REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT

THIRD JUDICIAL REGION
BRANCH 31
Guimba, Nueva Ecija

IMELDA B. CABANES, MARIA TERESITA

M. BUSTILLO, ADELIO F. PASCUA,
ALFONSO P. MATIAS and
CATALINA D. BACOTO,
Petitioner,
Spec. Civil Action No. 101-13-G
– versus – For: Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65

IGLESIA FILIPINA INDEPENDIENTE, or

IGLESIA INDEPENDIENTE,

- and -

MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF

CUYAPO, NUEVA ECIJA
Respondents.
x--------------------x

ORDER
Before this court is a Special Civil Action for Certiorari under Rule 65 brought by the defendants in Civil Case
No. 1919 for Forcible Entry and Damages with Prayer for Issuance of Preliminary Preventive Injunction before the
Municipal Trial Court of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija.

A special civil action for certiorari, or simply a Petition for Certiorari, under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court
is intended for the correction of errors of jurisdiction only or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Its principal office is only to keep the inferior court within the parameters of its jurisdiction or to prevent it
from committing such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.1 Since the issue is
jurisdiction, an original action for certiorari may be directed against an interlocutory order of the lower court prior to an
appeal from the judgment; or where there is no appeal or any plain, speedy or adequate remedy.2

An order or a judgment is deemed final when it finally disposes of a pending action, so that nothing more can
be done with it in the trial court. In other words, the order or judgment ends the litigation in the lower court. Au contraire,
an interlocutory order does not dispose of the case completely, but leaves something to be done as regards the merits
of the latter.3

In the present case, there is no question that the assailed judgment is already a disposition on the merits.
Therefore, said judgment is in the nature of final disposition. Specifically, this Court has no jurisdiction to review, reverse
or modify, in any manner whatsoever, the public respondent’s decision on the merits of the forcible entry case via a
petition for certiorari filed under Rule 65; if the petitioners wanted a review of the said decision, they should have instead
filed an appeal. Remedies of appeal (including petitions for review) and certiorari are mutually exclusive, not alternative
or successive. One of the requisites of certiorari is that there be no available appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy.4 Where an appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground therefor is grave abuse of
discretion.5

The resolution of this petition therefore hinges on whether or not respondent judge acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in rendering (i) the order6 for the issuance of preliminary injunction
in favor of the private respondent and requiring the parties to submit their position papers; (ii) the order7 denying the
Urgent Motion for Inhibition filed by the petitioner8; and (iii) the assailed judgment9 dated March 9, 2018.

Careful perusal of the instant petition fails to reveal that any bias or prejudice motivated the public respondent
in issuing the Writ of Preliminary Injunction or rendering judgment in favor of the private respondents. Neither did this
Court find any questionable or suspicious circumstances leading to the issuance of those Orders, as suggested by
petitioner.

With respect to order deying the petitioner’s Urgent Motion for Inhibition, this Court does not find the same being
arbitrary or whimsical. Respondent judge clearly explained that the denial of the urgent motion for inhibition filed by the
petitioner is already moot and academic considering that he has already rendered judgment on March 9, 2018 and was
posted on March 12, 2018. Granting that the questioned judgment was indeed posted on March 13, 2018 or one day
after the submission of the urgent motion for inhibition, as pointed out by the petitioner, there is no guarantee that
respondent judge will inhibit himself from sitting in the case, as provided in Section 1 of Rule 137 of the Rules of Court:

1 Tagle v. Pasamba, G.R. No. 172299.

2 Atty. Paa v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126560
3 Diesel Construction Company, Inc. v. Jollibee Foods Corp., 380 Phil. 813, 824, January 28, 2000
4
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
5 Madrigal Transport, Inc., v. Lapanday Holdings Corporation; Et al., G.R. No. 156067 August 11, 2004
6 Petition, Annex “E”.
7 Petition, Annex “P”.
8 id., Annex “N”.
9 Petition, Annex “A”.
 ORDER
Sp. Civil Case No. 110-18-G
Page 2 of 2

Section 1. Disqualification of judges. No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or
child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within
the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the
rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he
has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent
of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.

A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or
valid reasons other than those mentioned above.

The Rules contemplate two kinds of inhibition: compulsory and voluntary. Under the first paragraph of the cited
Rule, it is conclusively presumed that judges cannot actively and impartially sit in the instances mentioned. The second
paragraph, which embodies voluntary inhibition, leaves to the sound discretion of the judges concerned whether to sit
in a case for other just and valid reasons, with only their conscience as guide.10 The second paragraph of Section 1 of
Rule 137 does not give judges the unfettered discretion to decide whether to desist from hearing a case. The inhibition
must be for just and valid causes. The mere imputation of bias or partiality is not enough ground for them to inhibit,
especially when the charge is without basis. This Court has to be shown acts or conduct clearly indicative of
arbitrariness or prejudice before it can brand them with the stigma of bias or partiality.11 Under the circumstances,
however, to affirm his Order of Inhibition would open the floodgates to a form of forum-shopping, in which litigants
would be allowed to shop for a judge more sympathetic to their cause.12 Such action would be antithetical to the speedy
and fair administration of justice.

Likewise, a motion for reconsideration is generally required prior to the filing of a petition for certiorari which is
lacking in the instant petition. The plain and adequate remedy referred to in Section 1 of Rule 65 is a motion for
reconsideration of the assailed decision. The purpose of this requirement is to enable the court or agency to rectify its
mistakes without the intervention of a higher court. To dispense with this requirement, there must be a concrete,
compelling, and valid reason for the failure to comply with the requirement. 13 An examination of the petition shows that
petitioners did not file a motion for reconsideration of the respondent court’s decision.

Finally, Civil Case No. 1919, a forcible entry case, is governed by the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.
The purpose of the Rule on Summary Procedure is to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases
without regard to technical rules. Far from showing bias or prejudice, public respondent was merely complying with his
sworn duty as a judge to administer justice without delay. In other words, public respondent ordering the petitioner to
submit its position paper was merely fending off what was obviously petitioner's attempt to further delay the case. After
all, an independent and fair judge should not allow the parties to practically control the proceedings in his court through
obvious dilatory tactics.14

Verily, petitioners have not convinced this Court that public respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED. The prayer to declare as null and void the Judgment dated March
9, 2018 and to order the inhibition of the respondent judge are likewise DENIED for lack of merit.

The Judgment dated March 9, 2018 issued by respondent court in Civil Case No. 1919 STANDS.

SO ORDERED.

Given in chambers this 13th day of April, 2018.

Guimba, Nueva Ecija.

BRIGANDO P. SALDIVAR
Presiding Judge

BPS/no_ram

copy furnished:

Atty. Ruben S. Rillera

Sta. Maria, San Manuel, Tarlac 2309

Atty. April Joan B. Pico

1500 Taft Avenue, Ermita, Manila

Hon. Judge Erick A. Sadural

MTC, Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija

10
Gochan v. Gochan, supra, p. 447, per Panganiban, J. (citing People v. Kho, supra; Gohu v. Spouses Gohu, 397 Phil. 126, October 13, 2000; and Abdula
v. Guiani, 382 Phil. 757, February 18, 2000.)
11
id.
12
Chin v. CA, 409 SCRA 206, 215, August 15, 2003.
13
METRO TRANSIT ORGANIZATION, INC. ET AL. vs. CA, ET AL., G.R. No. 142133, November 19, 2002.
14
See Dysico v. Judge Dacumos, A.M. No.MTJ-94-999, 262 SCRA 275 [1996].