that the
Ombudsman and the DOJ have concurrent jurisdiction
to conduct preliminary investigation, the respective
heads of said offices came up with OMB-DOJ Joint
Circular No. 95-001 for the proper guidelines of their
respective prosecutors in the conduct of their
investigations.
WHEREFORE the petition is DISMISSED.
April 7, 2018 – Article 335 WHEN AND HOW RAPE IS
COMMITTED
DELA PEÑA, Clarisse J
Note:
Art. 335 has been repealed by Rep. Act. No. 8353, other-
wise known as the "Anti-Rape Law of 1997" which took
effect on October 22, 1997. See page 523 of this Book II.
(Article 266-A)
April 7, 2018 – Article 337 – QUALIFIED SEDUCTION
DIZON, Roxan Danica G.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARIANO
FONTANILLA
G.R. No. L-25354, June 28, 1968
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused is criminally liable under
Article 337 of the Revised Penal Code
FACTS:
On September 1960, Fe Castro, a fifteen-year old virgin,
was brought by her mother to the house of Mariano
Fontanilla and his second wife, Magdalena Copio, a
sister of Fe's mother, to serve as a helper. Fe Castro
testified that during her stay in the house of Fontanilla
for about three months, the accused succeeded in
having carnal knowledge of her repeatedly, the total
number of times she could not recall. Prior to this
incident, the accused had made amorous overtures
and advances toward her.
Fe Castro further testified that she subsequently
repeatedly yielded to the carnal desires of the accused,
as she was induced by his promises of marriage and
frightened by his acts of intimidation. The accused
made love to her during the day when his wife was
away and at night when the latter was already asleep.
Their intimacies lasted for almost three months until
her aunt, the wife of the accused, caught them in
flagrante on the kitchen floor. The following day she
returned to her parents, and revealed everything to her
mother two days later.
HELD:
Yes. It is nevertheless settled that deceit, although an
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CRIMINAL LAW II | CASE DIGESTS
essential element of ordinary or simple seduction, does
not need to be proved or established in a charge of
qualified seduction. It is replaced by abuse of
confidence. When the offender is a public officer, a
priest or minister, a servant, domestic, tutor, teacher, or
under any title is in charge of the education or keeping
of the offended woman, as in the present case, the act
is punishable although fraud or deceit may not have
been used or, if employed, has not been proved. The
seduction of a virgin over twelve and under eighteen
years of age, committed by any of the persons
enumerated in art. 337 "is constitutive of the crime of
qualified seduction ... even though no deceit intervenes
or even when such carnal knowledge were voluntary
on the part of the virgin, because in such a case, the
law takes for granted the existence of the deceit as an
integral element of the said crime and punishes it with
greater severity than it does the simple seduction ...
taking into account the abuse of confidence on the
part of the agent (culprit), an abuse of confidence
which implies deceit or fraud."
There is no evidence on record that Fe Castro, then a
15-year old single girl, was unchaste prior to her living
with the Fontanilla spouses. Such being the case, her
virginity before she was seduced by the appellant must
be presumed. Presumption of a woman's virginity
arises whenever it is shown that she is single, and
continues until overthrown by proof to the contrary.
G.R. Nos. 104942-43
November 25, 1993
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NAPOLEON
SUBINGSUBING
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused is guilty under Article 337
of the Revised Penal Code
FACTS:
Accused Napoleon was charged with the crime of rape
in three separate informations.
The complainant Mary Jane in all of these actions is
sixteen years old and unmarried. She was living with
her grandmother and the accused Napoleon who was
her uncle. On November 25 and 28, 1989, the accused
poked his garand rifle and then boxed the belly of Mary
Jane, which rendered her unconscious. He proceeded
having carnal knowledge with her against her will and
without her consent. On November 30, 1989, the
accused put over the nose of the victim handkerchief
soaked with chemical which rendered her unconscious.
He then proceeded having carnal knowledge with her.
Mary Jane did not reveal to anybody the things that
happened to her for fear that the accused might really
kill her as the accused had threatened to do. Months
later, Mary Jane finally divulged everything to her
mother. They reported the incidents to the police
station.Thereafter, she had herself physically examined
and was found pregnant.
At the trial, the accused Napoleon denied the charge
of rape as narrated above and proferred a different

story. He interposed consent on the part of the
complainant as a defense. Three other witnesses for
the defense were presented who corroborated the
story of the accused and testified that indeed, the
complainant and the accused were seen going out
together and sharing happy moments months after
November 1989.
HELD:
The evidence for the prosecution cannot, on its own,
stand and suffice to establish the guilt of the accused
for the crime of rape beyond reasonable doubt. A
perusal of the records and the testimony of the
complainant discloses contradictions and
inconsistencies on vital details which lead one to
seriously doubt the veracity of her story.
The complainant admitted that she still went out with
the accused to watch betamax movies or get food for
the pigs in the ricefields. Such behaviour directly
contradicts the normal or expected behaviour of a rape
victim.
Appellant's exculpation from the offense of rape does
not mean, however, that his responsibility is merely
moral and not penal in character. He was found guilty
of qualified seduction in one of the informations.
Qualified seduction is the act of having carnal
knowledge of a virgin over 12 years to 18 years of age
and committed by any of the persons enumerated in
Art. 337 of the Revised Penal Code. Abuse of
confidence is the qualifying circumstance in the
offense. Notably, among the persons who can commit
qualified seduction is a "domestic". And a "domestic,"
for purposes of said legal provision, has been
interpreted judicially as —
. . . Upon the word domestic being employed in said
legal provision segregating it from that of a servant,
the term is applied to persons usually living under the
same roof, pertaining to the same house, and
constituting, in the sense, a part thereof, distinguishing
it from the term servant whereby a person serving
another on a salary is designated; in this manner, it has
been properly used.
The verified complaint for rape contains allegations,
sans averment on the use of force, which impute the
crime of qualified seduction. Any deficiency in the
complaint is supplied by the supporting affidavit,
where complainant averred that the accused Napoleon
Subingsubing, her uncle, who was living in the same
house as the complainant, had sexual intercourse with
her. The accused took advantage of his moral
ascendancy if not dominance over the complainant.
She was presumably a virgin. As already stated, the
accused was a domestic in relation to the complainant
within the meaning of Art. 337 of the Revised Penal
Code.
April 8, 2018 – Article 340 - CORRUPTION OF
MINORS
FLORENTINO, Kimberly A.
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CRIMINAL LAW II | CASE DIGESTS
FRANCISCA ALIMAGNO & JOVITA MELO
VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO. L-36458, FEBRUARY 21, 1983
ISSUE:
Whether Article 340 of the Revised Penal Code was
violated by the accused?
FACTS:
Victim was employed as a domestic helper when she
came to know the accused who was then bringing
money to her employer. One time, accused tried to
convince her to leave the house of her employer
promising her a better job. Accused succeeded in
pursuing the victim to leave. Upon leaving the house
of her employer a note was left saying " Ako ho ay
nagtanan kasama ko ay lalake. Your utusan" which was
admitted to have been written by the accused. After
abandoning the house of her employer, victim was
brought by the two accused to a hut and there allowed
her to be ravished by a man whom she saw for the first
time.
RULING: Yes. Article 340 of the Revised Penal Code
provides that any person who shall promote or
facilitate or corruption of persons under age to satisfy
the lust of another shall be punished.
The Court clearly found through evidence and
witnesses presented that the accused violated this
article. The accused Alimagno was found guilty as
principal to the crime and accused Melo was found
guilty as an accomplice in the the consumated crime.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
VS SIMPLICIO DELANTAR
G.R. NO. 169143, FEBRUARY 2, 2007
ISSUE:
Was the accused guilty for violation of R.A. No. 7610 in
relation to Article 340 of the Revised Penal Code?
FACTS: The victim was a minor below 12 years old and
through her testimony showed that accused procured
her as a child prostitute for at least two clients: the first,
an Arab national named Mr. Hammond and the
second, then Congressman Romeo Jalosjos.Victim
testified that she was brought to the first client at least
eleven (11) times. Once left alone with the victim, the
client would perform lascivious acts, the recurrent
salient points of her harrowing experience revolved
around the client's kissing her, touching her breasts,
embracing her, and inserting his finger in her private
parts. After their first visit to the client, victim told
accused that she did not want to go back because the
client was "bastos." Accused promised her that they
would no longer go back but the promise was broken
as they went back a few more times.
As with the first client, accused would tell the victim
that they had to go to the second client because they
had obligations to pay. During each of these visits, the
client would give the victim money ranging from
P2,000.00 to P10,000.00. The details of what transpired
when victim was left alone with the second client were
vividly recounted in People v. Jalosjos, where the

second client was convicted of two (2) counts of rape
and six (6) counts of acts of lasciviousness, all
committed against the victim on various dates.
HELD:
Yes. There is no doubt, drawing from the evidence, that
the victim was a child who was exploited in prostitution
as defined in Section 5, Article III of R.A. No. 7610. The
law punishes not only the person who commits the acts
of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with the
child but also those who engage in or promote,
facilitate or induce child prostitution. Accused is one
such person. Accused in his brief, does not deny that
he brought the victim to the clients. He, however,
attempts to exculpate himself by stating that he did
not coerce or influence the victim to go to the two
clients to be exploited in prostitution. Verily, it was
against the victim's will and consent to see the two
clients. But even if the victim had in fact consented,
appellant may still be prosecuted for child prostitution
under Section 5, Article III of R.A. No. 7610 because the
child's consent or lack of it is not an element of the
offense.
April 8, 2018 – Article 341 – WHITE SLAVE TRADE
FUENTES, Arczft Ran Z.
PEOPLE V. NUEVAS
ISSUE:
WON accused Nuevas is guilty for violating Article 341
of the RPC
FACTS:
Jesus Nuevas contracted the services of 4 women of ill
repute whom he brought and maintained in a house
he rented in Batangas to engage in prostitution. He
provided them food and lodging and in return he
would receive ½ of the prostitutes’ earnings in their
illicit traffic with soldiers. It was established that the
prostitutes would charge the soldiers for 10 pesos each
sexual intercourse. The accused now contended that
under article 341 of the Revised Penal Code the
prosecution (a) must identify the alleged house of ill
fame, (b) must proved it to be really a house of ill fame,
and (c) must further proved that the accused is either
the owner or the lessee of the house.
Held: Yes. The accused is guilty of the said felony.
Under Article 341 penalizes three acts: (a) engaging in
the business of prostitution, (b) profiting by
prostitution, or (c) enlisting the service of women for
the purpose of prostitution. Any person committing
any one of these acts comes within the purview of said
article. The proofs show beyond reasonable doubt that
the appellant (a) enlisted the services of the women for
the purpose of prostitution and (b) profited thereby.
Even if the appellant were not the lessee of particular
house, he could not escape the penalty imposed by the
law for the immoral and illicit trade in which he
engaged. As a matter of law, once it was proved that
the accused had enlisted the services of women for the
purpose of prostitution, he was criminally liable even if
there were no proof that he had shared in the profit.
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CRIMINAL LAW II | CASE DIGESTS
And even if there were no proof that he had enlisted
the services of women for the purpose of prostitution,
he would still be criminally liable because there is
indubitable proof in this case that he had share in the
income of the prostitutes.
April 10, 2018 – Article 342 – FORCIBLE ABDUCTION
IBABAO, Konrad Stephen P.
G.R. NO. 131914 APRIL 30, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, VS. JAIME
ABLANEDA
FACTS:
On February 18, 1993, at around 7:00 o’clock in the
morning, 6-year old Magdalena Salas, a Grade I pupil
at the Baldovino Elementary School, Camambugan,
Daet, Camarines Norte, was walking to school. Along
the way, accused-appellant Jaime Ablaneda, also
known as Joey Capistrano, approached her and asked
if he could share her umbrella, because it was raining.
Suddenly, Ablaneda boarded a tricycle with Magdalena
and brought her to a small hut. While inside, Ablaneda
removed his underwear and the Magdalena’s panties.
He applied cooking oil, which he had bought earlier,
on his organ and on’s. Then, he proceeded to have
sexual intercourse with the little girl. Magdalena felt
pain but was too terrified to speak or cry out. After
satisfying his lust, Ablaneda ordered Magdalena to go
home. When Magdalena arrived at their house, Ailene
Villaflores, her uncle’s sister-in-law, noticed that she
looked pale and weak, and found traces of blood on
her dress. Ailene asked her what happened, but
Magdalena merely said that her classmate had pushed
her. Ailene did not believe this, so she brought her to
a quack doctor. The latter told her that Magdalena had
been raped. Ailene then brought Magdalena to the
Daet Police Station and, later, to the Camarines Norte
Provincial Hospital to have her medically examined.
When Ailene saw Magdalena’s bloodied panties, she
again asked her what happened. This time, Magdalena
confessed that she was raped by a man who had a scar
on the stomach.
The lower court found that the Ablaneda guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the complex crime of forcible
abduction with rape.
ISSUE:
Whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain the
conviction of the accused?
HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that there was sufficient
evidence to convict Ablaneda. All elements of the crime
of forcible abduction were proven in this case. The
victim, who is a woman, was taken against her will, as
shown by the fact that she was intentionally directed
by accused-appellant to a vacant hut. At her young
age, Magdalena could not be expected to physically
resist considering that the lewd designs of Ablaneda
could not have been apparent to her at that time.
Physical resistance need not be demonstrated to show
that the taking was against her will. The employment

of deception suffices to constitute the forcible taking,
especially since the victim is an unsuspecting young
girl. Considering that it was raining, going to the hut
was not unusual to Magdalena, as probably the
purpose was to seek shelter. Barrio girls are particularly
prone to deception. It is the taking advantage of their
innocence that makes them easy culprits of deceiving
minds. Finally, the evidence shows that the taking of
the young victim against her will was effected in
furtherance of lewd and unchaste designs. Such lewd
designs in forcible abduction is established by the
actual rape of the victim
In the case at bar, Magdalena testified in open court
that accused-appellant inserted his penis into her
private parts. The fact of sexual intercourse is
corroborated by the medical findings wherein it was
found that the victim suffered from complete hymenal
laceration. Whether or not she consented to the sexual
contact is immaterial considering that at the time
thereof, she was below twelve years of age. Sex with a
girl below twelve years, regardless of whether she
consented thereto or not, constitutes statutory rape.
G.R. NO. 199100
JULY 18, 2014
PEOPLE V. ROSENDO AMARO
FACTS:
26th day of March, 1998, at 5pm in the afternoon, in
front of Boots and Maya, AAA a 7 year old girl was
forcibly abducted by appellant Rosendo Amaro. AAA
testified that on her way home from school, she met
appellant and asked her to buy him some cigarettes.
Appellant offered her food. As she was finished eating
the food, she felt dizzy and was unconscious. She later
awoke in the house of appellant and saw the appellant
naked and was rape. Victim was raped 5 times and was
detained for 6 days.
The RTC rendered judgement finding the accused
guilty of violating Art. 342 of Forcible Abduction with
Rape.
In his appeal, appellant contends that there were no
sufficient evidence to convict him. According to him,
he did not rape AAA because she was not in his
custody at the time said incident allegedly happened.
Appellant adds that he entrusted AAA to the custody
of Florante Magay’s sister because he was working.
Appellant also insists that AAA voluntarily went with
him to his house.
ISSUE:
Whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain the
conviction of the accused?
HELD:
The elements of the crime of forcible abduction, as
defined in Article 342 of the Revised Penal Code, are:
(1) that the person abducted is any woman, regardless
of her age, civil status, or reputation; (2) that she is
taken against her will; and (3) that the abduction is with
lewd designs. On the other hand, rape under Article
266-A is committed by having carnal knowledge of a
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woman by: (1) force or intimidation, or (2) when the
woman is deprived of reason or is unconscious, or (3)
when she is under twelve years of age.
The prosecution was able to prove all these elements
in this case. The victim, AAA was a seven (7) year-old
girl who was taken against her will by appellant who
told her that he knew her mother and that he would
bring her home. At her tender age, AAA could have
easily been deceived by appellant. The employment of
deception suffices to constitute the forcible taking,
especially since the victim is an unsuspecting young
girl. It is the taking advantage of their innocence that
makes them easy culprits of deceiving minds. The
presence of lewd designs in forcible abduction is
established by the actual rape of the victim.
In the prosecution of rape cases, conviction or acquittal
depends on the complainant's testimony because of
the fact that usually only the participants are witnesses
to their occurrences. The issue therefore boils down to
credibility.
Testimonies of child-victims are normally given full
weight and credit, since when a girl, particularly if she
is a minor, saysthat she has been raped, she says in
effect all that is necessary to show thatrape has in fact
been committed.
Wherefore, the decision was affirmed finding the
accused guilty of Forcible Abduction with Rape.
April 10, 2018 – Article 343 – CONSENTED
ABDUCTION
LAZO, Joseph Artfel T.
The following cases could not be found:
PEOPLE VS CRISOSTOMO, 46 PHIL 775
PEOPLE VS AMANTE, 49 PHIL 679
April 12, 2018 – Article 344 – PROSECUTION OF THE
CRIME OF ADULTERY, CONCUBINAGE, SEDUCTION,
ABDUCTION, RAPE, AND ACTS OF
LASCIVIOUSNESS.
NASH, Regina Mercado
G.R. No. L-8520. June 29, 1957
PEOPLE v. ENGRACIO SANTOS, ET AL.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the “salaysay’ or written statement of
Policarpia Bansuelo, the offended party filed with the
Fiscal and not in court is the complaint contemplated
by Art. 344 of RPC?
FACTS:
Respondent Engracio Santos was charged in the Court
of First Instance of Rizal with the crime of rape. After
trial, said respondent was convicted a pd sentenced to
the maximum period of reclusion temporal, from 17
years, 4 months and 1 day to 20 years, and to pay the
costs. Appealing to the Court of Appeals, respondent
filed a motion to quash and for discharge, on the
ground that the trial court was without jurisdiction,
there having been no valid complaint subscribed and
sworn to by the offended party as required by Article

344 of the Revised Penal Code. Said motion was
granted. Hence this appeal by the petitioners.
It is contended that the "salaysay" executed and signed
by petitioner Policarpia Bansuelo on January 12, 1954,
before and in the presence of Fiscal Nicanor P. Nicolas
of Rizal and Capt. Hermogenes Marco of the PCAC, is
sufficient in form and substance to serve as the
complaint required by Article 344 of the Revised Penal
Code. That the law requiring that the crime of rape,
among others, shall be commenced by a complaint
filed by the offended party is merely "designed for the
protection of the offended party and her family who
may prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than
go through with the scandal of a public trial" (Samilin
v. Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, 57 Phil. 298,
304); that when petitioner Bansuelo executed said
"Salaysay", she had manifested her desire to prosecute
the maniacal abuse committed against her; that said
"salaysay" has conformed substantially to the
requisites of a, valid complaint; that it cannot be
considered as her testimony during the preliminary
investigation because, if it were so, the other witnesses
should have also signed it.
After a thorough examination of the "salaysay" in
question, we agree with the appealed decision that it
is a narration of how the crime of rape was committed
against petitioner Bansuelo. As correctly pointed out
by the Solicitor General in his comment on the motion
for reconsideration, such sworn statement "salaysay" is
not the complaint contemplated in and required by
sections 1, 2 and 5 of Rule 106 of the Rules of Court
and Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code.
"The complaint is the process which begins the criminal
action, and no other pleading on the part of the
government is necessary. So, if a criminal action, had
been commenced by complaint in appropriate cases, it
would be error for the court to dismiss it, because it
was not presented through the mediation of the
prosecution officer. The complaint contemplated by
the law and the rules is necessarily that one filed in
court. The "salaysay" was filed with the Fiscal and not
with the court; it did not start the criminal proceedings
"In front of these provisions of law, it cannot be
certainly pretended that the aforementioned ‘salaysay’
or written statement of the offended party, Exhibit 1,
could be considered as the complaint required by law
for the proper initiation of the present case of rape.
"It is argued, however, that said Exhibit 1 should be
considered as the complaint required by law, for on the
basis thereof the provincial fiscal of Rizal conducted
the preliminary investigation and then filed the
information at bar. It is further argued that since under
Republic Act No. 732, provincial fiscals have now the
same authority as the Justice of the Peace to conduct
preliminary investigation, said Exhibit 1 should be
considered as the complaint contemplated in the Rules
of Court and the Revised Penal Code. We cannot
concur to this theory, for according to Section 2 of
Republic Act No. 732, after the provincial fiscal has
conducted an investigation of a case, he has the duty
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to have prepared an information or complaint. The
pertinent portion of Section 2 of Republic Act No. 732
provides:
‘A provincial fiscal shall have authority to conduct
investigation into the matter of any crime or
misdemeanor and have the necessary information or
complaint prepared or made against persons charged
with the commission of the same.’
And the complaint mentioned in this provision of law
is precisely what is defined and mentioned in the Rules
of Court and the Revised Penal Code. Accordingly, we
hold the view that in the case at bar, after the fiscal has
investigated the case, he should have procured the
filing of a complaint by the offended party to properly
initiate this case and not file by himself an information
as he did."
It is also argued that in affixing her signature and
swearing to the allegations of the information together
with the fiscal, petitioner Bansuelo had complied with
the requirement of a valid complaint. Respondent
Santos has answered this argument by saying that such
fact is not borne out by the records; that such assertion
has never been made before the Court of Appeals; that
the opening paragraph of the information clearly and
unmistakably shows that the fiscal alone accuses
respondent Santos of the crime of rape; that the
offended party has never been referred to in the body
of the information as having requested its filing.
We cannot consider the information, although signed
by petitioner Bansuelo together with the fiscal, as
equivalent to the complaint required by law, because
said information lacks the oath of the complainant; the
jurat contained therein is the subscribed and sworn
certification of the fiscal that he had conducted the
preliminary investigation in which obviously the
offended party had taken no participation whatsoever;
in very unequivocal terms, the information commences
with the statement that "the undersigned fiscal accuse
Engracio Santos of the crime of rape", the offended
party not having been mentioned at all as one of the
accusers.
It is not altogether true that to require the offended
party to draft the complaint in legal form and
terminology, — otherwise the complaint will be
insufficient, — would impose a penalty on ignorance,
and that a person with no legal training will not be able
to institute a criminal action for private crimes;
because, as may be gathered from the provisions of
Section 2 of Republic Act 732, it is the duty of the
Provincial Fiscal to prepare the necessary complaint
after having taken down the testimony of the offended
party and his witnesses during the preliminary
investigation. Indeed, the law required this, since the
victims of crimes which cannot be prosecuted except
upon their complaint may be ignorant of the law.
This Court has invariably maintained strict compliance
with the jurisdictional requirement of a complaint by
the offered party, as defined in Section 2 of Rule 106

and Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code. In the case
of People v. Palabao (L-8027, August 31, 1954), we
considered insufficient an information filed with the
Provincial Fiscal, wherein the offended party signed at
the bottom thereof and above the signature of the
prosecuting officer, the information even reciting that
the Provincial Fiscal charged defendant with the crime
of seduction at the "instance of the offended party." In
the case of People v. Martinez, (76 Phil. 559), this Court
motu proprio dismissed the case for failure of the
aggrieved party to file the proper complaint for the
offense of oral defamation, although the accused never
raised the question on appeal, thereby showing the
necessity of strict compliance with the legal
requirement even at the cost of nullifying all the
proceedings already had in the lower court.
HELD:
The decision appealed from was affirmed without
costs.
April 11, 2018 – Article 345 – CIVIL LIABILITY OF
PERSONS GUILTY OF CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
OLACO, Jan-Lawrence P.
EGAP MADSALI, SAJIRON LAJIM AND MARON
LAJIM VS PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 179570 FEBRUARY 4, 2010
FACTS:
Fifteen-year-old AAA and her aunt Inon Dama were
fetching water in a cave in Barangay (Brgy.) Malitub,
Bataraza, Palawan. Suddenly, Sajiron arrived, running
towards them and carrying a badong (bolo). They tried
to run away, but Sajiron overtook them. Sajiron then
drew his gun, which was tucked in his waist, pointed it
at Inon Dama and said, “If you will not go, I will shoot
you”. Inon Dama went home and reported the incident
to AAA's mother. When Inon Dama left the place,
Maron, Sajiron's father, suddenly appeared with a gun
and told AAA to come with them. When AAA refused,
Sajiron and Maron tied her hands behind her back,
covered her mouth with a piece of cloth, and brought
her to the forest. There, while Sajiron was undressing
AAA, she pleaded with him not to abuse her, but
Sajiron told her that if she would submit to his desire,
her life would be spared. Sajiron had carnal knowledge
with AAA against the latter’s will. During the entire time
that AAA was being abused by Sajiron, Maron stood
guard and watched them. Sajiron instructed Egap to
guard AAA and to shoot her if she would attempt to
escape. Nine days after the abduction, upon instruction
of Egap, AAA and Sajiron were married by an Imam.
The marriage was solemnized against AAA's will and
without the presence of her parents. After the
marriage, AAA and Sajiron lived in the house of Egap,
together with the latter's wife, children and mother-in-
law. AAA stayed in one room with Sajiron. While
detained, AAA did not try to escape, because her house
was very far from the place where she was held captive,
and her captors threatened to kill her and her family if
she would attempt to escape. During her detention,
Sajiron abused her twice every night. She was free to
roam within the vicinity of the house but she was
usually accompanied by Egap's wife who served as her
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guard. She was also guarded and threatened by Egap's
sons. She got pregnant after some time. A crime of
abduction with rape was charged against the
appellants.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the crime imputed and the
corresponding civil liability under ART. 345 was correct.
HELD:
YES. The court held that Sajiron and Maron, who are
private individuals, forcibly took and dragged AAA, a
minor, to the forest and held her captive against her
will. The crime of serious illegal detention consists not
only of placing a person in an enclosure, but also of
detaining him or depriving him in any manner of his
liberty.For there to be kidnapping, it is enough that the
victim is restrained from going home.Its essence is the
actual deprivation of the victim's liberty, coupled with
indubitable proof of the intent of the accused to effect
such deprivation. In the present case, although AAA
was not actually confined in an enclosed place, she was
clearly restrained and deprived of her liberty, because
she was tied up and her mouth stuffed with a piece of
cloth, thus, making it very easy to physically drag her
to the forest away from her home. The crime of rape
was also proven beyond reasonable doubt in this case.
Sajiron succeeded in having carnal knowledge of AAA
through the use of force and intimidation. For fear of
losing her life, AAA had no choice but to give in to
Sajiron's beastly and lustful assault. Consequently, the
court further stated that, AAA was sexually abused and
gave birth. There was no showing that AAA had
previously been sexually abused or had sexual relations
with other men. Therefore, it can be logically deduced
that Sajiron is the father of the child. Under Art. 345 of
the Revised Penal Code, he is civilly liable for the
support of his offspring. Hence, he is directed to
provide support to the victim's child born out of the
rape, subject to the amount and conditions to be
determined by the trial court, after due notice and
hearing, in accordance with Art. 201 of the Family
Code.
PEOPLE VS. SGT. MORENO BAYANI
G.R. NO. 120894. OCTOBER 3, 1996
FACTS:
Sgt. Moreno Bayani, a member of the Philippine
National Police (PNP), seeks the reversal of finding him
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape
and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, with all the accessory penalties provided by
law; to indemnify complainant Maria Elena Nieto. On
the other hand, the People, through the Appellees Brief
filed by the Office of the Solicitor General, refuted the
accuseds arguments, and in closing, recommended
that apart from the FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.000)
PESOS as indemnity, appellant should be made to
support his illegitimate child with Maria Elena, in
conformity with Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code.
ISSUE:
 CRIMINAL LAW II | CASE DIGESTS

Whether or not Bayani is accountable under ART. 345

of the RPC.

HELD:
No. Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code provides that
persons guilty of rape, seduction, or abduction, shall be
sentenced to: (a) indemnify the offended woman; (b)
acknowledge the offspring, unless the law should
prevent him from so doing; and (c) in every case, to
support the offspring. While under Article 283 of the
Civil Code, the father is obliged to recognize the child
as his natural child in cases of rape, abduction, and
seduction when the period of the offense coincides,
more or less, with the period of the conception. It has
been held, however, that acknowledgment is
disallowed if the offender is a married man, with only
support for the offspring as part of the sentence.
Article 176 of the Family Code confers parental
authority over illegitimate children on the mother, and
likewise provides for their entitlement to support in
conformity with the Family Code. As such, there is no
further need for the prohibition against
acknowledgment of the offspring by an offender who
is married which would vest parental authority in him.
Therefore, under article 345 of the Revised Penal Code,
the offender in a rape case who is married can only be
sentenced to indemnify the victim and support the
offspring, if there be any. In the instant case, the
accused should also be ordered to support his
illegitimate offspring, Tracy Jhuen Nieto,with Marie
Elena Nieto, but in light of Article 201 of the Family
Code, the amount and terms thereof to be determined
by the trial court only after due notice and hearing.

April 10, 2018 – Article 346 – LIABILITY OF

ASCENDANTS, GUARDIANS, TEACHERS, OR OTHER
PERSONS ENTRUSTED WITH THE CUSTODY OF THE
OFFENDED PARTY.
PACQUIAO, Jose Luis P.

[NO CASE FOUND]

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 CRIMINAL LAW II | CASE DIGESTS

TITLE TWELVE – CRIMES AGAINST THE status, but as an attempt against its life. On the
CIVIL STATUS OF PERSONS contrary, he who places at the door of a charitable
person, a new-born child which is in condition to stand
the first inclemencies of the weather, is supposed to do
April 11, 2018 – Article 347 – SIMULATION OF
it in order that it may be taken up and protected, and
BIRTHS, SUBSTITUTION OF ONE CHILD FOR
therefore the legal presumption must be that he does
ANOTHER, AND CONCEALMENT OR
not act with any other purpose than to cause the loss
ABANDONMENT OF A LEGITIMATE CHILD
of any trace as to the filiation of the child. Finally, the
PACQUIAO, Jose Paolo P
same penalty is imposed upon anyone who conceals
or exposes a legitimate child with the intention of
G.R. NO. 9279
making him lose his civil status. It must be remembered
MARCH 25, 1915
that by the word child must be understood a fully
U.S. VS. CAPILLO, ET AL.
developed and living being, as the child born not
capable of living has no status, nor can he transmit any
ISSUE:
rights whatever. It is, therefore, an essential condition
Whether or not Capillo is guilty of concealment or
of this crime, that the child who has been exposed or
abandonment of a legitimate child
concealed shall have been born alive.
FACTS:
April 11, 2018 – Article 348 – USURPATION OF CIVIL
That on or about the 12th day of August, 1913, in the
STATUS
city of Manila, Philippine Islands, the said defendants
PANIZA, Lyndzelle Jane D
Saturnino Capillo and Petrona Paduga, conspiring and
confederating together and helping one another, did
[NO CASE FOUND]
then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously
expose a child, 1 month old, the legitimate son of the
April 11, 2018 – Article 349 – BIGAMY
accused Saturnino Capillo and his wife Vicenta
RIVERA, Marynit P.
Umanbang to lose his civil status in the following
manner to wit: That the defendant Saturnino Capillo,
G.R. No. 200233
with intent to cause his legitimate child to lose his civil
JULY 15, 2015
status and in cooperation with the defendant Petrona
LEONILA G. SANTIAGO vs. PEOPLEOF THE
Paduga, took the said child without the permission of
PHILIPPINES
his mother Vicenta Umanbang or the authority of the
courts of this city and agreed with one Chua Pue Tee
ISSUE:
to deliver to him the said child and never to claim it
Whether or not the petitioner should be charged with
again, asking the said Chua Pue Tee at the same time
bigamy under Article 349 of the RPC
to lend them the sum of P150 to defray the expenses
incurred by the defendant Saturnino Capillo during the
FACTS:
last sickness and death of his wife Vicenta Umanbang,
The prosecution adduced evidence that Nicanor
and received from said Chua Pue Tee the sum of P106
Santos, who had been married to Estela Galang since 2
of which P50 corresponded to the defendant Saturnino
June 1974, asked petitioner to marry him. Petitioner,
Capillo and P56 to defendant Petrona Paduga. That the
who 'was a 43-year-old widow then, married Santos on
living of said child under such circumstances in the
29 July 1997 despite the advice of her brother-in-law
possession of said Chua Pue Tee and his wife Sio Suat
and parents-in-law that if she wanted to remarry, she
King exposes said child to lose his civil status, to wit,
should choose someone who was "without
that of the legitimate son of the said defendant
responsibility."
Saturnino Capillo and his wife Vicenta Umanbang to
that of an unknown and nameless child or at the most
Petitioner asserted her affirmative defense that she
to that of the child of one Chua Pue Tee and his wife.
could not be included as an accused in the crime of
bigamy, because she had been under the belief that
HELD:
Santos was still single when they got married.
Yes. The exposition which is caused by abandoning a
new-born child in a place where it cannot be easily
Eleven years after the inception of this criminal case,
assisted, intending that it should perish and save the
the first wife, Estela Galang, testified for the
honor of the mother, is a crime against life. The
prosecution. She alleged that she had met petitioner
exposition of a child and the abandonment thereof in
as early as March and April 1997, on which occasions
a place where it may not be in danger may be a crime
the former introduced herself as the legal wife of
against the safety of persons. Only that which has for
Santos. Petitioner denied this allegation and averred
its purpose the deprivation of the new-born child’s civil
that she met Galang only in August and September
status is what constitutes the present crime. In order
1997, or after she had already married Santos.
that it may be so, it is necessary therefore that the acts
committed by the guilty party plainly show his intent.
HELD:
The fact that one abandons, in the midst of a lonely
Yes.
forest, an unfortunate child that needs all kinds of
In Montanez v. Cipriano, this Court enumerated the
assistance during the first moments of coming into the
elements of bigamy as follows:
world cannot be admitted as intent to destroy its civil

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The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (a) the
offender has been legally married; (b) the marriage has
not been legally dissolved x x x; (c) that he contracts a
second or subsequent marriage; and (d) the second or
subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for
validity. The felony is consummated on the celebration
of the second marriage or subsequent marriage. It is
essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged
second marriage, having all the essential requirements,
would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the
first marriage.
For the second spouse to be indicted as a co-accused
in the crime, People v. Nepomuceno, Jr. instructs that
she should have had knowledge of the previous
subsisting marriage. People v. Archilla likewise states
that the knowledge of the second wife of the fact of
her spouse's existing prior marriage constitutes an
indispensable cooperation in the commission of
bigamy, which makes her responsible as an
accomplice.
In the present case, there was a clear showing that she
knew of the first marriage as shown by the totality of
the following circumstances: (1) when Santos was
courting and visiting petitioner in the house of her in-
laws, they openly showed their disapproval of him; (2)
it was incredible for a learned person like petitioner to
not know of his true civil status; and (3) Galang, who
was the more credible witness compared with
petitioner who had various inconsistent testimonies,
straightforwardly testified that she had already told
petitioner on two occasions that the former was the
legal wife of Santos. Given that petitioner knew of the
first marriage, the petitioner was validly charged with
bigamy.
G.R. No. 188775
August 24, 2011
CENON R. TEVES vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
and DANILO R. BONGALON
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner should be charged with
bigamy under Article 349 of the RPC
FACTS:
On 26 November 1992, a marriage was solemnized
between Cenon Teves (Cenon) and Thelma Jaime-
Teves (Thelma). After the marriage, Thelma left to work
abroad. She would only come home to the Philippines
for vacations. While on a vacation in 2002, she was
informed that her husband had contracted marriage
with a certain Edita Calderon (Edita). To verify the
information, she went to the National Statistics Office
and secured a copy of the Certificate of Marriage
indicating that her husband and Edita contracted
marriage on 10 December 2001. On 13 February 2006,
Danilo Bongalon, uncle of Thelma, filed a complaint
accusing petitioner of committing bigamy. Petitioner
was charged on 8 June 2006 with bigamy defined and
penalized under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended.
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During the pendency of the criminal case for bigamy,
the Regional Trial Court rendered a decision dated 4
May 2006 declaring the marriage of petitioner and
Thelma null and void on the ground that Thelma is
physically incapacitated to comply with her essential
marital obligations pursuant to Article 36 of the Family
Code. Refusing to accept such verdict, petitioner
appealed the decision before the Court of Appeals
contending that the court a quo erred in not ruling that
his criminal action or liability had already been
extinguished. Petitioner claims that since his previous
marriage was declared null and void, "there is in effect
no marriage at all, and thus, there is no bigamy to
speak of."
HELD:
Yes.
The elements of this crime are as follows:
1. That the offender has been legally married;
2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or,
in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse
could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil
Code;
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage;
and
4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the
essential requisites for validity.
The instant case has all the elements of the crime of
bigamy. Petitioner was legally married to Thelma. He
contracted a second or subsequent marriage with
Edita. At the time of his second marriage with Edita, his
marriage with Thelma was legally subsisting. It is noted
that the finality of the decision declaring the nullity of
his first marriage with Thelma was only about five (5)
years after his second marriage to Edita. Finally, the
second or subsequent marriage of petitioner with Edita
has all the essential requisites for validity. Petitioner
has in fact not disputed the validity of such subsequent
marriage. Thus, it is evident therefore that petitioner
has committed the crime charged.
April 12, 2018 – Article 350 – MARRIAGE
CONTRACTED AGAINST PROVISIONS OF LAWS
ROMBLON, Shirley Kris M.
[NO CASE FOUND]
April 12, 2018 – Article 351 – PREMATURE
MARRIAGES
SALVERON, Jan Ione R.
REPEALED BY REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10655 on March 13,
2015
and DECRIMINILIZED the crime of PREMATURE
MARRIAGES
April 12, 2018 – Article 352 – PERFORMANCE OF
ILLEGAL MARRIAGE CEREMONY
SANTOALLA, Stephanie M.
RENE RONULO, vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 182438, July 2, 2014

FACTS:
The presented evidence showed that Joey Umadac and
Claire Bingayen were scheduled to marry each other on
March 29, 2003 at the Sta. Rosa Catholic Parish Church
of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte. However, on the day of
the wedding, the supposed officiating priest, Fr. Mario
Ragaza, refused to solemnize the marriage upon
learning that the couple failed to secure a marriage
license. As a recourse, Joey, who was then dressed in
barong tagalong,and Claire, clad in a wedding gown,
together with their parents, sponsors and guests,
proceeded to the Independent Church of Filipino
Christians, also known as the Aglipayan Church. They
requested the petitioner, an Aglipayan priest, to
perform a ceremony to which the latter agreed despite
having been informed by the couple that they had no
marriage certificate.
The petitioner prepared his choir and scheduled a mass
for the couple on the same date. He conducted the
ceremony in the presence of the groom, the bride, their
parents, the principal and secondary sponsors and the
rest of their invited guests.
An information for violation of Article 352 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, was filed
against the petitioner before the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) of Batac, Ilocos Norte for allegedly performing
an illegal marriage ceremony.
The petitioner entered the plea of "not guilty" to the
crime charged on arraignment.
The prosecution’s witnesses, Joseph and Mary Anne
Yere, testified on the incidents of the ceremony. Joseph
was the veil sponsor while Mary Anne was the cord
sponsor in the wedding. Mary Anne testified that she
saw the bride walk down the aisle.
She also saw the couple exchange their wedding rings,
kiss each other, and sign a document. She heard the
petitioner instructing the principal sponsors to sign the
marriage contract. Thereafter, they went to the
reception, had lunch and took pictures. She saw the
petitioner there. She also identified the wedding
invitation given to her by Joey.
Florida Umadac, the mother of Joey, testified that she
heard the couple declare during the ceremony that
they take each other as husband and wife.8 Days after
the wedding, she went to the municipal local civil
registrar of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte with Atty.
Mariano R. Nalupta Jr. where she was given a certificate
that no marriage license was issued to the couple.
The petitioner, while admitting that he conducted a
ceremony, denied that his act of blessing the couple
was tantamount to a solemnization of the marriage as
contemplated by law.
The MTC found the petitioner guilty of violation of
Article 352 of the RPC.
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The RTC affirmed the findings of the MTC.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC’s ruling.
ISSUE:
WON Ronulo is guilty of violation of Art, 352 of the RPC
HELD:
Yes
The elements of the crime punishable under Article 352
of the RPC, as amended, were proven by the
prosecution
Article 352 of the RPC, penalizes an authorized
solemnizing officer who shall perform or authorize any
illegal marriage ceremony.
The elements of this crime are as follows:
(1) authority of the solemnizing officer
(2) his performance of an illegal marriage ceremony.
In the present case, the RONULO admitted that he has
authority to solemnize a marriage. Hence, the only
issue to be resolved is whether the alleged "blessing"
by the petitioner is tantamount to the performance of
an "illegal marriage ceremony" which is punishable
under Article 352 of the RPC, as amended.
While Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not
specifically define a "marriage ceremony" and what
constitutes its "illegal" performance, Articles 3(3) and 6
of the Family Code are clear on these matters. These
provisions were taken from Article 55 of the New Civil
Code which, in turn, was copied from Section 3 of the
Marriage Law with no substantial amendments.
Article 6 of the Family Code provides that "no
prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization
of the marriage is required. It shall be necessary,
however, for the contracting parties to appear
personally before the solemnizing officer and declare
in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal
age that they take each other as husband and wife."
Pertinently, Article 3(3) mirrors Article 6 of the Family
Code and particularly defines a marriage ceremony as
that which takes place with the appearance of the
contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and
their personal declaration that they take each other as
husband and wife in the presence of not less than two
witnesses of legal age.
On the issue on the penalty for violation of Article 352
of the RPC, as amended, this provision clearly provides
that it shall be imposed in accordance with the
provision of the Marriage Law. The penalty provisions
of the Marriage Law are Sections 39 and 44 which
provide as follows:
Section 39 of the Marriage Law provides that:
Section 39. Illegal Solemnization of Marriage – Any
priest or minister solemnizing marriage without being
authorized by the Director of the Philippine National
Library or who, upon solemnizing marriage, refuses to
 CRIMINAL LAW II | CASE DIGESTS

exhibit the authorization in force when called upon to

do so by the parties or parents, grandparents,
guardians, or persons having charge and any bishop or
officer, priest, or minister of any church, religion or sect
the regulations and practices whereof require banns or
publications previous to the solemnization of a
marriage in accordance with section ten, who
authorized the immediate solemnization of a marriage
that is subsequently declared illegal; or any officer,
priest or minister solemnizing marriage in violation of
this act, shall be punished by imprisonment for not less
than one month nor more than two years, or by a fine
of not less than two hundred pesos nor more than two
thousand pesos.

On the other hand, Section 44 of the Marriage Law

states that:

Section 44. General Penal Clause – Any violation of any

provision of this Act not specifically penalized, or of the
regulations to be promulgated by the proper
authorities, shall be punished by a fine of not more
than two hundred pesos or by imprisonment for not
more than one month, or both, in the discretion of the
court. From a reading of the provisions cited above, we
find merit in the ruling of the CA and the MTC that the
penalty imposable in the present case is that covered
under Section 44, and not Section 39, of the Marriage
Law.

The penalized acts under Section 39 of Act No. 3613

do not include the present case. As correctly found by
the MTC, the petitioner was not found violating the
provisions of the Marriage Law but Article 352 of the
RPC, as amended. It is only the imposition of the
penalty for the violation of this provision which is
referred to the Marriage Law. On this point, Article 352
falls squarely under the provision of Section 44 of Act
No. 3613 which provides for the penalty for any
violation of the regulations to be promulgated by the
proper authorities; Article 352 of the RPC, as amended,
which was enacted after the Marriage Law, is one of
such regulations.

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 CRIMINAL LAW II | CASE DIGESTS

TITLE THIRTEEN – CRIMES AGAINST letter will show the injurious nature of the imputations
HONOR made to the complainant mayor. The charges in the
disputed letter against the mayor that the latter was
guilty of misconduct in public office, bribery,
April 13, 2018 – Article 353 – DEFINITION OF LIBEL
malversation of public funds, graft and corruption, if
TADO, Diann Kathelline A.
true, would constitute actual crimes punishable under
the Penal Code or special laws. The gravity of the
G.R. No. L-47971 October 31, 1990
imputations are sufficient to impeach the
LOPE O. DAEZ, petitioner,
complainant's honesty, virtue, integrity and reputation
vs.
as a public official.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
The matter of publication was also proven on the basis
of evidence on record as found both by the appellate
ISSUE:
court and the trial court. As indicated in the letter,
Whether or not the accused is guilty of libel under
copies thereof were distributed in the municipal court
Article 353
and municipal council of Meycauayan, Bulacan and
chief of police in that place. Several witnesses testified
FACTS:
as to having read the libelous letter. Further, evidence
Appellant Lope Daez was the chairman of the Liberal
shows that petitioner even read the questioned letter
Party in Meycauayan, Bulacan, and in that capacity
before a gathering at a local party meeting wherein the
helped the complainant Celso Legaspi campaign for
complainant was present.
the position of Mayor of that town. When Legaspi was
Anent the last element of malice, the law presumes that
already serving as Mayor of Meycauayan, he often
every defamatory imputation is malicious, even if it be
received recommendations from appellant regarding
true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for
the employment of certain persons in the police or
making it is shown, except in cases concerning
other departments of the municipality. In 1972,
privileged communications (Article 354, Revised Penal
appellant recommended a certain Villareal for the
Code). Hence, the burden of proving justifiable motive
position of policeman and a certain Rubio for that of
is upon the author of the libel.
performance officer. However, Legaspi failed to
appoint these persons. This omission of Legaspi as well
As a rule, it is the right and duty of a citizen to make a
as the prejudice which his subsequent renovation of
complaint of any misconduct on the part of public
the public market caused appellant's relatives resulted
officials, which comes to his notice, to those charged
in appellant's resentment of him.
with supervision over them. Such a communication is
qualifiedly privileged and the author is not guilty of
On April 19,1972, while Legaspi was on leave as mayor,
libel. The rule on privilege, however, imposes an
appellant wrote the then acting mayor, Vicente
additional requirement. Such complaints should be
Barazon stating:
addressed solely to some official having jurisdiction to
"Sala-ula at bulok ang iyong pangasiwaan, ang iyong
inquire into the charges, or power to redress the
polisia ay tinuruan mong maging collector mo ng tong,
grievance or has some duty to perform or interest in
ang daan libong pisong buwis ay ayaw mong
connection therewith (US v. Galeza, 31 Phil. 365). In the
ipakolekta sa Ingat Yaman Bayan, ang tanong ng
instant case, none of the persons to whom the letter
bayan, kangino napupunta ang daan libong buwis na
was sent, was vested with the power of supervision
ito? At mabuti na lamang kung hindi mahalungkat sa
over the mayor or the authority to investigate the
fael ng army ang Salaysay laban sa iyo nuong ikaw ay
charges made against the latter.
hulihin ng 7th BCT. Kaya mag-ingat ka Alkalde
sapagkat hindi mabilang ang iyong atraso. Ang bahay
OGIE DIAZ VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R.
mo ay nakatayo sa buhangin, mabuay at sa bahagyang
NO. 159787, MAY 25, 2007
ihip ng hangin ay babagsak."

ISSUE:
Thus causing to the complaining witness Celso R.
Whether the subject article is libelous.
Legaspi dishonor, discredit and contempt to his
damage and prejudice.
FACTS:
On or about December 28, 1991, the accused being
Trial Court rendered judgment finding the accused
then the Managing Editor and writer, respectively of
guilty. Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision.
Bandera, a newspaper of general circulation written,
published or caused to be published in the movie
RULING:
section of said newspaper an article. In which words
Yes.
and phrases, which were used by many people, the said
The elements of libel are: 1) The imputation of a
accused meant and intended to convey as in fact, they
discreditable act or condition to another; 2) publication
meant and conveyed false and malicious imputations
of the imputation; 3) Identity of the person defamed;
that the said Florinda Bagay is a sexual pervert and
and 4) existence of malice.
possesses lascivious and immoral habits, the accused
well knowing that said imputations are devoid of truth
There is no doubt as to the presence of the first three
and without foundation in fact whatsoever, highly
elements in the instant case. A simple perusal of the

193 | JMC COLLEGE OF LAW


libelous and offensive to the good name, character,
and reputation of the said Florinda Bagay.
Florinda Bagay, complaining witness, testified that she
is a graduate of medical secretarial course. She tried
her luck in the movies under the guidance of her
godmother, Mila Parawan, a writer covering the
entertainment industry. Florinda adopted and used
"Patricia Santillan" as her screen name.
Florinda claimed she was the "Miss S" alluded to in
petitioner’s column "Pakurot" considering that her
screen name is "Patricia Santillan."
Mila Parawan also took the witness stand and
corroborated Florinda’s testimony. She further testified
that after Philip and Florinda parted ways, her former
press relations officer, who used the nom de plume
"Isko Peta," wrote an item entitled "Ibinulgar namin
ang babaeng inanakan ni Philip Henson" which
appeared in the December 2, 1991 issue of Artista
Magazine. Philip believed that Florinda released their
story to the press. He then caused the publication of
the libelous article against her.
Mila Parawan added that Florinda came from a well
respected family in their community. Thus, she could
not have done the acts being imputed to her.
On cross-examination, Mila Parawan stated she was
certain the "Miss S" referred to in the article is Florinda
because petitioner and Pichel, her good friends, told
her that "Miss S" is her "alaga" (ward).
Petitioner Ogie Diaz admitted that while he wrote the
column "Pakurot" where the alleged libelous
statements appeared, however, he did not know the
complaining witness or "Miss S." The source of his
article was Philip Henson.
RULING:
NO.
For an imputation to be libelous, the following
requisites must be present: (a) it must be defamatory;
(b) it must be malicious; (c) it must be given publicity;
and (d) the victim must be identifiable. Absent one of
these elements, a case for libel will not prosper.
We find the first element present. In determining
whether a statement is defamatory, the words used are
to be construed in their entirety and should be taken
in their plain, natural, and ordinary meaning as they
would naturally be understood by the persons reading
them, unless it appears that they were used and
understood in another sense.
In the instant case, the article in question details the
sexual activities of a certain "Miss S" and one "Philip
Henson" who had a romantic liaison. In their ordinary
sense, the words used cast aspersion upon the
character, integrity, and reputation of "Miss S." The
words convey that "Miss S" is a sexual libertine with
unusually wanton proclivities in the bedroom. In a
society such as ours, where modesty is still highly
prized among young ladies, the behavior attributed to
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"Miss S" by the article in question had besmirched both
her character and reputation.
As to the element of malice, we find that since on its
face the article is defamatory, there is a presumption
that the offender acted with malice. In Article 354 of
the same Code, every defamatory imputation is
presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good
intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown.
There is malice when the author of the imputation is
prompted by personal ill-will or spite and speaks not
in response to duty but merely to injure the reputation
of the person who claims to have been defamed.
(Alonzo v. Court of Appeals, supra.). We agree with the
Court of Appeals that there was neither good reason
nor motive why the subject article was written except
to embarrass "Miss S" and injure her reputation.
On the element of publication, there can be no
question that the article appeared in the December 28,
1991 issue ofBandera, a local tabloid.
The last element of libel is that the victim is identified
or identifiable from the contents of the libelous article.
In order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the
victim be identifiable, although it is not necessary that
the person be named. It is enough if by intrinsic
reference the allusion is apparent or if the publication
contains matters of description or reference to facts
and circumstances from which others reading the
article may know the person alluded to, or if the latter
is pointed out by extraneous circumstances so that
those knowing such person could and did understand
that he was the person referred to.
Kunkle v. Cablenews-American and Lyons laid the rule
that this requirement is complied with where a third
person recognized or could identify the party vilified in
the article.
The libelous article, while referring to "Miss S," does
not give a sufficient description or other indications
which identify "Miss S." In short, the article fails to show
that "Miss S" and Florinda Bagay are one and the same
person.
Although the article is libelous, we find that Florinda
Bagay could not have been the person defamed
therein. In Uy Tioco v. Yang Shu Wen,7 we held that
where the requirement for an identified or identifiable
victim has not been complied with, the case for libel
must be dismissed.
April 13, 2018 – Article 355 – LIBEL MEANS BY
WRITINGS OR SIMILAR MEANS
VILLAHERMOSA, Alexand Rhea M.
G.R. No. 159787
MAY 25, 2007
OGIE DIAZ VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject article is libelous.
FACTS:

Manny Pichel and Ogie Diaz, Managing Editor and
writer, respectively for Bandera, were accused of
conspiring and confederating together and mutually
helping each other, with the malicious purpose of
impeaching the integrity, honor and reputation of one
Florinda Bagay. The accused were alleged to
feloniously wrote and published an article about the
sexual activities of certain “Miss S” and Philip Henson,
in which through the words and phrases used in the
article meant and conveyed malicious imputation that
this “Miss S” is a sexual pervert and possesses
lascivious and immoral habits. Florinda Bagay, who
happened to use “Patricia Santillan” as her screen
name, claims that she was this “Miss S” being referred
to in the said article.
HELD:
For an imputation to be libelous, the following
requisites must be present: (a) it must be defamatory;
(b) it must be malicious; © it must be given publicity;
and (d) the victim must be identifiable. 2 Absent one of
these elements, a case for libel will not prosper.
In the case at bar, it may be find that the first element
present. In determining whether a statement is
defamatory, the words used are to be construed in
their entirety and should be taken in their plain, natural,
and ordinary meaning as they would naturally be
understood by the persons reading them, unless it
appears that they were used and understood in
another sense. In the instant case, the article in
question details the sexual activities of a certain “Miss
S” and one “Philip Henson” who had a romantic liaison.
In their ordinary sense, the words used cast aspersion
upon the character, integrity, and reputation of “Miss
S.” The words convey that “Miss S” is a sexual libertine
with unusually wanton proclivities in the bedroom. In a
society such as ours, where modesty is still highly
prized among young ladies, the behavior attributed to
“Miss S” by the article in question had besmirched both
her character and reputation.
As to the element of malice, since on its face the article
is defamatory, there is a presumption that the offender
acted with malice. In Article 354 of the same Code,
every defamatory imputation is presumed to be
malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and
justifiable motive for making it is shown. There is
malice when the author of the imputation is prompted
by personal ill-will or spite and speaks not in response
to duty but merely to injure the reputation of the
person who claims to have been defamed. There was
neither good reason nor motive why the subject article
was written except to embarrass “Miss S” and injure her
reputation.
The last element of libel is that the victim is identified
or identifiable from the contents of the libelous article.
In order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the
victim be identifiable, although it is not necessary that
the person be named. It is enough if by intrinsic
reference the allusion is apparent or if the publication
contains matters of description or reference to facts
and circumstances from which others reading the
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article may know the person alluded to, or if the latter
is pointed out by extraneous circumstances so that
those knowing such person could and did understand
that he was the person referred to.
The libelous article, while referring to “Miss S,” does not
give a sufficient description or other indications which
identify “Miss S.” In short, the article fails to show that
“Miss S” and Florinda Bagay are one and the same
person.
Although the article is libelous, Florinda Bagay could
not have been the person defamed therein. In Uy Tioco
v. Yang Shu Wen, where the requirement for an
identified or identifiable victim has not been complied
with, the case for libel must be dismissed.
April 14, 2018 – Article 356 – THREATENING TO
PUBLISH AND OFFER TO PRESENT SUCH
PUBLICATION FOR A COMPENSATION
VILLARIN, Paulo Jose S.
UNITED STATES VS EGUIA
38 PHIL 857
FACTS:
Salvador A. Eguia and Sebastian Lozano, conspiring
and confederating with each other, willfully, unlawfully,
and criminally threatened one Maria S. Tuason to
publish in The Independent, a weekly newspaper
edited and published in the said city of Manila, a libel
consisting of certain letters which, according to the
said defendants, would expose the name of said Maria
S. Tuason to public contempt, the said defendants
promising at the same time, moved by a desire to gain,
to prevent the publication of said letters in the above-
mentioned newspaper, should the aforementioned
Maria S. Tuason agree to pay them the sum of P4,000,
Philippine currency.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendant is guilty of threats to
publish libel.
RULING:
YES.
Section 10 of the Libel Law (Act No. 277) is as follows:
"Every person who threatens another to publish a libel
concerning him, or any parent, husband, wife, or child
of such person, or any member of his family, and every
person who offers to prevent the publication of any
libel upon another person, with intent to extort any
money or other valuable consideration from any
person, shall be punished by a fine of not exceeding
one thousand dollars or by imprisonment for not
exceeding six months, or both."
In common parlance, blackmail and extortion are
synonimous, although the latter term may have the
wider signification. Blackmail, in its metaphorical sense,
may be defined as any unlawful extortion of money by
an appeal to the fears of the victim, especially extortion
of money by threats of accusation or exposure. Two
words are expressive of the crime hush money. The
gravamen of the offense is the intent to extort money
or other thing of value. The extortion is committed by

obtaining property from another without his consent,
induced by wrongful use of fear. The end is the same
as in crimes against property, but the means employed
are different. Indeed, certain classes of threatening
letters have been held in the United States when
followed by extortion to constitute robbery.
The circumstances of this case are such that they lead
to the irresistible conclusion that Eguia was the prime
mover in this nefarious scheme. The only reasonable
deduction is that he took the letters from the post
office box of Mrs. Tuason. He was the only person who
had possession of the key to the box. He knew that
Mrs. Tuason was writing to Dr. Harmer. Not all the
letters found in the possession of Lozano were from
Mrs. Tuason but all had been addressed to Dr. Harmer.
The post office box used by Mrs. Tuason was in the
name of Dr. Harmer and so if any mail was returned to
Manila with his name on it, it would be put in this box.
The night on which the letters were delivered, Lozano
went in the direction of Eguia's house to get the letters.
Eguia composed the note that fixed the price for the
letters at P8,000. He entered into and agreed to the
plot made up by Villaba. He introduced Villaba to
Lozano. Though Eguia never appeared in the open he
was always lurking in the background.
Defendants attack the evidence from two directions.
They contend, in the first place, that the court erred in
taking into consideration against each appellant
evidence presented at the trial of the other defendant.
While the court rendered but one judgment, it is
nevertheless true that practically the same facts were
adduced in the two trials. Each defendant, moreover,
endeavors to shield himself behind the acts of his
codefendant. Of course, such a contention cannot be
permitted to avail for a moment, where the proof
shows that both defendants are inculpated.
We hold that Salvador A. Eguia and Sebastian Lozano
have been proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt
April 14, 2018 – Article 357– PROHIBITED
PUBLICATION OF ACTS REFERRED TO IN THE
COURSE OF OFFICIAL PROCEEDINGS
VOSOTROS, Jules Andre B.
[NO CASE FOUND]
April 14, 2018 – Article 358 – SLANDER
Alameda Jr., Manuel F.
VILLANUEVA VS PEOPLE
APRIL 10, 2006
G.R. NO. 160351
FACTS:
The Councilor and Vice-Mayor of a town, both holders
of exalted government positions, became slaves to
their human limitations and engaged in a verbal scuffle
at the municipal hall as if they were ordinary men in the
streets. A moment of unguarded emotional outburst
lead to the long-drawn out twists and turns of this case,
which should have been avoided if only they have
imbedded in their complex emotions, habits and
convictions that consciousness to regulate these
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CRIMINAL LAW II | CASE DIGESTS
deflecting forces and not to let them loose, either to
their own detriment or to that of the public they serve.
This is the high price they have to pay as occupants of
their exalted positions.
On September 12, 1994 around four thirty (4:30 P.M.)
in the afternoon, more or less, at the Municipal
Building of Concepcion, Tarlac, where public
authorities are engaged in the discharge of their duties,
and in the presence of several persons, the accused
Noel L. Villanueva while in the process of hurling verbal
insults at the complainant, then and there unlawfully,
feloniously and contemptuously gave the complainant
what is commonly known as "dirty finger" by poking
his hand at complainant's face with the middle finger
extended and the rest of his fingers half-closed, an act
tending to cause dishonor, discredit and contempt on
the complainant and causing her mental anguish,
wounded feelings and moral suffering for which she is
entitled to moral and exemplary damages in an
amount to be determined by the honorable court.
Contrary to law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners act of poking a dirty finger
at complainant constitutes grave slander by deed
HELD:
Yes, but only simple slander by deed.
Slander by deed is a crime against honor, which is
committed by performing any act, which casts
dishonor, discredit, or contempt upon another person.
The elements are (1) that the offender performs any act
not included in any other crime against honor, (2) that
such act is performed in the presence of other person
or persons, and (3) that such act casts dishonor,
discredit or contempt upon the offended party.
Whether a certain slanderous act constitutes slander by
deed of a serious nature or not, depends on the social
standing of the offended party, the circumstances
under which the act was committed, the occasion,
etc.[32] It is libel committed by actions rather than
words. The most common examples are slapping
someone or spitting on his/her face in front of the
public market, in full view of a crowd, thus casting
dishonor, discredit, and contempt upon the person of
another.
Pointing a dirty finger ordinarily connotes the phrase
Fuck You, which is similar to the expression Puta or
Putang Ina mo, in local parlance. Such expression was
not held to be libelous in Reyes v. People,[38] where
the Court said that: This is a common enough
expression in the dialect that is often employed, not
really to slander but rather to express anger or
displeasure. It is seldom, if ever, taken in its literal sense
by the hearer, that is, as a reflection on the virtues of a
mother. Following Reyes, and in light of the fact that
there was a perceived provocation coming from
complainant, petitioners act of pointing a dirty finger
at complainant constitutes simple slander by deed, it
appearing from the factual milieu of the case that the
act complained of was employed by petitioner "to
express anger or displeasure" at complainant for
procrastinating the approval of his leave monetization.
While it may have cast dishonor, discredit or contempt

upon complainant, said act is not of a serious nature,
thus, the penalty shall be arresto menor meaning,
imprisonment from one day to 30 days or a fine not
exceeding P200.00.
PEOPLE VS PADER
G.R. NO. 139157
8 FEBRUARY 2000
FACTS:
Atty. Benjamin Escolango (ESCOLANGO) was a
candidate for vice mayor of Morong, Bataan in the 8
May 1995 Elections. Escolango and Pader were
neighbors. On the evening of 20 Apr 1995, Pader was
drunk. Pader was angry at Escolango because of
something that Escolango had done when Pader’s
father had died. On 20 Apr 1995, Escolango was
conversing with his political leaders at the terrace of his
house. Rogelio Pader (PADER) a political opponent of
Escolango suddenly appeared at the gate and shouted
“putang ina mo Atty. Escolango. Napakawalanghiya
mo!”
ISSUE:
Was Pader guilty of slight oral defamation, or of serious
oral defamation.
HELD:
The defamatory words only amounted to SLIGHT ORAL
DEFAMATION. DOCTRINE:
Defamatory words will fall under slight or serious oral
defamation, depending not only upon their sense,
grammatical significance, and accepted ordinary
meaning judging them separately, but also upon the
special circumstances of the case, antecedents or
relationship between the offended party and the
offender, which might tend to prove the intention of
the offender at the time.
“Putang ina mo” is a common enough utterance in the
dialect that is often employed, not really to slander but
rather to express anger or displeasure. In fact, more
often, it is just an expletive that punctuates one’s
expression of profanity.
DE LEON VS PEOPLE
JAN 11, 2016
GR NO. 212623
FACTS:
The said accused, with the deliberate intent to
besmirch the honor and reputation of one SPO3
PEDRITO L. LEONARDO, did and there wilfully,
unlawfully, feloniously publicly proffer against the
latter slanderous words and expressions such as
"WALANGHIYA KANG MANGONGOTONG NA PULIS
KA, ANG YABANG YABANG MO NOON. PATAY KA SA
AKIN MAMAYA [,]" and other words and expressions of
similar import, thereby bringing the said SPO3
PEDRITO L. LEONARDO into public contempt, discredit
and ridicule.
Version of the Prosecution:
The first hearing was scheduled on April 17, 2006 at the
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PLEB office on the 5th Floor of the Manila City Hall; At
around 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon, while waiting
outside the PLEB office on the 5th floor of the Manila
City Hall, SPO3 Leonardo noticed De Leon and several
of his companions approaching. Before entering the
PLEB office, De Leon uttered these words to SPO3
Leonardo, "Walanghiya kang mangongotong na pulis
ka, ang yabang yabang mo noon. Patay ka sa akin
ngayon."
The words uttered by De Leon caused SPO3 Leonardo
embarrassment because there were several persons
present at the PLEB premises. He could have arrested
De Leon but he did not want to make a scene.
Afterwards, De Leon's wife, Concepcion, emerged from
the said office and apologized to Leonardo for her
husband's actuations. SPO3 Leonardo calmly
proceeded to the Special Operations Group of the
Philippine National Police (PNP) located at the Manila
City Hall to have the incident entered in its blotter. On
the same day, SPO3 Leonardo filed his complaint at the
Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) together with
Principe.
Version of the Defense
Prior incident,when De Leon, with his son John, while
having breakfast with their fellow joggers at the
Philippine National Railroad-Tutuban Station, were
approached by SPO3 Leonardo who arrived on his
scooter. With his gun drawn, SPO3 Leonardo walked
fast towards the group and at a distance of two meters,
more or less, he said, "Putang ina mo, tapos ka na Ricky
Boy, referring to De Leon." He pressed the trigger but
the gun did not fire, when he was to strike again, De
Leon was able to escape with the help of John.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the crime of slander tenable in this
case.
HELD:
The crime committed is only Slight Oral Defamation.
Oral Defamation or Slander is libel committed by oral
(spoken) means, instead of in writing. It is defined as
"the speaking of base and defamatory words which
tend to prejudice another in his reputation, office,
trade, business or means of livelihood."[35] The
elements of oral defamation are: (1) there must be an
imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or
imaginary, or any act, omission, status or
circumstances; (2) made orally; (3) publicly; (4) and
maliciously; (5) directed to a natural or juridical person,
or one who is dead; (6) which tends to cause dishonour,
discredit or contempt of the person defamed. Oral
defamation may either be simple or grave. It becomes
grave when it is of a serious and insulting nature.An
allegation is considered defamatory if it ascribes to a
person the commission of a crime, the possession of a
vice or defect, real or imaginary or any act, omission,
condition, status or circumstance which tends to
dishonor or discredit or put him in contempt or which
tends to blacken the memory of one who is dead. To
determine whether a statement is defamatory, the

words used in the statement must be construed in their
entirety and should be taken in their plain, natural and
ordinary meaning as they would naturally be
understood by persons reading them, unless it appears
that they were used and understood in another sense.
It must be stressed that words which are merely
insulting are not actionable as libel or slander per se,
and mere words of general abuse however
opprobrious, ill-natured, or vexatious, whether written
or spoken, do not constitute a basis for an action for
defamation in the absence of an allegation for special
damages. The fact that the language is offensive to the
plaintiff does not make it actionable by itself. In this
case, the Court agrees that the words uttered by De
Leon were defamatory in nature. It is, however, of the
view that the same only constituted simple oral
defamation. Whether the offense committed is serious
or slight oral defamation, depends not only upon the
sense and grammatical meaning of the utterances but
also upon the special circumstances of the case, like
the social standing or the advanced age of the
offended party. "The gravity depends upon: (1) the
expressions used; (2) the personal relations of the
accused and the offended party; and (3) the special
circumstances of the case, the antecedents or
relationship between the offended party and the
offender, which may tend to prove the intention of the
offender at the time. In particular, it is a rule that
uttering defamatory words in the heat of anger, with
some provocation on the part of the offended party
constitutes only a light felony."
VICTORIO V. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NOS. L-32836-37
MAY 3, 1989
FACTS:
Appellant-petitioner called Atty. Ruiz, "estapador",
which attributes to the latter the crime of estafa, a
serious and insulting imputation. Appellant-petitioner
imputed the crime of estafa against a prominent lawyer
one-time Justice of the Peace and member of the
Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija, a professor of law and
for sometime a president of the Nueva Ecija Bar
Association.
ISSUE:
whether or not the defamatory words constitute
serious oral defamation or simply slight oral
defamation.
HELD:
The term oral defamation or slander as now
understood, has been defined as the speaking of base
and defamatory words which tend to prejudice another
in his reputation, office, trade, business or means of
livelihood (33 Am. Jur. 39). Article 358, Revised Penal
Code, spells out the demarcation line, between serious
and slight oral defamations, as follows: " Oral
defamation shall be punished by arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correccional in its
minimum period, if it is of a serious and insulting
nature, otherwise, the penalty shall be arresto menor
or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos." (Balite v. People, 18
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SCRA 280 [1966]). The scurrilous words imputed to the
offended party the crime estafa. The language of the
indictment strikes deep into the character of the victim;
He 'has sold the union; he 'has swindled the money of
the vendees; he 'received bribe money in the amount
of P10,000.00 ... and another P6,000.00'; He 'is engaged
in racketeering and enriching himself with the
capitalists'; He 'has spent the funds of the union for his
personal use.'
In the instant case, appellant-petitioner imputed the
crime of estafa against a prominent lawyer one-time
Justice of the Peace and member of the Provincial
Board of Nueva Ecija, a professor of law and for
sometime a president of the Nueva Ecija Bar
Association. As the scurrilous imputation strikes deep
into the character of the victim, no special
circumstance need be shown for the defamatory words
uttered to be considered grave oral defamation
US vs. TOLOSA
G.R. No. L-12696
November 19, 1917
FACTS:
The two families were living in houses about 15 meters
apart. They had several altercations. The defendant was
described as having the natural temperament,
vehemence of expression, and other peculiar
characteristics which indicates the kind of a woman
that would stir up disturbances with the least
provocation or whenever she feels offended.
As a result, the defendant hurled at the complainant
offensive and scurrilous epithets, including words
imputing unchastity to the mother and tending to
injure the characters of her daughters.
ISSUE:
WON the oral words imputing unchastity to a woman
were actionable without proof of special damage.
HELD:
Yes. The words of the defendant were uttered with
evident intent to injure complainant, to ruin her
reputation, and to hold her in public contempt, for the
sake of revenge. One who will thus seek to impute vice
or immorality to another, the consequences of which
might gravely prejudice the reputation of the person
insulted, in this instance, apparently an honorable and
respectable lady and her young daughters, all
prominent in social circles, deserves little judicial
sympathy. Certainly, it is time for the courts to put the
stamp of their disapproval on this practice of the vile
and loud slander, which so debauches and degrades
womanhood. Shrews must be tamed in the modern
Philippines.
PEOPLE VS ATIENZA
OCTOBER 26, 1968
G.R. NO. L-19857
FACTS:
Damaso Atienza, was charged with grave oral

defamation in the said Court upon a sworn complaint
signed by the offended party, Pilar Lee. The defamatory
word allegedly uttered by the defendant were: "Pauli
na, puta ka. Oo, puta ka puta kat bilaw." The translation
given in the complaint itself is: "Go home, you
prostitute. Yes, you are a prostitute, really a prostitute."
Damaso Atienza, was charged with grave oral
defamation in the said Court upon a sworn complaint
signed by the offended party, Pilar Lee. The defamatory
word allegedly uttered by the defendant were: "Pauli
na, puta ka. Oo, puta ka puta kat bilaw." The translation
given in the complaint itself is: "Go home, you
prostitute. Yes, you are a prostitute, really a prostitute."
ISSUE:
Whether or not the word "puta" connotes prostitution
thus defamatory.
HELD:
The word "puta" alleged to have been uttered by the
defendant in referring to the offended party does not
necessarily connote the crime of prostitution as
defined in Article 202 of the Revised Penal Code.
REYES VS PEOPLE
G.R. NOS. L-21528 & L- 21529
MARCH 28, 1969
FACTS:
Rosauro Reyes, was a former civilian employee of the
Navy Exchange, Sangley Point, Cavite City, whose
services were terminated on May 6, 1961. In the
afternoon of June 6, 1961, he led a group of about 20
to 30 persons in a demonstration staged in front of the
main gate of the United States Naval Station at Sangley
Point. They carried placards bearing statements such
as, "Agustin, mamatay ka;" "To, alla boss con Nolan;"
"Frank do not be a common funk;" "Agustin,
mamamatay ka rin"; "Agustin, Nolan for you;" "Agustin
alla bos con Nolan;" "Agustin, dillega, el dia di quida
rin bo chiquiting;" and others. The base commander,
Capt. McAllister, called up Col. Patricia Monzon, who as
Philippine Military Liaison Officer at Sangley Point was
in charge of preserving harmonious relations between
personnel of the naval station and the civilian
population of Cavite City. The three jeeps carrying the
demonstrators parked in front of Hallare's residence
after having gone by it twice Rosauro Reyes got off his
jeep and posted himself at the gate, and with his right
hand inside his pocket and his left holding the gate-
door, he shouted repeatedly, "Agustin, putang ina mo.
Agustin, mawawala ka. Agustin lumabas ka, papatayin
kita." Thereafter, he boarded his jeep and the
motorcade left the premises. Meanwhile, Hallare,
frightened by the demeanor of Reyes and the other
demonstrators, stayed inside the house.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the words "putang ina mo constitute
oral defamation.
HELD:
The charge of oral defamation stemmed from the
utterance of the words, "Agustin, putang ina mo". This
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is a common enough expression in the dialect that is
often employed, not really to slander but rather to
express anger or displeasure. It is seldom, if ever, taken
in its literal sense by the hearer, that is, as a reflection
on the virtues of a mother. In the instant case, it should
be viewed as part of the threats voiced by appellant
against Agustin Hallare, evidently to make the same
more emphatic. On the basis of the foregoing events
Rosauro Reyes was charged on July 24 and 25, 1961
with grave threats and grave oral defamation,
respectively
BALITE VS. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. L-21475
SEPTEMBER 30, 1966
FACTS:
The Democratic Labor Association declared a strike
against the Cebu Stevedoring Company. A copra
exporter affected by the strike offered the union
president Mercader P10,000 as aid to the union and
presumably to pave the way for the amicable
settlement. At first, it was decided that the amount be
distributed amongst all the members. However, at a
subsequent meeting Balite proposed that the amount
should be given solely to the officers. Passions seemed
to have run so high that Balite walked out of the
meeting, threatened to destroy the union and to
expose president and pursued a smear campaign
against Mercader.
Subsequently, Balite met with the Marine Officers Guild
and engaged in conversation with Marine Officer
Canlas, while the latter’s companions gathered around
and within hearing distance of the two. Balite then
uttered the words, as already translated –
"Mr. Mercader sold the Union. The money of the Union
was swindled in the strike staged by the Democratic
Labor Association against the Cebu Stevedoring
Company. Atty. Mercader received bribe money in the
sum of P10,000.00 from the copra exporter Richard
Corominas & Co. and another P6,000.00 from the Cebu
Stevedoring Company/ Atty. Mercader is engaged in
racketeering and that he is enriching himself with the
capitalists. The money of the Union was spent by him
to his own personal benefit".
At the time of the incident, Mercader was legal counsel
of the Marine Officers Guild. The imputation
apparently affected the guild's feeling and attitude
towards Atty. Mercader. For, subsequently, he was
eased out as the guild's legal counsel.
Mercader filed a complaint for grave oral defamation
against Balite.
Balite pleads prescription as it was merely one for slight
oral defamation which lapses in two months.
ISSUE:
WON there is slight oral defamation.

HELD:
No. Rather there is grave oral defamation.
The scurrilous words impute to the offended party the
crime of estafa. The language of the indictment strikes
deep into the character of the victim:
• He "has sold the union"
• He "has swindled the money of the members"
• He "received bribe money in the amount of
P10,000.00 . . . and another P6,000.00"
• He "is engaged in racketeering and enriching himself
with the capitalists"
• He "has spent the funds of the union for his personal
use."
No amount of sophistry will take these statements out
of the compass of grave oral defamation. They are
serious and insulting. No circumstances need be
shown to upgrade the slander. And, no circumstances
were alleged in the complaint.
Balite wanted the union officers to pocket the amount.
He was frustrated in his wish. Then he conducted a
smear campaign against the union president. For
these, he was expelled from the union. Long after,
came the meeting with the officers of the Marine
Officers Guild. There, in cool and forceful deliberation,
he let go the slanderous statements— in the absence
of Mercader. This time, he had his way. Mercader was
eased out as legal counsel of the Marine Officers Guild.
The People has thus clinched a case for grave oral
defamation.
CRUZ VS CA
G.R. NOS. L-56224-26
NOVEMBER 25, 1982
FACTS:
Purisima Gestoso Cruz, and Santiago Gayomali were
next-door neighbors, being residents of houses
standing on adjacent lots at Rizal Street, Guimbal,
Iloilo. At about 9:00 a.m. on August 5, 1976, while
Severina Gayomali, wife of Santiago Gayomali, was at
the ground floor of their house at Rizal, Street,
Guimbal, Iloilo (which ground floor was also used as a
store) she saw petitioner and heard her utter the
following words from a distance of about five meters:
... Usurper of land. They are shameless. They go to
church but they are shameless; they steal the land of
others. They ride in an automobile and when they walk
on the road they are as if somebody but they are
shameless. The land in Igcocolo would better be
surveyed and given to Santiago Gayomali'.
The next day Santiago Gayomali was at the store at the
ground floor of his residence at Rizal Street, Guimbal,
Iloilo. With him were his wife, Severina, and their maid.
At that time, petitioner, who stood on the boundary of
the lot of her mother and that of Santiago Gayomali,
and while facing the store of the latter from a distance
of about five meters, uttered the following words:
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... Judge who is a thief. Santiago is a land usurper. Che.
Punyeta, a lawyer who is a thief. Thunder, if I only know
that to be a lawyer is a good course, I would have taken
it. Because if you are an attorney, you just have the land
of others surveyed, it becomes yours, the genital organ
of Severina is dilated in smile and the penis of Santiago
is in erection in stealing the land of others', and other
similar words of import.
ISSUE:
whether or not the abusive remarks be considered as
serious oral defamation.
HELD:
Although uttered on three different occasions; they
originated from the same anticedents, and were
fomonted by the same basic dispute. Fanning fire to
the situation was a feeling of desperation and anxiety,
over the final consequences because of the position.
and alleged influence of complainant Judge
Gayomali..Although the abusive remarks may
ordinarily be considered as serious defamation, under
the environmental circumstances of the case, there
having been provocation on complainant's part, and
the utterances complained of having been made in the
heat of unrestrained anger and obfuscation, petitioner
is liable only for the crime of Slight Oral Defamation.
Article 358 of the Revised Penal Code penalizes Slight
Oral Defamation with arresto menor or a fine not
exceeding P200.00.
April 14, 2018 – Article 359 – SLANDER BY DEED
ALILIAN, Enna B.
June 28, 2017
G.R. No. 223844
DANILO CALIVO CARIAGA vs. EMMANUEL D.
SAPIGAO and GINALYN C. ACOSTA
FACTS:
Claiming that the statements in the blotter entries were
completely false and were made to dishonor and
discredit him, Cariaga filed a complaint against
respondents for in their respective capacities as
Barangay Chairman and Secretary of Brgy. Carosucan
Sur, Asingan, Pangasinan, made two (2) spurious
entries in the barangay blotter.
ISSUE:
WoN respondents were liable under Art 359 rpc
HELD:
No. The questioned blotter entries were all made in
good faith and merely for recording purposes; done in
the performance of respondents' official duties; and
based on personal knowledge of what actually
transpired.
November 13, 1934
G.R. No. L-41757
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs.
ANTONIO NOSCE
FACTS:

Antonio Nosce slapped the Reverend Father Ulric
Arcand, a catholic priest, before a large congregation.
ISSUE:
WoN appellant was liable under Art 259 RPC
HELD:
Yes. The offended party is invested with sacerdotal
dignity in his religion and was officiating as such priest
during solemn religious ceremonies before a large
congregation. There certainly could have been no
other circumstances under which greater dishonor,
discredit and contempt could be cast upon him before
the faithful over whom he held so high a dignity.
April 14, 2018 – Article 360 – PERSONS
RESPONSIBLE FOR LIBEL
ARANCES, Javy Ann G.
BONIFACIO ET AL VS RTC OF MAKATI AND JESSIE
JOHN GIMENEZ
G.R. NO. 184800, Marh 5, 2010
Ponente: Justice Carpio Morales
ISSUE:
Whether or not the offended party can file the criminal
case for libel in the place where he gained access to
the libelous article published over the Internet.
FACTS:
Petitioners Bonifacio et al were charged with the crime
of libel after private respondent Gimenez, on behalf of
Yuchengco family and Malayan Insurance Co., filed a
criminal complaint before the Makati City Prosecutor
for libel under Article 355 in relation to Article 353 of
the Revised Penal Code.
The complaint alleged that petitioners, together with
several John Does, publicly and maliciously with
intention of attacking the honesty, virtue, honor and
integrity, character and reputation of Malayan
Insurance Co. Inc., and Yuchengco family for exposing
them to public hatred and contempt, and published in
the said website (http://www.pepcoalition.com) a
defamatory article persuading the public to remove
their investments and policies from the said company.
Petitioners filed before the respondent RTC of Makati
a Motion to Quash on the grounds that it failed to vest
jurisdiction on the Makati RTC; the acts complained of
in the Information are not punishable by law since
internet libel is not covered by Article 353 of the RPC.
Petitioners maintained that the Information failed to
allege a particular place within the trial courts
jurisdiction where the subject article was printed and
first published or that the offended parties resided in
Makati at the time the alleged defamatory material was
printed and first published, and the prosecution
erroneously laid the venue of the case in the place
where the offended party accessed the internet-
published article. Since the article was first published
and accessed by Gimenez at Makati City, pursuant to
Art. 360 of the RPC as amended by RA 4363.
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HELD:
No. Venue is jurisdictional in criminal actions such that
the place where the crime was committed determines
not only the venue of the action but constitutes an
essential element of jurisdiction.
Art. 360 of the RPC provides:
“Any person who shall publish, exhibit or cause the
publication or exhibition of any defamation in writing
or by similar means, shall be responsible for the same.
xxxx
The criminal action and civil action for damages in
cases of written defamations, as provided for in this
chapter shall be filed simultaneously or separately with
the RTC of the province or city where the libelous
article is printed and first published or where any of the
offended parties actually resides at the time of the
commission of the offense. xxxx”
That venue of libel cases where the complainant is a
private individual is limited only to:
1. Where the complainant actually resides at the time
of the commission of the offense; or
2. Where the alleged defamatory article was printed
and first published.
If the circumstances as to where the libel was printed
and first published was used as basis for the venue of
the action, the Information must allege with
particularity where the defamatory article was printed
and first published. The same measures cannot be
reasonably expected when it pertains to defamatory
material appearing on a website on the internet as
there would be no way of determining the point of its
printing and first publication. To give credence to
Gimenez’s argument would spawn the very ills that the
amendment to Art. 360 of the RPC sought to
discourage and prevent. It would do chaos wherein
website author, writer, blogger or anyone who post
messages in websites could be sued for libel anywhere
in the Philippines.
The information is quashed and the case is dismissed.
TULFO VS PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 161032, SEPTEMBER 16, 2008
PONENTE: JUSTICE VELASCO, JR.
ISSUE:
Whether or not lack of participation in the preparation
of libelous articles does shield the persons from liability
of libel.
FACTS:
Atty. Carlos Ding So of the Bureau of Customs filed and
charged petitioners Erwin Tulfo, as author/writer,
Susan Cambri, as managing editor, Rey Salao, as
national editor, Jocelyn Barlizo, as city editor, and Philip
Pichay, as president of the Carlo Publishing House, Inc.,
of the daily tabloid Remate, with the crime of libel. That
private respondent was indicated as an extortionist, a

corrupt public official, smuggler and having acquired
his wealth illegally.
Petitioner Cambri, managing editor of Remate,
testified that she classifies the news articles written by
the reporters, and that in the Editorial Division, the
officers are herself; Briones, her supervisor; Lydia
Bueno, as news and city editor; and Salao as national
editor. She testified that petitioner Barlizo is her
subordinate, whose duties and responsibilities are the
typesetting, editing, and layout of the page assigned
to her, the Metro page. She further testified that she
had no participation in the writing, editing, or
publication of the column of Tulfo because the column
was not edited. She claimed that none among her co-
accused from the Remate newspaper edited the
columns of Tulfo, that the publication and editing of
the subject articles were the responsibility of Tulfo, and
that he was given blanket authority to write what he
wanted to write. She also testified that the page
wherein Tulfos column appeared was supervised by
Bueno as news editor.
HELD:
The Court held that the publisher could not escape
liability by claiming lack of participation in the
preparation and publication of a libelous article.
The claim that they had no participation does not
shield them from liability. The provision in the RPC
does not provide absence of participation as a defense,
but rather plainly and specifically states the
responsibility of those involved in publishing
newspapers and other periodicals. It is not a matter of
whether or not they conspired in preparing and
publishing the subject articles, because the law simply
so states that they are liable as they were the author.
Neither the publisher nor the editors can disclaim
liability for libelous articles that appear on their paper
by simply saying they had no participation in the
preparation of the same. They cannot say that Tulfo
was all alone in the publication of Remate, on which
the subject articles appeared, when they themselves
clearly hold positions of authority in the newspaper, or
in the case of Pichay, as the president in the publishing
company.
As Tulfo cannot simply say that he is not liable because
he did not fulfill his responsibility as a journalist, the
other petitioners cannot simply say that they are not
liable because they did not fulfill their responsibilities
as editors and publishers. An editor or manager of a
newspaper, who has active charge and control of its
management, conduct, and policy, generally is held to
be equally liable with the owner for the publication
therein of a libelous article.
On the theory that it is the duty of the editor or
manager to know and control the contents of the
paper, it is held that said person cannot evade
responsibility by abandoning the duties to employees,
so that it is immaterial whether or not the editor or
manager knew the contents of the publication.
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Under Art. 360 of the RPC, as Tulfo, the author of the
subject articles, has been found guilty of libel, so too
must Cambri, Salao, Barlizo, and Pichay.
TIME, INC. VS REYES
G.R. NO. L-28882 MAY 31, 1971
PONENTE: JUSTICE REYES
ISSUE:
Whether or not, under the provisions of RA 4363 the
respondent CFI of Rizal has jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the civil suit for damages arising from an
allegedly libelous publication, considering that the
action was instituted by public officers whose offices
were in the City of Manila at the time of the publication.
FACTS:
The petition alleges that petitioner Time, Inc., is an
American corporation with principal offices at
Rocketfeller Center, New York City, N. Y., and is the
publisher of "Time", a weekly news magazine; the
petition, however, does not allege the petitioner's legal
capacity to sue in the courts of the Philippine.
In the aforesaid civil case, therein plaintiffs-
respondents Antonio J. Villegas and Juan Ponce Enrile
seek to recover from petitioner Time, Inc. damages
upon an alleged libel arising from a publication of Time
(Asia Edition) magazine, in its issue of Aug. 18, 1967, of
an essay, entitled "Corruption in Asia", which talks
about the investigation of Manila mayor Antonio
Villegas due to the discovery of his excessive and
unreasonable resources. More specifically, the
plaintiffs' complaint alleges that Time magazine
published a libelous article, publicly, falsely and
maliciously imputing to plaintiffs the commission of
the crimes of graft, corruption and nepotism, that said
publication particularly referred to plaintiff Mayor
Antonio J. Villegas as a case in point in connection with
graft, corruption and nepotism in Asia; that said
publication without any doubt referred to co-plaintiff
Juan Ponce Enrile as the high government official who
helped under curious circumstances plaintiff Mayor
Villegas in lending the latter approximately P30,000.00
without interest because he was the Mayor's
compadre; that the purpose of said Publications is to
cause the dishonor, discredit and put in public
contempt the plaintiffs. At the time of the publication
of the allegedly offending essay, private respondents
Antonio Villegas and Juan Ponce Enrile were the Mayor
Of the City of Manila and Undersecretary of Finance
and concurrently Acting Commissioner of Customs,
respectively, with offices in the City of Manila.
On February 26, 1968, respondent court deferred the
determination of the motion to dismiss until after trial
of the case on the merits, the court having considered
that the grounds relied upon in the motion do not
appear to be indubitable. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration of the deferment private respondents
again opposed. Respondent judge issued an order re-
affirming the previous order of deferment for the
reason that "the rule laid down under Republic Act. No.
4363, amending Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code,

is not applicable to actions against non-resident
defendants, and because questions involving
harassment and inconvenience, as well as disruption of
public service do not appear indubitable. ..."
Failing in its efforts to discontinue the taking of the
depositions, previously adverted to, and to have action
taken, before trial, on its motion to dismiss, petitioner
filed the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition.
HELD:
The respondent Court of First Instance of Rizal is
without jurisdiction to take cognizance of its Civil Case.
Provisions of RA No. 4363 provides that Art. 360 of the
of the Revised Penal Code is further amended to read
that any person who shall publish, exhibit, or cause the
publication or exhibition of any defamation in writing
or by similar means, shall be responsible for the same.
The limitation of the choices of venue, as introduced
into the Penal Code through its amendments by
Republic Act 4363, was intended " to minimize or limit
the filing of out-of-town libel suits" to protect an
alleged offender from "hardships, inconveniences and
harassments" and, furthermore, to protect "the interest
of the public service" where one of the offended
parties is a public officer. But since the offending
publication was not printed in the Philippines, the
alternative venue was not open to respondent Mayor
Villegas of Manila and Undersecretary of Finance
Enrile, who were the offended parties.
CAMPITA VS VILLANUEVA
G.R. NO. L-20228, NOVEMBER 28, 1964
PONENTE: JUSTICE CONCEPCION
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not a complaint by the offended party
necessary in action for oral defamation.
2. Whether or not an action for defamation imputes a
crime which cannot be prosecuted de oficio.
FACTS:
This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First
Instance of Quezon, dismissing the petition in the
above entitled case.
In a complaint filed with the Court of First Instance of
Quezon, the municipal mayor of Lukban, was charged
by petitioner Romana Campita with the crime of acts
of lasciviousness. On June 7, 1962, an officer of the
Constabulary, in turn, accused petitioner of serious oral
defamation, for having allegedly made on May 27,
1962, the following defamatory statement: "Yang si
Mayor Dator ay walang hiya, bastos, masamang tao at
manggagahasa". Petitioner moved to dismiss this
complaint against her upon the ground that the said
Municipal Court had no jurisdiction over the case,
because the aforementioned defamatory statement
imputes to Dator the crime of either rape or acts of
lasciviousness, none of which may be prosecuted
except upon complaint of the offended party, pursuant
to Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code.
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HELD:
1. The fourth paragraph of Article 360 of the Revised
Penal Code requiring the complaint in an action for
defamation imputing a private offense to be expressly
filed by the offended party, applies not only to written
but also to oral defamation. Consequently, a complaint
for oral defamation imputing rape does not confer
jurisdiction on the lower court where it was not
expressly filed by the offended party but by a
Constabulary Officer.
2. A statement in a complaint for defamation that the
accused therein allegedly used the term
"manggagahasa" in referring to the offended party, is
held to impute a crime which cannot be prosecuted de
oficio because the word "gahasa" does not refer to
force in general but only to force or violence when
applied to a woman for the purpose of satisfying the
lust of the actor.
The crimes which may not be prosecuted de oficio are
adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction, and acts
of lasciviousness (Art. 344, Revised Penal Code).
April 16, 2018 – Article 361 – PROOF OF THE TRUTH
BANUELOS, Kelvinn L.
G.R. No. L-48498 September 30, 1942
SALVADOR G. TUMANG vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES.
Ponente: YULO, C.J.
FACTS:
TUMANG made many imputations against Felix
Manalo. He was then filed with libel and found guilty
on the lower courts.
It appears that the libelous article contained
imputations which insinuate the commission of
criminal acts as well as of many other acts which do not
constitute a crime.
As to those imputations insinuating the commission of
a crime, the Court of Appeals found that the petitioner
was allowed to introduce evidence on the truth thereof
but that said evidence was insufficient.
CA: The case before us does not fit within the rules just
cited and, therefore, TUMANG cannot seek the
protection of the provisions of said article 361 of the
Revised Penal Code, in order to justify his criminal
intent and secure his acquittal, it appearing that many
of the imputations made against Felix Manalo in the
libelous article in question do not constitute a crime;
while in others where an insinuation was made of some
criminal, act, the evidence submitted to prove the truth
has completely failed to support the stand of the
accused, and in general the imputations made against
Manalo are not at all connected with the discharge of
the duties of a Government official or employee, as it
is well known that Felix Manalo is not a Government
employee and proof of the truth of the imputations
would not be admissible.

LEGAL ISSUE:
W/N TUMANG should be acquitted based on Article
361 of the RPC.
HELD:
NO. Article 361 of the Revised Penal Code reads:
Art 361. Proof of the truth. — In every criminal
prosecution for libel, the truth may be given in
evidence to the court and if it appears that the matter
charged as libelous is true, and moreover, that it was
published with good motives and for justifiable ends,
the defendant shall be acquitted.
Proof of the truth of an imputation of an act or
omission not constituting a crime shall not be admitted
unless the imputation shall have been made against
Government employees with respect to facts related to
the discharge of their official duties.
In such cases if the defendant proves the truth of the
imputation made by him, he shall be acquitted.
In view of the above, we find no merit in petitioner's
contention that he had been unlawfully deprived of his
right to prove the truth of the libelous imputations. The
Court of Appeals has rightfully held that proof of the
truth of those acts imputed the offended party which
do not constitute a crime can be admitted, since he is
not a government employee, and, consequently, none
of those imputations can have any reference to facts
related to the discharge by a government employee of
his official duties. This is in consonance with the second
paragraph of article 361 which limits the scope of the
general rule set forth in the first paragraph of the same
article.
G.R. No. 172203 February 14, 2011
DIONISIO LOPEZ y ABERASTURI vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SALVADOR G.
ESCALANTE, JR.
Ponente: DEL CASTILLO, J.
FACTS:
Evidence introduced for the prosecution reveals that in
the early part of November 2002, while exercising his
official duties as Mayor of Cadiz City, private
respondent saw billboards with the printed phrase
"CADIZ FOREVER" with a blank space before the word
"NEVER" directly under said phrase. Those billboards
were posted on the corner of Gustilo and Villena
streets, in front of Cadiz Hotel and beside the old Coca-
Cola warehouse in Cadiz City. He became intrigued and
wondered on what the message conveyed since it was
incomplete.
Some days later, on November 15, 2002, private
respondent received a phone call relating that the
blank space preceding the word "NEVER" was filled up
with the added words "BADING AND SAGAY." The next
day, he saw the billboards with the phrase "CADIZ
FOREVER BADING AND SAGAY NEVER" printed in full.
Reacting and feeling that he was being maligned and
dishonored with the printed phrase and of being a
"tuta" of Sagay, private respondent, after consultation
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with the City Legal Officer, caused the filing of a
complaint for libel against petitioner. He claimed that
the incident resulted in mental anguish and sleepless
nights for him and his family. He thus prayed for
damages.
Petitioner admitted having placed all the billboards
because he is aware of all the things happening around
Cadiz City. He mentioned "BADING" because he was
not in conformity with the many things the mayor had
done in Cadiz City. He insisted that he has no intention
whatsoever of referring to "Bading" as the "Tuta" of
Sagay. He contended that it was private respondent
who referred to Bading as "Tuta" of Sagay. He further
maintained that his personal belief and expression was
that he will never love Bading and Sagay. He concluded
that the message in the billboards is just a wake-up call
for Cadiz City.
LEGAL ISSUE:
W/N Lopez should be acquitted on the crime of libel
based on Article 361 of the RPC.
HELD:
YES. For that matter, granting that the controversial
phrase is considered defamatory, still, no liability
attaches on petitioner. Pursuant to Article 361 of the
Revised Penal Code, if the defamatory statement is
made against a public official with respect to the
discharge of his official duties and functions and the
truth of the allegations is shown, the accused will be
entitled to an acquittal even though he does not prove
that the imputation was published with good motives
and for justifiable ends. As the Court held in United
States v. Bustos,22 the policy of a public official may be
attacked, rightly or wrongly with every argument which
ability can find or ingenuity invent. The public officer
"may suffer under a hostile and an unjust accusation;
the wound can be assuaged by the balm of a clear
conscience. A public [official] must not be too thin-
skinned with reference to comments upon his official
acts."
In arriving at an analogous finding of guilt on
petitioner, both lower courts heavily relied on the
testimony of the petitioner pertaining to the reasons
behind the printing of the phrase "CADIZ FOREVER
BADING AND SAGAY NEVER." Our in-depth scrutiny of
his testimony, however, reveals that the reasons
elicited by the prosecution mainly relate to the
discharge of private respondent’s official duties as City
Mayor of Cadiz City.
April 16, 2018 – Article 362 – LIBELOUS REMARKS
BURGOS, Paul Zandrix A.
DORR, ET. AL. VS. UNITED STATES
195 U.S. 138 (1904)
DAY, J.:
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused committed the crime of
Libelous remarks.

FACTS:
The case was a prosecution for libel, brought at the
instance of Don Benito Legarda, a member of the
Philippine Commission, against the plaintiffs in error,
Dorr and O'Brien, who were proprietors and editors of
a newspaper published in the city of Manila known as
the 'Manila Freedom.' It appears that Legarda was the
prosecuting witness against one Valdez, editor of a
certain Spanish newspaper called the 'Miau.' At the
time of the trial of Valdez, under the Spanish law then
in force in the islands, the truth could not be given in
defense in a prosecution for criminal libel.
Notwithstanding this fact, counsel for Valdez, in the
form of an offer of proof, read a paper in court, making
certain statements with reference to the libel charged,
tending to show the truth thereof. In what purported
to be a report of the proceeding, the Manila Freedom
printed an article containing the matter set forth in the
offer to prove, with headlines in large type, as follows:
'TRAITOR, SEDUCER, AND PERJURER.
SENSATIONAL ALLEGATIONS AGAINST
COMMISSIONER LEGARDA.
MADE OF RECORD AND READ IN ENGLISH-SPANISH
READING WAIVED.
Wife would have killed him.
Legarda pale and nervous.'
The prosecution of the plaintiffs in error was based
upon the [195 U.S. 138, 150] publication of these
headlines, which were charged to be a false and
malicious libel, printed in the English language, of and
concerning Don Benito Legarda. At the time Valdez
was tried, in which case the occurrence undertaken to
be reported took place, the Spanish law was in force,
denying the right to put in evidence the truth of the
alleged libelous matter. At the time of the trial of the
plaintiffs in error the Philippine Commission had
passed act No. 277, known as the libel law. Sec.8 of the
said law provides that: Libelous remarks or comments
connected with matter privileged by the last section
receive no privilege by reason of being so connected.
RULING:
Yes. The contention is that the publication is privileged
under 7 and 8, the claim being that the publication was
a fair and truthful report of judicial proceedings.
Testimony was introduced in the court below tending
to show malice, and there was no proof to support the
truth of the charges in the alleged libel, which were
found to be without basis and wanton, and as the
findings of the two lower courts in a case brought in
review here are not ordinarily disturbed, the case upon
this branch might rest upon that proposition. It is
evident, however, that the publication in question did
not stop with a simple report of the judicial
proceedings. Indeed, the paper offered in evidence
could not have been received under the law then in
force,-a fact concerning which no comment was made
in the report of the proceedings. Furthermore, 8 of the
law, while permitting, as privileged, a fair and truthful
report of judicial proceedings, except upon express
proof of malice, does not make privileged libelous
remarks or comments in connection with the privileged
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matter. The draftsman of the law evidently had in mind
the law of criminal libel in newspaper publications as it
exists in this country. The privilege extends to a full and
correct report of judicial proceedings without
prejudicial comment.
These headlines were not privileged matter at the
common law, and were libelous remarks or comments
if the matter could be deemed otherwise privileged,
within the meaning of 8 of the Philippine libel law. An
inspection of them would seem to be sufficient to
demonstrate this fact. The complainant was held up to
the public where the paper circulated in striking
headlines as 'Traitor, Seducer, Perjurer,' and while these
words were quoted, as well as the phrase 'Wife would
have killed him,' their publication in this manner was
certainly the equivalent to a remark or comment
unnecessary to a fair and truthful report of judicial
proceedings, and likely to raise inferences highly
detrimental to the character and standing of the one
concerning whom they were printed and published.
April 16, 2018 – Article 363 – INCRIMINATING
INNOCENT PERSON
CEBALLOS, Jesus C.
PEOPLE V. RIVERA
G.R. NOS. 38215 & 38216
DECEMBER 22, 1933.
ISSUE:
WoN Rivera was guilty of Art. 363 of the Revised Penal
Code.
FACTS:
Vito and Moreno were charged with theft by Sgt.
Ranas, Q. with Faustino Rivera as the witness of the
crime. The charge against them was dismissed by the
Court of First Instance of Lucena. Thereafter, Vito and
Moreno filed a case against Rivera for violation of Art.
363, Incriminating innocent person. The case was also
dismissed. The Attorney-General appealed to the
Supreme Court.
HELD:
No, he is not guilty of the crime.
Art. 363 do not apply to the instant case since it would
open the door to a flood of prosecutions in cases
where the defendants were acquitted. The gravamen
of the offense is performing an act which "tends
directly" to such an imputation
It will be observed that under article 326 of the former
Penal Code, the gravamen of the offense is the
imputation itself when made before an administrative
or judicial officer, whereas in article 363 of the Revised
Penal Code the gravamen of the offense is performing
an act which "tends directly" to such an imputation.
Article 326 of the old Penal Code punishes false
prosecutions whereas article 363 of the Revised Penal
Code punishes any act which may tend directly to
cause a false prosecution.

The subject article punishes the acts of “planting”
evidence and the like, which do not themselves
constitute false prosecutions but tend directly to cause
false prosecutions.
April 16, 2018 – Article 364 – INTRIGUING AGAINST
HONOR
DAHIROC, Janice L.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BENEDICTO
BAO
G.R. No. L-12102 September 25, 1959
ISSUE:
Whether or not the evidence adduced by the
prosecution establish the crime of intriguing against
honor penalized by article 364 of the revised Penal
Code and not the oral defamation as appealed.
FACTS:
This is an appeal by the Government from an order of
the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental,
dismissing, upon defendant-appellee's motion the
case against him for serious oral defamation.
On May 13, 1955, Benedicto Bao was charged with oral
defamation in the justice of the Peace Court of Aloran,
Misamis Occidental, in a complaint filed by the
offended party, Maximina Banguis for allegedly
speaking publicly and uttering "Si Maximina Banguis,
aking nakuha" (Maximina Banguis was carnally taken
by me) and other words of similar import and meaning
implying that the offended party no longer a virgin
despite her being a single woman, thus exposing her
to public contempt, disrepute and ridicule. The said
complaint was later amended to charge the crime or
serious defamation. The defendant having waived his
right to the preliminary investigation and the justice of
the peace court being of the opinion that the case did
not fall within its jurisdiction, the record of the case was
forwarded to the Court of First Instance of the province
for trial on the merits.
Upon arraignment, the accused entered a plea of not
guilty and the case was tried. After the prosecution had
rested its case, the accused, thru his counsel, filed a
motion to quash on the grounds the facts alleged in
the information did not constitute the crime of serious
oral defamation and that the evidence presented was
insufficient to convict him of any criminal offense. The
prosecution opposed the motion to quash, but the trial
court, in its order of November 3, 1956 - finding that
the evidence adduced by the prosecution establish the
crime of intriguing against honor penalized by article
364 of the revised Penal Code, which is within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the justice of the peace court
to try, and not oral defamation as defined and
punished under article 358 of the same code - granted
the motion and dismissed the case with costs de oficio.
In that the same order the court directed the provincial
fiscal to file the corresponding action before the
proper justice of the peace court. The prosecution
moved for reconsideration of the order but the motion
having been denied, it appealed directly to this Court.
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HELD:
We believe the appeal if bereft of merit.
This Court has already held that the dismissal of a
criminal case on the ground of variance between the
allegations in the information and the evidence
amounts to an acquittal. (People vs. Opemia, et al., 98
Phil., 698; 52 Off. Gaz., 1951.) And while there appears
to be merit in the Solicitor General's contention that
the offense of intriguing against honor is necessarily
included in the crime of serious oral defamation
charged in the information and therefore the accused
could be validly convicted by the trial court of that
crime under the same information, the fact remains
that the case was dismissed after the prosecution had
rested its case and upon motion by the defendant on
the grounds that the fact remains that the case alleged
in the information did not constitute the crime charged
and that, at any rate, the evidence presented was not
sufficient to establish his guilt. The dismissal, likewise,
amounts to an acquittal or discharge of the defendant,
from which the prosecution cannot appeal without
doing violence to the constitutional provision on
double jeopardy. (People vs. Cabarles, 54 Off. Gaz.,
7051, and the case cited therein). It goes without
saying that such dismissal constitutes a bar to another
prosecution not only for the offense charged, but also
"for any offense which necessarily includes or is
necessarily included" therein.
Wherefore, the appeal filed on behalf of the
Government must be, as it is hereby, dismissed with
costs de oficio.
Article 244. Unlawful Appointments. - Any public
officer who shall knowingly nominate or appoint to any
public office any person lacking the legal qualifications
therefor, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor and
a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.THE
SANDIGANBAYAN (FOURTH DIVISION) and
ALEJANDRO A. VILLAPANDO
G.R. No. 164185 July 23, 2008
ISSUE:
Whether or not Villapando is guilty of the crime of
Unlawful appointment under article 244 of the Revised
Penal Code.
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari filed by the Office of the
Ombudsman towards the decision of the
Sandiganbayan, granting private respondent Alejandro
A. Villapando's Demurrer to Evidence and acquitting
him of the crime of unlawful appointment under Article
244 of the Revised Penal Code.
Mayor Villapando was the duly elected Municipal
Mayor of San Vicente, Palawan when the alleged crime
was committed. On July 1998, the accused appointed
Orlando Tiape, who lost in May 1998 election, as
Municipal Administrator of the said municipality.
 CRIMINAL LAW II | CASE DIGESTS

However, respondents contend that the appointee

possesses all the qualifications stated in Article 244 of
the Revised Penal Code.

On the other hand, petitioner argues that the

Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction because its interpretation of Article 244 of
the Revised Penal Code does not complement the
provision on the one-year prohibition found in the
1987 Constitution and the Local Government Code.

HELD:
Yes. Villapandos contention and the Sandiganbayan,
Fourth Divisions interpretation of the term legal
disqualification lack cogency. Article 244 of the Revised
Penal Code cannot be circumscribed lexically. Legal
disqualification cannot be read as excluding temporary
disqualification in order to exempt therefrom the legal
prohibitions under Section 6, Article IX of the 1987
Constitution and Section 94(b) of the Local
Government Code of 1991. Its interpretation of the
term legal disqualification in Article 244 of the Revised
Penal Code defies legal cogency. Legal disqualification
cannot be read as excluding temporary disqualification
in order to exempt therefrom the legal prohibitions
under the 1987 Constitution and the Local Government
Code of 1991.

We reiterate the legal maxim ubi lex non distinguit nec

nosdistinguere debemus. Basic is the rule in statutory
construction that where the law does not distinguish,
the courts should not distinguish. There should be no
distinction in the application of a law where none is
indicated.

The Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division having acted with

grave abuse of discretion in disregarding the basic
rules of statutory construction resulting in its decision
granting Villapandos Demurrer to Evidence and
acquitting the latter, we can do no less but declare its
decision null and void.

The petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 20,

2004 of the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, in
granting private respondent Alejandro A. Villapandos
Demurrer to Evidence and acquitting him of the crime
of unlawful appointment under Article 244 of the
Revised Penal Code is hereby declared NULL and VOID.
Let the case be remanded to the Sandiganbayan,
Fourth Division, for further proceedings.

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TITLE FOURTEEN – QUASI-OFFENSES
April 19, 2018 – Article 365 – IMPRUDENCE AND
NEGLIGENCE
DELA PEÑA, Clarisse J
G.R. NO. L-24084 NOVEMBER 3, 1925
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
VS.
PEDRO RAMIREZ,
ISSUE:
Is the defendant criminally liable, and if so, did he act
with malice?
FACTS:
The defendant, along with Victoriano Ranga, the
deceased, and Agustin Menor, were invited by one
Bartolome Quiaoit to hunt in the mount Balitok of the
municipality of Nueva Era, Province of Ilocos Norte. The
three proceeded to hunt, leaving Quiaoit in a hut
approximately 1 kilometer from the scene of the crime.
Upon arrival on said mount Balitok, defendant, who
was then carrying the shotgun of Quiaoit and a lantern,
happened to hunt a deer, and thereafter told his
companions to stay there, watch over the prey, while
he was going away looking for another; that being far
away from his companions, he seemed to have seen
with his lantern something like the eyes of a deer about
fifty meters from him and then he shot it. But much to
his surprise, on approaching what he thought was a
deer, it proved to be his companion, Victoriano Ranga.
HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that although there was no
malice on the part of the defendant, he is still criminally
liable for homicide through reckless imprudence. The
defendant, knowing that he had two companions,
should have exercised all the necessary diligence to
avoid every undesirable accident. Furthermore, the act
of offering to the mother of the deceased a carabaos
and a horse by way of indemnity, indicates on the one
hand that the defendant admitted the commission of
the crime, on the other it shows that he performed that
act without criminal intent and only through a real
imprudence.
G.R. NO. 195671 JANUARY 21, 2015
ROGELIO J. GONZAGA, PETITIONER,
VS.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Rogelio is guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Reckless Imprudence Resulting
to Homicide with MDouble Serious Physical Injuries
and Damage to Property punishable under Article 365
in relation to Article 263 of the RPC.
FACTS:
At around 6 o'clock in the morning of June 25, 1997,
Dionesio Inguito, Sr. (Dionesio, Sr.) was driving his
motorcycle along Brgy. Kiara, Don Carlos, Bukidnon
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towards Brgy. Bocboc of the same municipality, to
bring his two (2) minor children, Dionesio Inguito, Jr.
(Dionesio, Jr.) and Cherry Inguito (Cherry), to school.
While they were ascending the curving road going to
Bocboc on their proper lane on the right side of the
road, a Toyota Land Cruiser (Land Cruiser)driven by
Rogelio was swiftly descending the same lane from the
opposite direction. Dionesio, Sr. blew the horn of his
motorcycle to signal the Land Cruiser to return to its
proper lane but the Land Cruiser remained.8 In order
to avoid collision, Dionesio, Sr. tried to swerve to the
left, but the Land Cruiser suddenly swerved towards
the same direction and collided head-on with the
motorcycle.
As a result of the collision, Dionesio, Sr. and his 2
children were thrown off the motorcycle. Dionesio, Sr.
was pinned beneath the Land Cruiser, while Cherry and
Dionesio, Jr. were thrown over the hood of the Land
Cruiser and fell on the side of the road, causing injuries
to their legs. Siblings Rolf, Cherry, and Jenny Ann
Aquino, who were traversing the same road aboard
their own motorcycle, stopped to help and placed the
victims together on the rightmost side of the road
facing Brgy. Bocboc, while Rogelio remained inside the
Land Cruiser.
In view of the foregoing mishap, the provincial
prosecutor filed an Information charging Rogelio for
Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide with
Double Serious Physical Injuries and Damage to
Property "with the aggravating circumstance that
accused failed to lend on the spot to the injured party
such help that was in his hands to give" before the RTC.
Upon arraignment, Rogelio entered a plea of not guilty.
HELD:
YES.
Reckless imprudence, as defined in Article 365 of the
RPC, consists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing
or failing to do an act from which material damage
results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on
the part of the person performing or failing to perform
such act, taking into consideration his employment or
occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition
and other circumstances regarding persons, time and
place.
In order to establish a motorist’s liability for the
negligent operation of a vehicle, it must be shown that
there was a direct causal connection between such
negligence and the injuries or damages complained of.
To constitute the offense of reckless driving, the act
must be something more than a mere negligence in
the operation of a motor vehicle – a willful and wanton
disregard of the consequences is required. Willful,
wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others
within the meaning of reckless driving statutes has
been held to involve a conscious choice of a course of
action which injures another, either with knowledge
fserious danger to others involved, or with knowledge
of facts which would disclose the danger to any
reasonable person. Verily, it is the inexcusable lack of
precaution or conscious indifference to the
 CRIMINAL LAW II | CASE DIGESTS

consequences of the conduct which supplies the

criminal intent and brings an act of mere negligence
and imprudence under the operation of the penal law,
without regard to whether the private offended party
may himself be considered likewise at fault.

In the present case, the RTC and the CA uniformly

found that Rogelio’s act of driving very fast on the
wrong side of the road was the proximate cause of the
collision, resulting to the death of Dionesio, Sr. and
serious physical injuries to Dionesio, Jr. and Cherry.
Notably, the road where the incident occurred was a
curve sloping upwards towards Brgy. Bocboc where the
Inguitos were bound and descending towards the
opposite direction where Rogelio was going. Indeed,
the very fact of speeding, under such circumstances, is
indicative of imprudent behavior. As a motorist,
Rogelio was bound to exercise ordinary care in such
affair by driving at a reasonable rate of speed
commensurate with the conditions encountered, as
this would enable him to keep the vehicle under
control and avoid injury to others using the highway.
Moreover, it is elementary in traffic school that a driver
slows down before negotiating a curve as it may be
reasonably anticipated that another vehicle may
appear from the opposite direction at any moment.
Hence, excessive speed, combined with other
circumstances such as the occurrence of the accident
on or near a curve, as in this case, constitutes
negligence. Consequently, the Court finds that Rogelio
acted recklessly and imprudently in driving at a fast
speed on the wrong side of the road while approaching
the curve where the incident happened, thereby
rendering him criminally liable, as well as civilly
accountable for the material damages resulting
therefrom. Nonetheless, while the CA and the RTC
concurred that the proximate cause of the collision was
Rogelio’s reckless driving, the CA Decision made no
mention as to the presence or absence of the limiting
element in the last paragraph of Article 365 of the RPC,
which imposes the penalty next higher in degree upon
the offender who "fails to lend on the spot to the
injured parties such help as may be in his hands to
give." Based on case law, the obligation under this
paragraph: (a) is dependent on the means in the hands
of the offender, i.e., the type and degree of assistance
that he/she, at the time and place of the incident, is
capable of giving; and (b) requires adequate proof.

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