A. Courts: Who interprets the Constitution and the law?
Commission adopted a resolution that it will not consider election protests not submitted
1. Judicial Power Defined:
CASE: Lopez v. Roxas (July 28, 1966)
PONENTE: CJ. Concepcion || G.R. No. L-25716
FACTS:
Fernando Lope and Gerardo Roxas were close contenders for the VP of the Philippines in
the General Elections. Lopez won with only 26,724 votes over Roxas. With this, Roxas filed
an election protest questioning the win of Lopez to the Presidential Electoral Tribunal.
Hence, petitioner Lopez filed the original action for prohibition with preliminary junction
to the Supreme Court on the ground that the said Tribunal is unconstitutional as per
Republic Act No. 1793.
Petitioner deems that only the Supreme Court is capable of judging election protests for
Tribunal is inferior than SC.
ISSUE: W/N the Presidential Electoral Tribunal is unconstitutional?
RULING: NO. The said R.A. has not created a new and separate court. It has merely
conferred upon the SC the functions of a Presidential Electoral Tribunal. Although has
distinct functions, the Court is only one. So the said Tribunal is not inferior to the SC but
its function is only limited in scope. Moreover, the tribunal is not under Congress rather is
still under the jurisdiction of the SC.
R.A. 1793: Establishment of a Presidential Electoral Tribunal to judge contests relating to
elections, returns, and qualifications for President and VP. Composed of 3 justices
including the Chief Justice, 4 from Senate, and 4 from HRep.
DISPOSITION: Petition DISMISSED.
2. Separation and Blending of Powers:
CASE: Angara v. Electoral Commission (July 15, 1936)
PONENTE: J. Laurel || G.R. No. 45081
FACTS:
Jose Angara won as member-elect of the National Assembly and took his oath of
office. On December 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed Resolution No. 8 confirming
the election of those not subject to an election protest.
On December 8, 1935, Pedro Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a
“Motion of Protest” against Angara. However, on December 9, 1935, the Electoral
on or before December 9, 1935.
Angara filed a Motion to dismiss the Protest before the Electoral Commission
which was denied.
Hence, Angara filed an original action to the Supreme Court for the issuance of a
writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit the Electoral Commission from acting on the
protest filed by Ynsua.
ISSUE: W/N the Electoral Commission erred in taking cognizance of the electoral protest
given Resolution No. 8.
RULING: NO. The Electoral Commission, as an independent organ of the tripartite
government, has the jurisdiction to decide all contests relation to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly. It has the sole power of regulating
its proceedings to the exclusion of the National Assembly. In its legitimate exercise of
power, its resolution must be upheld. It is a body separate and independent of the
legislature.
DISPOSITION: Petition DENIED.
3. Hierarchy of the Philippine Judicial System
A. Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts
CASE: Diocese of Bacolod vs. COMELEC (January 21, 2015)
PONENTE: J. Leonen || G.R. No. 205728
FACTS:
Petitioners posted two 6x10 ft. tarpaulins on the front wall of the Cathedral.
Subject of the present case, the second one contains the heading “Conscience Vote” listing
the names of politicians who are anti-RH as Team Buhay and pro-RH as Team Patay. It
contained names of candidates for the 2013 elections but is neither paid nor sponsored.
In her capacity as Elections Officer, respondent Mavil Majarucon issued a “Notice
to Remove Campaign Materials” which ordered the removal of the tarpaulin within three
days for being oversized. COMELEC allowed size is 2x3 ft. On February 25, 2013,
petitioners replied asking for a ruling from the COMELEC and allowing for the tarp to
remain.
On February 27, 2013, COMELEC issued a letter ordering the immediate
removal of the tarpaulin or election offense shall be filed.
Petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with
application for preliminary injunction and TRO under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
seeking to nullify COMELEC’s notice and letter.
ISSUES:
 1. W/N petitioners violated hierarchy of courts doctrine and exhaustion of legal
remedies
RULING:
1. NO. The case falls under the exception and can be solved by the court directly because
the case involves a paramount threat to citizen’s right to expression which can be bindingly
used in future similar cases since no jurisprudence is present yet. Similarly, prior
exhaustion of legal remedies can be dispensed because (a) there is a violation of right to
expression and separation of church and state – legal questions, and (b) circumstances
indicate urgency of judicial reviews considering the upcoming elections.
DISPOSITION: Petition is GRANTED. TRO is made PERMANENT. Notice and letter is
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
B. Highest Court of the Land: Supreme Court
i. En Banc and Division Cases
Philippine Constitution, Article 8 § 4 ¶ 2-3
Section 2. All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive
agreement, or law, which shall be heard by the Supreme Court en banc, and all other cases
which under the Rules of Court are required to be heard en banc, including those involving
the constitutionality, application, or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations,
orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations, shall be decided with the
concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on
the issues in the case and voted thereon.
Section 3. Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the
concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on
the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case without the concurrence of at least
three of such Members. When the required number is not obtained, the case shall be
decided en banc: Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a
decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the court
sitting en banc.
CASE: Firestone Ceramics v. Court of Appeals (June 28, 2000)
PONENTE: J. Purisima || G.R. No. 127245
FACTS:
Case at bar involves a 99-hectare of land presumptively belonging to the Republic of the
Philippines. It had been adjudicated to private individuals by a court alleged to be without
jurisdiction. Petitioner filed a Motion to Refer to the Court En Banc the consolidated cases
for its consideration. The 3rd Division voted 4-1 denying petitioners’ motion. But the Court
En Banc voted 9-5 accepting the case finding that it is of sufficient importance.
Firestone Ceramics, Inc. filed a Motion for Reconsideration of a decision of the Supreme
Court, Third Division.
ISSUE: W/N the Court En Banc has jurisdiction over the case
RULING: YES. The action of the Court En Banc is a legitimate exercise of its residual
power. The case also involves an enormous value of property allegedly owned by the
government in litigation.
DISPOSITION: Motion for reconsideration is GRANTED.
ii. Rule-Making Powers:
Philippine Constitution, Article 8 § 5 ¶ 5
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
integrated bar, and legal assistance to the under-privileged. Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform
for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective
unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
CASE: Fabian v. Desierto (September 16, 1998)
PONENTE: J. Regalado || G.R. No. 129742
FACTS:
Teresita Fabian, president of PROMAT, engaged in an affair with Nestor Agustin,
District Engineer of the First Metro Manila Engineering District (FMED). During the
course of their relationship, favors were exchanged between the two. However,
misunderstandings developed between them. Fabian tried to end their relationship but
Agustin refused and resisted by harassing, intimidating, and threatening her.
Fabian filed a complaint for violation of R.A. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989),
Section 19 and P.D. 807 (Civil Service Decree), with an ancillary prayer for preventive
suspension to the Ombudsman. Respondent was found guilty of grave misconduct and was
ordered dismissed from service by the Graft Investigator.
Ombudsman Hon. Desierto approved the resolution with modifications: guilty of
misconduct with penalty of 1-year suspension without pay. Agustin moved for
reconsideration. Knowing that Agustin was his former classmate, Desierto inhibited
himself. Case was transferred to Deputy Ombudsman Jesus Guerrero who set aside the
order of Desierto and acquitted Agustin.
Fabian filed for petition for review on certiorari on the joint order of the
Ombudsman and Deputy Ombudsman under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: W/N administrative disciplinary cases of the Office of Ombudsman may be
appealed to the Supreme Court
RULING: NO. Section 27 of RA No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to the SC
from decision of Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases for it increases appellate
jurisdiction of the SC violating Section 30 of the Constitution. Enlarging its appellate
jurisdiction shall only burden the court. Section 27 of RA No. 6770 is unconstitutional and
invalid. Case is referred to Court of Appeals.
Section 7, Rule III of A.O. No. 07: When a respondent is absolved of the charges in
an administrative proceeding the decision of the Ombudsman is final and
unappealable.
Section 27 of R.A. 6770: In all administrative disciplinary cases, order, directives,
or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the SC by filing a
petition for certiorari within 10 days from receipt of written notice of order,
directive, or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance
with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Section 30 of the 1987 Constitution: “No law shall be passed increasing the
appellate jurisdiction of the SC as provided in this Constitution without its advice
and consent.”
CASE: Secretary of National Defense, Chief of Staff AFP vs. Raymond and Reynaldo
Manalo (October 7, 2008)
PONENTE: C.J. Puno || G.R. No. 180906
FACTS:
On February 14, 2006, Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo were forcibly taken by
CAFGU and military units. They were suspected to be members of the New People’s Army
which their brother “Ka Bestre” is thought to be a leader of. The brothers were tortured,
interrogated, and transferred from one place to another. After several days of captivity, they
recognized their abductors as member of the armed forces led by Jovito Palparan. On
August 13, 2007, respondents were able to escape after 18 years of captivity.
On August 23, 2007 the Manalos filed a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and
TRO from depriving them of their right to liberty, and other basic rights. (**pending) On
December 26, 2007, CA granted herein respondents the Privilege of the Writ of Amparo
requiring the National Defense, AFP to: (1) furnish official and unofficial investigation
reports, (2) confirm official assignments of M/Sgt. Hilario and Donald Caigas, and (3)
produce all medical reports, records, and charts given to herein respondents.
In the Return of the Writ of Amparo, they admitted the abduction but denied any
involvement therein. According to the investigation of Lt. Col Jimenez, alleged charges
lacks merit.
Petitioners filed an appeal via Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in
relation to Section 19 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, seeking to reverse and set aside on
both questions of fact and law, the decision by CA.
ISSUE:
1. W/N there are substantial evidences for the court to grant privilege of writ
2. W/N there is a continuing violation to respondents’ right to security
RULING:
1. YES. Raymond’s testimony was corroborated by the affidavit of Reynaldo. Medical
reports prepared by forensic specialist Dr. Moline and pictures of scars left by the physical
injuries corroborated their accounts on torture. Raymond’s familiarity with facilities in
Fort Magsaysay firms stories of long detainment in the said military facility.
2. YES. (1) Violation of the right to security as freedom from threat to respondents’ life,
liberty, and security such that since their escape, they have been under concealment and
protection by private citizens. (2) Violation of the right to security as protection by the
government is the failure to conduct effective investigation by Lt. Col. Jimenez – did not
ascertain veracity or credibility of statements by CAFGU and did not seek investigations.
Moreover, Secretary of National Defense have not furnished the investigation which
respondents now seek under Petition for Writ of Amparo.
DISPOSITION: Petition is DISMISSED and Decision of the CA dated December 26, 2007
is AFFIRMED
C. Third Level Courts
i. Court of Appeals
CASE: Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (November 10, 2015)
PONENTE: J. Perlas-Bernabe || G.R. No. 217126-27
FACTS:
A complaint was filed before the Ombudsman against Binay Jr. et al. accusing
them of Plunder and violation of RA No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices).
According to the investigation, Binay Jr. is allegedly involved in the anomalous activities in
the procurement and construction phases of the Makati Parking Building project.
Ombudsman found that evidences against Binay are strong so he was placed under
preventive suspension.
Binay filed a petition for certiorari before the CA seeking to nullify the preventive
suspension order and praying for the issuance of TRO and/or WPI to order its
implementation. CA granted his prayer of TRO. With the implementation of the
preventive suspension, the Ombudsman declared the CA resolution moot and academic.
Binay filed a petition for contempt against Roxas, Brion, PNP, and Peña Jr of
refusing to obey CA. Without necessarily giving due course to Binay’s petition, CA directed
Ombudsman to comment.
Ombudsman filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition through the OSG assailing CA’s
(1) resolution granting Binay’s prayer of TRO, (2) ordering the Ombudsman to comment
on Binay’s petition for contempt.

ISSUE:
1. W/N petition for certiorari is the plain, adequate, and speedy remedy of the Ombudsman
2. W/N the CA has jurisdiction in granting Binay’s prayer for TRO
3. W/N the doctrine of condonation can be applied
4. W/N the CA’s directive for Ombudsman’s comment regarding Binay’s petition for
contempt is illegal and improper
RULING:
1. YES. First, it questions authority of the CA hence, involving an issue of transcendental
public importance. Second, it questions the aptness of continuously applying the
condonation doctrine invoked by Binay.
2. YES. The SC ruled that the second paragraph of Section 14 of RA 6770 is void. Its
jurisdiction does not stem from Section 14 rather in Section 27 of RA 6770 wherein a
motion for reconsideration may be filed within 5 days given that there is (1) new evidence,
and (2) errors of law. Since the first paragraph is also deemed ineffective, the CA correctly
issued the injunctive relief in enjoining the preventive suspension.
3. NO. Anomalous activities still continued even after Binay’s reelection. Legal landscape
has shifted. Ever since the 1986 people power revolution, the constitution has been
reprehensible of graft and corruption. Hence, upholding the doctrine will be against the
spirit of the 1987 Constitution. (Stare Decisis: 1959 Pascual Case) It is abandoned.
4. PREMATURE. Since no due course has yet been given to the contempt action,
Ombudsman’s claim is still premature.
DISPOSITION: Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Section 14 of RA 6770 second
paragraph is UNCONSTITUTIONAL and first paragraph INEFFECTIVE. Condonation
doctrine is ABANDONED. CA is ORDERED to act on Binay’s petition for certiorari. And
CA is ordered to RESOLVE Binay’s petition for contempt.
ii. Court of Tax Appeals
(see other file)
iii. Sandiganbayan
Art. XI, Sec. 4
The present anti-graft court known as the Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and
exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law.
RA 8249 An Act Further Defining the Jursidiction of the Sandiganbayan, Amending for the
Purpose of PD 1606, as amended, providing funds therefor, and for other purposes
Salary Grade 27 and higher or else exclusive jurisdiction resides in the regional trial courts
CASE: Danilo Duncano vs. Hon. Sandiganbayan, OSP (July 15, 2015)
PONENTE: J. Peralta || G.R. No. 191894
FACTS:
OSP, Ombudsman filed a criminal case against petitioner Danilo Duncano,
Regional Director of the BIR with Salary Grade 26, for violation of Section 8 in relation to
Section 11 of R.A. No. 6713 – failure to put some assets in SALN i.e., financial business
interests/connection in Documail Provides Corporation and Don Plus Trading which they
own and 1993 Nissan Patrol motor vehicle named under his son. Petitioner filed Motion to
Dismiss with prayer to Defer the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest before respondent
Sandiganbayan 2nd Division. But OSP asserts that Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction to try
and hear the case because he is an official of the executive branch with a position of
Regional Director but with a compensation classified as below Grade 27 – P.D. No. 1606.
OSP contends that motion to dismiss is premature because Sandiganbayan is yet to acquire
jurisdiction to it.
Nevertheless, Sandiganbayan 2nd Division denies motion to dismiss for being
devoid of merit and issue warrant of arrest against accused. Duncano filed a motion for
reconsideration but denied.
Petitioner filed Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with
prayer for issuance of preliminary injunction and/or TRO seeking to reverse and set aside
respondent Sandiganbayan resolution and order which denied petitioner’s motion to
dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
1. W/N petitioner is an executive official with Salary Grade 27 or higher
2. W/N Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the petitioner
RULING:
1. NO. Petitioner is not an executive official with Salary Grade 27 or higher. Neither does
he hold any position particularly enumerated in P.D. No. 1606 modified by R.A. No. 7975,
8249, and 10660.
2. NO. Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over violations unless committed by public
officials and employees occupying positions of regional director and higher with Salary
Grade 27. It incurred serious error of jurisdiction and acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack and excess of jurisdiction of suspending petitioner from office.
DISPOSITION: Petition for certiorari is GRANTED. Denied petitioner’s motion to
dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
D. Second Level Courts
i. Regional Trial Courts – Courts of General Jurisdiction:
RA 7691
RTC – incapable of pecuniary estimation, real property >20,000, >50,000 in Metro Manila,
except actions for forcible entry; maritime, estate, and all other cases, >100,000, >200,000 in
Metro Manila; marital relations; cases not within the jurisdiction of any court; former
Juvenile and Agrarian Court
E. First Level Courts:
ii. Municipal Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Circuit Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts
in Cities
MTC – municipal ordinances, imprisonment <6 years, civil action <100,000, <200,000
Metro Manila, unlawful entry, real property <20,000
4. Jurisdiction:
CASE: Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice (January 19, 1999)
PONENTE: J. Puno || G.R. No. 132601
FACTS:
On January 4, 1999, the SC issued a TRO staying the execution of petitioner Leo Echegaray
scheduled on that same day. The public respondent Justice Secretary assailed the issuance
of the TRO arguing that the action of the SC not only violated the rule on finality of
judgment but also encroached on the power of the executive to grant reprieve.
Secretary of Justice, et al. filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the resolution of
this Court which temporarily restrains the execution of Echegaray.
ISSUE:
1. W/N the Court loses jurisdiction on a decided case with a final judgment
RULING:
1. NO. In a decision rendered by the Secretary of Justice in the Entry of Judgment, the
decision of the Court mandated that (1) RA No. 8177 (Lethal Injection Law) is
unconstitutional, (2) Section 17 & 19 of the Rules and Regulations to implement the RA is
invalid, and (3) RA 8177 cannot be enforced until Section 17 & 19 are amended. What the
court restrained temporarily is the execution of its own decision to give it reasonable time
to check its fairness in light of supervening events in Congress as alleged by Echegaray.
However, in line with the developments in Congress i.e., the Golez Resolution, the Court’s
TRO should now be lifted as it has served its legal and humanitarian purpose.
Section 5 (5), Article VIII, 1987 Constitution:
Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the
practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the under-privileged.
Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy
disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not
diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special
courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the
Supreme Court
DISPOSITION: Motion is GRANTED. TRO is LIFTED. SET ANEW the date of
execution of Echegaray.
Philippine Constitution, Article 8 § 14
Section 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly
and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. No petition for review or motion
for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due course or denied without
stating the legal basis therefor.
5. Basis of Decisions
Art. VIII, Sec. 14
No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly
the facts and the law on which it is based.
No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision shall be refused due
course or denied without stating the legal basis therefor.
CASE: Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Court of Appeals (July 23, 1998)
PONENTE: J. Martinez || G.R. No. 114323
FACTS:
Oil and Natural Gas Commission, owned and controlled by the Government of India,
entered into a contract between the Pacific Cement Company, a private corporation under
the laws of the Philippines. Company is set to supply the Commission oil well cement and
the Commission will pay. The cement was sent through cargo but because of a dispute
between the Company and the shipowner, it was held up in Bangkok. Failing to deliver the
cement, the Company negotiated to replace the cement with Class “G” cement cost free but
it did not conform to Commission’s specifications. Commission referred its claims to the
arbitrator according to Clause 16 of their contract which resolved the dispute in favor of
the Commission.
To execute the award in its favor, the Commission filed a petition before the civil judge in
India praying that the decision be made rule of court in India. However, because of
Company’s failure to pay the filing fees, the court granted the petition of Commission.
Unwilling to pay, the Commission filed a complaint in the RTC of Surigao. The Company
then moved to dismiss the complaint. RTC upheld the Commission’s legal capacity to sue
but dismissed the complaint for lack of valid cause of action. It also pointed out that the
referral of the dispute to arbitrator amounted to want of jurisdiction making it null and
void. Thus, no legal awards.
Commission appealed to CA which affirmed with the RTC ruling: violates constitutional
provision, violates dues process, lack of impartiality in the arbitration. Commission’s
subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied as well.
Hence, Commission files a petition for review on certiorari the decision of CA.
ISSUE:
1. W/N the arbitrator had jurisdiction over the dispute under Clause 16 of the contract
2. W/N the judgement of the foreign court is enforceable in this jurisdiction
RULING:
1. YES. Clause 16 is confined to all claims or disputes relating to design, drawing.
Instructions, specifications, quality of materials. Whereas, Clause 15 covers all other claims
or disputes. Non-delivery is not a proper subject under arbitration of Clause 16 but of
Clause 15 which states that such dispute shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the
court within the local limits of the supply order. But, the failure of the replacement cement
to conform to the specifications of the contract falls within the ambit under Clause 16 of
the contract.
2. YES. It is not bereft of any statement of facts and law. The courts in this jurisdiction
cannot invalidate the order of the foreign court simply because our rules provide otherwise.
Moreover, there is no violation of dues process for the Company was afforded with
sufficient opportunity to be heard.
DISPOSITION: Petition is GRANTED. CA decision is REVERSED. Pacific Cement
Company is ORDERED to pay Oil and Natural Gas Commission amounts adjudged.
Philippine Constitution, Article 8 § 8
Section 8
1. A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the
Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the
Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a
representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the
Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector.
2. The regular members of the Council shall be appointed by the President
for a term of four years with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. Of
the Members first appointed, the representative of the Integrated Bar shall serve
for four years, the professor of law for three years, the retired Justice for two years,
and the representative of the private sector for one year.
3. The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall be the Secretary ex officio of the
Council and shall keep a record of its proceedings.
4. The regular Members of the Council shall receive such emoluments as
may be determined by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court shall provide in its
annual budget the appropriations for the Council.
5. The Council shall have the principal function of recommending
appointees to the Judiciary. It may exercise such other functions and duties as the
Supreme Court may assign to it.
6. The Judicial and Bar Council
CASE: De Castro v. Judicial Bar Council (March 17, 2010)
PONENTE: J. Bersamin || G.R. No. 191002
FACTS:
The compulsory retirement of CJ Reynato Puno by May 17, 2017 occurs just days after the
May 10, 2010 presidential elections. Article VIII, Section 4 (1) of the Constitution provides
that any vacancies in the SC shall be filled within 90 days. As per Article VII, Section 15,
such appointment shall be made by the President from the nominees duly screened by the
Judicial Bar Council (JBC). However, Article VII, Section 15 also prohibits the president or
acting president from making appointments within two months immediately before the
next presidential elections and up to the end of his term.
The JBC has started its screening proceedings for the preparation of the nominees shortlist
for CJ.
Hence, De Castro and Peralta filed special civil actions for certiorari and mandamus
praying that JBC be compelled to submit the list of nominees for CJ to incumbent
president.
Hence, Soriano filed a petition for prohibition proposing to prevent the JBC from
conducting the nomination proceedings for CJ.
Hence, PHILCONSA filed a special civil action for mandamus wanting the JBC to submit
list of nominees for CJ.
Hence, Mendoza filed an administrative matter seeking a ruling from the Court for the
guidance of JBC where Art. VII, Section 15 applies to appointments in judiciary.
Hence, Tolentino, Inting, and IBP governors wants to enjoin the JBC from submitting a list
of nominees for CJ to the President.
ISSUE:
1. W/N the incumbent president can appoint successor of CJ Puno upon his retirement
RULING:
1. YES. Based on the drafting, styling, and arranging of the Constitution, the prohibition
under Article VII, Section 15 does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the SC or
judiciary. It is only for executive appointments mainly to avoid “midnight” appointments.
Of the 3 sections in Article VII concerning president’s appointing power, two of which
refers to executive department. Its non-applicability has also been confirmed by Justice
Regalado to the JBC that the election ban does not apply to the appointments of COA.
Moreover, the appointment by the incumbent president will not compromise judicial
independence because (1) JBC prepares the nominee shortlist, and (2) the said term of the
president will be ending.
DISPOSITION: Petition of Mendoza is GRANTED. JBC is ordered to (1) RESUME
nomination proceedings, (2) PREPARE shortlist of nominees for CJ, (3) SUBMIT
incumbent president the shortlist, and (4) CONTINUE proceedings to fill other vacancies
in the judiciary.
B. The Power of Judicial Review
Origins of Judicial Review :
Art. VIII, Sec. 5
1. Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other
public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.
2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the
law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts
in:
a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,
international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree,
proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.
b. All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or
toll, or any penalty imposed in relation thereto.
c. All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.
d. All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion
perpetua or higher.
e. All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.
3. Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as public
interest may require. Such temporary assignment shall not exceed six months
without the consent of the judge concerned.
4. Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice.
5. Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission
to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the under-
privileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the
speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and
shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of
special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved
by the Supreme Court.
6. Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with
the Civil Service Law.
Francisco vs HOR
GR. No. 160261; 10 November 2003
Facts:
- The 12th congress adopted the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings (House
Impeachment Rules).
- On July 22, 2002, HOR adopted a resolution for the Committee of Justice to investigate
the expenditures of the Chief Justice of the SC of the Judiciary Development Fund.
- On June 2, 2003, the first impeachment complaint was filed by former President Joseph
Estrada against Chief Justice Davide for “culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of
public trust and higher crimes.” On October 22, 2003, although it was deemed “sufficient in
form,” it was dismissed for being insufficient in substance.
- A day later, a second impeachment complaint was filed against Davide again
accompanied by the “Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment” signed by 1/3 of the
member of the HOR
- Many petitions arose against the HOR claiming its violation of Art XI section 5 and
declaring the second impeachment complaint unconstitutional, thus null and void
Issues:
- Whether Judicial Review extends to impeachment proceedings?
- Whether the pre-requisites for judicial review have been met?
- Whether the Second Impeachment Complaint is valid and Constitutional?
Held:
- YES. Despite respondents claiming that exercising Judicial Review over impeachment
proceedings defeats the purpose of separating the powers of the Gov’t., Section 1 of Article
VIII vests Judicial Power to the Supreme Court and implicates the SC duty to determine
whether there has been an over-step of jurisdiction by any branch of Government.
- The House Impeachment rules which allowed for the second impeachment complaint is a
question of constitutionality due to it violating of Section 5, of Article XI of the
Constitution.
- There is no constitutional basis for the contention that Judicial Review over impeachment
proceedings would upset checks and balances of the different branches of gov’t.
- YES. For Judicial Review to be exercised: (a) The case must call for the exercise of Judicial
Power; (b) The person challenging must have substantial interest, “Standing,” in the case
that he may receive direct injury from the government act; (c) Question of constitutionality
must be raised; (d) The issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota
- Despite Respondents arguing that petitioners do not have standing, since only the CJ will
receive direct injury, the petitioners do have Standing since the Court has accorded
standing to petitioners in cases involving paramount public interest and transcendental
importance.
- Transcendental importance given in this case due to the presence of a clear disregard of a
constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent thereby giving the
petitioners Standing, warranting judicial review
- NO. Section 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings
permitted the Second Impeachment Complaint, but after review, the said sections are
found to be violating paragraph 5 of section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution, and, thus,
unconstitutional
- Article XI, Section 3(5) barrs the second impeachment complaint
Marbury v. Madison
Facts: Marbury was appointed judge of the peace in the District of Columbia by President
Adams. Despite the affidavits signed by the President and the seal of the US affixed to it by
the Sec. of State, Marbury did not receive the commission when President Thomas
Jefferson took office. Marbury brought his case directly to the SC and prayed that they issue
a writ of mandamus to deliver the commission.
Issue:
· Whether Marbury had the right to be commissioned as Judge?
· Whether Marbury had the right to seek for a remedy from the court?
· Whether the SC has can issue a mandamus to deliver the commission?
Held:
• YES. Marbury has the right to be commissioned judge since the necessary
affidavits and documents required were both signed and sealed by the, then,
President of the US
o Withholding said commission is illegal
• YES. The office of Justice in DC is guarded and protected by laws,
therefore, any person appointed to fill the office is also protected by laws
• NO. Art III § 2 of the US Constitution, “the Supreme Court shall have
Original Jurisdiction in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, and those which a state shall be a party. In all other cases, the Supreme
Court shall have Appellate Jurisdiction.”
o The act by congress includes a provision that allowed the SC to take
original jurisdiction in cases that MIGHT affect them (ergo, no
restrictions to the cases they take).
• A mandamus can only be issued by exercise appellate
jurisdiction
• Since Marbury brought the case directly to the SC,
original jurisdiction is exercised, and thus, a mandamus CAN
NOT be issued
o The act by congress, which allowed Marbury to take his case directly
to the SC, is rendered UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
PETITION DENIED
Francisco v HOR
Political Question
Tanada v. Cuenco
G.R. No. L-10520; Feb 28, 1957
FACTS:
In 1956, the Senate Electoral Tribunal, already consisting of Sen. Cipriano Primicias, Sen.
Jose P. Laurel, and Sen. Fernando Lopez, all from the dominant Nacionalista party
nominated Sen. Lorenzo Tanada from the Citizen’s party and respondents Sen. Mariano
Cuenco and Sen. Francisco Delgado to be added into the tribunal. Sen. Tanada accepted
his nomination but contested those of Sen. Cuenco and Sen. Delgado, arguing that the SET
must comprise of three SC Justices, three senators belonging to the party with the most
seats, and three senators belonging to the party with the second most number of
seats. However, all the senators except for Sen. Tanada belong to the Nacionalista party,
with the latter being the lone member of the Citizen’s Party. The nomination of the
respondents would give the NP two more than the permitted number of spots in the
SET. The respondents countered by arguing that the SC has no authority to alter the
decisions of the Senate regarding the SET and that since Sen. Tanada wouldn’t be able to
nominate any other non-Nacionalista senator, then there is no violation of the rule.
Issue:
Whether or not the dilemma is a political issue and not a judicial one.
Held:
NO. Although the Senate has exclusive authority to fill in the six members of the SET, the
tribunal is not a part of the Congress, hence the SC’s decision is not an act against the
Senate. The actions of the Senate, although outside the jurisdiction of the SC, is still subject
to scrutiny by the latter with regards to its constitutionality. It is the validity of the action
(of having five Nacionalista senators in the SET instead of the allowed three) that is being
questioned by the Judiciary. SC declares that Sen. Cuenco and Sen. Delgado have NOT
been elected as members of the SET.
Effects of a Declaration of Unconstitutionality
Film Development Council of the Philippines v. Colon Heritage
G.R. No. 203745; June 16, 2015
Velasco, J.
FACTS
1. Sometime in 1993, the respondent City of Cebu, in its exercise of power
to impose amusement taxes under Section 140 of the LGC, promulgated City
Ordinance LXIX which levied a 30% amusement tax on the gross receipts of
admission fees on all places of entertainment/amusement including, but not
limited to, cinemas.
2. In 2002, Congress passed Republic Act 9167 creating the Film
Development Council of the Philippines (FDCP) and enacted a system of tax
rewards for film producers. Films were graded either “A” or “B” and its producers
were awarded 100% and 65% (Section 13 RA 9167) of the amusement taxes that
would otherwise be provided to the cities and municipalities of Metro Manila
and/or highly urbanized cities and independent component cities (Sec 14 RA
9167). Said amusement taxes would be remitted to the FDCP, who in turn would
provide the tax reward to the producers. All aforementioned local government
units complied with the mandate of the law, with the sole exception of Cebu City.
3. In 2009, FDCP issued demand letters to numerous cinema operators in
Cebu City the unremitted amount of amusement taxes collected from the gross
admission receipts. Said amusement taxes were instead remitted to the City of
Cebu as per City Ordinance LXIX. City of Cebu filed before RTC 14 a petition for
declaratory relief with a preliminary injunction wherein petitioner sought to have
Section 13 and 14 of RA 9167 as unconstitutional. Similarly, Colon Heritage, a
cinema operator, filed a separate case before RTC 5 seeking also to declare Sec. 13
and 14 as unconstitutional.
4. On May 25, 2010, RTC Branch 14 issued a TRO in having FDCP collect
the amusement taxes in Cebu City and filing suits against cinema owners in Cebu
City from non-remittance to FDCP. Later on, RTC Branch 14 issued a Decision
favoring petitioner City of Cebu and declared Sec. 13 and 14 of RA 9167 as
unconstitutional, being violative of Section 5 Article X of the 1987 Constitution
and should cease to collect remittances as of the finality of the decision. However,
SM Investments Corp. (intervenor) still has the obligation to remit due prior to
the finality of the decision. Similarly RTC Branch 5 decided in favor of Colon
Heritage and declared RA 9167 as unconstitutional, remittance is to be ceased, and
the respondent being directed to refund the petitioner all the amounts that was
remitted by way of amusement tax.
5. Unsatisfied with the decision of the RTC Branches, petitioner FDCP
went to the Supreme Court to assail said decisions.
ISSUE
1. Whether or not the two RTC Branches err in having to declare Sections
13 and 14 of RA 9167 as unconstitutional.
HELD
1. NO. Sections 13 and 14 of RA 9167 is Unconstitutional.
• Section 5, Article X of the Constitution clearly states the a municipal
corporation, such as the City of Cebu, has the power to levy taxes as may be
provided by law and that all collections of taxes are to be accrued exclusively for
the enjoyment of the local government unit which imposed said tax. Sec. 13 and
14 of RA 9167 violates these principles as the imposition of the amusement taxes
by the local government unit, when collected by the FDCP, is not being enjoyed by
the local government unit who levied the said tax. The FDCP contends that Sec. 13
and 14 of RA 9167 is a tax exemption promulgated by Congress and therefore
cannot be seen as violative of the constitution, the Court saw it as a reward rather
than an exemption. The collected amount of the amusement tax, rather than being
remitted by the municipal corporation (herein the City of Cebu), it is rather
circumvented and brought to the national government instead.
• As Sections 13 and 14 of RA 9167 were declared unconstitutional,
therefore it cannot be considered as law and the collections made by the FDCP
would seem unlawful and therefore should remit back to the respondent the
amount collected from them. However, the doctrine of operative fact negates this
idea. The doctrine nullifies the effect of an unconstitutional law or an executive act
by recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a determination of
unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have consequences that cannot
always be ignored. It would be a financial burden if said refund was to take place,
and, taking into account that petitioner did its compliance with the legislative fiat
in good faith, the refund part of the case was removed. Instead of having to refund
Colon Heritage the total amount collected by FDCP, Colon Heritage would
instead remit to FDCP the amount withheld by them for the purposes of
amusement tax prior to the finality of the decision, and upon the finality of the
decision, all amusement taxes collected by Colon Heritage would be remitted
instead to the City of Cebu.
Grave Abuse of Discretion
Film Development Council of the Philippines v. Colon Heritage
G.R. No. 203745; June 16, 2015
Velasco, J.
FACTS
1. Sometime in 1993, the respondent City of Cebu, in its exercise of power
to impose amusement taxes under Section 140 of the LGC, promulgated City
Ordinance LXIX which levied a 30% amusement tax on the gross receipts of
admission fees on all places of entertainment/amusement including, but not
limited to, cinemas.
2. In 2002, Congress passed Republic Act 9167 creating the Film
Development Council of the Philippines (FDCP) and enacted a system of tax
rewards for film producers. Films were graded either “A” or “B” and its producers
were awarded 100% and 65% (Section 13 RA 9167) of the amusement taxes that
would otherwise be provided to the cities and municipalities of Metro Manila
and/or highly urbanized cities and independent component cities (Sec 14 RA
9167). Said amusement taxes would be remitted to the FDCP, who in turn would
provide the tax reward to the producers. All aforementioned local government
units complied with the mandate of the law, with the sole exception of Cebu City.
3. In 2009, FDCP issued demand letters to numerous cinema operators in
Cebu City the unremitted amount of amusement taxes collected from the gross
admission receipts. Said amusement taxes were instead remitted to the City of
Cebu as per City Ordinance LXIX. City of Cebu filed before RTC 14 a petition for
declaratory relief with a preliminary injunction wherein petitioner sought to have
Section 13 and 14 of RA 9167 as unconstitutional. Similarly, Colon Heritage, a
cinema operator, filed a separate case before RTC 5 seeking also to declare Sec. 13
and 14 as unconstitutional.
4. On May 25, 2010, RTC Branch 14 issued a TRO in having FDCP collect
the amusement taxes in Cebu City and filing suits against cinema owners in Cebu
City from non-remittance to FDCP. Later on, RTC Branch 14 issued a Decision
favoring petitioner City of Cebu and declared Sec. 13 and 14 of RA 9167 as
unconstitutional, being violative of Section 5 Article X of the 1987 Constitution
and should cease to collect remittances as of the finality of the decision. However,
SM Investments Corp. (intervenor) still has the obligation to remit due prior to
the finality of the decision. Similarly RTC Branch 5 decided in favor of Colon
Heritage and declared RA 9167 as unconstitutional, remittance is to be ceased, and
the respondent being directed to refund the petitioner all the amounts that was
remitted by way of amusement tax.
5. Unsatisfied with the decision of the RTC Branches, petitioner FDCP
went to the Supreme Court to assail said decisions.
ISSUE
1. Whether or not the two RTC Branches err in having to declare Sections
13 and 14 of RA 9167 as unconstitutional.
HELD
1. NO. Sections 13 and 14 of RA 9167 is Unconstitutional.
• Section 5, Article X of the Constitution clearly states the a municipal
corporation, such as the City of Cebu, has the power to levy taxes as may be
provided by law and that all collections of taxes are to be accrued exclusively for
the enjoyment of the local government unit which imposed said tax. Sec. 13 and
14 of RA 9167 violates these principles as the imposition of the amusement taxes
by the local government unit, when collected by the FDCP, is not being enjoyed by
the local government unit who levied the said tax. The FDCP contends that Sec. 13
and 14 of RA 9167 is a tax exemption promulgated by Congress and therefore
cannot be seen as violative of the constitution, the Court saw it as a reward rather
than an exemption. The collected amount of the amusement tax, rather than being
remitted by the municipal corporation (herein the City of Cebu), it is rather
circumvented and brought to the national government instead.
• As Sections 13 and 14 of RA 9167 were declared unconstitutional,
therefore it cannot be considered as law and the collections made by the FDCP
would seem unlawful and therefore should remit back to the respondent the
amount collected from them. However, the doctrine of operative fact negates this
idea. The doctrine nullifies the effect of an unconstitutional law or an executive act
by recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a determination of
unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have consequences that cannot
always be ignored. It would be a financial burden if said refund was to take place,
and, taking into account that petitioner did its compliance with the legislative fiat
in good faith, the refund part of the case was removed. Instead of having to refund
Colon Heritage the total amount collected by FDCP, Colon Heritage would
instead remit to FDCP the amount withheld by them for the purposes of
amusement tax prior to the finality of the decision, and upon the finality of the
decision, all amusement taxes collected by Colon Heritage would be remitted
instead to the City of Cebu.
Ocampo v. Enriquez
G.R. No. 225973; November 8, 2016
Facts:
During the campaign period for the 2016 Presidential Elections, then candidate Rodrigo
Duterte made a promise to allow the burial of the late President Ferdinand Marcos at the
Libingan ng mga Bayani (LMNB). Come May 9, 2016, he won the elections and assumed
office on June 30, 2016. On August 7, 2016, Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzana issued a
Memorandum to the AFP Chief of Staff General Ricardo Visaya regarding the interment of
Marcos at the LNMB. On August 9, 2016, AFP Rear Admiral Ernesto Enriquez issued the
following directives to the Philippine Army Commanding General for the funeral honors
and service: to provide services, honors and other courtesies; for his remains to lie in state
at Ilocos Norte; for his Interment to take place at the LNMB, and to provide all the
necessary military honors accorded to the President. Dissatisfied with the foregoing
issuance, 8 petitions were led by the following people: Saturnino Ocampo, Rene A.V.
Saguisag, Rep. Edcel Lagman, Loretta Ann Pargas-Rosales, Heherson T. Alvarez, Zaira
Patricia B. Baniaga, and Senator Leila M. De Lima.
Issues: (Procedural)
1. W/N President Duterte’s determination to have the remains of Marcos
interred at the LNMB poses a justiciable controversy. NO.
2. W/N petitioners have locus standi to file the instant petitions. NO.
3. W/N petitioners violated the doctrines of exhaustion of administrative
remedies and hierarchy of courts. YES.
Held:
1. President Duterte’s decision to have the remains of Marcos buried at the LNMB
involves a political question that is not justiciable controversy.
a. In the exercise of his powers under the Constitution and the EO No 292 to allow
the interment of Marcos at the LNMB, which is a land of the public domain devoted for
national military and cemetery and military shrine purposes, President Duterte decided a
question of policy based on his wisdom that it shall promote national healing and
forgiveness
2. Petitioners, who filed their respective petitions, have no legal standing to file such
petitions because they failed to show that they have suffered or will suffer direct and
personal injury as a result of the interment of Marcos
a. Petitioner-taxpayers merely claimed illegal disbursement of
public funds, without showing Marcos is disqualified from being interred
either by express or implied provision of the Constitution, the laws, or
jurisprudence.
b. Petitioners Saguisag et al, as members of the bar, failed to
disclose any potential injury the IBP may suffer, and that their interest in
this case is too general and shared by other groups.
c. Petitioners’ argument is founded on the wrong premise that the
LNMB is the National shrine intended by law to perpetuate the memory
of all heroes. The history of the LNMB reveals its nature as a national
military cemetery and shrine, under the administration of the AFP.
Sen. De Lima and Cong. Lagman, et al, do not specifically claim that the official
actions complained of, i.e., the memorandum of the Secretary of National Defense
and the directives of AFP Chief of Staff regarding the interment of Marcos at
LNMB, encroach on their prerogatives as legislators.
3. Petitioners violated the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and
hierarchy of courts.
a. Petitioners should be faulted for failing to seek reconsideration of the assailed
memorandum and directive before the Secretary of National Defense
b. While direct resort to the Court through petitions are allowed under exceptional
case, which are lacking in this case, petitioners cannot simply brush aside the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts that requires them to file this first with the proper Regional Trial Court.
Issues: (Substantive)
1. W/N the Secretary of National Defense and AFP Rear Admiral committed grave
abuse of discretion when they assailed the memorandum and directive in compliance
with the order of President Duterte. NO.
2. W/N the issuance and implementation of the memorandum and directive violated
the Constitution and domestic and international laws? NO.
3. W/N historical facts, laws enacted to recover ill-gotten wealth from the Marcoses
and their cronies, and the pronouncements of the Court on the Marcos regime have
nullified his entitlement as a soldier and former president to interment at the LNMB.
NO
4. W/N the Marcos family is deemed to have waived the burial of the remains of
President Marcos at the LNMB after they entered into agreement with the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines as to the conditions and procedure by
which his remains shall be brought back and interred in Philippines. NO.
Held:
NO. Grave abuse of discretion is committed when an act is done contrary to the
Constitution or if it was done whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will,
or personal bias. None of which was present in the case. There was no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of President Duterte because it was done in the exercise of his
mandate. There is also no law that prohibits the burial of Marcos’ remains at the
LNMB.
NO. President Duterte has the power to reserve for public use and purposes, any
of the lands under public domain.
NO. The President’s decision to bury Marcos at the LNMB is in accordance with
the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence. In the absence of any executive issuance or law
to the contrary, AFP regulations remain to be the sole authority in determining who is
entitled or disqualified to be buried at the LNMB. Marcos was a former President and
Commander-in-Chief, a legislator, a Secretary of National Defense, a military personnel, a
veteran, and a Medal of Valor awardee, aking him eligible for the interment at the LNMB.
He does not possess any of the disqualifications as 1) he was not convicted by final
judgement of an offense involving moral turpitude nor dishonorably discharged from
military service.
NO. The LNMB is considered as a national shrine for military memorials. The
PVAO which is empowered to administer, develop, and maintain military shrines is under
the supervision and control of the DND. The DND, in turn, is under the Office of the
President.
The presidential power of control over the Executive Branch of Government is a
self-executing provision of the Constitution and does not require statutory
implementation, nor may its exercise be limited or withdrawn by the legislature. President
Duterte is not bound by the alleged 1992 agreement between President Ramos and the
Marcos Family. As incumbent, he is free to amend, revoke or rescind political agreements
entered into by his predecessors, and determine policies which he considers, based on
inform judgment and presumed wisdom, will be most effective in carrying out his mandate.
SEPARATE OPINIONS
Bersamin, concurring
President Marcos -- being a former President of the Philippines, a Medal of Valor
awardee, a veteran of World War II, a former Senator and Senate Presdient, and a former
Congressman -- is of those who remained entitled to be interred in the LNMB under the
terms of the AFP Regulations G 161-375.
None of the disqualifications under AFP Regulation G 161-375 can apply to the
late Marcos. He had not been dishonorably discharged from military service, or convicted
by final judgment of any offense involving moral turpitude. The contention that he had
been ousted from the Presidency by the 1986 People Power revolution was not the same as
being dishonorably discharged because discharge must be from military service.
Brion, separate concurring
Judicial review, even under the Court’s expanded jurisdiction does not empower
the court to review allegations involving violations of statutes. The faithful execution clause
cannot be made the basis for questioning the manner by which the Executive implements
the law. The petitioners failed to point to a specific treaty obligation prohibiting the burial
at the LNMB.
The Constitution, while built on the ashes of the Marcos administration, should
not be so interpreted as to prevent reconciliation and moving forward in the name of
national unity. The necessity of Marcos’s burial at the LNMB is a political question that had
been decided by the President, and not without support from the Filipino electorate.
Perez, separate concurring
President Rodrigo R. Duterte did not gravely abuse his discretion, was neither
whimsical nor capricious when upon assumption of the office to which he was elected he
forthwith proceeded to implement his election promise to have the remains of the late
President Ferdinand E. Marcos buried in the Libingan ng mga Bayani.
As judicial admissions, petitioners state as fact that the burial of former President
Marcos as the Libingan ng mga Bayani is a matter about which the Filipino public was
consulted as a campaign promise of candidate Duterte who, when he became president
redeemed the pledge.
Whether the policy of healing and reconciliation ‘over’ and above the pain and
suffering of the human rights victims’ is in grave abuse of discretion or not is answered by
the evidently substantial Marcos vote during the fresh and immediately preceding national
elections of 2016. The election result is a showing that, while there may have once been,
there is no longer a national damnation of President Ferdinand E. Marcos; that the
‘constitutionalization’ of the sin and personification is no longer of national acceptance. A
Marcos vote came out of the elections, substantial enough to be a legitimate consideration
in the executive policy formulation. To go back, a Libingan Burial for Marcos was a
promise made by President Duterte, which promise was opposed by petitioners, in spite of
which opposition, candidate Duterte was elected President.
All in all, the redemption of an election pledge and the policy which has basis in
the result of the election, cannot be tainted with grave abuse of discretion. As things are, the
issue presented by the petitioners should not even be touched by the Court since it is a
political question already resolved politically.
Mendoza, separate concurring
The Court should not take part in the political controversy because the question
presented is not justiciable and that, therefore, the petition should be dismissed. Even were
the Court to take cognizance of the petitions, the President’s act was not attended by grave
abuse of discretion as there was no violation of any constitutional provision or law.
Lest it be misunderstood, the Court is not passing judgment on whether President
Marcos truly deserves to be buried in the LNMB. It is merely exercising judicial restraint as
the issues at hand are truly political in nature and, therefore, are best left to the discretion
of the President.
The Court sympathizes with the HRVVs and acknowledges he harrowing ordeals they
suffered (at) the hands of government forces during martial law. The stigma left by the
martial law regime will never be forgotten by the Filipino people and the burial of President
Marcos (at) the LNMB will not re-write history.
On (this) matter, however, the Supreme Court should not have a hand. It should not
resolve the issues in this truly political controversy.
C.J. Sereno, dissenting opinion
The Court must take cognizance of the issues presented in order to preserve the
Constitution as well as the judiciary’s own prerogatives under the Constitution.
The President acted with grave abuse of discretion in ordering the interment at
LNMB because it violated domestic law and international law in relation to the obligations
to do justice for human rights victims.
The Philippines is bound to affirmatively protect the rights of the human rights
victims under martial law by providing effective reparations, which would include
monetary compensation as well as non-monetary remedies (such as symbolic reparation).
The interment of the Marcos remains at LNMB would be the antithesis of symbolic
reparation. The interment would run counter to the duty to combat impunity as well as to
preserve memory—all of which are international commitments that the Philippines is
bound to observe. The recognition by both branches of government—the legislative and
judicial—that Marcos was a dictator, plunderer and a human rights violator would
preclude the interment at LNMB as such act would run counter to the original intention of
the LNMB. The invocation that the interment at LNMB would bring about national unity
and healing, by itself, is insufficient to justify the use of public funds absent a public
purpose.
Respondents may deny the implications of their actions today, but the symbolism
of the burial will outlive even their most emphatic refutations. Long after the clarifications
made by this administration have been forgotten, the gravesite at the LNMB will remain.
That is the peculiar power of symbols in the public landscape—they are not only carriers of
meaning but are repositories of public memory and ultimately, history.
For the Court to pretend that the present dispute is a simple question of the
entitlement of a soldier to a military burial is to take a regrettably myopic view of the
controversy. It would be to disregard historical truths and legal principles that persist after
death. As important, it would be to degrade the State’s duty to recognize the pain of
countless victims of Marcos and Martial Law. Regardless of the promised national unity
that the proposed burial will bring, I cannot, in good conscience, support such an expedient
and shortsighted view of Philippine history.
Caguioa, dissenting opinion
The order to inter the remains for former President Marcos at LNMB is contrary
to the Constitution, the law, and several executive issuances that have the force of law, as
well as the public policy that the Constitution, the said laws, and executive issuances
espouse and advance.
Burying (Marcos) in the LNMB does not make him a hero disregards the status of
the LNMB as a national shrine, the public policy in treating national shrines, the standards
set forth in these laws and executive issuances as well as in the AFP LNMB burial
regulations.
The RAC provision (as well as Sec. 83 of CA 141 or The Public Land Act) both
required the President to exercise this power by proclamation or executive order. The
President’s order to inter is a verbal order, which falls short of the manner prescribed by
law for its exercise.
Any disbursement of public funds in connection with the interment will not be for
a public purpose, as it is principally for the advantage of a private party -separate from the
motivation for the same.
Carpio, dissenting opinion
Even assuming that Marcos, as Medal of Valor awardee, was qualified for
interment at LNMB, he ceased to be qualified when he was ousted on February 25, 1986.
Citing Marcos v. Manglapus (1989), the Court described Marcos as “a dictator forced out of
office and into exile after causing twenty years of political, economic, and social havoc in
the country.” Marcos’s forcible removal in February 1986 amounted to the strongest form
of dishonorable discharge from office since it is meted out by the direct act of the sovereign
people. Marcos’s ouster is beyond judicial review and must be accepted as an
incontrovertible fact which has become part of history. The removal was a direct exercise of
the power of the Filipino people, which could not be called “honorable.”
J. Carpio disagrees with the majority that Marcos could not be considered
dishonorably discharged as his separation was not in accordance with the procedures and
guidelines prescribed in Circular 17, Series of 1987 of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
because: (1) Marcos was separated from service before the circular was passed; the circular,
an administrative act, cannot be applied retrospectively to undo a final act by the sovereign
people; and (2) even assuming the circular applied to Marcos, he was still dishonorably
discharged as the incontrovertible fact of ouster that is beyond both judicial and
administrative review cannot be undone by a mere circular.
To submit to respondents' view that the disqualifications under AFPR G 161-375
apply only to military personnel, and that the President, even as Commander-in-Chief, is
not a military personnel subject to such disqualifications, 10 negates the purpose for which
the LNMB was originally established, which is to honor Filipino soldiers who fought for
freedom and democracy for our country. Indeed, Marcos is the very anti-thesis of freedom
and democracy because he was a dictator as declared by this Court. Respondents.
The President must implement the law considering the highest standards of
promoting the public good as embodied in the Constitution, international law and
municipal statutes. The DND Memorandum is contrary to public policy as it would violate
RA 10368. The President, in implementing the law, must observe the standard of
recognition of the rights of human rights victims. Marcos’s interment at LNMB will cause
injury particularly to human rights victims of his regime and the sovereign people who
collectively ousted him. For this reason, he argues that the burial at LNMB is contrary to
public policy.
Public funds cannot be spent for a non-public purpose. Marcos’s ouster by a
sovereign act of the Filipino people constituted a dishonorable discharge; consequently, his
interment at LNMB serves to convert his burial into a private affair of the Marcos family.
No public purpose is served by transferring his remains to LNMB and public funds cannot
be used for this purpose.
Leonen, dissenting opinion
Under our constitutional order, Presidents, unlike kings, earn their honors. As
public servants, their position in itself should not be the basis to glorify them. Neither will
their place in history be determined by a successor President. Only the sovereign Filipino
People deserve to determine a President’s place in history.
Given the present state of our Constitution, our laws, and our jurisprudence, it is
illegal for the remains of Ferdinand E. Marcos to be interred at the Libingan ng mga
Bayani. The Filipino people do not deserve such a symbolism.
Marcos is no hero. He was not even an exemplary public officer. He is not worthy
of emulation and inspiration by those who suffer poverty as a result of the opportunity lost
during his administration, by those who continue to suffer the trauma of the violations to
the human dignity of their persons and of their family. He is certainly not worthy of
emulation and inspiration by those who do public service, including the lawyers, judges,
and justices who simply want to do what is right, protect others, and conscientiously and
diligently protect public funds entrusted to them.
The General Orders which were the basis for the issuance of the questioned orders
of public respondents are invalid because they violate RA 289. Assuming without accepting
that AFP Regulations were valid when issued, the verbal orders of the President, the
Memorandum of the Secretary of National Defense, and the orders of respondent Enriquez
all violate the requirement in RA 289, section 1 that those buried must have led lives
worthy of “inspiration and emulation.”
Assuming without conceding that the AFP regulations were valid when issued, the
public respondents gravely abused their discretion when they failed to show, in view of the
findings of the National Historical Commission of the Philippines, that they had
sufficiently determined that there was factual basis to believe that the burial of Marcos’s
remains would be consistent with RA 289 and the various proclamations relevant to the
LNMB. The President’s verbal orders, the memorandum of the Secretary of National
Defense, and the orders of respondent Enriquez were issued with grave abuse of discretion
because they violate RA 10368.
The President’s verbal orders, the memorandum of the Secretary of National
Defense, and the orders of respondent Enriquez cannot be justified under the provisions of
the Revised Administrative Code because there is no public purpose for the interment of
Marcos’ remains at LNMB.
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo vs. People of the Philippines and the Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 220598; July 19, 2016
Bersamin, J.
FACTS
· On July 10, 2012, the Ombudsman charged petitioners Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo et al.
with plunder in the Sandiganbayan. In the period of January 2008 and June 2010, the
accused were said to have, directly or indirectly, accumulated ill-gotten wealth totaling the
amount of Php 365,997,915.00, thereby constituting the crime of plunder as prescribed by
Sec. 2 RA 7080, as amended by RA 7659. The charges are described as follows:
· diverting in several instances, funds from the operating budget of PCSO to its
Confidential/Intelligence Fund that could be accessed and withdrawn at any time with
minimal restrictions, and converting, misusing, and/or illegally conveying or transferring
the proceeds drawn from said fund in the aforementioned sum, also in several instances, to
themselves, in the guise of fictitious expenditures, for their personal gain and benefit;
· raiding the public treasury by withdrawing and receiving, in several instances, the
above-mentioned amount from the Confidential/Intelligence Fund from PCSO's accounts,
and or unlawfully transferring or conveying the same into their possession and control
through irregularly issued disbursement vouchers and fictitious expenditures; and
· taking advantage of their respective official positions, authority, relationships,
connections or influence, in several instances, to unjustly enrich themselves in the
aforementioned sum, at the expense of, and the damage and prejudice of the Filipino
people and the Republic of the Philippines.
· For the prosecution, they presented Atty. Aleta Tolentino as their main witness against
all of the accused. As chairman of the audit committee, Atty. Tolentino saw that there was
an excessive disbursement of the Confidential and Intelligence Fund (CIF). During the
years 2006 to 2009, PCSO was running on a deficit. The CIF, which originates from the
operating fund, cannot be allocated from any other fund other than the operating fund, and
was limited to Php10,000,000.00 per year. When asked, one of the accused, Benigno Aguas,
indicated that the excess disbursement of the CIF was approved by the President and was
done by affixing her signature on letters sent to her with the subject “Request for
Intelligence Fund.” Evidence was also presented consisting in the testimonies of officers
coming from different agencies to corroborate Tolentino’s testimony to the effect that the
PCSO had not requested from their respective offices any intelligence operations contrary
to the liquidation submitted by General Manager Uriarte and Aguas.
· On April 6, 2015, the Sandiganbayan granted the demurrers to evidence of Morato,
Roquero, Taruc and Villar, and dismissed the charge against them. It held that said accused
who were members of the PCSO Board of Directors were not shown to have diverted any
PCSO funds to themselves, or to have raided the public treasury by conveying and
transferring into their possession and control any money or funds from PCSO account;
that as to Villar, there had been no clear showing that his designation of Plaras had been
tainted with any criminal design; and that the fact that Plaras had signed "by authority" of
Villar as the COA Chairman could not criminally bind him in the absence of any showing
of conspiracy. The demurrers to evidence of GMA, Aguas, and Valencia were denied,
however, holding that there was sufficient evidence showing that they had conspired to
commit plunder.
ISSUES
· Whether or not the special action for certiorari is proper to assail the denial of the
demurrers to evidence;
· Whether or not the State sufficiently established the existence of conspiracy among
GMA, Aguas, and Uriarte;
· Whether or not the State sufficiently established all the elements of the crime of
plunder:
· Was there evidence of amassing, accumulating or acquiring ill-gotten wealth in the
total amount of not less than Php50,000,000.00?
· Was there predicate act of raiding the public treasury alleged in the information
provided by the Prosecution?
HELD
· YES. The exercise of this power to correct grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government
cannot be thwarted by rules of procedure to the contrary or for the sake of the convenience
of one side. This is because the Court has the bounden constitutional duty to strike down
grave abuse of discretion whenever and wherever it is committed. Thus, notwithstanding
the interlocutory character and effect of the denial of the demurrers to evidence, the
petitioners as the accused could avail themselves of the remedy of certiorari when the
denial was tainted with grave abuse of discretion. As we shall soon show, the
Sandiganbayan as the trial court was guilty of grave abuse of discretion when it capriciously
denied the demurrers to evidence despite the absence of competent and sufficient evidence
to sustain the indictment for plunder, and despite the absence of the factual bases to expect
a guilty verdict
· NO. The prosecution did not properly allege and prove the existence of conspiracy
among GMA, Aguas, and Uriarte. To be considered part of the conspiracy, each of the
accused must be shown to have performed at least an overt act in pursuance or in the
furtherance of the conspiracy, for without being shown to do so none of them will be liable
as a co-conspirator, and each may only be held responsible for the results of his own acts.
· It is in this regard that the Sandigabayan gravely abused its discretion amounting to
lack or excess of its jurisdiction. To start with, its conclusion that GMA had been the
mastermind of plunder was plainly conjectural and outrightly unfounded considering that
the information did not aver at all that she had been the mastermind; hence, the
Sandigabayan thereby acted capriciously and arbitrarily. In the second place, the treatment
by the Sandiganbayan of her handwritten unqualified "OK" as an overt act of plunder was
absolutely unwarranted considering that such act was a common legal and valid practice of
signifying approval of a fund release by the President
· NO. The prosecution failed to establish that the accused accumulated at least
Php50,000,000.00. There was also no evidence, testimonial or otherwise, presented by the
Prosecution showing even the remotest possibility that the CIFs of the PCSO had been
diverted to either GMA or Aguas, or Uriarte.
· NO. The prosecution failed to present where the money went, if either directly or
indirectly to all accused, as personal benefit was seen to be lacking in the exercise of the said
raiding of the public treasury.
· The Sandiganbayan ignored the failure of the information to sufficiently charge
conspiracy to commit plunder against the petitioners, and ignored the lack of evidence
sufficient to charge the accused of plunder. The Sandiganbayan therefore acted
capriciously, thus gravely abusing its discretion amounting to lack or excess in
jurisdiction.
Judges
Qualifications
Art. VIII, Section 7
1. No person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme Court or any
lower collegiate court unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. A
Member of the Supreme Court must be at least forty years of age, and must have
been for fifteen years or more, a judge of a lower court or engaged in the practice
of law in the Philippines.
2. The Congress shall prescribe the qualifications of judges of lower courts,
but no person may be appointed judge thereof unless he is a citizen of the
Philippines and a member of the Philippine Bar.
3. A Member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven competence,
integrity, probity, and independence.
JBC-009
Sec. 2 Supreme Court - >40, judge of a lower court/member of the Philippine Bar
Sec. 3Court of Appeals – same as SC
Sec. 4 Sandiganbayan - >40, for ten years been a judge or engaged in the practice of law or
has held office requiring admission to the bar as pre-requisite
Sec. 5 Ombudsman - >40, of recognized probity and independence/ Bar, 10yrs, and not a
candidate in the immediately preceding election
Sec. 6 CTA – same as SC
Sec. 7 RTC - >35, lawyer for 10 years or held public office requiring practice o flaw
Sec. 8 Lower Courts (MTC, MeTC, MCTC) - >35, 5 yrs practice of law
Sec. 9 Sharia Courts – RTC + learned in Islamic law and jurisprudence, >25, Shari’a Bar
Kilosbayan Foundation vs Ermita
GR 177721; July 3, 2007
Justice Azcuna
FACTS:
Gregory Ong was appointed as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court by Executive
Secretary Ermita. Petitioners conted that Ong’s appointment by Ermita was tainted by
grave abuse of discretion, because Ong, as petitioner’s argue, was a Chinese citizen. At the
time of his birth, both of Ong’s parents were listed as Chinese citizens. As such, Ong cannot
be appointed as this would be contrary to Section 7(1) of Article VIII, which states that a
judge cannot be appointed unless he is a natural born citizen of the Philippines. So long as
Ong’s birth certificate is not changed by a judicial order, what is stated in his birth
certificate is binding. Ong contended that he is a Filipino citizen because his maternal
grandfather was a Filipino citizen, and that he was included in the naturalization of his
father.
ISSUES:
W/N Ong is a natural born Filipino citizen, and thus could validly be appointed
RULING:
- NO. Ong is a naturalized Filipino citizen. Court records clearly show that a copy of
his family’s naturalization certificate was attached in order to show the Court how his
Filipino citizenship was acquired. In fact, it was on the basis of this evidence of
naturalization that the Court allowed Ong to take the Lawyer’s Oath.
- Furthermore, petitioners are correct in pointing out that no substantial change or
correction in an entry in a civil registrar can be made without a judicial order. A change in
citizenship status is a substantial change. Hence, until Ong resorts to the proper judicial
proceedings to correct the existing records on his citizenship, the court is bound by such
existing records.
- Because he is not a natural-born Filipino citizen as is stated in the existing records,
Gregory Ong is ENJOINED from accepting the appointment
Roles:
Independence
RE: Allegations of Mr. Amado P. Macasaet
(A.M. No. 07-09-13-SC); August 8, 2008
DISSENTING OPINION
Carpio, J.
CASE
Resolves a contempt charge against respondent Amado A.P. Macasaet for
authoring publications imputing bribery to a member of the Court.
FACTS
1. Macasaet wrote in the 18-21 September 2007 issues of Malaya alleged bribery in the
Supreme Court by one Justice.
2. It wrote how a staff of an unnamed lady Justice named Cacilia opened received
boxes of cash worth P10 million.
3. The payoff was made about a decision rendered by a Justice in acquitting a Filipino-
Chinese businessman.
4. Subsequently, Newsbreak, an online magazine posted on its website a news report
on how Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago is the Justice involved in the alleged bribery,
while Cecila Delis was her staff whose employment has since been terminated.
5. The Committee, that conducted hearings regarding Macasaet and Newsbreak's
publications, submitted its Report and Recommendation that stated how there are
valid grounds to cite Macasaet for indirect contempt of court. It held that Macasaet's
publications were false, baseless, unbelievable, and malicious; also, that he was
negligent in failing to ascertain the veracity of his story.
ISSUES
Whether Amado A.P. Macasaet should liable for criminal contempt of Court
under Section 3(d), Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure". (YES, according to
Majority. NO, according to the DISSENTING OPINION of Justice Carpio.)
RATIONALE
1. The Committee proceedings were fatally defective.
A. When the witnesses testified. the Committee monopolized the right to
propound questions to the witnesses, denying to Macasaet such right
2. Two theoretical formulas should be devised in determination of conflicting rights to
draw a proper constitutional boundary.
A. "Clear and Present Danger" Rule: clear and present danger of substantive evils
because of indiscriminate publications regarding judicial proceedings justifies an
impairment of the constitutional right of freedom of speech and press only if the
evils are extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high. The
present case does not meet this criterion.
B. "Dangerous Tendency" Rule: If the words uttered created a dangerous tendency
which the state has a right to prevent, then such words are punishable. The present
case does not meet this criterion.
3. It had not been shown that there exists a substantive evil which is extremely serious and
that the degree of its imminence is so exceptionally high as to warrant punishment for
contempt and sufficient to disregard the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech.
4. In the absence of clear and convincing evidence that respondent knowingly foisted a
falsehood to degrade the court's administration of justice, the court should be slow in citing
Macasaet for contempt.
A. There is yet to come a man whose tongue only tells the truth. The abuse some
of some newsmen can't justify an overarching rule eroding the freedom of all of
them.
DECISION
Accordingly, I (Justice Carpio), vote NOT to hold Macasaet in contempt of court.
Integrity
OCA v JUDGE FLORO
AM No. RTJ-99-1460 March 31st, 2006
FACTS:
a. FIRST CASE (OCA v Floro, AM No. RTJ-99-1460):
Atty. Floro applied for a judgeship, but the SC requested for a psychological evaluation,
which revealed that he had “evidence of ego disintegration” and “developing psychotic
process.” Later on, he had another test which showed more psychological problems.
Eventually, the Judicial Bar Council (JBC) allowed him to get a second opinion (for the
psychological test) due to his impressive academic background. The second opinion proved
fruitful as he was appointed the judge of RTC Branch 73 in Malabon City, on November
4th,1998.
An audit on his sala was conducted, revealing that:
i. He had circulated calling cards containing self-laudatory statements and that he
would announce his qualifications in open court.
ii. That he would render resolutions without written orders and proceeding on a
hearing without the presence of the trial prosecutor.
iii. He was partial in a certain case wherein he had declared that he was pro-accused. • Lacks basis.
iv. • Mental incapacity.
v. He had openly criticized the Rules of Court, the country’s justice system, and that
he would use highly improper and intemperate language. Impartiality

People vs. CA
b. SECOND CASE (Arriego v Floro, AM. No. RTJ-06-1988): GR 1188882; September 26, 1996
The respondent judge, by using his moral ascendancy, persuaded the complainant, Luz Justice Melo
Arriego, to settle the Criminal Case No. 20385-MN (frustrated homicide) through
convincing the complainant and the accused to sign a settlement even without the presence FACTS
of a trial prosecutor, in order to “settle the civil aspect of the case.” In a Special Civil Action, Judge Pedro Espina enjoined the preliminary investigation
at the Regional State Prosecutor's Office against Jane Go, the principal accused in the
c. THIRD CASE (AM No. 99-7-273-RTC): killing of her husband Dominic Go. In response to this alleged partiality, an appeal was
Anent the petition to be admitted a citizen of the Philippines by petitioner Mary Ng Nei, filed to the CA, praying that Judge Espina be inhibited from hearing the case and that Judge
Floro denied the naturalization filed by the petitioner, declaring the motion null and void. Espina be enjoined from conducting further proceedings. The CA denied this appeal.
He then raffled the case anew Petitioners now file the present petition to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Floro is fit to be a judge.
HELD:
NO, he is not.
• He is guilty of simple misconduct.
• Self-laudatory statements, as in his calling cards, are in violation
of Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
• “... a judge should not seek publicity for personal
vainglory.”
• He is guilty of gross ignorance of the law.
• Floro was remiss regarding his duties when he did not reduce
the release of recognizance of the accused in writing.
• Echaus v CA.
• “... no judgment, or order… has juridical
existence and unless it is set down in writing, signed,
and promulgated.”
• This failure was not due to mere negligence, but to
actual ignorance of a procedural rule.
• He is guilty of unbecoming conduct.
• Canon 2.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
• “A judge should so behave at all times as to promote
public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary.
• Anent SECOND CASE.
ISSUE
• W/N Judge Espina acted partially, and whether this partiality justifies his
disqualification of hearing the cases (People vs Cristeta Reyes and People vs Jane
Go)
RULING
- YES. Judge Espina acted partially. By enjoining the investigation against Jane Go, he
failed to fairly assess both the evidence to be adduced by the prosecution and the defense.
The Court has consistently
Propriety
RE: Allegations made under oath at the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
Per Curiam
FACTS
1. The social news network Rappler published an article by Aries Rufo showing a
photograph of Senator Jinggoy Estrada together with Mrs. Napoles and the respondent.
2. Witnesses allege that Gregory Ong is Mrs. Napoles' contact in connection to her case
regarding the Kevlar Case, which acquitted Janet Lim-Napoles from liability. Gregory Ong
was one of the judges that decided on the Kevlar Case.
3. Gregory Ong wrote Chief Justice Sereno denying the involvement with Mrs. Napoles
except that he simply posed for photos in a social event.
4. The Court assigned retired SC Justice Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez for examination,
report, and recommendation. She held that Justice Gregory Ong be found Guilty of gross
misconduct, dishonesty, and impropriety; and she recommends his dismissal.
5. Justice Ong argues that in the photograph, Mrs. Napoles only helped him claim access
to the robe of the Black Nazarene. After having access to the robe, he then claims that his
visit to her office was in gratitude for Mrs. Napoles'. The second visit he made to her office
was in concurrence to Mrs. Napoles' request to avoid being perceived as disrespectful or
rude.
ISSUES
1. Whether respondent is guilty of gross misconduct, partiality, and corruption or
bribery in the Kevlar case, and impropriety because dealing and socializing with Napoles
after her acquittal of the case.
RATIONALE
1. Standard of substantial evidence is required when there is reasonable ground to believe
that respondent is responsible for the misconduct complained of, even if such evidence
might not be overwhelming or even preponderant.
a. Justice Ong failed to disclose in his letter to the Chief Justice that he
had visited Napoles at her office in 2012.
b. Whistleblowers' testimonies against Justice Ong and Mrs. Napoles
were candid, straightforward, and categorical as well as instantaneously
clear, unequivocal, and carried with a ring of truth. Both never wavered
or faltered even during cross-examination.
2. Judges should always be beyond reproach and should avoid the mere suggestion of
impropriety.
a. Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct states: "propriety and
the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the
activities of a judge."
b. Section 2 further provides: "As a subject of constant public scrutiny,
judges must accept personal restrictions that might be viewed as
burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do freely and willingly.
In particular, judges shall conduct themselves in a way that is consistent
with the dignity of judicial office."
c. Judges should be extra prudent in associating with litigants and
counsel appearing before them to avoid even a mere perception of
possible bias or partiality.
d. It does not matter that the case is no longer pending when improper
acts were committed by the judge. Because magistrates are under
constant public scrutiny, the termination of a case will not deter public
criticisms for acts which may cast suspicion on its disposition or
resolution.
e. Justice Ong's visits to Mrs. Napoles were improper and unnecessary.
DECISION: Justice Ong held GUILTY and hence, DISMISSED.
Competence and Diligence
Ocampo v. Arcaya-Chua
AM OCA IPI No. 07-2630-ITJ; 23 April 2010
Per Curiam
FACTS:
Ocampo charged Judge Acaya-Chua with gross ignorance of the law and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Ocampo’s wife Milan filed a petition for sole
custody of her and Ocampo’s daughters. Arcaya-Chua issued an Order enjoining Ocampo
from taking their daughter’s abroad without the Court’s permission and to allow Milan to
visit their daughters in Bulacan. In response, Ocampo filed a motion to dismiss, with
evidence that his wife was not a resident of Makati as both Ocampo and his wife are
registered voters of Meycauayan. While Milan did not present any contrary evidence, the
Judge dismissed his motion. An appeal for reconsideration was likewise denied. Arcaya-
Chua then issued a TPO requiring Ocampo to turn over the custody of his daughters to his
wife’s residence in Makati City, among other things. Ocampo argues that the Judge gravely
erred in both the issuance (as he was ordered to pay monthly support even if his wife
alleged he did not father the daughters) and the implementation (in that the Judge ordered
a sheriff to forcefully take the daughters away, even as Ocampo assured him that he will
bring his daughters to his wife peacefully) of the TPO.
ISSUES:
- W/N Judge Arcaya-Chua acted properly in handling the said case
RULING:
- YES. There is no evidence that Arcaya-Chua ruled in such manner
because of a corrupt or dishonest motive, bad faith, fraud, or malice.
- With regards to Milan’s residence, it is not irreconcilable that while
Milan is a registered voter of Meycauayan, she might be maintaining
residence elsewhere, especially considering her estranged relationship with
Ocampo.
- With the alleged suddenness of the hearing issued one day after the
summons were served, Arcaya-Chua clarified that it was not her intent to
harass Ocampo. In fact, the order setting the hearing was issued five days
before the actual hearing. There is no evidence that the Judge had a hand in
the late serving of the notice. Furthermore, a prayer for TPO needs to be acted
with dispatch. Hence, it is quite possible that it might be acted upon in a
sudden manner.
- Likewise, the issuance of the TPO before Ocampo could file his answer
is neither irregular nor improper. As it appears, the daughters were
illegitimate children of Milan, conceived through artificial insemination
without the consent of Ocampo. As Ocampo did not authorize the
 insemination, he has no right to custody. Milan also appended evidence of
Ocampo’s violence and perversity toward the daughters. While there is merit
in Ocampo’s objection regarding payment of support, this could be treated as
a mere error of judgement, placed with a reliance under the rule that
“provisional orders for protection and support may be issued without
hearing”.
- Arcaya-Chua did not act overzealously in the implementation of the
TPO. A TPO needs to be served immediately. It was the counsel of Ocampo
who chose the hearing date (April 3) himself. The implementation of the TPO
was made the following day, a Holy Wednesday. Since Ocampo’s counsel
himself chose the hearing date, there is no ground to say that Judge Arcaya-
Chua purposely sought the issuance of the TPO on Holy Week.
- The charge of bribery is dismissed on being based of hearsay.
- Hence, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty, or corruption, the acts of a
judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action, even
though such acts are erroneous. CHARGES DISMISSED.
LIABILITIES OF A JUDGE
Civil Liability
Civil Code (RA 386)
Art. 27 – Any person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant or employee
refuses or neglects, without just cause, to perform his official duty may file an action for
damages and other relief against the latter, without prejudice to any disciplinary
administrative action that may be taken.
Art. 32 - Article 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly
or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the
following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages:
(1) Freedom of religion;
(2) Freedom of speech;
(3) Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical publication;
(4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;
(5) Freedom of suffrage;
(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;
(7) The right to a just compensation when private property is taken for public use;
(8) The right to the equal protection of the laws;
(9) The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures;
(10) The liberty of abode and of changing the same;
(11) The privacy of communication and correspondence;
(12) The right to become a member of associations or societies for purposes not
contrary to law;
(13) The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition the Government for
redress of grievances;
(14) The right to be a free from involuntary servitude in any form;
(15) The right of the accused against excessive bail;
(16) The right of the accused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy and public
trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure
the attendance of witness in his behalf;
(17) Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against one's self, or from
being forced to confess guilt, or from being induced by a promise of immunity or
reward to make such confession, except when the person confessing becomes a
State witness;
(18) Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel and unusual punishment, unless the
same is imposed or inflicted in accordance with a statute which has not been
judicially declared unconstitutional; and
(19) Freedom of access to the courts.
In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the defendant's act or
omission constitutes a criminal offense, the aggrieved party has a right to
commence an entirely separate and distinct civil action for damages, and for other
relief. Such civil action shall proceed independently of any criminal prosecution (if
the latter be instituted), and may be proved by a preponderance of evidence.
The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated.
The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge unless his act or
omission constitutes a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.
Criminal Liability
Act No. 3815
Article 204. Knowingly rendering unjust judgment. - Any judge who shall knowingly render
an unjust judgment in any case submitted to him for decision, shall be punished by prision
mayor and perpetual absolute disqualification.
Article 205. Judgment rendered through negligence. - Any judge who, by reason of
inexcusable negligence or ignorance shall render a manifestly unjust judgment in any case
submitted to him for decision shall be punished by arresto mayor and temporary special
disqualification.
Article 206. Unjust interlocutory order. - Any judge who shall knowingly render an unjust
interlocutory order or decree shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum
period and suspension; but if he shall have acted by reason of inexcusable negligence or
ignorance and the interlocutory order or decree be manifestly unjust, the penalty shall be
suspension.
SANTIAGO III v ENRIQUEZ, JR
AM No. CA-09-47-J
February 13th, 2009
Carpio-Morales, J.,
FACTS:
Gerardo Santiago III filed a petition in the RTC of QC, in which the latter granted. In turn,
the People of the Philippines through the Office of the Solicitor General appealed the
decision, which was then raffled to Justice Gonzales-Sison of the the 13th Division of the
appellate court, in which the respondent was also Chairperson of. Justice Gonzales-Sison
presided over the main Decision, to which a certain Justice Veloso concurred with. After
this, the respondent expressed dissent over the dissent and thus requested to designate two
more associate justices (Justice Cruz and Justice Bersamin), which now makes a Special
Division of five. The dissenting opinion of the respondent became the majority. The
petitioner, thus, filed a Motion to Disqualify/Inhibit this decision to which the appellate
court denied.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the complaint has merit.
2. Whether or not the filing of charges against a single member of the
division of the appellate court is appropriate.
HELD:
• The complaint has no merit.
• That circumstances do not necessarily warrant the filing of an
administrative complaint against a judge, unless the Decision is tainted
with fraud, malice or dishonesty, or with deliberate intent to cause
injustice.
• The administrative complaint was filed prematurely,
considering that complainant’s motion for reconsideration of
the decision was pending.
• That the administrative complaint is not the proper
forum for the determination of whether the Decision is
erroneous -- as long as judicial recourse is stil available.
• The remedy is to elevate the assailed decision
to the higher court.
• The Court has to be shown acts or conduct of the judge
that shows means to do ill or cause harm, or has bias or
prejudice or arbitrariness.
• The failure to interpret the law or to properly appreciate the
evidence presented does not necessarily render a judge administratively
liable.
• That the filing of charges against a single member of a division of the
appellate court is inappropriate.
• The Decision was not rendered by the respondent in his
individual capacity, but was a product of the consultations and
deliberations by the Special Division of five.
• Bautista v Abdulwahid.
• The CA is a collegiate court.
Conclusions are reached by the members through consultation and render their collective
judgment after due deliberations.
Administrative Liability
A.M. NO. 01-8-10-SC; September 11, 2001
RE: PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO RULE 140 OF THE RULES OF COURT RE:
DISCIPLINE OF JUSTICES AND JUDGES
The Court resolved to APPROVE the amendment of Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court regarding the discipline of Justices and Judges, so as to read as follows:
RULE 140
DISCIPLINE OF JUDGES OF REGULAR AND SPECIAL COURTS AND JUSTICES
OF THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE SANDIGANBAYAN
SECTION 1. How instituted. - Proceedings for the discipline of judges of regular and
special courts and Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan may be
instituted motu proprio by the Supreme Court or upon a verified complaint, supported by
affidavits of person who have personal knowledge of the facts alleged therein or by
documents which may substantiate said allegations, or upon an anonymous complaint,
supported by public records of indubitable integrity. The complaint shall be in writing and
shall state clearly and concisely the acts and omissions constituting violations of standards
of conduct prescribed for Judges by law, the Rules of Court, or the Code of Judicial
Conduct.
SEC. 2. Action on the complaint. - If the complaint is sufficient in form and substance, a
copy thereof shall be served upon the respondent, and he shall be required to comment
within ten (10) days from the date of service. Otherwise, the same shall be dismissed.
SEC. 3. By whom complaint investigated. - Upon the filing of the respondent's comment,
or upon the expiration of the time for filing the same and unless other pleadings or
documents are required, the Court shall refer the matter to the Office of the Court
Administrator for evaluation, report, and recommendation or assign the case for
investigation, report, and recommendation to a retired member of the Supreme Court, if
the respondent is a Justice of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan, or to a Justice of
the Court of Appeals, if the respondent is a Judge of a Regional Trial Court or of a special
court of equivalent rank, or to a Judge of the Regional Trial Court if the respondent is a
Judge of an inferior court.
SEC. 4. Hearing. - the investigating Justice or Judge shall set a day of the hearing and send
notice thereof to both parties. At such hearing the parties may present oral and
documentary evidence. If, after due notice, the respondent fails to appear, the investigation
shall proceed ex parte.
The Investigating Justice or Judge shall terminate the investigation within ninety (90) days
from the date of its commencement or within such extension as the Supreme Court may
grant.
SEC. 5. Report. - Within thirty (30) days from the termination of the investigation, the
investigating Justice or Judge shall submit to the Supreme Court a report containing
findings of fact and recommendation. The report shall be accompanied by the record
containing the evidence and the pleadings filed by the parties. The report shall be
confidential and shall be for the exclusive use of the Court.
SEC. 6. Action. - The Court shall take such action on the report as the facts and the law
may warrant.
SEC. 7. Classification of charges. - Administrative charges are classified as serious, less
serious, or light.
SEC. 8. Serious charges. - Serious charges include:
1. Bribery, direct or indirect;
2. Dishonesty and violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Law (R.A.
No. 3019);
3. Gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct;
4. Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment or order as determined by a
competent court in an appropriate proceeding;
5. Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude;
6. Willful failure to pay a just debt;
7. Borrowing money or property from lawyers and litigants in a case pending
before the court;
8. Immorality;
9. Gross ignorance of the law or procedure;
10. Partisan political activities; and
11. Alcoholism and/or vicious habits.
SEC. 9. Less Serious Charges. - Less serious charges include:
1. Undue delay in rendering a decision or order, or in transmitting the records of a
case;
2. Frequently and unjustified absences without leave or habitual tardiness;
3. Unauthorized practice of law;
4. Violation of Supreme Court rules, directives, and circulars;
5. Receiving additional or double compensation unless specifically authorized by
law;
6. Untruthful statements in the certificate of service; and
7. Simple Misconduct.
SEC. 10. Light Charges. - Light charges include:
1. Vulgar and unbecoming conduct;
2. Gambling in public;
3. Fraternizing with lawyers and litigants with pending case/cases in his court; and
4. Undue delay in the submission of monthly reports.
SEC. 11. Sanctions. - A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following
sanctions may be imposed:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court
may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any
public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations. Provided,
however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave
credits;
2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3)
but not exceeding six (6) months; or
3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00
B. If the respondent is guilty of a less serious charge, any of the following sanctions shall be
imposed:
1. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one
(1) nor more than three (3) months; or
2. A fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.
C. If the respondent is guilty of a light charge, any of the following sanctions shall be
imposed:
1. A fine of not less than P1,000.00 but not exceeding P10,000.00 and/or
2. Censure;
3. Reprimand;
4. Admonition with warning.
SEC. 12. Confidentiality of proceedings. - Proceedings against Judges of regular and
special courts and Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan shall be private
and confidential, but a copy of the decision or resolution of the court shall be attached to
the record of the respondent in the Office of the Court Administrator.
These amendments to Rule 140 shall take effect on October 1, 2001 following their
publication in two newspapers of general circulation on or before September 15, 2001.
Discipline of Members of the Bench
Art. XI, Sec. 3, Par. 8
The Congress shall promulgate rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose
of this section.
Art. VIII, Sec. 11
The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of the lower court shall hold office during
good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years or become incapacitated to
discharge the duties of their office. The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to
discipline judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of majority of the
Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted in
thereon.
OCA v. Judge Eliza Yu
AM No. MTJ-12-1813; 22 November 2016
PER CURIAM
FACTS:
Judge Eliza B. Yu is charged with several charges. In refusing to comply with night
court duties , refusing to acknowledge the appointment of Tejero-Lopez as Clerk of Court
III (to the point where she actually threatened Tejero-Lopez) and Lagman as Clerk II, she
is charged with misconduct and insubordination. In constantly and maliciously threatening
her staff with administrative complaints and in displaying disrespectful attitude towards
other members of the judiciary (wherein she declared that she was not the co-equal judge
of Vito-Cruz, as well as issuing a show cause order against other judges), she is charged
with misconduct and oppression. In allowing OJT students access to court records and in
mishandling cases contrary to rules of procedure, she is charged with gross ignorance of the
law. She also abused a seriously-ill worker of the court, Noel Labid, denying him leave and
ordering him to carry out duties despite full knowledge of his illness. She was also charged
with conduct unbecoming of a judge by constantly sending lewd and alarming messages to
a fellow judge, San Gaspar, to the point of harassment. Yu also abused her authority by
using her official letterhead to invite San Gaspar’s brother to court for a meeting.
ISSUES:
- W/N Judge Yu is guilty of the offenses charged
- What punishment would be proper
RULING:
- INSUBORDINATION: Judge Yu’s unjustified refusal to comply with Night Court
duties made her liable for gross insubordination and misconduct.
- INSUBORDINATION: Her persistent refusal to honor the appointments of court
personnel amounted to a brazen challenge against the Court’ power and discretion to
appoint employees.
- FLAGRANT ABUSE OF AUTHORITY: Her issuance of the show-cause order
against fellow judges and court personnel show her clear abuse of court processes and
flagrant abuse of authority. In this case, her desire to retaliate was clearly shown.
- OPPRESSION: Her refusal to grant Labid’s LOA despite the latter’s compliance with
the requirements reveals her motive to retaliate against Labid for joining the administrative
complaint against her; these acts amount to grave abuse of authority and oppression.
- GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW: Judge Yu is guilty of gross ignorance when
she allowed a student to be an encoder and when she designated Mr. Santos (a first level
employee) as OIC (a second level position)
- IGNORANCE OF FUNDAMENTAL REQUIREMENTS: Judge Yu, however, is
guilty of gross ignorance when she allowed the proceedings of a case without the presence
of the public prosecutor, as well as when she allowed the change of plea by the accused
without the assistance of the counsel.
- CONDUCT UNBECOMING OF A JUDGE/ABUSE OF POWER: In (1) sending
lewd messages and in (2) using the official letterhead to summon San Gaspar’s brother, Yu
is guilty of improper conduct and abuse of power.
- Both gross misconduct and gross ignorance of the law are grounds for dismissal
from the service. Oppression and gross insubordination are grounds for suspension.
Conduct unbecoming of a judge merits either fine, censure, reprimand, or admonition with
warning. Given the extent of her offenses, Judge Yu is UNFIT and INCOMPETENT so as
to further discharge her office as a judge. She is therefore DISMISSED from service
- The charges of gross misconduct and the willful disobedience of any lawful court are
grounds for disbarment. Hence, Judge Yu’s offenses could also be grounds for her
disbarment. Disbarment seeks to safeguard the administration of justice by removing from
the Law Profession attorneys who have disregarded their Lawyer’s Oath and thereby
proved themselves unfit to continue discharging their role as officers of the court.
However, Judge Yu cannot be disbarred just yet as she as a right to due process. She must
first be afforded the opportunity to defend her professional standing as a lawyer before the
Court could disbar her. Hence, a SHOW CAUSE ORDER is issued to Yu on why she
should not be disbarred.
OCA v. HON JUDGE ELIZA YU
MTJ-12-1813 || Nov. 22, 2016
Ponente: Per Curiam
Any conduct that violated the norms of public accountability and diminishes the faith of
people in the judicial system must be condemned the court will not hesitate to remove from
the Bench any judge or Justice who has stained the integrity and dignity of the judiciary.
Hon. Judge Eliza Yu of MeTC Branch 47 was faced with several administrative
charges filed by her fellow judges and staff, accusing her of insubordination, gross ignorance
of law, refusal to perform official duties, gross misconduct amounting to violation of the Code
of Judicial Conduct, oppression, grave abuse of authority, and conduct unbecoming of a
judge. Upon the investigation of the Office of the Court Administrator and careful perusal
of evidences, the Court pronounced Hon. Eliza Yu guilty of the aforementioned cases and
accordingly dismissed her from service with forfeiture of benefits and disqualified her from
any reinstatement of appointment in any government office/government-owned
corporation. Also, by the virtue of AM.No. 02-9-02-SC that mandates the automatic
conversion of any administrative charges as a member of judiciary to disciplinary charges
as members of the bar, the Court hereby ordered Yu to show cause on why she should not
be disbarred. In her motion for reconsideration with explanation of show-
cause order, Yu repeatedly denied committing all the administrative charges which she was
held guilty by the court. However, the Court already resolved her submissions and the
evidence against her is sufficient to prove that she tainted the name of the Judiciary,
warranting her removal from office.
The Court denied her petition for lack of merit.
Insubordination
Gross ignorance of law
Refusal to perform official
duties
Gross misconduct
Oppression
· Non-compliance to A.O. No. 192011
· Refusal to honor appointments of court personnel
· Allowing OJTs and designating an OIC who did not
possess minimum qualifications for the position and approval
of court.
· Ordering the presentation of ex-parte evidence before
the OIC, who is not a member of the bar.
· Allowing criminal proceeding without the presence of
public prosecutor
· Authorizing the change of plea by the accused without
the assistance of a counsel.
· Refusing to sign official leave of absence despite
employee having complied with the requirements.
· Non-compliance to A.O. No. 192011
· Not inhibiting herself in acting on the supposedly
contumacious conduct of her fellow judges and concerned
personnel.
· Refusing to sign official leave of absence despite
employee having complied with the requirements.
· Verbal threats against Ms. Tejero-Lopez
Grave abuse of authority · Verbal threats against Ms. Tejero-Lopez
· Issuing the show-cause order against her fellow judges
Conduct unbecoming of a · Sending inappropriate messages with sexual innuendos
judicial officer to a fellow judge
· Using the official letterhead of her office in summoning
a lawyer to a conference.
MANE V JUDGE BELEN
A.M. No. RTJ-08-2119; June 30, 2008
FACTS: Petitioner Melvin Mane filed a complaint to the OCA against Respondent Judge
Mendel Arnaldo B. Belen of Branch 36, RTC of Calamba City. The complaint was issued
because during the hearing of case “Rural Bank of Cabuyao v. Samuel Malabanan” where
the petitioner was counsel for the plaintiff, the respondent resorted to “demeaning,
humiliating, and berating him” in court. The petitioner cited remarks made by Judge Belen
criticizing the petitioner for being from Manuel L. Quezon University and not graduating
from UP Law. The transcript also showed how Judge Belen made threatening and
demeaning remarks to the petitioner who was young and inexperienced. Petitioner then
withdrew his complaint on September 4, 2006 stating that the decision to file a
Misconduct
Plagiarism Charges Against Assoc. Justice Mariano Del Castillo;
A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC.
FACTS: On October 12, 2010, In Vinuya v. Romulo GR No. 162230, The Supreme Court
dismissed the petition of the Malaya Lola’s Organization to seek formal apologies for
WWII rape victims from Japan through the ICJ. The Malaya Lolas then moved to have the
decision reconsidered citing the plagiarism and gross negligence accusations against Justice
Mariano del Castillo, the one who drafted the decision. The Lola’s claimed that Del Castillo
lifted and utilized texts and sources from foreign legal articles in support of the court’s
decision against their agenda. The Lolas claim that this normalizes plagiarism in the
Philippines.
ISSUE: Did Justice Del Castillo commit plagiarism when drafting the decision for the
Vinuya v. Romulo Case?

HELD: NO. Majority of the Justices believed that the actions of Justice Del Castillo does not
merit the accusations of Plagiarism. Joyce George, author of the “Judicial Opinion Writing
Handbook” was quoted “A judge writing to resolve a dispute, whether trial or appellate, is
exempted from a change of plagiarism even if ideas, words or phrases from a law review
article…are used without giving attribution.” It was also argued that lawyers do not draft
decisions for merit but for them to settle disputed and deliver fair judgment. This gives
them no reason to purposely plagiarize the work of other people. Furthermore, it was also
brought up that potential plagiarism was a result of clerical error. Justice Del Castillo hired
a researcher who neglected to accurately site the sources used in drafting the vineyard case.
The researcher accidentally deleted the citations, showing that potentially plagiarized
sections of the decision was not done purposely.
DECISION: Court DENIES petition for motion for reconsideration
Dissenting Opinion:
Sereno J: Justice Sereno believes that there is doubt on the argument that the plagiarized
sections of the Vinuya case was done inadvertently. She points out that not being able to
cite 59 sources must have been done deliberately, not by mere negligence. The Justice ends
her dissenting opinion by reiterating that ““more work of more authors must be
appropriately acknowledged, apologies must be extended, and a more extensively corrected
Corrigendum must be issued."
J Abad: Wrote that Justice Sereno has no right to judge potential plagiarism of Del Castillo
in the Vinuya Case. He points out that the dissenting Justice also has history of plagiarism
on works that she has written as a judge, not an academian - much like Justice Del Castillo.
LAWYERS: CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR LAWYERS
Nature and Scope of the Legal Profession
Cayetano v. Monsod
GR. No. 100113; 3 September 1991
FACTS:
• Commission of Appointments designated respondent Christian Monsod
as the Chairman of the COMELEC
• Petitioner filed a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition praying that
appointment of Monsod be null and void. Cayetano contends that Monsod
doesn’t possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice
of law for at least ten years
• Monsod graduated from the U.P College of Law. He worked in the
World Bank Group as an operations officer. His work involved getting acquainted
with the laws of member- countries, negotiating loans and coordinating legal,
economic and project work of the Bank. He has worked as legal and economic
consultant in various companies in the Philippines. He also became the Secretary-
General and National Chairman of NAMFREL; these positions required
knowledge in election law. Monsod was also member of the Davide and
Constituional Commissions, and Committee on Accountability of Public Officers
ISSUE: Whether or not the experience and practice of Monsod are considered “practice of
law”
HELD: Petition is DISMISSED
• Practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. A person is
also considered practicing law when he engages in the business of advising person,
firms, associations or corporations as to their rights under the law. Monsod’s
experience as lawyer-economist and lawyer-manager among others more than
satisfy the constitutional requirement of 10 years experience in the practice of law.
PRACTICE OF LAW Rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the
application of legal principles and technique to serve the interest of another with
his consent • Not limited to the conduct of cases in court • A person is also
considered practicing law when he engages in the business of advising person,
firms, associations or corporations as to their rights under the law • It embraces
the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special
proceedings • UP Law Center: means any activity, in or out of court, which
requires the application law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience
Ulep vs. Legal Clinic
BM 553; June 17, 1993
Justice Regalado
FACTS:
Legal Clinic is charged with using advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the
law profession other than those allowed by law. According to Ulep, the advertisements
which advocate divorce and secret marriages demean the legal profession. In their answer,
Legal Clinic says that the use of such advertisements are not unwarranted because they are
not engaged in the practice of law. Rather, they are engaged in “legal support services”
through paralegals.
ISSUE:
- W/N Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law
- W/N the advertisements of Legal Clinic are warranted
RULING:
- YES. Practice of law means any activity, in and out of court, which requires the
applications of law, legal procedures, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the
practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristic of the profession. As such,
the practice is not only limited to the handling of cases, but also legal advice and the
preparation of legal instruments.
- When a person participates in a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in the
practice of law. Seeing as the practice of law covers a wide range of activities, and the fact
that Legal Clinic advocates itself as a lawyering firm, then its activities constitute practice of
law.
- It must be stressed, however, that a corporation cannot be organized for or engage
the practice of law in this country. As such, the nature of the respondent’s corporate charter
must be examined.
- The advertisements represent Legal Clinic as having attorneys and paralegals which
will necessarily have to explain to the client the intricacies of the law and advise him/her on
the proper course of action. While Legal Clinic does not handle cases at court, this does not
diminish the fact that they are engaged in the practice of law.
- Given that it engages in the practice of law, it must be bound by statutory
prohibitions that define the legal profession. This includes the use of advertisements. The
Code of Professional Responsibility states that lawyers, in making known his legal services,
must only use true, fair, honest, dignified and objective information. A lawyer cannot
advertise his talents in the same way as a merchant advertises his goods. Also, only a
publication in a recognized law list and the use of a simple professional card are permitted
modes of advertisements. At the bottomline, law is a profession and not a trade.
- Hence, the use of such advertisements by Legal Clinic as a body engaged in the
practice of law is UNWARRANTED.
Admission to Practice Law
Art. VIII, Sec. 5, Par. 5
Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
integrated bar, and legal assistance to the under-privileged. Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall
remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
In re: Cunanan
94 Phil. 534
Justice Diokno
FACTS:
The Bar Flunkers Act of 1953 was passed, aiming to remedy the effects caused by
the varying difficulties of the different examinations after 1946. While the general rule
holds that only takers who passed a general average of 75 without falling below 50 in any
subject may pass, the said Act passed students who got lower standards in the examinations
held in the years 1946-1953. The issue began when candidates who obtained averages of a
few percentage lower agitated in Congress for the passing of Senate Bill 12, which reduced
the passing average to 70 since 1946. Despite the contest raised by the Supreme Court, the
bill was passed into the assailed Act.
ISSUES:
- W/N the said act is unconstitutional
RULING:
- YES. The law is unconstitutional, hence it is invalid.
- The law has for its object to admit ot the Bar those candidates who have suffered
from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparation. As such, the law is
contrary to public interest because it qualifies candidates who confessed they had
inadequate preparation for the law profession.
- In our judicial system, the admission, suspension, disbarment, and reinstatement of
lawyers in the practice of the profession have been indisputably a judicial function. The fact
that Congress passed the said Act governing admission is an encroachment in the
Constitutional power of the Court. Each branch is supreme in that branch of sovereignty
which properly belongs to its department.
- The disputed law is not a legislation. It is a judgment revoking those promulgated by
the Court during the aforecited year affecting the bar candidates concerned. The passage of
the law is clearly a clear usurpation of judicial functions. While Congress may repeal, later,
and supplement the rules promulgated by this Court, the procedures of admission, etc still
remain vested in the SC.
- The law is UNCONSTITUTIONAL because (1) it is not within the legislative
powers of Congress to pass a law determining admission, (2) it establishes arbitrary
methods or forms that infringe methods that infringe constitutional principles, and (3)
because its prupose violate the Constitution.
Nature of the Lawyer’s Oath
LAWYER’S OATH
I___________ of ___________ do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey laws as well as the
legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any court; I will not wittingly nor willingly promote or sue any
groundless, false or unlawful suit, or give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no
man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of
my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my
clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligations without any mental
reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God.
Sebastian v. Calis
A.C 5118; September 9, 1999
Per Curiam
FACTS:
Atty. Calis promised to process all documents required by Sebastian for her trip to
the USA, for a fee of 150,000. Sebastian paid Calis a partial payment of 20,000. Afterwards,
Calis demanded an additional payment of 65,000 from Sebastian, and also advised her to
resign from her job, which Sebastian did. When Sebastian inquired about her passport,
Calis said that she will be using an assumed identity. Sebastian realized that she will be
traveling with spurious documents, but Calis assured her that he had done this several
times before. Sebastian was arrested in Singapore for traveling with spurious documents,
and was consequently detained before getting deported. Upon arrival in the Philippines,
Sebastian demanded a refund from Calis. Calis only gave her partial refunds before
allegedly transferring to an unkown residence. During the hearing that came afterwards,
Calis made no appearance.
ISSUE:
- W/N Calis is guilty of gross misconduct, and is therefore worthy to be disbarred
RULING:
- YES. Calis committed gross misconduct and contemptuous acts that merits
disbarment
- The claim that Calis recruited Sebastian for a job is unsubstantiated. In fact, the only
service of Calis to Sebastian was securing a visa to the US.
- However, respondent still engaged in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful
conduct. Calis assured Sebastian that nothing untoward will happen if she travels with
spurious documents. He also assured that she will make it to the USA, and if not, then he
will refund her. Sebastian did not make true to any and all of these promises.
- Deception and other fraudulent acts by a lawyer are disgraceful and dishonorable.
They reveal moral flaws which are unacceptable in the practice of law. Calis jeopardized the
life and liberty of Sebastian by assuring her that she will incur no liabilities whatsoever if
she travels with spurious documents.
- Furthermore, by refusing to heed the orders of the IBP that he refund Sebastian,
Calis acted contemptuously and unprofessionally. By his unethical, unscrupulous, and
unsconable conduct towards Sebastian, Calis is therefore DISBARRED.
Qualifications
Cojuangco, Jr. vs Palma
AC 2474; Sep. 15, 2004
Per Curiam
FACTS:
Cojuangco hired Palma as his personal counsel. Palma frequented Cojuangco’s
house, and soon developed an illicit affair with Cojuangco’s daughter, Lisa. Without
Cojuangco’s knowledge, Palma married Lisa in Hong Kong, despite the fact that Palma is
married and has children. Palma allegedly represented himself as a bachelor in order to
make the marriage possible. Cojuangco sought to nullify the marriage, and was successful
in doing so. He then filed the present petition before the Court seeking the disbarment of
Palma
ISSUES:
- W/N Palma is worthy of being disbarred
RULING:
- The law profession does not prescribe a dichotomy of standards among its members.
There is no distinction as to whether the transgression is committed in the lawyer’s
professional capacity or in his private life. After all, any questionable act a lawyer does in
his private life may tarnish his professional standing. It must also be stressed that
professional competency is not enough. A lawyer must also be of good moral character.
- The fact of the matter is that Palma married Lisa while he was engaged in a valid
marriage. Furthermore, his marriage to Lisa was done without her father’s knowledge. As
such, he made a mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution demanding respect and
dignity.
- Palma’s immorality, therefore, is substantiated by (1) his abandonment of his lawful
wife and children, (2) his luring of an innocent young woman into marriage, and (3) his
misrepresentation of himself as a bachelor so he could marry in a foreign land.
- The circumstances here speak of a clear case of betrayal of trust and abuse of
confidence. This is contrary to the rule that lawyers “shall not engage in unlawful, immoral,
dishonest, or deceitful conduct. By committing grossly immoral conduct and by violating
his oath as a lawyer, Palma is hereby DISBARRED.
The Lawyer and Society
Castaneda vs. Ago
GR 28546; July 30, 1976
Justice Castro
FACTS:
Castaneda filed a replevin suit against Ago in order to recover certain machineries.
Ago failed to comply, and his appeal to the SC was denied. As such, Ago’s house was
auctioned off by the Sheriff, in which Castaneda was the highest bidder. Ago sought to stop
the auction but the appeal was dismissed. Ago’s three petitions for preliminary injunction
restraining the sheriff were all denied. Years later, Ago filed subsequent complaints arguing
that the replevin was against him and so the sheriff could not auction his wife’s half-share
of the property. At one instance the QC court countermanded the Manila Court, but this
issue was finally decided with the lifting of the restraining order which the QC Court
issued. The CA finally granted a prohibition with preliminary injunction, exempting
Lourdes Ago’s share from being auctioned off.
ISSUE:
- W/N the CA decision exempting Ago’s share from the suit is valid? N
RULING:
- It is much too late in the day to raise the issue that Ago’s wife’s share is exempt.
Looking at the facts of the case, it took years for Ago to raise this issue. Hence, this issue is
barred by laches, or failure or neglect to do what could have been done earlier.
- The CA decision is infirm. Exactly which part of the Ago’s property belongs to
Lourdes is impossible to determine, especially since the Ago spouses live in the same house.
Pastor could therefore be ousted, but Lourdes cannot.
- Furthermore, the Agos and their lawyer have misused legal remedies and prostituted
judicial process to thwart the satisfaction of judgment. This is clear from the fact that for 14
years, the respondents and counsel attempted to resist the execution of the judgment by
using tactics filed in one court and another (5 times in the SC alone). As such, the Agos and
their lawyer used the courts for purposes other than to seek justice. This action caused
harm not only to the Court, but also to Castaneda as rightful winner of the auction and
hence owner of the disputed property.
- As such, the Ago’s lawyer, Atty Luison, became an instigator of controversy and
conflict instead of a mediator of concord. It is the duty of a counsel to inform his client if he
finds their cause defenseless, thus advising acquiescence rather than a traversal of the
incontrovertible.
- Hence, the CA decision is SET ASIDE. Furthermore, the treble costs against the
spouses Ago shall be paid by their lawyer, Atty. Luison
The Lawyer and the Legal Profession
In re Atty Marcial Edillon
AM 1928; Aug. 3, 1978
Chief Justice Castro
FACTS:
The IBP recommended that Edillon’s name be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys
as the latter stubbornly refused to pay membership dues. For his part, Edrillon argues that
the mandatory payment of his dues to the IBP is unconstitutional insofar as it invades his
constitutional rights to liberty and property.
ISSUES:
- W/N the membership and the payment of membership dues to the IBP is valid
RULING:
- All lawyers are required to be members of the IBP. As such, they are subject to all the
rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the payment of a reasonable
annual fee. The Bar also has the authority to recommend disbarment or suspension of any
offending member.
- All legislation directing the integration of the Bar is substantiated as a valid exercise
of police power. A lawyer has substantial duties not only to his clients, but to his brethren
in the profession as well.
- The purpose of the Bar is to regulate the important profession of law, which is of
paramount importance to the welfare of the State. The State, in order to promote general
welfare, may regulate personal liberty, property, and occupations, because the public
welfare is the supreme law. All lawyers, therefore, must subject themselves to the Bar as a
proper authority for the common good.
- To compel a lawyer to be a member of IBP is not violative of his constitutional
freedom to associate. Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group. All it
does is provide an official and well-defined cohesive group. A lawyer may freely refuse to
attend IBP meetings or to vote in its election. The only mandatory duty of a lawyer to the
IBP is the payment of annual dues.
- The fee is also constitutional, as a means toward defraying the expenses of the legal
profession. It is but a regulatory measure.
- All matters of admission, suspension, disbarment, and reinstatement are judicial
functions. Hence, it is within the powers of the SC to disbar insubordinate attorneys.
Because of his stubborn refusal to adhere to a valid and constitutional requirement, Atty
Edillon is hereby DISBARRED.
The Lawyer and the Courts
In Re: Letter of the UP Faculty entitled “Restoring Integrity”…,
AN 10-10-4-SC; Mar. 8, 2011
Justice Leonardo de Castro
FACTS:
In response to the alleged plagiarism committed by Justice del Castillo in penning
the Vinuya decision, the UP College of Law issued a statement entitled “Restoring
Integrity”. The said statement labeled the alleged plagiarism as unacceptable and unethical,
and thus does violence to the SC as the ultimate dispenser of justice. It also called for the
resignation of Justice del Castillo. Copies of the statement were posted in the College’s
bulletin board and website. A “dummy “copy, signed by Dean Leonen, was also sent to the
SC. Names of several college professors were also attached to the copy. While lacking actual
signatures, the copy states “SGD.” The Court, due to the language employed by the
statement, labeled it as a “harmful and irresponsible” attack, and issued a show-cause order
on why the professors who signed the statement should not be disciplined for violation of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. In their defense, the professors cited noble
intentions with regard to a public issue, freedom of expression, and academic freedom.
ISSUES:
- W/N the professors who signed the statement violated the proper decorum with
regard to addressing the court
RULING:
- While the right to criticize the judiciary exists, healthy criticism only goes so far.
When a lawyer speaks their mind, they must ever be mindful of the ethical standards of
their profession. In their dealings, a lawyer owes candor, fairness, and good faith to the
court.
- The Show-cause order does not deny the professors of their freedom of expression.
The SC does not seek to silence the dissenting views on the matter. The professors crossed
the line, however, when they treated the allegations of plagiarism against Justice del Castillo
to be true.
- By employing language that was harsh and uncalled-for, the statement undermines
the SC’s honesty, integrity, and competence. As such, the issuance of the statement runs
contrary to the professor’s obligations as lawyers to be the first to uphold the dignity and
authority of the SC. The right to criticize the Court must be balanced against the equally
primordial concern that the independence of the Judiciary be protected from undue
influence or interference.
- The right to criticize, which is guaranteed by the freedom of speech, must be
exercised responsibly for every right carries with it a corresponding obligation. As such,
freedom is always freedom with responsibility.
- It is possible that one extend deference and candor to the Court without changing
one’s stance, as what Prof. Vasquez did. Vasquez admitted that he might have been remiss
in correctly assessing the effects of such language, and that attacking the SC’s integrity was
the farthest thing on his mind when he signed the statement. All of this he did without
changing his stance.
- All in all, the SC finds that there was indeed a lack of observance of fidelity and due
respect to the Court, especially since the professors know that the merits to the VInuya
decision and the alleged plagiarism case are still being decided.
The Lawyer and the Client
-Attorney Client Relationship
Burbe vs Magulta
AC 5713; June 10, 2002
Justice Panganiban
FACTS:
Dominador Burbe paid Atty. Magulta 25,000 to prepare a few legal documents.
Despite Atty. Magulta’s claim that the documents have already been prepared and filed,
Burbe felt that there was no progress on his case. After some time, Burbe confirmed with
the Clerk of Court that Atty. Magulta did not file any document on Burbe’s behalf. Burbe
confronted Magulta, who finally admitted that he spent Burbe’s money on other matters.
Magulta offered to refund Burbe a sum of 20,000. When Burbe filed a complaint for
disbarment against Magulta, the latter answered that he did services for Burbe which had
not been compensated yet. The SC now hears the disbarment case against Magulta.
ISSUES:
- W/N Atty. Magulta should be disbarred
RULING:
- After agreeing to take up the cause of a client, a lawyer owes fidelity to both the cause
and the client, even if the client never paid any fee for the attorney-client relationship.
Thus, Magulta’s argument that no lawyer-client relationship existed between him and
Burbe because Burbe never paid him is invalid. Such a relationship was established the
moment Burbe asked Magulta for legal advice.
- If a person consults a lawyer with a view to obtain professional advice/assistance, and
the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces with the consultation, then a lawyer-client
relationship is established.
- A lawyer may lien upon the client’s documents and funds and retain them until the
lawful fees have been paid. Yet, this still requires them to properly account for the money
they received.
- Law is a noble calling. Lawyers must subordinate their personal interests to the duty
to public service and to the administration of justice.
- Magulta fell short of the standard when he converted his client’s filing fees into his
legal fees, and thus failed to file the complaint promptly. Yet, his offense is not worthy of
disbarment, for only a serious misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character
of the lawyer as an officer of the Court may warrant disbarment. Magulta is therefore
SUSPENDED.
-Conflict of Interest
Pacana Jr vs Pascual-Lopez
AC 8243; July 24, 2009
Per Curiam
FACTS:
Atty. Pascual-Lopez tricked her client Pacana into thinking that she will help him
settle matters after his company’s failed investment schemes. Pascual-Lopez advised Pacana
to flee to the US as he is facing criminal charges in the Philippines, as well as to give her
money and documents which will help clear his name. When Pacana returned to the US,
Pascual-Lopez soon evaded him. Because of his frustration with Pascual-Lopez, he wrote
her a letter asking for a full accounting of all the money, documents, and properties given
to the letter. Pascual-Lopez replied, after an inadequate accounting, that she in fact turned
over Pacana’s assets to her clients who had money claims against Pacana’s company. In
exchange for this, she was able to clear Pacana from any liability. Unsatisfied, Pacana filed a
disbarment complaint to the IBP. In her defense, Pascual-Lopez denied being Pacana’s
lawyer as she is merely helping him as a friend and co-member of a religious organization.
Also, Pascual-Lopez cannot be disbarred as she voluntarily terminated her IBP
membership The IBP found that a lawyer-client relationship was established between
respondent and complainant, and that Pascual-Lopez violated her duty to be fair, loyal, and
candid. The SC now reviews the IBP’s recommendation.
ISSUES:
- W/N Pascual-Lopez is apt to be disbarred
RULING:
- The prohibition against conflict of interests is founded on the principles of public
policy, good taste, and especially necessity. In taking up his client’s case, the lawyer learns
all the facts related to it. Such knowledge must be treated with utmost care. A lawyer must
not take advantage of his client, given that his client trusted him with handling his legal
concerns. It behooves lawyers not to engage in treachery and double-dealing, for only then
would clients trust their secrets to their lawyers.
- There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or
more opposing parties. If a lawyer argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by
him when he argues for another client.
- Pascual-Lopez established a professional relationship with Pacana through her act of
constantly communicating with him, especially when she said she was his “friend and
lawyer”. The fact that no written contract was signed does not weaken the case. To establish
a professional relationship, it is enough that the advice of the attorney is sought and
received in a manner pertinent to the legal profession.
- Pascual-Lopez took advantage of Pacana when she tricked him into entrusting his
legal concerns with him, while at the same time dealing for the Multitel investors’ interests.
- Pascual-Lopez can still be disbarred even if she terminated her IBP membership,
because a proper termination requires that one prove that the withdrawal of membership is
not a ploy to further prejudice the public or escape liability. Given her offense of of conflict
of interest, Pascual-Lopez is hereby DISBARRED.
-Attorney Client Privilege
Regala vs Sandiganbayan
GR 108113; September 20, 1996
Justice Kapunan
FACTS:
A complaint was instituted against Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. for the recovery of
alleged ill-gotten wealth which includes shares in certain corporations. Raul Roco admitted
that ACCRA Law (which Regala et. al are members of) assisted in the organization and
acquisition of these corporations. Roco was excluded from the complaint because he said
that he is willing to reveal the identity of the principals whom he acted as stockholder for.
The other members of ACCRA refused to reveal the identity of their clients pursuant to
what the PCGG orders, and hence were not excluded from the complaint. Regala et. al.
contended that they are prohibited from revealing the identity of their principals, since they
as lawyers must uphold the confidentiality of information acquired during lawyer-client
relationships. Hence, they said that the Sandiganbayan erred by not excluding them from
the respondents in the complaint.
ISSUES:
- W/N the withholding of the name of the client is granted under the attorney-client
privilege
RULING:
- YES. ACCRA was impleaded as co-defendants because PCGG wants to force them to
admit that Cojuangco, Jr. is their client. This is clear from the fact that Roco was excluded
because he undertook to name his client.
- The lawyer-client relationship is bound by ethical rules, conduct, and duties. Among
those is the fiduciary duty to his client which is of a very delicate, exacting, and confidential
character. Section 383 from the old Code of Civil Procedure states that an attorney cannot
reveal any communication between him and his client without the latter’s consent.
- Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that revealing the
client’s name would implicate that client in the very activity for which he sought the
lawyer’s advice (US vs Hodge and Zweig). When disclosure would open the client to civil
liability, his identity is privileged (Neugass vs Terminal Cab Corporation). In sum,
information relating to the identity of a client may fall within the ambit of privilege when
the client’s name itself has an independent significance such that disclosure would reveal
client confidences.
- In the case at bar, disclosure of the client’s name would establish the client’s
connection with the very fact in issue of the case. ACCRA has a valid fear that identifying
their client would implicate them in the very activity for which legal advice had been
sought.
- An exception to the rule exists where a client takes on the services of an attorney for
illicit purposes. A client can, however, consult with his attorney if he thinks he might have
committed something illegal. In the latter case, whether or not the act for which the client
sought advice is illegal, his name cannot be disclosed if this disclosure might give evidence
to the prosecution.
- The PCGG has alternative sources of information that it could use which do not - It is true that due to the contract, the lawyers are entitled to contingent fees. Yet, a
depend on utilizing the opponent counsel as a convenient and readily-available source of lawyer should only charge reasonable fees, subject to the time spent, effort extended, etc.
information. According to Sction 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, the Court may modify the lawyer’s
- Hence, the Sandiganbayan’s resolution is SET ASIDE, and ACCRA is EXCLUDED. fees even if it is set in a valid contract if the Court found it unconscionable or unreasonable.
- The lawyers were paid an amount equal to 44% of the just compensation fees that the
Zuazarreguis received from the NHA. Considering that there was no full blown hearing on
-Attorney’s Fees the expropriation case, this amount is unconscionable and excessive. Hence, it must be
reduced.
Roxas vs. De Zuzuarregui, Jr. - Therefore, the Zuzuarreguis should receive P17 per sqm, of 87.8% of P19.5. The
GR. No. 105938; 20 September 1996 remaining 12.2% should go to the lawyers. The same should apply to the yield, with the
Justice Chico-Nazario Zuzuarreguis getting 87.18% of the P19.58 million, while the lawyers get the rest. In sum,
the amount of P17.07 must be returned by the lawyers to the Zuzuarreguis, taking this
FACTS: amount form the yield of P19.58 million they appropriated from themselves.
Facing an expropriation case filed by the NHA, the Zuzuarreguis entered into an - There was no showing of bad faith, for contingent fees are not per se prohibited,
agreement with lawyers Roxas and Pastor. The Zuzuarreguis agreed that they are willing to hence no moral damages. Furthermore, the charge of conspiracy is unsubstantiated.
accept a just compensation of seventeen pesos per square meter for their 179 has. property,
for a total of P30.4 million. In return, the lawyers would get contingent fees all amounts in
excess of the P17 per square meter. The NHA issued a statement laying down the price of
the Zuzuarregui property to P19.50 per square meter. This would bring the total price of
the property to around P34.9 million. The total amount released to the lawyers in behalf of
the Zuzuarreguis was P54.5 million. The difference between the total price and the amount
released by the NHA was due to the yield on bonds. The lawyers then turned over around
P30.5 million to the Zuazarreguis. The Zuazarreguis, through a new counsel, demanded
that the yield on bonds be delivered to them. This appeal was initially denied. A favorable
decision to the Zuazarreguis, however, was granted by the CA upon appeal, stating that the
amount of roughly P4.47 million (or computed to P2.5 per square meter) is commensurate
to the services of the lawyers. Thus, Roxas and Pastor filed a review for certiorari to this
court assailing the CA decision. They argued that the Zuazarreguis accepted the price of 17
per square meter (total of 30.44 million) when in fact they received 30.5 million.

ISSUES:
- W/N the agreement between the Zuazarreguis and the lawyers fixing the exact
amount that goes to the former stand as law between parties.

RULING:
- For a contract to be valid, there must be (1) consent of the contracting parties, (2)
object certain which is the subject matter, and (3) cause of obligation. All these were
present in the letter-agreement. Hence, the contract is valid. There is no evidence to show
that the enty into the contract was forced. Two objects-certain were present in the contract
(money to the Zuazaregguis at 17 per sqm., to the lawyers at any amount in excess of 17).
The cause is the legal service. Obligations arising from contracts have the force of law
between contracting parties and should be complied with in good faith.