SECOND DIVISION Soon after, BBB arrived and found AAA crying.
Soon after, BBB arrived and found AAA crying.18 Appellant claimed he scolded her for staying
G.R. No. 186228 March 15, 2010
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ANTONIO LAUGA Y PINA ALIAS TERIO, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Before Us for final review is the trial court’s conviction of the appellant for the rape of his
thirteen-year old daughter.
Consistent with the ruling of this Court in People v. Cabalquinto, 1 the real name and the personal
circumstances of the victim, and any other information tending to establish or compromise her
identity, including those of her immediate family or household members, are not disclosed in this
decision.
The Facts
In an Information dated 21 September 2000,2 the appellant was accused of the crime of
QUALIFIED RAPE allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 15th day of March 2000, in the evening, at Barangay xxx, municipality of
xxx, province of Bukidnon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, being the father of AAA with lewd design, with the use of force and
intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally have carnal knowledge with
his own daughter AAA, a 13 year[s]old minor against her will. 3
On 12 October 2000, appellant entered a plea of not guilty.4 During the pre-trial conference, the
prosecution and the defense stipulated and admitted: (a) the correctness of the findings indicated
in the medical certificate of the physician who examined AAA; (b) that AAA was only thirteen
(13) years old when the alleged offense was committed; and (c) that AAA is the daughter of the
appellant.5 On trial, three (3) witnesses testified for the prosecution, namely: victim AAA; 6 her
brother BBB;7 and one Moises Boy Banting,8 a "bantay bayan" in the barangay. Their
testimonies revealed the following:
In the afternoon of 15 March 2000, AAA was left alone at home. 9 AAA’s father, the appellant,
was having a drinking spree at the neighbor’s place.10 Her mother decided to leave because when
appellant gets drunk, he has the habit of mauling AAA’s mother. 11 Her only brother BBB also
went out in the company of some neighbors.12
At around 10:00 o’clock in the evening, appellant woke AAA up;13 removed his pants, slid
inside the blanket covering AAA and removed her pants and underwear; 14 warned her not to
shout for help while threatening her with his fist;15 and told her that he had a knife placed above
her head.16 He proceeded to mash her breast, kiss her repeatedly, and "inserted his penis inside
her vagina."17
out late.19 BBB decided to take AAA with him.20 While on their way to their maternal
grandmother’s house, AAA recounted her harrowing experience with their father. 21 Upon
reaching their grandmother’s house, they told their grandmother and uncle of the incident,22 after
which, they sought the assistance of Moises Boy Banting. 23
Moises Boy Banting found appellant in his house wearing only his underwear. 24 He invited
appellant to the police station,25 to which appellant obliged. At the police outpost, he admitted to
him that he raped AAA because he was unable to control himself. 26
The following day, AAA submitted herself to physical examination. 27 Dra. Josefa Arlita L.
Alsula, Municipal Health Officer of x x x, Bukidnon, issued the Medical Certificate, which
reads:
hyperemic vulvae with 4 o’clock & 6 o’clock freshly lacerated hymen; (+) minimal to moderate
bloody discharges 2° to an alleged raping incident28
On the other hand, only appellant testified for the defense. He believed that the charge against
him was ill-motivated because he sometimes physically abuses his wife in front of their children
after engaging in a heated argument,29 and beats the children as a disciplinary measure.30 He
went further to narrate how his day was on the date of the alleged rape.
He alleged that on 15 March 2000, there was no food prepared for him at lunchtime. 31 Shortly
after, AAA arrived.32 She answered back when confronted.33 This infuriated him that he kicked
her hard on her buttocks.34
Appellant went back to work and went home again around 3 o’clock in the afternoon.35 Finding
nobody at home,36 he prepared his dinner and went to sleep.37
Later in the evening, he was awakened by the members of the "Bantay Bayan" headed by Moises
Boy Banting.38They asked him to go with them to discuss some matters.39 He later learned that
he was under detention because AAA charged him of rape.40
On 8 July 2006, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Malaybalay City, Bukidnon, rendered its
decision41 in Criminal Case No. 10372-0, finding appellant guilty of rape qualified by
relationship and minority, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.42 It also
ordered him to indemnify AAA P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity with exemplary damages of P25,000.00.43
On 30 September 2008, the decision of the trial court was AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS44 by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00456-MIN.45 The
appellate court found that appellant is not eligible for parole and it increased both the civil
indemnity and moral damages from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00.46
On 24 November 2008, the Court of Appeals gave due course to the appellant’s notice of
appeal.47 This Court required the parties to simultaneously file their respective supplemental
briefs,48 but both manifested that they will no longer file supplemental pleadings. 49
The lone assignment of error in the appellant’s brief is that, the trial court gravely erred in
finding him guilty as charged despite the failure of the prosecution to establish his guilt beyond
CONSTI II (Sec. 11-13) | 1
reasonable doubt,50 because: (1) there were inconsistencies in the testimonies of AAA and her
brother BBB;51 (2) his extrajudicial confession before Moises Boy Banting was without the
assistance of a counsel, in violation of his constitutional right; 52 and (3) AAA’s accusation was
ill-motivated.53
Our Ruling
Appellant contests the admissibility in evidence of his alleged confession with a "bantay bayan"
and the credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution.
Admissibility in Evidence of an Extrajudicial Confession before a "Bantay Bayan"
Appellant argues that even if he, indeed, confessed to Moises Boy Banting, a "bantay bayan,"
the confession was inadmissible in evidence because he was not assisted by a lawyer and there
was no valid waiver of such requirement.54
The case of People v. Malngan55 is the authority on the scope of the Miranda doctrine provided
for under Article III, Section 12(1)56 and (3)57 of the Constitution. In Malngan, appellant
questioned the admissibility of her extrajudicial confessions given to the barangay chairman and
a neighbor of the private complainant. This Court distinguished. Thus:
Arguably, the barangay tanods, including the Barangay Chairman, in this particular instance,
may be deemed as law enforcement officer for purposes of applying Article III, Section 12(1)
and (3), of the Constitution. When accused-appellant was brought to the barangay hall in the
morning of 2 January 2001, she was already a suspect, actually the only one, in the fire that
destroyed several houses x x x. She was, therefore, already under custodial investigation and the
rights guaranteed by x x x [the] Constitution should have already been observed or applied to
her. Accused-appellant’s confession to Barangay Chairman x x x was made in response to the
‘interrogation’ made by the latter – admittedly conducted without first informing accused-
appellant of her rights under the Constitution or done in the presence of counsel. For this reason,
the confession of accused-appellant, given to Barangay Chairman x x x, as well as the lighter
found x x x in her bag are inadmissible in evidence against her x x x.1avvphi1
[But such does] not automatically lead to her acquittal. x x x [T]he constitutional safeguards
during custodial investigations do not apply to those not elicited through questioning by the
police or their agents but given in an ordinary manner whereby the accused verbally admits x x x
as x x x in the case at bar when accused-appellant admitted to Mercedita Mendoza, one of the
neighbors x x x [of the private complainant].58 (Emphasis supplied)
Following the rationale behind the ruling in Malngan, this Court needs to ascertain whether or
not a "bantay bayan" may be deemed a law enforcement officer within the contemplation of
Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution.
In People of the Philippines v. Buendia,59 this Court had the occasion to mention the nature of a
"bantay bayan," that is, "a group of male residents living in [the] area organized for the purpose
of keeping peace in their community[,which is] an accredited auxiliary of the x x x PNP." 60
Also, it may be worthy to consider that pursuant to Section 1(g) of Executive Order No. 309
issued on 11 November 1987, as amended, a Peace and Order Committee in each barangay shall
be organized "to serve as implementing arm of the City/Municipal Peace and Order Council at
the Barangay level."61 The composition of the Committee includes, among others: (1)
the Punong Barangay as Chairman; (2) the Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan; (3) a
Member of the Lupon Tagapamayapa; (4) a Barangay Tanod; and (5) at least three (3) Members
of existing Barangay-Based Anti-Crime or neighborhood Watch Groups or a Non Government
Organization Representative well-known in his community.62
This Court is, therefore, convinced that barangay-based volunteer organizations in the nature of
watch groups, as in the case of the "bantay bayan," are recognized by the local government unit
to perform functions relating to the preservation of peace and order at the barangay level. Thus,
without ruling on the legality of the actions taken by Moises Boy Banting, and the specific scope
of duties and responsibilities delegated to a "bantay bayan," particularly on the authority to
conduct a custodial investigation, any inquiry he makes has the color of a state-related function
and objective insofar as the entitlement of a suspect to his constitutional rights provided for
under Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution, otherwise known as the Miranda Rights, is
concerned.
We, therefore, find the extrajudicial confession of appellant, which was taken without a counsel,
inadmissible in evidence.
Be that as it may, We agree with the Court of Appeals that the conviction of the appellant was
not deduced solely from the assailed extrajudicial confession but "from the confluence of
evidence showing his guilt beyond reasonable doubt."63
Credibility of the Witnesses for the Prosecution
Appellant assails the inconsistencies in the testimonies of AAA and her brother BBB. AAA
testified that BBB accompanied her to the house of their grandmother. Thereafter, they, together
with her relatives, proceeded to look for a "bantay bayan." On the other hand, BBB testified that
he brought her sister to the house of their "bantay bayan" after he learned of the incident.
Citing Bartocillo v. Court of Appeals,64 appellant argues that "where the testimonies of two key
witnesses cannot stand together, the inevitable conclusion is that one or both must be telling a lie,
and their story a mere concoction."65
The principle, however, is not applicable in the case at bar. In Bartocillo, the two testimonies
could not simply stand together because:
On one hand, if we are to believe Susan, Orlando could not have possibly seen the hacking
incident since he had accompanied Vicente home. On the other hand, if we are to accept the
testimony of Orlando, then Susan could not have possibly witnessed the hacking incident since
she was with Vicente at that time.
Here, the testimony of AAA does not run contrary to that of BBB. Both testified that they sought
the help of a "bantay bayan." Their respective testimonies differ only as to when the help was
sought for, which this Court could well attribute to the nature of the testimony of BBB, a
shortcut version of AAA’s testimony that dispensed with a detailed account of the incident.
At any rate, the Court of Appeals is correct in holding that the assailed inconsistency is too trivial
to affect the veracity of the testimonies.66 In fact, inconsistencies which refer to minor, trivial or
CONSTI II (Sec. 11-13) | 2
inconsequential circumstances even strengthen the credibility of the witnesses, as they erase
doubts that such testimonies have been coached or rehearsed.67
Appellant’s contention that AAA charged him of rape only because she bore grudges against him
is likewise unmeritorious. This Court is not dissuaded from giving full credence to the testimony
of a minor complainant by motives of feuds, resentment or revenge. 68 As correctly pointed out
by the Court of Appeals:
Indeed, mere disciplinary chastisement is not strong enough to make daughters in a Filipino
family invent a charge that would not only bring shame and humiliation upon them and their
families but also bring their fathers into the gallows of death. 69 The Supreme Court has
repeatedly held that it is unbelievable for a daughter to charge her own father with rape, exposing
herself to the ordeal and embarrassment of a public trial and subjecting her private parts to
examination if such heinous crime was not in fact committed.70 No person, much less a woman,
could attain such height of cruelty to one who has sired her, and from whom she owes her very
existence, and for which she naturally feels loving and lasting gratefulness. 71 Even when
consumed with revenge, it takes a certain amount of psychological depravity for a young woman
to concoct a story which would put her own father to jail for the most of his remaining life and
drag the rest of the family including herself to a lifetime of shame. 72 It is highly improbable for
[AAA] against whom no proof of sexual perversity or loose morality has been shown to fake
charges much more against her own father. In fact her testimony is entitled to greater weight
since her accusing words were directed against a close relative.73
Elements of Rape
Having established the credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution, We now examine the
applicability of the Anti-Rape Law of 199774 to the case at bar.
The law provides, in part, that rape is committed, among others, "[b]y a man who shall have
carnal knowledge of a woman" "through force, threat or intimidation."75 The death penalty shall
be imposed if it is committed with aggravating/qualifying circumstances, which include, "[w]hen
the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent."76
The consistent and forthright testimony of AAA detailing how she was raped, culminating with
the penetration of appellant’s penis into her vagina, suffices to prove that appellant had carnal
knowledge of her. When a woman states that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is
necessary to show that rape was committed.77Further, when such testimony corresponds with
medical findings, there is sufficient basis to conclude that the essential requisites of carnal
knowledge have been established.78
The Court of Appeals pointed out that the element of force or intimidation is not essential when
the accused is the father of the victim, inasmuch as his superior moral ascendancy or influence
substitutes for violence and intimidation.79 At any rate, AAA was actually threatened by
appellant with his fist and a knife allegedly placed above AAA’s head. 80
It may be added that the self-serving defense of appellant cannot prevail over the positive and
straightforward testimony of AAA. Settled is the rule that, "alibi is an inherently weak defense
that is viewed with suspicion because it is easy to fabricate."81 "Alibi and denial must be
supported by strong corroborative evidence in order to merit credibility."82 Moreover, for the
defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must establish two elements – (1) he was not at the locus
delicti at the time the offense was committed; and (2) it was physically impossible for him to be
at the scene at the time of its commission.83 Appellant failed in this wise.
Aggravating/Qualifying Circumstances
The presence of the qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship with the offender in
the instant case has likewise been adequately established. Both qualifying circumstances were
specifically alleged in the Information, stipulated on and admitted during the pre-trial
conference, and testified to by both parties in their respective testimonies. Also, such stipulation
and admission, as correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, are binding upon this Court
because they are judicial admissions within the contemplation of Section 4, Rule 129 of the
Revised Rules of Court. It provides:
Sec. 4. Judicial admissions. - An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of
the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted
only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.
Penalty
Finally, in increasing the amount of civil indemnity and damages each from P50,000.00
to P75,000.00, the Court of Appeals correctly considered controlling jurisprudence to the effect
that where, as here, the rape is committed with any of the qualifying/aggravating circumstances
warranting the imposition of the death penalty, the victim is entitled to P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity ex delicto84 and P75,000.00 as moral damages.85 However, the award of exemplary
damages should have been increased from P25,000.00 to P30,000.00.86 Also, the penalty of
reclusion perpetua in lieu of death was correctly imposed considering that the imposition of the
death penalty upon appellant would have been appropriate were it not for the enactment of
Republic Act No. 9346, or An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the
Philippines.87 We further affirm the ruling of the Court of Appeals on appellant’s non-eligibility
for parole. Sec. 3 of Republic Act No. 9346 clearly provides that "persons convicted of offenses
punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetuaby
reason of the law, shall not be eligible for parole."
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 30 September 2008 in CA-G.R. CR
HC No. 00456-MIN is hereby AFFIRMED. Appellant Antonio Lauga is GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of qualified rape, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua without eligibility for parole and to pay AAAP75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00
as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
CONSTI II (Sec. 11-13) | 3

G.R. No. 95028 May 15, 1995
PEOPLE OF THE. PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MARLO COMPIL Y LITABAN, accused-appellant.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
On the belief that the case for the prosecution depends in the main on his own extrajudicial
confession which he claims is inadmissible, accused Marlo Compil y Litaban filed a demurrer to
evidence instead of presenting evidence in his behalf. The trial court however denied his
demurrer, admitted his extrajudicial confession, and found him guilty of robbery with homicide.
Now before us, he maintains that his extrajudicial confession was extracted without the
assistance of counsel, thus constitutionally flawed.
As submitted by the prosecution, on 23 October 1987, just before midnight, robbers struck on MJ
Furnitureslocated along Tomas Mapua Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila, which doubled as the dwelling
of its proprietors, the spouses Manuel and Mary Jay. The intruders made their way into the
furniture shop through the window grills they detached on the second floor where the bedroom
of the Jays was located. Two (2) of the robbers forthwith herded the two (2) maids of the owners
into the bathroom.
Manuel Jay was not yet home. He was to come from their other furniture store, the Best Wood
Furniture, along Tomas Pinpin Street, also in Sta. Cruz. His wife Mary had earlier retired to their
bedroom. Sensing however that something unusual was going on outside, Mary opened the door
to peek. Suddenly, a man placed his arms around her neck while another poked a balisong at her
nape. She was pushed back into the bedroom and ordered to open the drawers where she kept
money. A third man ransacked the bedroom. They then tied her hands behind her back, stuffed
her mouth with a towel, and took off with some P35,000.00 in cash and pieces of jewelry worth
P30,000.00.
Afterwards, Mary who was gagged in the bedroom, and one of the housemaids herded into the
bathroom, heard Manuel agonizing amid a commotion in the ground floor. After noticing that the
two (2) men guarding them had already left, the helpers, Jenelyn Valle and Virginia Ngoho,
dashed out of the bathroom and proceeded to the bedroom of their employers. Upon seeing
Mary, the two (2) maids untied her hands and took out the towel from her mouth. They then
rushed to the ground floor where they saw Manuel sprawled on the floor among the pieces of
furniture which were in disarray. He succumbed to thirteen (13) stab wounds.
In the investigation that followed, Jessie Bartolome, a furniture worker in MJ Furnitures, told
operatives of the Western Police District (WPD) that just before the incident that evening, while
with his girlfriend Linda Hermoso inside an owner-type jeep parked near MJ Furnitures, he saw
his co-workers Marlo Compil, Baltazar Mabini and Jose Jacale go to the back of the furniture
shop. Linda then confirmed the information of Bartolome to the police investigators who also
learned that the trio who were all from Samar failed to report for work the day after the incident,
and that Baltazar Mabini was planning to go to Tayabas, Quezon, to be the baptismal godfather
of his sister's child.
Thus on 27 October 1987, WPD agents together with Tomas Jay, brother of the deceased, and
Jenelyn Valle went to the parish church of Tayabas, Quezon, to look for Baltazar Mabini and his
companions. From the records of the parish they were able to confirm that suspect Baltazar
Mabini stood as godfather in the baptism of the child of his sister Mamerta and Rey Lopez.
Immediately they proceeded to the house of Lopez who informed them that Baltazar Mabini and
his companions already left the day before, except Compil who stayed behind and still planning
to leave.
After being positively identified by Jenelyn Valle as one of the workers of the Jay spouses,
accused Marlo Compil who was lying on a couch was immediately frisked and placed under
arrest. According to Jenelyn, Compil turned pale, became speechless and was trembling.
However after regaining his composure and upon being interrogated, Compil readily admitted
his guilt and pointed to the arresting officers the perpetrators of the heist from a picture of the
baptism of the child of Mabini's sister. Compil was then brought to the Tayabas Police Station
where he was further investigated. On their way back to Manila, he was again questioned. He
confessed that shortly before midnight on 23 October 1987 he was with the group that robbed MJ
Furnitures. He divulged to the police officers who his companions were and his participation as
a lookout for which he received P1,000.00. He did not go inside the furniture shop since he
would be recognized. Only those who were not known to their employers went inside. Compil
said that his cohorts stabbed Manuel Jay to death. He also narrated that after the robbery, they all
met in Bangkal, Makati, in the house of one Pablo Pakit, a brother of his co-conspirator Rogelio
Pakit, where they shared the loot and drank beer until four-thirty in the morning. Then they all
left for Quezon and agreed that from there they would all go home to their respective provinces.
From Tayabas, Quezon, the arresting team together with accused Compil proceeded to the house
of Pablo Pakit who confirmed that his younger brother Rogelio, with some six (6) others
including Compil, went to his house past midnight on 23 October 1987 and divided among
themselves the money and jewelry which, as he picked up from their conversation, was taken
from Sta. Cruz, Manila. They drank beer until past four o'clock the next morning.
On 28 October 1987, the day following his arrest, accused Compil after conferring with CLAO
lawyer Melencio Claroz and in the presence of his sister Leticia Compil, brother Orville Compil
and brother-in-law Virgilio Jacala, executed a sworn statement before Cpl. Patricio Balanay of
the WPD admitting his participation in the heist as a lookout. He named the six (6) other
perpetrators of the crime as Jose Jacale, Baltazar Mabini, Amancio Alvos, Rogelio Pakit, a
certain "Erning" and one "Lando," and asserted that he was merely forced to join the group by
Jose Jacale and Baltazar Mabini who were the masterminds: According to Compil, he was earlier
hired by Mabini to work for MJ Furnitures where he was the foreman.
Meanwhile WPD agents had gathered other leads and conducted follow-up operations in Manila,
Parañaque and Bulacan but failed to apprehend the cohorts of Compil.
On 12 November 1987 an Information for robbery with homicide was filed against Marlo
Compil. Assisted by a counsel de oficio he entered a plea of "Not Guilty" when arraigned. After
CONSTI II (Sec. 11-13) | 4
the prosecution had rested, the accused represented by counsel de parte instead of adducing
evidence filed a demurrer to evidence.
On 2 June 1988 the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br. 49, 1 denied the demurrer, found the
accused guilty of robbery with homicide, and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua.
In his 75-page appellant's brief, accused Compil claims that "(he) was not apprised of his
constitutional rights (to remain silent and seek the assistance of counsel) before the police
officers started interrogating him from the time of his arrest at the house of Rey Lopez, then at
the Tayabas Police Station, and while on their way to Manila . . . . (he) was made to confess and
declare statements that can be used against him in any proceeding." 2 And, the belated arrival of
counsel from the CLAO prior to the actual execution of the written extrajudicial confession did
not cure the constitutional infirmity since the police investigators had already extracted
incriminatory statements from him the day before, which extracted statements formed part of his
alleged confession. He then concludes that "[w]ithout the admission of (his) oral . . . and . . .
written extrajudicial (confessions) . . . (he) cannot be convicted beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of robbery with homicide based on the testimonies of other witnesses" 3 which are replete
with "serious and glaring inconsistencies and contradictions." 4
In People v. Rous, 5 the Third Division of this Court held that an extrajudicial confession may be
admitted in evidence even if obtained without the assistance of counsel provided that it was read
and fully explained to confessant by counsel before it was signed. However we adopt our view
in Gamboa v. Cruz 6 where the Court En Banc ruled that "[t]he right to counsel attaches upon the
start of an investigation, i.e., when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit
information and/or confessions or admissions from respondent/accused. At such point or stage,
the person being interrogated must be assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of
extorting forced or coerced admissions or confessions from the lips of the person undergoing
interrogation for the commission of the offense." We maintained this rule in the fairly recent
cases of People v. Macam 7 and People v. Bandula 8 where we further reiterated the procedure
— FISCAL FORMOSO (re-direct):
. . . At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of
the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be informed
of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement he might make
could be used against him. The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his
lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means — by telephone if possible
— or by letter or messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that
this is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of
counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court
upon petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf . . . Any statement
obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in
whole or in part, shall be in admissible in evidence.
In the case at bench, it is evident that accused-appellant was immediately subjected to an
interrogation upon his arrest in the house of Rey Lopez in Tayabas, Quezon. He was then
brought to the Tayabas Police Station where he was further questioned. And while on their way
to Manila, the arresting agents again elicited incriminating information. In all three instances, he
confessed to the commission of the crime and admitted his participation therein. In all those
instances, he was not assisted by counsel.
The belated arrival of the CLAO lawyer the following day even if prior to the actual signing of
the uncounseled confession does not cure the defect for the investigators were already able to
extract incriminatory statements from accused-appellant. The operative act, it has been stressed,
is when the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has
begun to focus on a particular suspect who has been taken into custody by the police to carry out
a process of interrogation that lends itself to eliciting incriminatory statements, and not the
signing by the suspect of his supposed extrajudicial confession. Thus in People v. de Jesus 9 we
said that admissions obtained during custodial interrogations without the benefit of counsel
although later reduced to writing and signed in the presence of counsel are still flawed under the
Constitution.
What is more, it is highly improbable for CLAO lawyer Melencio Claroz to have fully explained
to the accused who did not even finish Grade One, in less than ten (10) minutes as borne by the
records, the latter's constitutional rights and the consequences of subscribing to an extrajudicial
confession.
While the extrajudicial confession of accused-appellant is so convincing that it mentions details
which could not have been merely concocted, and jibes with the other pieces of evidence
uncovered by the investigators, still we cannot admit it in evidence because of its implicit
constitutional infirmity. Nevertheless, we find other sufficient factual circumstances to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
We give credence to the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Linda Hermoso, Pablo Pakit and
Jenelyn Valle. We believe that Linda Hermoso saw the accused and Mabini in the vicinity of MJ
Furnitures just before the commission of the crime. While Hermoso may have contradicted
herself on some minor incidents, she was straightforward on this specific instance —
Q. You said that you saw Marlo and Puti (Baltazar Mabini) together with Jessie when you were
inside the jeep, is it not?
WITNESS HERMOSO:
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Was this before you went to sleep?
A. Yes, sir. 10
Time and again it has been said that minor inconsistencies do not impair the credibility of
witnesses, more so with witness Hermoso who only reached Grade Two and who as the trial
court noted had difficulty understanding the questions being propounded to her. In fine, in the
absence of evidence to show any reason why prosecution witnesses should falsely testify, it is
fair to conclude that no improper motive exists and that their testimony is worthy of full faith and
credit.
CONSTI II (Sec. 11-13) | 5
We have repeatedly ruled that the guilt of the accused may be established through circumstantial WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court appealed from is AFFIRMED insofar
evidence provided that: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the as it finds accused-appellant MARLO COMPIL y LITABAN guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
inferences are derived are proved; and, (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to robbery with homicide. Consequently, he is sentenced to reclusion perpetua with all the
produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt. 11 And there can be a conviction based on accessory penalties provided by law.
circumstantial evidence when the circumstances proven form an unbroken chain which leads to a
Accused-appellant is also directed to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Manuel Jay in the
fair and reasonable conclusion pinpointing the accused as the perpetrator of the crime. 12
amount of P50,000.00, plus P35,000.00 as actual damages. He is further directed to return to
In the instant case, the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of the accused through the Mary Jay the jewelry worth P30,000.00, and if he can no longer return the jewelry, to pay its
following circumstances: First, accused Marlo Compil and Baltazar Mabini who are both from value.
Samar worked in MJ Furnitures in Sta. Cruz, Manila, and were familiar with the floor plan of the
Costs against accused-appellant.
shop. Second, on the night of the incident, they were seen in front of MJ Furnitures. Third, they
were seen going to the rear of the furniture store. Fourth, robbers forcibly entered MJ SO ORDERED.
Furnitures through the back window on the second floor. Fifth, some two (2) hours after the
commission of the crime, at around two o'clock the following morning, they were in a house in
Bangkal, Makati, dividing between themselves and their five (5) other companions the money
and jewelry taken from Sta. Cruz, Manila. Sixth, they all failed to show up for work the
following day. Seventh, accuses Compil turned ashen, was trembling and speechless when
apprehended in Tayabas, Quezon, for a crime committed in Manila. Certainly these
circumstances as gleaned from the factual findings of the trial court form an unbroken chain
which leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused as one of the perpetrators
of the crime. 13 Hence even disregarding accused-appellant's oral and written confessions, as we
do, still the prosecution was able to show that he was a co-conspirator in the robbery with
homicide.
While it may be true that the arrest, search and seizure were made without the benefit of a
warrant, accused-appellant is now estopped from questioning this defect after failing to move for
the quashing of the information before the trial court. Thus any irregularity attendant to his arrest
was cured when he voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court by entering
a plea of "not guilty" and by participating in the trial. 14
The argument of accused-appellant that the trial court should have convicted the arresting police
officers of arbitrary detention, if not delay in the delivery of detained persons, is misplaced.
Suffice it to say that the law enforcers who arrested him are not being charged and prosecuted in
the case at bench.

Likewise devoid of merit is the contention of accused-appellant that granting that he had
participated in the commission of the crime, he should be considered only as an accomplice.
Disregarding his extrajudicial confession and by reason of his failure to adduce evidence in his
behalf, the Court is left with no other recourse but to consider only the evidence of the
prosecution which shows that the perpetrators of the crime acted in concert. For, direct proof is
not essential to prove conspiracy 15 which may be inferred from the acts of the accused during
and after the commission of the crime which point to a joint purpose, concert of action and
community of interest. 16Thus circumstantial evidence is sufficient to prove conspiracy. 17 And
where conspiracy exists, the act of one is the act of all, and each is to be held in the same degree
of liability as the others. 18

CONSTI II (Sec. 11-13) | 6

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 133026 February 20, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EDWARD ENDINO (at large) and GERRY GALGARIN alias TOTO, accused.
GERRY GALGARIN alias TOTO, accused-appellant.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
YIELDING to man's brutish instinct for revenge, Edward Endino, with the aid of Gerry Galgarin
alias Toto, slew Dennis Aquino in the presence of a lady whose love they once
shared.1âwphi1.nêt
On a busy street in Puerto Princesa City in the evening of 16 October 1991, an emboldened
Gerry Galgarin, uncle of accused Edward Endino, suddenly and without warning lunged at
Dennis and stabbed him repeatedly on the chest. Dennis' girlfriend Clara Agagas who was with
him, stunned by the unexpected attack, pleaded to Galgarin to stop. Dennis struggled and
succeeded momentarily to free himself from his attacker. Dennis dashed towards the
nearby Midtown Sales but his escape was foiled when from out of nowhere Edward Endino
appeared and fired at Dennis. As Dennis staggered for safety, the two (2) assailants fled in the
direction of the airport.
Meanwhile, Dennis, wounded and bleeding, sought refuge inside the Elohim Store where he
collapsed on the floor. He was grasping for breath and near death. Clara with the help of some
onlookers took him to the hospital but Dennis expired even before he could receive medical
attention. According to the autopsy report of Dr. Josephine Goh-Cruz, cause of death was
"cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to hypovolemic shock secondary to a stab wound which
penetrated the heart."1
On 18 October 1991, an Information for the murder of Dennis Aquino was filed against Edward
Endino and accused-appellant Gerry Galgarin and warrants were issued for their arrest.
However, as both accused remained at large, the trial court issued on 26 December 1991 an order
putting the case in the archives without prejudice to its reinstatement upon their apprehension.
On 19 November 1992, Gerry Galgarin was arrested through the combined efforts of the
Antipolo and Palawan police forces at a house in Sitio Sto. Niño, Antipolo, Rizal. He was
immediately taken into temporary custody by the Antipolo Police. Early in the evening of the
following day, he was fetched from the Antipolo Police Station by PO3 Gaudencio Manlavi and
PO3 Edwin Magbanua of the Palawan police force to be taken to Palawan and be tried
accordingly.
On their way to the airport, they stopped at the ABS-CBN television station where accused
Galgarin was interviewed by reporters. Video footages of the interview were taken showing
Galgarin admitting his guilt while pointing to his nephew Edward Endino as the gunman.
According to Galgarin, after attacking Aquino, they left for Roxas, Palawan, where his
sister Langging who is Edward's mother, was waiting. Langging gave them money for their fare
for Manila. They took the boat for Batangas, where they stayed for a few days, and proceeded to
Manila where they separated, with him heading for Antipolo. Galgarin appealed for Edward to
give himself up to the authorities. His interview was shown over the ABS-CBN evening news
program TV Patrol.
The case against accused-appellant Gerry Galgarin was established through the testimony of
Clara Agagas who said that she was with the victim Dennis Aquino standing outside
the Soundlab Recording Studio, a barhouse owned by him, when Galgarin suddenly approached
them and without any prior warning stabbed Dennis. Dennis tried to run away, but Edward, a
spurned lover who harbored ill-feelings towards her and Dennis, shot Dennis. She recognized
Edward and Gerry because the street was sufficiently lighted.2
The testimony of Clara Agagas was corroborated by Anita Leong, next-door neighbor of Dennis,
who testified that a little past six o'clock in the evening of 16 October 1991 Gerry Galgarin
together with a companion went to her house looking for Dennis. She instructed them to proceed
to the Soundlab Recording Studio as Dennis might still be there. But a few minutes later she
heard a Instinctively, she instructed her two (2) young daughters to duck for cover while she
anxiously waited for her seven (7)-year old daughter Josephine who was out of the house for an
errand for her. Soon enough she heard Josephine knocking at their door. She was crying because
she said herKuya Dennis had been shot and stabbed.3
Josephine confirmed her mother's testimony and even said that she had seen Gerry Galgarin stab
her KuyaDennis and she could remember Gerry very well because of the mole below his nose. 4
For his part, accused-appellant Gerry Galgarin disclaimed having taking part in the slaying of
Dennis. Gerry asserted that on 14 October 1991 he was in Antipolo to help his common-law wife
Maria Marasigan give birth to their first born. He stayed with her until the 16th of October when
she was discharged from the Pedragoza Maternity Clinic.5
Clarita Florentino Pedragoza, the midwife who delivered his son, supported the alibi of accused-
appellant. However, she admitted that when she registered the child's birth on 13 December 1993
or more than two (2) years after the delivery, she informed the civil registrar that the child's
father was "unknown."6 His story was also confirmed by Dolores Arciaga and Maria Tomenio,
his co-workers at the Kainan sa Kubo Sing Along Restaurant, who testified that accused-
appellant was fetched by a neighbor from the restaurant in the early afternoon of 14 October with
the news that his wife was having labor pains.7
Accused-appellant disowned the confession which he made over TV Patrol and claimed that it
was induced by the threats of the arresting police officers. He asserted that the videotaped
confession was constitutionally infirmed and inadmissible under the exclusionary rule provided
in Sec.12, Art. III, of the Constitution.8
The trial court however admitted the video footages on the strength of the testimony of the police
officers that no force or compulsion was exerted on accused-appellant and upon a finding that his
confession was made before a group of newsmen that could have dissipated any semblance of
hostility towards him. The court gave credence to the arresting officers' assertion that it was even
accused-appellant who pleaded with them that he be allowed to air his appeal on national
television for Edward to surrender.
CONSTI II (Sec. 11-13) | 7
The alibi of Galgarin was likewise rejected since there was no convincing evidence to support
his allegation that he was not at the locus criminis on the evening of 16 October 1991.
Accordingly, accused-appellant Gerry Galgarin was convicted of murder qualified by
treachery9 and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. Additionally, he was ordered to indemnify the
heirs of Dennis Aquino P50,000.00 as compensatory damages and P72,725.35 as actual
damages. The case against his nephew and co-accused Edward Endino remained in the archives
without prejudice to its reinstatement as soon as he could be arrested.10
In his Appellant's Brief, Gerry Galgarin assails the trial court for rejecting his alibi and admitting
his videotaped confession as evidence against him.
The argument that accused-appellant could not be at the scene of the crime on 16 October 1991
as he was in Antipolo assisting his wife who was giving birth on the 14th of that month, is not
persuasive. Alibi is a weak defense. The testimony of Cornelio Tejero Jr.,11 Philippine Airlines
Load Controller of the Puerto Princesa City, that the name of "Gerry Galgarin" did not appear on
their passenger manifest for the 16 October 1991 Manila-Puerto Princesa flight, could not be
relied upon inasmuch as he himself admitted that they could not be sure of their passengers' real
identities. The testimonies of accused-appellant's co-workers that he was in Antipolo on 14
October 1991 did not fortify his defense either since these witnesses did not categorically state
that they saw him in Antipolo in the evening of 16 October 1991.
With accused-appellant having been positively identified by the prosecution witnesses as the one
who stabbed Dennis, his bare denial proves futile and unavailing. Josephine Leong's
identification of accused-appellant was given in a very categorical and spontaneous manner. Her
confidence as to the attacker's identity was clearly shown by her vivid recollection of him having
a mole below his nose, which is correct. Moreover, it is inconceivable for Josephine and Anita to
implicate accused-appellant, a complete stranger to them, if there was no truth to their assertion.
As for Clara, her naming of accused-appellant as her boyfriend's assailant was not done out of
spite, but was impelled by her desire to seek justice for Dennis.
Corroborating further accused-appellant's guilt, probably with intense incriminating effect, were
his immediate flight after the slaying, and his attempt at jailbreak12 revealing a guilty conscience,
hence, his persistent effort to evade the clutches of the law.
Apropos the court a quo's admission of accused-appellant's videotaped confession, we find such
admission proper. The interview was recorded on video and it showed accused-appellant
unburdening his guilt willingly, openly and publicly in the presence of newsmen. Such
confession does not form part of custodial investigation as it was not given to police officers but
to media men in an attempt to elicit sympathy and forgiveness from the public. Besides, if he had
indeed been forced into confessing, he could have easily sought succor from the newsmen who,
in all likelihood, would have been symphatetic with him. As the trial court stated in its
Decision13 -
Furthermore, accused, in his TV interview (Exh. H), freely admitted that he had stabbed Dennis
Aquino, and that Edward Endino had shot him (Aquino). There is no showing that the interview
of accused was coerced or against his will. Hence, there is basis to accept the truth of his
statements therein.
We agree. However, because of the inherent danger in the use of television as a medium for
admitting one's guilt, and the recurrence of this phenomenon in several cases, 14 it is prudent that
trial courts are reminded that extreme caution must be taken in further admitting similar
confessions. For in all probability, the police, with the connivance of unscrupulous media
practitioners, may attempt to legitimize coerced extrajudicial confessions and place them beyond
the exclusionary rule by having an accused admit an offense on television. Such a situation
would be detrimental to the guaranteed rights of the accused and thus imperil our criminal justice
system.1âwphi1.nêt
We do not suggest that videotaped confessions given before media men by an accused with the
knowledge of and in the presence of police officers are impermissible. Indeed, the line between
proper and invalid police techniques and conduct is a difficult one to draw, particularly in cases
such as this where it is essential to make sharp judgments in determining whether a confession
was given under coercive physical or psychological atmosphere.
A word of counsel then to lower courts: we should never presume that all media confessions
described as voluntary have been freely given. This type of confession always remains suspect
and therefore should be thoroughly examined and scrutinized. Detection of coerced confessions
is admittedly a difficult and arduous task for the courts to make. It requires persistence and
determination in separating polluted confessions from untainted ones. We have a sworn duty to
be vigilant and protective of the rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
With all the evidence tightly ringed around accused-appellant, the question that next presents
itself is whether the trial court correctly denominated the crime as murder qualified by treachery.
Doubtless, the crime committed is one of murder considering that the victim was stabbed while
he was simply standing on the pavement with his girlfriend waiting for a ride, blissfully
oblivious of the accused's criminal design. The suddenness of the assault on an unsuspecting
victim, without the slightest provocation from him who had no opportunity to parry the attack,
certainly qualifies the killing to murder.15
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the court a quo finding accused-appellant GERRY
GALGARIN alias Toto guilty of Murder qualified by Treachery, sentencing him
to reclusion perpetua, and ordering him to indemnify the heirs of Dennis Aquino in the amount
of P50,000.00 as compensatory damages and P72,725.35 as actual damages, isAFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that accused-appellant is further ordered to compensate the decedent's
heirs P50,000.00 as moral damages for their emotional and mental anguish. Costs against
accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
CONSTI II (Sec. 11-13) | 8
EN BANC
G.R. No. 151286 March 31, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
AZCUNA and CATALINO DUEÑAS, JR., appellant.
DECISION
CORONA J.:
Before us on automatic review is the decision,1 dated October 26, 2001, of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Baler, Aurora, Branch 96, in Criminal Case No. 2220 finding the appellant,
Catalino Dueñas, Jr., guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder qualified by evident
premeditation and attended by the aggravating circumstance of recidivism. Appellant was
sentenced to death.
On April 1, 1997, Provincial Prosecutor Charlaw W. Ronquillo filed with the RTC Baler, Aurora
an information charging appellant with the crime of murder:
That at about 8:00 o’clock in the morning on November 29, 1996 at Gabgab Buhangin, Baler,
Aurora and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the said accused who was convicted
of Murder on October 2, 1990, with intent to kill, evident premeditation, treachery and use of an
unlicensed firearm, did then and there, attack, assault and use personal violence upon Elva
Ramos-Jacob, also known as Elving Jacob, by shooting her at the head with a .38 caliber
revolver that caused her death not long thereafter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
Upon arraignment, appellant entered a plea of not guilty.3
The following facts are uncontroverted.
Appellant was a convicted felon for the crime of homicide4 in Criminal Case No. 1414 in the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, Baler, Aurora. He was serving sentence in the Iwahig Prison
Farm, Puerto Princesa City, Palawan, when he escaped from confinement on July 11, 1995.
On November 29, 1996, at around 8:00 a.m., Cesar Friginal was cutting grass in his rice field in
Sitio Gabgab, Brgy. Buhangin, Baler, Aurora, when he heard two gunshots. He instinctively
turned to the direction where he heard the shots and, from about a hundred meters away, saw a
short man wearing green clothes running away. At first, he ignored the occurrence but when he
saw people trooping to the vicinity, he joined the crowd and there saw a dead woman on the
ground. The woman was later identified as his cousin and neighbor, Elva "Ka Elving" Ramos-
Jacob.5
On December 6, 1996, Dr. Nenita S. Hernandez, municipal health officer of Baler, Aurora,
conducted a post mortem examination on the victim. Her autopsy report showed the following:
I - Head:
1. wound, gunshot, entrance, circular in shape about 1 cm. diameter at the right parieto-temporal
area.
2. wound, gunshot, exit, stollate in shape, edges everted about 1.5 cm. diameter with an exposed
brain matter and fractured bone fragment located at the temporal area, right side.
3. wound lacerated about 1.5 cm. long at the right parietal area.
II - Arm:
1. wound lacerated 4 cm. long, lateral aspect, right wrist.
CAUSE OF DEATH:
The most probable cause of death was brain damage and hypovelmic shock due to gunshot
wounds of the brain.6
In a manifestation, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) narrated what it viewed as the
factual antecedents of the case:
On December 18, 1996, appellant tried to enter the house of one Benny Poblete in Brgy.
Buhangin, Baler, Aurora, without permission. Benny and his father Harold Poblete tied
appellant’s hands until the police arrived. Police Officer Noel C. Palmero then apprehended and
detained appellant at the Baler Police Station.
The next day, or on December 19, 1996, appellant sought voluntary confinement for
"safekeeping" because there were threats upon his life brought about by his involvement in the
aforementioned incident of theft against the Pobletes.
Right after his apprehension, appellant intimated to Police Officer Palmero that he has
information regarding the death of Ka Elving. Police Officer Palmero then instructed appellant to
think about it over (sic) first.
Four days after or on December 23, 1996, Police Officer Palmero asked the still detained
appellant if he was ready to divulge the information regarding Ka Elving’s death, to which
appellant answered yes. Appellant was then informed of his constitutional rights, including the
right to secure the services of a lawyer of his own choice. Police Officer Palmero told appellant
that if he cannot afford the services of counsel, he would even be provided with one for free.
By eleven o’clock that same morning, Atty. Josefina S. Angara, upon the police’s invitation,
arrived at the Baler Police Station to talk to appellant. Atty. Angara spoke with appellant in
private for about thirty (30) minutes. Appellant blamed Benny for kicking him and causing him
to suffer chest pains. Atty. Angara asked appellant what really happened. Before long, appellant
admitted that he was commissioned by Benny to kill the victim. Atty. Angara warned him of the
seriousness of his implications but appellant was adamant in confessing to the murder of Ka
Elving. The lawyer-client conference was briefly interrupted by lunchtime. By one-thirty in the
afternoon, however, the inquisition resumed. Between the hours of three thirty and four o’clock
in the afternoon, appellant completed his Sinumpaang Salaysay where he confessed to the killing
of Ka Elving. The statement of appellant was initially written on pad paper, thereafter it was
typewritten. However, by the time the Sinumpaang Salaysay was finalized, it was already past
CONSTI II (Sec. 11-13) | 9
office hours such that the attestation before the municipal mayor was postponed until the
following morning.
Afterwards, because of persistent chest pains, appellant was then brought to the Aurora
Memorial Hospital to be medically examined. However, Police Officer Palmero did not inquire
as to the results of the medical examination. The results of the medical examination were not
offered in evidence.
The following morning, December 24, 1996, appellant, who was escorted by the police, was
brought before the then Municipal Mayor of Baler, Aurora, Arturo S. Angara. Mayor Angara
read the signed Sinumpaang Salaysay before administering the oath. He probed appellant if the
signature appearing in the Sinumpaang Salaysay was his and whether he understood the contents
of the said document. Subsequently, Mayor Angara affixed his signature on
appellant’s Sinumpaang Salaysay.
In substance, the contested Sinumpaang Salaysay states that Benny Poblete commissioned one
Cesar to kill Ka Elving. Cesar, in turn, contacted appellant for the hit. For more than a week,
appellant and Cesar, together with a certain Manny Gonzales, stalked the victim. On November
29, 1996, appellant acted as a lookout while his companions shot the victim.7
On the other hand, appellant testified that, before noon on December 14, 1996, 8 he went to the
house of one Benny Poblete to see his brother-in-law, Erwin Bernardo, who was working for the
Pobletes. Since his brother-in-law was not around, Harold, son of Benny Poblete, invited him to
a drinking spree. While they were drinking, police officers Alfredo Miel and Amoranto Aquino
arrived and arrested him. He was brought to the municipal hall where he was forced to admit the
killing of Elving Jacob. For three consecutive nights, he was mauled. As a result, his eyes
became swollen and his chest ached. Unable to endure the pain any longer, he owned up to the
crime.9
On December 23, 1996, PO3 Noel C. Palmero, in the presence of Atty. Josefina Angara, took
appellant’s statement. Appellant claimed that neither investigating officer Palmero nor Atty.
Josefina Angara apprised him of his constitutional rights during the custodial investigation. The
following day, he was brought to Mayor Arturo Angara before whom he swore to his affidavit
containing his confession.10
Dr. Roberto A. Correa of the Aurora Memorial Hospital testified that he conducted a medical
examination of the appellant at around 2:00 p.m. on December 23, 1996. During the
examination, he found a three-inch lacerated wound on appellant’s right arm and a biositis
tenderness (inflammation of the muscle) in his right scapular area. He further testified that the
lesions were caused by a sharp instrument. Aside from these lesions, Dr. Correo did not notice
any other injuries on the body of the appellant.11
On rebuttal, Atty. Angara belied the accusation of Dueñas. She testified that at past 10:00 a.m.
on December 23, 1996, policemen came to her office and requested her to assist the appellant
who was then under custodial investigation. She arrived at the police station at past 11:00 a.m.
and was introduced to the appellant. During her private conversation with the appellant, she
apprised him of his constitutional rights and told him that whatever he said could be used against
him. She discouraged him from giving his confession but appellant was determined to do so. The
questioning resumed at about 1:30 p.m. and lasted up to 4:00 p.m. While the investigation was
going on, appellant complained of chest pains so she requested that appellant be brought to the
hospital for medical attention.
PO3 Palmero was also presented as rebuttal witness. He disclaimed mauling the appellant. He
admitted that appellant was indeed complaining of chest pains but it was allegedly the result of
the kick by Harold Poblete. In contrast with his previous declaration that he fetched Atty. Angara
at around 3:30 p.m. to assist appellant during the investigation, PO3 Palmero now claimed that
the interrogation lasted about three hours, that is, from 1:00 p.m. up to about 4:00 p.m. on
December 23, 1996. He also declared that appellant was given medical attention after the
interrogation.12
Relying principally on the extrajudicial confession of the appellant on December 23, 1996
(which was later repudiated), the trial court rendered its decision convicting appellant of the
crime charged:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused Catalino Dueñas, Jr. GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of Murder qualified by evident premeditation,
and considering the presence of the aggravating circumstance of recidivism and in the absence of
any mitigating circumstance, hereby sentences him to suffer the extreme penalty of DEATH and
further orders him to indemnify the heirs of the victims in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) as moral damages and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.13
Hence, this automatic appeal.
According to appellant, the extrajudicial confession which the trial court relied on heavily for his
conviction was infirm because the confession was secured through force and intimidation, a
violation of his constitutional rights.
For the State, the OSG filed a manifestation and motion in lieu of appellee’s brief, seeking the
reversal of the challenged decision and the acquittal of Dueñas on the ground of involuntariness
of his extrajudicial confession. The OSG underscored the fact that it was forced out of appellant
by means of threats, violence and intimidation, thus violating his rights.
The appeal is meritorious.
In convicting the appellant, the court a quo reasoned as follows:
The extrajudicial confession of accused Dueñas, Jr. was freely and voluntarily given and that his
retraction and claims of violence and coercion were merely belated contrivances and efforts of
exculpation.
The statement (Exh. B-Stip.) itself reveals that there was compliance with the constitutional
requirement on pre-interrogation advisories, thus:
PASUBALI: Ikaw Catalino Dueñas, Jr., ipinagbibigay alam ko sa iyo, na ikaw ay inuusig sa
isang kasalanan, pinapaalala ko sa iyo na sa ilalim ng ating Saligang Batas ay karapatan mo
ang manahimik at hindi sumagot sa mga tanong ko sa iyo at magkaroon ng Abogado ng sarili
mong pili, ito ba ay nauunawaan mo?
CONSTI II (Sec. 11-13) | 10
SAGOT: Opo. xxx xxx xxx
TANONG: Alam mo ba at naipaliwanag ng iyong abogado na anumang salaysay mo sa The defense tried to impress to the Court that the policemen subjected the accused to cruel and
pagsisiyasat na ito ay maaring gamitin laban sa iyo? painful punishment to extract his confession, thus:

SAGOT: Opo. ATTY. NOVERAS TO THE ACCUSED

The Court finds no merit in the insinuation of the defense that Atty. Josefina Angara was not Q During the third time they mauled you and told you to admit responsibility for the death of
Dueñas’ own choice as counsel for the interrogation (TSN, October 4, 2001, p. 4). Elving Jacob, what happened?
xxx xxx xxx A I already admit (sic) because I could not bear the pain anymore, Sir.
In the present case, accused even admitted that he trusted Atty. Angara when he signed his sworn xxx xxx xxx
statement in the presence of the said counsel (TSN, November 23, 2000, p. 9).
Q What else, if there are any?
Absent any showing that the lawyer who assisted the accused was remissed (sic) in her duties, it
A They could (sic) not allow me to sleep. They just throw water on me so I could not sleep or
can be safely concluded that the custodial investigation of Dueñas was regularly conducted.
rest. (TSN, October 4, 2000, pp. 3-4).
As could be observed, the confession is replete with details that could not have been concocted
But,
by the police authorities. According to Dueñas, he is one of those who killed Elva Jacob; that his
companions were Manny Gonzales and one Cesar; that Benny Poblete contacted Cesar who in Q You said you were forced and intimidated to give the confession in connection with the death
turn contacted him (accused) for the purpose of killing Elving Jacob because his (Benny of Mrs. Jacob, did you tell Atty. Angara about the fact?
Poblete’s) daughter Rhea who died in September, 1996 might still be alive were it not for the
A I did not.
witchcraft of Elving Jacob and her siblings; that he (accused) was contacted by Cesar in
November, 1996 at the market near the terminal of Baliwag Transit in Cabanatuan City; that he Q Why?
and Cesar were together when they went to Baler, Aurora and they just fetched Manny Gonzales
A HOW COULD I TELL THAT WHEN THE POLICE OFFICERS WERE THERE
at the gasoline station in Maria Aurora, Aurora; that they hatched the plan of executing Elving
SURROUNDING ME? (Emphasis ours) (Ibid, p. 6)
Jacob in the middle of November, 1996 at the house of Benny Poblete; that at that place and
time, Cesar was given three thousand pesos (P3,000.00); that he (accused) did not know Cesar xxx xxx xxx
well but could describe the latter’s distinctive features; that Cesar and Manny Gonzales were
PROS. RONQUILLO TO THE ACCUSED
armed with a .38 cal. revolver; that they conducted a surveillance on Elving Jacob for more than
a week to determine her movement in going to and from the ricefield she is working on at Sitio Q Did you file any charge to (sic) the policemen who mauled you?
Gabgab, Brgy. Buhangin, Baler, Aurora; that on November 29, 1996, at about eight o’clock in
A No, sir.
the morning, they positioned themselves under a canal, feigning to be catching fish, until Elving
Jacob passed by; that his two companions followed Elving Jacob, while he remained on top of Q Why?
the canal and acted as a look out; that, not long thereafter, he heard two gunshots; that they left
A BECAUSE I HAVE NO ONE TO TELL ON AND I AM AFRAID FOR THEM,
the scene and reunited at Santiago’s house in Brgy. Suklayin, Baler, Aurora; that on December
SIR (sic). (TSN, November 23, 2000, p. 11)
18, 1996, at around one o’clock in the afternoon, he was instructed by Cesar to go to the house of
Benny Poblete to collect the balance of five thousand pesos (P5,000.00); and that he was arrested A review of appellant’s extrajudicial confession discloses certain facts and circumstances which
there by the police. "The confession is replete with details that only the confessant could have put his culpability in doubt.
known and which, therefore, show that the confession was executed voluntarily (People vs.
Under Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution, persons under custodial investigation
Jimenez, 105 SCRA 721)."
have the following rights:
Also, the confession of the accused is exonerative in nature as it points to other member of the
(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be
group as the triggerman. "The exculpatory tone of admission of the crime and the abundance of
informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel, preferably
details negate violence and maltreatment in obtaining a confession. A guilty person seldom
of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with
admits his guilt fully and completely. He has a tendency to explain away his conduct or
one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
minimize his fault or crime or shift the blame to others."

CONSTI II (Sec. 11-13) | 11

(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiate the free will
shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar
forms of detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him.
(4) x x x xxx xxx
There are two kinds of involuntary or coerced confessions covered by this constitutional
provision: (1) those resulting from third degree methods like torture, force, violence, threat and
intimidation, and (2) those given without the benefit of the Miranda warnings. 14
Viewed against this backdrop, certain circumstances in this case need to be carefully reviewed
and considered.
On December 18, 1996,15 appellant was arrested for theft on the request of a certain Benny
Poblete. PO3 Palmero admitted that at the time of the arrest, appellant was not committing any
crime. He was detained overnight without any charges. The following day, PO3 Palmero claimed
that appellant supposedly sought "voluntary confinement for his own protection." The police
blotter entry, however, was not offered in evidence. Only a certification of such entry was
presented, which certification was not even signed by appellant. Under the circumstances, the
"voluntary confinement" tale appears to be an afterthought to cover up the appellant’s illegal
arrest and detention. No person in his right mind, already behind bars, will still seek "voluntary
confinement" when there are no charges against him.
Appellant executed his sworn statement on his alleged involvement in the killing of Ka Elving
on December 23, 1996 or five days after his arrest. Immediately after accomplishing the
affidavit, appellant sought medical attention, during which Dr. Correa found positive marks of
violence on the latter’s body, an indication that physical coercion occurred at one point from the
time of his arrest up to the execution of his extrajudicial confession. The only purpose of the
maltreatment could have been to force him to admit guilt against his will. When confronted on
this matter, rebuttal witness PO3 Palmero had nothing but evasive and unresponsive answers:
Q Did you personally bring Dueñas to the hospital?
A I could not remember, anymore, Sir. But he was brought to the hospital.
Q Are you sure of that?
A Yes, sir.
Q If you could not remember anymore if you were the one who bring (sic) him to the hospital, do
you know who was the police officer who brought him?
A I do not know the jailer at the time.
Q Were you still in the police station when he was brought back?
A Maybe I was not there.
Q Did you try to inquire what was the result of the examination being conducted upon Catalino
Dueñas?
A Not anymore, sir.
Q Why?
A Because I could not remember anymore the person who accompanied him. 16
The trial court considered appellant’s claim of maltreatment as but a lame excuse. It stated that
the failure of the accused to complain to the swearing officer or to file charges against the
person(s) who allegedly maltreated him, although he had the opportunity to do so, meant that the
confession was voluntary. But appellant adequately explained why he did not tell anybody about
the police brutality he had suffered. He testified:
Q You said you were forced and intimidated to give the confession in connection with the death
of Mrs. Jacob, did you tell Atty. Angara about that fact?
A I did not.
Q Why?
A How could I tell that when the police officers were there surrounding me. 17
On cross-examination, appellant made the following declaration:
PROS. RONQUILLO
Q Did you file any charge to (sic) the policemen who mauled you?
A No, sir.
Q Why?
A Because I have no one to tell on and I am afraid for them, sir. (sic)18
Furthermore, the trial court misapplied the rule that a confession is presumed voluntary where
the same contains details and facts unknown to the investigator which could have been supplied
only by the perpetrator of the crime. In People vs. Abayon,19 we held:
It is a settled rule that where an alleged confession contains details and is replete with facts
which could have possibly been supplied only by the perpetrator of the crime, and could not have
been known to or invented by the investigators, the confession is considered to have been
voluntarily given. This rule, however, was erroneously applied by the trial court in the case at
bar.
The facts and details contained in at least three of the confessions, those of Reynaldo Abayon,
Mariano Aragon and Jose Juarez, were already known to the PC investigators at the time the
statements were allegedly signed by the said accused-appellants. The three confessions referred
to all appear to have been executed after the body of the deceased Pedro Eslamado had been
exhumed by the PC team on July 15, 1971. Abayon's statement is dated July 16, Aragon's
statement, July 22, and Juarez' statement, July 23, 1971. On those dates, the PC would have
known details and facts such as, that Pedro Eslamado was abducted and killed, where his
CONSTI II (Sec. 11-13) | 12
remains were buried, that he was tied around the mouth by towels, that his hands were tied with
shoe strings, all of which were stated in the confessions.
In this case, the police authorities already knew of the murder of Ka Elving. As succinctly
pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General:
xxx at the time of the execution of the extrajudicial confession, and even before appellant’s
arrest, the post mortem examination was already available to the police. Data regarding the
murder weapon, the wounds sustained by the victim, the whereabouts of the cadaver were
properly within the knowledge of the investigating officers. The latter, then, could have easily
filled up the details of the crime in the extrajudicial confession. It must be emphasized that the
presumption of voluntariness of an extrajudicial confession arises only when the replete details
could have been supplied by no other person but the perpetrator himself [People vs. Base, 105
SCRA 721 (1981)], which is not the case here.
Also worth mentioning is the belated appearance of Atty. Angara, incidentally not of appellant’s
choice, who assisted him in the execution of his extrajudicial confession. This fell terribly short
of the standards demanded by the Constitution and Section 2 of RA 7438. 20 Appellant was
arrested before noon on December 18, 1996. The extrajudicial confession was taken five days
later, on December 23, 1996. Atty. Angara testified that policemen came to her office at past
10:00 a.m. on December 23, 1996 requesting her to assist a suspect under custodial investigation.
She arrived at the police station at around 11:00 a.m. and conferred with the appellant for about
30 minutes. The interrogation resumed after lunch and lasted till 4:00 p.m.
From the foregoing, it is evident that appellant had already been in detention for five days before
he came to be assisted by a lawyer, just before he was about to put his confession in writing. We
entertain no doubt that the constitutional requirement was violated. In People vs. Bolanos,21 we
held that:
Well-settled is the doctrine that the purpose of providing counsel to a person under custodial
investigation is to curb the uncivilized practice of extracting a confession, even through the
slightest coercion which might lead the accused to admit something untrue. 23 What is sought to
be avoided is the "evil of extorting from the very mouth of the person undergoing interrogation
for the commission of an offense, the very evidence with which to prosecute and thereafter
convict him."24 These constitutional guarantees are meant to protect a person from the inherently
coercive psychological, if not physical, atmosphere of such investigation. 25
Finally, the court notes the material discrepancy between the testimony of PO3 Palmero and that
of Atty. Angara. When PO3 Palmero was first put on the witness stand, he testified that he
fetched Atty. Angara to assist appellant at about 3:30 p.m. on December 23, 1996. The
interrogation lasted more or less an hour. However, on rebuttal, PO3 Palmero changed his story
and declared that the interrogation of appellant lasted about three hours from about 1:00 p.m. to
4:00 p.m. The adjustment in the time cited may have been made to conform to the earlier
testimony of rebuttal witness Atty. Angara who said that the interrogation of appellant lasted
from about 1:30 p.m. up to about 4:00 p.m. But how could the interrogation of appellant have
taken place within that time-frame when, according to Dr. Correo and the appellant’s medical
record, the doctor conducted his medical examination of the appellant at around 2:00 p.m. on
December 23, 1996?26
In view of the foregoing, since the extrajudicial confession of appellant was given in violation of
the safeguards in Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution, we hold that the appellant’s
extrajudicial confession dated December 23, 1996 was inadmissible as evidence. And with the
exclusion thereof, the record is bereft of any substantial evidence to sustain the judgment of
conviction. While it is true that one Cesar Friginal was presented as a witness by the prosecution,
his testimony did not implicate the appellant in the murder of Elving Jacob, the witness having
said only that he saw a short man in green clothes running away from the vicinity of the crime.

An accused who is on board the police vehicle on the way to the police station is already under WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Baler, Aurora, Branch 96, in
custodial investigation and should therefore be accorded his rights under the Constitution. Criminal Case No. 2220, convicting appellant Catalino Dueñas, Jr., is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant is ACQUITTED of the crime of murder and
Custodial investigation refers to the critical pre-trial stage when the investigation ceases to be a
his immediate release is ordered unless there is reason to return him for confinement at the
general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular person as a suspect.
Iwahig Prison Farm in Puerto Princesa City or to detain him for some other valid cause. The
According to PO3 Palmero, right after appellant’s arrest, the latter already insinuated to him that
Director of Prisons is directed to inform this Court of his compliance within ten days from
he would confess his participation in the killing. As he testified on cross-examination:
receipt of this decision.
Q On December 18, 1996, when you arrested him what did he actually told (sic) you?
No costs.
A Before we put him in jail at the Baler Police Station he told us that he has (sic) to reveal
SO ORDERED.
something about the death of Elvira Jacob.
Q So you already know that on December 18, 1996 that whatever Catalino Dueñas will reveal to
you will give you lead in solving the investigation in connection with the death of Elvira Jacob,
isn’t it?
A Yes, sir.

Q So, you still waited until December 23, 1996 for that revelation, isn’t it?
A Yes, sir. That’s all, your honor.22
CONSTI II (Sec. 11-13) | 13
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 112035 January 16, 1998
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PANFILO CABILES alias "NONOY", accused-appellant.
MELO, J.:
Accused-appellant, Panfilo Cabiles, alias Nonoy, seeks the reversal of the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region (Branch 124, Kalookan City),
finding him guilty of the crime of Robbery with Rape, as follows:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Court finds the accused Panfilo
Cabiles aliasNonoy guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Robbery with Rape as charged and
hereby sentences him to suffer imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua in accordance with
Paragraph 2 of Art. 294 of the Revised Penal Code; to indemnify the victim Luzviminda Aquino
in the amount of P30,000.00 as consequential damages. Said accused is also ordered to return to
Marites Nas Atienza the stolen Seiko Wrist watch worth P1,500.00 and one gold ring worth
P500.00 and if unable to do so, to pay said victim the corresponding prices of these articles as
shown above; to reimburse Marites Nas Atienza the amount of P1,000.00 in cash and to pay the
costs.
The accused shall be entitled to the full period of his preventive imprisonment, pursuant to Art.
29 of the Revised Penal Code provided with the conditions enumerated thereon have been
complied with.
SO ORDERED.
(pp. 86-87, Rollo.)
Through an Amended Information, accused-appellant, together with the additional accused, was
charged as follows:
That on or about the 5th day of November 1989, in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused by means of force and violence,
with intent of gain, conspiring together and mutually helping one another, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, rob, and carry away one (1) gold ring worth P500.00,
one (1) ladies seiko watch worth P1,500.00, cash money worth P1,000.00, one (1) bracelet worth
P500.00 and wristwatch (Channel) worth P800.00 belonging to one Marites Nas Atienza, to the
latter's damage and prejudice, and by reason or on occasion of said robbery, with the use of a
deadly weapon, and lewd designs, had carnal knowledge of one LUZVIMINDA AQUINO Y
AREVALO, and then attacked, assaulted and stabbed one ARNEL CERICOS Y MICIANO with
the same weapon, thereby inflicting upon the latter serious physical injuries.
(p. 7, Rollo.)
Accused-appellant's co-accused, Jaime Mabingnay, was neither apprehended nor arraigned,
whereas accused-appellant was arraigned on both original and amended informations. After trial,
following the entry of a not guilty plea, the above-quoted verdict was rendered. Hence, the
instant appeal.
As deduced from the prosecution's evidence which came primarily from the testimony of Marites
Nas Atienza and Luzviminda Aquino, the inculpatory facts are as follows:
Marites Nas Atienza, a housewife whose husband was abroad, was residing at No. 224
Malambing St., Amparo Subdivision, Kalookan City. On the eve of November 5, 1989, she was
asleep with her 1 1/2-year old daughter, Erica Dianne Atienza, inside her room at her house.
Approximately two steps away from her bed, Luzviminda Aquino, Marites' housemaid, was
sleeping on a sofa. The house has an area of about 29 square meters. The main door is located at
the kitchen. In the kitchen, there is a stairway leading to a store. To the left of the house is the
bedroom where the three were asleep. The place was illuminated by the light coming from a 25-
watt electrical bulb which was outside the room's window (tsn, March 5, 1990, p. 6; tsn, April 5,
1990, pp. 20-24, 28; tsn, April 26, 1990, pp. 4, 6, 8, 10, 17).
At around 1:15 o'clock on the morning of November 5, 1989, a man suddenly barged into the
house of Marites by destroying the kitchen door and removing the lawanit wall thereof, thus
enabling him to reach the lock inside. The man suddenly poked a 6-inch kitchen knife on the
right side of Marites' neck. This awakened her. She was told not to shout, otherwise she would
be killed. Then the man placed masking tape on her mouth and ordered her to bring out her
money and jewelry. At the point of the knife, Marites, while carrying her baby, went to the
cabinet outside the room, took cash amounting to P1,000.00, a Seiko watch worth P1,500.00, a
lady's wristwatch with the trademark "Chanel" (also referred to in the records as "Channel")
worth P850.00, a bracelet worth P500.00, and a ring worth P500.00, and gave them to the man.
Afterwards, they went back inside the bedroom and Marites sat on her bed, still cuddling her
baby (tsn, March 5, 1990, pp. 7-8, 11-12, 40; tsn, April 5, 1990, pp. 19, 30, 31). Marites later
identified the man as accused-appellant.
Meanwhile, Luzviminda was awakened by the crying of Marites' baby. When she was about to
shout, the man poked the knife on her left side, causing her an injury. The man then told her,
"Huwag kang sisigaw kundi papatayin kita." Meanwhile, Marites sat on the bed, trembling with
fear, as she cuddled her baby. The man also placed masking tape on Luzviminda's mouth.
Thereafter, he forcibly held both of her arms in front of her. Notwithstanding her struggle to hide
her hands at her back, accused-appellant succeeded in tying her hands at the front with the use of
a piece of shoestring (tsn, March 5, 1990, pp. 9-10, 16; tsn, April 5, 1990, pp. 34-35; tsn, April
26, 1990, pp. 6-9, 27, 34, 44). Luzviminda likewise later identified the man as accused-appellant.
The man then went to the store which was only about 4 to 5 steps away from Marites' bed. He
ransacked the same in search for more valuables. Thereafter, he took a bottle of beer from the
refrigerator and began drinking. Afterwards, he returned to the room and sat beside Luzviminda
(tsn, March 5, 1990, p. 10; tsn, April 5, 1990, p. 25).
While the man continued to hold the knife, he tapped Luzviminda's thigh. When he was about to
consume the beer, he started removing Luzviminda's pants and underwear while still holding the
knife with his right hand. The man then rolled down his short pants to his thighs. He poked the
knife on Luzviminda's right side and despite the latter's resistance, he succeeded in inserting his
sexual organ into Luzviminda's private parts after forcibly lying on top of her. Luzviminda
CONSTI II (Sec. 11-13) | 14
struggled and kicked, accidentally hitting with her right foot the knife thus causing her injury.
All the while, Marites was still cuddling her daughter, as she sat on her bed in extreme fear. She
was witnessing Luzviminda being raped by the man. While on top of Luzviminda and
continuously doing the sexual act, the man uttered: "Isusunod ko ang Ate mo pagkatapos ko sa
iyo." Upon hearing those words, Marites tried to escape by asking permission to prepare milk for
her baby (tsn, March 5, 1990, pp. 11-14, 16-17; tsn, April 5, 1990, pp. 36, 38, 40, 42; tsn, April
26, 1990, pp. 10-11, 13-14, 27).
While carrying her child, Marites was able to run to the house of her neighbor, Arnel Cericos,
from whom she asked for help. Ceriro's house was approximately twelve steps away from
Marites' house. Marites decided to hide at Ceriro's house. When Cericos entered the room, the
man was still on top of Luzviminda. However, upon seeing Cericos, the man stood up right away
and stabbed Cericos four times. Afterwards, they chased each other outside the house.
Meanwhile Luzviminda put on her pants and ran toward Cericos' house (tsn, March 5, 1990, pp.
18-19; tsn, April 26, 1990, pp. 15, 18).
When Marites learned that Cericos was injured, she rushed back to her house to administer first
aid to him. Cericos sustained a stab wound on his chest, two stab wounds on his left arm, and a
stab wound on his right arm. Cericos then complained of difficulty in breathing. Consequently,
Marites brought him to a physician, one Col. Javier, for treatment. When Cerico's complaints
continued, Marites decided to bring him to the V. Luna Hospital in Quezon City at about 4
o'clock that morning (tsn, March 5, 1990, pp. 19-22).
Attending physician Dr. Emmanuel Quedding noted that Cericos sustained four stab wounds of
different sizes, the most serious of which was the lacerated wound on the interior chest which
required Cericos to be placed under observation for 8 to 12 hours. Dr. Quedding found that the
wounds, if deep enough, could result in the laceration of the lung, heart, and some arteries and
consequently, the victim's death. After advising Cericos not to work for about one week or more,
he was permitted to leave the hospital at about 1 o'clock that afternoon (tsn, April 5, 1990, pp. 4-
5, 10, 12).
For her part, Luzviminda, at 9 o'clock that morning, went to the Kalookan Police Department
and reported what happened to her. On November 6, 1989, upon referral by the chief of the
Northern Police District, Kalookan City, Luzviminda subjected herself to a physical examination
conducted by Dr. Carmelita Belgica, a medico-legal officer. Resultantly, Dr. Belgica found on
Luzviminda's right foot "a laceration, healing, measuring 3.5 cm. with scab formation and
peripheral edema at the medine melcolus, right side . . ." Her genital examination results showed
an old healed laceration indicative of sexual intercourse possibly occurring three months before
the date of examination. Dr. Belgica expounded that although the physical examination results
manifested that the occurrence of sexual intercourse three months before could have caused the
laceration, she did not discount the possibility that sexual intercourse also took place on
November 5, 1989 without any injury at the genital area, as it "cannot be consulted medically
because the opening is wide enough" (tsn, January 10, 1990, pp. 3-6, 8-10).
Later, on November 8, 1989, at about 1:40 o'clock in the afternoon, Corporal Luciano Cañeda
and Pcf. Manuel Rodriguez of the Kalookan City Police Station, along with Romeo Nas, brother
of Marites, went to a sash factory warehouse at the Marivic Compound, Kalookan City. Outside
the factory edifice, they saw accused-appellant sleeping on a bench. Romeo Nas saw that
accused-appellant was wearing a bracelet which the former recognized as the bracelet taken from
Marites. Upon being awakened, accused-appellant, told the three men that the other things he
took from Marites were inside a plastic bag at the factory building. Consequently, Pcf. Rodriguez
went inside the building to get the plastic bag and it was found to contain a woman's undershirt, a
light blue shirt, and a wristwatch with the brand name "Chanel" which was the one taken from
Marites (tsn, April 10, 1990, pp. 4-5, 7-8, 11, 14, 16, 25).
The following day, November 9, 1989, at about 3:30 o'clock in the afternoon, Marites saw
accused-appellant at the Kalookan City Police Station. The latter admitted his guilt and pointed
to Jaime Mabingnay, Marites' brother-in-law, as the one who asked him to commit the crime.
Marites further recalled that she saw accused-appellant at Mabingnay's house on November 5,
1989, before the crime took place (tsn, March 5, 1990, p. 30; tsn, April 10, 1990, pp. 33-36).
Accused-appellant, on the other hand, relied and banked on denial and alibi.
Accused-appellant denied even having gone to Amparo Village, Kalookan City. He denied
having raped Luzviminda Aquino. He said that the first time he ever saw Marites was at the
Kalookan City Police Station on November 9, 1989. He said the same thing about Luzviminda
(tsn, August 23, 1990, pp. 4-6).
Regarding the day of the incidence, accused-appellant testified that on November 5, 1989, at
1:30 o'clock in the morning, he was at Marivic Subdivision, sleeping with his wife. He had been
residing at the Marivic compound starting October 30, 1989 as he was designated by the owner
of the place to watch over the premises (tsn, August 23, 1990, p. 4).
As to accused-appellant's arrest which took place on November 8, 1989 at around 1 o'clock in the
afternoon, he testified that he was lying on a bench at the Marivic Compound when three men in
civilian clothes arrived. He did not know the reason for his arrest. He, however, admitted that a
"Chanel" lady's watch was recovered from him at the time of the arrest but insisted that he owns
the watch, the same having been pledged to him by his cousin Elizabeth Abantao when he was
still at Wright, Samar, and which was later sold to him. He denied that a plastic bag with stolen
contents was recovered from him by his captors. He said he only saw the contents of the bag
when he was under detention at the Kalookan City Jail. As regards his sworn statement
containing a confession to the commission of the crime, he said he was forced by the policemen
at the station to execute the same. He did not read it and was just forced to sign it. He was not
assisted by counsel during that time (tsn, August 23, 1990, pp. 6-9).
Accused-appellant's version of the event was corroborated by: (a) his wife Soledad Cabiles who
testified that she slept with accused-appellant at Marivic Subdivision in the evening of
November 4, 1989; (b) Conrado Bacoy, Sr., owner of the woodcarving factory watched over by
accused-appellant, who testified that accused-appellant and his wife were allowed to sleep within
the factory premises; and (c) Melchor Mabini who aside from supporting accused-appellant's
alibi, also said that accused-appellant's captors did not have a warrant when they made the arrest.
The trial court found no merit in accused-appellant's defense. It found that his identity was well
established, based on the testimony of Marites and Luzviminda who were adjudged as credible
witnesses. From the testimony of said witnesses, the trial court likewise observed that: (1) at the
CONSTI II (Sec. 11-13) | 15
time of accused-appellant's arrest, he was wearing a bracelet which was said to be owned by
Marites; (2) that a shoestring was found inside the plastic bag which accused-appellant stated as
his own when he led the arresting officers to the factory compound at Marivic, Baesa, Kalookan
City; and (3) that said shoestring was the one used by accused-appellant in tying Luzviminda's
hands before she was raped. The trial court likewise noted accused-appellant's confession before
Marites and in the presence of Amy Maliwanag, a council woman of Amparo Subdivision and
Linda Pilahan, that accused-appellant's robbed and raped Luzviminda, and that Jaime Mabingnay
instructed him to do so, to cause the blindness of Marites, and to kill her. Mabingnay was said to
have promised to help accused-appellant to get a job abroad and to help the latter financially.
However, accused-appellant took pity on Marites' child.
As regards the crime of serious physical injuries, which, as charged in the Amended Information,
was allegedly committed by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the trial court found that the
evidence is insufficient to prove the commission of the same or any of the physical injuries
penalized in Subdivision 1 of Art. 263 of the Revised Penal Code.
We affirm the trial court's decision.
Accused-appellant argues as his sole assignment of error that the trial court erred in finding him
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. He stresses the following arguments, to
wit: (1) that the medico-legal officer said several times that the sexual intercourse occurred three
months before the incident complained of; (2) that verbal admissions are inadmissible against the
accused; (3) that the bracelet and the "Chanel" watch and even the "improbable" shoestring were
the products of a poisonous tree, not having been the fruits of a lawful warrantless arrest; and (4)
that his identification based on his built and voice is not an effective one.
We shall first discuss the procedural matters and circumstances surrounding the charge.
Accused-appellant, corroborated by defense witness Melchor Mabini, contends that his arrest
was an alleged warrantless one. However, such irregularity was only raised during trial. In regard
to this delay, this Court has consistently ruled that any objection involving a warrant of arrest or
procedure in the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be
made before he enters his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed waived (People v. Lopez, Jr.,
245 SCRA 95 [1995]; People vs. Rivera, 245 SCRA 421 [1995]). Verily, the illegal arrest of an
accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient
complaint after trial free from error; such arrest does not negate the validity of the conviction of
the accused (People vs. Manzano, 248 SCRA 239 [1995]). And it is much too late in the day to
complain about the warrantless arrest after a valid information had been filed and the accused
arraigned and trial commenced and completed and a judgment of conviction rendered against
him (People vs. Llanaresas, 248 SCRA 629 [1995]).
As regards the evidentiary weight of accused-appellant's sworn statement wherein he confessed
to the crime charged, and his verbal confession made before robbery victim, Marites Nas
Atienza, we rule against the validity of the written confession but uphold the admissibility of the
verbal confession.
In People vs. Deniega, 251 SCRA 626 [1995], we laid down the four fundamental requirements
needed for admissibility of a confession, to wit: (1) the confession must be voluntary; (2) the
confession must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (3) the
confession must be express; and (4) the confession must be in writing.
Accused-appellant testified that he was forced to execute the sworn statement containing his
confession (tsn, August 23, 1990, p. 9). Although this assertion is uncorroborated, accused-
appellant's free will and volition in signing his confession will not cure the defect that it was
made without assistance of counsel. An admission made without the assistance of counsel during
custodial investigation is inadmissible in evidence. (People vs. Cascalla, 240 SCRA 482 [1995]).
Even if the confession of an accused speaks the truth, if it was made without the assistance of
counsel, it is inadmissible in evidence regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it had been
voluntarily given (People vs. Agustin, 240 SCRA 541 [1995]). An uncounselled extrajudicial
confession without a valid waiver of the right to counsel — that is, in writing and in the presence
of counsel — is inadmissible in evidence (People vs. Cabintoy, 241 SCRA 442 [1995]).
In contrast, accused-appellant's verbal confession before Marites Nas Atienza is, however,
admissible in evidence. The case in point is People vs. Andan (G.R. No. 116437, March 3, 1997)
where we ruled that the accused's verbal confession made in a private meeting with the
municipal mayor, spontaneously, fully and voluntarily done, is admissible in evidence since it is
not covered by the requirements of Section 12(1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. When
said accused talked with the mayor as a confidant and not as a law enforcement officer, his
uncounselled confession did not violate his constitutional rights. Constitutional procedures on
custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning
by the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby the accused orally admitted having
committed the crime — as in the case at bar.
In any event, we agree with the prosecution's contention that accused-appellant's conviction was
deduced not on the basis of his admission of guilt, but on the trial court's assessment of the
evidence presented before it.
We find no reason to disturb the trial court's finding as to the credibility of prosecution witnesses
Marites Nas Atienza and Luzviminda Aquino, the victims of robbery and rape, respectively. The
time-tested jurisprudence is that the findings and conclusions of the trial court on the credibility
of witnesses enjoy a badge of respect for the reason that trial courts have the advantage of
observing the demeanor of witnesses as they testify (People vs. Gamiao, 240 SCRA 254 [1995];
People vs. Ramos, 240 SCRA 191 [1995]; People vs. Cajambab, 240 SCRA 643 [1995]; People
vs. Moran, 241 SCRA 709 [1995]). A perusal of the testimony of both witnesses convinces us
even more that there is no strong and cogent reason to disregard the trial court's findings.
We agree that the identity of accused-appellant was sufficiently established through the
following circumstances:
1. The room where the crime was committed covered a very small area of 29 square meters (tsn,
April 5, 1990, p. 24). It was illuminated by a lighted electric bulb outside the jalousie window of
said room (tsn, April 26, 1990, p. 17). The victims could have easily noticed the physical
features of their assailant, who was later identified as accused-appellant.
2. Two witnesses (Marites Nas Atienza and Corporal Luciano Cañeda) testified that at the time
of accused-appellant's arrest, he was wearing a bracelet (Exh. "F") which Marites recognized as
CONSTI II (Sec. 11-13) | 16
the one she surrendered to accused-appellant during the robbery on November 5, 1989 (tsn, A. She was standing at the door of Jaime's house and I was behind her.
March 5, 1990, p. 35). Marites' identification of accused-appellant is corroborated by Luzviminda's identification of
accused-appellant as her rapist, as follows:
In this light, we are swayed by Marites' spontaneous and straightforward testimony on how she
Q. Aside from that admission, what other basis have you to say that the accused was that person
recognized the culprit, to wit:
if there is still any?
Q Now, what was your basis in saying that it was the accused who was the one who poked a ATTY. ILAGAN:
kitchen knife on you? I object, your Honor, because there is no basis and after the witness answered that the only sign
A His height, his built, especially his voice, were my basis, sir, in saying that he was the person she knows of the accused is when at the police headquarters he admitted before De Leon to have
who poked the knife on me. allegedly sexually played on her, so I object.
Q What is so particular in his voice that you know that it was the voice of the accused in this FISCAL SISON:
case? If she has other basis, your Honor, aside from that admission he made.
ATTY. CHAVEZ: COURT:
The question has already been answered, your Honor, his height, his built and his voice are the Witness may answer.
basis for her knowing accused Panfilo Cabiles. WITNESS (A):
COURT: His voice and his built, sir.
Witness may answer. FISCAL SISON (Q):
WITNESS: You mentioned about his built, when he had sexual intercourse with you that was you said at
A. Because I have seen him once and I heard his voice when he went to the house of my brother- about 1:15 in the morning, how come you were able to see the built of the accused at that time?
in-law, Jaime Mabingnay, on the last week of October, 1989. A: Because the light coming inside thru the jalousie window illuminates the inside of the room,
FISCAL SISON: sir.
Q When you said Jaime Mabingnay, he is one of the accused in this case? (tsn, April 26, 1990, pp. 16-17)
A Yes, sir. Q: What awakened you?
Q Now, tell us how far is that house of Jaime Mabingnay to your house? A: Because the baby of Ate Tes was crying and that awakened me, sir, and when I opened my
A. About six (6) steps away from our house, sir. eyes I saw that there was somebody standing.
Q. And when you heard the voice of Panfilo Cabiles, what were they doing then inside the house Q: And that person that you saw standing was facing his back to you, correct?
of Jaime Mabingnay? A: No, sir. He was facing my direction.
A They were having a drinking spree in the sala of the house of Jaime Mabingnay which is just Q: So this person you said was facing in your direction was between you and your Ate Marites,
in front of the door of my house, sir. is that what you want us to understand?
Q When you saw them drinking, what time was that? A: Yes, sir.
A Around 8:00 o'clock in the evening, sir. (tsn, April 26, 1990, p. 34.)
Q And up to what time did you see him inside the house of Jaime Mabingnay?
3. Aside from the bracelet, the arresting officers found a "Chanel" lady's wristwatch (Exh. "G")
A I saw him there for about an hour and I don't know whether or not he slept there.
which Marites likewise recognized as another of the objects taken by accused-appellant during
Q Before last week of October, have you seen him?
the robbery. Accused-appellant's assertion that said watch is his own is not persuasive. Aside
ATTY. CHAVEZ:
from the fact that his testimony is not corroborated, we likewise make the practical observation
We object to the question on the basis of, first, there is no basis; second, the Fiscal interpreting in
that "Chanel" is not an ordinary watch brand. It would be too much of a coincidence that a watch
Tagalog gives an advance sign for an answer to the witness, your Honor.
of the same not very ordinary brand as that involved in the robbery subject hereof was pledged to
FISCAL SISON:
accused-appellant.
Q So that at the time in October, that was the first time you saw the accused in this case, I am
referring to Panfilo Cabiles? The trial court correctly cited the evidentiary presumption that a person found in possession of a
A Yes, sir. thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and doer of the whole act (Sec. 3[7],
Q Have you heard what he said? Rule 131, Revised Rules of Evidence). In People vs. Newman (163 SCRA 496 [1988]), we ruled
A No, sir. But I heard his voice when he greeted my sister Imelda Nas. that where the accused offers no satisfactory explanation as to the fact of his possession of stolen
Q When he greeted your sister Imelda Nas, where was he? properties, such evidence would abundantly incriminate him and proves that he took them
A He was there sitting at the sala while he was drinking with Jaime Mabingnay. with animus lucrandi. In the case at bench, all that accused-appellant could offer as defense was
Q Where was your sister at that time? denial which is a weak defense. The defense of denial, if uncorroborated by clear and convincing
CONSTI II (Sec. 11-13) | 17
proof, is considered self-serving evidence undeserving of any weight in law (People vs. Macario, having been established through the testimony of Marites Nas Atienza, including the P1,000.00
240 SCRA 531 [1995]). awarded for costs.
Accused-appellant strongly relies on the finding of NBI Medico-Legal Officer, Carmelita WHEREFORE, finding the conviction of accused-appellant justified by the evidence on record,
Belgica, that upon physical examination of the rape victim, it was found that the hymenal the assailed decision is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification above-stated.
lacerations took place three months before the date of examination, to rule out his commission of
SO ORDERED.
the crime of rape. We are not persuaded.
Any prior sexual intercourse which could have resulted in hymenal laceration is irrelevant in
rape cases for virginity is not an element of rape (People vs. Delovino, 247 SCRA 519 [1995]).
Hence, it is of no moment that there is a finding that sexual intercourse occurred three months
earlier than November 5, 1989. Too, the rape could have been so slight as to leave no traces upon
examination, for complete penetration of the female organ is not necessary to constitute rape
(People vs. Soan, 243 SCRA 622). The mere penetration of the penis by entry thereof into
the labia majora of the female organ suffices to warrant a conviction for rape (People vs.
Sanchez, 250 SCRA 14 [1995]). The following circumstances are significant:

1. Luzviminda testified that she was raped by accused-appellant. No young Filipina would
publicly admit that she had been criminally abused and ravished unless that is the truth, as it is
her natural instinct to protect her honor. (People vs. Delovino, supra; People vs. Namayon, 246
SCRA 646 [1995]; People vs. Rivera, 242 SCRA 26 [1995]).
2. Luzviminda's testimony is corroborated by that of Marites who herself witnessed the rape (tsn,
March 5, 1990, p. 16).

3. The shoestring that was found inside the plastic bag is also an indication of accused-
appellant's commission of the crime of rape. Luzviminda identified said shoestring as that which
was used on her to effect the crime of rape.
Lastly, accused-appellant's defense of denial and alibi must fail considering that he was
positively identified by Marites and Luzviminda as the author of the crime. We have consistently
ruled that alibi, like denial, is inherently weak and easily fabricated. In order to justify an
acquittal based on this defense, the accused must establish by clear and convincing evidence that
it was physically impossible for him to have been at the crime scene during its commission
(People vs. Pontilar, G.R. No. 104865, July 11, 1997; People vs. Sumbillo, et. al., G.R. No.
105292, April 18, 1997; People vs. Gamiao, supra).
In the case at bench, accused-appellant admitted being at Marivic Compound at Baesa, Quezon
City, during the night of the incident. He was allegedly with his wife (tsn, August 23, 1990, p. 4).
Defense witness Melchor Mabini even attested that the couple spent the night at the compound
on the eve of November 5, 1989. But did Mabini watch over the couple the whole night? It is not
impossible for accused-appellant to sleep at the Marivic Compound on the night of November 4,
1989 and surreptitiously leave the premises at midnight to get to Kalookan City. The distance
between Quezon City and Kalookan City is not significant.

Anent the award of consequential damages, we increase the indemnity in favor of rape victim
Luzviminda Aquino from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00 in line with recent jurisprudence. We affirm
the awards concerning the amounts corresponding to the value of the items stolen, the same

CONSTI II (Sec. 11-13) | 18

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 112177 January 28, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
TITO ZUELA y MORANDARTE, MAXIMO VELARDE y DE LOS REYES, and
NELSON GARCIA y TEMPORAS,accused-appellants.
PARDO, J.:
The case is an appeal of accused Maximo Velarde y de los Reyes, Nelson Garcia y Temporas
and Tito Zuela y Morandarte from the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court, Camarines Sur,
Libmanan, Branch 24, finding them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide
and sentencing each of them to reclusion perpetua, and to pay jointly and severally the amount
of one hundred thousand (P100,000.00) pesos to the heirs of Maria Abendaño and John
Abendaño, and fifty thousand (P50,000.00) pesos to the heirs of Hegino Hernandez, without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. 2
On July 29, 1985, Assistant Provincial Fiscal Julian C. Ocampo III filed with the Regional Trial
Court, Libmanan, Camarines Sur an information charging accused Maximo Velarde y de los
Reyes, Nelson Garcia y Temporas and Tito Zuela y Morandarte with "robbery with triple
homicide" committed as follows:
That in the evening of April 27, 1985 in Camagong, Cabusao, Camarines Sur, Philippines, the
above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually aiding each other,
with intent to gain, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with violence and
intimidation gainst [sic] persons, that is by shooting and stabbing one Hegino Hernandez, Sr.,
Maria S. Abendaño and John-John Abendaño, thereby inflicting upon them mortal injuries that
caused their instantaneous death, take, rob and carry away the following personal properties
belonging to the said Maria Abendaño, to wit:
(1) Cash money P 21,000.00
(2) one gold ring P 750.00
(3) one Seiko wrist watch P 1,250.00
P 23,000.00
That as a consequence of the felonious act of the accused, the heirs of the deceased suffered
damages in the amount of P25,000.00 each, representing indemnity for death, loss of earning
capacity and moral damages.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
On June 1, 1985 Maximo Velarde was arrested at Magallanes, Sorsogon, while accused Nelson
Garcia and Tito Zuela were arrested at Cabusao, Camarines Sur on June 4, 1985 and June 9,
1985, respectively.
On March 26, 1987, all three accused, were arraigned with the assistance of their counsel, and
pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial ensued.
The evidence established the following facts:
Maria Abendaño was engaged in business. She has a store operated a passenger jeepney and
engaged in the buy and sale of palay. Her house cum store was beside that of her sister
Romualda Algarin's house, by the roadside in Barcelonita, Cabusao, Camarines Sur. Romualda
also had a store.1âwphi1.nêt
Accused Nelson Garcia was Maria's store helper. Accused Tito Zuela alias "Anting" helped
Romualda in her store during palay season. The other accused Maximo Velarde was known to
Romualda because she met him at a birthday party held at Maria's house on April 19, 1985. The
three accused were friends.
On April 27, 1985, Maria made three (3) deliveries of palay on board to her jeepney, driven by
Hegino Hernandez, Jr., to the ricemill of Gerardo Benitez in San Juan, Libmanan, Camarines
Sur. Every delivery costs seven thousand (P7,000.00) pesos. The three deliveries were made at
9:00 in the morning, 2:00 in the afternoon and 7:30 in the evening. 4
Between 6:00 and 7:00 in the evening of that day, from a distance of five (5) arms length,
Romualda saw the three (3) accused board the jeepney of Maria, bound for San Juan, Libmanan,
Camarines Sur. Because the jeepney was filled with palay, they merely hold on the railing of the
jeepney.5 There were other passengers namely, Pablo Abendaño and Roberto Echiaca. 6
Gerardo Atienza, the buyer of palay, saw Maximo inside the jeepney during the second and third
delivery of palay to his ricemill.7 For each delivery, Gerardo paid Maria the amount of seven
thousand (P7,000.00) pesos.
The following morning, the bodies of Hegino Hernandez, Maria and John-John Abendaño were
found in rigor mortis condition at New Poblacion, Cabusao, Camarines Sur.8
Dr. Restituto Sampilo, municipal health officer of Cabusao, found Maria in a reclining position
on the front seat of the jeepney. John was in a semi-kneeling position, facing his mother with
both hands clasping her left hand. Hegino was at the steering wheel with his body, from the
abdomen up, resting on the side of the vehicle and his head outside of it. 9 A bullet that exited
from Hegino's left eyebrow caused the wound near his right ear.10
Maria had a horizontal stab wound at the front part of her neck just above the xyphoid
process.11 Her seven (7) year old son, John, had a three (3) inch slashed horizontal wound at the
front base of the neck, a two (2) inch wound on the left upper arm and two (2) stab wounds on
the lateral side of the neck at the junction of the right shoulder. 12 Hegino had a small wound with
slightly depressed edges, about an inch from the highest tip of the right ear, a wound with
everted and lacerated edges above the middle part of the left eyebrow, and seven (7) stab wounds
at the back.13
Though there were no eyewitnesses, the prosecution established how the crime was committed
with the testimony of Romualda Algarin, which was in turn based on the extrajudicial admission
given by Maximo Velarde to Romualda when she visited the latter at the Camaligan municipal
jail on June 6, 1985.
CONSTI II (Sec. 11-13) | 19
Maximo, Tito and Nelson conceived the plan to hold-up Maria while drinking in front of
Romualda's store because Maximo needed money for his fare to Manila.
When the palay-laden jeepney of Maria left for Libmanan, Camarines Sur Maximo, Tito and
Nelson boarded it. They alighted at sitio Cagumpis, Camagong, Cabusao, Camarines Sur to
attend a wedding.14 Maximo was supposed to board the jeepney on its way back to Barcelonita,
while the other two (2) accused, Tito and Nelson would wait along the road at the crossing of
New Poblacion and Camagong, Camarines Sur to board the jeepney and hold-up Maria.
Everything went according to plan. Nelson and Tito hailed the jeepney at the crossing of
Cabusao, Camarines Sur. Upon reaching an uninhabited place, Tito alias "Anting" told Velarde:
"Oragui na ngaya ang driver."15Maximo poked a gun at the driver and shot him. He also shot
Maria at the neck when the latter shouted.16
Nelson and Tito alighted from the jeepney. Nelson went to the front side of the jeepney, while
Tito approached the right front side of the jeepney, in the process stepping on the sleeping John-
John who was then awakened. The boy stood up and said, "You will see I will tell my father that
you killed my mother."17 To avoid being identified by the boy, Tito told Maximo "Oragui na
ini."18 Maximo took hold of the boy's hair and slashed his neck.
Tito took Maria's money and divided it, each accused receiving about seven thousand
(P7,000.00) pesos from the loot.
Tito and Nelson went back to Barcelonita, Cabusao, Camarines Sur. Maximo proceeded to
Manila.
On June 1, 1985, Lt. Ernesto J. Idian, Station Commander, Cabusao Police Station, Cabusao,
Camarines Sur assisted by two (2) other policemen, arrested Maximo in Magallanes, Sorsogon.
Though no warrant of arrest had been issued, Maximo was immediately brought to the
Camaligan police station in Camaligan, Camarines Sur where he was investigated and asked to
give a written statement in the presence of Atty. Jose Ocampo from the Citizen's Legal
Assistance Office (CLAO), Naga City.19
On June 4, and 9, 1985, Tito and Nelson were taken into police custody without a warrant. They
underwent custodial investigation without the assistance of counsel because no lawyer could be
found in Cabusao, Camarines Sur.
On the last page of each accused's confession appeared a statement, in their own handwriting, to
the effect that they voluntarily gave their statements and that no one coerced or promised them
anything to admit responsibility for the crime.
Maximo, Nelson and Tito signed their individual statements before Judge Lore R. Valencia
Bagalacsa, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Libmanan, Camarines Sur on three (3) different
dates.20 She followed the same procedure and line of questioning, using the local dialect, in
ascertaining the voluntariness of the three (3) accused's confessions. She ordered Lt. Idian and
his companions to leave her and the accused inside the chamber. 21Satisfied that they were
properly apprised of their rights and that they voluntarily executed their statements, she had them
sign their individual extrajudicial statements.
Antonio Abendaño, the husband of Maria, was working at Saudi Arabia when his family was
killed. He came to know about the tragic death of his wife and son through an overseas call from
his brother Renato Abendaño. When he learned about it, he became unconscious. He arrived in
the Philippines five (5) days after.22 He knew Nelson Garcia because he was the son of his
cousin. He was also familiar with Tito Zuela, but he did not know Maximo Velarde. He spent
twenty thousand (P20,000.00) pesos for the funeral of his wife and son. He gave one thousand
(P1,000.00) pesos financial assistance to the family of their driver, Hegino.23
On the other hand Maximo, Tito and Nelson interposed common defenses: (1) denial and (2) that
they were tortured and forced to make a confession. In addition, Tito and Nelson claimed they
were not assisted by counsel when their confessions were taken, while Maximo alleged the
defense of alibi saying that he did not leave Magallanes, Sorsogon anytime in 1985.
On June 1, 1985, five (5) persons, led by Lt. Idian, went to the house of Maximo Velarde in
Magallanes, Sorsogon to fetch him because his parents wanted him at Cabusao, Camarines Sur
as his brother Benito Velarde died. He was shown the picture of the cadaver of his brother.
Maximo went with the group of Lt. Idian on board a red car and traveled to Naga City, arriving
there between 7:00 and 8:00 in the evening.
In a dark place before reaching Naga City, the driver stopped the vehicle to urinate. Before the
driver could return, Maximo felt a hard object hit his head and he passed out. When he regained
consciousness, he was already handcuffed. Pointing a gun at him, Lt. Idian told him that he had
two choices, either to die or sign the statement they prepared because his brother had wronged
them. He was warned not to tell anyone that he was mauled. Thereafter, they proceeded to the
Camaligan municipal jail.
Two days later or on June 3, 1985, Maximo was brought out of the jail and ushered into a small
room where he saw three persons, namely Lt. Idian, Atty. Jose Ocampo from CLAO; Naga City
and Pat. Gonsalo Refe, a police investigator from Cabusao, Camarines Sur. Atty. Ocampo read
to him the contents of a prepared statement, which in substance mentioned that some people died
and that he was responsible for their death. Maximo refused to sign. Atty. Ocampo stepped out
of the room, followed by Lt. Idian and he overheard that he would be made to sign the statement
in Atty. Ocampo's office in Naga City. Atty. Ocampo then left and Lt. Idian returned to the
room.
Upon Lt. Idian's return to the smaller room, he kicked Maximo in the stomach and poked a gun
at him. Consumed by fear, Maximo promised that he would sign the prepared statement. He was
then handed a piece of paper and ordered to copy its contents on the prepared statement. Found
on page 5 of his extrajudicial confession was this statement, in his own handwriting:
Opo binasa ko po ang apedabeth na ito na may 5# pahina na pawang totoo at sasareling
kagustohan at walang nantakot o nangako.24
On June 4, 1985, Maximo again signed the statement before Judge Lore R. Valencia Bagalacsa,
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Libmanan, Camarines Sur. From the time accused Maximo was
arrested, he was never released. Maximo denied that he saw and talked to Romualda on June 6,
1985 at the Camaligan municipal jail because he had been detained at the Libmanan municipal
jail since June 4, 1985.
CONSTI II (Sec. 11-13) | 20
For his part, Nelson Garcia denied any knowledge of the crime. On June 4, 1985, the group of
Pat. Gonsalo Refe went to his house and invited him to the office of Lt. Idian. He was brought to
the Camaligan Police Station. Upon their arrival, Lt. Idian talked to him and tried to convince
him to confess to the killing of the Abendaños. Because Nelson refused, Lt. Idian brought him
upstairs and mauled him. He was transferred to Nage City jail, where he was detained for two (2)
hours.
Thereafter, he was brought to the Cabusao Police Station where Pat. Rodolfo O. Cariño
subjected him to another investigation. Because of his continued refusal to confess, he was
mauled again, this time by Pat. Cariño.
To avoid further injury to his person, on June 5, 1985, Nelson Garcia was forced to sign the
prepared statement. He was neither informed of its contents nor assisted by counsel. He was
handed a piece of paper, the contents of which he was ordered to copy, in his own handwriting,
and in substance was similar to what Maximo was ordered to copy as his own extrajudicial
statement. He was brought to the office of Judge Bagalacsa that same afternoon so that he could
sign his extrajudicial statement.
From the time he was invited to the office of Lt. Idian, Nelson was never released from police
custody. He was first detained at the Libmanan municipal jail, and later on transferred to the
Tinangis Penal Farm in Pili, Camarines Sur. Though he suffered physically from the beatings he
got from the policemen, he was never permitted to see a doctor. His relatives were not able to
visit or talk to him because the policemen prohibited visitors. 25
Like Nelson, Tito alias "Anting," denied participation in the crime. On July 9, 1985, Pat. Refe
invited him to the office of Lt. Idian in Cabusao, Camarines Sur. Upon arrival at the police
station, he was investigated about his knowledge of the crime. Failing to elicit any information
from him, he was brought to Libmanan jail where he spent the night.
The following day, Tito was again brought to Cabusao Police Station and presented to Lt. Idian.
In Lt. Idian's office, he was investigated about his involvement in the crime. When he could not
provide any answer, he was made to board the police jeep, to be brought back to the Libmanan
jail.
Along the way, the police jeep stopped and Pat. Cabrera got off and kicked Tito who fell to the
ground. He heard a gunshot and was shown the piece of paper that he was ordered to sign before
Judge Bagalacsa. He was threatened with death should he refuse to sign the prepared statement.
Out of fear for his life, Tito promised to sign. Thereafter, they boarded the police jeep and
proceeded to the office of Judge Bagalacsa Libmanan, in Camarines Sur.
Upon arrival at the office of Judge Bagalacsa, he was ordered to sign the statement without the
assistance of counsel and without being informed of its contents. Thereafter, he was brought to
Libmanan municipal jail and later to Tinangis Penal Farm. Like his co-accused, he was never
released from police custody from the time of arrest.
On August 26, 1993, the trial court promulgated its decision convicting the three (3) accused of
robbery with homicide, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, after a careful and serious evaluation of the evidence presented by the
prosecution and the defense, the Court is morally convinced beyond reasonable doubt, that the
three (3) accused Maximo Velarde, Tito Zuela and Nelson Garcia had committed the crime of
Robbery with Homicide and, therefore, sentences them to suffer the penalty of imprisonment
of reclusion perpetua and to pay jointly and severally an indemnity in the amount of ONE
HUNDRED THOUSAND (P100,000.00) PESOS for the Heirs of Maria Abendaño and John
Abendaño and FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS for the Heirs of Hegino Hernandez,
without imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
GIVEN this 26th day of July, 1993 at Libmanan, Camarines Sur, Philippines.
(Sgd.) SALVADOR G. CAJOT
Presiding Judge26
On the same day, all three (3) accused filed a notice of appeal with the trial court.
In their appeal, accused-appellants claim that the trial court erred in:
(1) relying on Maximo Velarde's extra-judicial confession notwithstanding the violation of his
constitutional rights;
(2) giving full faith and credit to Romualda Algarin's testimony; and
(3) finding all three (3) accused guilty as charged despite the prosecution's failure to prove their
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Considering that there were no eyewitnesses to the commission of the crime, the extra-judicial
confessions of the three (3) accused play a pivotal role in the determination of their culpability.
The Court is duty-bound, therefore, to resolve the issue of whether or not the extra-judicial
confessions were executed in accordance with the provisions of the 1973 Constitution, in light of
the fact that the crime took place in 1985.
The pertinent provision of the 1973 Constitution provides:
Art. IV, Section 20. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person
under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to
counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other
means, which vitiates the free will, shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in
violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence.27
The right to counsel attaches the moment an investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit
information on the crime from the suspected offender. It is at this point that the law requires the
assistance of counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of extorting forced or coerced admissions
or confessions from the person undergoing interrogation. In other words, "the moment there is a
move or even urge of said investigators to elicit admissions or confessions or even plain
information which may appear innocent or innocuous at the time, from said suspect, he should
then and there be assisted by counsel, unless he waives the right, but the waiver shall be made in
writing and in the presence of counsel."28
CONSTI II (Sec. 11-13) | 21
Lt. Idian's team apprehended appellant Maximo in Magallanes Sorsogon on June 1, 1985 when
no warrant had been issued for his arrest. Immediately thereafter, the arresting peace officers
investigated appellant Maximo. His statement was reduced in writing when they were in
Camaligan, Camarines Sur. It was in Camaligan that CLAO lawyer Ocampo was summoned to
assist appellant Maximo in the execution of his written confession. Atty. Ocampo was not
present during the entire duration that accused Maximo was subjected to custodial investigation
as could be inferred from the testimony of Pat. Rodolfo Cariño, to wit:
Q: And after taking the statement of Velarde, what did you do with the statement of Velarde?
A: It was presented to Atty. Ocampo.
Q: Do you want to tell me that inspite of the fact that he was present when the confession was
made you still present the statement to Atty. Ocampo?
A: In order to let him sign the statement.
Q: And where did Atty. Ocampo sign the confession of Velarde?
A: It was sign [sic] at Naga because he went ahead.
Q: Do you mean to tell me now that after the confession was made, the confession was left to
you and after the confession was brought to his office at the CLAO Office in Naga, is that what
you want to tell this court.
A: We went to Naga with Lt. Idian and Velarde.
Q: But it remains a fact that Atty. Ocampo was already at Naga when the statement of Velarde
was presented to him for signature, is that correct?
A: Yes he went ahead to Naga.29
There was no evidence that Maximo executed a waiver of his right to counsel. In light of these
facts, we are constrained to the rule that Maximo Velarde's extra-judicial statement is
inadmissible in evidence.30 "An uncounselled extra-judicial confession without a valid waiver of
the right to counsel — that is, in writing and in the presence of counsel — is inadmissible in
evidence."31
The respective sworn statements of appellants Tito and Nelson were likewise inadmissible in
evidence because they were executed without the assistance of counsel. Despite the fact that the
reason for the absence of lawyer during the custodial investigation was the scarcity of lawyers in
the area, the Court could not be lenient in this case. The absence or scarcity of lawyers in any
given place is not a valid reason for defying the constitutional mandate on counseled
confessions.
Contrary to the ruling of the trial court, the defect in the confessions of Tito and Nelson was not
cured by their signing the extra-judicial statements before Judge Bagalacsa.
Nevertheless, the infirmity of accused-appellants' sworn statements did not leave a void in the
prosecution's case. Accused-appellant Maximo repeated the contents of his sworn statement to
Romualda Algarin who, in turn, related these in court. Such declaration to a private person is
admissible in evidence against accused-appellant Maximo pursuant to Rule 130, Section 26 of
the Rules of Court stating that the "act, declaration for omission of a party as to a relevant fact
may be given in evidence against him." The trial court, therefore, correctly gave evidentiary
value to Romualda's testimony. In People vs. Maqueda,32 we held:
However, the extrajudicial admissions of Maqueda to Prosecutor Zarate and to Ray Dean
Salvosa stand on a different footing. These are not governed by the exclusionary rules under the
Bill of Rights. Masqueda voluntarily and freely made them to Prosecutor Zarate not in the course
of an investigation, but in connection with Maqueda's plea to be utilized as a state witness; and
as to the other admission, it was given to a private person. The provisions of the Bill of Rights
are primarily limitations on government, declaring the rights that exist without the governmental
grant, that may not be taken away by government and that government has the duty to protect; or
restrictions on the power of the government found "not in particular specific types of action
prohibited, but in the general principle that keeps alive in the public mind the doctrine that
governmental power is not unlimited." They are the fundamental safeguards against aggressions
of arbitrary power, or state tyranny and abuse of authority. In laying down the principles of the
government and fundamental liberties of the people, the Constitution did not govern the
relationships between individuals.
Accordingly, Maqueda's admissions to Ray Dean Salvosa, a private party, are admissible in
evidence against the former under Section 26, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. In Aballe
vs. People (183 SCRA 196 [1990]), this Court held that the declaration of an accused expressly
acknowledging his guilt of the offense may be given in evidence against him and any
person, otherwise competent to testify as a witness, who heard the confession, is competent to
testify as to the substance of what he heard if he heard and understood it. The said witness need
not repeat verbatim the oral confession; it suffices if he gives its substance. By analogy, that rule
applies to oral extrajudicial admission. (Emphasis supplied)33
And in the recent case of People vs. Andan34 the Court reiterated the doctrine enunciated in
the Maqueda case. In Andan, the Court said that "when the accused talked with the mayor as
confidant and not as a law enforcement officer, his uncounselled confession did not violate his
constitutional rights. Constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a
spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an
ordinary manner whereby appellant orally admitted having committed the crime." Of course,
accused-appellant Maximo attempted to discredit Romualda's credibility as a witness when he
swore that he could not have been in Camaligan on June 6, 1985 because since June 4, 1985 until
some three weeks later, he was detained at the Libmanan jail. 35 The trial court correctly
disregarded this self-serving uncorroborated assertion.
The defense failed to attribute any ill-motive on the part of Romualda for testifying on accused-
appellant Maximo's admission and therefore the presumption that in so testifying, she was
impelled by no other reason than to tell the truth, stands. The fact that she is related to two of the
victims did not render her testimony incredible. Relationshipper se is not proof of
prejudice.36 She might have been mistaken as to the date when she talked with accused-appellant
Maximo while he was detained considering the more than three-year gap between June 1985 and
September to October 1988 when Romualda testified. However, it is not necessary that the
witness should be able to fix accurately the date of the conversation in which the admission was
CONSTI II (Sec. 11-13) | 22
made. What is important is that the witness is able to state the substance of the conversation or
declaration.37
Romualda's testimony on accused-appellant Maximo's admission sealed not only the latter's fate
but also that of appellants Tito and Nelson. The rule that an extrajudicial confession is binding
only upon the confessant and is not admissible against his co-accused because the latter has no
opportunity to cross-examine the confessant and therefore, as against him, the confession is
hearsay,38 is not applicable here. What is involved here is an admission, not a confession.
Wharton distinguished these terms as follows:
A confession is an acknowledgment in express terms, by a party in a criminal case, of his guilt of
the crime charged, while an admission is a statement by the accused, direct or implied, of facts
pertinent to the issue and tending, in connection with proof of other facts, to prove his guilt. In
other words, an admission is something less than a confession, and is but an acknowledgment of
some fact or circumstance which in itself is insufficient to authorize a conviction and which
tends only to establish the ultimate fact of guilt.39
Appellants Tito and Nelson were afforded the opportunity to cross-examine witness Romualda
on accused-appellant Maximo's declaration. They could have questioned its veracity by
presenting evidence in support of their defenses of denial and alibi so they could put to test
Romualda's credibility. Having failed to do so, Romualda's testimony, which the trial court
correctly considered as credible, stands unscathed.
Romualda's testimony on the substance of accused-appellant Maximo's admission standing
alone, may not be the basis for conviction of the appellants. However, such testimony, taken with
circumstances duly established by the prosecution, point unerringly to accused-appellants'
culpability. These circumstances are: (1) accused-appellants and the victims were all residents of
Barcelonita, Cabusao, Camarines Sur, a small barangay where everyone knew everybody; (2)
accused-appellants Tito and Nelson helped in the stores of the sisters Maria and Romualda a
week before the incident; (3) Romualda saw the three accused-appellants as they boarded Maria's
jeepney during its last palay delivery to Libmanan; (4) Gerardo Atienza saw accused-appellant
Maximo with Maria's group during the jeepney's second delivery of palay; (5) Atienza saw
accused-appellant Maximo riding in Maria's jeepney after the last delivery; (6) after the
commission of the crime, accused-appellants Tito and Nelson no longer went to the store of
Romualda; (7) accused-appellants never attended the wake of the victims, and (8) accused-
appellant Maximo fled to Manila.
These circumstances form an unbroken chain, which, by themselves lead to a fair and reasonable
conclusion that accused-appellants were the culprits in the robbery with homicide.40 Under the
law, circumstantial evidence is sufficient basis for conviction as long as: (1) there is more than
one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proved, and (3) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.41 These requisites were present in this case.
Accused-appellants' diverse course of action after the commission of the crime, with accused-
appellant Maximo going to Manila and accused-appellants Tito and Nelson staying in
Barcelonita, do not negate their guilt. As regards accused-appellant Maximo, his flight to Manila
and to Magallanes, Sorsogon with no plausible explanation therefor is a clear indication of
guilt.42 With respect to accused-appellants Tito and Nelson, their decision to stay in Barcelonita
did not mean that they were not equally guilty as accused-appellant Maximo. As this Court once
said:
Accused-appellant argues that had he participated in the crime, his natural reaction would have
been to flee. We do not agree. Each culprit behaves differently in externalizing and manifesting
his guilt. Others may escape or flee — which circumstance is strongly indicative of guilt, while
others may remain in the same vicinity so as to create a semblance of normalcy, careful not to
arouse suspicion in the community.43
Conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of accused-appellants before, during and after the
commission of the crime, which indicate a joint purpose, concerted action and concurrence of
sentiments.44 Whenever homicide is committed as a consequence or on the occasion of the
robbery, all those who took part as principals in the conspiracy are also guilty as principals in the
special complex crime of robbery with homicide although they did not actually take part in the
killing, unless there is no proof that they tried to prevent the crime. 45 There is no evidence that
any of the accused-appellants desisted from the malevolent intent of the others to kill the victims
during the robbery. As such, they shall equally bear the responsibility for the resulting crime.
Treachery was not alleged in the information but the suddenness of the assault upon Hegino and
Maria from behind was proven reasonable doubt. As such, treachery may be appreciated as a
generic aggravating circumstance.46 As regards seven-year-old John, even if the manner by
which he was attacked was not shown, treachery may be deemed to have attended his killing.
Treachery exists when an adult person illegally attacks a child of tender years and causes his
death.47
The crime committed is the special complex crime of robbery with homicide defined and
penalized in Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code. The trial court correctly considered the
crime as robbery with homicide and not "robbery with triple homicide" as charged in the
information. The term "homicide" in Article 294(1) is used in its generic sense, embracing not
only the act which results in death but also all other acts producing anything short of
death.48 Neither is the nature of the offense altered by the number of killings in connection with
the robbery.49The multiplicity of victims slain on the occasion of the robbery is only appreciated
as an aggravating circumstance. This would preclude an anomalous situation where, from the
standpoint of the gravity of the offense, robbery with one killing would be treated in the same
way that robbery with multiple killings would be.50
Under Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code, robbery with homicide is punishable
by reclusion perpetua to death. By the presence of two aggravating circumstances, namely,
treachery and multiplicity of slain victims, the proper penalty should be death in view of Article
63 (1) of the same Code.51 However, considering that when this case happened, the imposition of
the death penalty was proscribed, the proper imposable penalty was reclusion perpetua. The
heinousness of the crime they committed notwithstanding, accused-appellants may not be
deprived of such favorable factor in their case.
The Solicitor General's plea for modification of the penalty in accordance with Republic Act No.
7659 which "has already expressly converted reclusion perpetua into a divisible penalty" and on
CONSTI II (Sec. 11-13) | 23
account of the decision in People vs. Lucas,52 is untenable. It must be stressed that the Lucas
ruling has been reconsidered and, accordingly, the Court has held:
After deliberating on the motion and re-examining the legislative history of R.A. No. 7659, the
Court concludes that although Section 17 of the R.A. No. 7659 has fixed the duration
of reclusion perpetua from twenty (20) years and one (1) day to forty (40) years, there was no
clear legislative intent to alter its original classification as an indivisible penalty. It shall then
remain as an indivisible penalty.53
The trial court failed to award the heirs of Maria Abendaño the amount of twenty three thousand
(P23,000.00) pesos in reimbursement of the stolen cash, ring and wristwatch and the expenses
amounting to twenty thousand (P20,000.00) pesos for her wake and that of her son, which were
duly proved.54 The heirs are entitled to those amounts as reparation of the damage caused by
accused-appellants. They shall also be liable for exemplary damages in view of the presence of
two aggravating circumstances in the commission of the crime. 55
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS with MODIFICATION the decision of the trial court. The
Court renders judgment finding accused-appellants Tito Zuela y Morandarte, Maximo Velarde y
de los Reyes, Nelson Garcia y Temporas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with
homicide, defined and penalized under Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code, and sentences
each of them to reclusion perpetua with all its accessory penalties and to pay civil indemnity of
one hundred thousand (P100,000.00) pesos to the heirs of Maria Abendaño and John Abendaño
and fifty thousand (P50,000.00) pesos to the heirs of Hegino Hernandez, Jr.

In addition, the Court sentences each of the accused-appellants solidarily to pay the additional
amounts of forty three thousand (P43,000.00) pesos as reimbursement of damages to the heirs of
Maria Abendaño, and fifty thousand (P50,000.00) pesos as exemplary damages to the heirs of
each of the three (3) victims.1âwphi1.nêt
With costs.
SO ORDERED.

CONSTI II (Sec. 11-13) | 24

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 145176 March 30, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
SANTIAGO PERALTA y POLIDARIO (at large), ARMANDO DATUIN JR. y
GRANADOS (at large), ULYSSES GARCIA y TUPAS, MIGUELITO DE LEON y
LUCIANO, LIBRANDO FLORES y CRUZ and ANTONIO LOYOLA y SALISI,accused,
ULYSSES GARCIA y TUPAS, MIGUELITO DE LEON y LUCIANO, LIBRANDO
FLORES y CRUZ and ANTONIO LOYOLA y SALISI, appellants.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The right of the accused to counsel demands effective, vigilant and independent representation.
The lawyer’s role cannot be reduced to being that of a mere witness to the signing of an extra-
judicial confession.
The Case
Before the Court is an appeal from the August 21, 2000 Decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila (Branch 18) in Criminal Case No. 92-112322. Appellants Ulysses Garcia y
Tupas, Miguelito de Leon y Luciano, Librando Flores y Cruz and Antonio Loyola y Salisi, as
well as their co-accused -- Santiago Peralta y Polidario and Armando Datuin Jr. y Granados --
were convicted therein of qualified theft. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, the accused, Santiago Peralta y Polidario, Armando Datuin, Jr. y Granados,
Ulysses Garcia y Tupas, Miguelito De Leon y Luciano, Librando Flores y Cruz and Antonio
Loyola y Salisi, are hereby convicted of the crime of qualified theft of P194,190.00 and
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with all the accessory penalties provided by
law, and to pay the costs. Moreover, all the accused are ordered to pay the Central Bank of the
Philippines, now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, actual damages in the sum of P194,190.00 with
interest thereon at the legal rate from the date of the filing of this action, November 9, 1992, until
fully paid."2
In an Information dated November 9, 1992,3 appellants and their co-accused were charged as
follows:
"That sometime in the year 1990 and including November 4, 1992, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating with others whose true names,
identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and helping one another, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to gain and without the knowledge and consent
of the owner thereof, take, steal and carry away punctured currency notes due for shredding in
the total amount of P194,190.00, belonging to the Central Bank of the Philippines as represented
by Pedro Labita y Cabriga, to the damage and prejudice of the latter in the aforesaid sum of
P194,190.00 Philippine currency;
"That said accused Santiago Peralta y Polidario, Armando Datuin, Jr. y Granados, Ulysses
Garcia y Tupas, Miguelito de Leon y Luciano and Antonio Loyola y Salisi committed said
offense with grave abuse of confidence they being at the time employed as Currency Reviewers,
Driver, Currency Assistant I and Money Counter of the offended party and as such they had free
access to the property stolen."4
Garcia was arrested on November 4, 1992; and his co-accused, on November 9, 1992.
Appellants, however, obtained two Release Orders from RTC Vice Executive Judge Corona
Ibay-Somera on November 9 and 10, 1992, upon their filing of a cash bond to secure their
appearance whenever required by the trial court.5
During their arraignment on May 4, 1993, appellants, assisted by their respective counsels,
pleaded not guilty.6 On September 30, 1998, the trial court declared that Datuin Jr. and Peralta
were at large, because they had failed to appear in court despite notice. 7
After trial in due course, they were all found guilty and convicted of qualified theft in the
appealed Decision.
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) presents the prosecution’s version of the facts as
follows:
"About 10:00 o’clock in the morning of November 4, 1992, Pedro Labita of Central Bank of the
Philippines (CBP) [now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP)] went to the Theft and Robbery
Section of Western Police District Command (WPDC), and filed a complaint for Qualified Theft
against Santiago Peralta, Armando Datuin, Jr., Ulysses Garcia, Miguelito de Leon, Librando
Flores and Antonio S. Loyola.
"Pedro Labita submitted to SPO4 Cielito Coronel, the investigating officer at WPDC, punctured
currency notes in P100.00 and P500.00 bills with a face value of Php194,190.00. Said notes were
allegedly recovered by the BSP Cash Department during its cash counting of punctured currency
bills submitted by different banks to the latter. The punctured bills were rejected by the BSP
money counter machine and were later submitted to the investigation staff of the BSP Cash
Department. As a result of the investigation, it was determined that said rejected currency bills
were actually punctured notes already due for shredding. These currency bills were punctured
because they were no longer intended for circulation. Before these notes could be shredded, they
were stolen from the BSP by the above-named accused.
"On the basis of the complaint filed by Pedro Labita, Ulysses Garcia was apprehended in front of
Golden Gate Subdivision, Las Piñas City, while he was waiting for a passenger bus on his way to
the BSP. Garcia was brought to the police station for investigation.
"On November 4, 5 and 6, 1992, while in the custody of the police officers, Garcia gave three
separate statements admitting his guilt and participation in the crime charged. He also identified
the other named accused as his cohorts and accomplices and narrated the participation of each
and everyone of them.
CONSTI II (Sec. 11-13) | 25
"On the basis of Garcia’s sworn statements, the other named accused were invited for
questioning at the police station and were subsequently charged with qualified theft together with
Garcia."8 (Citations omitted)
Version of the Defense
The defense states its version of the facts in the following manner:
"Accused-appellant Garcia served as a driver of the armored car of the Central Bank from 1978
to 1994.
"On November 4, 1992, between 7:00 a.m. and 8:00 a.m., a man who had identified himself as a
police officer arrested accused-appellant Garcia while waiting for a passenger bus in front of the
Golden Gate Subdivision, Las Piñas City. He was arrested without any warrant for his arrest. The
police officer who had arrested accused-appellant Garcia dragged the latter across the street and
forced him to ride x x x a car.
"While inside the car, he was blindfolded, his hands were handcuffed behind his back, and he
was made to bend with his chest touching his knees. Somebody from behind hit him and he
heard some of the occupants of the car say that he would be salvaged if he would not tell the
truth. When the occupants of the car mentioned perforated notes, he told them that he does not
know anything about those notes.
"After the car had stopped, he was dragged out of the car and x x x up and down x x x the stairs.
While being dragged out of the car, he felt somebody frisk his pocket.
"At a safe house, somebody mentioned to him the names of his co-accused and he told them that
he does not know his co-accused x x x. Whenever he would deny knowing his co-accused,
somebody would box him on his chest. Somebody poured water on accused-appellant Garcia’s
nose while lying on the bench. He was able to spit out the water that had been poured on his nose
[at first], but somebody covered his mouth. As a result, he could not breath[e].
"When accused-appellant Garcia realized that he could not bear the torture anymore, he decided
to cooperate with the police, and they stopped the water pouring and allowed him to sit down.
"Accused-appellant Garcia heard people talking and he heard somebody utter, ‘may nakikinig.‘
Suddenly his two ears were hit with open palm[s] x x x. As he was being brought down, he felt
somebody return his personal belongings to his pocket. Accused-appellant Garcia’s personal
belongings consisted of [his] driver’s license, important papers and coin purse.
"He was forced to ride x x x the car still with blindfold. His blindfold and handcuffs were
removed when he was at the office of police officer Dante Dimagmaliw at the Western Police
District, U.N. Avenue, Manila.
"SPO4 Cielito Coronel asked accused-appellant Garcia about the latter’s name, age and address.
The arrival of Mr. Pedro Labita of the Cash Department, Central Bank of the Philippines,
interrupted the interview, and Mr. Labita instructed SPO4 Coronel to get accused-appellant
Garcia’s wallet and examine the contents thereof. SPO4 Coronel supposedly found three pieces
of P100 perforated bill in accused-appellant Garcia’s wallet and the former insisted that they
recovered the said perforated notes from accused-appellant’s wallet. SPO4 Coronel took down
the statement of Mr. Labita.
"It was actually Mr. Labita, and not accused-appellant Garcia, who gave the answers appearing
in accused-appellant Garcia’s alleged three sworn statements dated November 4, 1992,
November 5, 1992 and x x x November 6, 1992.
"At or about 6:00 p.m. on November 5, 1992, accused-appellant Garcia was brought to the cell
of the Theft and Robbery Section of the WPD. At or about 8:00 p.m., he was brought to the
office of Col. Alladin Dimagmaliw where his co-accused were also inside. He did not identify
his co-accused, but he merely placed his hands on the shoulders of each of his co-accused, upon
being requested, and Mr. Labita took x x x pictures while he was doing the said act.
"Accused-appellant Garcia came to know Atty. Francisco Sanchez of the Public Attorney’s
Office on November 4, 1992, at the office of police officer Dante Dimagmaliw, when SPO4
Coronel introduced Atty. Sanchez to accused-appellant Garcia and told him that Atty. Sanchez
would be his lawyer. However, accused-appellant Garcia did not agree to have Atty. Sanchez to
be his lawyer. Atty. Sanchez left after talking to SPO4 Coronel, and accused-appellant Garcia
had not met Atty. Sanchez anymore since then. He was not present when Atty. Sanchez allegedly
signed x x x the alleged three (3) sworn statements.
"During the hearing of the case on April 6, 2000, Atty. Sanchez manifested in open court that he
did not assist accused-appellant Garcia when the police investigated accused-appellant Garcia,
and that he signed x x x the three (3) sworn statements only as a witness thereto.
"Accused-appellant Garcia signed the alleged three sworn statements due to SPO4 Coronel’s
warning that if he would not do so, he would again be tortured by water cure.
"SPO[4] Coronel caused the arrest without any warrant of accused appellants De Leon, Loyola,
[Flores] on the basis of the complaint of Mr. Pedro Labita, and which arrest was effected on
November 5, 1992, by SPO1 Alfredo Silva and SPO1 Redelico.
"SPO4 Coronel, in his letter dated November 6, 1992, forwarded the case to the Duty Inquest
Prosecutor assigned at the WPDC Headquarters."9 (Citations omitted)
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court found that all the accused used to work for the BSP. Garcia was a driver assigned
to the Security and Transport Department; while Peralta, Datuin Jr., De Leon, Flores and Loyola
were laborers assigned to the Currency Retirement Division. Their main task was to haul
perforated currency notes from the currency retirement vault to the basement of the BSP building
for shredding.
On several occasions, during the period 1990-1992, they handed to Garcia perforated currency
notes placed in a coin sack that he, in turn, loaded in an armored escort van and delivered to
someone waiting outside the premises of the building. The trial court held that the coordinated
acts of all the accused unerringly led to the conclusion that they had conspired to pilfer the
perforated currency notes belonging to the BSP.
CONSTI II (Sec. 11-13) | 26
The RTC rejected the disclaimer by Garcia of his own confessions, as such disclaimer was "an
eleventh hour concoction to exculpate himself and his co-accused." The trial court found his
allegations of torture and coerced confessions unsupported by evidence. Moreover, it held that
the recovery of three pieces of perforated P100 bills from Garcia’s wallet and the flight of Peralta
and Datuin Jr. were indicative of the guilt of the accused.
Hence, this appeal.10
Issues
In his Brief, Garcia raises the following issues:
"1
The trial court erred in admitting in evidence the alleged three Sworn Statements of Accused-
appellant Garcia and the alleged three pieces of P100 perforated notes
"2
The trial court erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty of qualified theft."11
In their joint Brief, De Leon, Loyola and Flores interpose this additional assignment of errors:
"1 The trial court erred in admitting in evidence the alleged three sworn statements of Accused
Ulysses Garcia (Exhibits ‘I’, ‘J’ and ‘K’) and the alleged three pieces of P100 perforated notes
(Exhibits ‘N’ to ‘N-2’) over the objections of the accused-appellants.
"2 The trial court erred in denying the demurrer to evidence of Accused-appellants De Leon,
Loyola and Flores;
"3 The trial court erred in denying the Motion for Reconsideration of the Order denying the
demurrer to evidence;
"4 The trial court erred when it failed to consider the evidence adduced by the accused-
appellants, consisting of exhibits ‘1’, ‘2’ to ‘2-B’, ‘3’ and ‘4’ and the testimony of their witness,
State Auditor Esmeralda Elli;
"5 The trial court erred in finding the accused-appellants guilty of qualified theft."12
Simplified, the issues are as follows: (1) the sufficiency of the evidence against appellants,
including the admissibility of Garcia’s confessions and of the three perforated P100 currency
notes; and (2) the propriety of the denial of their demurrer to evidence.
The Court’s Ruling
The appeal has merit.
First Issue: Sufficiency of Evidence
The trial court convicted appellants mainly on the strength of the three confessions given by
Garcia and the three perforated P100 currency notes confiscated from him upon his arrest.
Appellants, however, contend that these pieces of evidence are inadmissible.
Extrajudicial Confessions
Appellants aver that the alleged three Sworn Statements of Garcia were obtained without the
assistance of counsel in violation of his rights under Article III, Section 12 (1) and (2) of the
1987 Constitution, which provides thus:
"Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the
right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel,
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
"(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free
will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incomunicado, or other similar
forms of detention are prohibited."
On the other hand, the OSG contends that counsel, Atty. Francisco Sanchez III of the Public
Attorney’s Office, duly assisted Garcia during the custodial investigation.
It is clear from a plain reading of the three extrajudicial confessions13 that Garcia was not
assisted by Atty. Sanchez. The signature of the latter on those documents was affixed after the
word "SAKSI." Moreover, he appeared in court and categorically testified that he had not
assisted Garcia when the latter was investigated by the police, and that the former had signed the
Sworn Statement only as a witness.14
The written confessions, however, were still admitted in evidence by the RTC on the ground that
Garcia had expressed in writing his willingness and readiness to give the Sworn Statements
without the assistance of counsel. The lower court’s action is manifest error.
The right to counsel has been written into our Constitution in order to prevent the use of duress
and other undue influence in extracting confessions from a suspect in a crime. The basic law
specifically requires that any waiver of this right must be made in writing and executed in the
presence of a counsel. In such case, counsel must not only ascertain that the confession is
voluntarily made and that the accused understands its nature and consequences, but also advise
and assist the accused continuously from the time the first question is asked by the investigating
officer until the signing of the confession.
Hence, the lawyer’s role cannot be reduced to being that of a mere witness to the signing of a
pre-prepared confession, even if it indicated compliance with the constitutional rights of the
accused.15 The accused is entitled to effective, vigilant and independent counsel.16
A waiver in writing, like that which the trial court relied upon in the present case, is not enough.
Without the assistance of a counsel, the waiver has no evidentiary relevance. 17 The Constitution
states that "[a]ny confession or admission obtained in violation of [the aforecited Section 12]
shall be inadmissible in evidence x x x." Hence, the trial court was in error when it admitted in
evidence the uncounseled confessions of Garcia and convicted appellants on the basis thereof.
The question of whether he was tortured becomes moot.
Perforated Currency Notes
CONSTI II (Sec. 11-13) | 27
Appellants contend that the three P100 perforated currency notes (Exhibits "N" to "N-2") Without the extrajudicial confession and the perforated currency notes, the remaining evidence
allegedly confiscated from Garcia after his arrest were "fruits of the poisonous tree" and, hence, would be utterly inadequate to overturn the constitutional presumption of innocence.
inadmissible in evidence.
Second Issue: Demurrer to Evidence
The solicitor general evades the issue and argues, instead, that appellants waived the illegality of
Appellants contend that the trial court seriously erred when it denied the demurrer to evidence
their arrest when they entered a plea. He further contends that the exclusion from the evidence of
filed by Appellants Loyola, De Leon and Flores. Not one of the documents offered by the
the three punctured currency bills would not alter the findings of the trial court.
prosecution and admitted in evidence by the RTC established the alleged qualified theft of
The police arrested Garcia without a warrant, while he had merely been waiting for a passenger perforated notes, and not one of the pieces of evidence showed appellants’ participation in the
bus after being pointed out by the Cash Department personnel of the BSP. At the time of his commission of the crime.
arrest, he had not committed, was not committing, and was not about to commit any crime.
On the exercise of sound judicial discretion rests the trial judge’s determination of the
Neither was he acting in a manner that would engender a reasonable ground to suspect that he
sufficiency or the insufficiency of the evidence presented by the prosecution to establish a prima
was committing a crime. None of the circumstances justifying an arrest without a warrant under
facie case against the accused. Unless there is a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
Section 5 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court was present.
jurisdiction, the trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss may not be disturbed. 24
Hence, Garcia was not lawfully arrested. Nonetheless, not having raised the matter before
As discussed earlier, the inadmissibility of the confessions of Garcia did not become apparent
entering his plea, he is deemed to have waived the illegality of his arrest. Note, however, that this
until after Atty. Francisco had testified in court. Even if the confiscated perforated notes from the
waiver is limited to the arrest. It does not extend to the search made as an incident thereto or to
person of the former were held to be inadmissible, the confessions would still have constituted
the subsequent seizure of evidence allegedly found during the search.
prima facie evidence of the guilt of appellants. On that basis, the trial court did not abuse its
The Constitution proscribes unreasonable searches and seizures18 of whatever nature. Without a discretion in denying their demurrer to evidence.
judicial warrant, these are allowed only under the following exceptional circumstances: (1) a
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellants are hereby
search incident to a lawful arrest, (2) seizure of evidence in plain view, (3) search of a moving
ACQUITTED and ordered immediately RELEASED, unless they are being detained for any
motor vehicle, (4) customs search, (5) stop and frisk situations, and (6) consented search.19
other lawful cause. The director of the Bureau of Corrections is hereby directed to submit his
Where the arrest was incipiently illegal, it follows that the subsequent search was similarly report on the release of the appellant or the reason for his continued detention within five (5)
illegal.20 Any evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional provision is legally days from notice of this Decision. No costs.
inadmissible in evidence under the exclusionary rule.21 In the present case, the perforated P100
SO ORDERED.
currency notes were obtained as a result of a search made without a warrant subsequent to an
unlawful arrest; hence, they are inadmissible in evidence.

Moreover, untenable is the solicitor general’s argument that Appellants De Leon, Flores and
Loyola waived the illegality of the arrest and seizure when, without raising objections thereto,
they entered a plea of guilty. It was Garcia who was unlawfully arrested and searched, not the
aforementioned three appellants. The legality of an arrest can be contested only by the party
whose rights have been impaired thereby. Objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely
personal, and third parties cannot avail themselves of it.22

Indeed, the prosecution sufficiently proved the theft of the perforated currency notes for
retirement. It failed, however, to present sufficient admissible evidence pointing to appellants as
the authors of the crime.
The evidence presented by the prosecution shows that there were other people who had similar
access to the shredding machine area and the currency retirement vault. 23 Appellants were
pinpointed by Labita because of an anonymous phone call informing his superior of the people
allegedly behind the theft; and of the unexplained increase in their spending, which was
incompatible with their income. Labita, however, did not submit sufficient evidence to support
his allegation.

CONSTI II (Sec. 11-13) | 28

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 127493 December 8, 1999
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ORLANDO LABTAN y DAQUIHON (At Large), alias BEBOT, HENRY FELICIANO y
LAGURA and JONELTO LABTAN (At Large), accused, HENRY FELICIANO y
LAGURA, accused-appellant.
PUNO, J.:
Accused-appellant Henry Feliciano appeals the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan
de Oro City, Branch 25 1 convicting him of highway robbery and robbery with homicide on the
basis of a sworn statement which he repudiated during the trial.
On April 23, 1993, an information 2 was filed against Henry Feliciano, Orlando Labtan, and
Jonelto Labtan charging them with robbery with homicide committed as follows:
That on or about April 16, 1993, at about 2:30 in the afternoon, more or less, at Buntong,
Camaman-an, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one
another, and with grave abuse of confidence, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously and by means of violence, take, rob and carry away P30.00/cash money to the
damage and prejudice of the offended party (Florentino Bolasito); that on the occasion of the
said robbery and for the purpose of enabling them (accused) to steal, take and carry away the
P30.00 money, the herein accused, in pursuance of their conspiracy, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, and with evident premeditation and taking advantage of their number
and strength and with intent to kill, accused Orlando Labtan y Daquihon, alias Bebot Labtan and
Jonelto Labtan, treacherously attack, assault and use personal violence upon Florentino Bolasito
thereby inflicting upon him the following injuries: "Shock due to multiple stab wounds heart",
with the use of a (sic) knives/bladed weapon which accused are conveniently provided, which
directly caused the death of the said Florentino Bolasito.
Contrary to and in violation of Article 299 and 249 of the Revised Penal Code.
Subsequently, another information 3 dated May 20, 1993 was filed against Henry Feliciano and
Orlando Labtan charging them with highway robbery committed as follows:
That on March 28, 1993, at more or less 10:30 o'clock in the evening while inside a motor
vehicle in the national highway at Barangay Agusan up to the road at Camaman-an, all of
Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named with intent to gain and against the will of the owners, by means of violence against and
intimidation of persons, or force upon things with the use of knives which they were
conveniently provided with, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one
another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously and criminally take, rob and
carry away money or cash amounting to P720.00, pioneer stereo, booster and twitters owned by
and belonging to Roman S. Mercado, and a Seiko Diver wristwatch owned by Ismael P. Ebon,
all in all amounting to P10,800,00, against their will, to the damage and prejudice of the said
offended parties in the total sum of P10,800.00 Philippine Currency.
Contrary to and in violation of PD 532.
Only accused Feliciano pleaded not guilty to the two charges. Orlando Labtan had escaped the
Maharlika Rehabilitation and Detention Center in Carmen, Cagayan de Oro City where he was
detained while Jonelto Labtan has eluded arrest. The two cases were tried together.
The prosecution's case was mainly anchored on the three-page sworn statement executed by
Feliciano, originally in Visayan language, before the Cagayan de Oro City Police station, viz: 4
Preliminary: You Henry Feliciano y Lagura, I would like to inform you that you are here in [the]
Theft and Robbery Section of Cagayan de Oro City Police Station to be investigated regarding
an incident wherein a certain driver whose name is Florentino Bolasito, a resident of Abellanoso
St., of this City (sic). Said driver was killed on April 13, 1993, whose body was found at
Tipolohan, Camaman-an of this City since you knew everything about it.
I would like to inform you that according to our law you have the following rights:
1. You have the right to remain silent, and not to answer incriminating questions which will be
used as evidence against you.
2. You have the right to choose an attorney to defend you in this investigation.
3. That if you can't (sic) get a lawyer, I can give you a counsel de oficio to defend you.
Certification
This is to establish the fact that I myself voluntarily executed this certification and hereby affix
my signature hereunder on the _________________ day [of] April, [1993 in the] City of
Cagayan de Oro, Philippines.
Sgd. Henry Feliciano y Lagura
(Affiant)
Assisted by his lawyer:
Sgd. Pepito A. Chavez
Notary Public
Until Dec. 31, 1993
PTR No. 10843256 1/8/93
Q: Before we (will) proceed [with] this investigation, did you understand all those rights I
narrated to you?
A: Yes, sir [,] I understand everything.
Q: Will you get a lawyer of your own to defend you in this investigation?
A: No, sir. I can't (sic) pay the services of lawyer.
Q: Since you will not get your own lawyer, will you agree that I'll (sic) give you Atty. Pepito
Chavez as your counsel de oficio in this investigation?
A: Yes, sir. I agree that Atty. Pepito Chavez will be my lawyer for the ascertainment of the truth.
CONSTI II (Sec. 11-13) | 29
Q: What is your highest educational attainment?
A: Grade 4 only at Baongca, Bukidnon.
Q: In other words, you know how to read Visaya?
A: I know[,] sir how to read Visaya including English but I can't (sic) understand deep English.
Q: Tell me your name, age, occupation, residence and other personal circumstances?
A: I, Henry Feliciano, 25 years old, married and a resident of Kolambog, Lapasan of this city and
I am [a] jeepney driver of this city.
Q: Up to this time, are you still driving?
A: No more, sir.
Q: What is then your work at this time?
A: I go [to] work [with] my friends like Orlando Labtan alias Bebot Labtan who are residents of
Kolambog, Lapasan of this City.
Q: From what time did you go along with this [sic] persons?
A: Since the month of February, 1993.
Q: From the time you go (sic) with them, what have you done, if any?
A: On March 1993, I participated in a hold-up of a certain driver Mr. Roman Mercado 5of Tablan
who owned a jeep I use[d] to drive (before) and we got a car stereo including the jeep. Then, we
brought the jeep to Buntong, Camaman-an and the driver, however, we freed the driver later.
Q: What else?
A: On March 1993 we hold-up (sic) a collector of my brother whose name is Carmen Tan y
Feliciano 6 and we were able to get cash of P2,080.00; [a]nd, there was also [a] certain jeep,
owned by Mr. Mangano that we carnapped and brought (it) to Aglayan, Malaybalay, Bukidnon.
Q: With the latest incident, what have you done?
A: Last April 16, 1993, we held-up a certain driver of [a] "PU Minica" whose name is Florentino
Bolasito of Abellanosa St.
Q: Will you tell us how the driver was killed and who killed them?
A: On April 16, 1993, at 2:30 in the afternoon, I, Bebot Labtan and Jonelto Labtan [were]
hang[ing] around outside Ororama Superstore at J.R. Borja St., of this City, and the three of us
went to a place where most of PU Minica cars were parked. We were able to board one PU
Minica driven by an old man.
Q: As you boarded the PU Minica where did you go?
A: We ordered the driver to take us to Buntong, Camaman-an of this City. When we arrive[d]
thereat, Jonelto told us that he will visit his girlfriend while Bebot Labtan alighted, we remained
inside the vehicle. As [the] driver demanded for the fare, however, we have no money to pay.
Suddenly, I saw Bebot Labtan and Jonelto Labtan took a knife and stabbed the driver.
Q: After stabbing the driver, he died, and so Jonelto Labtan drove the PU towards Tipolohon and
we leave (sic) behind the body of the driver, instead of me getting out from the car (sic), Jonelto
did not stop the car (sic), so we proceeded towards Aluba Subd. and we left the PU Minica there.
A: After you left the PU Minica at Aluba, where did you go?
Q: I went home at Balolong of this City, and I do not [know] where my companions proceeded.
Q: Who then stabbed the driver?
A: The one who stabbed [the driver] [,] sir[,] was Jonelto Labtan and Bebot Labtan.
Q: Did (sic) you able to get some money from the driver?
A: Jonelto Labtan was able to get P30.00, and we brought (sic) a (sic) coconut wine at
Kolambog, Lapasan.
Q: With respect to this (sic) two (2) knives which were taken from you and Bebot Labtan, what
can you say about this (sic) knives?
A: These two (2) knives, sir, the sharp knife with a knife case is owned by Bebot Labtan, this
double blade is owned by Jonelto Labtan.
Q: Are these [the] knives which were used by Bebot Labtan and Jonelto Labtan in stabbing the
PU Minica driver if you know?
A: Yes, sir. Bebot Labtan used this knife with a knife case, but this knife which is double bladed
was not used, the other kitchen knife like a fan knife which was left inside the PU was used by
Jonelto in stabbing.
Q: When (was then) were you arrested by the police authorities of the Theft and Robbery
Section?
A: On April 20, 1993, while we, I and Bebot Labtan were at Tambo, Macasandig of this City
waiting for the truck of Mr. Aberrastori to ride to bring us to Valencia, Bukidnon, we were
apprehended by the policemen near the store of Mrs. Carmen Tan. It was then that time where
Bebot Labtan was shot at his feet and the two knives were confiscated.
Q: I have no other questions, do you have anything to say.
A: No more. sir.
This is to certify that I have read the foregoing statements consisting of three (3) pages of which
I have initiated and signed in the presence of Atty. Pepito Chavez, Attorney de Officio, and I
state that it is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.
Sgd. Henry Feliciano y Lagura
(Affiant). 7
In addition, the prosecution presented the testimony of Ismael Ebon that on March 28, 1993, at
10:30 p.m., he was driving along Bugo Highway, when two (2) men boarded his jeepney. He
identified the men as Henry Feliciano and Orlando Labtan. Suddenly, Bebot Labtan pointed a
double bladed knife on the right side of his neck. Feliciano then took the steering wheel and
proceeded to Bolonsori. When they were near the house of a certain Policeman Lapis, Feliciano
stopped the jeep. The two then divested him of his watch, P700.00 cash, car stereo, two (2)
tweeters and one (1) booster. They threatened to kill him should he report to the police.
However, when the two left, he proceeded to the Puerto Police Station and reported the hold-up.
He then went to the garage and told Roman Mercado, the owner of the jeepney, that he was
robbed. That night, the two of them reported the robbery to the Cagayan de Oro City Police
Station. Ebon also stated that he knew Feliciano because the latter previously worked as driver of
Roman Mercado. 8
When the defense presented its case, only accused Henry Feliciano testified for his behalf. His
defense consisted of an alibi and a repudiation of his sworn statement. He told the court that on
March 28, 1993, when Ismael Ebon was held-up, he was in Maasin, Baungon, Bukidnon, his
birthplace. He did not deny Ebon's claim that they were acquainted for he used to work as driver
of Roman Mercado. However, when his driver's license expired on January 20, 1993, he went
home to Bukidnon. On April 20, 1993, he went back to Cagayan de Oro City and stayed at the
residence of his sister, Carmen Tan, who lives in Macasandig, Cagayan de Oro City. At 4:00
p.m. of the same day, Carmen asked him to buy snacks at a nearby store. While buying the
snacks, he heard a shot and when he looked around, he saw a man lying on the ground. Two men
in civilian clothes poked their guns at him. One of them asked him whether he was a companion
CONSTI II (Sec. 11-13) | 30
of the man lying on the ground. He said no. The two men brought him to the police station. The
man lying on the ground was brought to the hospital. At the police station, the two men asked
him to confess whether he was a companion of the person who was shot. He said no. They asked
him whether he was one of those who robbed Ismael Ebon. Again, he said no. He was questioned
for about an hour during which he was hit "at the right and left breast, at the right and left ribs,
and at the left side of [his] face." Afterwards, he was locked up in jail. In the morning of the
following day, he was investigated and mauled for two hours. Again, he was asked whether
Orlando Labtan was his companion. He insisted that he was not Labtan's companion for he does
not even know him. After the investigation, a policeman approached him and brought a piece of
paper for him to sign. He asked whether it was possible for him to read the contents. The
policeman answered, "No need, just sign so that we can finish it." They then started to maul him.
He was forced to sign the paper. At around 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of April 22, 1993, he
was brought to the office of Atty. Pepito Chavez. He was told to sit down while Atty. Chavez
signed the papers. He did not know what was happening. Atty. Chavez did not even talk to him
before signing the document. He was then brought back to jail. 9
Finding the sworn statement executed by Feliciano credible, the trial court convicted him and
imposed the following penalties: 10
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this court hereby finds accused Henry Feliciano guilty
beyond reasonable doubt as principal by direct participation in the crime of robbery with
homicide and hereby sentences the accused to reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the offended
party the sum of P50,000.00 and to pay the offended party the sum of P35,000.00 representing
funeral expenses and to pay the cost.
This court hereby finds also the accused Henry Feliciano guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of highway robbery committed on March 28, 1993 and sentences the accused to an
indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor as the minimum term to fourteen
(14) years, eight (8) months of reclusion temporal in its minimum period as the maximum term
and to indemnify Roman S. Mercado the sum of P8,000.00, representing the value of the
P700.00 cash, stereo, booster, and twitter and to indemnify Ismael Ebon the sum of P2,500.00,
the value of the Seiko Wrist watch divested from him and to pay the cost.
SO ORDERED. 11
Hence, this appeal where accused-appellant assigns the following errors committed by the trial
court:
I. On the charge of robbery with homicide, the court a quo erred in admitting in evidence, the
tainted extra-judicial confession of the accused executed in the absence of an effective and
vigilant counsel.
II. on the charge of highway robbery, the court a quo erred in believing the complainant driver
who, it turned out, from the police blotter, said that the perpetrators were initially unidentified
persons then later identified accused feliciano whom he knew very well as a fellow driver.
III. the court a quo erred in finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of
robbery with homicide and highway robbery.
The appeal is meritorious.
Under Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution, the rights of persons under custodial
investigation are provided as follows:
(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably
of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with
one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will
shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar
forms of detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible against him.
In People v. Macam 12, the rational for the guarantee, was explained in this wise —
Historically, the counsel guarantee was intended to assure the assistance of counsel at the trial,
inasmuch as the accused "was confronted with both the intricacies of the law and the advocacy
of the public prosecutor." However, as the result of the changes in the patterns of police
investigation, today's accused confronts both expert adversaries and the judicial system well
before his trial begins (U.S. v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 37 L Ed 2d 619, 93 S Ct 2568 [1973]). It is
therefore appropriate to extend the counsel guarantee to critical stages of prosecution even before
the trial. The law enforcement machinery at present involves critical confrontations of the
accused by the prosecution at pre-trial proceedings "where the result might well settle the
accused's fate and reduce the trial itself to a mere formality."
Thus, in People v. Gamboa 13, we stated that:
[T]he right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation, i.e. when the investigating
officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or confessions or admissions from the
respondent/accused. At such point or stage, the person being interrogated must be assisted by
counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of extorting false or coerced admissions or confessions
from the lips of the person undergoing interrogation, for the commission of an offense. The
moment there is a move or even urge of said investigators to elicit admissions or confessions or
even plain information which may appear innocent or inocuous at the time, from said suspect, he
should then and there be assisted by counsel, unless he waives the right, but the waiver shall be
made in writing and in the presence of counsel.
We find that accused-appellant Feliciano had been denied of his right to have a competent and
independent counsel when he was questioned in the Cagayan de Oro City Police Station. SPO1
Alfonso Cuarez testified that he started questioning Feliciano at 8:00 a.m. of April 22, 1993
regarding his involvement in the killing of jeepney driver Florentino Bolasito, notwithstanding
the fact that he had not been apprised of his right to counsel.
On cross-examination:
Atty. Carlo Mejia
CONSTI II (Sec. 11-13) | 31
Q: What [time] did you report to your office on April 22, 1993?
SPO1 Alfonso Cuarez
A: I reported at eight o'clock in the morning.
xxx xxx xxx.
Q: What time was Henry Feliciano brought to your office on April 22, 1993? What time did you
start to investigate Henry Feliciano on April 22, 1993?
A: In the morning, at 8:00 o'clock, when I reported for work.
Q: You already investigated the accused in this case at 8:00 o'clock in the morning on April 22,
1993?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Of course, when you investigated the accused in the morning, he had no counsel yet?
A: I just interviewed him.
Q: We will just use the word interview. Was he assisted by counsel when you interviewed him in
the morning?
A: None.
Q: What was the subject matter of the interview in the morning of April 22, 1993 to the accused
Henry Feliciano? (sic)
A: About the PU driver that was killed.
Q: Of course, he related to you everything that transpired regarding that alleged death of a PU
driver?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: So that in the morning of April 22, 1993 you already had an idea, more or less, who
committed or who killed the PU driver by the family name Bolasito, am I correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: All that time in the morning of April 22, 1993 the accused was not assisted by a legal counsel.
A: Not yet.
Q: What time did you decide to bring the accused to the office of Atty. Chavez on April 22,
1993?
A: About 10:00 o'clock in the morning of April 22, 1993.
Q: Are you trying to impress us that in the morning of April 22, 1993 you also brought the
accused Henry Feliciano to the office of Atty. Chavez?
A: At 8:00 in the morning, I just interviewed him and at 10:00 o'clock in the morning I brought
him to the office of Atty. Chavez.
Q: Are you trying to impress [upon] us that you brought accused Henry Feliciano to the office of
Atty. Chavez at 10:00 o'clock in the morning and in the afternoon also you brought him to the
office of Atty. Chavez?
A: No more. In the afternoon Atty. Chavez was the one who came to our office because that was
what we agreed in the morning. 14
At that point, accused-appellant had been subjected to custodial investigation without a counsel.
In Navallo v.Sandiganbayan 15, we said that a person is deemed under custodial investigation
where the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has
began to focus on a particular suspect who had been taken into custody by the police who carry
out a process of interrogation that lends itself to elicit incriminating statements.
When SPO1 Cuarez investigated accused-appellant Feliciano, the latter was already a suspect in
the killing of jeepney driver Bolasito as shown by the joint affidavit of SPO4 Johny Salcedo and
SPO1 Florencio Bagaipo who were the ones who arrested Feliciano. In their affidavit dated April
21, 1993, the two police officers stated:
in the investigation conducted to (sic) Henry Feliciano, he admitted and confessed to us for (sic)
his involvement of (sic) the death of the PU driver together with his companion Bebot Labtan,
and the same was identified by many victims of robbery hold-up in this City. And also during the
investigation, Henry Feliciano admitted to us regarding their confiscated bladed knife as the very
weapon used in the stabbing of the PU minica driver.
The prosecution tried to establish that Atty. Pepito Chavez provided effective and independent
counselling to accused-appellant Feliciano which cured the initial lack of counsel. However, this
is belied by the very testimony of Atty. Chavez showing he performed his duty in a lackadaisical
fashion:
Assistant City Prosecutor Nicolas C. Caballero, Jr.
Q: Atty. Chavez, you stated that you are a practicing lawyer in Cagayan de Oro City as well as in
Misamis Oriental?
Atty. Pepito Chavez
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Do you remember having assisted in the investigation of one Henry Feliciano on April 22,
1993 at about 3:30 in the afternoon when the said Henry Feliciano was (sic) investigated whose
written statement was taken by SPO1 Cuarez in the presence of Cabigon?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Where was this statement taken?
A: At the office of the Theft and Robbery Section at Operation Kahusay ug Kalinaw.
Q: How did you happen to assist Henry Feliciano in the taking of his written statement?
A: Because SPO3 Cuarez approached me in my office and requested me to assist Henry
Feliciano in the taking of his testimony.
Q: What time was that when SPO1 Alfonso Cuarez came to your office and requested you to
assist Henry Feliciano?
A: If I can remember right, Police Officer Cuarez came to my office about three o'clock in the
afternoon.
Q: Where is your office in Cagayan de Oro City?
A: Located at Pabayo-Gomez.
Q: What did you do after Alfonso Cuarez came to your office and requested you to assist in the
taking of the written statement or sworn statement of Henry Feliciano?
A: I told him I will follow later because at that time when he came to my office I was working on
some paper works.
Q: When you said him, you were referring to Alfonso Cuarez?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What happened after you told him you will follow later?
A: At about 3:25, if I remember right, I was able to come to Operation Kahusay ug Kalinaw
particularly the office of the Theft and Robbery Section.
Q: When you arrived at the Operation Kahusay ug Kalinaw, who were there?
A: Police Officer Cabigon and Cuarez.
Q: Who else were there? What about Henry Feliciano?
A: Yes, I have also seen Henry Feliciano.
Q: If you see again Henry Feliciano, will you be able to identify him?
CONSTI II (Sec. 11-13) | 32
A: Yes, sir. A: About 3:30 in the afternoon.
Q: Look around if he is present in the courtroom? Q: After Henry Feliciano, as you said, answered in the affirmative, what happened then?
A: (Witness pointing to a person with a green t-shirt and when asked his name he answered A: Before I started the formal investigation to [sic] him, I reiterated that question about his desire
Henry Feliciano.) to take me as his counsel, and he again answered in the affirmative.
Q: What did you do after you arrived at the office of the Theft and Robbery Section and saw Q: After that, for the second time, what happened?
Henry Feliciano, Cabigon and Cuarez? A: Then I started his investigation.
A: I started my investigation or confrontation with Henry Feliciano informing him, appraising Q: Were you the one who investigated him?
him of his constitutional right to counsel, that he has a right to remain silent and appraise him if A: At first, it was Alfonso Cuarez. Sometimes, I interrupted in the investigation.
it is his desire that I be his lawyer because I told him if he has no desire that I will be his lawyer, Q: How did Alfonso Cuarez start the investigation?
then he can look for another. A: In the appraisal of Henry Feliciano of his constitutional rights.
Q: What else did you inform him or asked him aside from what you testified already? Q: After that, what happened?
A: I told him did you come to confess or testify because of fact that the police offered you some A: As far as I can remember, he proceeded with the incident where Henry Feliciano was
consideration or money where you promised of release. involved in a series of robberies.
Q: And what was the reaction of the said Henry Feliciano? Q: While these questions were being asked of Henry Feliciano, where were you?
A: As far as I can remember, Henry Feliciano told me that he is forced to testify only to tell the A: I was there.
truth. Q: How many meters away from Henry Feliciano?
Q: While you were conferring with Henry Feliciano, where was Eleuterio Cabigon and Alfonso A: About one arm's length, I sat behind him.
Cuarez? Q: While these questions were asked of Henry Feliciano, as you testified a series of robberies
A: Alfonso Cuarez was there listening to us. were committed, what did you do? What was your reaction?
Q: How far away from you? A: At first, I interrupted with the answer of Henry Feliciano thinking that it was not the truth or it
A: About one armslength (sic). might be that the testimony will be counted against him in the court. So, I whispered to him if it
Q: What about Eleuterio Cabigon? is the truth, and he insisted it is the truth.
A: About three meters near. Q: When you whispered to him, you are referring to Henry Feliciano?
Q: Did Alfonso Cuarez participate in your discussions or conference with Henry Feliciano? A: Yes, sir.
A: Yes. He sometimes clarified some answers propounded by Henry Feliciano in the course of Q: Atty. Chavez, after the termination of the investigation which was taken by SPO1 Alfonso
the investigation. Cuarez in your presence of SPO4 Eleuterio Cabigon on one Henry Feliciano, what happened
Q: For example, what answer? after that?
A: As far as I can remember, the question was reduced into writing. A: I examined the question and answer taken, then I read it to Henry Feliciano, appraised him,
Q: Before that, I am referring to the point where you had a conference with Henry Feliciano translated to him, clarified to him after he testified.
before the start of the investigation; where was Alfonso Cuarez? Q: What was the reaction of Henry Feliciano?
A: He was listening to us. A: He willingly listened to my explanation and clarification about what he confessed.
Q: Was there a participation of Alfonso Cuarez during your discussion? Q: And after listening to your explanation, what happened?
A: Yes, he was the one typing the questions asked by me and the answers propounded by Henry A: I required him to sign. Before finally requiring to sign, if you will change your mind about
Feliciano. what you confessed, you still have the right to.
Q: And these questions were the ones you testified a while ago. Q: What did Henry Feliciano say?
A: Yes, sir. A: It is the truth; and after being clarified, he willingly signed the confession.
Q: After that, what happened after you asked these questions and you got the answer from him?
Q: After Henry Feliciano signed the same written statement of (sic) him, what did you do?
What did Alfonso Cuarez do to him?
A: Alfonso Cuarez told him that is it really his desire . . . we are giving you Atty. Chavez as your A: After that, Alfonso Cuarez, Henry Feliciano and me (sic) went to my office to have that
counsel. Are you willing? And he said yes. notarized, so that when I came to the Operation Kahusay ug Kalinaw for the taking of the
Q: What was the answer of Henry Feliciano? confession of Henry Feliciano, I was not bringing with me my bill and other paraphernalias (sic).
A: He answered in the affirmative.
Q: When Henry Feliciano signed the written statement, where were you, Cabigon and Alfonso
Q: Exactly, how did he answer?
Cuarez?
A: Yes, I am very much willing.
Q: After that, when did the investigation start? A: The same location at that time when Henry Feliciano was taken his confession (sic).16
CONSTI II (Sec. 11-13) | 33
The right to counsel is a fundamental right and contemplates not a mere presence of the lawyer
beside the accused. In People v. Bacamante 17, the term "effective and vigilant counsel" was
explained thus:
necessarily and logically [requires] that the lawyer be present and able to advise and assist his
client from the time the confessant answers the first question asked by the investigating officer
until the signing of the extrajudicial confession. Moreover, the lawyer should ascertain that the
confession is made voluntarily and that the person under investigation fully understands the
nature and the consequence of his extrajudicial confession in relation to his constitutional rights.
A contrary rule would undoubtedly be antagonistic to the constitutional rights to remain silent, to
counsel and to be presumed innocent.
In People v. dela Cruz 18, an effective counsel was characterized as:
one who can be made to act in protection of his [accused's] rights, and not by merely going
through the motions of providing him with anyone who possesses a law degree.
Again, about the only matter that bears out the presence of such counsel at that stage of custodial
interrogation are the signatures which she affixed on the affidavit. Withal, a cursory reading of
the confession itself and SPO1 Atanacio's version of the manner in which he conducted the
interrogation yields no evidence or indication pointing to her having explained to the appellant
his rights under the Constitution. Indeed, from our earliest jurisprudence, the law vouchsafes to
the accused the right to an effective counsel, one who can be made to act in protection of his
rights, and not by merely going through the motions of providing him with anyone who
possesses a law degree.
Atty. Chavez did not provide the kind of counselling required by the Constitution. He did not
explain to accused-appellant the consequences of his action — that the sworn statement can be
used against him and that it is possible that he could be found guilty and sent to jail.
We also find that Atty. Chavez's independence as counsel is suspect — he is regularly engaged
by the Cagayan de Oro City Police as counsel de officio for suspects who cannot avail the
services of counsel. He even received money from the police as payment for his services:
On cross-examination:
Atty. Carlo Mejia
Q: Mr. Alfonso Cuarez, how long have you known Atty. Chavez?
A: I know him for a long time ago (sic).
Q: How many times have you utilized Atty. Chavez to assist prisoners under the custody of the
Cagayan de Oro Police Department?
A: As far as I can remember, three times already.
Q: Is Atty. Chavez being paid by your office to assist detained prisoners?
A: Sometimes we pay him P400.00 but if we have none, he will assist for free.
Q: So Atty. Chavez is paid by the Cagayan de Oro Police Station?
A: It is not the Cagayan de Oro Police who paid but it is only my initiative to give him.
Q: It is only on your own personal initiative to pay Atty. Chavez?
A: Yes.
Q: And, of course, Atty. Chavez, if you have the money, also accepts the money you pay to him?
A: Yes, sir.
In People v. Deniega 19, expounding on the constitutional requirement that the lawyer provided
be "competent and independent", we stated that:
It is noteworthy that the modifiers competent and independent were terms absent in all organic
laws previous to the 1987 Constitution. Their addition in the fundamental law of 1987 was meant
to stress the primacy accorded to the voluntariness of the choice, under the uniquely stressful
conditions of a custodial investigation, by according the accused, deprived of normal conditions
guaranteeing individual autonomy, an informed judgment based on the choices given to him by a
competent and independent lawyer.
Thus, the lawyer called to be present during such investigation should be as far as possible, the
choice of the individual undergoing questioning. If the lawyer were one furnished in the
accused's behalf, it is important that he should be competent and independent, i.e., that he is
willing to fully safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused, as distinguished from one who
would merely be giving a routine, peremptory and meaningless recital of the individual's
constitutional rights. In People v. Basay, this Court stressed that an accused's right to be
informed of the right to remain silent and to counsel "contemplates the transmission of
meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract
constitutional principle.
Ideally, therefore, a lawyer engaged for an individual facing custodial investigation (if the latter
could not afford one) "should be engaged by the accused (himself), or by the latter's relative or
person authorized by him to engage an attorney or by the court, upon proper petition of the
accused or person authorized by the accused to file such petition. Lawyers engaged by the police,
whatever testimonials are given as proof of their probity and supposed independence, are
generally suspect, as in many areas, the relationship between lawyers and law enforcement
authorities can be symbiotic."
In People v. Sahagun 20, we stated that the constitutional requirement that a lawyer should be
independent was not complied with when a lawyer who just happened to be following-up a case
at the NBI was asked to counsel the accused:
[T]he counselling given by Atty. Dizon to Villareal was not sufficiently protective of Villareal's
rights as an accused as contemplated by the Constitution. To start with, Atty. Dizon is not really
known to Villareal. He was requested to act as counsel because he happened to be at the NBI
following-up a client's case. Given that circumstance, it cannot be expected that Atty. Dizon
would give an advice to Villareal that would offend the agent conducting the investigation. Thus,
it appears that Atty. Dizon did no more than recite to Villareal his constitutional rights. He made
no independent effort to determine whether Villareal's confessions were free and voluntary. . . ..
He did not inquire from Villareal how he was treated in the last 24-hours. He did not seek any of
CONSTI II (Sec. 11-13) | 34
Villareal's relatives or friends to find out if he has any defense which Villareal was not free to
disclose due to his confinement.
Atty. Dizon's lack of vigilance as a counsel is likewise underscored by the fact that he himself
testified that Villareal gave his confession under the impression that he was only a witness and
not an accused in the case. This revelation should have jolted Atty. Dizon and should have driven
him to exert extra efforts to find out whether Villareal was tricked in making his confession.
Again, he did not take an extra effort.
In People v. Januario 21, the main evidence relied upon for the conviction of appellants was their
own extrajudicial confessions which admittedly were extracted and signed in the presence and
with the assistance of a lawyer who was applying for work in the NBI. We held that —
(s)uch counsel cannot in any wise be considered "independent" because he cannot be expected to
work against the interest of a police agency he was hoping to join, as a few months later he in
fact was admitted into its work force. For this violation of their constitutional right to
independent counsel, appellants deserve acquittal. After the exclusion of their tainted
confessions, no sufficient and credible evidence remains in the Court's records to overturn
another constitutional right: the right to be presumed innocent of any crime until the contrary is
proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Perfunctorily informing a confessant of his constitutional rights, asking him if he wants to avail
of the services of counsel and telling him that he could ask for counsel if he so desires or that one
could be provided him at his request, are simply not in compliance with the constitutional
mandate. In this case, appellant Canape was merely told of his constitutional rights and
posthaste, asked whether he was willing to confess. His affirmative answer may not, by any
means, be interpreted as waiver of his right to counsel of his own choice.
We also find the fact that Atty. Chavez notarized the sworn statement seriously compromised his
independence. By doing so, he vouched for the regularity of the circumstances surrounding the
taking of the sworn statement by the police. He cannot serve as counsel of the accused and the
police at the same time. There was a serious conflict of interest on his part. 22
In People v. de Jesus 23, we stated that an independent counsel cannot be a special counsel,
public is private prosecutor, counsel of the police, or a municipal attorney whose interest is
admittedly adverse to the accused.
We have examined the three-page sworn statement allegedly executed by Feliciano and we failed
to see any badge of spontaneity and credibility to it. It shows signs of what we call stereotype
advice to which we have already called the attention of police officers. In People v. Jarra 24, we
said:
[T]he stereotyped "advice" appearing in practically all extrajudicial confessions which are later
repudiated has assumed the nature of "legal form" or mode. Police investigators either
automatically type it together with the curt "Opo" as the answer or ask the accused to sign it or
even copy it in their handwriting. Its tired, punctilious, fixed and artificially stately style does not
create an impression of voluntariness or even understanding on the part of the accused. The
showing of a spontaneous, free and unconstrained giving up of a right is missing.
Since April 27, 1992 when Republic Act No. 7438 25 was enacted, the constitutional rights of
persons under custodial investigation have been further operationalized:
Sec. 2. Rights of Persons Arrested, Detained, or Under Custodial Investigation; Duties of Public
Officers.
(a) Any person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation shall at all times be assisted by
counsel.
(b) Any public officer or employee, or anyone acting under his order or in his place, who arrests,
detains or investigates any person for the commission of an offense shall inform the latter, in a
language known to and understood by him, of his rights to remain silent and to have competent
and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice, who shall at all times be allowed to
confer privately with the person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation. If such
person cannot afford the services of his own counsel, he must be provided with a competent and
independent counsel by the investigating officer.
(c) The custodial investigation report shall be reduced to writing by the investigating officer,
provided that before such report is signed, or thumbmarked if the person arrested does not know
how to read and write, it shall be read and adequately explained to him by his counsel or by the
assisting counsel provided by the investigating officer in the language or dialect known to such
arrested or detained person, otherwise, such investigation report shall be null and void and of no
effect whatsoever.
(d) Any extrajudicial confession made by a person arrested, detained or under custodial
investigation shall be in writing and signed by such person in the presence of his counsel or in
the latter's absence, upon a valid waiver, and in the presence of any of the parents, older brothers
and sisters, his spouses, the municipal mayor, the municipal judge, district school supervisor, or
priest or minister of the gospel as chosen by him; otherwise, such extrajudicial confession shall
be inadmissible as evidence in any proceeding.
(e) Any waiver by a person arrested or detained under the provisions of Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code, or under custodial investigation, shall be in writing and signed by the
person in the presence of his counsel; otherwise such waiver shall be null and void and of no
effect.
(f) Any person arrested or detained or under custodial investigation shall be allowed visits by or
conferences with any member of his immediate family, or any medical doctor or priest or
religious minister chosen by him or by any member of his immediate family or by his counsel, or
by any national non-governmental organization duly accredited by the Commission on Human
Rights or by any international non-governmental organization duly accredited by the Office of
the President. The person's immediate family shall include his or her spouse, fiance or fiancee,
parent or child, brother or sister, grandparent or grandchild, uncle or aunt, nephew or niece, and
guardian or ward.
Consequently, it is disappointing to see how up to now some police officers still sidestep the
constitutional mandate, the consequence of which is all too familiar — the inadmissibility of the
statement, confession, or admission taken. 26
CONSTI II (Sec. 11-13) | 35
In People v. dela Cruz 27, we stated that "a confession made in an atmosphere characterized by
deficiencies in informing the accused of all rights to which he is entitled would be rendered
valueless and inadmissible, perforated, as it is, by non-compliance with the procedural and
substantive safeguards to which an accused is entitled under the Bill of Rights and as now further
implemented and ramified by statutory law."
On the charge of robbery with homicide, the only evidence presented by the prosecution was the
sworn statement which we have found inadmissible. Thus, we are forced to absolve accused-
appellant of this charge. With respect to the charge of highway robbery, the prosecution
presented the testimony of Ismael Ebon. However, Ebon failed to identify Feliciano as the
perpetrator when he reported to the police immediately after the incident:
CASE NO. 2143 dated 0030 H 29 March 93. Ismael Ibon y Petalcorin, 27 m (sic), of Reyes
Bugo, CDO, driver of PUJ Bugo Liner bearing Plate No. KBJ-748, and Christopher Impoc y
Amba, 16, s (sic), of Zone 4, Tablon, this City, jointly came to this OKK-CIS and reported that
they were allegedly victimized by two unidentified robbers who was (sic) armed with a (sic)
knives and taken from the possession of the above driver his cash money P700.00 and took our
stereo Pioneer Brand with Booster and twitter. The incident was (sic) occurred at Agusan, this
City, and the suspect was desembarked (sic) at Camaman-an, this City at 10:30 p.m., this date. 28
Ismael Ebon and accused-appellant Feliciano are acquainted. There is no reason for Ebon to
withhold the identity of the perpetrator except for the fact that he was not certain of
it. 29 Consequently, there is no evidence pointing to Feliciano as one of those who held-up Ebon.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the trial court is SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Henry
Feliciano is ACQUITTED on both charges of robbery with homicide and highway robbery due
to lack of evidence to sustain a conviction. The Director of the New Bilibid Prisons (NBP) is
directed to inform this Court compliance with the Decision within ten (10) days from its receipt.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

CONSTI II (Sec. 11-13) | 36

EN BANC
G.R. No. 145566 March 9, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
DINDO "BEBOT" MOJELLO, appellant.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On automatic review is a decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bogo, Cebu, Branch 61,
finding appellant Dindo "Bebot" Mojello guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape
with homicide defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
by Republic Act No. 7659, and sentencing him to the supreme penalty of death. 1
Appellant Dindo Mojello, alias "Bebot" was charged with the crime of rape with homicide in an
Information dated May 22, 1997, as follows:2
That on the 15th day of December 1996, at about 11:00 o'clock in the evening, at Sitio Kota,
Barangay Talisay, Municipality of Santa Fe, Province of Cebu, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, moved by lewd design and by
means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously succeed in having carnal knowledge with Lenlen Rayco under twelve (12) years of
age and with mental deficiency, against her will and consent, and by reason and/or on the
occasion thereof, purposely to conceal the most brutal act and in pursuance of his criminal
design, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with
intent to kill, treacherously and employing personal violence, attack, assault and kill the victim
Lenlen Rayco, thereby inflicting upon the victim wounds on the different parts of her body
which caused her death. CONTRARY TO LAW.
Appellant was arraigned on July 24, 1997, entering a plea of "not guilty." Trial followed.
On January 21, 1999, the trial court rendered judgment finding appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide, and sentencing him to suffer the death
penalty.
From the facts found by the court a quo, it appears that on December 15, 1996, at or around 9:00
p.m., Rogelio Rayco was having some drinks with a group which included Roger Capacito and
his wife and the spouses Borah and Arsolin Illustrismo at the Capacito residence located at
Barangay Talisay, Sta. Fe, Cebu.3
Rogelio Rayco left the group to go home about an hour later. On his way home, he saw his niece,
Lenlen Rayco, with appellant Dindo Mojello, a nephew of Roger Capacito, walking together
some thirty meters away towards the direction of Sitio Kota.4 Since he was used to seeing them
together on other occasions, he did not find anything strange about this. He proceeded to his
house.5
On December 16, 1996, between 5:00 to 6:00 a.m., the Rayco family was informed that the body
of Lenlen was found at the seashore of Sitio Kota. Rogelio Rayco immediately proceeded to the
site and saw the lifeless, naked and bruised body of his niece. Rogelio was devastated by what he
saw. A remorse of conscience enveloped him for his failure to protect his niece. He even
attempted to take his own life several days after the incident. 6
Appellant was arrested at Bantayan while attempting to board a motor launch bound for Cadiz
City. On an investigation conducted by SPO2 Wilfredo Giducos, he admitted that he was the
perpetrator of the dastardly deed. Appellant was assisted by Atty. Isaias Giduquio during his
custodial interrogation. His confession was witnessed by Barangay Captains Wilfredo
Batobalanos and Manolo Landao. Batobalanos testified that after it was executed, the contents of
the document were read to appellant who later on voluntarily signed it. 7 Appellant's extrajudicial
confession was sworn before Judge Cornelio T. Jaca of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
(MCTC) of Sta. Fe-Bantayan.8 On December 21, 1996, an autopsy was conducted on the victim's
cadaver by Dr. Nestor Sator of the Medico-Legal Branch of the PNP Crime Laboratory, Region
VII.9
Dr. Sator testified that the swelling of the labia majora and hymenal lacerations positively
indicate that the victim was raped.10 He observed that froth in the lungs of the victim and
contusions on her neck show that she was strangled and died of asphyxia. 11 He indicated the
cause of death as cardio-respiratory arrest due to asphyxia by strangulation and physical injuries
to the head and the trunk.12
In this automatic review, appellant raises two issues: whether the extrajudicial confession
executed by appellant is admissible in evidence; and whether appellant is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide.
We now resolve.
Appellant alleges that the lower court gravely erred in admitting in evidence the alleged
extrajudicial confession which he executed on December 23, 1996. In his Brief, appellant avers
that the confession which he executed was not freely, intelligently and voluntarily entered
into.13 He argues that he was not knowingly and intelligently apprised of his constitutional rights
before the confession was taken from him.14 Hence, his confession, and admissions made
therein, should be deemed inadmissible in evidence, under the fruit of the poisonous tree
doctrine.
We are not convinced.
At the core of the instant case is the application of the law on custodial investigation enshrined in
Article III, Section 12, paragraph 1 of the Constitution, which provides:
Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably
of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with
one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
The above provision in the fundamental Charter embodies what jurisprudence has termed as
"Miranda rights" stemming from the landmark decision of the United States Supreme
Court, Miranda v. Arizona.15 It has been the linchpin of the modern Bill of Rights, and the
ultimate refuge of individuals against the coercive power of the State.
CONSTI II (Sec. 11-13) | 37
The Miranda doctrine requires that: (a) any person under custodial investigation has the right to
remain silent; (b) anything he says can and will be used against him in a court of law; (c) he has
the right to talk to an attorney before being questioned and to have his counsel present when
being questioned; and (d) if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided before any
questioning if he so desires.
In the Philippines, the right to counsel espoused in the Miranda doctrine was based on the
leading case of People v. Galit16 and Morales, Jr. v. Enrile,17 rulings subsequently incorporated
into the present Constitution. TheMiranda doctrine under the 1987 Charter took on a modified
form where the right to counsel was specifically qualified to mean competent and independent
counsel preferably of the suspect's own choice. Waiver of the right to counsel likewise provided
for stricter requirements compared to its American counterpart; it must be done in writing, and in
the presence of counsel.
Verily, it may be observed that the Philippine law on custodial investigation has evolved to
provide for more stringent standards than what was originally laid out in Miranda v. Arizona.
The purpose of the constitutional limitations on police interrogation as the process shifts from the
investigatory to the accusatory seems to be to accord even the lowliest and most despicable
criminal suspects a measure of dignity and respect. The main focus is the suspect, and the
underlying mission of custodial investigation – to elicit a confession.
The extrajudicial confession executed by appellant on December 23, 1996, applying Art. III, Sec.
12, par. 1 of the Constitution in relation to Rep. Act No. 7438, Sec. 2 complies with the strict
constitutional requirements on the right to counsel. In other words, the extrajudicial confession
of the appellant is valid and therefore admissible in evidence.
As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, appellant was undoubtedly apprised of
his Miranda rights under the Constitution.18 The court a quo observed that the confession itself
expressly states that the investigating officers informed him of such rights.19 As further proof of
the same, Atty. Isaias Giduquio testified that while he was attending a Sangguniang Bayan
session, he was requested by the Chief of Police of Sta. Fe to assist appellant. 20 Appellant
manifested on record his desire to have Atty. Giduquio as his counsel, with the latter
categorically stating that before the investigation was conducted and appellant's statement taken,
he advised appellant of his constitutional rights. Atty. Giduquio even told appellant to answer
only the questions he understood freely and not to do so if he was not sure of his answer. 21 Atty.
Giduquio represented appellant during the initial stages of the trial of the present case.
Atty. Giduquio was a competent and independent counsel of appellant within the contemplation
of the Constitution. No evidence was presented to negate his competence and independence in
representing appellant during the custodial investigation. Moreover, appellant manifested for the
record that Atty. Giduquio was his choice of counsel during the custodial proceedings.
The phrase "preferably of his own choice" does not convey the message that the choice of a
lawyer by a person under investigation is exclusive as to preclude other equally competent and
independent attorneys from handling the defense; otherwise the tempo of custodial investigation
will be solely in the hands of the accused who can impede, nay, obstruct the progress of the
interrogation by simply selecting a lawyer who, for one reason or another, is not available to
protect his interest.22
We ruled in People v. Continente23 that while the choice of a lawyer in cases where the person
under custodial interrogation cannot afford the services of counsel – or where the preferred
lawyer is not available – is naturally lodged in the police investigators, the suspect has the final
choice as he may reject the counsel chosen for him and ask for another one. A lawyer provided
by the investigators is deemed engaged by the accused when he does not raise any objection
against the counsel's appointment during the course of the investigation, and the accused
thereafter subscribes to the veracity of the statement before the swearing officer. 24
The right to counsel at all times is intended to preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the
accused to admit something false. The lawyer, however, should never prevent an accused from
freely and voluntarily telling the truth. In People v. Dumalahay,25 this Court held:
The sworn confessions of the three accused show that they were properly apprised of their right
to remain silent and right to counsel, in accordance with the constitutional guarantee.
At 8:00 in the morning of the next day, the three accused proceeded to the office of Atty. Rexel
Pacuribot, Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City. All of the three
accused, still accompanied by Atty. Ubay-ubay, subscribed and swore to their respective written
confessions. Before administering the oaths, Atty. Pacuribot reminded the three accused of their
constitutional rights under the Miranda doctrine and verified that their statements were
voluntarily given. Atty. Pacuribot also translated the contents of each confession in the Visayan
dialect, to ensure that each accused understood the same before signing it.
No ill-motive was imputed on these two lawyers to testify falsely against the accused. Their
participation in these cases merely involved the performance of their legal duties as officers of
the court. Accused-appellant Dumalahay's allegation to the contrary, being self-serving, cannot
prevail over the testimonies of these impartial and disinterested witnesses.
More importantly, the confessions are replete with details which could possibly be supplied only
by the accused, reflecting spontaneity and coherence which psychologically cannot be associated
with a mind to which violence and torture have been applied. These factors are clear indicia that
the confessions were voluntarily given.
When the details narrated in an extrajudicial confession are such that they could not have been
concocted by one who did not take part in the acts narrated, where the claim of maltreatment in
the extraction of the confession is unsubstantiated and where abundant evidence exists showing
that the statement was voluntarily executed, the confession is admissible against the declarant.
There is greater reason for finding a confession to be voluntary where it is corroborated by
evidence aliunde which dovetails with the essential facts contained in such confession.
The confessions dovetail in all their material respects. Each of the accused gave the same
detailed narration of the manner by which Layagon and Escalante were killed. This clearly
shows that their confessions could not have been contrived. Surely, the three accused could not
have given such identical accounts of their participation and culpability in the crime were it not
the truth.
Concededly, the December 17, 1996 custodial investigation upon appellant's apprehension by the
police authorities violated the Miranda doctrine on two grounds: (1) no counsel was present; and
(2) improper waiver of the right to counsel as it was not made in writing and in the presence of
CONSTI II (Sec. 11-13) | 38
counsel. However, the December 23, 1996 custodial investigation which elicited the appellant's
confession should nevertheless be upheld for having complied with Art. III, Sec. 12, par. 1. Even
though improper interrogation methods were used at the outset, there is still a possibility of
obtaining a legally valid confession later on by properly interrogating the subject under different
conditions and circumstances than those which prevailed originally. 26
The records of this case clearly reflect that the appellant freely, voluntarily and intelligently
entered into the extrajudicial confession in full compliance with the Miranda doctrine under Art.
III, Sec. 12, par. 1 of the Constitution in relation to Rep. Act No. 7438, Sec. 2. SPO2 Wilfredo
Abello Giducos, prior to conducting his investigation, explained to appellant his constitutional
rights in the Visayan dialect, notably Cebuano, a language known to the appellant, viz:27
PASIUNA (PRELIMINARY) : Ikaw karon Dindo Mojello ubos sa usa ka inbestigasyon diin
ikaw gituhon nga adunay kalabutan sa kamatayon ni LENLEN RAYCO ug nahitabong paglugos
kaniya. Ubos sa atong Batakang Balaod, ikaw adunay katungod sa pagpakahilom ning maong
inbesigasyon karon kanimo ug aduna usab ikaw ug katungod nga katabangan ug usa ka
abogado nga motabang karon kanimo ning maong inbestigasyon. Imo ba nasabtan kining tanan?
(DINDO MOJELLO, you are hereby reminded that you are under investigation in which you
were suspected about the death and raping of LENLEN RAYCO. Under the Constitution you
have the right to remain silent about this investigation on you now and you have also the right to
have counsel of your own choice to assist you in this investigation now. Have you understood
everything?)
TUBAG (ANSWER) : Oo, sir. (Yes, sir.)
PANGUTANA (QUESTION) : Human ikaw sayri sa imong katungod ubos sa atong Batakang
Balaod sa pagpakahilom, gusto ba nimo nga ipadayon nato kining inbestigasyon karon kanimo?
(After you have been apprised of your rights under our Constitution to remain silent, do you
want to proceed this investigation on you now?)
TUBAG (QUESTION) : Oo, sir. (Yes, sir.)
PANGUTANA (QUESTION) : Gusto ba usab nimo ug abogado nga makatabang kanimo ning
maong inbestigasyon? (Do you want counsel to assist you in this said investigation?)
TUBAG (ANSWER) : Oo, sir. (Yes, sir.)
APPEARANCE : Atty. Isaias Giduquio is appearing as counsel of the affiant.
PANGUTANA (QUESTION) : Ako usab ikaw pahinumdoman nga unsa man ang imo isulti
karon dinhi magamit pabor o batok kanimo sa Hukmanan, nasabtan ba nimo kining tanan mo
nga mga katungod nga walay naghulga, nagpugos o nagdagmal kanimo o nagsaad ba ug ganti
sa kaulihan? (You are also hereby reminded that all your statements now will be used as
evidence against or in your favor in any court of justice. Have you understood all your rights
with nobody coercing or forcing you, or mauling or promising a reward in the end?)
TUBAG (ANSWER) : Oo (Yes.)
PANGUTANA (QUESTION) : Andam ka nga mohatag ug libre ug boluntaryo nga pamahayag?
(Are you now ready to give your free and voluntary statement?)
TUBAG (ANSWER) : Oo, sir. (Yes, sir.)
xxx xxx xxx
(START OF CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION)
xxx xxx x x x.
The trial court observed that as to the confession of appellant, he was fully apprised of his
constitutional rights to remain silent and his right to counsel, as contained in such
confession.28 Appellant was properly assisted by Atty. Isaias Giduquio. The extrajudicial
confession of appellant was subscribed and sworn to before Judge Cornelio T. Jaca, Municipal
Judge of Medellin-Daanbantayan and acting Judge of MCTC Sta. Fe-Bantayan and Madredijos.
Judge Jaca declared that he explained to the appellant the contents of the extrajudicial confession
and asked if he understood it. He subsequently acknowledged that when appellant subscribed to
his statement, Atty. Giduquio, witness Batobalonos and his Clerk of Court were present as well
as other people.29
The extrajudicial confession executed by the appellant followed the rigid requirements of the
Miranda doctrine; consequently, it is admissible as evidence. The lower court was correct in
giving credence to the extrajudicial confession of the appellant.
On cross-examination, appellant Mojello claimed his life was threatened, thereby inducing him
to execute an extrajudicial confession, yet he neither filed any case against the person who
threatened him, nor he report this to his counsel. He further claimed that he did not
understand the contents of the confession which was read in the Visayan dialect, yet he admits
that he uses the Visayan dialect in his daily discourse.
In People v. Pia,30 we held that "where appellants did not present evidence of compulsion or
duress or violence on their persons; where they failed to complain to officers who administered
the oaths; where they did not institute any criminal or administrative action against their alleged
maltreatment; where there appears no marks of violence on their bodies and where they did not
have themselves examined by a reputable physician to buttress their claim, all these should be
considered as factors indicating voluntariness of confessions." The failure of the appellant to
complain to the swearing officer or to file charges against the persons who allegedly maltreated
him, although he had all the chances to do so, manifests voluntariness in the execution of his
confessions.31 To hold otherwise is to facilitate the retraction of his statements at the mere
allegation of threat, torture, coercion, intimidation or inducement, without any proof
whatsoever. People v. Enanoria further declared that another indicium of voluntariness is the
disclosure of details in the confession which could have been known only to the declarant. 32
The confessant bears the burden of proof that his confession is tainted with duress, compulsion
or coercion by substantiating his claim with independent evidence other than his own self-
serving claims that the admissions in his affidavit are untrue and unwillingly executed. 33 Bare
assertions will certainly not suffice to overturn the presumption. 34
The test for determining whether a confession is voluntary is whether the defendant's will was
overborne at the time he confessed.35 In cases where the Miranda warnings have been given, the
CONSTI II (Sec. 11-13) | 39
test of voluntariness should be subsequently applied in order to determine the probative weight Appellant should instead be held liable only for the crime of statutory rape, the victim Lenlen
of the confession. Rayco being then eleven years old. The sexual assault was necessarily included in the special
complex crime charged in the Information dated May 22, 1997.
Accordingly, the presumption of voluntariness of appellant's confession remains unrebutted by
his failure to present independent evidence that the same was coerced. The trial court should have awarded damages to the heirs of the victim. Civil indemnity in the
amount of P50,000.00 is awarded upon the finding of the fact of rape. 36 Moral damages in the
It cannot be gainsaid that the constitutional duty of law enforcement officers is to ensure that a
amount of P50,000.00 may likewise be given to the heirs of the victim without need of proof in
suspect has been properly apprised of his Miranda rights, including the right to counsel. It is in
accordance with current jurisprudence.37
the paramount public interest that the foundation of an effective administration of criminal
justice relies on the faithful adherence to the Mirandadoctrine. Compliance with Art. III, Sec. 12, WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bogo,
par. 1 by police authorities is central to the criminal justice system;Miranda rights must in every Cebu, Branch 61 in Criminal Case No. B-00224 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
case be respected, without exception. Appellant Dindo Mojello is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of statutory rape
and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is also ordered to pay the heirs of
Thus, the confession, having strictly complied with the constitutional requirements under Art. III,
the victim, Lenlen Rayco, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
Sec. 12, par. 1, is deemed admissible in evidence against appellant. It follows that the admission
of culpability made therein is admissible. It is therefore not "fruit of the poisonous tree" since the Costs de oficio.
tree itself is not poisonous.
SO ORDERED.
Appellant also alleges that the lower court gravely erred in holding him guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape with homicide, thereby sentencing him to suffer the death penalty
despite the glaring insufficiency of circumstantial evidence against him. In his Brief, he argues
that the evidence against him is insufficient to warrant his conviction of rape with homicide.
The categorical admission of the appellant to the crime of rape, coupled with the corpus
delicti as established by the Medico-Legal Report and the testimony of Rogelio Rayco, leads us
to no other conclusion than that of appellant's guilt for the rape of Lenlen Rayco on December
15, 1996. It passes the test of moral certainty and must therefore be sustained.
However, the records do not adequately show that appellant admitted to killing the victim.
Neither is the circumstantial evidence sufficient to establish that by reason or on the occasion of
the rape a homicide was committed by the appellant. The lack of physical evidence further
precludes us from connecting the slaying of the victim to her sexual assault, given the quantum
of proof required by law for conviction. No estimated time of death was given, which is essential
in making a connection with the appellant's story that he went home after a night of drinking.
The time when he and the victim were headed towards the seashore at or about 9:00 to 10:00
p.m. of December 15, 1996 until the time when the victim's lifeless body was found at or about
4:00 a.m. of December 16, 1996 had a time variance of between six to seven hours. Although the
circumstances may point to the appellant as the most likely perpetrator of the homicide, the same
do not constitute an unbroken chain of events which would lead us to a reasonable conclusion
that appellant was guilty of killing the victim. In other words, there are gaps in the reconstruction
of facts and inferences surrounding the death of Lenlen. Appellant only admitted to boxing the
victim when she shouted, then hurriedly ran away. The cause of death of Lenlen was cardio-
respiratory attack due to asphyxiation and physical injuries; she was strangled to death and left
on the seashore as manifested by the frothing in her lungs. No physical, scientific or DNA
evidence was presented to pinpoint appellant as the person who killed the victim. Fingerprints, if
available, would have determined who committed the homicide. Thus, appellant cannot be
convicted of rape with homicide considering the insufficiency of evidence which thereby created
a reasonable doubt as to his guilt for the said special complex crime.
CONSTI II (Sec. 11-13) | 40
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 95089 August 11, 1997
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
NICOMEDES FABRO, FRANCISCO DIMALANTA, AMADO ALCALA, WILLIAM
HOGE and "JOHN DOE," accused, NICOMEDES FABRO, accused-appellant.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The 1987 Constitution guarantees persons undergoing custodial investigation the rights to remain
silent and to have competent and independent counsel. These rights cannot be waived except in
writing and in the presence of counsel. The Constitution impels strict compliance with these
requirements because a confession of guilt given during such investigation constitutes
formidable evidence against the accused on the principle that no one will knowingly, freely and
deliberately admit authorship of a crime unless prompted by truth and conscience, particularly
where the facts given could have been known only by appellant. On the other hand, any
allegation of force, duress, undue influence or other forms of involuntariness in exacting such
confession must be proven by clear, convincing and competent evidence by the defense.
Otherwise, the confession's full probative value may be used to demonstrate the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt.
Statement of the Case
These doctrines are applied by the Court in deciding this appeal from the Decision 1
of the
Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, Branch 72, 2 in Crim. Case No. 364-87, finding the
accused guilty of murder and sentencing them toreclusion perpetua.
In an Information dated June 11, 1987, Second Assistant Fiscal of Olongapo City, Jesus P.
Duranto, charged Nicomedes Fabro, Francisco Dimalanta, Amado Alcala, William Hoge and a
certain "John Doe" with murder committed as follows:
That on or about the twelfth (12th) day of April 1987, in the City of Olongapo, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring
confederating together and mutually helping one another, accused Nicomedes Fabro armed with
a gun, with intent to kill and with treachery, evident premeditation and in consideration of
promise of reward, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and
shot (sic) therewith one Dionisio Joaquin and as a result thereof, the latter suffered shock and
Hemmorhage Massive, Secondary to Gun Shot Wound which directly caused his death shortly
thereafter.
CONTRARY TO LAW: With the qualifying circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation
and reward. 3
On August 10, 1987, Dimalanta and Appellant Fabro, with the assistance of Counsel de
oficio Romeo C. Alinea, pleaded not guilty. On September 8, 1987, Accused Alcala entered the
same plea. The other two accused, William Hoge and "John Doe," were never arrested or
arraigned.
In the course of the trial, both Accused Dimalanta and Alcala jumped bail. 4 Thus, only appellant
was presented as witness by the defense.
On June 25, 1990, the trial court rendered its assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, premised on all the foregoing consideration, the Court finds accused
NICOMEDES FABRO, FRANCISCO DIMALANTA and AMADO ALCALA guilty beyond
the shadow of a doubt of the crime of MURDER as charged in the information, with three
aggravating circumstances and pursuant to Article 248, and hereby sentences them (to) the
maximum penalty of death. However, with the abolition of death penalty, accused shall
suffer reclusion perpetua, with costs against the accused. The Court orders the accused
collectively to indemnify the heirs of Dionisio Joaquin (in) the sum of P30,000.00. 5
On June 29, 1990, a Notice of Appeal direct to the Supreme Court was filed in the trial court in
view of the penalty imposed, reclusion perpetua. As Dimalanta and Alcala jumped bail during
the proceedings before the court a quo, their appeal is deemed dismissed pursuant to Rule 124,
Section 8 of the Rules of Court 6 and Supreme Court Administrative Circular 2-92. 7 Hence, only
the appeal of Fabro will be ruled upon. 7-A References to Dimalanta and Alcala in this Decision
are made only to complete the narration of the case, and thus will affect only Fabro.
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecution presented five witnesses: (1) Dr. Richard Patilano who conducted the autopsy
on the remains of the victim; (2) Sgt. Felipe Bolina, the police investigator; (3) Anthony Beck,
companion of the victim; (4) Conrado Joaquin, the victim's father; and (5) Atty. Isagani Jungco,
the IBP President (Zambales Chapter) who was presented as rebuttal witness. Among the
documentary evidence submitted were the sworn statements of appellant, Beck, Dimalanta and
Joaquin, and the joint affidavit of Sgts. Bolina and Lappay. The prosecution's version of the
facts, as summarized by the Solicitor General in the Appellee's Brief, 8 is as follows:
Sometime in the second week of April, 1987, a strike was held by workers on the premises of the
Casa Blanca located at Barrio Barretto, Olongapo City. Dionisio Joaquin, the victim, was one of
organizers thereof. He sought the assistance of friends, among whom was Anthony Beck, a
stevedore and resident of Olongapo City (pp. 28-31, TSN, May 24, 1988).
At about 6:00 P.M. on April 11, 1987, Joaquin and Beck were at Whisky Bar fronting the Casa
Blanca, at Barrio Barretto, Olongapo City. They were conversing while resting at the veranda of
said Whisky Bar, fronting the Casa Blanca where a picket was being conducted by their co-
strikers. Both had fallen asleep, as they lacked sleep the previous nights, on a chair near each
other with their feet resting on the veranda railings (pp. 39-46, ibid).
Anthony Beck fell asleep at about 4:00 o'clock in the early morning of April 12, 1987. Shortly
thereafter, at about 5:00 to 5:30 in the morning, he was awakened by gun report. Opening his
eyes, he saw Joaquin dead, with a single bullet wound on the forehead. Blood was oozing from
Joaquin's head. Seeing a man running away from where he and Joaquin were seated, Anthony
Beck then gave chase. The fleeing man turned left on an alley and then right on another. Beck
CONSTI II (Sec. 11-13) | 41
lost him at the second turn. He saw an old man who inquired why he was chasing the fleeing
man. Beck told the old man of the shooting incident. Then and there the old man told Beck that
the man he (Beck) was running after was "Badong", later identified as the accused Nicomedes
Fabro (pp. 54-62, ibid).
Police officers from the Olongapo Metrodiscom, led by Sgt. Felipe Bolina, proceeded to Fabro's
residence at about noon that same day. They failed to apprehend Fabro as he was allegedly then
asleep. The accused (Fabro) was surrendered by his sister to the CIS the following day (pp. 12-
14, TSN, July 18, 1989).
At 6:00 o'clock that night, April 13, 1987, Fabro was interrogated by CIS personnel and grilled
for about two (2) hours (pp. 16-19, supra).
At that juncture, CIS investigator Santiago requested Fabro to sign a document, which turned out
to be his extra-judicial confession/admission (Exh. "F"). Accused Fabro (claims that he) was not
allowed to read the document, neither were its contents read to him (pp. 24-26). A certain Atty.
Isagani Jungco was however present when he signed the document (p. 28, supra; pp. 2-18, TSN,
March 19, 1990).
While it appears from the transcript that co-accused Francisco Dimalanta executed an extra-
judicial statement (confession) (pp. 24-25, TSN, Feb. 2, 1988), Dimalanta himself was never
presented in court as defense witness, as both accused Dimalanta and Alcala jumped bail during
trial.
Version of the Defense
The defense presented its only witness in the person of the appellant. No documentary evidence
was submitted. The counter-statement of facts, as narrated in the six-page Brief for the
Appellants, 9 reads as follows:
The version of the defense as testified to by Nicomedes Fabro was that at two o'clock in the
morning of April 12, 1987, he stopped ferrying passengers and slept on a sofa at the Whiskey
River Club, located on a terrace of said club. When he laid down and rested at the sofa, there was
also another person who was seated on the sofa and was more or less one arm's length away from
him. The man was then asleep but (Fabro) only knew his face but not his name. While sleeping,
he was awakened by the shout of one of his companion saying "may binaril, may binaril". The
shout was very loud and after shouting the man ran towards Olongapo City. Accused according
to him was standing and looking at the bloodied person who was more or less two arms length
away from him. The bloodied person was at the balcony of the Whiskey River Club.
Accused was surrendered to the CIS by his sister on April 13, 1987. Nicomedes Fabro claimed
that he was made to sign a document without allowing him to read the contents. According to
accused Fabro, investigator Santiago told him that if he will not sign the document something
will happen to him. Atty. Isagani Jungco was present when he signed his name, however, the
document was already prepared and ready for signature.
Trial Court's Findings
In its Decision, the trial court leaned towards the version of the prosecution; 10
From the evidence presented by the prosecution, both testimonial and documentary, the Court
finds these facts to be indubitable. That in the early morning of April 12, 1987, between 5:00 and
5:30, the deceased Dionisio Joaquin who was sleeping side by side with Anthony Beck on the
terrace of the Whiskey Bar, opposite Casa Blanca, Barrio Barretto, Olongapo City, was shot in
the head at close range by accused Nicomedes Fabro. The deceased was bleeding with blood
oozing from the forehead when found by some Olongapo police and Sgt. Bolina, a PC soldier
who arrived at the scene. The deceased was found on a chair, his feet raised on the veranda with
his head inclined back.
xxx xxx xxx
Anthony Beck who was asleep side by side with the deceased was awakened by a shot and even
heard the "kalansing" of the bullet, chased the person whom he saw running away after the shot
was fired. He testified that when he was chasing the man he did not yet know his name but he
could identify him. Beck made the identification when accused Fabro was mixed with other
people getting clearance at 164th PC Company Office. Beck positively identified the accused
when he testified in Court.
xxx xxx xxx
Beck testified that Dionisio Joaquin was an organizer of a labor organization and that the latter
invited the former to support the strikers.
Sgt. Bolina thru his investigation learned the identity of the man who was running away from the
scene of the crime as Nicomedes Fabro. Upon learning the identity of the suspect, Bolina went to
the parents of Fabro whom he knew personally and requested that Fabro be surrendered to him.
Bolina learned later that the suspect was surrendered to the CIS. After the CIS investigation,
Nicomedes Fabro gave his confession in the presence of Atty. Isagani Jungco who was called to
assist the suspect. In his confession, Fabro implicated Francisco Dimalanta and Amado Alcala.
From reliable information received by Sgt. Bolina and the other policemen, they learned the
identity of two other suspects, namely: Francisco Dimalanta and Amado Alcala. From
unconfirmed reports these two Dimalanta and Alcala participated in the killing of Dionisio
Joaquin. The confession of Fabro confirmed that indeed Dimalanta and Alcala were his co-
conspirator.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . . (Sgt.). Lappay testified that he was present during the investigation of Fabro. Fabro in his
presence admitted his participation and pointed to Francisco Dimalanta and Amado Alcala and
one Ernesto de Guzman. It was in early morning of April 14, 1987 that de Guzman and
Dimalanta were apprehended along Rizal Extension, they being neighbors. Alcala was arrested at
above street.
After analyzing and weighing all the pieces of testimonial and documentary evidence, the trial
court declined to give credence to the uncorroborated claim of appellant that he was asleep at the
terrace of the Whiskey Club at the time of the incident. The court a quo also rejected his
contention that he was coerced into signing a confession, since the solitary verbal "threat"
allegedly made by the investigator was vague and not backed up by the use of actual physical
CONSTI II (Sec. 11-13) | 42
force. After considering the presence of the counsel (Atty. Jungco) who assisted the appellant of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with
and his co-accused during the custodial investigation as well as in the execution of their one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
respective sworn statements, the lower court admitted in evidence their extrajudicial confessions.
xxx xxx xxx
The confession of Appellant Fabro was summarized by the lower court, thus:
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or section 17 hereof shall be
In the confession of Nicomedes Fabro he narrated how Francisco Dimalanta offered him inadmissible in evidence against him.
P10,000.00 to kill a man, how the gun was given him and how they observed the movements of
Moreover, Article III, Section 17 of the Constitution, guaranteeing the right of the accused
the victim to the time of the killing. While Nicomedes Fabro did the actual shooting, accused
against self-incrimination, provides:
Alcala and Dimalanta were present awaiting the outcome of the shooting.
Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
The confession of Dimalanta coincide in all materials points with the confession of Fabro.
Dimalanta narrated how he was promised the amount P10,000 by a certain Bill Hoge and how he In jurisprudence, no confession can be admitted in evidence unless it is given:
was paid of P5,000.00 as initial payment and the balance to be paid after the killing is
1. Freely and voluntarily, without compulsion, inducement or
accomplished. The P5,000.00 initial payment was shared by the three accused.
trickery; 12
From the foregoing, the trial court established the existence of conspiracy among the three
2. Knowingly based on an effective communication to the individual under custodial
accused. The trial court further found the testimony of Beck unbiased, truthful and credible.
investigation of his constitutional rights; 13 and
Finally, the court below held that the commission of the crime was attended by the aggravating
3. Intelligently with full appreciation of its importance and comprehension of its consequences. 14
circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation and consideration of price or reward.
Once admitted, the confession must inspire credibility or be one which the normal experience of
Assignment of Errors
mankind can accept as being within the realm of probability. 15
Appellant interposes the present appeal, faulting the trial court:
A confession meeting all the foregoing requisites constitutes evidence of a high order since it is
I. For not considering the defense of alibi when there is doubt as to the identity of the suspect. supported by the strong presumption that no person of normal mind will knowingly, freely and
deliberately confess that he is the perpetrator of a crime unless prompted by truth and
II. For not considering the admissions and confessions as inadmissible as violative of the
conscience. 16 When all these requirements are met and the confession is admitted in evidence,
Constitution.
the burden of proof that it was obtained by undue pressure, threat or intimidation rests upon the
III. For not considering the statements and testimonies of prosecution witnesses as hearsay. accused. 17
IV. For presuming that conspiracy exists. Admittedly, the case of the prosecution hinges on appellant's confession. The defense maintains
that the same is inadmissible for the following reasons: (1) appellant's confession was extracted
The Court's Ruling
under threat and intimidation; (2) the lawyer's (Atty. Jungco's) participation was only as a
The appeal is not meritorious. In view of the incriminatory nature of appellant's confession, the witness during the signing of the prepared confession and not during the investigation or
Court will tackle the second assigned error ahead of the first. interrogation itself; and (3) appellant was made to sign the confession without having read it and
without the presence of counsel.
First Issue: Admissibility of Appellant's Confession
As proof thereof, the defense quotes appellant's statements during direct examination: 18
A confession is defined in jurisprudence as a declaration made voluntarily and without
compulsion or inducement by a person, stating or acknowledging that he has committed or Q. And what did (CIS Investigator) Santiago tell you if he told you anything?
participated in the commission of a crime. 11 But before it can be admitted in evidence, several
A. Santiago told me that if I will not sign it, something will happen to me.
requirements have to be satisfied.
Q. But you will admit before this Court that before you affixed your signature, the document was
Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution, which came into effect on February 2, 1987,
shown to you by Santiago, did he not?
requires that:
A. No more, I was just made to sign.
(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably

CONSTI II (Sec. 11-13) | 43

Q. Do you want to impress the Court that you just affixed your signature without you being
allowed to read the documents or the investigator Santiago did not even read unto you the
contents of the documents?
A. No sir.
Such uncorroborated and anemic allegations are insufficient to render appellant's confession
inadmissible. Rather, they appear to be a mere subterfuge designed to impute constitutional
infirmity to the conduct of the custodial interrogation.
The more credible evidence is the rebuttal testimony of Atty. Jungco showing adherence to the
constitutional requirements. Atty. Jungco testified that after he apprised appellant of his
constitutional rights to be silent and to have counsel during the investigation, the latter waived
them in his (Atty. Jungco's) presence. Thus: 19
ATTY. DE DIOS:
Q Atty. Jungco, I would like to bring your attention to April 13, 1987, do you remember having
been called to assist an accused detained at the CIS Office, Camp Maquinaya, Olongapo City?
A Yes, I was then the President of the IBP of Zambales-Olongapo Chapter and the CIS people
approached me if I will help them in the waiver, to be present when waiver will be signed by the
person before the CIS,
Q Waiver of what?
A Waiver of the right to counsel and the presence of counsel during the taking of his
investigation.
xxx xxx xxx
Q To refresh your memory, Atty. Jungco, I am showing you a statement which has been marked
as Exhibit F for the prosecution, please go over this before I ask my question.
A (Witness going over the document handed to him) I recognize this statement.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Can you explain what is this Pagpapatunay wherein you are witness to that?
A I was present when Nicomedes Fabro during the time that I was there signed his waiver of the
right to have counsel at the time of the taking of his testimony.
Q Now, it is the waiver of the accused to counsel, will you please tell the Court if you advised
him of his rights and effect of such waiver?
xxx xxx xxx
A Before he signed this waiver, I apprised him of his rights under the Constitution, that is, the
right to be silent, the right to counsel and that any statement that he will make in any
investigation may be used for or against him in any court of law and after that, I asked him if
despite his right to have counsel present during the taking of his testimony, he still waives that
right to counsel and he said "Yes" and he signed that statement there. As a matter of fact, in this
Pagpapatunay, the last sentence "Pumirma ako . . . . sa harapan ni Atty. Isagani Jungco, IBP
President." (Sgd) Nicomedes Fabro".
Q Atty. Jungco, was that advice given in Tagalog or in English?
A It was given in Tagalog and in English.
Q Did he understand your admonition or your reminders concerning his right?
A He understood because he said "Yes".
xxx xxx xxx
Q Thank you. Atty. Jungco, at the last page and this is the end of his confession, there is a
signature of Nicomedes Fabro, were you present when he signed the last page of his testimony?
A At the time that he signed this, I was there present because I was talking then with their Chief
there which is I think Capt. Flores and before I left, this statement was completed.
ATTY. DE DIOS:
Q Thank you. Atty. Jungco, when you signed this first page and when Nicomedes Fabro signed
this waiver, do you remember whether or not there was already a statement prepared?
xxx xxx xxx
A At the time that he signed this, the investigation has not yet began because precisely, I was
asked to be present because of the waiver. And after he signed his waiver and I signed it also in
his presence, I was talking with Capt. Flores and they were taking his testimony at that time.
Then, afterwards, before I left.
This adherence to the Constitution is further confirmed by the confession itself. It starts off with
a Pasubali 20wherein appellant was informed of his constitutional rights and
a Pagpapatunay which confirmed that he understood said rights. Both parts also serve as a
written proof of appellant's waiver in fulfillment of the requirements of the Constitution.
As pointed out by the Solicitor General, the testimony of Atty. Jungco was replete with details as
to how he informed and warned appellant of the consequences of the waiver of his right to
counsel. Thus, he argues that there is no room for doubt that appellant was indeed assisted by
counsel when he waived his right to counsel during the time that his statement was taken, and not
only at the time he signed it as claimed by appellant.
The Constitution further requires that the counsel be independent; thus, he cannot be a special
counsel, public or private prosecutor, counsel of the police, or a municipal attorney whose
interest is admittedly adverse to that of the accused. Atty. Jungco does not fall under any of said
enumeration. Nor is there any evidence that he had any interest adverse to that of the
accused. 21 The indelible fact is that he was president of the Zambales Chapter of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, and not a lackey of the lawmen.
Doubts that Atty. Jungco's assistance to appellant was not independent since he was engaged by
the CIS Investigators are further dispelled by the fact that he was sent 22 to the CIS Office by Sgt.
Bolina who personally knew appellant's parents and was a friend of his brother-in-law. 23 He
CONSTI II (Sec. 11-13) | 44
took the trouble to ensure that a lawyer was present during the taking of appellant's statement,
even though he (Bolina) would not be there. Ineluctably, appellant, by his uncorroborated,
puerile and matter-of-fact claim, failed to overcome the presumption that Atty. Jungco regularly
performed his official duty as an officer of the court in giving assistance to persons undergoing
custodial interrogation. 24 Upon the other, the overwhelming evidence is that he did performs
such duty faithfully.
After the prosecution has shown that the confession was obtained in accordance with the
aforesaid constitutional guarantee, the burden of proving that undue pressure or duress was used
to obtain it rests on the accused. 25 InAntillon vs. Barcelon, 26 the Court imposed a high degree of
proof to overthrow the presumption of truth in the recitals contained in a public instrument
executed with all the legal formalities.
In People vs. Pia, 27 the Court held that where the accused failed to present credible evidence of
compulsion or duress or violence on their person, e.g., where they failed to complain to the
officers who administered the oaths; where they did not institute any criminal or administrative
action against their alleged intimidators for maltreatment; where there appeared to be no marks
of violence on their bodies; and where they did not have themselves examined by a reputable
physician to buttress their claim, their confession should be considered voluntary. 28
Appellant has miserably failed to present any convincing evidence to prove the use of force or
intimidation on his person to secure his confession. The records show that appellant's confession
was sworn and subscribed to before Fiscal Jesus Dorante, to whom he could have and should
have voiced his objection, if any. Quite the contrary, Fiscal Dorante certified that he personally
examined appellant and was convinced that the latter gave his statement freely and voluntarily
and that he understood the contents of his confession. Appellant's failure to voice out his
complaints is tantamount to a manifestation that indeed he waived his right to counsel in the
presence of Atty. Jungco in accordance with the Constitution. 29 His assertion on appeal that he
was intimidated into giving said confession rings hollow and too late. 30
This claim is further belied by appellant's lack of complaint, or even any mention thereof, to his
sister and relatives who visited him at Camp Maquinaya where he was detained for one
year. 31 This reinforces the trial court's ruling.
Perhaps the most telling indication that appellant's confession was voluntary is the fact that said
confession contained exculpatory claims 32 (Question Nos. 5, 7, 8 and 9) and facts that only the
appellant could have known (Question Nos. 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 14, 15, 17, 20 and 29). 33
Thus, we can only affirm the following findings of the trial court:
Neither can the Court accept that accused Nicomedes Fabro was only forced into giving a
confession. The Court cannot even for a while believe that he was only forced to give his
statement when the accused himself stated that he was not even once hurt by any of the CIS
investigators. In (fact), he was even told to rest.
Atty. Alinea:
Q — And immediately after your sister left, your interrogation by the CIS agents started, that is
correct or it is not?
A — No, sir I was asked to clean.
Q — What portion or portions of the CIS headquarters were you ordered to clean?
A — The ceilings.
Q — And after cleaning the ceiling of the CIS headquarters, what was the next order to you?
A — They asked me to rest.
(TSN, July 18, 1989, pp. 15-16.)
xxx xxx xxx
Q — And after cleaning the car of Capt. Flores, what was your next chore or activity?
A — I cooked food for them.
Q — And these activities became routinary and ordinary for how many days?
A — I stayed there for a year and that was the routinary work I did. (TSN, July 18, 1989, p. 23)
The only alleged threat to him was that "Santiago told me that if I will not sign it something will
happen to me." (TSN, July 18, 1989, p. 26). Nothing was mentioned about actual physical force
used on accused. 34 . . .
We hold that appellant's confession was properly admitted by the trial court as part of the
prosecution evidence.
Second Issue: Defense of "Alibi" vs. Positive Identification
The defense argues that, although alibi is the weakest defense, easily fabricated and concocted,
nevertheless is gains strength when there is doubt as to the identity of the suspect. Although
appellant admitted that he was sleeping next to the victim when the latter was shot, he claims that
Witness Beck could not have seen the face of the person running away from the crime scene
since it was still dark at that time. Beck had just awakened, so it would have taken some time
before his eyes could have adjusted. Thus, the defense speculates that the identification of
appellant by Beck was "coached and suggested" by the investigators who fetched him and
prepared his second statement.
These arguments do not inspire belief. Beck claimed that he saw appellant running away from
the scene of the shooting. In answer to the trial judge's clarificatory questions during the cross-
examination, the witness replied that, when he opened his eyes after hearing the gun report, he
saw a person who immediately ran away. 35 Beck testified that he was appellant's face while
chasing the latter, although he did not catch up with appellant. 36 Therefore, from the time he was
awakened until the lost the appellant during the chase, Beck saw appellant's face. Subsequently,
in open court, he pointed to appellant as the man he had chased. This fact was not lost on the
defense; thus, the defense claimed that, considering the time of the incident (5:00 to 5:30 a.m. in
mid-April), there would have been insufficient daylight to permit clear and positive identification
of the culprit by the witness.
The defense claims that this "weak" identification by Beck strengthened appellant's "alibi,"
which is actually and more accurately a denial in view of appellant's admission that he was at the
CONSTI II (Sec. 11-13) | 45
scene of the crime. However, giving it a different name does not increase its probative value. A
denial, like other defenses, remains subject to the strength of the prosecution evidence which is
independently assessed. When the evidence for the prosecution convincingly connects the crime
and the culprit, the probative value of the denial is negligible. Otherwise, credibility of
testimonies and their evidentiary weight come into play. The well-settled rule is that the
assessment by the trial court of credibility and weight of evidence is accorded the highest respect
and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of any clear showing that the trial court
overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of substance which would
have affected the result of the case.
Back's testimony that appellant was the man he chased contravenes the contention that appellant
was sleeping one arm's length away from the victim; that appellant was only awakened by shouts
that somebody was shot; and that he stayed at the crime scene for a time during the investigation.
Moreover, the denial is directly contravened by his confession that he shot the victim.
In light of this confession, the denial is actually a belated retraction of said confession. The rule
in this jurisdiction is that repudiation and recantation of confessions which have been obtained in
accordance with the Constitution are looked upon with disfavor as unreliable. 37 They have
negligible probative weight.
Thus, we agree with the trial court that appellant's denial is totally unconvincing. Appellant's
uncorroborated testimony is: (1) that he just happened to be asleep at the terrace of the Whiskey
Bar; (2) that appellant who resided nearby, for no explainable reason, elected to sleep on the
same veranda during the very same night that the victim was shot; (3) that he was awakened only
by the shouting of people and not by the sound of the gunshot; (4) and finally, that he stayed at
the scene of the crime for about 30 minutes without anybody noticing that he was there at all. 38
Third Issue: Alleged Hearsay Evidence
The defense claims that the identification of appellant was hearsay because appellant's name was
allegedly given to Witness Beck by a certain Eduardo Ragonton who, however, was not
presented as a witness. We cannot sustain this. The fact remains that Witness Beck was able to
identify appellant in open court because he had seen the latters face that fateful night. 39 While
Beck may not have known the name of the appellant, he was certain about the latter's identity.
Indeed, appellant's name which was supplied by another person to Witness Beck may be
considered hearsay; but appellant's identity which the said witness personally knew is not.
Fourth Issue: Existence of Conspiracy
The defense raises this issue without elaborating further or offering any evidence in support
thereof.
We are not persuaded. In fact, the conspiracy between appellant and his co-accused appears
indubitable. The decision of the trial court states that:
From reliable information received by Sgt. Bolina and other policemen, they learned the identity
of two other suspects, namely: Francisco Dimalanta and Amado Alcala. From unconfirmed
reports these two (,) Dimalanta and Alcala(,) participated in the killing of Dionisio Joaquin. The
confession of Fabro confirmed that indeed Dimalanta and Alcala were his co-conspirators.
xxx xxx xxx
In the confession of Nicomedes Fabro he narrated how Francisco Dimalanta offered him
P10,000.00 to kill a man, how the gun was given him and how they observed the movements of
the victim to the time of the killing. While Nicomedes Fabro did the actual shooting, accused
Alcala and Dimalanta were present awaiting the outcome of the shooting. 40
The said decision further elaborates:
The confession of Dimalanta coincided in all material points with the confession of Fabro.
Dimalanta narrated how he was promised the amount of P10,000.00 by a certain Bill Hoge and
how he was paid P5,000.00 initial payment was shared by the three accused. 41
The acts of the accused show that they were animated by the same purpose and were united in
their execution. When, by their acts, two or more persons proceed toward the accomplishment of
the same unlawful object — each doing a part so that their acts though apparently independent
were in fact connected, indicating a closeness of formal association and a concurrence of
sentiment — conspiracy may be inferred. 42
From appellant's confession, it is clear that Dimalanta offered him money to kill Joaquin; that,
together with Alcala, they observed the movements of the victim; that prior to the shooting, they
had attempted to kill the victim at the D & E Fast Food Restaurant; and that at the time of the
shooting, on April 12, 1987, Dimalanta and Alcala were at or near the scene of the crime, acting
as lookouts and awaiting the outcome of the killing. 43
Aggravating Circumstances
The trial court held that the following circumstances attended the killing:
1. The crime was committed in consideration of a price. Dimalanta was promised P10,000.00 by
Hope to look for a killer. P5,000.00 was actually paid. In turn Dimalanta secured the services of
the triggerman, Fabro in exchange for money. Alcala was paid for his participation in the plan.
2. With evident premeditation, the accused directly aiming the gun at a (sic) close range; and
3. Treachery, by shooting the helpless victim while asleep to insure its execution without risk to
the killer. 44
That the crime was committed in consideration of a price has been satisfactorily shown by
appellant's confession. From the confession also, evident premeditation is manifest from the fact
that on April 10, 1987, appellant was approached and hired by Dimalanta to kill the victim; that
the appellant clung to his determination to kill the victim even after an unsuccessful first attempt
on April 11, 1987 at the D & E Fast Food Restaurant; and that a sufficient lapse of time had
passed giving the appellant a chance to reflect upon the consequences of his act.
In U.S. vs. Manalinde, 45 the Court held that the aggravating circumstances of evident
premeditation and offer of money, reward or promise are not incompatible and may be
appreciated together, one being independent of the other.
Treachery is shown by the fact that appellant, after several days of observing the movements of
the victim, shot the latter while he was asleep. 46 The means of execution (1) gave the person
CONSTI II (Sec. 11-13) | 46
attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) showed that such method was
deliberately or consciously adopted. 47
Although all three circumstances (price, premeditation and treachery) were proven, only one will
be appreciated to qualify the killing to murder and the two others can be used only as generic
aggravating circumstances.
However, the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should also be appreciated in
appellant's favor, as he surrender to the CIS in Camp Maquinaya on April 13, 1987, thus,
offsetting one generic aggravating circumstance. Accordingly, the proper penalty is reclusion
perpetua.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED with slight modification, i.e., the
indemnity is INCREASED to P50,000.00 in line with current jurisprudence. 48
SO ORDERED.

CONSTI II (Sec. 11-13) | 47

IRST DIVISION "MELCO GROUP

G.R. No. 109143 October 11, 2000 "KA BONG

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, "MABUHAY ANG N.P.A."
vs.
On the same day, at around eight o’clock in the morning (8:00 a. m.), Lacson instructed Renato
PEDRO G. TALIMAN, BASILIO M. BAYBAYAN, AMADO B. BELANO, DANILO
to take his passenger jeep and to proceed to his "gold field" in Nalisbitan to get his collectibles
OBENIA and RUFINO VALERA, JR., accused,
from the field. This was the last time Lacson saw Renato alive.8
PEDRO G. TALIMAN, BASILIO M. BAYBAYAN and AMADO B. BELANO, accused-
appellants. Also on the same day, Lacson told his employee,9 prosecution witness Elizer Obregon
(hereinafter referred to as "Elizer"), to go to the crossing of Nalisbitan, 10 the place mentioned in
DECISION
the letter to investigate who the persons demanding money were.11
PARDO, J.:
Elizer complied and reached the place at around five o’clock in the afternoon (5:00 p.m.) of the
The case is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Camarines Norte, Branch same day.
40, Daet1 finding accused Pedro Taliman, Basilio Baybayan and Amado Belano guilty beyond
Upon reaching the place, Elizer saw Renato and spoke with him. In the vicinity, Elizer saw
reasonable doubt of murder, sentencing each of them to reclusion perpetua and ordering them to
accused Basilio Baybayan, Pedro Taliman and Amado Belano. At that time, accused Sgt. Pedro
pay the heirs of the victim, Renato Cuano, indemnity of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00),
Taliman and C1C Basilio M. Baybayan were members of the Camarines Norte
funeral expenses of ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) and actual damages for unrealized income
Constabulary/Integrated National Police Command.12 Elizer saw two other civilians in their
in the amount of one million forty six thousand pesos (P1,046,000.00). The trial court also
company.13
ordered that alias warrants of arrest be issued against accused Danilo Obenia and Rufino Valera,
Jr. who are at large.2 Elizer then saw accused Pedro Taliman and Basilio Baybayan take Renato 14 to a hilltop, where
he was guarded by accused who were armed. Elizer heard one of the accused say that Renato
We state the facts.
must be taken as "he must be acting as a lookout (for Lacson)."15
The victim was Renato Cuano (hereinafter referred to as "Renato"). Prosecution witness Ernesto
Elizer then proceeded to Bagong Silang and reported to Lacson that Renato was taken by
Lacson (hereinafter referred to as "Lacson") was the uncle and employer of Renato, who was the
accused Pedro Taliman, Basilio Baybayan and Amado Belano.
caretaker of his gravel and sand truck.3
A custodial investigation was conducted.
On July 21, 1990, Renato came to see Lacson and informed him that armed and hooded
persons4 were asking for money amounting to six thousand pesos (P6,000.00). The amount was On July 23, 1990, Attorney Nicolas V. Pardo was mayor of Labo, Camarines Norte. He went to
reduced to six hundred pesos (P600.00) and finally to two hundred pesos (P200.00).5 the police station upon invitation of police corporal Cereno to "assist" accused during their
custodial investigation.16 Accused executed extra-judicial statements, confessing to the
On July 22, 1990, Lacson arrived home from church. His wife handed him a letter delivered to
commission of the crime.
her by a child. In the letter, purportedly members of the N.P.A. demanded eight thousand pesos
(P8,000.00) from him.6 We quote the letter:7 It was during this custodial investigation that accused Basilio Baybayin confessed to prosecution
witness Sgt. Bonifacio Argarin that he participated in the killing of Renato because Renato did
"Sayo TaTay Erning
not give them the money they were demanding. This confession was given without the assistance
"Rebolusyonaryong pagbati sa yo/ of counsel and was not reduced to writing.17
sa inyo layunin ng sulat kong ito upang ipahiwatig sa yo na ang pakikibaka pang kalawakang On July 23, 1990, police authorities, accompanied by accused Basilio Baybayan went to the
pakikibaka ay humihingi ng tulong sa iyo Tay "Erning" Siguro alam mo na amg aming pakay place indicated in a sketch prepared by accused Pedro Taliman. 18 It was in the place indicated
lalo na sa aming pangangailangan pinansyal upang magamit sa kilusan bigyan mo po kami ng that they found the cadaver of Renato.19 This was the same place or hilltop where prosecution
halagang 8,000.00 at ito po ang aming inaasahan "okey" inaasahan ko po at maghihintay kami witness Elizer saw Renato being guarded.20
doon sa kabilang ilog papuntang nalisbitan dalhin mo ang "jeep" mo iyan ang aming
On July 24, 1990, a medical officer of Labo, Camarines Norte issued a certificate of death of
palatandaan alas 4:00 p.m. July 22,90 inaasahan po namin ang iyong pakikipakaupira at
Renato Lacson Cuaño, stating as cause of death, the following: 21
inaasahan po namin na walang ibang makakaalam.
"Immediate cause : a. Irreversible shock due to massive hemorrhages
"Okey salamat sigi po maghihintay kami alas 4:00 mamaya.

CONSTI II (Sec. 11-13) | 48

"Antecedent cause : b. Internal and External secondary to
"Underlying cause : c. Gunshot wound and multiple stab wounds."
On December 18, 1990, Provincial Prosecutor Pascualita Duran-Cereno filed with the Regional
Trial Court, Camarines Norte an information for murder against accused Pedro Taliman, Basilio
Baybayan, Amado Belano, Danilo Obenia and Rufino Valera, Jr. alleging:
"That on or about 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon of July 22, 1990, at Crossing of sitio Malisbitan,
Brgy. Exiben, municipality of Labo, province of Camarines Norte, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating
together and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with deliberate intent to kill, with treachery, evident premeditation and taking
advantage of superior strength, assault, attack, stab and shoot one RENATO CUAÑO alias
LAPOY, thereby inflicting upon the latter gunshot wound and multiple stab wounds on the
different parts of his body, and which injuries were the proximate cause of the death of said
Renato Cuano alias Lapoy, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the victim.
"CONTRARY TO LAW."22
On February 26, 1991, accused Pedro G. Taliman, Basilio M. Baybayan and Amado B. Belano
were arraigned. They pleaded "not guilty."23 Accused Danilo Obenia24 and Rufino Valero, Jr.
were not arraigned because they remained at large.
On March 21, 1991, accused waived the pre-trial conference25 and trial ensued.26
On May 29, 1992, the trial court declared the case submitted for decision. 27
On September 24, 1992, the trial court rendered a decision, the decretal portion of which
provides:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the accused Pedro Taliman, Basilio Baybayan and
Amado Delano are all found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder as charged,
and are hereby each sentence (sic) to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua (or life
imprisonment) (sic). The accused are furthermore jointly and severally ordered to pay the heirs
of the victim for his death the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) and for funeral
expenses the amount of ten thousand (P10,000.00) pesos, and considering that the deceased
victim was only 27 years old when killed and applying the formula (2/3 x [80-27] - life
expectancy of the American Table of Mortality, said deceased victim has still 44 years more to
live were he not killed by the accused. Therefore, since he was employed and receiving monthly
salary of P2,000.00 his unrealized income for the 44 more years of his life is P1,046,000.00 for
which the accused likewise are jointly and severally ordered to pay.
"Considering that accused Danilo Obenis and Rufino Valera, Jr., are still at large, let an alias
Warrant of Arrest be issued against them. In the meantime, let the records of the case be archived
and reinstated as soon as they are apprehended.
"SO ORDERED."28
On October 28, 1992, the decision was promulgated.29 However, accused Basilio M. Baybayan
was not present,30 despite due notice.31
On October 30, 1992, the trial court issued a warrant for the arrest of accused Basilio M.
Baybayan.32 The warrant of arrest was returned unserved as he could not be found.33
On November 11, 1992, accused Pedro G. Taliman filed a notice of appeal with the trial court. 34
On May 26, 1993, we resolved to accept the appeal. 35
We state at the onset that while counsel for accused represents all five accused in this appeal, the
benefit of this appeal is only accorded accused-appellants Pedro G. Taliman, Basilio M.
Baybayan36 and Amado B. Belano.
The other two accused Danilo Obenia and Rufino Valera, Jr., were not arraigned. 37 Thus, the trial
court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons.
The rule on trial in absentia cannot apply to Danilo Obenia and Rufino Valera, Jr. In People v.
Salas,38 the Court declared that one of the requisites for trial to proceed in absentia is that the
accused had been arraigned.
Now, the merits.
Accused-appellants submit that the extra-judicial confessions on which the trial court relied were
inadmissible in evidence because they were obtained in violation of their constitutional
rights.39 We agree with accused-appellants on this point. The extra-judicial statements alone
cannot be a basis for conviction.
Article III, Section 12 (1) of the Constitution provides:
"Any person under custodial investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right
to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must
be provided with one. These rights cannot be waivedexcept in writing and in the presence of
counsel (underscoring ours)."
Mayor Pardo cannot be considered as an independent counsel for accused during their custodial
investigation.
In People v. Culala,40 we held that the extra-judicial confession of the accused-appellant was
inadmissible as he was "assisted" by the incumbent municipal attorney. In People vs.
Bandula,41 we held that a municipal attorney could not be an independent counsel as required by
the Constitution. We reasoned that as legal officer of the municipality, he provides legal
assistance and support to the mayor and the municipality in carrying out the delivery of basic
services to the people, including the maintenance of peace and order. It is therefore seriously
doubted whether he can effectively undertake the defense of the accused without running into
conflict of interests.
Besides, lawyers engaged by the police, whatever testimonials are given as proof of their probity
and supposed independence, are suspects. In many areas, even less obvious than that obtaining in
the present case, the relationship between lawyers and law enforcement authorities can be
symbiotic.42
CONSTI II (Sec. 11-13) | 49
If in the aforecited cases, we disregarded the extra-judicial statements of the accused, how much
more must we do so now, given that it was the mayor himself, and not just the provincial
attorney, that assisted accused-appellants?
Even assuming that the right to counsel was orally waived during custodial investigation,43 still
the defect was not cured. The Constitution expressly provides that the waiver must be in writing
and in the presence of counsel.44This, accused-appellants did not do.
However, while we agree that the extra-judicial statements of the accused are inadmissible in
evidence, we find that there is still sufficient evidence to convict.
While no one saw the actual killing of Renato, circumstantial evidence proved its commission.
Resort to circumstantial evidence is essential, when to insist on direct testimony would set felons
free.45
Rule 133, Section 4 of the 1989 Revised Rules on Evidence provides: 46
"SEC. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient - Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for
conviction if:
"(a) There is more than one circumstance;
"(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
"(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond
reasonable doubt."
In the present case, we find the following circumstances attendant:
First, Renato was last seen alive in the company of accused-appellants. This was the substance
of Elizer’s testimony. The trial court did not find reason not to believe him. Neither do we.
It is the trial court and not this Court that had the opportunity to observe Elizer’s manner of
testifying, his furtive glances, his calmness, sighs or the scant or full realization of his oath.47 The
trial court’s assessment of the credibility of witnesses is entitled to respect. 48
Second, accused-appellants, two other civilians, Renato and Elizer were the only persons present
at the Nalisbitan crossing, on July 22, 1990, at five o’clock in the afternoon. The place and the
time are significant. This was the very place, the very date and more or less the time of day
indicated in the letter of demand that Lacson received.49 While Renato’s and Elizer’s presence in
the area was explained, the presence of accused-appellants in that area and during that crucial
time can be only explained by the fact that accused-appellants were the very ones demanding
money from Lacson.
"Facts or circumstances which are not only consistent with the guilt of the accused but also
inconsistent with his innocence, constitute evidence which, in weight and probative force, may
surpass even direct evidence in its effect upon the court."50
Third, motive is apparent. Renato was first approached by accused-appellants with an oral
demand. Renato relayed the demand to Lacson.51
The oral demand was followed up with a written demand. 52
When Renato passed through the Nalisbitan crossing, he was driving Lacson’s jeepney. This was
the very jeepney indicated in the letter. The letter instructed Lacson to bring money and to drive
a specific jeepney to Nalisbitan. Yet, when accused-appellants confronted Renato, he did not
have the money they demanded.
The fact that Renato was the driver of the jeepney indicated in the letter can explain accused-
appellants’ reason for killing him.
This conclusion is supported by Elizer’s testimony.1âwphi1 We quote the pertinent portions:53
"q. Now, you said you were requested by Mr. Lacson to proceed to that crossing of Nalisbitan
for you to see the person who was demanding money and identified themselves as members of
NPA. Were you able to go to that place?
a. Yes, sir.
q. What time was that?
a. I reached the place more or less 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon of that same date July 22, 1990,
sir.
q. What did you do when you reached that Nalisbitan Crossing?
a. Upon reaching the place at the crossing of Nalisbitan I have talked with Renato Cuaño who
asked where I was going. I have not confided to him that I was doing surveillance work on the
person demanding money from Ernesto Lacson and so I proceeded. I walked and upon reaching
a point I have seen Basilio Naybayan in the company of two (2) civilians and I continued with
my walk and ahead of them I saw Mr. Taliman with Belano and I did not notice that I was
followed by Mr. Renato Cuaño.
xxx
a. I saw, sir, Renato Cuaño was taken by Mr. Taliman and Belano, sir.
xxx
q. Now, when you go back taking the same route what did you see if any?
a. When I was on my way back taking the same route my way was blocked by Belano and
Taliman accompanied by civilian and inquired from me whether I was the driver of the jeep.
q. What was your answer if any?
a. I denied being the driver of the jeep, sir.
q. Why did you deny being the driver of the jeep?
a. I denied being the driver of the jeep because I saw already Renato Cuaño on top of the hill on
a cut guarded by Baybayan with a ccivilian in their company, sir.
xxx
q. The question of this Court is why did you say that this Renato Cuaño is being guarded?
CONSTI II (Sec. 11-13) | 50
a. They are guarding Renato Cuaño, sir, because that is the person they have conferred with to
whom they have relayed the demand of money and he is the driver of the jeep. He is the one who
pretended to be the driver of the jeep.
xxx
q. Now, when Amado Belano asked you whether you know Renato Cuaño and you denied it,
what more did Amado Belano ask you if any?
a. Amado Belano further made a statement that it is better for them to take along that man,
referring to Renato Cuaño, because Renato Cuaño might be acting as a lookout."
The trial court’s award of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity for wrongful
death is affirmed. This can be awarded without need of proof other than the death of the victim. 66
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Camarines Norte, Branch 40, Daet,
dated September 24, 1992 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellants Pedro G.
Taliman, Basilio M. Baybayab and Amado B. Belano are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of HOMICIDE, defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, and in the
absence of any modifying circumstance, are sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of ten (10)
years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion
temporal, as maximum.

The letter54 provided that "no one else should know"55 about the demand. Thus, Renato’s
presence would naturally alarm accused-appellants.
Motive is a key element when establishing guilt through circumstantial evidence.56 Coupled with
enough circumstantial evidence or facts from which it may be reasonably inferred that the
accused was the malefactor, motive may be sufficient to support a conviction. 57
Fourth, Renato’s corpse was discovered in the same place where he was held and guarded by
accused-appellants.58
Accused-appellants are jointly and severally ordered to pay the heirs of Renato Cuaño, moral
damages in the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) and civil indemnity in the amount of
fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00). The award of actual damages for funeral expenses and
unrealized income is DELETED.
The case is archived as to accused Danilo Obenis and Rufino Valera, Jr., until their arrest and
submission to the jurisdiction of the trial court.
Costs against accused-appellants.

Fifth is the facts of death of Renato, which is the corpus delicti of the crime. SO ORDERED.

However, while Renato’s death in the hands of accused-appellants was proven, we find that the
manner of killingwas not so evidenced. There was no showing of treachery.
Treachery exists when the accused employs means, methods, and forms which directly and
specially ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the
offended party might make.59 Treachery, like the crime itself, must be proved beyond reasonable
doubt.60
In the absence of proof as to how the killing was perpetrated, the crime committed was
homicide.61
The imposable penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal. In the absence of any mitigating or
aggravating circumstances, the penalty is imposed in its medium period. 62 The Indeterminate
Sentence Law applies.
The trial court awarded the heirs of Renato Cuaño one million forty six thousand pesos
(P1,046,000.00) as actual damages for unrealized income. We delete this award as it is not
supported by receipts. The testimony of Renato’s father as to how much Renato was earning at
the time of his death is self-serving and hearsay.

The trial court’s award of actual damages for funeral expenses in the amount of ten thousand
(P10,000.00) pesos is likewise deleted. The claim is not supported by any receipt. The rule is that
every pecuniary loss must be established by credible evidence before it may be awarded. 63
An award of moral damages in the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) is
proper.64 Renato’s father testified that because of his son’s death, he felt "great pain" and his
wife suffered some "sleepless nights" and "cried for several days."65

CONSTI II (Sec. 11-13) | 51

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 133188 July 23, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, appellee,
vs.
ELIZAR TOMAQUIN, appellant.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Once again, the Court is confronted with the issue of the admissibility of an extrajudicial
confession. This appeal particularly involves the question of whether a barangay captain who is
a lawyer can be considered an independent counsel within the purview of Section 12, Article III
of the 1987 Constitution.
On December 17, 1996, the Cebu City Prosecutor filed an Information charging appellant with
Murder, committed as follows:
That on or about the 15th day of December, 1996, about 2:30 a.m., in the City of Cebu,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, armed with a
bladed instrument (tres cantos), with deliberate intent, with intent to kill, with treachery and
evident premeditation, did then and there suddenly and unexpectedly attack, assault and use
personal violence upon one Jaquelyn Luchavez Tatoy, by stabbing her with said bladed
instrument, hitting her on the vital parts of her body, thereby inflicting upon her physical injuries
causing:
"CARDIO RESPIRATORY ARREST DUE TO SHOCK & HEMORRHAGE SEC. TO STAB
WOUNDS TO THE TRUNK (POSTERIOR ASPECT)"
as a consequence of which, Jaquelyn Luchavez Tatoy died almost instantaneously.
CONTRARY TO LAW.1
On arraignment, appellant pleaded "not guilty" to the charge,2 and trial thereafter ensued.
There were no eyewitnesses to the incident, and the prosecution’s evidence, aside from
appellant’s extrajudicial confession, was mainly circumstantial.
As presented by the prosecution, the facts are as follows:
At around 11:00 in the evening of December 14, 1996, appellant Elizar Tomaquin @ Hapon,
together with Rico and Romy Magdasal, Noel Labay, and a certain Cardo, were drinking "Red
Horse" beer in Itom Yuta, Lorega, Cebu City. Appellant left the group at around 1:00 in the
morning,
saying he has a headache. At the behest of Rico Magdasal, the group transferred to Lorega
proper. A few minutes later, they heard Rustica Isogan shouting for help as the latter heard
Jaquelyn3 Tatoy, her goddaughter, asking for help. Isogan got two flashlights and they proceeded
upstairs to Jaquelyn’s house. The first to go up was a certain Moises, followed by the brothers
Rico and Romy Magdasal, while Noel and Cardo remained downstairs. Rico noticed that the
hinge and the "walling" of the main door were damaged, as if it were kicked open, and only the
light in the kitchen was turned on. Rico also saw a black shoe on the stairs and another in
thesala, which he claims belong to appellant. When they went into the kitchen, they saw
Jaquelyn bloodied and sprawled face-up on the floor, with her head inside a plastic container.
Jaquelyn was brought to the hospital, where she expired. A neighbor later found a tres
cantos with blood on it by the stairs, which Rico also identified to be appellant’s. 4 A certain Rey
got the black pair of shoes and tres cantos for safekeeping which were later turned over to
Policeman Tariao of the Homicide Section, Ramos Police Station. The person who turned over
the objects to Policeman Tariao was not identified.5
At around 12:00 in the afternoon of December 15, 1996, barangay tanods Julius Yosores and
Armando Zabate of Lorega, Cebu City, searched for appellant because of the information given
by Rico Magdasal that the shoes andtres cantos found in the scene of the crime belonged to
appellant. Together with Rico, they went to the house of Wilson Magdasal where appellant was
temporarily staying, and found him sleeping. Appellant was wearing a
bloodstained maong shorts. The tanods told appellant that he is a suspect in the killing of
Jaquelyn, and brought him to the house of barangay captain Atty. Fortunato Parawan. There,
appellant was asked about the shirt he was wearing and he told them that it was in Wilson
Magdasal’s house. It was Edgar Magdasal who found his shirt, wet and bloodstained, among the
soiled clothes. Atty. Parawan then told his tanods to take appellant to the police station.6
In the morning of the next day, December 16, 1996, appellant was investigated by SPO2 Mario
Monilar of the Homicide Section, Ramos Police Station in Cebu City. After being apprised of his
constitutional rights, appellant told SPO2 Monilar that he was willing to confess and asked for
Atty. Parawan, the barangay captain, to assist him. SPO2 Monilar called Atty. Parawan but the
latter told him that he will be available in the afternoon. When Atty. Parawan arrived at 2:00 in
the afternoon, he conferred with appellant for around fifteen minutes. Atty. Parawan then called
SPO2 Monilar and told him that appellant was ready to give his statement. 7 Appellant’s
extrajudicial confession, which was taken down completely in the Cebuano dialect, 8 reads:
Pasiuna: Mr. ELIZAR TOMAQUIN, pahibaloon ko ikaw nga ubos sa atong batakang balaod
(Constitution) aduna kay katungod nga pahibaloon sa imong mga katungod, sama sa imong
katungod sa pagpakahilum, ingon man duna kay katungod sa pagdamgop/pagpilig sa abogado o
manlalaban aron motabang kanimo niining maong imbestighasyon nga may kalabutan sa
kamatayon ni Jaqueline Tatoy niadtong mga alas 2:30 sa kaadlawon kapin kongkulang niadtong
petsa 15 sa bulan sa Disyembra 1996, didto sa Brgy Lorega proper, Siyudad sa Sugbo. Kong
ugaling dili ka maka-abot pagbayad o pagpangitago abogado aron motabang kanimo karon, ako
isip negrepresenttar sa Estado mohatag akong abogado kanimo. Nasabtan ba kini nimo?
Tubag: OO, nasabtan ka ang akong katungod?
Pangutana: Pahabloon ko usab ikaw nga sumala usab sa atong Batakang Balaod, anfg tanan nga
imong isulti karon dinhi, mahimong magamit ebedensya pabor o batok kanimo sa bisan asaing
husgado sa atong nasud. Nasabtan be usab kini nimo?
Tubag: OO, nasabtan ko usab kanang taan.
CONSTI II (Sec. 11-13) | 52
Pangutana: Tinuod ba gayod nga nasabtan pag-ayo nimo anf mao nimong mga katungod ug
anadam ka ba nga moperma karon dinhi timailhan sa imong tina-aw nga nga pagsabut? ingon
man andam ka ba sa pagsulti sa matuod walay lain kon kili ang matuod lamang gayud?
Tubag: O
Tubag: Oo, andam ako nga mpemar Sir ug ania karon dinhi ai Atty Parawan ang among Brgy
Captain nga maoy akong giisip nga abogado nga akong pinili nga maoy motabang kanako karon.
Aron sa pagmatuod, ako kining pirmahan ning ika petsa 16 sa bulan sa Disyembre 1996.
...
Pangutana: Sunlion ko, andama bas a pagsulti sa matuod Elizar Tomaquin kon dili ang matuod
lamang gayud? Ingon man andam ka ba nga modawat sa resulta o linugdangan niini?
Tubag: Oo, andam gyud ako.
Pangutana: Palihog isulti ang imong ngalan inong man ang tanan nga circumstacia o rmay
kalambigitan sa imong pagkatawo, sa imong grado, imong trabaho, imong pinuy-anan ug uban
pa?
Tubag: Ako si Elizar Tomaquin kinsa nagdala sa bansagon o apelyedo sa akong mama sanglit
dili man kasado and akong mama ug papa. Ang apelyedo sa akong papa, Cabagui ug and akon
angga Hapon. Ako 19 anyos ang panuigon, ulitawo ug kasamtangan nga nagpuyo sa Brgy
Lorega proper duol sa kapilaya San Roque apan ako lumad nga taga Bo. Tunga, Moalboal, Cebu
diin didto ano nakatungha sa grade six.
Pangutana: Niadtong kaadlawon sa petsa 15 sa bulan sa Disyembre 1996, diin ka man?
Tubag: Sa sinugdanan nianang mga ala una kapin kon kulang kauba ko sa pag-inom si Rico
Magdasal didito sa Brgy Lorega Proper ug taodtaod niadto nilakaw ako libot sa sitio Itom Tuta
ug dayon nakong saka sa balay nila ni Jaqueline Tatoy sa Brgy Lorega nianang pagka mga alas
2:20 sa maong petsa/kadlawon agii sa aberto nga bentana sa akong tuyo sa pagkawat sa ilang
colored nga TV.
Pangutana: Nganong nakahiabwo ka man na duna silay TV nga colored?
Tubag: Suweto man ko kay permi ko magtan-awan sa ilang colored TV.
Pangutana: Niadtong niagi ka sa ilang bentana aron pagkawat sa ilang TV, diin ka man punta
deretso.
Tubag: Deretso ako sa may lamesa sa ilang sala diin didto gibutang ilang TV.
Pangutana: Nakuha ba gayod nimo anf maong TV?
Tubag: Wala, kay sa akong pag-alsa sa among TV nisyagit man si Jaqueline Tatoy nga naghidga
sa ilang may terrace ug nidagan siya padulong sa kusina nila ug diha-diha akong siyang
ginsunod, gilayog ug gidunggab makadaghan pinaagi sa akong tres kantps nga hinagiban
(Gidtudo ni Eliza rang Tres Kantos nga nakit-an didto sa patyang lawas nga Jaqueline Tatoy).
Pangutana: Kapila nimo dunggaba ug diin maigo si Jaqueline Totay?
Tubag: Dili na ko nakahinumdom, ingon man dili sba ko makahinumdom kon diin to siya maigo.
Basta manadaghan to nako siya dunggaba ginamit ko ang akong Tres kantos.
Pangutana: Gawas nga imo to siyang gidunggab, wala ba nimo pahimudsi and iyang
pagkapbabye o wala ka bay plano sa pag rape kaniya niadtong higayona?
Tubag: Wala gyud to nako siya pahimudsi og wala gyud koy tuyo sa pag rape niya. Ang ako ra
gyud nga tuyo mao ra gyud and pagkawat sa ilang TV apan kay nisiyagit man siyang nakaila
man kayo siya nako, nahadlok kong mahibaw-an sa ako untang pagkawat sa ilang TV,
hinungdan nga ako siyang gilayog ug gidunggab makadaghan.
Pangutana: Nganog nakahibawo or nakaila ka man nga si Jaqueline Tatoy tong naisiyagit ug
imong gidunggab?
Tubag: Duna ma hayag nga suga sa elektresidad sa ilang may kusina.
Pangutana: Kaila ba nimong daan si Jaqueline Tatoy?
Tubag: Oo, Sir ka saw ala pa ang among hitabo permi man kong nagtan-awan sa ilang TV.
Pangutana: Human nim dunggaba si Jaqueline Tatoy unsa may sunod nimonh gibuhat?
Tubag: Dihang sa akong pagtoo nga patay na siya, ako naidagan agi sa pultahan nga akong
gisikaran dayon kanaog subay sa hagdan didto nabiyaan nako ang akong sapatos.
Pangutana: Diin ka man paduiong dagan?
Tubag: Didto ako padulong sa akong gipuya-an sa ilang Wilson Magdasal sa maong Brgy.
Pangutana: Unya unsa may sunod nimonh gibuhat og nahibaw-an?
Tubag: Niadtong hapon sa petsa 15 sa bulan sa Disyembre 1996, didtoy mga Brgy Tanods sa
balay ni Wilson Magdasal diin ila akong gipangutaan tali sa maong hitabo og igo lan ako nitudlo
sa akong white Slave shirt nga akong gihumulan ug tubig sa planggana sa tumong nga makuha
ang mansa sa dugo nga pinisik sa akong paggdunggab patay ni Jaqueline Tatoy.
Pangutana: Ngano ug unsa may diay kalabutan niadtong maong slaveless white shirt nimo?
Tubag: Mao na ang akong gisul-ob dihang akog kawaton unta ang TV nila ni Jaqueline ug sa
iyang pagsiyagit ako siyang gidunggab-dunggab patay. (Elizar Yomaquin postivo nga nitudlo ug
niangkon sa maong whitel sleve less shirt)
Pangutana: Kinign nia karon dinhi nga sapatos itom nga nakuha didto so hagdan sa balay nila ni
Jaqueline Tatoy human siya nakit-i nga patay, unsa may imong ikasulti niini?
Tubag: Mao kana ang akong sapatos nga nabiyaan didto sa ilang hagdan human sa hitabo ug gain
sa akong pagdagan akong napatiran kadtong ilang container.
Pangutana: Sa pagkakaron, wala na akoy ipangutana kanimo. Ikay aduna ka pa bay ikasul ti o
bakwion ba hinoon sa mao nimong gipamahayag nga naglangkob sa duha ka pahina lakip niining
maong pahina?
Tubag: Wala na akoy ikadugang pagsulti ni bakwion ba hinnon. Nao kana ang tanan.
CONSTI II (Sec. 11-13) | 53
Pangutana: Andam ka ba pagperme niini sa pagmatuod nga wlay tawo nga nagpugos, naghulga,
nagsaad ug gnate o nag hadlok ba hinoon kon dili sa imong kaugalingon nga kabubut-on lamang.
Tubag: Oo, andam ako pageram. Aron matuoron kining tanan kini akong permaahn ning petsa 16
sa Diusyembre 1996, Siyudad Sugbo, Pilipinas.9
On the witness stand, appellant did not deny that he had a drinking spree with Rico Magdasal
and three other persons. His version of the incident is that it was Rico who committed the crime
and not him. Appellant testified that Rico asked his help in stealing the television set from the
Tatoy’s residence. When Jacquelyn saw them, she ran towards the kitchen but she did not reach
it as Rico had stabbed her on the back with the tres cantos. Appellant claims that it was Rico who
owns the tres cantos, as well as the pair of shoes, left inside Tatoy’s house. Afraid of what
happened, appellant went home to Wilson Magdasal’s house and slept there. He was awakened
the next morning by barangay tanod Julius Yosores who kicked him. Yosores also boxed and
poked a gun at him. Appellant claims that Rico and Edgar Magdasal maltreated him in the
presence of barangay captain Atty. Fortunato Parawan when he was brought to the latter’s
house. He was made to admit committing the crime because Rico has a family while he is
single.10
Appellant also repudiated his extrajudicial confession, saying that Atty. Parawan merely asked
him to sign a blank sheet of paper and in exchange, Atty. Parawan promised to assist and help
him with his expenses.11
After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City (Branch 18) (RTC for brevity) rendered its
decision on October 24, 1997, convicting appellant of the crime of Murder, to wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, accused Elizar Tomaquin is found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and is hereby imposed the penalty of
RECLUSION PERPERTUA, with the accessory penalties of the law; to indemnify the heirs of
Jaquelyn Tatoy in the sum of P50,000.00 and to pay the costs. The accused is, however, credited
in full during the whole period of his detention provided he will signify in writing that he will
abide by all the rules and regulations of the penitentiary.
SO ORDERED.12
Hence, this appeal.
In his Brief, appellant raises the following Assignment of Errors:
1. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN SHE (SIC) CONVICTED ACCUSED-APPELLANT
BASED ON HIS UNCOUNSELLED CONFESSION;
2. THE TRIAL COURT LIKEWISE ERRED WHEN SHE (SIC) GAVE FULL CREDENCE
AND FULL FAITH ON THE TESTIMONY OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES;13
Appellant’s extrajudicial confession was taken and transcribed entirely in the Cebuano dialect.
Rule 132, Section 33 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:
Sec. 33. Documentary evidence in an unofficial language.-- Documents written in an unofficial
language shall not be admitted as evidence, unless accompanied with a translation into English
or Filipino. To avoid interruption of proceedings, parties or their attorneys are directed to have
such translation prepared before trial.
The rule is that when there is presented in evidence an exhibit written in any language other than
the official language (Filipino or English), if there is an appeal, that exhibit should be translated
by the official interpreter of the court, or a translation should be agreed upon by the parties, and
both original and translation sent to this court.14 In this case, there is no official translation of
appellant’s extrajudicial confession in the Filipino or English language. If the Court were to
strictly follow the rule, then appellant’s extrajudicial confession should not have been admitted
by the trial court as evidence for the prosecution.
Nevertheless, considering that appellant did not interpose any objection thereto, and the parties
and the judicial authorities or personnel concerned appeared to be familiar with or
knowledgeable of Cebuano in which the document was written,15 such extrajudicial confession
was appropriately considered by the trial court as evidence for the prosecution.
As stated at the outset, the crucial issue in this case is whether or not the extrajudicial confession
executed by appellant, with the assistance of Atty. Fortunato Parawan, is admissible in evidence
against him. There is no need at this point to secure an official translation of the confession to
English.
Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:
(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably
of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with
one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
The words "competent and independent counsel" in the constitutional provision is not an empty
rhetoric. It stresses the need to accord the accused, under the uniquely stressful conditions of a
custodial investigation, an informed judgment on the choices explained to him by a diligent and
capable lawyer.16
As heretofore stated, Atty. Fortunato Parawan, at that time, was the barangay captain of
Barangay Lorega, Cebu City. Under the 1991 Local Government Code, a barangay captain
performs the following duties and functions:
(a) The punong barangay, as the chief executive of the barangay government, shall exercise such
powers and perform such duties and functions, as provided by this Code and other laws.
(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance, the purpose of which is the general
welfare of the barangay and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code, the punong
barangay shall:
(1) Enforce all laws and ordinances which are applicable within the barangay;
...
(3) Maintain public order in the barangay and, in pursuance thereof, assist the city or municipal
mayor and the sanggunian members in the performance of their duties and functions; . . . 17
CONSTI II (Sec. 11-13) | 54
Simply put, Atty. Parawan, as barangay captain, is called upon to enforce the law and ordinances antagonistic to the constitutional rights to remain silent, to counsel and to be presumed
in his barangayand ensure peace and order at all times. innocent.25
In fact, as barangay captain, Atty. Parawan is deemed a person in authority under Article 152 of The assistance rendered by Atty. Parawan to appellant cannot be fittingly described as effective
the Revised Penal Code, to wit: and vigilant. As testified by Atty. Parawan, hereinbelow quoted verbatim, this was what
transpired when he went to the Ramos police station to assist appellant during the investigation:
ART. 152. Persons in authority and agents of persons in authority. – Who shall be deemed as
such. – In applying the provisions of the preceding and other articles of this Code, any person Q What happened when you arrived at the Ramos Police Station at around 2:00 o’clock in the
directly vested with jurisdiction, whether as an individual or as a member of some court or afternoon of December 16, 1996?
government corporation, board, or commission, shall be deemed a person in authority. A barrio
A I go (sic) to the room where Policeman Monilar and the accused and had a conversation with
captain and a barangay chairman shall also be deemed a person in authority.
the accused.
On these bases, it is not legally possible to consider Atty. Parawan as an independent counsel of
Q What transpired during that conversation with the accused.
appellant.
A I asked him. Are you going to get me as your lawyer?
In People vs. Culala,18 the Court reiterated the rule that a municipal attorney cannot be an
independent counsel because as a legal officer of the municipality, he provides legal assistance Q And may we know what did he answer?
and support to the mayor and the municipality in carrying out the delivery of basic services to the
A Yes, Cap. Okay Cap.
people, including the maintenance of peace and order, and it was seriously doubted whether he
can effectively undertake the defense of the accused without running into conflict of interests. Q When you said "Cap" what did he mean by that word "Cap."
Thus, the Court held that he is no better than a fiscal or a prosecutor who cannot represent the
A Being a Barangay Captain.
accused during custodial investigations.19
Q After the accused told you that you were his counsel of choice. What did you do next if any?
This is reiterated in People vs. Taliman,20 and People vs. Velarde,21 where we further ruled that a
municipal mayor cannot likewise be an independent counsel as required by the Constitution. A I informed Elizar Tomaquin that do you know what will be the implication of your admission,
you will be imprisoned.
Similarly in this case, considering that Atty. Parawan’s role as a barangay captain, was a
peacekeeping officer of his barangay and therefore in direct conflict with the role of providing Q After you asked him whether he knew of the implication of his confession that could be …
competent legal assistance to appellant who was accused of committing a crime in his because of that confession. What was his reaction?
jurisdiction, Atty. Parawan could not be considered as an independent counsel of appellant, when
A Yes Cap. I know. And then I told him as follows: "Because of this confession you will be
the latter executed his extrajudicial confession. What the Constitution requires is the presence of
imprisoned."
an independent and competent counsel, one who will effectively undertake his client’s defense
without any intervening conflict of interest.22 Q And what did he say after you told him again that if he would execute that affidavit of
confession he would surely be imprisoned?
Neither does Atty. Parawan qualify as a competent counsel, i.e., an effective and vigilant
counsel. An "effective and vigilant counsel" necessarily and logically requires that the lawyer be A No I even continue that "why did he do that?"
present and able to advise and assist his client from the time the confessant answers the first
Q And what did he answer?
question asked by the investigating officer until the signing of the extrajudicial confession. As
held in People vs. Velarde:23 A He answered to me that he was drunk at that time.
. . . The competent and independent lawyer so engaged should be present at all stages of the Q And so what transpired next?
interview, counseling or advising caution reasonably at every turn of the investigation, and
A So I told him are you willing now to give your confession, then policeman Monilar went
stopping the interrogation once in a while either to give advice to the accused that he may either
inside the room and we had that investigation.
continue, choose to remain silent or terminate the interview.24
Q Now how was the investigation of the accused done?
Moreover, the lawyer should ascertain that the confession is made voluntarily and that the person
under investigation fully understands the nature and the consequence of his extrajudicial A It was made in a question and answer form.
confession in relation to his constitutional rights. A contrary rule would undoubtedly be
Q And in what language were the questions framed?

CONSTI II (Sec. 11-13) | 55

A In the vernacular, vesaya.
Q What did you do during the question and answer form of investigation?
A I just observed them.
Q But did you stay there until the whole taking of the confession was over?
A Yes I was there in the presence of two persons coming from my Barangay.
...
Q When you arrived and saw Mr. Monilar with the accused as an Attorney did you immediately
inquire what had happened before you arrived like; Did you start the investigation? did you
inquire from that from Mr. Monilar?
A He was already preparing this top portion here.
INTERPRETER:
Q Witness pointing to the upper portion of the certification up to the signature to that portion
above the names typewritten thereon.
...
Q And that means to say that when he prepared this from the top most portion to that portion
immediately right before the typewritten name Elizar Tomaquin and Atty. Fortunato Parawan
you were not around. Correct?
A I was not around but we have already a conversation earlier with Monilar. 26
Records also show that appellant was presented to SPO2 Monilar in the morning of December
16, 1996. When appellant intimated that he was willing to confess and requested the presence of
Atty. Parawan, SPO2 Monilar called up Atty. Parawan and informed him of appellant’s decision.
Atty. Parawan arrived at the Ramos Police Station only at 2:00 in the afternoon. 27 By the time
Atty. Parawan arrived, the investigation had already started and SPO2 Monilar had already asked
and elicited information from appellant. Worse, Atty. Parawan merely "observed" during the
entire investigation and failed to advise or explain to appellant the questions being propounded
by SPO2 Monilar. He did not even bother to ask appellant if the extrajudicial confession he was
about to execute was being voluntarily given.
Moreover, that Atty. Parawan is not an effective and vigilant counsel is bolstered by his own
testimony that he already suspected appellant as having committed the crime when the latter was
brought to his house by thebarangay tanods, viz.:
Q Being an attorney naturally your first question to your arresting tanods was where was he
arrested and how was he arrested and what is the reason why he was arrested. Correct?
A Yes.
...
Q You are telling this Court now Atty. Parawan that before the Barangay Tanods could explain
to you the circumstances of his arrest you already started to ask questions like; Why did you
have blood in your pants. Where is your t-shirt you wore. Where did you get that information
since you were not in the house of Jaqueline Tatoy when she was killed?
A It was like this. I heard that the victim suffered multiple stab wounds. So when I saw blood
stains with all probability it might come from the victim. It was conclusion something like when
I saw that t-shirt stained with blood.
Q So you mean to this Court that you already reached the conclusion of mine (sic) that Elizar
Tomaquin one of your constituents in the Barangay was already on your conclusion in mine (sic)
the killer of Jacquilyn Tatoy before your tanods turned it over to the police for investigation. Is
that what you are telling Atty. Parawan?
A It is somewhat like that. That is why I ordered my tanod to bring him to the Homicide.28
The Court cannot imagine how Atty. Parawan could have effectively safeguarded appellant’s
rights as an accused during the investigation when he himself entertained the suspicion that
appellant is guilty of the crime charged, and naturally, he would want appellant to admit having
committed it.
It was posited that appellant cannot challenge Atty. Parawan’s qualification as a competent and
independent counsel because he was his choice.
As provided in Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, "(A)ny person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right … to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. Ideally, the lawyer called to be present during
such investigations should be as far as reasonably possible, the choice of the individual
undergoing questioning, but the word "preferably" does not convey the message that the choice
of a lawyer by a person under investigation is exclusive as to preclude other equally competent
and independent attorneys from handling his defense.29 What is imperative is that the counsel
should be competent and independent. That appellant chose Atty. Parawan does not estop
appellant from complaining about the latter’s failure to safeguard his rights.
It appears that appellant chose Atty. Parawan because he was the barangay captain of Brgy.
Lorega where appellant resides, and apparently, appellant trusts Atty. Parawan to protect his
rights. The latter, however, fell short in tending to the trust reposed on him. Appellant did not
finish Grade 1 and does not know how to read and write.30 As between him and Atty.
Parawan who presumably knows the intricacies of the law and appellant’s predicament, Atty.
Parawan should have known better and exercised his sound judgment before conceding to
appellant’s choice. But it did not occur to him to inhibit himself from acting as appellant’s
counsel and instead, he even let appellant go through the investigation and execute the
extrajudicial confession knowing fully well that he was biased as regards appellant’s innocence.
Quoted verbatim, Atty. Parawan testified thus:
Q Atty. Parawan comparing yourself to the accused who is a graduate of Batchelor (sic) of Law
compared to your constituent who is jobless, illiterate [and] of low intelligence. The question is
this: It did not occur to your mine (sic) to inhibit yourself despite the request by telling the
accused as barangay Captain there could be a conflict of interest and bias that I would not be in
(sic) effective counsel or assistance to you. Did it not occur toy our mine (sic) or not?
CONSTI II (Sec. 11-13) | 56
A It did not occur to my nime (sic).
...
Q But as experienced attorney you know very well that when you assist a suspect in the police
station and the circumstances he was arrested the best assistance a lawyer could give is would be
to tell the accused to remain silent. Would you agree?
...
A It did not occur to my mine (sic) that time.31
Clearly, Atty. Parawan failed to meet the exacting standards of
an independent and competent counsel as required by the Constitution. Thus, the extrajudicial
confession executed by appellant, even if gospel truth, is deemed an uncounselled confession and
therefore, inadmissible in evidence.
In this regard, it may not be amiss to repeat the declaration of the Court in People vs.
Deniega,32 stressing the role of the courts in ascertaining that extrajudicial confessions meet the
exacting standards of the Constitution:
Every so often, courts are confronted with the difficult task of taking a hard look into the
sufficiency of extra-judicial confessions extracted by law enforcement authorities as the sole
basis for convicting accused individuals. In cases of crimes notable for their brutality and
ruthlessness, the impulse to find the culprits at any cost occasionally tempts these agencies to
take shortcuts and disregard constitutional and legal safeguards intended to bring about a
reasonable assurance that only the guilty are punished. Our courts, in the process of
establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, play a central role in bringing about this
assurance by determining whether or not the evidence gathered by law enforcement
agencies scrupulously meets exacting standards fixed by the Constitution. If the standards
are not met, the Constitution provides the corresponding remedy by providing a strict
exclusionary rule, i.e., that "[a]ny confession or admission obtained in violation of (Article
III, Section 12(1) . . . hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence."
Without appellant’s extrajudicial confession, the prosecution’s case now teeters precariously on
circumstantial evidence, namely:
(1) Rico Magdasal’s testimony that:
(a) appellant left their drinking session at 1:00 in the morning of December 16, 1996;
(b) the tres cantos and pair of shoes found inside Jaquelyn’s residence belongs to appellant; and
(c) appellant was wearing a pair of maong shorts and white sando shirt on the night of the crime,
which blood-stained shirt was found among the soiled clothes in Wilson Magdasal’s house;
(2) Medical Technologist Jude Daniel Mendoza’s testimony that the blood stains on
appellant’s sando shirt and the tres cantos was of human origin.33
These circumstances, however, are not sufficient to demonstrate positively and convincingly that
it was appellant who killed Jaquelyn.
Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence would be sufficient to
convict if (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are
derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.34 As jurisprudentially formulated, a judgment of conviction
based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld only if the circumstances proven constitute an
unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the
exclusion of all others, as the guilty person, i.e., the circumstances proven must be consistent
with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time
inconsistent with any other hypothesis except that of guilty.35
The circumstantial evidence in this case does not constitute an unbroken chain leading to one fair
and reasonable conclusion that appellant is the guilty person.
For one, appellant’s act of leaving the drinking session at 1:00 in the morning does not establish
appellant’s whereabouts at the time the crime was committed. There is nothing in the testimony
of Rico Magdasal and the other prosecution witnesses that will show if appellant indeed went to
Jaquelyn’s house after he left the group. No one saw him enter or leave her residence. If at all,
what was proved is that appellant was found by the barangay tanods sleeping at home in the
afternoon of the same day.
Added to that is the prosecution’s failure to establish the chain of custody of these valuable
pieces of evidence.
Prosecution witness Armando Zabate testified that the pair of black shoes and tres cantos were
given to a certain Rey for safekeeping. These were later turned over to a Policeman Tariao of the
Ramos Police Station. Zabate, however, did not identify the person who turned over the objects
to the police.36 There was no showing who turned over those articles to the police and Rey was
not presented to identify if these were the same pair of shoes and tres cantos found in Jaquelyn’s
house and turned over to the police. Policeman Tariao was not called to the witness stand so as to
confirm if those articles were the same evidence turned over to him and later presented in court.
Ordinarily, it would not be indispensable for the prosecution to allege and prove every single fact
of the case. But in this case, the pieces of evidence are crucial to the prosecution’s case. Also, the
fact that a civilian obtained and received the evidence, the possibility that the integrity of these
articles could have been compromised cannot be ignored. The Court even noted that during his
direct examination, SPO2 Monilar was confused as to whether the pair of shoes presented in
court was the same ones that were turned over to the police. It turned out that the marking he
made on the shoes were washed off because at one time, the shoes fell in the canal located in
front of the police station and they had to clean and wash the shoes!37 Such sloppy handling
renders the chain of custody of those pieces of evidence dubious, and damaging to the
prosecution’s case.
And even if appellant did own the pair of shoes and tres cantos, the fact that it was found in the
scene of the crime merely proved that he was in the residence of Jaquelyn at some point in time.
But it does not prove when particularly he was there, his authorship of the crime or his motive
for being
CONSTI II (Sec. 11-13) | 57
there. While the motive of an accused in a criminal case is generally held to be immaterial, not Appellant enjoys in his favor the presumption of innocence until the contrary is proven. Proof of
being an element of the crime, motive becomes important when, as in this case, the evidence of the guilt of the accused should not be tainted with ambiguity. Although appellant’s defense is
the commission of the crime is purely circumstantial.38 weak, conviction must come from the strength of the prosecution's evidence and not from the
weakness of the defense. In this case, the prosecution’s evidence is not strong enough to justify a
The prosecution’s evidence that is perceived to be conclusive of appellant’s guilt is mainly the
finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.46 Acquittal, therefore, is inevitable.
testimony of Rico Magdasal. Such testimony, however, is uncorroborated. The rule is that the
testimony of one witness is sufficient to sustain a conviction, if such testimony positively WHEREFORE, appellant Elizar Tomaquin is hereby ACQUITTED and
establishes the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.39 Moreover, the doctrine of ordered RELEASED immediately, unless he is being detained for some other legal cause.
long standing that the testimony of a lone witness, if credible and positive, is sufficient to convict
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to cause the immediate release of appellant
an accused applies only to eyewitnesses. Thus, an uncorroborated circumstantial evidence is
unless he is being lawfully held for another cause, and to inform this Court of the date of his
certainly not sufficient for conviction when the evidence itself is in serious doubt. 40Rico’s lone
release, or the ground for his continued confinement, within ten (10) days from notice of herein
testimony is not sufficient to establish appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
decision.
In addition, appellant vehemently denied Rico’s allegations. According to appellant, it was Rico
Costs de oficio.
who actually owns the pair of shoes and tres cantos; that it was he who bid appellant to go to the
Tatoys’ residence and lift their TV set; and that it was Rico who stabbed Jaquelyn. Considering SO ORDERED.
appellant’s denial and his different version of the incident, it became incumbent upon the
prosecution to rebut appellant's allegations with further evidence to corroborate the statement of
Rico. It must be noted that there were other persons present during their drinking spree, namely,
Romy Magdasal, Noel Labay, and a certain Cardo. These persons could have been presented as
witnesses to back up Rico’s claim but the prosecution did not do so. Rico testified that appellant
owned the tres cantos found by the stairs; but Rico also stated he only "heard" that the tres
cantos was found by the stairs.41Who found the tres cantos that was supposed to have been used
to stab Jaquelyn? The neighbor who allegedly found it by the stairs was not presented in court to
identify if the tres cantos presented by the prosecution was the alleged weapon in the stabbing of
Jaquelyn. Such failure of the prosecution to corroborate the material points of Rico’s testimony
weakened their case.

The Court also has serious misgivings on the probative value of the white sando shirt that
appellant was allegedly wearing at the time of stabbing Jaquelyn, which Edgar Magdasal later
found bloodstained among the soiled clothes.
First, when appellant was asked by the barangay tanods about the shirt he was wearing, he told
them that it was in Wilson Magdasal’s house. According to barangay tanod Armando Zabate, it
was Edgar Magdasal who found the shirt, "somewhat wet and bloody," among the soiled
clothes.42 Edgar Magdasal, however, was not presented to testify as to where he found the shirt,
the state the shirt was in when he found it, and how he knew that it was the shirt worn by
appellant.
Second, Medical Technologist Jude Daniel Mendoza testified that the bloodstains on
appellant’s sando shirt, as well as the tres cantos, were human blood.43 Mendoza, however, did
not conduct further tests to ascertain the type of blood found on these pieces of evidence nor did
he match it with the victim’s blood type,44 hence, it does not connect the bloodstains to the
herein victim. In People vs. Rodriguez, the Court ruled that the maong pants allegedly belonging
to appellant and found positive of type O blood has no probative value since the blood type of
appellant and the victim were not taken for purposes of comparison.45
The same ruling applies with regard to the bloodstains found on the tres cantos.
CONSTI II (Sec. 11-13) | 58
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 97936 May 29, 1995
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ALEJANDRO LUCERO y CORTEL, accused-appellant.
PUNO, J.:
If the Constitution has any value, it is because it stands up for those who cannot stand up for
themselves. Thus, it protected those under custodial investigation with the all-important right to
counsel. We hold that the right to counsel cannot be diluted without tampering the scales of
justice. For denial of his right to counsel, we acquit accused-appellant.
Alejandro Lucero, Bienvenido Echavez, Balbino Echavez, Peter Doe, Richard Doe and John Doe
were charged with the crime of robbery with homicide. The Information against them reads:
That on or about the 7th day of May, 1988, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together,
confederating with and mutually helping one another , did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously rob one DR. DEMETRIO Z. MADRID, in the manner as follows: on the date
and in the place aforementioned, the said accused, one armed with handgun, pursuant to their
conspiracy blocked the way of the said complainant who was on board a Mercedez Benz crusing
along Road 14 near (the) corner (of) Mindanao Avenue, Pag-asa, this City, and did then and
there, by means of violence and intimidation against persons, take, rob and carry away his cash
money amounting to P6,600.00; one gold necklace with cross pendant, 7 karat, worth
P45,000.00; one (1) gold Rolex watch worth P155,000.00; one (1) 3 karat gold ring worth
P80,000.00; one 2 karat gold ring, domino style, worth P27,000.00; one (1) solid gold bracelet
worth 363,600.00, Philippine Currency, belonging to said DR. DEMETRIO Z. MADRID, to the
damage and prejudice of the said offended party in the total amount aforementioned; that on the
occasion of the robbery and pursuant to their conspiracy, the above-named accused, with intent
to kill, and taking advantage the(ir) superior strength, with the use of handgun, shot LORENZO
BERNALES y ALERIA, a driver of the said offended party, thus inflicting upon him serious and
mortal wounds which resulted to the insta(n)taneous death of the said LORENZO BERNALES y
ALERIA, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said LORENZO BERNALEZ y ALERIA
in such amount as may be awarded to them under the provisions of the Civil Code.
Contrary to law. 1
Only the accused Echavez brothers and Alejandro Lucero were apprehended. The others
remained at large.
Trial proceeded only as against the three.
The evidence on record shows that on May 6, 1988, private complainant DR. DEMETRIO Z.
MADRID spent the night at his boarding house, located at #35 Ilocos Norte Street, Bago-Bantay,
Quezon City. He wanted to return that night to his residence at Project 6, Quezon City. However,
his driver, Lorenzo Bernales, advised him not to leave that night for Bernales overheard that the
group of Balbino and Bienvenido Echavez would rob him on his way home. He heeded the
advice.
It was around 7:00 a.m., the next day, that Dr. Madrid again asked his driver to bring him to his
main residence in Project 6, Quezon City. While traversing Road 14, a gray-reddish car overtook
the Mercedes Benz he was riding and blocked their way. Three (3) men swiftly alighted from the
car blocking them and barged into his Benz. The first grabbed the driver's seat and pushed his
driver to the other side of the seat. The second occupied the right side of his driver. The third sat
beside Dr. Madrid at the back sent and punched him. Simultaneously, the man at the right side of
his driver pulled out his gun and announced a hold-up. 2
The man beside Dr. Madrid divested him of the following: a gold Rolex watch, studded with
diamonds, worth P155,000.00, a three (3) carat diamond ring worth P80,000.00, another two (2)
carat domino-style ring, surrounded with diamonds worth P27,000.00, a necklace worth
P27,000.00, a bracelet worth P50,000.00, and his wallet containing P6,600.00. 3
After driving them around the area for a couple of hours, the malefactors stopped his car and
alighted. The worst came. The man at the right side of his driver shot the latter at the chest before
fleeing. Dr. Madrid and his driver were rushed by concerned citizens to the Veterans Memorial
Hospital. Two hours later, his driver died of hemorrhage as a result of the gunshot wound he
sustained. 4 Dr. Madrid survived. 5 He reported the incident to the Quezon City police. When no
action was taken on his case, he filed his complaint with the Special Operations Group of the
Central Intelligence Service (CIS). 6
Two months later, the CIS efforts paid-off. On July 23, 1988, the Special Operations Group
headed by Capt. Raul Boac, after a surveillance of the suspects, interrogated Bienvenido Echavez
in Camp Crame. Two days later, they apprehended Balbino Echavez and Alejandro Lucero. They
turned them over to the Investigation Department of the CIS. 7
Pfc. Alberto Pursal was assigned to conduct the investigation of the suspects. He declared that
even before the investigation started, Lucero verbally admitted his participation in the crime and
that he was the one who shot Bernales, the driver of Dr. Madrid. 8
In any event, Pfc. Pursal went thru the motions of investigation. He informed Lucero of his
constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel. When Lucero told him that he had no
lawyer, Pursal informed that CIS Legal Department about Lucero's need for a lawyer. 9 In due
time, Atty. Diosdado Peralta appeared at the investigator's office at around 9:00 p.m. He
identified himself as the lawyer who was requested to assist Lucero and inquired about the
latter's whereabouts. He was then directed to where Lucero was.
Atty. Peralta conferred with Lucero. He also apprised Lucero of his constitutional rights. He
explained to Lucero that he has the right to remain silent, that he is not obliged to give any
statement to the investigators, and that even if he has already given a statement, he may refuse to
sign it. He observed no reaction from Lucero. Nonetheless, Atty. Peralta gathered the impression
that Lucero understood his advice.
Thereafter, the CIS investigator began taking down Lucero's statement. When the investigator
started asking the preliminary questions, Atty. Peralta left to attend the wake of his friend, Capt.
CONSTI II (Sec. 11-13) | 59
Emilio Dacanay, at Fort Bonifacio. He gave word that in case of need, he could be reached at his
residence.
The next morning, Lucero was accompanied by two (2) CIS agents to Atty. Peralta's house. The
extrajudicial statement of Lucero (Exhibit "C"), was presented to Atty. Peralta. It was already
signed by Lucero. In the presence of the two (2) CIS agents, Atty. Peralta examined Exhibit "C"
and explained to Lucero its Legal implications. He asked Lucero whether he gave the statements
voluntarily. Lucero replied in the affirmative. Atty. Peralta then signed Exhibit "C". 10
The three (3) accused denied complicity in the in the crime charged.
Appellant Lucero's defense is alibi. He testified that on May 7, 1988, he was at his house in
Caloocan City. He woke up at 6:30 a.m., stayed at his house the whole day repairing the
upholstery of a customer's chair. He was then with his cousin Marcelino Seneta and his wife
Mylen Lucero. He worked until 5 p.m. that day.
Lucero was apprehended on July 25, 1988, more than two (2) months after the commission of the
crime. He said he was surprised when several unidentified men accosted him while he was
walking towards his house. They chased him, handcuffed and blindfolded him and pushed him
into a jeep. He was He was blindfolded the whole night and did not know where he was taken.
The men turned out to be police officers. Later, he identified one of the men to be Capt. Boak,
head of the CIS Special Operations Group.
The next day, he learned he was in Camp Crame. He claimed that he was tortured. He was not
informed of the offense for which he was being investigated. Neither did they reveal the identity
of the complainant. A couple of days lapsed and a CIS agent brought him to a clinic inside Camp
Crame. The doctor saw the contusions on his body. He advised that he be treated. The CIS agent
refused and they left the clinic.
Lucero denied knowing Dr. Madrid, the Echavez brothers and the other accused in this case. He
said he only met Dr. Madrid at the CIS Office during the police line-up. He was made to line-up
four (4) times before Dr. Madrid finally identified him on the fourth time.
Lucero also claimed he signed the extrajudicial confession (Exhibit "C") 11 under duress. He
denied engaging the services of Atty. Peralta. He likewise confirmed that Atty. Peralta was not
present during his actual custodial interrogation.12
After trial, the court a quo acquitted the Echavez brothers for insufficient evidence. The trial
court, however, convicted accused Lucero. The dispositive portion of the Decision 13 reads:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. The accused brothers BIENVENIDO ECHAVEZ y VALIDA and BALBINO ECHAVEZ y
VALIDA are hereby ACQUITTED for insufficiency of evidence; and
2. Accused ALEJANDRO LUCERO y CORTEL is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt as principal by direct participation of Robbery with Homicide. Alejandro Lucero is hereby
sentenced to suffer an imprisonment term of RECLUSION PERPETUA.
On the civil aspect, Alejandro Lucero is hereby ordered a) to pay the heirs of the deceased victim
Lorenzo Bernales y Aleria the sum of P30,000.00 as actual damages and P50,000.00 as moral
damages for the mental anguish suffered by his family; and b) to pay Dr. Demetrio Z. Madrid the
sum of P363,600.00 representing the cash money, and money value of the jewelries and
wristwatch he lost due to the robbery at bar.
SO ORDERED. 14
Hence this appeal by Lucero, raising the following assignments of error:
1. the lower court erred in giving more weight to the evidences (sic) of the prosecution which
were inconsistent, not credible, unreliable, doubtful and insufficient to support accused-
appellant's conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
2. the lower court erred in not acquitting accused-appellant of the alleged crime of robbery with
homicide inspite of the fact that conspiracy was not proven in this case.
3. that the lower court erred in convicting accused-appellant of the crime charged on the basis of
his alleged extrajudicial confession (made in custodial investigation) which was obtained thru
force, violence and without the presence of counsel of his own choice or engaged by any person
on his behalf or appointed by the lower court and therefore suffered constitutional infirmities.
4 that the lower erred in convicting accused-appellant of the crime charged inspite of the fact that
the accused-appellant was not positively identified with certitude by the prosecution.
5. that the lower court erred in convicting accused-appellant of the crime charged primarily on
the basis of the weakness of his defense of alibi and not on the strength of the prosecution
evidence; and inspite of the lack of positive identification of accused-appellant.
6. that the lower court erred in convicting accused-appellant and not acquitting him like his co-
accused and alleged co-conspirators [the echavez brothers] of the crime charged.
We find the appeal meritorious.
The conviction of appellant rests on two (2) facts: (a) his positive identification by the
complainant, and (b) his extra-judicial confession admitting his participation in the crime. We
find that the evidence proving these facts cannot stand scrutiny.
Firstly, the credibility of the main prosecution eyewitness, Dr. Demetrio Madrid who identified
appellant, is seriously open to doubt. It stands unrebutted on the record that appellant had to
participate at the police line-upfour (4) times before he was finally identified by Dr. Madrid.
There is no reason for the ambivalence. The robbery took place in broad daylight and the three
malefactors wore no mask. They drove them around for three (3) hours. Considering these
circumstances, there is no reason for Dr. Madrid's failure to immediately identify appellant.
We are also disconcerted by the vacillating testimony of Dr. Madrid during the trial. Initially, Dr.
Madrid claimed that he could identify only one of the robbers who staged the hold-up. 15 At
another point, Dr. Madrid said he could identify two of the malefactors. 16 In his affidavit, Dr.
Madrid presented he could identify all three. 17 Appellant's conviction cannot be made to rest on
this nebulous identification by Dr. Madrid.
Secondly, appellant's conviction cannot be based on his extra-judicial confession.
CONSTI II (Sec. 11-13) | 60
The 1987 Constitution 18 requires that a person under investigation for the commission of a crime
should be provided with counsel. We have constitutionalized the right to counsel because of our
hostility against the use of duress and other undue influence in extracting confessions from a
suspect. Force and fraud tarnish confessions and render them inadmissible. 19We take pride in
constitutionalizing this right to counsel even while other countries have desisted from elevating
this right to a higher pedestal. We have sustained the inviolability of this precious right with
vigor and without any apology.
The trial court did not display the required sensitivity to appellant's right to counsel. Indeed, it
did not impose a rigorous respect for the right. It was satisfied that there was "substantial"
compliance with the requirements of right to counsel. This is far from the intent of the
Constitution. The records show that Atty. Peralta's, who was not the counsel of choice of
appellant, arrived at the CIS Office an the second night of appellant's detention. More exactly, he
arrived at the CIS Office at around 9:00 p.m. and talked with appellant about his rights. Atty.
Peralta himself admitted he received no reaction from appellant although his impression was that
appellant understood him. 20 Worse, Atty. Peralta left appellant in the custody of the CIS agents
when his real interrogation started. He said he had to attend the wake of a friend. His attitude
did not speak well of the importance he gave to his role as counsel to a person under custodial
interrogation for the commission of a very serious offense. It was during his absence that
appellant gave an uncounselled confession. They tried to cure his uncounselled confession for
the next day, appellant was brought by two (2) CIS agents to Atty. Peralta's house. In the
presence of these agents, Atty. Peralta asked appellant if he understood the statements he gave
and if he signed it voluntarily. Appellant, of course, affirmed the voluntariness of the execution
of the confession. Atty. Peralta was satisfied and the trial court ruled that appellant's right to
counsel was not infringed. We disagree.
We hold that when the Constitution requires the right to counsel, it did not mean any kind of
counsel but effective and vigilant counsel. The circumstances in the case at bench clearly
demonstrate that appellant received no effective counseling from Atty. Peralta. In People v. De
Guzman, 21 we held that in custodial investigation, the right to counsel attaches from the moment
the investigation starts, i.e., when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit
information and confessions or admissions from the accused. In this case, at the crucial point
when the interrogation was just starting, Atty. Peralta left appellant to attend the wake of a friend
. At that critical stage, appellant gave his uncounselled extra-judicial a confession. Surely, such a
confession where appellant was unprotected from mischief cannot convict.
Neither can the trial court convict appellant on the ground that alibi is inherently a weak defense.
Chiseled in our jurisprudence is the rule that the onus is on the prosecution to prove the guilt of
the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Given the uncertainty of appellant's identification and the
inadmissibility of his uncounselled confession, there is no thread of evidence to criminally
inculpate appellant.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision in Criminal Case No. Q-88-201 of the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City , Branch CIII, convicting appellant Alejandro Lucero y Cortel of robbery with
homicide is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.

CONSTI II (Sec. 11-13) | 61

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 102786 August 14, 1998
ALEJANDRO B. DE LA TORRE, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
This case is here on appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated June 18, 1991,
which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City finding petitioner
Alejandro B. de la Torre guilty of qualified theft and sentencing him to an indeterminate prison
term of 6 years, 1 month, and 11 days, as minimum, to 8 years and 1 day, as maximum, and
ordering him to indemnify the Manila Electric Company (MERALCO), the offended party, in
the amount of P41,786.000.
The facts are as follows:
In the afternoon of April 18, 1989, Alexander Manalo, an electrical engineer of MERALCO
assigned to inspect six electric meters installed in the premises of the Cathay Pacific Steel and
Smelting Corporation (CAPASSCO) on De la Cruz Street in San Bartolome, Novaliches,
Quezon City, discovered that the said electric meters were missing. He reported the loss to the
MERALCO office in Ortigas Avenue, Pasig City. On April 20,1989, Manalo and Felino
Olegario, also of MERALCO, gave statements to the Northern Police District at Camp Karingal,
Sikatuna Village, Quezon City regarding the loss of the electric meters. They suspected that
CAPASSCO employees must have damaged the electric meters while tampering with them and
that to conceal the attempt, the employees must have removed the electric meters. They
expressed suspicion that MERALCO personnel were involved.
Patrolman Edgar Enopia, who was assigned to the case, proceeded to the scene of the crime and
inquired from people he saw there if they had seen the electric meters being taken down from the
post near the gate of CAPASSCO. According to Enopia, one of those he asked, Danilo Garcia,
said he had seen at about 10:00 p.m. on April 11, 1989 four crewmembers in a MERALCO
service truck, with the number 522 painted on its side, removing the electric meters. Acting on
this lead, Enopia asked MERALCO for the identities of the men, one of whom turned out to be
petitioner de la Torre. It appears that MERALCO service truck number 522 had specific
crewmembers assigned to it.
On July 4, 1989, the crewmembers were taken to the NPD headquarters for investigation. They
were included in a line-up of eight (8) persons. Garcia pointed to petitioner de la Torre as the
leader of the group which took down the electric meters from the CAPASSCO premises, but he
did not recognize the three (3) other crewmembers.
Based on the statements of Alexander Manalo, Felino Olegario, Edgar Enopia, and Danilo
Garcia, Assistant City Prosecutor Demetrio Macapagal filed on July 13, 1989 an information
charging petitioner de la Torre with Qualified Theft as defined in Arts. 309 and 310 of the
Revised Penal Code:
That on or about the 11th day of April, 1989, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, ALEJANDRO DELA TORRE Y BERNAL, being then
employed as leadman of a 5-men service crew of linemen of MERALCO, with grave abuse of
confidence, in conspiracy with his co-accused JOHN DOE, PETER DOE and CHARLES DOE,
conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping each other, with intent to gain and
without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously take, steal and carry away the following properties owned by the Manila Electric
Company (MERALCO) which were installed at the premises of the CATHAY PACIFIC STEEL
AND SMELTING CORPORATION (CAPASSCO), located at No. 292 P. dela Cruz Street, San
Bartolome, Novaliches, this City, customers of the aforesaid MERALCO, to wit:
One (1) GE Type C-9,
120 volts, Co. No. 42GRM-219 — P13,025.00
One (1) GE Type VW-63-A,
120 volts, Co. No. 41G208 — 4,997.06
One (1) GE Type V-63-A,
120 volts, Co. No. 41 GD-558 — 2,870.94
One (1) GE Type G-9,
139 volts, 3 phase, No. 42GRIM 1091 — 13,025.00
One (1) WH Type
D4A-2, 3 phase, Co. No. 41D4AW-92 — 4,997.06
One (1) Reactive Meter,
No. 41CA-34 — 2,870.94
with an aggregate value of P41,786.00, Philippine Currency, belonging to MANILA ELECTRIC
COMPANY, represented by FELINO R. OLEGARIO, to the damage and prejudice of the latter
in the aforementioned amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 1
The case was raffled to Branch 92 of the RTC of Quezon City, presided over by Judge Pacita
Cañizares-Nye. Trial was held from December 28, 1989 to February 1, 1990. In a decision
rendered on March 16, 1990, Judge Cañizares-Nye, relying heavily on the testimony of Garcia,
found petitioner de la Torre guilty of Qualified Theft and thus sentenced him to an indeterminate
prison term of 6 years, 1 month, and 11 days of prision mayor, as minimum, to 8 years and 1 day
of prision mayor, as maximum; and ordered him to pay MERALCO the amount of P41,786.00.
Petitioner de la Torre appealed to the Court of Appeals, contending first, that his constitutional
rights were violated during the custodial investigation conducted in the case; second, that the
RTC erred when it admitted in evidence the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, when the
same were not formally offered; third, that the RTC took into account hearsay evidence in
arriving at its judgment; and fourth, that the uncorroborated testimony of Garcia was insufficient
CONSTI II (Sec. 11-13) | 62
to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. However, the Court of Appeals 2 affirmed the
lower court's decision. 3 The Court of Appeals subsequently denied reconsideration. Hence, this
appeal.
First. Petitioner de la Torre alleges violation of his constitutional rights under Art. III, §12 (1) of
the Constitution which provides that "any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent
and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of
counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in
the presence of counsel." Petitioner de la Torre claims he was not informed of his right to remain
silent and to have the assistance of counsel during the investigation conducted on July 4, 1989 at
the NPD headquarters, where the crewmembers of MERALCO service truck number 522 were
presented in a police line-up. He further invokes the exclusionary rule in par. 3 of the same §12
that "any confession or admission obtained in violation of [this rule] shall be inadmissible in
evidence against him."
In Gamboa v. Cruz, 4 this Court ruled that "no custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it
be in the presence of counsel, engaged by the person arrested, or by any person in his behalf, or
appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself, or by anyone in his behalf,
and that, while the right may be waived, the waiver shall not be valid unless made in writing and
in the presence of counsel." 5 However, this applies only from the moment the investigating
officer begins to ask questions for the purpose of eliciting admissions, confessions, or any
information from the accused. A police line-up is not considered part of any custodial inquest
because it is conducted before that stage is reached. 6
In the instant case, petitioner de la Torre, together with the other crewmembers of MERALCO
truck number 522, was merely included in a line-up of eight (8) persons from which he was
picked out by Garcia as the leader of the group which had removed the electric meters from the
CAPASSCO premises. Until then, the police investigation did not focus on petitioner. Indeed, no
questions were put to him. Rather, the questions were directed to witnesses of the complainant.
There is, therefore, no basis for petitioner's allegations that his rights as a suspect in a custodial
interrogation were violated.
Second. Petitioner contends that the trial court admitted in evidence the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses when the fact is that before they testified, their testimonies were not
formally offered as required by Rule 132, §35 of the Rules of Court. Indeed, as held in People v.
Java: 7
. . . Rule 132, Section 34 of the Revised Rules of Court requires that for evidence to be
considered, it should be formally offered and the purpose specified. . . .
Under the new procedure as spelled out in Section 35 of the said rule which became effective on
July 1, 1989, the offer of the testimony of a witness must be made at the time the witness is
called to testify. The previous practice was to offer the testimonial evidence at the end of the trial
after all the witnesses had testified. With the innovation, the court is put on notice whether the
witness to be presented is a material witness and should be heard, or a witness who would be
testifying on irrelevant matters or on facts already testified to by other witnesses and should,
therefore, be stopped from testifying further.
. . . Sec. 36 of the aforementioned rule requires that an objection in the course of the oral
examination of a witness should be made as soon as the grounds therefor shall become
reasonably apparent. Since no objection to the admissibility of evidence was made in the court
below, an objection raised for the first time on appeal will not be considered. 8
Petitioner raised this point, however, only in the Court of Appeals. He thus waived his objection
by his failure to raise it at the close of the presentation of the prosecution evidence in the trial
court. As already noted, the trial in this case took place from December 28, 1989 to February 1,
1990. That was after the adoption of the new rule which required that the offer be made at the
beginning of the testimony of a witness. Petitioner should have invoked this rule and objected to
the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, if not before each of their testimonies, then at least
at the time their testimonies were formally offered at the close of the presentation of the
prosecution evidence. Not having done so, he must be deemed to have waived his objection
based on this ground. Consequently, the trial court committed no error in considering the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses in its decision despite the fact that such testimonies had
not been offered before they were given.
Third. Petitioner claims that, in violation of the hearsay rule, written statements pertaining to
disputed facts were considered by the trial court in its decision without presenting the declarants
at the trial for examination.
Rule 132, §1 of the Rules of Court provides that "the examination of witnesses presented in a
trial or hearing shall be done in open court, and under oath or affirmation. Unless the witness is
incapacitated to speak, or the question calls for a different mode of answer, the answers of the
witness shall be given orally." The reason for this rule is two-fold: to afford the judge the
opportunity of observing the demeanor of the witness and to allow the adverse party a chance of
cross-examining him.
Although hearsay evidence may be admitted because of lack of objection by the adverse party's
counsel, it is nonetheless without probative value. The explanation for this is given in People v.
Valero, thus: 9
The failure of the defense counsel to object to the presentation of incompetent evidence, like
hearsay evidence or evidence that violates the rule of res inter alios acta, or his failure to ask for
the striking out of the same does not give such evidence any probative value. The lack of
objection may make any incompetent evidence admissible. But admissibility of evidence should
not be equated with weight of evidence. Hearsay evidence whether objected to or not has no
probative value.
In this case, documents material to the guilt of the accused were admitted without the
prosecution presenting in court those who executed them, to wit: Exhibit M, certification signed
by a certain G.B. Pilapil, Jr., which states that MERALCO did not send out any personnel to
inspect the electrical installations at CAPASSCO during the period April 11, 1989 to April 12,
1989; Exhibit N, certification issued by one Vitaliano A. Dizon, which states that MERALCO
did not receive any complaint from CAPASSCO concerning the electric meters in question
during the same period; and Exhibit P, certification given by a certain E.M. Lopez, Jr., stating
that MERALCO did not authorize any of its employees to remove the subject electric meters.
CONSTI II (Sec. 11-13) | 63
These documents contain statements of facts and, therefore, those who made them should have
been presented in court so that they could be cross-examined by the defense. Otherwise,
whatever matter they contain is hearsay and, consequently, without probative value.
Fourth. We likewise agree with the final point raised by petitioner, namely, that the evidence for
the prosecution at the trial is not sufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The trial
court convicted petitioner solely on the uncorroborated testimony of Danilo Garcia.
Garcia claimed that at about 10:00 p.m. on April 11, 1989, while he was waiting for his wife in
front of the CAPASSCO compound on P. de la Cruz Street, San Bartolome, Novaliches, Quezon
City, he saw petitioner supervising the other crewmembers of a MERALCO service truck
number 522 in bringing down the six electric meters from the MERALCO post at the
CAPASSCO compound. According to Garcia, he noticed the Meralco truck parked below the
Meralco post outside the CAPASSCO gate. The truck was equipped with a crane-like structure
to which was attached a basket in which two men rode. The basket was raised toward the
Meralco post while two or three men remained on the ground next to the Meralco truck. One
man was giving instructions to the men removing the meters. Garcia recognized the truck to be
that of Meralco because of its familiar orange color. Thus, he testified:
Q: While conversing with your friends at a sidewalk beside CAPASSCO, did you observe any
unusual incident?
A: There is, sir.
Q: Could you please tell us what is this unusual incident that you observed?
A: Yes, sir, a MERALCO truck was parked and the basket was being raised to the post.
Q: And could you please tell us what happened after the basket was raised to the post, Mr.
Witness?
A: While the basket was being raised to the post with two (2) men on board, another one was
giving instructions from below.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: After the adjustment of the basket, what happened, Mr. Witness?
A: Then, they opened the box that was attached to the wall of CAPASSCO while the other one
was tampering the meters and handing it to his companion who was with him in the basket.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Mr. Witness, could you recognize the two (2) men aboard the basket if you have the
opportunity of seeing them again?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: How about the other man who was giving instructions on the ground? Can you recognize that
person if you have the opportunity of seeing him again?
A: Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Will you look around inside the courtroom if he is here?
A: No, sir.
Q: I will show you photographs of several persons. Can you identify the person whom you saw
giving instructions on April 11, 1989?
A: Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
(Witness pointed to a photograph of Alejandro de la Torre which appears on the bailbond filed
by the accused.)
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Can you remember the body number of the truck, Mr. Witness?
A: Body number 522, sir.
Q: You stated that it was Body No. 522. Why do you say that it is 522, Mr. Witness?
A: It so happened that I won in the jueteng, sir. 10
To be sure, the uncorroborated testimony of a lone witness is sufficient basis for the conviction
of the accused if it is credible, positive, and constitutes proof beyond reasonable doubt that the
latter is guilty. However, in the case at bar, the answers given by Garcia to questions asked
during his direct examination fall short of this standard. First, Garcia must have an extremely
acute sense of perception to recall a feature of the MERALCO service truck, such as its number,
which at the time had absolutely no significance for him. His claim that he remembered the
number because it was the number of a winning bet in "jueteng" is too facile to be convincing.
Second, Garcia must have a phenomenal memory to be able to recall almost three months after
the incident the appearance of a complete stranger whom he had seen only once. The removal of
electric meters by crewmembers of MERALCO was hardly a remarkable event that would have
deserved the attention to detail that Garcia, a mere chance passerby, apparently lavished upon it.
As this Court said in People v. Ibal: 11
. . . the presence of minor inconsistencies in the testimony of a witness could be an indication of
truth. A witness whose testimony is perfect in all aspects, without a flaw and remembering even
the minutest details which jibe beautifully with one another, lays himself open to suspicion of
having been coached or having memorized statements earlier rehearsed.
On the other hand, if, as Garcia said, he noticed that the MERALCO men were "tampering with
the meters," it is a source of wonder why he did not report the matter to the barangay authorities.
Not only is the testimony of Danilo Garcia improbable. His credibility as a witness is likewise
doubtful in view of the testimony of Pio Bautista, a council member of Barangay San Bartolome,
Novaliches, Quezon City. He testified that Danilo Garcia was not known to residents of P. de la
Cruz Street in San Bartolome, Novaliches, Quezon City. According to Bautista, he made
inquiries upon the request of petitioner de la Torre concerning the residence address of Garcia.
Bautista testified:
Q: . . . Were you able to make some exhaustive inquiries of Mr. Danilo Garcia which he said in
his sworn statement "nakatira sa looban of P. de la Cruz Street, San Bartolome, Quezon City?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And then what happened when you went in looban, P. de la Cruz Street, San Bartolome,
Novaliches, Quezon City?
A: Nobody was able to tell me that a certain Danilo Garcia resides in that place. 12
Evidence to be believed must come from a credible witness and must itself be credible.
CONSTI II (Sec. 11-13) | 64
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is REVERSED and petitioner Alejandro B. de la
Torre is ACQUITTED on the ground of reasonable doubt.
SO ORDERED.

CONSTI II (Sec. 11-13) | 65

EN BANC
G.R. No. 117565 November 18, 1997
ARSENIO P. LUMIQUED (deceased), Regional Director, DAR — CAR, Represented by
his Heirs, Francisca A. Lumiqued, May A. Lumiqued, Arlene A. Lumiqued and Richard A.
Lumiqued, petitioners,
vs.
Honorable APOLONIO G. EXEVEA, ERDOLFO V. BALAJADIA and FELIX T.
CABADING, ALL Members of Investigating Committee, created by DOJ Order No. 145
on May 30, 1992; HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, HON.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO, CHIEF Presidential Legal Adviser/Counsel; and HON.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING, Senior Deputy Executive Secretary of the Office of the
President, and JEANNETTE OBAR-ZAMUDIO, Private Respondent, respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
Does the due process clause encompass the right to be assisted by counsel during an
administrative inquiry?
Arsenio P. Lumiqued was the Regional Director of the Department of Agrarian Reform —
Cordillera Autonomous Region (DAR-CAR) until President Fidel V. Ramos dismissed him from
that position pursuant to Administrative Order No. 52 dated May 12, 1993. In view of
Lumiqued's death on May 19, 1994, his heirs instituted this petition for certiorari and
mandamus, questioning such order.
The dismissal was the aftermath of three complaints filed by DAR-CAR Regional Cashier and
private respondent Jeannette Obar-Zamudio with the Board of Discipline of the DAR. The first
affidavit-complaint dated November 16, 1989, 1 charged Lumiqued with malversation through
falsification of official documents. From May to September 1989, Lumiqued allegedly
committed at least 93 counts of falsification by padding gasoline receipts. He even submitted a
vulcanizing shop receipt worth P550.00 for gasoline bought from the shop, and another receipt
for P660.00 for a single vulcanizing job. With the use of falsified receipts, Lumiqued claimed
and was reimbursed the sum of P44,172.46. Private respondent added that Lumiqued seldom
made field trips and preferred to stay in the office, making it impossible for him to consume the
nearly 120 liters of gasoline he claimed everyday.
In her second affidavit-complaint dated November 22, 1989, 2 private respondent accused
Lumiqued with violation of Commission on Audit (COA) rules and regulations, alleging that
during the months of April, May, July, August, September and October, 1989, he made
unliquidated cash advances in the total amount of P116,000.00. Lumiqued purportedly defrauded
the government "by deliberately concealing his unliquidated cash advances through the
falsification of accounting entries in order not to reflect on 'Cash advances of other officials'
under code 8-70-600 of accounting rules."
The third affidavit-complaint dated December 15, 1989, 3 charged Lumiqued with oppression
and harassment. According to private respondent, her two previous complaints prompted
Lumiqued to retaliate by relieving her from her post as Regional Cashier without just cause.
The three affidavit-complaints were referred in due course to the Department of Justice (DOJ)
for appropriate action. On May 20, 1992, Acting Justice Secretary Eduardo G. Montenegro
issued Department Order No. 145 creating a committee to investigate the complaints against
Lumiqued. The order appointed Regional State Prosecutor Apolinario Exevea as committee
chairman with City Prosecutor Erdolfo Balajadia and Provincial Prosecutor Felix Cabading as
members. They were mandated to conduct an investigation within thirty days from receipt of the
order, and to submit their report and recommendation within fifteen days from its conclusion.
The investigating committee accordingly issued a subpoena directing Lumiqued to submit his
counter-affidavit on or before June 17, 1992. Lumiqued, however, filed instead an urgent motion
to defer submission of his counter-affidavit pending actual receipt of two of private respondent's
complaints. The committee granted the motion and gave him a five-day extension.
In his counter-affidavit dated June 23, 1992, 4 Lumiqued alleged, inter alia, that the cases were
filed against him to extort money from innocent public servants like him, and were initiated by
private respondent in connivance with a certain Benedict Ballug of Tarlac and a certain Benigno
Aquino III. He claimed that the apparent weakness of the charge was bolstered by private
respondent's execution of an affidavit of desistance. 5
Lumiqued admitted that his average daily gasoline consumption was 108.45 liters. He submitted,
however, that such consumption was warranted as it was the aggregate consumption of the five
service vehicles issued under his name and intended for the use of the Office of the Regional
Director of the DAR. He added that the receipts which were issued beyond his region were made
in the course of his travels to Ifugao Province, the DAR Central Office in Diliman, Quezon City,
and Laguna, where he attended a seminar. Because these receipts were merely turned over to him
by drivers for reimbursement, it was not his obligation but that of auditors and accountants to
determine whether they were falsified. He affixed his signature on the receipts only to signify
that the same were validly issued by the establishments concerned in order that official
transactions of the DAR-CAR could be carried out.
Explaining why a vulcanizing shop issued a gasoline receipt, Lumiqued said that he and his
companions were cruising along Santa Fe, Nueva Vizcaya on their way to Ifugao when their
service vehicle ran out of gas. Since it was almost midnight, they sought the help of the owner of
a vulcanizing shop who readily furnished them with the gasoline they needed. The vulcanizing
shop issued its own receipt so that they could reimburse the cost of the gasoline. Domingo
Lucero, the owner of said vulcanizing shop, corroborated this explanation in an affidavit dated
June 25, 1990. 6 With respect to the accusation that he sought reimbursement in the amount of
P660.00 for one vulcanizing job, Lumiqued submitted that the amount was actually only P6.60.
Any error committed in posting the amount in the books of the Regional Office was not his
personal error or accountability.
To refute private respondent's allegation that he violated COA rules and regulations in incurring
unliquidated cash advances in the amount of P116,000.00, Lumiqued presented a
certification 7 of DAR-CAR Administrative Officer Deogracias F. Almora that he had no
outstanding cash advances on record as of December 31, 1989.
In disputing the charges of oppression and harassment against him, Lumiqued contended that
private respondent was not terminated from the service but was merely relieved of her duties due
CONSTI II (Sec. 11-13) | 66
to her prolonged absences. While admitting that private respondent filed the required
applications for leave of absence, Lumiqued claimed that the exigency of the service necessitated
disapproval of her application for leave of absence. He allegedly rejected her second application
for leave of absence in view of her failure to file the same immediately with the head office or
upon her return to work. He also asserted that no medical certificate supported her application for
leave of absence.
In the same counter-affidavit, Lumiqued also claimed that private respondent was corrupt and
dishonest because a COA examination revealed that her cash accountabilities from June 22 to
November 23, 1989, were short by P30,406.87. Although private respondent immediately
returned the amount on January 18, 1990, the day following the completion of the cash
examination, Lumiqued asserted that she should be relieved from her duties and assigned to jobs
that would not require handling of cash and money matters.
Committee hearings on the complaints were conducted on July 3 and 10, 1992, but Lumiqued
was not assisted by counsel. On the second hearing date, he moved for its resetting to July 17,
1992, to enable him to employ the services of counsel. The committee granted the motion, but
neither Lumiqued nor his counsel appeared on the date he himself had chosen, so the committee
deemed the case submitted for resolution.
On August 12, 1992, Lumiqued filed an urgent motion for additional hearing, 8 alleging that he
suffered a stroke on July 10, 1992. The motion was forwarded to the Office of the State
Prosecutor apparently because
the investigation had already been terminated. In an order dated September 7, 1992, 9 State
Prosecutor Zoila C. Montero denied the motion, viz:
The medical certificate given show(s) that respondent was discharged from the Sacred Heart
Hospital on July 17, 1992, the date of the hearing, which date was upon the request of respondent
(Lumiqued). The records do not disclose that respondent advised the Investigating committee of
his confinement and inability to attend despite his discharge, either by himself or thru counsel.
The records likewise do not show that efforts were exerted to notify the Committee of
respondent's condition on any reasonable date after July 17, 1992. It is herein noted that as early
as June 23, 1992, respondent was already being assisted by counsel.
Moreover an evaluation of the counter-affidavit submitted reveal(s) the sufficiency,
completeness and thoroughness of the counter-affidavit together with the documentary evidence
annexed thereto, such that a judicious determination of the case based on the pleadings submitted
is already possible.
Moreover, considering that the complaint-affidavit was filed as far back as November 16, 1989
yet, justice can not be delayed much longer.
Following the conclusion of the hearings, the investigating committee rendered a report dated
July 31, 1992, 10finding Lumiqued liable for all the charges against him. It made the following
findings:
After a thorough evaluation of the evidences (sic) submitted by the parties, this committee finds
the evidence submitted by the complainant sufficient to establish the guilt of the respondent for
Gross Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct.
That most of the gasoline receipts used by the respondent in claiming for the reimbursement of
his gasoline expenses were falsified is clearly established by the 15 Certified Xerox Copies of the
duplicate receipts (Annexes G-1 to G-15) and the certifications issued by the different gasoline
stations where the respondent purchased gasoline. Annexes "G-1" to "G-15" show that the actual
average purchase made by the respondent is about 8.46 liters only at a purchase price of P50.00,
in contrast to the receipts used by the respondent which reflects an average of 108.45 liters at a
purchase price of P550.00. Here, the greed of the respondent is made manifest by his act of
claiming reimbursements of more than 10 times the value of what he actually spends. While only
15 of the gasoline receipts were ascertained to have been falsified, the motive, the pattern and the
scheme employed by the respondent in defrauding the government has, nevertheless, been
established.
That the gasoline receipts have been falsified was not rebutted by the respondent. In fact, he had
in effect admitted that he had been claiming for the payment of an average consumption of
108.45 liters/day by justifying that this was being used by the 4 vehicles issued to his office.
Besides he also admitted having signed the receipts.
Respondent's act in defrauding the government of a considerable sum of money by falsifying
receipts constitutes not only Dishonesty of a high degree but also a criminal offense for
Malversation through Falsification of Official Documents.
This committee likewise finds that the respondent have (sic) unliquidated cash advances in the
year 1989 which is in violation of established office and auditing rules. His cash advances
totaling to about P116,000.00 were properly documented. The requests for obligation of
allotments and the vouchers covering the amounts were all signed by him. The mere certification
issued by the Administrative Officer of the DAR-CAR cannot therefore rebut these concrete
evidences (sic).
On the third complaint, this committee likewise believes that the respondent's act in relieving the
complainant of her functions as a Regional Cashier on December 1, 1989 was an act of
harassment. It is noted that this was done barely two weeks after the complainant filed charges
against her (sic). The recommendation of Jose G. Medina of the Commission on Audit came
only on May 11, 1990 or almost six months after the respondent's order relieving the
complainant was issued. His act in harassing a subordinate employee in retaliation to a complaint
she filed constitute(s) Gross Misconduct on the part of the respondent who is a head of office.
The affidavits of Joseph In-uyay and Josefina Guting are of no help to the respondent. In fact,
this only show(s) that he is capable of giving bribes if only to have the cases against him
dismissed. He could not have given a certain Benigno Aquino III the sum of P10,000.00 for any
other purpose.
Accordingly, the investigating committee recommended Lumiqued's dismissal or removal from
office, without prejudice to the filing of the appropriate criminal charges against him.
Acting on the report and recommendation, former Justice Secretary Franklin M. Drilon adopted
the same in his Memorandum to President Fidel V. Ramos dated October 22, 1992. He added
that the filing of the affidavit of desistance 11 would not prevent the issuance of a resolution on
the matter considering that what was at stake was not only "the violation of complainant's (herein
CONSTI II (Sec. 11-13) | 67
private respondent's) personal rights" but also "the competence and fitness of the respondent
(Lumiqued) to remain in public office." He opined that, in fact, the evidence on record could call
for "a punitive action against the respondent on the initiative of the DAR."
On December 17, 1992, Lumiqued filed a motion for reconsideration of "the findings of the
Committee" with the DOJ. 12 Undersecretary Ramon S. Esguerra indorsed the motion to the
investigating committee. 13 In a letter dated April 1, 1993, the three-member investigating
committee informed Undersecretary Esguerra that the committee "had no more authority to act
on the same (motion for reconsideration) considering that the matter has already been forwarded
to the Office of the President" and that their authority under Department Order No. 145 ceased
when they transmitted their report to the
DOJ. 14 Concurring with this view, Undersecretary Esguerra informed Lumiqued that the
investigating committee could no longer act on his motion for reconsideration. He added that the
motion was also prematurely filed because the Office of the President (OP) had yet to act on
Secretary Drilon's recommendation. 15
On May 12, 1993, President Fidel V. Ramos himself issued Administrative Order No. 52 (A.O.
No. 52), 16 finding Lumiqued administratively liable for dishonesty in the alteration of fifteen
gasoline receipts, and dismissing him from the service, with forfeiture of his retirement and other
benefits. Thus:
That the receipts were merely turned over to him by his drivers and that the auditor and
accountant of the DAR-CAR should be the ones to be held liable is untenable. The receipts in
question were signed by respondent for the purpose of attesting that those receipts were validly
issued by the commercial establishments and were properly disbursed and used in the official
business for which it was intended.
This Office is not about to shift the blame for all these to the drivers employed by the DAR-CAR
as respondent would want us to do.
The OP, however, found that the charges of oppression and harassment, as well as that of
incurring unliquidated cash advances, were not satisfactorily established.
In a "petition for appeal" 17 addressed to President Ramos, Lumiqued prayed that A.O. No. 52 be
reconsidered and that he be reinstated to his former position "with all the benefits accorded to
him by law and existing rules and regulations." This petition was basically premised on the
affidavit dated May 27, 1993, of a certain Dwight L. Lumiqued, a former driver of the DAR-
CAR, who confessed to having authored the falsification of gasoline receipts and attested to
petitioner Lumiqued's being an "honest man" who had no "premonition" that the receipts he
(Dwight) turned over to him were "altered." 18
Treating the "petition for appeal" as a motion for reconsideration of A.O. No. 52, the OP,
through Senior Deputy Executive Secretary Leonardo A. Quisumbing, denied the same on
August 31, 1993.
Undaunted, Lumiqued filed a second motion for reconsideration, alleging, among other things,
that he was denied the constitutional right to counsel during the hearing. 19 On May 19,
1994, 20 however, before his motion could be resolved, Lumiqued died. On September 28,
1994, 21 Secretary Quisumbing denied the second motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari and mandamus praying for the reversal of the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Committee, the October 22, 1992, Memorandum of
then Justice Secretary Drilon, A.O. No. 52 issued by President Ramos, and the orders of
Secretary Quisumbing. In a nutshell, it prays for the "payment of retirement benefits and other
benefits accorded to deceased Arsenio Lumiqued by law, payable to his heirs; and the backwages
from the period he was dismissed from service up to the time of his death on May 19, 1994." 22
Petitioners fault the investigating committee for its failure to inform Lumiqued of his right to
counsel during the hearing. They maintain that his right to counsel could not be waived unless
the waiver was in writing and in the presence of counsel. They assert that the committee should
have suspended the hearing and granted Lumiqued a reasonable time within which to secure a
counsel of his own. If suspension was not possible, the committee should have appointed a
counsel de oficio to assist him.
These arguments are untenable and misplaced. The right to counsel, which cannot be waived
unless the waiver is in writing and in the presence of counsel, is a right afforded a suspect or an
accused during custodial investigation. 23 It is not an absolute right and may, thus, be invoked or
rejected in a criminal proceeding and, with more reason, in an administrative inquiry. In the case
at bar, petitioners invoke the right of an accused in criminal proceedings to have competent and
independent counsel of his own choice. Lumiqued, however, was not accused of any crime in the
proceedings below. The investigation conducted by the committee created by Department Order
No. 145 was for the purpose of determining if he could be held administratively liable under the
law for the complaints filed against him. The order issued by Acting Secretary of Justice
Montenegro states thus:
In the interest of the public service and pursuant to the provisions of existing laws, a Committee
to conduct the formal investigation of the administrative complaint for oppression, dishonesty,
disgraceful and immoral conduct, being notoriously undesirable and conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service against Mr. ARSENIO P. LUMIQUED, Regional Director,
Department of Agrarian Reform, Cordillera Autonomous Region, is hereby created . . . 24
As such, the hearing conducted by the investigating committee was not part of a criminal
prosecution. This was even made more pronounced when, after finding Lumiqued
administratively liable, it hinted at the filing of a criminal case for malversation through
falsification of public documents in its report and recommendation.
Petitioners' misconception on the nature of the investigation 25 conducted against Lumiqued
appears to have been engendered by the fact that the DOJ conducted it. While it is true that under
the Administrative Code of 1987, the DOJ shall "administer the criminal justice system in
accordance with the accepted processes thereof consisting in the investigation of the crimes,
prosecution of offenders and administration of the correctional system, 26 conducting criminal
investigations is not its sole function. By its power to "perform such other functions as may be
provided by law," 27 prosecutors may be called upon to conduct administrative investigations.
Accordingly, the investigating committee created by Department Order No. 145 was duty-bound
to conduct the administrative investigation in accordance with the rules therefor.
While investigations conducted by an administrative body may at times be akin to a criminal
proceeding, the fact remains that under existing laws, a party in an administrative inquiry may or
CONSTI II (Sec. 11-13) | 68
may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of the respondent's DIRECTOR LUMIQUED:
capacity to represent himself, and no duty rests on such a body to furnish the person being A. I think so, Sir.
investigated with counsel. 28 In an administrative proceeding such as the one that transpired CP BALAJADIA:
below, a respondent (such as Lumiqued) has the option of engaging the services of counsel or Let us make it of record that we have been warning you to proceed with the assistance of counsel
not. This is clear from the provisions of Section 32, Article VII of Republic Act No. but you said that you can take care of yourself so we have no other alternative but to
2260 29 (otherwise known as the Civil Service Act) and Section 39, paragraph 2, Rule XIV (on proceed. 36 (Emphasis supplied).
Discipline) of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. Thereafter, the following colloquies transpired:
292 30 (otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987). Excerpts from the transcript of CP BALAJADIA:
stenographic notes of the hearings attended by Lumiqued 31 clearly show that he was confident of We will suspend in the meantime that we are waiting for the supplemental affidavit you are
his capacity and so opted to represent himself . Thus, the right to counsel is not imperative in going to present to us. Do you have any request from the panel of investigators, Director
administrative investigations because such inquiries are conducted merely to determine whether Lumiqued?
there are facts that merit disciplinary measures against erring public officers and employees, with DIRECTOR LUMIQUED:
the purpose of maintaining the dignity of government service. I was not able to bring a lawyer since the lawyer I requested to assist me and was the one who
prepared my counter-affidavit is already engaged for a hearing and according to him he is
Furthermore, petitioners' reliance on Resolution No. 94-0521 of the Civil Service Commission
engaged for the whole month of July.
on the Uniform Procedure in the Conduct of Administrative Investigation stating that a
RSP EXEVEA:
respondent in an administrative complaint must be "informed of his right to the assistance of a
We cannot wait . . .
counsel of his choice," 32 is inappropriate. In the first place, this resolution is applicable only to
CP BALAJADIA:
cases brought before the Civil Service Commission. 33 Secondly, said resolution, which is dated
Why don't you engage the services of another counsel. The charges against you are quite serious.
January 25, 1994, took effect fifteen days following its publication in a newspaper of general
We are not saying you are guilty already. We are just apprehensive that you will go through this
circulation, 34 much later than the July 1992 hearings of the investigating committee created by
investigation without a counsel. We would like you to be protected legally in the course of this
Department Order No. 145. Thirdly, the same committee was not remiss in the matter of
investigation. Why don't you get the services of another counsel. There are plenty here in Baguio
reminding Lumiqued of his right to counsel. Thus, at the July 3, 1992, hearing, Lumiqued was
...
repeatedly appraised of his option to secure the services of counsel:
DIRECTOR LUMIQUED:
RSP EXEVEA: I will try to see, Sir . . .
CP BALAJADIA:
This is an administrative case against Director Lumiqued. Director Lumiqued is present. The
Please select your date now, we are only given one month to finish the investigation, Director
complainant is present, Janet Obar-Zamudio. Complainant has just been furnished with a copy of
Lumiqued.
the counter-affidavit of the respondent. Do you have a counsel, Director?
RSP EXEVEA:
DIR. LUMIQUED:
We will not entertain any postponement. With or without counsel, we will proceed.
I did not bring anybody, Sir, because when I went to see him, he told me, Sir, that he has already
CP BALAJADIA:
set a hearing, morning and afternoon today.
RSP EXEVEA: Madam Witness, will you please submit the document which we asked for and Director
So, we will proceed with the hearing even without your counsel? You are willing to proceed with Lumiqued, if you have other witnesses, please bring them but reduce their testimonies in
the hearing even without your counsel? affidavit form so that we can expedite with the proceedings. 37
DIR. LUMIQUED:
At the hearing scheduled for July 10, 1992, Lumiqued still did not avail of the services of
Yes, I am confident. . .
counsel. Pertinent excerpts from said hearing follow:
CP BALAJADIA:
You are confident that you will be able to represent yourself? FISCAL BALAJADIA:
DIR. LUMIQUED:
I notice also Mr. Chairman that the respondent is not being represented by a counsel. The last
That is my concern. 35 (Emphasis supplied)
time he was asked to invite his lawyer in this investigation. May we know if he has a lawyer to
In the course of private respondent's damaging testimony, the investigating committee once
represent him in this investigation?
again reminded Lumiqued of his need for a counsel. Thus:
CP BALAJADIA: DIR. LUMIQUED:
Q. (To Director Lumiqued) You really wish to go through with this even without your counsel?

CONSTI II (Sec. 11-13) | 69

There is none Sir because when I went to my lawyer, he told me that he had set a case also at
9:30 in the other court and he told me if there is a possibility of having this case postponed
anytime next week, probably Wednesday so we will have good time (sic) of presenting the
affidavit.
FISCAL BALAJADIA:
Are you moving for a postponement Director? May I throw this to the panel. The charges in this
case are quite serious and he should be given a chance to the assistance of a counsel/lawyer.
RSP EXEVEA:
And is (sic) appearing that the supplemental-affidavit has been furnished him only now and this
has several documents attached to it so I think we could grant him one last postponement
considering that he has already asked for an extension.
DIR. LUMIQUED:
Furthermore Sir, I am now being bothered by my heart ailment. 38
The hearing was reset to July 17, 1992, the date when Lumiqued was released from the hospital.
Prior to said date, however, Lumiqued did not inform the committee of his confinement.
Consequently because the hearing could not push through on said date, and Lumiqued had
already submitted his counter-affidavit, the committee decided to wind up the proceedings. This
did not mean, however, that Lumiqued was short-changed in his right to due process.
Lumiqued, a Regional Director of a major department in the executive branch of the government,
graduated from the University of the Philippines (Los Baños) with the degree of Bachelor of
Science major in Agriculture, was a recipient of various scholarships and grants, and underwent
training seminars both here and abroad. 39 Hence, he could have defended himself if need be,
without the help of counsel, if truth were on his side. This, apparently, was the thought he
entertained during the hearings he was able to attend. In his statement, "That is my concern," one
could detect that it had been uttered testily, if not exasperatedly, because of the doubt or
skepticism implicit in the question, "You are confident that you will be able to represent
yourself?" despite his having positively asserted earlier, "Yes, I am confident." He was obviously
convinced that he could ably represent himself. Beyond repeatedly reminding him that he could
avail himself of counsel and as often receiving the reply that he is confident of his ability to
defend himself, the investigating committee could not do more. One can lead a horse to water but
cannot make him drink.
The right to counsel is not indispensable to due process unless required by the Constitution or the
law. In Nera v.Auditor General, 40 the Court said:
. . . There is nothing in the Constitution that says that a party in a non-criminal proceeding is
entitled to be represented by counsel and that, without such representation, he shall not be bound
by such proceedings. The assistance of lawyers; while desirable, is not indispensable. The legal
profession was not engrafted in the due process clause such that without the participation of its
members, the safeguard is deemed ignored or violated. The ordinary citizen is not that helpless
that he cannot validly act at all except only with a lawyer at his side.
In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain
one's side. One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also, and perhaps even much
more creditably as it is more practicable than oral arguments, through pleadings. 41 An actual
hearing is not always an indispensable aspect of due process. 42 As long as a party was given the
opportunity to defend his interests in due course; he cannot be said to have been denied due
process of law, for this opportunity to be heard is the very essence of due process. 43 Moreover,
this constitutional mandate is deemed satisfied if a person is granted an opportunity to seek
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. 44 Lumiqued's appeal and his subsequent
filing of motions for reconsideration cured whatever irregularity attended the proceedings
conducted by the committee. 45
The constitutional provision on due process safeguards life, liberty and property. 46 In the early
case of Cornejo v.Gabriel and Provincial Board of
Rizal 47 the Court held that a public office is not property within the sense of the constitutional
guarantee of due process of law for it is a public trust or agency. This jurisprudential
pronouncement has been enshrined in the 1987 Constitution under Article XI, Section 1, on
accountability of public officers, as follows:
Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
When the dispute concerns one's constitutional right to security of tenure, however, public office
is deemed analogous to property in a limited sense; hence, the right to due process could
rightfully be invoked. Nonetheless, the right to security of tenure is not absolute. Of equal weight
is the countervailing mandate of the Constitution that all public officers and employees must
serve with responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency. 48 In this case, it has been clearly
shown that Lumiqued did not live up to this constitutional precept.
The committee's findings pinning culpability for the charges of dishonesty and grave misconduct
upon Lumiqued were not, as shown above, fraught with procedural mischief. Its conclusions
were founded on the evidence presented and evaluated as facts. Well-settled in our jurisdiction is
the doctrine that findings of fact of administrative agencies must be respected as long as they are
supported by substantial evidence, even if such evidence is not overwhelming or
preponderant. 49 The quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt in administrative cases is
only substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion. 50
Consequently, the adoption by Secretary Drilon and the OP of the committee's recommendation
of dismissal may not in any way be deemed tainted with arbitrariness amounting to grave abuse
of discretion. Government officials are presumed to perform their functions with regularity.
Strong evidence is not necessary to rebut that presumption, 51 which petitioners have not
successfully disputed in the instant case.
Dishonesty is a grave offense penalized by dismissal under Section 23 of Rule XIV of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987. Under Section 9 of
the same Rule, the penalty of dismissal carries with it "cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of
leave credits and retirement benefits, and the disqualification for reemployment in the
CONSTI II (Sec. 11-13) | 70
government service." The instant petition, which is aimed primarily at the "payment of
retirement benefits and other benefits," plus back wages from the time of Lumiqued's dismissal
until his demise, must, therefore, fail.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari and mandamus is hereby DISMISSED and
Administrative Order no. 52 of the Office of the President is AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

CONSTI II (Sec. 11-13) | 71

SECOND DIVISION they left the room. Having decided to go home, Tandoc opened the sliding door. All of a sudden,
Din saw Appellant, who at that time was wearing a security guard's uniform, shoot Tandoc with
G.R. No. 108494 September 20, 1994
a revolver. There was a fluorescent bulb installed at the front of the hotel which enabled Din to
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, identify the assailant. Tandoc was shot in the middle of the chest and he fell down. Then, Din
vs. saw four to five men scamper away from the scene. 9
SAMUEL MARRA y ZARATE, ALLAN TAN, alias "Allan Yao,"
Aware of his injury, Tandoc told Din, "Tol, I was shot." The latter tried to chase appellant and
PETER DOE, PAUL DOE and TOM DOE, accused.
his companions but he failed to catch up with them. Din and his wife then brought Tandoc to the
SAMUEL MARRA y ZARATE, accused-appellant. Villaflor Hospital. The victim was taken to the emergency room but he expired an hour later. 10

REGALADO, J.: At about 3:45 A.M. of March 7, 1992, SPO3 Reynaldo de Vera of the Dagupan City Police
Station received a report about a shooting incident at the annex building of the Lucky Hotel. He
In an information filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, Dagupan City, Samuel Marra
proceeded to the crime scene along with SPO4 Orlando Garcia, SPO3 Mauricio Flores and SPO3
y Zarate, John Doe, Peter Doe, Paul Doe and Tom Doe were charged with the crime of murder
Noli de Castro. Upon their arrival about five minutes later, they were informed by the wife of
for the fatal shooting of one Nelson Tandoc on March 7, 1992. 1 On June 4, 1992, an amended
Jimmy Din that the victim had been brought to the Villaflor Hospital. They proceeded to the
information was filed wherein Allan Tan, alias "Allan Yao," was indicated as an accused instead
hospital where Din informed them that he could recognize the man who killed Tandoc and that
of John Doe. 2 A warrant of arrest was thereafter issued against Allan Tan 3 but the same was
the killer was, at that time, wearing the polo shirt of a security guard's uniform. 11
returned unserved, 4 hence trial proceeded with regard to herein accused-appellant Samuel Marra
alone. They decided to proceed to an eatery called "Linda's Ihaw-Ihaw." Seeing the security guard of a
nearby bus company, they inquired from him if he knew of any unusual incident that happened
Duly assisted by counsel, appellant pleaded not guilty upon arraignment on May 15,
in the vicinity. The guard said that he saw the guard of "Linda's Ihaw-Ihaw," together with some
1992. 5 After trial on the merits, judgment was rendered by the court below on October 8, 1992
companions, chasing two persons running towards M. H. del Pilar Street. He further added that
finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, attended by the
the man was wearing a polo shirt of a security guard's uniform. Asked where that particular
aggravating circumstance of nighttime, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty ofreclusion
guard might be, he pointed to a man eating inside the eatery nearby. The man eating was not in a
perpetua. He was further ordered to pay the heirs of Nelson Tandoc the sums of P50,000.00 as
security guard's uniform. 12
death indemnity, P50,000.00 as actual damages, P100,000.00 as moral damages, and the costs. 6
They approached the man and inquired whether he was the security guard of "Linda's Ihaw-
The prosecution's eyewitness, Jimmy Din, positively identified appellant as the triggerman in the
Ihaw," which the latter answered in the affirmative. After a series of questions, they learned that
killing of Nelson Tandoc. Din recounted that at around 2:00 A.M. on March 7, 1992, he and his
he was Samuel Marra, that his tour of duty was from 7:00 P.M. of a preceding day to 6:00 A.M.
friend, Nelson Tandoc, were conversing with each other in front of Lucky Hotel located at M.H.
the following day, that he was still on duty at around 2:30 in the morning of March 7, 1992, and
del Pilar Street, Dagupan City, which was owned by the witness' father and of which he was the
that the firearm issued to him was in his house. Upon their request to see the firearm, they
administrator. He noticed a man pass by on the opposite side of the street. The man made a dirty
proceeded to Marra's residence at Interior Nueva Street. 13
sign with his finger and Din informed Tandoc thereof. The man repeated his offensive act and
called them by waving his hands. Infuriated, they followed the man until the latter stopped in When they arrived, Marra took a .38 caliber revolver from inside an aparador and handed it to
front of the Dunkin' Donuts store at the corner of Arellano and Fernandez streets. They De Vera. De Vera also found five live bullets and one spent shell. Smelling gunpowder from the
demanded an explanation from the man but they were not given any. 7 barrel of the gun, De Vera asked Marra when he last fired the gun but the latter denied ever
having done so. Abruptly, De Vera asked him point-blank why he shot Tandoc. Marra at first
At that instant, two men arrived and one of them inquired what was going on. Tandoc informed
denied the accusation but when informed that someone saw him do it, he said that he did so in
him that they were just demanding an explanation from the man. Din was surprised when Tandoc
self-defense, firing at the victim only once. Tandoc allegedly had a samurai sword with him at
unexpectedly slapped one of the two men. A brawl ensued, with Tandoc clashing with the two
the time of the incident. However, persistent efforts on the part of the policemen to thereafter
men while Din exchanged blows with the man who made the dirty finger sign. After the
locate said bladed weapon proved futile. Marra also admitted that prior to the incident, he chased
fisticuffs, their three opponents ran away in a westward direction. 8
the victim and Din. The officers then took Marra to the police station where he was detained. 14
Tandoc and Din then decided to walk back to the hotel. When they were about to enter the place,
Meanwhile, De Vera went to Villaflor Hospital from where he fetched Din and brought him to
they noticed that the men with whom they just had a fight were running towards them. Sensing
the police station. There, Din definitely identified Marra as the assailant. During the
danger, they ran inside the annex building of the hotel and immediately secured the lock of the
investigation, De Vera also found out that Marra had not firearm license. 15
sliding outer door. They entered a room and waited until they felt that the situation had
normalized. After ten to fifteen minutes, thinking that the men were no longer in the vicinity,

CONSTI II (Sec. 11-13) | 72

Dr. Tomas G. Cornel, Assistant City Health Officer of Dagupan City, testified that he conducted
an autopsy on a certain Nelson Tandoc. He found a gunshot wound on the victim with the point
of entry of the left side of the anterior chest wall and the point of exit at the lower left portion of
the right shoulder. 16
Prosecutor Gregorio Gaerlan, stepfather of the victim, testified on the funeral, burial and other
expenses incurred by the family. He declared that they paid Funeraria Quiogue P25,000.00 for its
services; Villaflor Hospital, P2,875.00 for the confinement of Tandoc; St. John Memorial
Cathedral, P350.00; Eternal Garden, P3,000.00 for the interment fee and P150.00 for the rent of
the tent during the burial; and that they spent P2,300.00 for the video tape expenses and
P11,800.00 for food and drinks during the wake. 17
Understandably, appellant gave a different version of the incident. Marra declared in court that
he used to work as a security guard at "Linda's Ihaw-Ihaw" from seven o'clock in the evening to
six o'clock in the morning of the following day. On March 6, 1992, he reported for duty at seven
o'clock that evening as was his usual practice. At around four o'clock down of the following day,
he went home to change his clothes. He proceeded to the Five Star Bus Terminal which was
adjacent to "Linda's Ihaw-Ihaw." He saw Neneng, the cashier of said eatery, and together they
ordered arroz caldo. Later, at about 5:00 A.M., he was approached by four policemen who
inquired if he was a security guard. He answered in the affirmative. He was also asked about his
sidearm. When he answered that it was at his residence, they all went to his house to look for it.
After he handed over the firearm to the policemen, he was brought to the city hall where he was
detained. 18
Under cross-examination, he insisted that when he handed the gun to the policeman, there were
five live bullets, and not four live bullets and one empty shell as claimed by the prosecution.
Prior to the incident, he had never met Jimmy Din nor does he know of any cause why Din
would harbor any ill feelings against him. 19
After a careful scrutiny of the records and an objective evaluation of the evidence, the Court is
not disposed to reverse the judgment of the lower court, the decision of the latter being amply
supported by the established facts and fully sustained by the applicable law.
In assailing the decision of the court below, the defense argues that "Jimmy Din . . . was not able
to identify the assailant in a definite and believable manner." It goes on to state further that "
Jimmy Din was inside the hotel when Nelson Tandoc was shot and his vision was o(b)structed
by the door. Jimmy Din was also not familiar with the accused. Under the circumstances by
which he allegedly witnessed the shooting, how could be identify clearly an assailant at the
distance of 45 meters?" 20
Appellant's counsel is only partly correct, having conveniently failed to mention other vital parts
of Din's testimony. An impartial review of said testimony readily reveals that Din was indeed in
a position to know the identity of the assailant. Firstly, Din knew for a fact that the persons he
and Tandoc fought with near the Dunkin' Donuts store were the same men who chased them
while they were on their way back to the hotel because he was able to take a good look at them.
During the chase, he naturally turned around to look at the men who were running after them and
who were at that time in front of the Balingit Trading store which was well-lighted. 21 It logically
follows that they were the same persons who were waiting for them when they later came out of
the hotel, and he was familiar with their identities because of their previous encounter.
Secondly, we do not agree with appellant that the door blocked the view of Din. Said door, partly
made of plywood, had a spring hinge which makes it possible for the door to close by itself.
However, at that time the spring hinge had been weakened by long and constant use such that it
would take some time for it to close the door, thereby allowing Din sufficient opportunity to
have an unobstructed view of the scene outside. 22
Thirdly, Din was quite near the victim and appellant, which proximity, enabled him to clearly see
what really happened. He thus readily perceived the actual shooting at the time when Tandoc
pushed the door open. At that precise moment, Din was at the left side of Tandoc and about four
to five meters away from the assailant. 23
Lastly, the place was brightly illuminated by a 20-watt fluorescent bulb installed on the outside
wall in front of the hotel. Marra was only about three meters away therefrom. Such physical
conditions would undeniably afford a clear view from inside the hotel of the immediate area
outside and in front of the same where the incident took place.
The prosecution presented another vital witness in the person of Sgt. Reynaldo de Vera, whose
testimony we shall repeat here for easy reference. In capsulized form, De Vera narrated the
sequence of events that happened after he and his companions went to the crime scene to conduct
an investigation. Having received information that a man in a security guard's uniform was
involved in the incident, they sought information from a security guard of a nearby bus terminal.
Said security guard pointed them to Marra, who at that time was eating in acarinderia nearby.
Informed by Marra that his gun was at his residence, they all went to Marra's residence to get the
same. After receiving said firearm, De Vera asked appellant why he killed Tandoc but Marra
initially denied any participation in the killing. Nevertheless, when confronted with the fact that
somebody saw him do it, Marra admitted the act although he alleged it was done in self-defense.
This testimony of De Vera as to the confession of Marra is of significant weight, but the
admissibility thereof shall also be passed upon.
Section 12(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that "(a)ny person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to
remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. . . . ."
The critical inquiry then is whether or not Marra was under custodial investigation when he
admitted the killing but invoked self-defense. We believe that he was not so situated.
Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a
person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way. It is only after the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved
crime and begins to focus on a particular suspect,the suspect is taken into custody, and the police
carries out a process of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements that
the rule begins to operate. 24
In the case at bar, appellant was not under custodial investigation when he made the admission.
There was no coercion whatsoever to compel him to make such a statement. Indeed, he could
have refused to answer questions from the very start when the policemen requested that they all
CONSTI II (Sec. 11-13) | 73
go to his residence. The police inquiry had not yet reached a level wherein they considered him penalty to be imposed on appellant would not be affected considering the proscription against the
as a particular suspect. They were just probing into a number of possibilities, having been merely imposition of the death penalty at the time when the offense in the instant case was committed.
informed that the suspect was wearing what could be a security guard's uniform. As we held
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court a quo finding accused-appellant Samuel Marra y
in People vs. Dy: 25 "What was told by the accused to Pat. Padilla was a spontaneous statement
Zarate guilty of the crime of murder and imposing upon him the penalty and civil liabilities
not elicited through questioning, but given in an ordinary manner. No written confession was
therein stated is hereby AFFIRMED.
sought to be presented in evidence as a result of formal custodial investigation. 26 The trial Court,
therefore, cannot be held to have erred in holding that compliance with the constitutional SO ORDERED.
procedure on custodial investigation is not applicable in the instant case, . . . ."
Accordingly, the testimony of Sgt. de Vera assumes a dominant dimension because it totally
destroys the defense of denial cum alibi subsequently raised by appellant. In his answers to Sgt.
De Vera, appellant expressly admitted that he shot Tandoc, albeit with an exculpatory
explanation. This admission of Marra is in complete contrast to the statements he later made in
open court.
In addition, the law provides that the declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the
offense charged, or of any offense necessarily included therein may be given in evidence against
him and, in certain circumstances, this admission may be considered as part of the res gestae. In
a similar situation involved in the aforecited case ofPeople vs. Dy, this Court held:
. . . the oral confession made by the accused to Pat. Padilla that "he had shot a tourist" and that
the gun he had used in shooting the victim was in his bar which he wanted surrendered to the
Chief of Police (t.s.n., October 17, 1984, pp. 6-9) is competent evidence against him. The
declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged may be given in
evidence against him (Sec. 29 [now Sec. 33], Rule 130). It may in a sense be also regarded as
part of the res gestae. The rule is that, any person, otherwise competent as a witness, who heard
the confession, is competent to testify as to the substance of what he heard if he heard and
understood all of it. An oral confession need not be repeated verbatim, but in such a case it must
be given in substance. (23 C.J.S. 196, cited in People vs. Tawat, G.R. No. 62871, May 25, 1985,
129 SCRA 431). (Italics supplied.)
In any event, even without his admission, the case against appellant has been duly established by
the other evidence of the prosecution, as earlier discussed. However, persistently arguing for an
acquittal, the defense points out that when the police officers saw Marra, he was not in a blue
uniform whereas Din testified that the person who shot Tandoc was wearing the polo shirt of a
security guard's uniform. This is a puerile argument since appellant himself removed any
lingering doubts on this point. He said that on ending his tour of duty at 4:00 A.M. of March 7,
1992, he decided to go home to change clothes, after which he went to "Linda's Ihaw-Ihaw" to
eat. This explains why, at the time the police officers saw him, he was already in civilian clothes.
The shooting had taken place earlier at around 2:00 A.M. At that time, Marra was still in his
security guard's uniform, being then on duty.
However, while we agree that the crime committed by appellant was murder qualified by
treachery, we reject the finding that the same was aggravated by nighttime. No evidence was
presented by the prosecution to show that nocturnity was specially sought by appellant or taken
advantage of by him to facilitate the commission of the crime or to ensure his immunity from
capture. 27 At any rate, whether or not such aggravating circumstance should be appreciated, the

CONSTI II (Sec. 11-13) | 74

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 104492-93 May 31, 1994
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ORLANDO FRAGO, accused-appellant.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
ORLANDO FRAGO was charged before the court a quo with rape and attempted rape, docketed
as Crim. Cases Nos. 9144 and 9145, respectively.
In Crim. Case No. 9144, the Information states that in the early morning of 26 September 1990,
at about four o'clock, in the poblacion of Quezon, Palawan, the accused Orlando Frago —
. . . entered the sleeping room of the house belonging to Fortunato Moral where JICELYN
LANSAP was sleeping, thereby Jicelyn Lansap was bodily carried by accused Orlando Frago to
a nearby house belonging to Dado Andor and with lewd design did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously lay with and have carnal knowledge with said Jicelyn Lansap who at
that time was deeply asleep, against her will and without her consent, to the damage and
prejudice of Jicelyn Lansap.
In Crim. Case No. 9145, the Information alleges that in the early morning of 26 September 1990,
at about three forty-five, in the poblacion of Quezon, Palawan, the accused Orlando Frago —
. . . entered the room of the dwelling house of Philip Pastera where one RONALYN PASTERA,
a girl 9 years of age, was sleeping, and once inside the room, with lewd design did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously hold her head and bodily carry said Ronalyn Pastera, thus
commencing the commission of a felony of Rape directly by overt acts but did not perform all
the acts of execution which would produce the said felony by reason of causes other than the
spontaneous desistance of the accused, that is, Ronalyn Pastera was awakened and shouted for
help, thus forcing the accused to release Ronalyn Pastera and ran away.
On 1 October 1991, after trial, the court a quo rendered its decision finding the accused guilty of
rape in Crim. Case No. 9144 and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua with the accessory
penalties of civil interdiction for life and perpetual absolute disqualification, to pay Jicelyn
Lansap P30,000.00 for moral damages, and to pay the costs.
In Crim. Case No. 9145 for attempted rape, the accused was acquitted on "reasonable doubt
occasioned by lack of clear and convincing evidence that the accused Orlando Frago indeed
performed against Ronalyn Pastera overt acts constituting commencement of the commission of
the crime of rape."
In view of the acquittal of the accused in Crim. Case No. 9145, we are here called upon to review
only his conviction in Crim. Case No. 9144 for rape.
In holding appellant liable for rape, the trial court based its decision mainly on its finding that the
accused was positively identified by his victim, complaining witness Jicelyn Lansap, and that
there was no ill motive on her part to testify against him.
Jicelyn Lansap, a 15-year old high school student, was boarding in the house of one Fausto
Morales in the poblacion together with her cousins Susan and Adea Bansil. The version of the
prosecution is that before proceeding to the boarding house of Jicelyn Lansap, the accused, an
ice cream vendor, first went to the residence of Ronalyn Pastera at around three forty-five in the
morning and surreptitiously entered Ronalyn's bedroom where she was sleeping. He fanned her
face with his handkerchief and then lifted her bodily from the floor. He was about to take her out
of the room when she suddenly woke up and screamed for help thus prompting her father to
respond immediately by switching on the lights. As a consequence, the accused had to drop
Ronalyn on the floor and run out of the house. The prosecution would seem to infer that from the
house of Ronalyn where he failed in his alleged attempt to defile her, the accused next went to
the boarding house of Jicelyn some fifty meters away.
According to Jicelyn, she and her cousins went to bed at about eight o'clock in the evening of 25
September 1990. Then at around five-thirty the following morning, she was awakened by
appellant who was already strangling her. She shouted for help so that he immediately ran away.
She felt pain all over her body, more particularly in her private part, and discovered that she was
no longer wearing her skirt and underwear. To her consternation, she found herself in the vacant
house of a certain Dado Andor. So she lost no time looking for her way home. Upon reaching her
boarding house, she narrated her harrowing experience to her cousins who in turn related the
incident to her mother.
At eight o'clock that morning, Jicelyn and her mother went to the hospital where she was
examined by Dr. Marcela Remegio who found Jicelyn with "Labia Majora and Minora still
coaptated and with sign of external struggle . . . contusion, abrasion all over face . . . around neck
. . . scratch marks on both medial surface of thigh . . . vulva swollen . . . presence of fresh
hymenal laceration at six o'clock . . . [e]xamination for the presence of spermatoza was positive .
. . physical virginity lost." 1
On the same day, Ronalyn's father and Jicelyn reported the incidents to the police authorities.
Both Ronalyn and Jicelyn identified the accused as their attacker in the police line-up on 28
September and 8 October 1990, respectively, and then filed their formal complaints against him.
On his part, appellant seeks sanctuary in the alcove of denial and alibi. He claims that at nine
o'clock in the evening of 25 September 1990, he was already asleep with his wife and children.
He woke up at six o'clock the following morning. He was very tired that night because he was
vending ice cream in thepoblacion the whole day.
In his appeal, appellant imputes error to the trial court in convicting him on the basis of an
identification which was made without the assistance of counsel and according credence to the
story of Jicelyn, which he considers fantastic, thereby denying his constitutional right to be
presumed innocent until proved guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
Appellant argues that it was during his detention, when he was not assisted by counsel, that he
was identified by Jicelyn. Thus he invokes People v. Hassan 2 where this Court affirmed the
right of an accused to counsel at all stages of the proceedings, the most crucial of which is his
identification, and denial thereof entitles him to acquittal.
CONSTI II (Sec. 11-13) | 75
We cannot sustain the argument. We quote hereunder the pertinent portions constituting the ratio
decidendi in the Hassan case —
. . . The manner by which Jose Samson, Jr., was made to confront and identify the accused alone
at the funeral parlor, without being placed in a police line-up, was "pointedly suggestive,
generated confidence where there was none, activated visual imagination, and, all told, subverted
his reliability as eyewitness. This unusual, coarse and highly singular method of identification,
which revolts against the accepted principles of scientific crime detection, alienates the esteem of
every just man, and commands neither our respect nor acceptance" (citing People v. Cruz, No. L-
24424, 30 March 1970, 32 SCRA 181, 186; People v. Olvis, et al., G.R. No. 71092, 30
September 1987; Chavez v. Court of Appeals, No. L-29169, 24 SCRA 663, 679).
Moreover, the confrontation arranged by the police investigator between the self-proclaimed
eyewitness and the accused did violence to the right of the latter to counsel in all stages of the
investigation into the commission of a crime especially at its most crucial stage — the
identification of the accused. 3
While the infringement of the constitutional protection to the rights of the accused should result
in the acquittal of the accused in proper cases as a matter of course, appellant's reliance
on Hassan is misplaced and shows a deficient comprehension of our rationalization therein. We
acquitted the accused in that case because, among other things, of its peculiar factual milieu.
There was no line-up of suspects. There was only the accused. Thus, we observed:
As it turned out, the method of identification became just a confrontation. At that critical and
decisive moment, the scales of justice tipped unevenly against the young, poor, and
disadvantaged accused. The police procedure adopted in this case in which only the accused was
presented to witness Samson, in the funeral parlor, and in the presence of the grieving relatives
of the victim, is as tainted as an uncounselled confession . . . (italics supplied) 4
In contrast, Orlando Frago was singled out by Jicelyn in a police line-up composed of ten
persons. 5Some were stout while others were slim, but almost all of them were mustachioed and
five were long-haired. 6 InGamboa v. Cruz, 7 we were explicit —
The right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation,i.e., when the investigating officer
starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or confessions or admissions from the
respondent/accused. At such point or stage, the person being interrogated must be assisted by
counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of extorting false or coerced admissions or confessions
from the lips of the person undergoing interrogation, for the commission of an offense.
Any person under investigation must, among other things, be assisted by counsel. The above-
cited provisions of the Constitution are clear. They leave no room for equivocation. Accordingly,
in several cases, this Court has consistently held that no custodial investigation shall be
conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel, engaged by the person arrested, or by any
person in his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself, or by
anyone in his behalf, and that, while the right may be waived, the waiver shall not be valid unless
made in writing and in the presence of counsel.
As aptly observed, however, by the Solicitor General, the police line-up (at least, in this case)
was not part of the custodial inquest, hence, petitioner was not yet entitled, at such stage, to
counsel. The Solicitor General states:
When petitioner was identified by the complainant at the police line-up, he had not been held yet
to answer for a criminal offense. The police line-up is not a part of the custodial inquest, hence,
he was not yet entitled to counsel. Thus, it was held that when the process had not yet shifted
from the investigatory to the accusatory as when police investigation does not elicit a confession
the accused may not yet avail of the services of his lawyer (Escobedo v. Illinois of the United
States Federal Supreme Court, 378 US 478, 1964). Since petitioner in the course of his
identification in the police line-up had not yet been held to answer for a criminal offense, he was,
therefore, not deprived of his right to be assisted by counsel because the accusatory process had
not yet set in. The police could not have violated petitioner's right to counsel and due process as
the confrontation between the State and him had not begun. In fact, when he was identified in the
police line-up by complainant he did not give any statement to the police. He was, therefore, not
interrogated at all as he was not facing a criminal charge. Far from what he professes, the police
did not, at that stage, exact a confession to be used against him. For it was not he but the
complainant who was being investigated at that time. He "was ordered to sit down in front of the
complainant while the latter was being investigated" (par. 3.03, Petition). Petitioner's right to
counsel had not accrued (Italics supplied). 8
This ruling was reiterated in the recent case of People v. Santos. 9 We similarly find in the case at
bench. There is nothing in the records which shows that in the course of the identification from
the police line-up the police investigator sought to extract any admission or confession from
appellant. Thus far, we agree with the prosecution.
But we sustain the defense on the insufficiency of the identification of appellant Orlando Frago.
A careful dissection of the testimony of Jicelyn herself indubitably shows that she has no reliable
basis for pointing to the accused as the person who raped her. She says that his face was covered;
that he had long hair; that while the person who raped her had high nose (matangos) his nose is
just "katamtaman"; that she did not have the opportunity to observe the height of the rapist; and,
that the only evidence of sexual intercourse is the result of the medical examination.
Appellant argues that the "contusion, abrasion all over the face, around the neck, presence of
scratch marks on both medial surface of thigh" 10 did not necessarily indicate resistance on her
part, contending further that it is a matter of judicial notice that passionate kissing and petting
could normally produce "injuries." According to him, Jicelyn herself disclosed that she had a
suitor for whom she had "feelings of affection," thus concluding that she may have submitted
herself to him.
A rule of long standing in this jurisdiction, reverence to which remains undiminished to this day,
is that the Court will not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in passing upon the
credibility of opposing witnesses unless there appears in the record some fact or substance of
weight and influence which has been overlooked or the significance of which has been
misinterpreted. This is due to the fact that the trial court is in a better position to weigh
conflicting testimonies, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment
and manner of testifying. 11
CONSTI II (Sec. 11-13) | 76
There are indeed reasons to deviate from the general rule. We have examined carefully the entire
transcript of stenographic notes and we do not hesitate to conclude that the exception to the rule
must be applied. There was no positive identification of Orlando Frago by Jicelyn. Her testimony
on direct examination supports this conclusion. While she would make it appear that she was
able to positively identify the accused, her account of the incident proved otherwise.
There seems to be no question that, on the part of the Pastera sisters, they may have recognized
appellant positively because their room was lighted with a wick/gas lamp 12 and he was not
wearing anything on his face. 13 They identified him on 28 September 1990, 14 whereas Jicelyn
pointed him out only on 8 October 1990. 15 The possibility that Jicelyn had conferred with the
Pastera sisters regarding the identity of the accused before she testified is not remote because
they were neighbors. 16 As a consequence, when Jicelyn testified on 13 August 1991, she gave
the same description of her attacker as that given by Ronalyn Pastera.
Under the circumstances, we are inevitably drawn to the conclusion that Jicelyn's identification
of Orlando Frago was merely patterned after the identification made by the Pastera sisters. This
is then aderivative, not positive, identification. The identification then of appellant by Jicelyn is
doubtful. 17 Her testimony, standing alone, does not satisfy that quantum of proof required to
support a judgment of conviction. The material discrepancies therein engender perplexity as to
its veracity and reliability.
Besides, it appears highly incredible that Jicelyn could be bodily lifted from her room in her
boarding house and taken some three hundred meters away to the vacant house of Dado Andor
where she was supposedly abused 18 without awakening her and her two cousins who were all
sleeping side by side with her. 19 Moreover, we find the following observations of the Solicitor
General decidedly speculative, hence, unacceptable —
. . . appellant's earlier act of fanning his handkerchief over the face of Ronalyn Pastera evidently
shows that there was something in it, most likely drug, to induce her to remain sleeping. This
same method was apparently employed by appellant to Jicelyn Lansap that kept her sleeping
while being taken to another house and therein raped by him, 20
because a mere reading of Ronalyn's testimony on cross-examination would indicate that she did
not smell any substance emanating from her attacker.
Appellant's denial and alibi are inherently weak, but the prosecution cannot rely on their frailty
to enhance its cause. The prosecution must draw its strength from its own evidence. As has been
oft-repeated, every circumstance favoring the innocence of the accused must be taken into
account and the proof against him must survive the test of reason. Only when the conscience is
satisfied that the crime has been committed by the person on trial should the sentence be for
conviction. 21 Unfortunately for the prosecution, its evidence has miserably failed to pass that
conscience test.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo finding accused-appellant ORLANDO FRAGO
guilty of rape in Crim. Case No. 9144 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and he is ACQUITTED
as his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. It appearing that he is detained, his
immediate release from custody is ordered unless he is held for another cause. SO ORDERED.

CONSTI II (Sec. 11-13) | 77

EN BANC
G.R. Nos. L-32951-2 September 17, 1971
RICARDO DE LA CAMARA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MANUEL LOPEZ ENAGE, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Agusan del Norte and Butuan City (Branch II), respondents.
RESOLUTION
FERNANDO, J.:
An order of respondent Judge Manuel Lopez Enage, fixing the bail of petitioner, Ricardo de la
Camara, in the sum of P1,195,200.00 is assailed in this petition for certiorari as repugnant to the
constitutional mandate prohibiting excessive bail. 1 The merit of the petition on its face is thus
apparent. Nonetheless, relief sought setting aside the above order by reducing the amount of bail
to P40,000.00 cannot be granted, as in the meanwhile, petitioner had escaped from the provincial
jail, thus rendering this case moot and academic. It is deemed advisable, however, for the
guidance of lower court judges, to set forth anew the controlling and authoritative doctrines that
should be observed in fixing the amount of the bail sought in order that full respect be accorded
to such a constitutional right.
The facts are not in dispute. Petitioner, Ricardo, de la Camara, Municipal Mayor of Magsaysay,
Misamis Oriental, was arrested on November 7, 1968 and detained at the Provincial Jail of
Agusan, for his alleged participation in the killing of fourteen and the wounding of twelve other
laborers of the Tirador Logging Co., at Nato, Esperanza, Agusan del Sur, on August 21, 1968.
Thereafter, on November 25, 1968, the Provincial Fiscal of Agusan filed with the Court of First
Instance a case for multiple frustrated murder 2 and another for multiple murder 3 against
petitioner, his co-accused Nambinalot Tagunan and Fortunato Galgo, resulting from the
aforesaid occurrence. Then on January 14, 1969, came an application for bail filed by petitioner
with the lower court, premised on the assertion that there was no evidence to link him with such
fatal incident of August 21, 1968. He likewise mantained his innocence. Respondent Judge
started the trial of petitioner on February 24, 1969, the prosecution resting its case on July 10,
1969. As of the time of the filing ofthe petition, the defense had not presented its evidence.
Respondent Judge, on August 10, 1970, issued an order granting petitioner's application for bail,
admitting that there was a failure on the part of the prosecution to prove that petitioner would
flee even if he had the opportunity,but fixed the amount of the bail bond at the excessive amount
of P1,195,200.00,the sum of P840,000.00 for the information charging multiple murder and
P355,200.00 for the offense of multiple frustrated murder. Then came the allegation that on
August 12, 1970, the Secretary of Justice, Vicente Abad Santos, upon being informed of such
order, sent a telegram to respondent Judgestating that the bond required "is excessive" and
suggesting that a P40,000.00bond, either in cash or property, would be reasonable. There was
likewise a motion for reconsideration to reduce the amount. Respondent Judge however
remained adamant. Hence this petition.
The answer filed by respondent Judge on March 5, 1971 set forth the circumstances concerning
the issuance of the above order and the other incidents of the case, which, to his mind would
disprove any charge that he wasguilty of grave abuse of discretion. It stressed, moreover, that the
challengedorder would find support in circulars of the Department of Justice given sanction by
this Court. He sought the dismissal of the petition for lack of merit.
In the hearing of the case set for March 31, 1971, there was no appearance for both the petitioner
and respondents with the former, upon written motion, being given thirty days within which to
submit a memorandum in lieu of oral argument, respondent Judge in turn having the same period
from receipt thereofto file his reply. Such a memorandum as duly submitted by petitioner on
April 6, 1971.
Instead of a reply, respondent Judge submitted, on May 26, 1971, a supplemental answer
wherein he alleged that petitioner escaped from the provincial jail on April 28, 1971 and had
since then remained at large. There was a reiteration then of the dismissal of this petition for lack
of merit, towhich petitioner countered in a pleading dated June 7, 1971, and filed with this Court
the next day with this plea: "The undersigned counsel, therefore, vehemently interpose
opposition, on behalf of petitioner, to respondent's prayer for dismissal of the present petition for
lack of merit. For, the issue in this case is not alone the fate of petitioner Ricardo de la Camara.
The issue in the present petition that calls for the resolution of this Honorable Tribunal is the fate
of countless other Ricardo de la Camaras who maybe awaiting the clear-cut definition and
declaration of the power of trial courts in regard to the fixing of bail." 4
While under the circumstances a ruling on the merits of the petition for certiorari is not
warranted, still, as set forth at the opening of this opinion, the fact that this case is moot and
academic should not preclude thisTribunal from setting forth in language clear and unmistakable,
the obligationof fidelity on the part of lower court judges to the unequivocal command of
theConstitution that excessive bail shall not be required.
1. Before conviction, every person is bailable except if charged with capital offenses when the
evidence of guilt is strong. 5 Such a right flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of
every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be
entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Thereby a regimeof
liberty is honored in the observance and not in the breach. It is not beyondthe realm of
probability, however, that a person charged with a crime, especially so where his defense is
weak, would just simply make himself scarceand thus frustrate the hearing of his case. A bail is
intended as a guarantee that such an intent would be thwarted. It is, in the language of Cooley, a
"mode short of confinement which would, with reasonable certainty, insure the attendance of the
accused" for the subsequent trial. 6 Nor is there, anything unreasonable in denying this right to
one charged with a capital offense when evidence of guilt is strong, as the likelihood is, rather
than await the outcome of the proceeding against him with a death sentence, an ever-present
threat, temptation to flee the jurisdiction would be too great to be resisted.
2. Where, however, the right to bail exists, it should not be rendered nugatory by requiring a sum
that is excessive. So the Constitution commands. It is understandable why. If there were no such
prohibition, the right to bail becomes meaningless. It would have been more forthright if no
mention of such a guarantee were found in the fundamental law. It is not to be lost sight of that
the United States Constitution limits itself to a prohibition against excessive bail. 7 As construed
in the latest American decision, "the sole permissible function of money bail is to assure the
CONSTI II (Sec. 11-13) | 78
accused's presence at trial, and declared that "bail set at a higher figure than an amount a meaning was ascribed to it. No doctrine refinement may elicit approval if to doso would be to
reasonablycalculated to fulfill thus purpose is "excessive" under the Eighth Amendment." 8 reduce the right to bail to a barren form of words. Not only isthe order complained of absolutely
bereft of support in law, but it flies in the face of common sense. It is not too much to say that it
Nothing can be clearer, therefore, than that the challenged order of August 10, 1970 fixing the
is at war with thecommand of reason.
amount of P1,195,200.00 as the bail that should be posted by petitioner, the sum of P840,000.00
for the information charging multiple murder, there being fourteen victim, and the sum of With petitioner, however, having escaped from the provincial jail, no ruling can be had on his
P355,200 for the other offense of multiple frustrated murder, there being twelve victims, is plea to nullify the above order.
clearly violative of constitutional provision. Under the circumstances, there being only two
WHEREFORE, this case is dismissed for being moot and academic. Without pronouncement as
offenses charged, the amount required as bail could not possibly exceed P50,000.00 for the
to costs.
information for murder and P25,000.00 for the other information for frustrated murder. Nor
should it be ignored in this case that the Department of Justice did recomend the total sum of
P40,000.00 for the twooffenses.
3. There is an attempt on the part of respondent Judge to justify what, on its face, appears to be
indefensible by the alleged reliance on Villaseñor v. Abano. 9 The guidelines in the fixing of bail
was there summarized, in the opinion of Justice Sanchez, as follows: "(1) ability of the accused
to give bail; (2) nature of the offense; (3) penalty for the offense charged; (4) character and
reputation of the accused; (5) health of the accused; (6) character and strength of the evidence;
(7) probability of the accused appearing in trial; (8) forfeiture of other bonds; (9) whether the
accused wasa fugitive from justice when arrested; and (10) if the accused is under bond for
appearance at trial in other cases." 10 Respondent Judge, however, did ignore this decisive
consideration appearing at the end of the above opinion: "Discretion, indeed, is with the court
called upon to rule on the question of bail. We must stress, however, that where conditions
imposed upon a defendant seeking bail would amount to a refusal thereof and render nugatory
the constitutional right to bail, we will not hesitate to exercise our supervisorypowers to provide
the required remedy." 11
No attempt at rationalization can therefore give a color of validity to the challenged order. There
is grim irony in an accused being told that he has a right to bail but at the same time being
required to post such an exorbitant sum. What aggravates the situation is that the lower court
judge would apparently yield to the command of the fundamental law. In reality, such a
sanctimonious avowal of respect for a mandate of the Constitution was on a purely verbal level.
There is reason to believe that any person in the position of petitioner would under the
circumstances be unable to resists thoughts of escaping from confinement, reduced as he must
have been to a stateof desperation. In the same breath that he was told he could be bailed out, the
excessive amount required could only mean that provisional liberty would bebeyond his reach. It
would have been more forthright if he were informed categorically that such a right could not be
availed of. There would have beenno disappointment of expectations then. It does call to mind
these words of Justice Jackson, "a promise to the ear to be broken to the hope, a teasing illusion
like a munificent bequest in a pauper's will." 12 It is no wonder that the resulting frustration left
resentment and bitterness in its wake.Petitioner's subsequent escape cannot be condoned. That is
why he is not entitled to the relief prayed for. What respondent Judge did, however, does call for
repudiation from this Court.
Nor is there any justification then for imputing his inability to fix a lesser amount by virtue of an
alleged reliance on a decision of this Tribunal. Even if one were charitably inclined, the mildest
characterization of such a result is that there was a clear reading of the Abano opinion when such
CONSTI II (Sec. 11-13) | 79
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 141529 June 6, 2001
FRANCISCO YAP, JR., aka EDWIN YAP, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
The right against excessive bail, and the liberty of abode and travel, are being invoked to set
aside two resolutions of the Court of Appeals which fixed bail at P5,500,000.00 and imposed
conditions on change of residence and travel abroad.
For misappropriating amounts equivalent to P5,500,000.00, petitioner was convicted of estafa by
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City1 and was sentenced to four years and two months
of prision correctional, as minimum to eight years of prision mayor as maximum, "in addition to
one (1) year for each additional P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00 but in no case shall it exceed
twenty (20) years."2 He filed a notice of appeal, and moved to be allowed provisional liberty
under the cash bond he had filed earlier in the proceedings. The motion was denied by the trial
court in an order dated February 17,1999.
After the records of the case were transmitted to the Court of Appeals, petitioner filed with the
said court a Motion to Fix Bail For the Provisional Liberty of Accused Appellant Pending
Appeal, invoking the last paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court.
Asked to comment on this motion, the Solicitor General opined that petitioner may be allowed to
post bail in the amount of P5,500,000.00 and be required to secure "a certification/guaranty from
the Mayor of the place of his residence that he is a resident of the area and that he will remain to
be so until final judgment is rendered or in case he transfers residence, it must be with prior
notice to the court and private complainant."3 Petitioner filed a Reply, contending that the
proposed bail ofP5,500,000.00 was violative of his right against excessive bail.
The assailed resolution of the Court of Appeals4, issued on October 6, 1999, upheld the
recommendation of the Solicitor General; thus, its dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the "Motion to Fix Bail For Provisional Liberty of
Accused-Appellant Pending Appeal" is hereby GRANTED. Accused-appellant Francisco Yap,
Jr., a.k.a. Edwin Yap is hereby ALLOWED TO POST BAIL in the amount of Five Million Five
Hundred Thousand (P5,500,000.00) Pesos, subject to the following conditions, viz. :
(1) He (accused-appellant) secures a certification/guaranty from the Mayor of the place of his
residence that he is a resident of the area and that he will remain to be a resident therein until
final judgment is rendered or in case he transfers residence, it must be with prior notice to the
court;
(2) The Commission of lmmigration and Deportation (CID) is hereby directed to issue a hold
departure order against accused-appellant; and
(3) The accused-appellant shall forthwith surrender his passport to the Division Clerk of Court
for safekeeping until the court orders its return;
(4) Any violation of the aforesaid conditions shall cause the forfeiture of accused-appellant's bail
bond, the dismissal of appeal and his immediate arrest and confinement in jail.
SO ORDERED.5
A motion for reconsideration was filed, seeking the reduction of the amount of bail fixed by
respondent court, but was denied in a resolution issued on November 25, 1999. Hence, this
petition.
Petitioner sets out the following assignments of error:
The respondent Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in fixing the bail of the
provisional liberty of petitioner pending appeal in the amount of P5 .5 million.
The respondent Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in basing the bail for the
provisional liberty of the petitioner on his civil liability.
The respondent Court of Appeals unduly restricted petitioner's constitutional liberty of abode and
travel in imposing the other conditions for the grant of bail.
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals, by setting bail at a prohibitory amount, effectively
denied him his right to bail. He challenges the legal basis of respondent court for fixing bail at
P5,500,000.00, which is equivalent to the amount of his civil liability to private complainant
Manila Mahogany Marketing Corporation, and argues that the Rules of Court never intended for
the civil liability of the accused to be a guideline or basis for determining the amount of bail. He
prays that bail be reduced to at least P40,000.00, citing the maximum amount of bail that can be
posted for the crime of estafa under the 1996 Bail Bond Guide, or P20,000.00, equivalent to the
amount of bail he posted during the trial of the case. 6
On the other hand, the Solicitor General maintains that no grave abuse of discretion could be
ascribed to the Court of Appeals for fixing the amount of bail at P5,500,000.00 considering the
severity of the penalty imposed, the weight of the evidence against petitioner, and the gravity of
the offense of which petitioner was convicted by the RTC. He asserted that the P5,500,000.00
not only corresponded to civil liability but also to the amount of fraud imputed to petitioner. The
Solicitor General further pointed out the probability of flight in case petitioner is released on bail,
it having been established that petitioner was in possession of a valid passport and visa and had
in fact left the country several times during the course of the proceedings in the lower court. It
was also shown that petitioner used different names in his business transactions and had several
abodes in different parts of the country.
As for the conditions imposed by the bail bond, the Solicitor General advanced that all that the
Court of Appeals requires is notice in case of change of address; it does not in any way impair
petitioner's right to change abode for as long as the court is apprised of his change of residence
during the pendency of the appeal.
Petitioner's case falls within the provisions of Section 5, Rule 114 of the 1997 Rules of Court
which states:
CONSTI II (Sec. 11-13) | 80
SEC. 5. Bail, when discretionary. -- Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense
not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the court, on application, may
admit the accused to bail.
The court, in its discretion, may allow the accused to continue on provisional liberty under the
same bail bond during the period to appeal subject to the consent of the bondsman.
If the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, but not more than twenty
(20) years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail previously granted shall be cancelled,
upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or other similar
circumstances:
(a) That the accused is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the
crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That the accused is found to have previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded
sentence, or has violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification;
(c) That the accused committed the offense while on probation, parole, or under conditional
pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of the accused or his case indicate the probability of flight if released
on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that during the pendency of the appeal, the accused may commit
another crime.
The appellate court may review the resolution of the Regional Trial Court, on motion and with
notice to the adverse party.7
There is no question that in the present case the Court of Appeals exercised its discretion in favor
of allowing bail to petitioner on appeal. Respondent court stated that it was doing so for
"humanitarian reasons", and despite a perceived high risk of flight, as by petitioner's admission
he went out of the country several times during the pendency of the case, for which reason the
court deemed it necessary to peg the amount of bail at P5,500,000.00.
The prohibition against requiring excessive bail is enshrined in the Constitution. 8 The obvious
rationale, as declared in the leading case of De la Camara vs. Enage,9 is that imposing bail in an
excessive amount could render meaningless the right to bail. Thus, in Villaseñor vs. Abano,10 this
Court made the pronouncement that it will not hesitate to exercise its supervisory powers over
lower courts should the latter, after holding the accused entitled to bail, effectively deny the same
by imposing a prohibitory sum or exacting unreasonable conditions.
xxx There is grim irony in an accused being told that he has a right to bail but at the same time
being required to post such an exorbitant sum. What aggravates the situation is that the lower
court judge would apparently yield to the command of the fundamental law. In reality, such a
sanctimonious avowal of respect for a mandate of the Constitution was on a purely verbal level.
There is reason to believe that any person in the position of petitioner would under the
circumstances be unable to resist thoughts of escaping from confinement, reduced as he must
have been to a state of desperation. In the same breath as he was told he could be bailed out, the
excessive amount required could only mean that provisional liberty would be beyond his reach.
It would have been more forthright if he were informed categorically that such a right could not
be availed of. There would have been no disappointment of expectations then. It does call to
mind these words of Justice Jackson, "a promise to the ear to be broken to the hope, a teasing
illusion like a munificent bequest in a pauper's will." XXX11
At the same time, Section 9, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure advises courts
to consider the following factors in the setting of the amount of bail:
(a) Financial ability of the accused to give bail;
(b) Nature and circumstances of the offense;
(c) Penalty for the offense charged;
(d) Character and reputation of the accused;
(e) Age and health of the accused;
(f) Weight of the evidence against the accused;
(g) Probability of the accused appearing at the trial;
(h) Forfeiture of other bail;
(i) The fact that the accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested; and
(j) Pendency of other cases where the accused is on bail.
Thus, the court has wide latitude in fixing the amount of bail. Where it fears that the accused
may jump bail, it is certainly not precluded from installing devices to ensure against the same.
Options may include increasing the bail bond to an appropriate level, or requiring the person to
report periodically to the court and to make an accounting of his movements.12 In the present
case, where petitioner was found to have left the country several times while the case was
pending, the Court of Appeals required the confiscation of his passport and the issuance of a
hold-departure order against him.
Under the circumstances of this case, we find that appropriate conditions have been imposed in
the bail bond to ensure against the risk of flight, particularly, the combination of the hold-
departure order and the requirement that petitioner inform the court of any change of residence
and of his whereabouts. Although an increase in the amount of bail while the case is on appeal
may be meritorious, we find that the setting of the amount at P5,500,000.00 is unreasonable,
excessive, and constitutes an effective denial of petitioner's right to bail.
The purpose for bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, 13 or whenever so
required by the Court14. The amount should be high enough to assure the presence of the accused
when required but no higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose.15 To fix bail at
an amount equivalent to the civil liability of which petitioner is charged (in this case,
P5,500,000.00).is to permit the impression that the amount paid as bail is an exaction of the civil
liability that accused is charged of; this we cannot allow because bail is not intended as a
punishment, nor as a satisfaction of civil liability which should necessarily await the judgment of
the appellate court.
At the same time, we cannot yield to petitioner's submission that bail in the instant case be set at
P40,000.00 based on the 1996 Bail Bond Guide. (The current Bail Bond Guide, issued on August
29, 2000, maintains recommended bail at P40,000.00 for estafa where the amount of fraud is
P142,000.00 or over and the imposable penalty 20 years of reclusion temporal). True, the Court
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has held that the Bail Bond Guide, a circular of the Department of Justice for the guidance of that he will not escape. Thus, to require him to inform the court every time he changed his
state prosecutors, although technically not binding upon the courts, "merits attention, being in a residence is already unnecessary."22
sense an expression of policy of the Executive Branch, through the Department of Justice, in the
The right to change abode and travel within the Philippines, being invoked by petitioner, are not
enforcement of criminal laws."16 Thus, courts are advised that they must not only be aware but
absolute rights. Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution states:
should also consider the Bail Bond Guide due to its significance in the administration of criminal
justice.17 This notwithstanding, the Court is not precluded from imposing in petitioner's case an The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be
amount higher than P40,000.00 (based on the Bail Bond Guide) where it perceives that an impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired
appropriate increase is dictated by the circumstances. except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by
law.
It militates emphasis that petitioner is seeking bail on appeal. Section 5, Rule 114 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure is clear that although the grant of bail on appeal is non-capital The order of the Court of Appeals releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such lawful order as
offenses is discretionary, when the penalty imposed on the convicted accused exceeds six years contemplated by the above provision.23 The condition imposed by the Court of Appeals is simply
and circumstances exist that point to the probability of flight if released on bail, then the accused consistent with the nature and function of a bail bond, which is to ensure that petitioner will
must be denied bail, or his bail previously granted should be cancelled. 18 In the same vein, the make himself available at all times whenever the Court requires his presence. Besides, a closer
Court has held that the discretion to extend bail during the course of the appeal should be look at the questioned condition will show that petitioner is not prevented from changing abode;
exercised with grave caution and for strong reasons, considering that the accused had been in fact he is merely required to inform the court in case he does so.
convicted by the trial court.19 In an earlier case, the Court adopted Senator Vicente J. Francisco's
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Petitioner's bail pending appeal is
disquisition on why bail should be denied after judgment of conviction as a matter of wise
reduced from P5,500,000.00 to P200,000.00. In all other respects, the resolutions of the Court of
discretion; thus:
Appeals, dated October 6, 1999 and November 25, 1999, respectively, are AFFIRMED. No
The importance attached to conviction is due to the underlying principle that bail should be pronouncement as to costs.
granted only where it is uncertain whether the accused is guilty or innocent, and therefore, where
SO ORDERED. 1
that uncertainty is removed by conviction it would, generally speaking, be absurd to admit to
bail. After a person has been tried and convicted the presumption of innocence which may be
relied upon in prior applications is rebutted, and the burden is upon the accused to show error in
the conviction. From another point of view it may be properly argued that the probability of
ultimate punishment is so enhanced by the conviction that the accused is much more likely to
attempt to escape if liberated on bail than before conviction.xxx20
Petitioner is seeking bail on appeal. He was in fact declared guilty beyond reasonable doubt by
the RTC, and due to the serious amount of fraud involved, sentenced to imprisonment for twenty
years --the maximum penalty for estafa by false pretenses or fraudulent acts allowed by the
Revised Penal Code. Although it cannot be controverted that the Court of Appeals, despite the
foregoing considerations and the possibility of flight still wielded its discretion to grant petitioner
bail, the setting of bail in the amount of P5,500,000.00 is unjustified as having no legal nor
factual basis. Guided by the penalty imposed by the lower court and the weight of the evidence
against petitioner, we believe that the amount of P200,000.00 is more reasonable.
Petitioner also contests the condition imposed by the Court of Appeals that he secure "a
certification/guaranty from the Mayor of the place of his residence that he is a resident of the
area and that he will remain to be a resident therein until final judgment is rendered or in case he
transfers residence, it must be with prior notice to the court", claiming that the same violates his
liberty of abode and travel.
Notably, petitioner does not question the hold-departure order which prevents him from leaving
the Philippines unless expressly permitted by the court which issued the order. 21 In fact, the
petition submits that "the hold-departure order against petitioner is already sufficient guarantee

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