LABOR CASE 1

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. Nos. L-16292-94, L-16309 and L-16317-18 October 31, 1960

KAPISANAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA MANILA RAILROAD

COMPANY, petitioner,
vs.
YARD CREW UNION, STATION EMPLOYEES UNION, RAILROAD ENGINEERING
DEPARTMENT UNION, MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY, and COURT OF
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.

MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, MANILA RAILROAD CREW UNION,
STATION EMPLOYEES UNION and KAPISANAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA
MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY, respondents.

L-16292-94.
Jose Espinas for petitioner.
F.A. Sambajon for respondent CIR.
Government Corporate Counsel Simeon M. Gopengco and F.A. Umali for respondent
MRR.
Carlos E. Santiago for respondent Unions.
F. Da. Bondoc for respondents (REDU).

L-16309 and L-16217-18.

Government Corporate Counsel Simeon M. Gopengco and F.A. Umali for petitioner.
V.C. Magbanua for respondent CIR.
F. Da. Bondoc for respondent (REDU).
Jose R. Espinas for respondent Kap. Ng Manggagawa sa MRR.
Carlos C. Santiago for the other respondent Unions.

PAREDES, J.:

In the Court of Industrial Relations, three separate petitions were registered: Case No.
491-MC, by Yard Crew Union, Case No. 494-MC, by Station Employees' Union; and
Case No. 507-MC, by Railroad Engineering Department Union. The Kapisanan Ng Mga
Manggagawa Sa Manila Railroad Company, intervened. They were treated jointly by the
respondent Court because they involved identical questions. On appeal, three separate
petitions for certiorari were presented by the Kapisanan Ng Mga Manggagawa Sa
Manila Railroad Company (G.R. Nos. L-16292-94) and three separate petitions
for certiorari by the Manila Railroad Company (G.R. No. L-16309, L-16317 and L-
16318.).

We glean from the record the following facts:

On March 7, 1955, the Kapisanan Ng Mga Manggagawa Sa Manila Railroad Company,

hereinafter called Kapisanan, filed a petition (Case No. 237-MC), praying that it be
certified as the exclusive bargaining agent in the Manila Railroad Company, hereinafter
called Company. A decision was promulgated on September 29, 1956, affirmed by the
Court en banc on January 16, 1957, in which the respondent Court found three unions
appropriate for purposes of collective bargaining, to wit: (1) The unit of locomotive
drivers, firemen, assistant firemen and motormen-otherwise known as the engine crew
unit: (2) the unit of conductors, assistant conductors, unit agents, assistant route agents
and train posters, otherwise known as the train crew unit, and (3) the unit of all the rest
of the company personnel, except the supervisors, temporary employees, the members
of the Auditing Department, the members of the security guard and professional and
technical employees, referred to by the respondent court as the unit of the rest of the
employees. To these 3 units, the following unions were respectively certified as the
exclusive bargaining agents: (1) The Union de Maquinistas, Fogoneros, Ayudantes y
Motormen; (2) Union de Empleados de Trenes (conductors); and (3) the Kapisanan Ng
Mga Manggagawa Sa Manila Railroad Company.

After the decision had become final, Case No. 491-MC was filled on September 20,
1957, amended on August 13, 1958, by the Manila Railroad Yard Crew Union, praying
that it be defined as a separate unit; Case No. 494-MC, on September 25, 1957,
amended on August 13, 1958, by the Station Employees' Union, praying that it be
constituted as a separate bargaining unit, and Case No. 507- MC, on November 30,
1957, by the Railroad Engineering Department Union, praying that it be defined as a
separate bargaining unit. All asked that they be certified in the units sought to be
separated. The respondent unions are legitimate labor organizations with certificates of
registration in the Department of Labor.

The Kapisanan and the Company opposed the separation of the said three units on the
following grounds:

(1) That the Kapisanan had been duly certified as the collective bargaining agent in
the unit of all of the rest of the employees and it had entered into a collective bargaining
agreement on November 4, 1957, and this agreement bars certification of a unit at least
during the first 12 months after the finality of Case No. 237-MC (contract bar rule).

(2) That the Court had denied similar petitions for separation of unit as was ordered in
Case No. 488-MC, wherein the petition for the separation of Mechanical Department
Labor Union was dismissed by the respondent Court on April 25, 1958 and in the case
of the Benguet Auto Lines Union, Case No. 4-MC-PANG) dismissed on July 18, 1958.
(3) That the three unions in question are barred from petitioning for separate units
because they are bound by the decision in Case No. 237-MC, for having been
represented therein by the Kapisanan.

After due hearing, the respondent Court, through the Hon. Arsenio Martinez, Associate
Judge, handed down an order, dated June 8, 1959, the dispositive portion of which
recites as follows:

Wherefore, all the foregoing considered, and without passing upon the basic
questions raised herein and as part of its fact finding investigations, the Court
orders a plebiscite to be conducted among the employees in the three proposed
groups, namely: the Engineering Department, the Station Employees and the
Yard Crew Personnel. The employee in the proposed groups minus the
supervisors, temporary employees, members of the Auditing Department,
members of the security group, professionals and technical employees, shall
vote, in a secret ballot to be conducted by this Court, on the question of whether
or not they desire to be separated from the unit of the rest of the
employees being represented by the Kapisanan. In this connection, the Court
requests the cooperation of the Manila Railroad Company to extend its facilities
for the holding of this plebiscite, particularly the payrolls for the month to be
agreed upon by the parties. . . .

The respondent Court also declared that the collective bargaining agreement could not
be a bar to another certification election because one of its signatories, the Kapisanan
President, Vicente K. Olazo, was a supervisor:

In considering however such existing contract between the Kapisanan and the
Company, the Court cannot close its eyes and fail to observe that among the
signatories thereto, on the part of the Kapisanan, is the President of the Union,
Vicente K. Olazo.

In case No. 237-MC. one of the important and fundamental questions raised was
whether or not Vicente K. Olazo is a supervisor within the meaning of Section
2(k) of Republic Act 875. The Trial Court, as well as the majority of the Court en
banc, reached the conclusion in same Case No. 237-MC that he is a supervisor.

. . . For this reason, the Court believes that his existing contract, through
embodying terms and conditions of employment and with a reasonable period to
run, would not be a bar to a certification proceeding.

A motion for reconsideration of the order of June 8, 1959, was presented by the
Kapisanan, and same was denied on August 20, 1959, in an order, concurred in by
three Judges of the Court, with two Judges dissenting, against which the Kapisanan on
November 28, 1959, filed its notice of appeal. Appeals by certiorari were filed by the
Kapisanan and the Company. In this Court, respondents presented motion to dismiss
the petitions, on the ground that the order of the respondent court on June 8, 1959 and
the resolution of the respondent court en banc dated August 20, 1959, to hold a
plebiscite, were interlocutory, not subject to appeal. They also allege the same in their
answers, as one of the defenses. The case, therefore, poses three questions, to wit:

1. Are the appealed orders interlocutory in nature?

2. Is the order of the respondent court, granting groups of employees to choose whether
or not they desire to be separated from the certified unit to which they belong, during the
existence of a valid bargaining contract entered into by a union close to the heels of its
certification, contrary to law?

3. Is it legal error for the respondent court to hold that the bargaining agreement in
question does not bar certification proceedings, only because one of the signatories for
the union was adjudged by the majority of such court to be supervisor, in a previous
case?

Wherefore, all the foregoing considered, and without passing upon the basic
question raised herein and as part of its fact finding investigation, the Court
orders a plebiscite to be conducted among the employees in the three proposed
groups, namely: the Engineering Department, the Station Employees and the
Yard Crew Personnel.

The resolution en banc, dated August 20, 1959, partially states:

It will be further noted that it is just a part of the investigatory power of the Court
to determine by secret ballot the desire of the employees concerned. What has
been ordered is merely a plebiscite and not the certification election itself. . . .
Proceedings may still continue and an order whether denying the petition or not
would necessarily ensue. In a word, something else has to be done within the
premises and the order does not deny or grant petition in the above entitled case.

In the case of Democratic Labor Association vs. Cebu Stevedoring Co., G.R. No. L-
10321, February 28, 1958, we stated that because of the modern complexity of the
relation between both employer and union structure, it becomes difficult to determine
from the evidence alone which of the several claimant groups forms a proper bargaining
unit; that it becomes necessary to give consideration to the express will or desire of the
employees — a practice designated as the "Globe doctrine," which sanctions the
holding of a series of elections, not for the purpose of allowing the group receiving an
over all majority of votes to represent all employees, but for the specific purpose of
permitting the employees in each of the several categories to select the group which
each chooses as a bargaining unit; that the factors which may be considered and
weighed in fixing appropriate units are: the history, of their collective bargaining; the
history, extent and type of organization of employees in other plants of the same
employer, or other employers in the same industry; the skill, wages, work and working
conditions of the employees; the desires of the employees; the eligibility of the
employees for membership in the union or unions involved; and the relationship
between the unit or units proposed and the employer's organization, management and
operation, and the test in determining the appropriate bargaining unit is that a unit must
effect a grouping of employees who have substantial, mutual interests in wages, hours,
working conditions and other subjects of collective bargaining.

It is manifest, therefore, that "the desires of the employees" is one of the factors in
determining the appropriate bargaining unit. The respondent Court was simply
interested "in the verification of the evidence already placed on record and submitted
wherein the workers have signed manifestations and resolutions of their desire to be
separated from Kapisanan." Certainly, no one would deny the respondent court's right
of full investigation in arriving at a correct and conclusive finding of fact in order to deny
or grant the conclusive findings of fact in order to deny or grant the petitions for
certification election. On the contrary, all respondent court, or any court for that matter,
to investigate before acting, to do justice to the parties concerned. And one way of
determining the will or desire of the employees is what the respondent court had
suggested: a plebiscite — carried by secret ballot. A plebiscite not to be conducted by
the Department of Labor, as contemplated in a certification election under Sec. 12 of the
Magna Charter of Labor, R.A. No. 875, but by the respondent court itself. As well as
observed by the respondent court, "the votes of workers one way or the other, in these
cases will not by any chance choose the agent or unit which will represent them anew,
for precisely that is a matter that is within the issues raised in these petitions for
certification".

The test in determining whether an order or judgment is interlocutory or final is "Does it

leave something to be done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the case? If it
does, it is interlocutory; if it does not, it is final" (Moran's Comments on the Rules of
Court, 1952 Ed., Vol. I, p. 41). Having in view the avowed purpose of the orders in
question, as heretofore exposed, one should not stretch his imagination far to see that
they are clearly interlocutory, as they leave something more to be done in the trial court
and do not decide one way or the other the petitions of the respondent unions. We are,
therefore, constrained to hold, as we do hereby hold, that the present appeals or
petitions for review by certiorari, are not authorized by law and should be dismissed
(Section 2, Rule 44, Rules of Court). There is, moreover, nothing, under the facts
obtaining in these cases and the law on the subject, which would warrant this Court to
declare the orders under consideration, illegal.

The herein petitioners contend that the collective bargaining agreement, executed on
November 4, 1957 (Case No. 237-MC), is a bar to the certification proceedings under
consideration. The respondents counter that it is not so, because one of the signatories
in the said agreement for the Kapisanan, Vicente K. Olazo, was found to be a
supervisor under section 2(k) R.A. 875, in Kapisanan, etc. vs. CIR, etc., 106 Phil., 607;
57 Off. Gaz. (2) 254. Having, however, reached the conclusion that the orders in
question are not appealable and that the respondent court has not as yet decided on
whether the said collective bargaining agreement is a bar or not to the petitions for
separate units and for certification election, which could properly be determined after
the result of the plebiscite shall have been known by the respondent court, the
consideration of this issue is premature.

In view hereof, the petitions or appeals for review by certiorari are dismissed, without
costs.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L.
Barrera and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.
 LABOR CASE 2

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-26844 September 30, 1969

FELIPE DE LEON, BALDOMERO SALVADOR, MARTINIANO EVANGELISTA,

VICENTE PANLAQUI, CASTOR TUASON, FRANCISCO GONZALO, ENRIQUE
PAGCU, CLAUDIO SICHON, ESTANISLAO SICHON, RUBEN ICBAN, ABONDINO
ISIP, LUIS P. ISIP, DIOSDADO P. GONZALES, MAXIMO PAULE, FAUSTINO
DIMATULAC, MATEO BAUTISTA, WILFREDO AYCARDO, HORACIO OCAMPO,
FABIAN MENESES, FLORENTINO GARCIA and JOSE D. GALANG, petitioners,
vs.
PAMPANGA SUGAR DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, INC., respondent.

Juan C. Limin for petitioners.

Carlos, Madarang, Carballo and Valdez for respondent.

CASTRO, J.:

Review on certiorari of the resolution dated October 14, 1966 of the Court of Industrial
Relations (CIR) dismissing the petitioners' complaint in case 38-V.

The respondent Pampanga Sugar Development Company (PASUDECO) operates a

sugar central at San Fernando, Pampanga. The petitioners, 21 all told, were its security
guards required to work eight hours a day, seven days a week. On November 28, 1961
the petitioners filed with the CIR a complaint seeking payment to them of premium or
differential pay in the total amount P49,581.79, plus attorney's fees of P3,000 and costs
of suit. Upon the finding that the "petitioners were paid their monthly salaries plus 25%
additional compensation for work on Sundays and Holidays as provided for by law and
that work on said days is one of the terms and conditions of their employment as
security guards." CIR Judge Joaquin M. Salvador dismissed the case. Acting on the
petitioners' motion for reconsideration, the court en banc affirmed Judge Salvador's
order. Hence this appeal.

The petitioners' claim, in essence, is that under the authority of section 4 of

Commonwealth Act 444 as amended (Eight-Hour Labor Law), for a Sunday or legal
holiday work of not more than eight hours, each of them is entitled to his monthly salary
and his premium or differential compensation, i.e., his wage for the said Sunday or legal
holiday plus at least 25% thereof.

Sec. 4 of C.A. 444, as amended, reads:

No person, firm, or corporation, business establishment or place or center of

labor shall compel an employee or laborer to work during Sundays and legal
holidays, unless he is paid an additional sum of at least twenty-five per centum of
his regular remuneration: Provided, however, That this prohibition shall not apply
to public utilities performing some public service such as supplying gas,
electricity, power, water, or providing means of transportation or communication.

The issue which the petitioners here pose is not one of novel perception. In Manalo vs.
Pampanga Sugar Development Company, Inc., L-26776, June 30, 1969, this Court
disposed of a similar contention, thus:

The law is plain and unambiguous. It directs payment for work done not
exceeding eight hours during Sundays and legal holidays by an employee or
laborer not falling under the exception "an additional sum of at least twenty-five
per centum of his regular remuneration." And we already said in one case that
"(t)he minimum legal additional compensation for work on Sundays and legal
holidays is — 25% of the laborer's regular remuneration." Thus, if said employee
or laborer regularly receives P6 a day for an eight-hour work on an ordinary day
and he is made to work for eight hours on Sunday or legal holiday, he is entitled
to his base pay of P6 plus P1.50 (25% of P6), or a total of P7.50. His premium
pay is P1.50, the "twenty-five per centum of his regular remuneration of P6. It
does not include his base pay of P6. He gets that P6 for an eight-hour work
performed any day. And he gets the extra P1.50 if such eight-hour work is
rendered on a Sunday or legal holiday. This is the most logical and reasonable
import of the law. The CIR did not err in following it.

The same signification is, contrary to petitioners' contention, given to the term
"premium pay" by the Department of Labor, as may be gleaned from the
following formula it devised in determining the daily wage of monthly-salaried
employees, except those employed by public utilities, working the whole year
round, including Sundays and legal holidays:

Monthly salary multiplied by 12 (months) equals yearly salary; yearly salary

divided by 380.5 (days) equals daily wage.1awphîl.nèt

The figure 380.5 above is the sum of the 303 ordinary days of the year and the
62 Sundays, and legal holidays of the same year and 15.5 (25% of 62). Stated
otherwise, the last figure 15.5 is the difference between 380.5 (theoretically, the
number of days worked by the employee in one year) and 365 days (the actual
number of days in a year). It is, in short, the equivalent in days of the employee's
25% premium pay for 52 Sundays and 10 legal holidays in one year. The
 premium pay is not, therefore, 125% as petitioners want us to believe. Thus, if
the employee's daily wage is P6, his total premium pay for one year is P93 (P6
times 15.5). Computed in another way, with the same daily wage, his premium
pay for one Sunday or legal holiday is P1.50 (25% of P6); multiplying P1.50 by
62 (the number of Sundays and legal holidays in one year), we get the same
amount of P93. This is the amount of premium pay to which he is entitled in one
year in addition to his fixed yearly salary.

Petitioners postulate that the monthly salary or, for that matter, the yearly salary
applies only to the ordinary working days and does not take into account the
Sundays and legal holidays found in a given calendar month or year.

The position thus taken by petitioners-appellants, that they are entitled to 125%
premium, or extra pay, for work done in each Sunday and holiday, would only
apply if it is shown that the monthly or yearly salaries stipulated are intended to
cover work on ordinary working days only or where the nature or conditions of
employment do not require work on Sundays and holidays. But where, in
agreeing to the monthly or yearly stipend, the parties knew, or had reason to
know, that the work would be continuous, without interruption on Sundays and
holidays, then the wage earner would only be entitled to the 25% supplement (or
extra pay) provided by section 4 of the Eight-Hour Labor law, as the regular
monthly or yearly wage already covered the work done on Sundays and holidays.

The import of the law and the decision in Manalo is that for work on Sundays and legal
holidays, the employer must pay the employee: (1) his regular remuneration, or 100%;
and (2) an additional sum of at least 25% of the regular remuneration, which is called
the "premium pay." In other words, the pay for Sundays and legal holidays is 125% of
the pay for ordinary days, but only the excess of 25% is premium pay. With respect to
employees paid on a monthly basis, the first 100% (of the 125%), corresponding to the
regular remuneration, may or may not be included in the monthly salary. If it is, then the
employee is entitled to collect only the premium of 25%. If it is not, then the employee
has a right to receive the entire 125%.

The question that thus emerges is whether the petitioners' monthly salaries already
cover the 100% regular remuneration for Sundays and legal holidays. 1

From the allegations in paragraph 3 of the petitioners' complaint it can be clearly

inferred that such regular remuneration of 100% is already encompassed in the
petitioners' monthly salaries. We hereunder quote the itemization of the claim (which is
essentially the same in respect to the other petitioners) of the petitioner Felipe de Leon:

Period of employment for which claim is

based January 1, 1946 to October 31,
1957
Salary per month from P95.00
 January 1, 1946 to
December 31, 1950
Number of Sundays
and Holidays from
January 1, 1946 to
December 31, 1950 300
Rate per day plus 25% P3.95
300 Sundays and
Holidays multiplied by
P3.95 rate per each
Sunday and Holiday P1,185.00

From the particular precise statement, "Rate per day plus 25% - P3.95," 2 it follows that
the regular rate per ordinary day is P3.1666, which is 1/30th of the monthly salary of
P95. This means that in computing the daily wage, each of the petitioners divided his
monthly salary by 30, the average number of days in a month, which includes Sundays
and legal holidays. This is an effective admission, or at least demonstrates awareness
on the part of the petitioners, that their monthly salaries covered work not only on
ordinary days but also on Sundays and legal holidays. 3 The allegation, "300 Sundays
and holidays multiplied by P3.95 rate per each Sunday and Holiday — P1,185.00," is
correct. However, it must be remembered that of the amount of P1,185, the sum of
P948 had already been paid to De Leon as part of his salary for the five-year period
from January 1, 1946 to December 31, 1950.

The only question remaining is whether the 25% premium pay has also been paid. In
the order of Judge Salvador, affirmed by the court en banc, there is a finding that the
"petitioners were paid their monthly salaries plus 25% additional compensation for work
on Sundays and holidays." The factual findings of the trial judge, unaltered or
unmodified by the court en banc, cannot be reviewed by this Court. 4 The findings of fact
of the CIR are conclusive on this Court, where they are supported by substantial
evidence, and the lower court has not acted with grave abuse of discretion in reaching
them. 5

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment a quo dismissing the complaint is affirmed. No

pronouncement as to costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Fernando, Capistrano,

Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., concur.
Reyes, J.B.L., J., is on leave.

Footnotes
1
In Manalo vs. PASUDECO, supra, this Court remanded the case to the CIR
because the latter failed to make a finding on this pivotal point.
2
Actually, it should be P3.9582 or P3.96.
3
Otherwise, the petitioners would have divided their monthly salaries only by the
number of regular working days, in which situation, with respect to De Leon's
aforementioned claim, the daily wage should have been P3.74 and his Sunday
and legal holiday pay should have been P4.67 (Computation here is based on
365 days with only 60 Sundays and holidays a year, the latter being the number
claimed by the petitioners.)
4
Liberation Steamship Co. & NDC vs. CIR, L-25389-25390, June 27, 1968.
5
Laguna Colleges vs. CIR, L-28927, Sept. 25, 1968, Luzon Stevedoring
Corporation vs. Celorio, L-22542, July 31, 1968; Tanglaw ng Paggawa vs. CIR,
L-24498, Sept. 21, 1968; Mechanical Department of Labor Union sa PNC vs.
CIR, L-28223, August 30, 1968.
 LABOR CASE 3

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 77395 November 29, 1988

BELYCA CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
DIR. PURA FERRER CALLEJA, LABOR RELATIONS, MANILA, MINISTRY OF
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT; MED-ARBITER, RODOLFO S. MILADO, MINISTRY OF
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, REGIONAL OFFICE NO. 10 AND ASSOCIATED
LABOR UNION (ALU-TUCP), MINDANAO REGIONAL OFFICE, CAGAYAN DE ORO
CITY, respondents.

Soriano and Arana Law Offices for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for public respondent.

Francisco D. Alas for respondent Associated Labor Unions-TUCP.

PARAS, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction seeking to annul
or to set aside the resolution of the Bureau of Labor Relations dated November 24,
1986 and denying the appeal, and the Bureau's resolution dated January 13, 1987
denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

The dispositive portion of the questioned resolution dated November 24, 1986 (Rollo, p.
4) reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, the Order is

affirmed and the appeal therefrom denied.

Let, therefore, the pertinent records of the case be remanded to the office
of origin for the immediate conduct of the certification election.

The dispositive portion of the resolution dated January 13, 1987 (Rollo, p. 92) reads, as
follows:
 WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent Belyca
Corporation (Livestock Agro-Division) is hereby dismissed for lack of merit
and the Bureau's Resolution dated 24 November 1986 is affirmed.
Accordingly, let the records of this case be immediately forwarded to the
Office of origin for the holding of the certification elections.

No further motion shall hereafter be entertained.

The antecedents of the case are as follows:

On June 3, 1986, private respondent Associated Labor Union (ALU)-TUCP, a legitimate

labor organization duly registered with the Ministry of Labor and Employment under
Registration Certificate No. 783-IP, filed with the Regional Office No. 10, Ministry of
Labor and Employment at Cagayan de Oro City, a petition for direct certification as the
sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all the rank and file employees/workers of Belyca
Corporation (Livestock and Agro-Division), a duly organized, registered and existing
corporation engaged in the business of poultry raising, piggery and planting of
agricultural crops such as corn, coffee and various vegetables, employing
approximately 205 rank and file employees/workers, the collective bargaining unit
sought in the petition, or in case of doubt of the union's majority representation, for the
issuance of an order authorizing the immediate holding of a certification election (Rollo,
p. 18). Although the case was scheduled for hearing at least three times, no amicable
settlement was reached by the parties. During the scheduled hearing of July 31, 1986
they, however, agreed to submit simultaneously their respective position papers on or
before August 11, 1986 (rollo. p. 62).

Petitioner ALU-TUCP, private respondent herein, in its petition and position paper
alleged, among others, (1) that there is no existing collective bargaining agreement
between the respondent employer, petitioner herein, and any other existing legitimate
labor unions; (2) that there had neither been a certification election conducted in the
proposed bargaining unit within the last twelve (12) months prior to the filing of the
petition nor a contending union requesting for certification as the. sole and exclusive
bargaining representative in the proposed bargaining unit; (3) that more than a majority
of respondent employer's rank-and-file employees/workers in the proposed bargaining
unit or one hundred thirty-eight (138) as of the date of the filing of the petition, have
signed membership with the ALU-TUCP and have expressed their written consent and
authorization to the filing of the petition; (4) that in response to petitioner union's two
letters to the proprietor/ General Manager of respondent employer, dated April 21, 1986
and May 8, 1 986, requesting for direct recognition as the sole and exclusive bargaining
agent of the rank-and-file workers, respondent employer has locked out 119 of its rank-
and-file employees in the said bargaining unit and had dismissed earlier the local union
president, vice-president and three other active members of the local unions for which
an unfair labor practice case was filed by petitioner union against respondent employer
last July 2, 1986 before the NLRC in Cagayan de Oro City (Rollo, pp. 18;
263).<äre||anº•1àw>
Respondent employer, on the other hand, alleged in its position paper, among others,
(1) that due to the nature of its business, very few of its employees are permanent, the
overwhelming majority of which are seasonal and casual and regular employees; (2)
that of the total 138 rank-and-file employees who authorized, signed and supported the
filing of the petition (a) 14 were no longer working as of June 3, 1986 (b) 4 resigned
after June, 1986 (c) 6 withdrew their membership from petitioner union (d) 5 were
retrenched on June 23, 1986 (e) 12 were dismissed due to malicious insubordination
and destruction of property and (f) 100 simply abandoned their work or stopped
working; (3) that the 128 incumbent employees or workers of the livestock section were
merely transferred from the agricultural section as replacement for those who have
either been dismissed, retrenched or resigned; and (4) that the statutory requirement for
holding a certification election has not been complied with by the union (Rollo, p. 26).

The Labor Arbiter granted the certification election sought for by petitioner union in his
order dated August 18, 1986 (Rollo, p. 62).

On February 4, 1987, respondent employer Belyca Corporation, appealed the order of

the Labor Arbiter to the Bureau of Labor Relations in Manila (Rollo, p. 67) which denied
the appeal (Rollo, p. 80) and the motion for reconsideration (Rollo, p. 92). Thus, the
instant petition received in this Court by mail on February 20, 1987 (Rollo, p. 3).

In the resolution of March 4, 1987, the Second Division of this Court required
respondent Union to comment on the petition and issued a temporary restraining order
(,Rollo, p. 95).

Respondent union filed its comment on March 30, 1987 (Rollo, p. 190); public
respondents filed its comment on April 8, 1987 (Rollo, p. 218).

On May 4, 1987, the Court resolved to give due course to the petition and to require the
parties to submit their respective memoranda within twenty (20) days from notice (Rollo,
p. 225).

The Office of the Solicitor General manifested on June 11, 1987 that it is adopting the
comment for public respondents as its memorandum (Rollo, p. 226); memorandum for
respondent ALU was filed on June 30, 1987 (Rollo, p. 231); and memorandum for
petitioner, on July 30, 1987 (Rollo, p. 435).

The issues raised in this petition are:

WHETHER OR NOT THE PROPOSED BARGAINING UNIT IS AN

APPROPRIATE BARGAINING UNIT.
 II

WHETHER OR NOT THE STATUTORY REQUIREMENT OF 30% (NOW

20%) OF THE EMPLOYEES IN THE PROPOSED BARGAINING UNIT,
ASKING FOR A CERTIFICATION ELECTION HAD BEEN STRICTLY
COMPLIED WITH.

In the instant case, respondent ALU seeks direct certification as the sole and exclusive
bargaining agent of all the rank-and-file workers of the livestock and agro division of
petitioner BELYCA Corporation (Rollo, p. 232), engaged in piggery, poultry raising and
the planting of agricultural crops such as corn, coffee and various vegetables (Rollo, p.
26). But petitioner contends that the bargaining unit must include all the workers in its
integrated business concerns ranging from piggery, poultry, to supermarts and cinemas
so as not to split an otherwise single bargaining unit into fragmented bargaining units
(Rollo, p. 435).<äre||anº•1àw>

The Labor Code does not specifically define what constitutes an appropriate collective
bargaining unit. Article 256 of the Code provides:

Art. 256. Exclusive bargaining representative.—The labor

organization designated or selected by the majority of the
employees in an appropriate collective bargaining unit shall
be exclusive representative of the employees in such unit for
the purpose of collective bargaining. However, an individual
employee or group of employee shall have the right at any
time to present grievances to their employer.

According to Rothenberg, a proper bargaining unit maybe said to be a group of

employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of
employees, which the collective interests of all the employees, consistent with equity to
the employer, indicate to be best suited to serve reciprocal rights and duties of the
parties under the collective bargaining provisions of the law (Rothenberg in Labor
Relations, p. 482).

This Court has already taken cognizance of the crucial issue of determining the proper
constituency of a collective bargaining unit.

Among the factors considered in Democratic Labor Association v. Cebu Stevedoring

Co. Inc. (103 Phil 1103 [1958]) are: "(1) will of employees (Glove Doctrine); (2) affinity
and unity of employee's interest, such as substantial similarity of work and duties or
similarity of compensation and working conditions; (3) prior collective bargaining history;
and (4) employment status, such as temporary, seasonal and probationary employees".

Under the circumstances of that case, the Court stressed the importance of the fourth
factor and sustained the trial court's conclusion that two separate bargaining units
should be formed in dealing with respondent company, one consisting of regular and
permanent employees and another consisting of casual laborers or stevedores.
Otherwise stated, temporary employees should be treated separately from permanent
employees. But more importantly, this Court laid down the test of proper grouping,
which is community and mutuality of interest.

Thus, in a later case, (Alhambra Cigar and Cigarette Manufacturing Co. et al. v.
Alhambra Employees' Association 107 Phil. 28 [1960]) where the employment status
was not at issue but the nature of work of the employees concerned; the Court stressed
the importance of the second factor otherwise known as the substantial-mutual-interest
test and found no reason to disturb the finding of the lower Court that the employees in
the administrative, sales and dispensary departments perform work which has nothing
to do with production and maintenance, unlike those in the raw leaf, cigar, cigarette and
packing and engineering and garage departments and therefore community of interest
which justifies the format or existence as a separate appropriate collective bargaining
unit.

Still later in PLASLU v. CIR et al. (110 Phil. 180 [1960]) where the employment status of
the employees concerned was again challenged, the Court reiterating the rulings, both
in Democratic Labor Association v. Cebu Stevedoring Co. Inc. supra and Alhambra
Cigar and Cigarette Co. et al. v. Alhambra Employees' Association (supra) held that
among the factors to be considered are: employment status of the employees to be
affected, that is the positions and categories of work to which they belong, and the unity
of employees' interest such as substantial similarity of work and duties.

In any event, whether importance is focused on the employment status or the mutuality
of interest of the employees concerned "the basic test of an asserted bargaining unit's
acceptability is whether or not it is fundamentally the combination which will best assure
to all employees the exercise of their collective bargaining rights (Democratic Labor
Association v. Cebu Stevedoring Co. Inc. supra)

Hence, still later following the substantial-mutual interest test, the Court ruled that there
is a substantial difference between the work performed by musicians and that of other
persons who participate in the production of a film which suffice to show that they
constitute a proper bargaining unit. (LVN Pictures, Inc. v. Philippine Musicians Guild, 1
SCRA 132 [1961]).

Coming back to the case at bar, it is beyond question that the employees of the
livestock and agro division of petitioner corporation perform work entirely different from
those performed by employees in the supermarts and cinema. Among others, the noted
difference are: their working conditions, hours of work, rates of pay, including the
categories of their positions and employment status. As stated by petitioner corporation
in its position paper, due to the nature of the business in which its livestock-agro division
is engaged very few of its employees in the division are permanent, the overwhelming
majority of which are seasonal and casual and not regular employees (Rollo, p. 26).
Definitely, they have very little in common with the employees of the supermarts and
cinemas. To lump all the employees of petitioner in its integrated business concerns
cannot result in an efficacious bargaining unit comprised of constituents enjoying a
community or mutuality of interest. Undeniably, the rank and file employees of the
livestock-agro division fully constitute a bargaining unit that satisfies both requirements
of classification according to employment status and of the substantial similarity of work
and duties which will ultimately assure its members the exercise of their collective
bargaining rights.

II

It is undisputed that petitioner BELYCA Corporation (Livestock and Agro Division)

employs more or less two hundred five (205) rank-and-file employees and workers. It
has no existing duly certified collective bargaining agreement with any legitimate labor
organization. There has not been any certification election conducted in the proposed
bargaining unit within the last twelve (12) months prior to the filing of the petition for
direct certification and/or certification election with the Ministry of Labor and
Employment, and there is no contending union requesting for certification as the sole
and exclusive bargaining representative in the proposed bargaining unit.

The records show that on the filing of the petition for certification and/or certification
election on June 3, 1986; 124 employees or workers which are more than a majority of
the rank-and-file employees or workers in the proposed bargaining unit had signed
membership with respondent ALU-TUCP and had expressed their written consent and
authorization to the filing of the petition. Thus, the Labor Arbiter ordered the certification
election on August 18, 1986 on a finding that 30% of the statutory requirement under
Art. 258 of the Labor Code has been met.

But, petitioner corporation contends that after June 3, 1986 four (4) employees
resigned; six (6) subsequently withdrew their membership; five (5) were retrenched;
twelve (12) were dismissed for illegally and unlawfully barricading the entrance to
petitioner's farm; and one hundred (100) simply abandoned their work.

Petitioner's claim was however belied by the Memorandum of its personnel officer to the
119 employees dated July 28, 1986 showing that the employees were on strike, which
was confirmed by the finding of the Bureau of Labor Relations to the effect that they
went on strike on July 24, 1986 (Rollo, p. 419). Earlier the local union president,
Warrencio Maputi; the Vice-president, Gilbert Redoblado and three other active
members of the union Carmen Saguing, Roberto Romolo and Iluminada Bonio were
dismissed and a complaint for unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal etc. was filed by the
Union in their behalf on July 2, 1986 before the NLRC of Cagayan de Oro City (Rollo, p.
415).<äre||anº•1àw> The complaint was amended on August 20, 1986 for respondent
Union to represent Warrencio Maputi and 137 others against petitioner corporation and
Bello Casanova President and General Manager for unfair labor practice, illegal
dismissal, illegal lockout, etc. (Rollo, p. 416).

Under Art. 257 of the Labor Code once the statutory requirement is met, the Director of
Labor Relations has no choice but to call a certification election (Atlas Free Workers
Union AFWU PSSLU Local v. Noriel, 104 SCRA 565 [1981]; Vismico Industrial Workers
Association (VIWA) v. Noriel, 131 SCRA 569 [1984]) It becomes in the language of the
New Labor Code "Mandatory for the Bureau to conduct a certification election for the
purpose of determining the representative of the employees in the appropriate
bargaining unit and certify the winner as the exclusive bargaining representative of all
employees in the unit." (Federacion Obrera de la Industria Tabaquera y Otros
Trabajadores de Filipinas v. Noriel, 72 SCRA 24 [1976]; Kapisanan Ng Mga
Manggagawa v. Noriel, 77 SCRA 414 [1977]); more so when there is no existing
collective bargaining agreement. (Samahang Manggagawa Ng Pacific Mills, Inc. v.
Noriel, 134 SCRA 152 [1985]); and there has not been a certification election in the
company for the past three years (PLUM Federation of Industrial and Agrarian Workers
v. Noriel, 119 SCRA 299 [1982]) as in the instant case.

It is significant to note that 124 employees out of the 205 employees of the Belyca
Corporation have expressed their written consent to the certification election or more
than a majority of the rank and file employees and workers; much more than the
required 30% and over and above the present requirement of 20% by Executive Order
No. 111 issued on December 24, 1980 and applicable only to unorganized
establishments under Art. 257, of the Labor Code, to which the BELYCA Corporation
belong (Ass. Trade Unions (ATU) v. Trajano, G.R. No. 75321, June 20, 1988).) More
than that, any doubt cast on the authenticity of signatures to the petition for holding a
certification election cannot be a bar to its being granted (Filipino Metals Corp. v. Ople
107 SCRA 211 [1981]). Even doubts as to the required 30% being met warrant holding
of the certification election (PLUM Federation of Industrial and Agrarian Workers v.
Noriel, 119 SCRA 299 [1982]). In fact, once the required percentage requirement has
been reached, the employees' withdrawal from union membership taking place after the
filing of the petition for certification election will not affect said petition. On the contrary,
the presumption arises that the withdrawal was not free but was procured through
duress, coercion or for a valuable consideration (La Suerte Cigar and Cigarette Factory
v. Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations, 123 SCRA 679 [1983]). Hence, the
subsequent disaffiliation of the six (6) employees from the union will not be counted
against or deducted from the previous number who had signed up for certification
elections Vismico Industrial Workers Association (VIWA) v. Noriel 131 SCRA 569
[1984]).<äre||anº•1àw> Similarly, until a decision, final in character, has been issued
declaring the strike illegal and the mass dismissal or retrenchment valid, the strikers
cannot be denied participation in the certification election notwithstanding, the vigorous
condemnation of the strike and the fact that the picketing were attended by violence.
Under the foregoing circumstances, it does not necessarily follow that the strikers in
question are no longer entitled to participate in the certification election on the theory
that they have automatically lost their jobs. (Barrera v. CIR, 107 SCRA 596 [1981]). For
obvious reasons, the duty of the employer to bargain collectively is nullified if the
purpose of the dismissal of the union members is to defeat the union in the consent
requirement for certification election. (Samahang Manggagawa Ng Via Mare v. Noriel,
98 SCRA 507 [1980]). As stressed by this Court, the holding of a certification election is
a statutory policy that should not be circumvented. (George and Peter Lines Inc. v.
Associated Labor Unions (ALU), 134 SCRA 82 [1986]).
Finally, as a general rule, a certification election is the sole concern of the workers. The
only exception is where the employer has to file a petition for certification election
pursuant to Art. 259 of the Labor Code because the latter was requested to bargain
collectively. But thereafter the role of the employer in the certification process ceases.
The employer becomes merely a bystander (Trade Union of the Phil. and Allied
Services (TUPAS) v. Trajano, 120 SCRA 64 [1983]).

There is no showing that the instant case falls under the above mentioned exception.
However, it will be noted that petitioner corporation from the outset has actively
participated and consistently taken the position of adversary in the petition for direct
certification as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative and/or certification
election filed by respondent Associated Labor Unions (ALU)-TUCP to the extent of filing
this petition for certiorari in this Court. Considering that a petition for certification election
is not a litigation but a mere investigation of a non-adversary character to determining
the bargaining unit to represent the employees (LVN Pictures, Inc. v. Philippine
Musicians Guild, supra; Bulakena Restaurant & Caterer v. Court of Industrial Relations,
45 SCRA 88 [1972]; George Peter Lines, Inc. v. Associated Labor Union, 134 SCRA 82
[1986]; Tanduay Distillery Labor Union v. NLRC, 149 SCRA 470 [1987]), and its only
purpose is to give the employees true representation in their collective bargaining with
an employer (Confederation of Citizens Labor Unions CCLU v. Noriel, 116 SCRA 694
[1982]), there appears to be no reason for the employer's objection to the formation of
subject union, much less for the filing of the petition for a certification election.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, (a) the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit (b)
resolution of the Bureau of Labor Relations dated Nov. 24, 1986 is AFFIRMED; and the
temporary restraining order issued by the Court on March 4, 1987 is LIFTED
permanently.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.

 LABOR CASE 4

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 100485 September 21, 1994

SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA and NORTH LUZON MAGNOLIA
SALES LABOR UNION-INDEPENDENT, respondents.

Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Ongsiako for petitioner.

E.N.A. Cruz & Associates for private respondent.

PUNO, J.:

Petitioner San Miguel Corporation (SMC) prays that the Resolution dated March 19,
1991 and the Order dated April 12, 1991 of public respondent Undersecretary
Bienvenido E. Laguesma declaring respondent union as the sole and exclusive
bargaining agent of all the Magnolia sales personnel in northern Luzon be set aside for
having been issued in excess of jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion.

On June 4, 1990, the North Luzon Magnolia Sales Labor Union (respondent union for
brevity) filed with the Department of Labor a petition for certification election among all
the regular sales personnel of Magnolia Dairy Products in the North Luzon Sales Area. 1

Petitioner opposed the petition and questioned the appropriateness of the bargaining
unit sought to be represented by respondent union. It claimed that its bargaining history
in its sales offices, plants and warehouses is to have a separate bargaining unit for each
sales office.

The petition was heard on November 9, 1990 with petitioner

being represented by Atty. Alvin C. Batalla of the Siguion Reyna law office. Atty. Batalla
withdrew petitioner's opposition to a certification election and agreed to consider all the
sales offices in northern Luzon as one bargaining unit. At the pre-election conference,
the parties agreed inter alia, on the date, time and place of the consent election.
Respondent union won the election held on November 24, 1990. In an Order dated
December 3, 1990, 2 Mediator-Arbiter Benalfre J. Galang certified respondent union as
the sole and exclusive bargaining agent for all the regular sales personnel in all the
sales offices of Magnolia Dairy Products in the North Luzon Sales Area.

Petitioner appealed to the Secretary of Labor. It claimed that

Atty. Batalla was only authorized to agree to the holding of certification elections subject
to the following conditions: (1) there would only be one general election; (2) in this
general election, the individual sales offices shall still comprise separate bargaining
units. 3

In a Resolution dated March 19, 1991, 4 public respondent, by authority of the Secretary
of Labor, denied SMC's appeal and affirmed the Order of the Med- Arbiter.

Hence this petition for certiorari.

Petitioner claims that:

THE HONORABLE UNDERSECRETARY LAGUESMA ACTED WITH

GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN HE IGNORED AND TOTALLY
DISREGARDED PETITIONER'S VALID AND JUSTIFIABLE GROUNDS
WHY THE ERROR MADE IN GOOD FAITH BY PETITIONER'S
COUNSEL BE CORRECTED, AND INSTEAD RULED:

THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS "THE SOLE AND

EXCLUSIVE BARGAINING AGENT FOR ALL THE
REGULAR SALES OFFICES OF MAGNOLIA DAIRY
PRODUCTS, NORTH LUZON SALES AREA",
COMPLETELY IGNORING THE ESTABLISHED
BARGAINING HISTORY OF PETITIONER SMC.

THAT PETITIONER IS ESTOPPED FROM QUESTIONING

THE "AGREEMENT" ENTERED INTO AT THE HEARING
ON
9 NOVEMBER 1990, IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE
ESTABLISHED FACTS OF THE CASE AND THE
APPLICABLE LAW ON THE MATTER.

We find no merit in the petition.

The issues for resolution are: (1) whether or not respondent union represents an
appropriate bargaining unit, and (2) whether or not petitioner is bound by its lawyer's act
of agreeing to consider the sales personnel in the north Luzon sales area as one
bargaining unit.

Petitioner claims that in issuing the impugned Orders, public respondent disregarded its
collective bargaining history which is to have a separate bargaining unit for each sales
office. It insists that its prior collective bargaining history is the most persuasive
criterion in determining the appropriateness of the collective bargaining unit.

There is no merit in the contention.

A bargaining unit is a "group of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less

than all of the entire body of employees, consistent with equity to the employer, indicate
to be the best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the
collective bargaining provisions of the law." 5

The fundamental factors in determining the appropriate collective bargaining unit are:
(1) the will of the employees (Globe Doctrine); 6 (2) affinity and unity of the employees'
interest, such as substantial similarity of work and duties, or similarity of compensation
and working conditions (Substantial Mutual Interests Rule); (3) prior collective
bargaining history; and (4) similarity of employment status. 7

Contrary to petitioner's assertion, this Court has categorically ruled that the existence of
a prior collective bargaining history is neither decisive nor conclusive in the
determination of what constitutes an appropriate bargaining unit. 8

Indeed, the test of grouping is mutuality or commonality of interests. The employees

sought to be represented by the collective bargaining agent must have substantial
mutual interests in terms of employment and working conditions as evinced by the type
of work they perform.

In the case at bench, respondent union sought to represent the sales personnel in the
various Magnolia sales offices in northern Luzon. There is similarity of employment
status for only the regular sales personnel in the north Luzon area are covered. They
have the same duties and responsibilities and substantially similar compensation and
working conditions. The commonality of interest among he sales personnel in the north
Luzon sales area cannot be gainsaid. In fact, in the certification election held on
November 24, 1990, the employees concerned accepted respondent union as their
exclusive bargaining agent. Clearly, they have expressed their desire to be one.

Petitioner cannot insist that each of the sales office of Magnolia should constitute only
one bargaining unit. What greatly militates against this position is the meager number of
sales personnel in each of the Magnolia sales office in northern Luzon. Even the
bargaining unit sought to be represented by respondent union in the entire north Luzon
sales area consists only of approximately
fifty-five (55) employees. 9 Surely, it would not be for the best interest of these
employees if they would further be fractionalized. The adage "there is strength in
number" is the very rationale underlying the formation of a labor union.

Anent the second issue, petitioner claims that Atty. Batalla was merely a substitute
lawyer for Atty. Christine Ona, who got stranded in Legaspi City. Atty. Batalla was
allegedly unfamiliar with the collective bargaining history of its establishment. Petitioner
claims it should not be bound by the mistake committed by its substitute lawyer.

We are not persuaded. As discussed earlier, the collective bargaining history of a

company is not decisive of what should comprise the collective bargaining unit. Insofar
as the alleged "mistake" of the substitute lawyer is concerned, we find that this mistake
was the direct result of the negligence of petitioner's lawyers. It will be noted that Atty.
Ona was under the supervision of two (2) other lawyers, Attys. Jacinto de la Rosa, Jr.
and George C. Nograles. There is nothing in the records to show that these two (2)
counsels were likewise unavailable at that time. Instead of deferring the hearing,
petitioner's counsels chose to proceed therewith. Indeed, prudence dictates that, in
such case, the lawyers allegedly actively involved in SMC's labor case should have
adequately and sufficiently briefed the substitute lawyer with respect to the matters
involved in the case and the specific limits of his authority. Unfortunately, this was not
done in this case. The negligence of its lawyers binds petitioner. As held by this Court in
the case of Villa Rhecar Bus v. De la Cruz: 10

. . . As a general rule, a client is bound by the mistakes of his counsel.

Only when the application of the general rule would result in serious
injustice should an exception thereto be called for.

In the case at bench, petitioner insists that each of the sales offices in northern Luzon
should be considered as a separate bargaining unit for negotiations would be more
expeditious. Petitioner obviously chooses to follow the path of least resistance. It is not,
however, the convenience of the employer that constitutes the determinative factor in
forming an appropriate bargaining unit. Equally, if not more important, is the interest of
the employees. In choosing and crafting an appropriate bargaining unit, extreme care
should be taken to prevent an employer from having any undue advantage over the
employees' bargaining representative. Our workers are weak enough and it is not our
social policy to further debilitate their bargaining representative.

In sum, we find that no arbitrariness or grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to

public respondents certification of respondent union as the sole and exclusive
bargaining agent of all the regular Magnolia sales personnel of the north Luzon sales
area.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the challenged Resolution and Order of public

respondent are hereby AFFIRMED in toto, there being no showing of grave abuse of
discretion or lack of jurisdiction.

SO ORDERED.
 Narvasa, C.J., Regalado and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Padilla, J., took no part.

#Footnotes

1 The Magnolia North Luzon Sales Area covers San Fernando,

Pampanga, Cabanatuan City, Olongapo City, Poro Point, La Union,
Baguio City, Dagupan City, Laoag City and Ilagan, Isabela.

2 Annex "K", Petition, Rollo, pp. 94-97.

3 See Appeal, Annex "L", Petition, Rollo, pp. 98-103, at p. 101.

4 Annex "A", Petition, Rollo, pp. 30-36.

5 U.P. v. Ferre-Calleja, G.R. No. 96189, July 14, 1992, 211 SCRA 451;
Belyca Corporation v. Ferrer-Calleja, G.R. No. L-77395, November 29,
1988, 168 SCRA 184; both cases citing Rothenberg in Labor Relations, at
p. 482.

6 Mechanical Department Labor Union Sa Philippine National Railways v.

Court of Industrial Relations, No. L-28223, August 30, 1968, 24 SCRA
925.

7 Rothenberg on Labor Relations, pp. 482-510.

8 Free Trade Unions v. Mainit Lumber Development Company Workers

Union,
G.R. No. 79526, December 21, 1990, 192 SCRA 598.

9 See Petition for Certification Election, Annex "C", Petition, Rollo, at p.

39.

10 No. L-78936, January 7, 1988, 157 SCRA 13.

 LABOR CASE 5

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-24711 April 30, 1968

BENGUET CONSOLIDATED, INC., plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
BCI EMPLOYEES and WORKERS UNION-PAFLU, PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF
FREE LABOR UNIONS, CIPRIANO CID and JUANITO GARCIA, defendants-
appellees.

Ross, Selph, Del Rosario, Bito and Misa for plaintiff-appellant.

Cipriano Cid and Associates for defendants-appellees.

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

The contending parties in this case —Benguet Consolidated, Inc., ("BENGUET") on the
one hand, and on the other, BCI Employees & Workers Union ("UNION") and the
Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions ("PAFLU") —do not dispute the following
factual settings established by the lower court.

On June 23, 1959, the Benguet-Balatoc Workers Union ("BBWU"), for and in behalf of
all BENGUET employees in its mines and milling establishment located at Balatoc,
Antamok and Acupan, Municipality of Itogon, Mt. Province, entered into a Collective
Bargaining Contract, Exh. "Z" ("CONTRACT") with BENGUET. Pursuant to its very
terms, said CONTRACT became effective for a period of four and a half (4-½) years, or
from June 23, 1959 to December 23, 1963. It likewise embodied a No-Strike, No-
Lockout clause. 1

About three years later, or on April 6, 1962, a certification election was conducted by the
Department of Labor among all the rank and file employees of BENGUET in the same
collective bargaining units. UNION obtained more than 50% of the total number of
votes, defeating BBWU, and accordingly, the Court of Industrial Relations, on August
18, 1962, certified UNION as the sole and exclusive collective bargaining agent of all
BENGUET employees as regards rates of pay, wages, hours of work and such other
terms and conditions of employment allowed them by law or contract.

Subsequently, separate meetings were conducted on November 22, 23 and 24, 1962 at
Antamok, Balatoc and Acupan Mines respectively by UNION. The result thereof was the
approval by UNION members of a resolution 2directing its president to file a notice of
strike against BENGUET for:
 1. [Refusal] to grant any amount as monthly living allowance for the workers;

2. Violation of Agreements reached in conciliation meetings among which is the

taking down of investigation [sic] and statements of employees without the
presence of union representative;

3. Refusal to dismiss erring executive after affidavits had been presented,

thereby company showing [sic] bias and partiality to company personnel;

4. Discrimination against union members in the enforcement of disciplinary

actions.

The Notice of Strike 3 was filed on December 28, 1962. Three months later, in the
evening of March 2, 1963, UNION members who were BENGUET employees in the
mining camps at Acupan, Antamok and Balatoc, went on strike. Regarding the conduct
of the strike, the trial court reports: 4

... Picket lines were formed at strategic points within the premises of the plaintiff.
The picketers, by means of threats and intimidation, and in some instances by
the use of force and violence, prevented passage thru the picket lines by
personnel of the plaintiff who were reporting for work. Human blocks were formed
on points of entrance to working areas so that even vehicles could not pass thru,
while the officers of the plaintiff were not allowed for sometime to leave the "staff"
area.

The strikers forming picket lines bore placards with the letters BBWU-PAFLU
written thereon. As a general rule, the picketers were unruly, aggressive and
uttered threatening remarks to staff members and non-strikers who desire to
pass thru the picket lines. On some occasions, the picketers resorted to violence
by pushing back the car wherein staff officers were riding who would like to enter
the mine working area. The picketers lifted one side of the vehicle and were in
the act of overturning it when they were prevented from doing so by the timely
intervention of PC soldiers, who threw tear gas bombs to make the crowd
disperse. Many of the picketers were apprehended by the PC soldiers and
criminal charges for grave coercion were filed against them before the Court of
First Instance of Baguio. Two of the strike leaders and twenty-two picketers,
however, were found guilty of light coercion while nineteen other accused were
acquitted.

There was a complete stoppage of work during the strike in all the mines. After
two weeks elapsed, repair and maintenance of the water pump was allowed by
the strikers and some of the staff members were permitted to enter the mines,
who inspected the premises in the company of PC soldiers to ascertain the
extent of the damage to the equipment and losses of company property.

xxx xxx xxx

On May 2, 1963, the parties agreed to end the raging dispute. Accordingly, BENGUET
and UNION executed the AGREEMENT, Exh. 1. PAFLU placed its conformity thereto
and said agreement was attested to by the Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations.
About a year later or on January 29, 1964, a collective bargaining contract was finally
executed between UNION-PAFLU and BENGUET. 5

Meanwhile, as a result, allegedly, of the strike staged by UNION and its members,
BENGUET had to incur expenses for the rehabilitation of mine openings, repair of
mechanical equipment, cost of pumping water out of the mines, value of explosives,
tools and supplies lost and/or destroyed, and other miscellaneous expenses, all
amounting to P1,911,363.83. So, BENGUET sued UNION, PAFLU and their respective
Presidents to recover said amount in the Court of First Instance of Manila, on the sole
premise that said defendants breached their undertaking in the existing CONTRACT not
to strike during the effectivity thereof .

In answer to BENGUET's complaint, defendants unions and their respective presidents

put up the following defenses: (1) they were not bound by the CONTRACT which
BBWU, the defeated union, had executed with BENGUET; (2) the strike was due, inter
alia, to unfair labor practices of BENGUET; and (3) the strike was lawful and in the
exercise of the legitimate rights of UNION-PAFLU under Republic Act 875.

Issues having been joined, trial commenced. On February 23, 1965, the trial court
rendered judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the CONTRACT,
particularly the No-Strike clause, did not bind defendants. The latters' counterclaim was
likewise denied. Failing to get a reconsideration of said decision, BENGUET interposed
the present appeal.

The several errors assigned by BENGUET basically ask three questions:

(1) Did the Collective Bargaining Contract executed between BENGUET and
BBWU on June 23, 1959 and effective until December 23, 1963 automatically
bind UNION-PAFLU upon its certification, on August 18, 1962, as sole bargaining
representative of all BENGUET employees?

(2) Are defendants labor unions and their respective presidents liable for the
illegal acts committed during the course of the strike and picketing by some union
members?

(3) Are defendants liable to pay the damages claimed by BENGUET?

In support of an affirmative answer to the first question, BENGUET first invokes the so-
called "Doctrine of Substitution" referred to in General Maritime Stevedores' Union v.
South Sea Shipping Lines, L-14689, July 26, 1960. There it was remarked:

xxx xxx xxx

 We also hold that where the bargaining contract is to run for more than two
years, the principle of substitution may well be adopted and enforced by the CIR
to the effect that after two years of the life of a bargaining agreement, a
certification election may be allowed by the CIR; that if a bargaining agent other
than the union or organization that executed the contract, is elected, said new
agent would have to respect said contract, but that it may bargain with the
management for the shortening of the life of the contract if it considers it too long,
or refuse to renew the contract pursuant to an automatic renewal clause.
(Emphasis supplied)

xxx xxx xxx

The submission utterly fails to persuade Us. The above-quoted pronouncement

was obiter dictum. The only issue in the General Maritime Stevedores' Union case was
whether a collective bargaining agreement which had practically run for 5 years
constituted a bar to certification proceedings. We held it did not and accordingly directed
the court a quo to order certification elections. With that, nothing more was necessary
for the disposition of the case. Moreover, the pronouncement adverted to was rather
premature. The possible certification of a union different from that which signed the
bargaining contract was a mere contingency then since the elections were still to be
held. Clearly, the Court was not called upon to rule on possible effects of such
proceedings on the bargaining agreement. 6

But worse, BENGUET's reliance upon the Principle of Substitution is totally misplaced.
This principle, formulated by the NLRB 7 as its initial compromise solution to the problem
facing it when there occurs a shift in employees' union allegiance after the execution of
a bargaining contract with their employer, merely states that even during the effectivity
of a collective bargaining agreement executed between employer and employees thru
their agent, the employees can change said agent but the contract continues to bind
them up to its expiration date. They may bargain however for the shortening of said
expiration date. 8

In formulating the "substitutionary" doctrine, the only consideration involved was the
employees' interest in the existing bargaining agreement. The agent's interest never
entered the picture. In fact, the justification 9 for said doctrine was:

... that the majority of the employees, as an entity under the statute, is the true
party in interest to the contract, holding rights through the agency of the union
representative. Thus, any exclusive interest claimed by the agent is defeasible at
the will of the principal.... (Emphasis supplied)

Stated otherwise, the "substitutionary" doctrine only provides that the employees cannot
revoke the validly executed collective bargaining contract with their employer by the
simple expedient of changing their bargaining agent. And it is in the light of this that the
phrase "said new agent would have to respect said contract" must be understood. It
only means that the employees, thru their new bargaining agent, cannot renege on their
collective bargaining contract, except of course to negotiate with management for the
shortening thereof.

The "substitutionary" doctrine, therefore, cannot be invoked to support the contention

that a newly certified collective bargaining agent automatically assumes all the personal
undertakings — like the no-strike stipulation here — in the collective bargaining
agreement made by the deposed union. When BBWU bound itself and its officers not to
strike, it could not have validly bound also all the other rival unions existing in the
bargaining units in question. BBWU was the agent of the employees, not of the other
unions which possess distinct personalities. To consider UNION contractually bound to
the no-strike stipulation would therefore violate the legal maxim that res inter alios nec
prodest nec nocet. 10

Of course, UNION, as the newly certified bargaining agent, could always voluntarily
assume all the personal undertakings made by the displaced agent. But as the lower
court found, there was no showing at all that, prior to the strike, 11 UNION formally
adopted the existing CONTRACT as its own and assumed all the liability ties imposed
by the same upon BBWU.

BENGUET also alleges that UNION is now in estoppel to claim that it is not
contractually bound by the CONTRACT for having filed on September 28, 1962, in Civil
Case No. 1150 of the Court of First Instance of Baguio, entitled "Bobok Lumber Jack
Ass'n. vs. Benguet Consolidated, Inc. and BCI Employees Workers Union-PAFLU" 12 a
motion praying for the dissolution of the ex parte writ of preliminary injunction issued
therein, wherein the following appears:

In that case, the CIR transfered the contactual rights of the BBWU to the
defendant union. One of such rights transferred was the right to the modified
union-shop — checked off union dues arrangement now under injunction.

The collective bargaining contract mentioned in the plaintiff's complaint did not
expire by the mere fact that the defendant union was certified as bargaining
agent in place of the BBWU. The Court of Industrial Relations in the case above
mentioned made it clear that the collective bargaining contract would be
respected unless and until the parties act otherwise. In effect, the defendant
union by act of subrogation took the place of the BBWU as the UNION referred to
in the contract. (Emphasis supplied)

There is no estoppel. UNION did not assert the above statement against BENGUET to
force it to rely upon the same to effect the union check-off in its favor. UNION and
BENGUET were together as co-defendants in said Civil Case No. 1150. Rather, the
statement was directed against Bobok Lumber Jack Ass'n., plaintiff therein, to weaken
its cause of action. Moreover, BENGUET did not rely upon said statement. What
prompted Bobok Lumber Jack Ass'n. to file the complaint for declaratory relief was the
fact that "... the defendants [UNION and BENGUET] are planning to agree to the
continuation of a modified union shop in the three camps mentioned above without
giving the employees concerned the opportunity to express their wishes on the matter
..." BENGUET even went further in its answer filed on October 18, 1962, by asserting
that "... defendants have already agreed to the continuation of the modified union shop
provision in the collective bargaining agreement...." 13

Neither can we accept BENGUET's contention that the inclusion of said aforequoted
motion in the record on appeal filed in said Civil Case No. 1150, now on appeal before
Us docketed as case No. L-24729, refutes UNION's allegation that it has subsequently
abandoned its stand against Bobok Lumber Jack Ass'n., in said case. The mere
appearance of such motion in the record on appeal is but a compliance with the
procedural requirement of Rule 41, Sec. 6, of the Rules of Court, that all matters
necessary for a proper understanding of the issues involved be included in the record
on appeal. This therefore cannot be taken as a rebuttal of the UNION's explanation.

There is nothing then, in law as well as in fact, to support plaintiff BENGUET's

contention that defendants are contractually bound by the CONTRACT. And the stand
taken by the trial court all the more becomes unassailable in the light of Art. 1704 of the
Civil Code providing that:

In the collective bargaining, the labor union or members of the board or

committee signing the contract shall be liable for non-fulfillment thereof.
(Emphasis supplied)

There is no question, defendants were not signatories nor participants in the

CONTRACT.

Lastly, BENGUET contends, citing Clause II in connection with Clause XVIII of the
CONTRACT, that since all the employees, as principals, continue being bound by the
no-strike stipulation until the CONTRACT's expiration, UNION, as their agent, must
necessarily be bound also pursuant to the Law on Agency. This is untenable. The way
We understand it, everything binding on a duly authorized agent, acting as such, is
binding on the principal; not vice-versa, unless there is a mutual agency, or unless the
agent expressly binds himself to the party with whom he contracts. As the Civil Code
decrees it: 14

The agent who acts as such is not personally liable to the party with whom he
contracts, unless he expressly binds himself or exceeds the limits of his authority
without giving such party sufficient notice of his powers. (Emphasis
supplied)1äwphï1.ñët

Here, it was the previous agent who expressly bound itself to the other party,
BENGUET. UNION, the new agent, did not assume this undertaking of BBWU.

In view of all the foregoing, We see no further necessity of delving further into the other
less important points raised by BENGUET in connection with the first question.
On the second question, it suffices to consider, in answer thereto, that the rule of
vicarious liability has, since the passage of Republic Act 875, been expressly legislated
out. 15 The standing rule now is that for a labor union and/or its officials and members to
be liable, there must be clear proof of actual participation in, or authorization or
ratification of the illegal acts. 16 While the lower court found that some strikers and
picketers resorted to intimidation and actual violence, it also found that defendants
presented uncontradicted evidence that before and during the strike, the strike leaders
had time and again warned the strikers not to resort to violence but to conduct peaceful
picketing only. 17 Assuming that the strikers did not heed these admonitions coming
from their leaders, the failure of the union officials to go against the erring union
members pursuant to the UNION and PAFLU constitutions and by-laws exposes, at the
most, only a flaw or weakness in the defense which, however, cannot be the basis for
plaintiff BENGUET to recover.

Lastly, paragraph VI of the Answer 18 sufficiently traverses the material allegations in

paragraph VI of the Complaint, 19 thus precluding a fatal admission on defendants' part.
The purpose behind the rule requiring specific denial is obtained: defendants have set
forth the matters relied upon in support of their denial. Paragraph VI of the Answer may
not be a model pleading, but it suffices for purposes of the rule. Pleadings should, after
all, be liberally construed. 20

Since defendants were not contractually bound by the no-strike clause in the
CONTRACT, for the simple reason that they were not parties thereto, they could not be
liable for breach of contract to plaintiff. The lower court therefore correctly absolved
them from liability.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the lower court appealed from is hereby affirmed. No
costs. So ordered.1äwphï1.ñët

Dizon, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.

Makalintal, J. reserves his vote.
Concepcion, C.J., is on leave.
Reyes, J.B.L., Actg. C.J., took no part.

Footnotes
1
Clause XVIII, entitled "INDUSTRIAL PEACE," pars. B and C.

2
Exhibit "2".

3
Neither of the parties presented this Notice as evidence.

4
Record on Appeal, pp. 40-41.

5
See Exhibit "3".

6
See Buklod ng Saulog Transit v. Casalla, 99 Phil. 16.
7
National Labor Relations Board, counterpart of our Court of Industrial Relations.

8
See: "CHANGE OF BARGAINING REPRESENTATIVE DURING THE LIFE OF A COLLECTIVE
AGREEMENT UNDER THE WAGNER ACT", Note appearing in 51 Yale Law Journal, 465.

9
51 Yale Law Journal, 465.

10
77 C.J.S. 275.

11
After the end of the strike, UNION agreed, in the return-to-work Agreement executed on May 2,
1963, to respect the CONTRACT for the remaining period of effectivity thereof..

12
This was an action brought by one of the defeated unions seeking a declaratory judgment that
UNION cannot enter into an agreement with BENGUET to continue the modified union shop
embodied in the CONTRACT and praying that, pendente lite, BENGUET be restrained from
effecting any union check-off in UNION's favor.

13
See Record on Appeal in L-24729, pp. 6, 56.

14
Art. 1897.

15
Sec. 9 (c), Republic Act 875.

16
Rothenberg on LABOR RELATIONS, p. 202.

17
Record on Appeal, p. 48.

18
They deny the allegations in paragraph VI. (1) The picketing and strike of defendants were
conducted peacefully, properly and without fraud or violence; (2) It was the plaintiff that caused
untold harm and damages to the defendants by unlawfully violating and breaking up the strike
and picketing."

19
"That in furtherance and in connection with the strike illegally and unlawfully called, declared
and enforced by defendants, the said defendants conspiring and confabulating together ordered,
caused and directed the strikers to conduct picketing within the property of plaintiff, and by means
of force, violence and intimidation prevented, stopped, and obstructed officials of plaintiff
company from going to the different offices, working areas and underground tunnels of plaintiff
company thus preventing them from doing and performing maintenance work and taking such
other measures to prevent or minimize damages to plaintiff's property."

20
Rule 6, Sec. 15, Rules of Court.
 LABOR CASE 6

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 97237 August 16, 1991

FILIPINAS PORT SERVICES, INC., petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, PATERNO LIBOON, SEGUNDO
AQUINO, JOVITO BULAY, DOMINGO NAVOA, DELFIN BERMEJO, CELEDONIO
MANCUBAT, ALBERTO MAHINAY, SR., TEODULO SILAYA, SANTOS ARGUIDO,
JUANITO LABANON, FLORENCIO MIRANTES, LUCIO BARRERA, VICENTE
GILDORE, LEON FUENTES, CASIMIRO MAGSAYO, FERNANDO MORIENTE,
MATIAS ORBITA, SR., FRANCISCO PARDILLO, ILDEFONSO JUMILLA AND JOSE
CANTONJOS, respondents.

Yap, Ocampo & Associates for petitioner.

Porfirio S. Daclan for private respondents.

PARAS, J.:

This is a petition for clarification with prayer for preliminary injunction filed by Filipinas
Port Services, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Filport) seeking to clarify two conflicting
decisions rendered by this Court in cases involving identical or similar parties, facts and
issues.

The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:

In view of the government policy which ordained that cargo handling operations should
be limited to only one cargo handling operator-contractor for every port (under Customs
Memorandum Order 28075, later on superseded by General Ports Regulations of the
Philippine Ports Authority) the different stevedoring and arrastre corporations operating
in the Port of Davao were integrated into a single dockhandlers corporation, known as
the Davao Dockhandlers, Inc., which was registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on July 13, 1976.
Due to the late receipt of its permit to operate at the Port of Davao from the Bureau of
Customs, Davao Dockhandlers, Inc., which was subsequently renamed Filport, actually
started its operation on February 16, 1977.

As a result of the merger, Section 118, Article X of the General Guidelines on The
Integration of Stevedoring/Arrastre Services (PPA Administrative Order No. 13-77)
mandated Filport to draw its personnel complements from the merging operators, as
follows:

Sec. 118. Absorption of labor.—Subject to the provisions of the immediate

preceding section, and consistent with the actual operational requirements of the
new management, all labor force together with its necessary personnel
complement, of the merging operators shall be absorbed by the merged or
integrated organization to constitute its labor force. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, Filport's labor force was mostly taken from the integrating corporations, among
them the private respondents.

On February 4,1987, private respondent Paterno Liboon and 18 others filed a complaint
with the Department of Labor and Employment Regional Office in Davao City, alleging
that they were employees of Filport since 1955 through 1958 up to December 31, 1986
when they retired; that they were paid retirement benefits computed from February
16,1977 up to December 31, 1986 only; and that taking into consideration their
continuous length of service, they are entitled to be paid retirement benefits differentials
from the time they started working with the predecessors of Filport up to the time they
were absorbed by the latter in 1977 (p. 15, Rollo).

Finding Filport a mere alter ego of the different integrating corporations, the Labor
Arbiter held Filport liable for retirement benefits due private respondents for services
rendered prior to February 16, 1977. Said decision was affirmed by the NLRC on
appeal.

Filport filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court docketed as G.R. No. 85704,
claiming that it is an entirely new corporation with a separate juridical personality from
the integrating corporations; and that Filport is not a successor-employer, liable for the
obligations of private respondents' previous employers, as shown clearly in the
memorandum dated November 21,1978 of PPA Assistant General Manager Maximo S.
Dumlao, Jr., to wit:

21 November 1978

MEMORANDUM

TO: The Officer-in-Charge

PMU Davao
FROM: The AGM for Operations

SUBJECT: Clarification of Sec. 116 of PPA Administrative

Order No. 13-77 of New Organization's Liability.

In reply to your telegram dated November 16, 1978, Sec. 116 of PPA Administrative
Order #13-77 is hereby quoted for clarification:

New Organization's Liability—The integrated cargo-handling organization shall be

absolutely free from any liability or obligation of the merging operators who shall
continue to be individually liable for their respective liabilities or obligations, if any.
(emphasis supplied) ...

xxx xxx xxx

The new organization's liability shall be the payment of salaries, benefits and all other
money due the employee as a result of his employment, starting on the date of his
service in the newly integrated organization.

In answer to your query, therefore, the absorption of an employee into a newly

integrated organization does not include the carry over of his length of service.

s/t MAXIMO S. DUMLAO, JR.

Asst. General Manager

While G.R. No. 85704 was still pending decision by this Court, Josefino Silva, another
employee of Filport, instituted a suit against Filport and Damasticor (one of the defunct
stevedoring firms) claiming for retirement benefits for services rendered prior to
February 19, 1977. The labor arbiter found for Josefino Silva and said decision was
affirmed by the NLRC.

Filport filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court docketed as G.R. No. 86026.
On August 31, 1989, this Court, through the First Division, rendered a decision, holding
that:

Petitioner (Filport) cannot be held liable for the payment of the retirement pay of private
respondent (Josefino Silva) while in the employ of DAMASTICOR ... who is held
responsible for the same as the labor contract is in personamand cannot be passed on
to the petitioner." (Rollo, p. 7)

In so ruling, the First Division relied heavily on the case of Fernando v. Angat Labor
Union (5 SCRA 248) where it was held that unless expressly assumed, labor contracts
are not enforceable against a transferee of an enterprise labor contracts being
in personam.
Per entry of judgment, the aforesaid decision became final and executory on November
24, 1989 (p. 87, Rollo).

On September 3, 1990, however, this Court, through the Second Division, dismissed
the petition in G.R. No. 85704 "for failure to sufficiently show that the questioned
judgment is tainted with grave abuse of discretion."

Per entry of judgment, said resolution became final and executory on December 4, 1
990 (p. 108, Rollo).

Hence, the instant petition for clarification with prayer for preliminary injunction to enjoin
the respondents from enforcing the decision in G.R. No. 85704 until further orders of
this Court.

We see no reason to disturb the findings of fact of the public respondent, supported as
they are by substantial evidence in the light of the well established principle that findings
of administrative agencies which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is
confined to specific matters are generally accorded not only respect but at times even
finality, and that judicial review by this Court on labor cases does not go so far as to
evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence upon which the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC
based their determinations but are limited to issues of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion. (National Federation of Labor Union v. Ople, 143 SCRA 129).

In the case filed by private respondent Paterno Liboon et al against Filport, the findings
of the NLRC in its November 27, 1987 decision are categorical:

In resolving the issues, the Labor Arbiter concludes as follows:

The eventual incorporation of the arrastre/stevedoring firms and their subsequent

registration with the Securities and Exchange Commission on July 13, 1975
brought to the fore the interlocking ownership of the new corporation.

xxx xxx xxx

Subsequent amendment of its Articles of Incorporation highlighted by the

renaming of the Davao Dockhandlers, Inc. to Filipinas Port Services, Inc. did not
diminish the fact that the ownership and constituency of the new corporation are
basically Identical with the previous owners.

It is, therefore, the considered view of this Office that respondent Filport being a
mere alter ego of the different merging companies has at the very least, the
obligation not only to absorb into its employ workers of the dissolved companies,
but also to absorb the length of service earned by the absorbed employees from
their former employers.

xxx xxx xxx

 We are in full accord with, and hereby sustain, the findings and conclusions of
the Labor Arbiter. Under the circumstances, respondent-appellant is a successor-
employer. As a successor entity, it is answerable to the lawful obligations of the
predecessor employers, herein integrees. This Commission has so held under
the principle of 'substitution' that the successor firm is liable to (sic) the
obligations of the predecessor employer, notwithstanding the change in
management or even personality, of the new contracting employer." (Lakas Ng
Manggagawang Filipino (LAKAS] v. Tarlac Electrical Cooperative, Inc. et
al., NLRC Case No. RB III-1 57-75, January 28,1978, En Banc). ... The Supreme
Court earlier upheld the "Substitutionary" doctrine in the case of Benguet
Consolidated, Inc. vs. BOI Employees & Workers Union, (G.R. L-24711, April 30,
1968, 23 SCRA 465). (pp. 35 & 37, Rollo)

Said findings were reiterated in the case filed by Josefino Silva against Filport where the
NLRC, in its decision dated January 19, 1988, further ruled that:

... As We have ruled in the similar case involving herein appellant, the latter is
deemed a survivor entity because it continued in an essentially unchanged
manner the business operators of the predecessor arrastre and port service
operators, hiring substantially the same workers, including herein appellee, of the
integree predecessors, using substantially the same facilities, with similar
working conditions and line of business, and employing the same corporate
control, although under a new management and corporate personality. (G.R. No.
86026, p. 35, Rollo)

Thus, granting that Filport had no contract whatsoever with the private respondents
regarding the services rendered by them prior to February 16, 1977, by the fact of the
merger, a succession of employment rights and obligations had occurred between
Filport and the private respondents. The law enforced at the time of the merger was
Section 3 of Act No. 2772 which took effect on March 6, 1918. Said law provides:

Sec. 3. Upon the perfecting, as aforesaid, of a consolidation made in the manner

herein provided, the several corporations parties thereto shall be deemed and
taken as one corporation, upon the terms and conditions set forth in said
agreement; or, upon the perfecting of a merger, the corporation merged shall be
deemed and taken as absorbed by the other corporation and incorporated in it;
and all and singular rights, privileges, and franchises of each of said
corporations, and all property, real and personal, and all debts due on whatever
account, belonging to each of such corporations, shall be taken and deemed as
transferred to and vested in the new corporation formed by the consolidation, or
in the surviving corporation in case of merger, without further act or deed; and
the title to real estate, either by deed or otherwise, under the laws of the
Philippine Islands vested in either corporation, shall not be deemed in any way
impaired by reason of this Act: Provided, however, That the rights of creditors
and all liens upon the property of either of said corporations shall be preserved
unimpaired; and all debts liabilities, and duties of said corporations shall
 thenceforth attach to the new corporation in case of a consolidation, or to the
surviving corporation in case of a merger, and be enforced against said new
corporation or surviving corporation as if said debts, liabilities, and duties had
been incurred or contracted by it.

As earlier stated, it was mandated that Filport shall absorb all labor force and necessary
personnel complement of the merging operators, thus, clearly indicating the intention to
continue the employer-employee relationships of the individual companies with its
employees through Filport.

The alleged memorandum of the PPA Assistant General Manager exonerating Filport
from any liability arising from and as a result of the merger is contrary to public policy
and is violative of the workers' right to security of tenure. Said memorandum was issued
in response to a query of the PMU Officer-in-Charge and was not even published nor
made known to the workers who came to know of its existence only at the hearing
before the NLRC. (G.R. No. 86026, pp. 93-94, Rollo)

The principle involved in the case cited by the First Division (Fernando v. Angat Labor
Union [supra]) applies only when the transferee is an entirely new corporation with a
distinct personality from the integrating firms and NOT where the transferee was found
to be merely an alter ego of the different merging firms, as in this case.1âwphi1 Thus,
Filport has the obligation not only to absorb the workers of the dissolved companies but
also to include the length of service earned by the absorbed employees with their
former employees as well. To rule otherwise would be manifestly less than fair,
certainly, less than just and equitable.

Finally, to deny the private respondents the fruits of their labor corresponding to the time
they worked with their previous employers would render at naught the constitutional
provisions on labor protection. In interpreting the protection to labor and social justice
provisions of the Constitution and the labor laws, and rules and regulations
implementing the constitutional mandate, the Supreme Court has always adopted the
liberal approach which favors the exercise of labor rights. (EuroLinea Phils., Inc. v.
NLRC, 156 SCRA 83).

WHEREFORE, the Resolution of the Second Division of this Court in G.R. No. 85704
dated September 3, 1990 is hereby REITERATED.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin,

Sarmiento, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
Narvasa and Gancayco, JJ., concur in the result.
 LABOR CASE 7

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 103525 March 29, 1996

MARCOPPER MINING CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and NATIONAL MINES AND
ALLIED WORKERS' UNION (NAMAWU-MIF), respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:p

Social justice and full protection to labor guaranteed by the fundamental law of this land
is not some romantic notion, high in rhetoric but low in substance. The case at bench
provides yet another example of harmonizing and balancing the "right of labor to its just
share in the fruits of production and the right of enterprises to reasonable returns on
investments, and to expansion and growth." 1

In this petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court,
Marcopper Mining Corporation impugns the decision rendered by the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) on 18 November 1991 in RAB-IV-12-258888 dismissing
petitioner's appeal, and the resolution issued by the said tribunal dated 20 December
1991 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

There is no disagreement as to the following facts:

On 23 August 1984, Marcopper Mining Corporation, a corporation duly organized and

existing under the laws of the Philippines, engaged in the business of mineral
prospecting, exploration and extraction, and private respondent NAMAWU-MIF, a labor
federation duly organized and registered with the Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE), to which the Marcopper Employees Union (the exclusive bargaining agent of all
rank-and-file workers of petitioner) is affiliated, entered into a Collective Bargaining
Agreement (CBA) effective from 1 May 1984 until 30 April 1987.

Sec. 1, Art. V of the said Collective Bargaining Agreement provides:

 Sec. 1. The COMPANY agrees to grant general wage increase to all
employees within the bargaining unit as follows:

Increase per day on

Effectivity the Basic Wage

May 1, 1985 5%
May 1, 1986 5%

It is expressly understood that this wage increase shall be exclusive of any

increase in the minimum wage and/or mandatory living allowance that
may be promulgated during the life of this Agreement. 2

Prior to the expiration of the aforestated Agreement, on 25 July 1986, petitioner and
private respondent executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) wherein the terms of
the CBA, specifically on matters of wage increase and facilities allowance, were
modified as follows:

1. The COMPANY hereby grants a wage increase of 10% of the basic rate
to all employees and workers within the bargaining units (sic) as follows.

(a) 5% effective May 1, 1986.

This will mean that the members of the bargaining unit will get an effective
increase of 10% from May 1, 1986.

(b) 5% effective May 1, 1987.

2. The COMPANY hereby grants an increase of the facilities allowance

from P50.00 to P100.00 per month effective May 1, 1986. 3

In compliance with the amended CBA, petitioner implemented the initial 5% wage
increase due on 1 May 1986. 4

On 1 June 1987, Executive Order (E.O.) No. 178 was promulgated mandating the
integration of the cost of living allowance under Wage Orders Nos. 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 into
the basic wage of workers, its effectivity retroactive to 1 May 1987. 5 Consequently,
effective on 1 May 1987, the basic wage rate of petitioner's laborers categorized as non-
agricultural workers was increased by P9.00 per day. 6

Petitioner implemented the second five percent (5%) wage increase due on 1 May 1987
and thereafter added the integrated COLA. 7

Private respondent, however, assailed the manner in which the second wage increase
was effected. It argued that the COLA should first be integrated into the basic wage
before the 5% wage increase is computed. 8
Consequently, on 15 December 1988, the union filed a complaint for underpayment of
wages before the Regional Arbitration Branch IV, Quezon City.

On 24 July 1989, the Labor Arbiter promulgated a decision in favor of the union. The
dispositive part reads, thus:

WHEREFORE consistent with the tenor hereof, judgment is rendered

directing respondent company to pay the wage differentials due its rank-
and-file workers retroactive to 1 May 1987.

SO ORDERED. 9

The Labor Arbiter ruled in this wise:

First and foremost, the written instrument and the intention of the parties
must be brought to the fore. And talking of intention, we conjure to sharp
focus the provision embossed in Section 1, Article V of the collective
agreement, viz:.

xxx xxx xxx

It is expressly understood that this wage increase shall be

exclusive of increase in the minimum wage and/or
mandatory living allowance that may be promulgated during
the life of this Agreement. (Emphasis ours.)

The foregoing phrase albeit innocuously framed offers the cue. This
ushers us to the inner sanctum of what really was the intention of the
parties to the contract. Treading along its lines, it becomes readily
discernible that this portion of the contract is the "stop-lock" gate or known
in its technical term as the "non-chargeability" clause. There can be no
quibbling that on the strength of this provision, the wage/allowance
granted under this accord cannot be credited to similar form of benefit that
may be thereafter ordained by the government through legislation. That
the parties therefore were consciously aware at the time of the conclusion
of the agreement of the never-ending rise in the cost of living is a logical
corollary. And while this upward trend may not be a welcome
phenomenon, there was the intention to yield and comply in the event of
an imposition. Of course, there cannot likewise be any rivalry that if the
Executive Order were to retroact to 2 May 1987 or a day after the last
contractual increase, this question will not arise. It is in this sense of
fairness that we cannot allow this "one (1) day" to be an insulating medium
to deny the workers the benediction endowed by Executive Order No.
178. 10
Petitioner appealed the Labor Arbiter's decision and on 18 November 1991 the NLRC
rendered its decision sustaining the Labor Arbiter's ruling. The dispositive portion states:

WHEREFORE in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the Labor Arbiter is

hereby AFFIRMED and the appeal filed is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit.

SO ORDERED. 11

The NLRC declared:

. . . Increments to the laborers' financial gratification, be they in the form of

salary increases or changes in the salary scale are aimed at one thing —
improvement of the economic predicament of the laborers. As such, they
should be viewed in the light of the State's avowed policy to protect labor.
Thus, having entered into an agreement with its employees, an employer
may not be allowed to renege on its obligation under a collective
bargaining agreement should, at the same time, the law grants the
employees the same or better terms and conditions of employment.
Employee benefits derived from law are exclusive of benefits arrived at
through negotiation and agreement unless otherwise provided by the
agreement itself or by law. (Meycauayan College v. Hen. Franklin N.
Drilon, 185 SCRA 50). 12

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by the NLRC in its resolution dated
20 December 1991.

In the present petition, Marcopper challenges the NLRC decision on the following
grounds:

PUBLIC RESPONDENT NLRC ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF LABOR ARBITER
JOAQUIN TANODRA DIRECTING MARCOPPER TO PAY WAGE
DIFFERENTIALS DUE ITS RANK-AND-FILE EMPLOYEES
RETROACTIVE TO 1 MAY 1987 CONSIDERING THAT SANS E.O 178,
THE FUNDAMENTAL MEANING OF THE BASIC WAGE IS CLEARLY
DIFFERENT FROM, AND DOES NOT INCLUDE THE COLA AT THE
TIME THE CBA WAS ENTERED INTO. THUS, PUBLIC RESPONDENTS
READING OF THE CBA, AS AMENDED BY THE MEMORANDUM OF
AGREEMENT DATED 25 JULY 1986, ULTIMATELY DISREGARDED
THE ORDINARY MEANING OF THE PHRASE "BASIC WAGE",
OTHERWISE INTENDED BY THE PARTIES DURING THE TIME THE
CBA WAS EXECUTED.
 II

THE LABOR ARBITER AND PUBLIC RESPONDENT NLRC'S RELIANCE

ON THE LAST PARAGRAPH OF SECTION 1, ARTICLE V OF THE CBA
WHICH STATES: "IT IS EXPRESSLY UNDERSTOOD THAT THIS WAGE
INCREASE SHALL BE EXCLUSIVE OF ANY INCREASE IN THE
MINIMUM WAGE AND/OR MANDATORY LIVING ALLOWANCE THAT
MAY BE PROMULGATED DURING THE LIFE OF THIS AGREEMENT"
IS MISPLACED AND WITHOUT BASIS BECAUSE SAID PROVISION
HARDLY OFFERS A HINT AS TO WHAT BASIC WAGE THE PARTIES
HAD IN MIND AT THE TIME THEY EXECUTED THE CBA AS AMENDED
BY THE MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT.

III

PETITIONER COMPUTED THE 5% WAGE INCREASE BASED ON THE

UNINTEGRATED BASIC WAGE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE INTENT
AND TERMS OF THE CBA, AS AMENDED BY THE MEMORANDUM OF
AGREEMENT. THIS WAS IN FULL ACCORD AND IN FAITHFUL
COMPLIANCE WITH E.O 178. HENCE, PETITIONER DID NOT COMMIT
ANY UNDERPAYMENT.

IV

THE DOCTRINE OF LIBERAL INTERPRETATION IN FAVOR OF LABOR

IN CASE OF DOUBT IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT CASE. 13

Stripped of the non-essentials, the question for our resolution is what should be the
basis for the computation of the CBA increase, the basic wage without the COLA or the
so-called "integrated" basic wage which, by mandate of E.O. No. 178, includes the
COLA.

It is petitioner's contention that the basic wage referred to in the CBA pertains to the
"unintegrated" basic wage. Petitioner maintains that the rules on interpretation of
contracts, particularly Art. 1371 of the New Civil Code which states that:

Art. 1371. In order to judge the intention of the contracting parties, their
contemporaneous and subsequent acts shall be principally considered.

should govern. Accordingly, applying the aforequoted provision in the case at

bench, petitioner concludes that it was clearly not the intention of the parties
(petitioner and private respondent) to include the COLA in computing the
CBA/MOA mandated increase since the MOA was entered into a year before
E.O. No. 178 was enacted even though their effectivity dates coincide. In other
words, the situation "contemporaneous" to the execution of the amendatory MOA
was that there was yet no law requiring the integration of the COLA into the basic
 wage. 14 Petitioner, therefore, cannot be compelled to undertake an obligation it
never assumed or contemplated under the CBA or MOA.

Siding with the petitioner, the Solicitor General opines that for the purpose of complying
with the obligations imposed by the CBA, the integrated COLA should not be
considered due to the exclusivity of the benefits under the said CBA and E.O. No. 178.
He explains thus:

A collective bargaining agreement is a contractual obligation. It is distinct

from an obligation imposed by law. The terms and conditions of a CBA
constitute the law between the parties. Thus, employee benefits derived
from either the law or a contract should be treated as distinct and separate
from each other.(Meycauayan College vs. Drilon, supra.)

xxx xxx xxx

Very clearly, the CBA and E.O. 178 provided for the exclusiveness of the
benefits to be given or awarded to the employees of petitioner. Thus,
when petitioner computed the 5% wage increase based on the
unintegrated basic wage, it complied with its contractual obligations under
the CBA. When it thereafter integrated the COLA into the basic wage, it
complied also with the mandate of E.O. 178. Petitioner, therefore,
complied with its contractual obligations in the CBA as well as with the
legal mandate of the law. Consequently, petitioner is not guilty of
underpayment.

To follow the theory of private respondent, that is to integrate first the

COLA into the basic wage and thereafter compute the 5% wage increase
therefrom, would violate the "exclusiveness" of the benefits granted under
the CBA and under E.O. 178. 15

Private respondent counters by asserting that the purpose, nature and essence of CBA
negotiation is to obtain wage increases and benefits over and above what the law
provides and that the principle of non-diminution of benefits should prevail.

The NLRC, which filed its own comment, likewise, made the following assertions:

. . . However, to state outright that the parties intended the basic wage to
remain invariable even after the advent of EO 178 is unfounded and
presumptuous a claim as such inevitably works to the utmost
disadvantage of the workers and runs counter to the constitutional
guarantee of affording protection to labor. Evidently, the rationale for the
integration of the COLA with the basic wage was primarily to increase the
base wage for purposes of computation of such items as overtime and
premium pay, fringe benefits, etc. To adopt the statement and claim of the
petitioner would then redound to depriving the workers of the full benefits
 the law intended for them, which in the final analysis was solely for the
purpose of alleviating their plight due to the continuous undue hardship
they suffer caused by the ever escalating prices of prime commodities. 16

We rule for the respondents..

The principle that the CBA is the law between the contracting parties stands strong and
true. 17 However, the present controversy involves not merely an interpretation of CBA
provisions. More importantly, it requires a determination of the effect of an executive
order on the terms and the conditions of the CBA. This is, and should be, the focus of
the instant case.

It is unnecessary to delve too much on the intention of the parties as to what they
allegedly meant by the term "basic wage" at the time the CBA and MOA were executed
because there is no question that as of 1 May 1987, as mandated by E.O. No. 178, the
basic wage of workers, or the statutory minimum wage, was increased with the
integration of the COLA. As of said date, then, the term "basic wage" includes the
COLA. This is what the law ordains and to which the collective bargaining agreement of
the parties must conform.

Petitioner's arguments eventually lose steam in the light of the fact that compliance with
the law is mandatory and beyond contractual stipulation by and between the parties;
consequently, whether or not petitioner intended the basic wage to include the COLA
becomes immaterial. There is evidently nothing to construe and interpret because the
law is clear and unambiguous. Unfortunately for petitioner, said law, by some uncanny
coincidence, retroactively took effect on the same date the CBA increase became
effective. Therefore, there cannot be any doubt that the computation of the CBA
increase on the basis of the "integrated" wage does not constitute a violation of the
CBA.

Petitioner's contention that under the Rules Implementing E.O. No. 178, the definition of
the term "basic wage" has remained unchanged is off the mark since said definition
expressly allows integration of monetary benefits into the regular pay of employees:

Chapter 1. Definition of Terms and Coverage.

Sec. 1. Definition of Terms.

xxx xxx xxx

(j) "Basic Wage" means all regular remuneration or earnings paid by an

employer for services rendered on normal working days and hours but
does not include cost-of-living allowances, profit-sharing payments,
premium payments, 13th month pay, and other monetary benefits which
are not considered as part of or integrated into the regular salary of the
employee on the date the Order became effective. (Emphasis ours.)
What E.O. No. 178 did was exactly to integrate the COLA under Wage Orders Nos. 1,
2, 3, 5 and 6 into the basic pay so as to increase the statutory daily minimum wage.
Section 2 of the Rules is quite explicit:

Sec. 2. Amount to be Integrated. — Effective on the dates specified, as a

result of the integration, the basic rate of covered workers shall be
increased by the following amounts: (Emphasis ours.)

Integration of monetary benefits into the basic pay of workers is not a new method of
increasing the minimum wage. 18 But even so, we are still guided by our ruling in Davao
Integrated Port Stevedoring Services v. Abarquez, 19 which we herein reiterate:

While the terms and conditions of the CBA constitute the law between the
parties, it is not, however, an ordinary contract to which is applied the
principles of law governing ordinary contracts. A CBA, as a labor contract
within the contemplation of Article 1700 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
which governs the relations between labor and capital, is not merely
contractual in nature but impressed with public interest, thus, it must yield
to the common good. As such it must be construed liberally rather than
narrowly and technically, and the courts must place a practical and
realistic construction upon it, giving due consideration to the context in
which it is negotiated and purpose which it is intended to serve.

Finally, petitioner misinterprets the declaration of the Labor Arbiter in the assailed
decision that "when the pendulum of judgment swings to and fro and the forces are
equal on both sides, the same must be stilled in favor of labor." While petitioner
acknowledges that all doubts in the interpretation of the Labor Code shall be resolved in
favor of labor, 20 it insists that what is involved here is the amended CBA which is
essentially a contract between private persons. What petitioner has lost sight of is the
avowed policy of the State, enshrined in our Constitution, to accord utmost protection
and justice to labor, a policy, we are, likewise, sworn to uphold..

Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Corporation v. NLRC, 21 we categorically stated that:

When conflicting interests of labor and capital are to be weighed on the

scales of social justice, the heavier influence of the latter should be
counter-balanced by sympathy and compassion the law must accord the
underprivileged worker.

Likewise, in Terminal Facilities and Services Corporation v. NLRC, 22 we declared:

Any doubt concerning the rights of labor should be resolved in its favor
pursuant to the social justice policy.

The purpose of E.O. No. 178 is to improve the lot of the workers covered by the said
statute. We are bound to ensure its fruition.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, Bellosillo, Vitug and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 THE 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, art.

XIII, sec. 3.

2 Rollo, p. 6.

3 Original Records, Volume 1, pp. 20, 43.

4 Ibid.

5 Executive Order No. 178

INCREASING THE STATUTORY DAILY MINIMUM WAGES AFTER

INTEGRATING THE COST OF LIVING ALLOWANCES UNDER WAGE
ORDERS NOS. 1, 2, 3, 5 AND 6 INTO THE BASIC PAY OF ALL COVERED
WORKERS

WHEREAS, the National Tripartite Conference, held on April 10-11, 1987, has
agreed in principle on the integration of existing cost-of-living allowances
(COLAs) into the basic pay, leaving to the President of the Philippines the
decision on the manner and schedule of integration.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, CORAZON C. AQUINO, President of the Philippines, do

hereby order:

Sec. 1. The cost-of-living allowances mandated under existing Wage Orders

shall be integrated into the basic wage of all covered workers based on the
following schedule:

a) COLAs under Wage Orders Nos. 1, 2 and 3 effective May 1, 1987.

b) COLAs under Wage Orders Nos. 5 and 6 effective October 1, 1987.

For establishments with less than 30 employees and

paid-up capital of P500,000 or less:

a) COLAs under Wage Orders Nos. 1 and 2, effective May 1, 1987.

b) COLAs under Wage Order No. 3, effective October 1, 1987.

c) COLAs under Wage Orders Nos. 5 and 6, effective January 1, 1988.

Sec. 2. The Secretary of Labor and Employment, as Chairman of the National
Wages Council, shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to
implement this Executive Order.

Sec. 3. All laws, orders, issuances, rules and regulations or parts thereof
inconsistent with this Executive Order are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly.

Sec. 4. This Executive Order shall take effect on May 1, 1987.

6 Rules Implementing E.O. No. 178, Chapter II, sec. 2.

7 Rollo, p. 7.

8 Id., at 28; 80.

9 Id., at 30.

10 Id., at 28-29.

11 Id., at 49.

12 Id., at 48-49.

13 Id., at 9-10.

14 Id., at 187.

15 Id.; at 84-85.

16 Id., at 115.

17 Kimberly Clark Phils. v. Lorredo, 226 SCRA 639 (1993); Plastic Town Center
Corporation v. NLRC, 172 SCRA 580 (1989).

18 See P.D. 1751 dated 14 May 1980 which increased the statutory daily
minimum wage at all levels by P4.00 after integrating the mandatory emergency
living allowance under PD Nos. 525 and 1123 into the basic pay of all covered
workers. (Meycauayan College v. Drilon, 185 SCRA 50 [1990].)

19 220 SCRA 197 (1993).

20 Art. 4, Labor Code. Construction in favor of labor. — All doubts in the

implementation and interpretation of the provisions of this code, including its
implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor.

21 183 SCRA 451 (1990).

22 199 SCRA 269 (1991).