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Prof. Joselito Guianan Chan's The Labor Code of the Philippines, Annotated, Labor Relations, Volume II
of a 3-Volume Series 2017 Edition, 5th Revised Edition,

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UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE

PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE

November-2015 Jurisprudence

G.R. No. 192955, November 09, 2015 - EDILBERTO P. ETOM, JR., Petitioner, v. AROMA LODGING HOUSE
THROUGH EDUARDO G. LEM, PROPRIETOR AND GENERAL MANAGER, Respondent.

G.R. No. 197458, November 11, 2015 - NICANOR PINLAC Y RESOLME, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

G.R. No. 197802, November 11, 2015 - ZUNECA PHARMACEUTICAL, AKRAM ARAIN AND/OR VENUS
ARAIN, M.D. DBA ZUNECA PHARMACEUTICAL, Petitioners, v. NATRAPHARM, INC., Respondent.
G.R. No. 179121, November 09, 2015 - MARGARITA M. BENEDICTO-MUÑOZ, Petitioner, v. MARIA
ANGELES CACHO-OLIVARES, EDGARDO P. OLIVARES, PETER C. OLIVARES, CARMELA Q. OLIVARES,
MICHAEL C. OLIVARES, ALEXANDRA B. OLIVARES, AND MELISSA C. OLIVARES, Respondents.; G.R. NO.
179128 - ABACUS SECURITIES CORPORATION AND JOEL CHUA CHIU, Petitioners, v. MARIA ANGELES
CACHO-OLIVARES, PETER C. OLIVARES, CARMELA Q. OLIVARES, MICHAEL Q. OLIVARES, ALEXANDRA B.
OLIVARES, [and] MELISSA C. OLIVARES, Respondents.; G.R. NO. 179129 SAPPHIRE SECURITIES, INC.,
Petitioner, v. MARIA ANGELES CACHO-OLIVARES, EDGARDO P. OLIVARES, PETER C. OLIVARES, CARMELA
Q. OLIVARES, MICHAEL C. OLIVARES, ALEXANDRA B. OLIVARES, MELISSA C. OLIVARES, AND THE HON.
COURT OF APPEALS, NINTH DIVISION, Respondents.

G.R. Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015 - CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES, IN HER CAPACITY AS THE
OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS (SIXTH DIVISION) AND JEJOMAR ERWIN S. BINAY, JR.,
Respondents.

A.M. No. P-15-3391, November 16, 2015 - RE: INCIDENT REPORT RELATIVE TO A CRIMINAL CASE FILED
AGAINST ROSEMARIE U. GARDUCE, CLERK III, OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF COURT (OCC), REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT (RTC), PARANAQUE CITY

G.R. No. 207041, November 09, 2015 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE OFFICE OF
THE CITY PROSECUTOR, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ROXAS CITY, Petitioner, v. JESUS A. ARROJADO,
Respondent.

G.R. No. 176908, November 11, 2015 - PURISIMO M. CABAOBAS, EXUPERIO C. MOLINA, GILBERTO V.
OPINION, VICENTE R. LAURON, RAMON M. DE PAZ, JR., ZACARIAS E. CARBO, JULITO G. ABARRACOSO,
DOMINGO B. GLORIA, AND FRANCISCO P. CUMPIO, Petitioners, v. PEPSI-COLA PRODUCTS, PHILIPPINES,
INC., Respondents.

G.R. No. 196083, November 11, 2015 - MILAGROS C. REYES, Petitioner, v. FELIX P. ASUNCION,
Respondent.

A.C. No. 10671, November 25, 2015 - JOSEPH C. CHUA, Complainant, v. ATTY. ARTURO M. DE CASTRO,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 199601, November 23, 2015 - PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK (NOW BDO
UNIBANK, INC., Petitioner, v. JOSEPHINE D. GOMEZ, Respondent.

G.R. No. 173864, November 23, 2015 - BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS, Petitioner, v. AGUSTIN LIBO-ON,
Respondent.

A.C. No. 10737, November 09, 2015 - ROLANDO TOLENTINO, Complainant, v. ATTY. RODIL L. MILLADO
AND ATTY. FRANCISCO B. SIBAYAN, Respondents.

G.R. No. 193158, November 11, 2015 - PHILIPPINE HEALTH INSURANCE CORPORATION, Petitioner, v.
OUR LADY OF LOURDES HOSPITAL, Respondent.

G.R. No. 214502, November 25, 2015 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FRANCO
DARMO DE GUZMAN Y YANZON, A.K.A. DARMO YAZON Y CORTEZ, A.K.A. FRANCO DE GUZMAN Y
CORTEZ, Accused-Appellant.

G.R. No. 202611, November 23, 2015 - ABNER MANGUBAT, Petitioner, v. BELEN MORGA-SEVA,
Respondent.

A.C. No. 7353, November 16, 2015 - NELSON P. VALDEZ, Petitioner, v. ATTY. ANTOLIN ALLYSON DABON,
JR., Respondent.

G.R. No. 197925, November 09, 2015 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. EDWIN
DALAWIS Y HIDALGO, Accused-Appellant.

G.R. No. 213330, November 16, 2015 - ALELI C. ALMADOVAR, GENERAL MANAGER ISAWAD, ISABELA
CITY, BASILAN PROVINCE, Petitioner, v. CHAIRPERSON MA. GRACIA M. PULIDO-TAN, COMMISSION ON
AUDIT, Respondent.
G.R. No. 202859, November 11, 2015 - NEW FILIPINO MARITIME AGENCIES, INC., TAIYO NIPPON KISEN
CO., LTD., AND ANGELINA T, RIVERA, Petitioners, v. VINCENT H. D ATAYAN -HEIR OF SIMON VINCENT H.
DATAYAN III, Respondent.

A.M. No. MTJ-10-1760, November 16, 2015 - OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Petitioner, v.
RETIRED JUDGE FILEMON A. TANDINCO, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT IN CITIES (MTCC), CALBAYOG CITY,
SAMAR AND RONALDO C. DIONEDA, CLERK OF COURT OF THE MTCC, CALBAYOG CITY, SAMAR,
Respondent.

G.R. No. 195654, November 25, 2015 - REYNALDO INUTAN, HELEN CARTE, NOEL AYSON, IVY CABARLE,
NOELJAMILI, MARITES HULAR, ROLITOAZUCENA, RAYMUNDO TUNOG, ROGER BERNAL, AGUSTEV ESTRE,
MARILOU SAGUN, AND ENRIQUE LEDESMA, JR., Petitioners, v. NAPAR CONTRACTING & ALLIED
SERVICES, NORMAN LACSAMANA, JONAS INTERNATIONAL, INC., AND PHILIP YOUNG, Respondent.

G.R. No. 179257, November 23, 2015 - UNITED ALLOY PHILIPPINES CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. UNITED
COCONUT PLANTERS BANK [UCPB] AND/OR PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION [PDIC],
JAKOB VAN DER SLUIS AND ROBERT T.CHUA, Respondent.

G.R. No. 187464, November 25, 2015 - CABIB ALONTO TANOG, Petitioner, v. HON. RASAD G.
BALINDONG, Acting Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, 12th Judicial Region, MARAWI CITY,
AND GAPO SIDIC, Respondent.

G.R. No. 205760, November 09, 2015 - FRANCISCO T. INOCENCIO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

G.R. No. 199087, November 11, 2015 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JERRY
PUNZALAN AND PATRICIA PUNZALAN, Accused-Appellants.

G.R. No. 203883, November 10, 2015 - HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION OF TALAYAN VILLAGE INC.,
Petitioner, v. J.M. TUASON & CO., INC., TALAYAN HOLDINGS, INC., QUEZON CITY MAYOR AND
EQUITABLE BANKING CORPORATION (NOW BANCO DE ORO BANKING CORPORATION), Respondents.;
G.R. NO. 203930 - J.M. TUASON & CO., AND TALAYAN HOLDINGS, INC., Petitioner, v. HOMEOWNERS
ASSOCIATION OF TALAYAN VILLAGE, INC. AND QUEZON CITY MAYOR, Respondent.
G.R. No. 217456, November 24, 2015 - MARILOU S. LAUDE AND MESEHILDA S. LAUDE, Petitioners, v.
HON. ROLINE M. GINEZ-JABALDE, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 74, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF THE CITY
OF OLONGAPO; HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., EXECUTIVE SECRETARY; HON. ALBERT F. DEL ROSARIO,
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS; HON. GEN. GREGORIO PIO P. CATAPANG, CHIEF
OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; HON. EMILIE FE DELOS SANTOS, CHIEF CITY
PROSECUTOR OF OLONGAPO CITY; AND L/CPL JOSEPH SCOTT PEMBERTON, Respondent.

G.R. No. 202664, November 20, 2015 - MANUEL LUIS C. GONZALES AND FRANCIS MARTIN D. GONZALES,
Petitioners, v. GJH LAND, INC. (FORMERLY KNOWN AS S.J. LAND, INC.), CHANG HWAN JANG A.K.A.
STEVE JANG, SANG RAK KIM, MARIECHU N. YAP, AND ATTY. ROBERTO P. MALLARI II, Respondent.

G.R. No. 193821, November 23, 2015 - PHIL-AIR CONDITIONING CENTER, Petitioner, v. RCJ LINES AND
ROLANDO ABADILLA, JR., Respondent.

A.C. No. 8507, November 10, 2015 - ELENA BIETE LEONES VDA. DE MILLER, Complainant, v. ATTY.
ROLANDO B. MIRANDA, Respondent.

G.R. No. 211056, November 10, 2015 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BIENVENIDO
REMEDIOS y SARAMOSING, Accused-Appellant.

G.R. No. 205915, November 10, 2015 - ASSET POOL A (SPV-AMC), INC., Petitioner, v. CLARK
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent. - JUDGMENT [BASED ON COMPROMISE AGREEMENT]

G.R. No. 203087, November 23, 2015 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. EDGARDO
ZABALA y BALADA AND ROMEO ALBIUS JR. y BAUTISTA, Accused-Appellants.

G.R. No. 201830, November 10, 2015 - OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, REPRESENTED BY HON. CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES, IN HER CAPACITY AS TANODBAYAN, AND HON. GERARD A. MOSQUERA, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR LUZON, Petitioners, v. ROGER F. BORJA, Respondent.; G.R. NO.
201882 - LERMA S. PRUDENTE AND DAMASO T. AMBRAY, Petitioners, v. ROGER F. BORJA, Respondent.
G.R. No. 188372, November 25, 2015 - BEAMS PHILIPPINE EXPORT CORPORATION, Petitioner, v.
MARIANITA CASTILLO AND NIDA QUIRANTE, Respondents.

G.R. No. 195194, November 25, 2015 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. KAMAD
AKMAD Y ULIMPAIN @ "MHADS" AND BAINHOR AKMAD Y ULIMPAIN @ "BHADS,", Accused-Appellants.

G.R. No. 188118, November 23, 2015 - FEDERAL PHOENIX ASSURANCE CO., LTD., Petitioner, v. FORTUNE
SEA CARRIER, INC., Respondent.

G.R. No. 207105, November 10, 2015 - ARSENIO A. AGUSTIN, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
AND SALVADOR S. PILLOS, Respondent.

G.R. No. 210616, November 25, 2015 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. EDDIE SALIBAD
Y DILO, Accused-Appellant.

G.R. No. 174115, November 09, 2015 - PUNONGBAYAN AND ARAULLO (P&A), BENJAMIN R.
PUNONGBAYAN., JOSE G. ARAULLO, GREGORIO S. NAVARRO, ALFREDO V. DAMIAN AND JESSIE C.
CARPIO, Petitioners, v. ROBERTO PONCE LEPON, Respondent.

G.R. No. 189229, November 23, 2015 - REYNALDO NOBLADO, JIMMY ARAGON, ARTURO MALAYO,
MARCIANO VICTORIA, ELINO DALANON, JOSE ESTRIL, DOMINGO MALUPENG, ALFREDIE RAYTA,
ROMULO RECOMES, ADRIAN VERCELES, RUEL MAD RON A, RUBEN MIRAFUENTES, ARNULFO MALAYO,
JAIME REMIAS, JELMER BEROLLA, EDIL CASTILLO, FELICIDAD ROSIMA, MITCHEL VICTORIA, DANIEL
MALUPENG, ZOSIMO RANAS, ROSIETA RAYTA, RAFAEL TUMIMBANG, FLORENCIO VICTORIA, ERNESTO
VICTORIA, CERIA ORTIZ, RAUL ADRA, AND VICENTE CUACHIN, SUBSTITUTED BY HIS LEGAL HEIRS,
NAMELY: LILIA LORENO CUACHIN, NILO L. CUACHIN, LEONARDO L. CUACHIN, JUDITH L. CUACHIN, VILMA
CUACHIN LLANZANA, ELVIE CUACHIN MANTES, CRISTINA CUACHIN SARCIA, LILIBETH CUACHIN BELORIA,
AIDA CUACHIN MIRANDILLA, JULIET CUACHIN AWA, Petitioners, v. PRTNCESITA K. ALFONSO,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 208842, November 10, 2015 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. REYNALDO
SIMBULAN ARCEO, Accused-Appellant.

G.R. No. 162032, November 25, 2015 - RURAL BANK OF MALASIQUI, INC., Petitioner, v. ROMEO M.
CERALDE AND EDUARDO M. CERALDE, JR., Respondent.

G.R. No. 175378, November 11, 2015 - MULTI-INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS DATA SYSTEM, INC.,
Petitioner, v. RUEL MARTINEZ, Respondent.

A.M. No. P-11-2992 (Formerly A.M. No. 11-8-156-RTC), November 09, 2015 - OFFICE OF THE COURT
ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant, v. ROGER D. COREA, SHERIFF IV, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 39,
POLOMOLOK, SOUTH COTOBATO, Respondent.

G.R. No. 215471, November 23, 2015 - MARLOW NAVIGATION PHILIPPINES INC., MARLOW NAVIGATION
CO. LTD./ CYPRUS, LIGAYA C. DELA CRUZ AND ANTONIO GALVEZ, JR., Petitioners, v. BRAULIO A. OSIAS,
Respondent.

G.R. No. 210603, November 25, 2015 - EDITHA B. SAGUIN AND LANI D. GRADO, Petitioners, v. PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

G.R. No. 209284, November 10, 2015 - RENEE B. TANCHULING, AND THE HEIRS OF VICENTE N. Y.
TANCHULING, NAMELY REBECCA TANCHULING-TAN, RITA TANCHULING-MAPA, ROSEMARIE
TANCHULING-SALINAS, AND VINCENT RAYMOND B. TANCHULING, Petitioners, v. SOTERO C. CANTELA,
Respondent.

G.R. No. 206593, November 10, 2015 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RAMONITO B.
ASIGNAR, Accused-Appellant.

G.R. No. 213679, November 25, 2015 - JAY H. LICAYAN, Petitioner, v. SEACREST MARITIME
MANAGEMENT, INC., CLIPPER FLEET MANAGEMENT, A/S AND/OR REDENTOR ANAYA, Respondent.
G.R. No. 192629, November 25, 2015 - FILINVEST LAND, INC., Petitioner, v. EDUARDO R. ADIA, LITO M.
ADIGUE, CANDIDO M. AMPARO, MARINO S. AMPARO, RODOLFO S. AMPARO, FLORDELIZA L. ARIAS,
BALBINO M. ATIENZA, PEDRO M. ATIENZA, DALMACIO C. AVANILLA, PASTOR M. AVANILLA, VENACIO P.
BAUTISTA, RODOLFO S. BERGADO, ENRIQUE R. BRABANTE, EMMA D. BUBAN, JUANITO A. CANDARE,
ROMEO O. CANDARE, ANTONIO M. CATAPANG, EDUARDO A. CATAPANG, GRACIANO C. CATAPANG,
HERMINIO V. CATAPANG, JUANA P. CATAPANG, REYNALDO P. CATAPANG, ROMEO A. CATAPANG,
RODOLFO A. CATAPANG, VICTORIANO A. CATAPANG, JUAN D. CENTOS, FERNANDO B. CERNETCHEZ,
EDUARDO C. CREENCIA, ARNEL N. M. CREMA, REYNALDO B. CRISTAL, MOISES CUBCUBIN, DELSO
POBLETO, SALVADOR M. DE LEON, MELQUIADES P. DESCALSO, GREGORIO P. DINO, ROBERTO L.
DOMINO, CELSO R. ESCALLAR, ARMAND P. ESCUADRO, ELISA C. FELICIANO, PASTOR C. FERRER, ERLINDO
M. FORMARAN, LEONARDO D. GARINO, RAFAEL R. GRANADO, ALMARIO IBANEZ, CASIMIRO P. IBANEZ,
CEFERINO P. IBANEZ, MIGUEL V. IBANEZ, MONTANO V. IBANEZ, CESAR N. JECIEL, ALFREDO B. LAURENTE,
EFIGENIA B. LAURENTE, CELSO C. MEDINA, EDUARDO A. PANGANIBAN, ROMEO C. PASCUA, DANILO L.
PAULMINO, LAURO A. PEGA, LEONARDO M. PEREZ, FELIPE V. PETATE, LEONARDO V. PETATE,
ESTANISLAO PORTO, MAXIMO D. PORTO, GREGORIO L. REYES, JOSE L. REYES, LEONARDO M.
SALINGYAGA, DEMETRIO A. SALONGA, MANOLITO G. SORILLA, HERMOGENES L. TORRES, JUANITO M.
TORRES, MARIANO B. TAGLE, MARIO D. TAGLE, AND SANCHO V. VILLA, Respondents.

G.R. No. 185058, November 09, 2015 - JOVITA S. MANALO, Petitioner, v. ATENEO DE NAGA UNIVERSITY,
FR. JOEL TABORA AND MR. EDWIN BERNAL, Respondent.

G.R. No. 217380, November 23, 2015 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. EDUARDO
CUESTA Y ASTORGA A.K.A BOYET CUBILLA Y QUINTANA, Accused-Appellant.

G.R. No. 189509, November 23, 2015 - METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY, Petitioner, v. G & P
BUILDERS, INCORPORATED, SPOUSES ELPIDIO AND ROSE VIOLET PARAS, SPOUSES JESUS AND MA.
CONSUELO PARAS AND VICTORIA PARAS, Respondents.

G.R. No. 208844, November 10, 2015 - F & S VELASCO COMPANY, INC., IRWIN J. SEVA, ROSINA B.
VELASCO-SCRIBNER, MERCEDEZ SUNICO, AND JOSE SATURNINO O. VELASCO, Petitioners, v. DR.
ROMMEL L. MADRID, PETER PAUL L. DANAO, MANUEL L. ARIMADO, AND MAUREEN R. LABALAN,
Respondents.

G.R. No. 170458, November 23, 2015 - REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY ASSET
PRIVATIZATION TRUST, NOW PRIVATIZATION AND MANAGEMENT OFFICE (PMO), Petitioner, v. VIRGILIO
M. TATLONGHARI, DOMINGO P. UY, GUILLERMO P. UY, HINOSAN MOTORS CORPORATION, AND
WESTERN GUARANTY CORPORATION, Respondents.

Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence > Year 2015 > November 2015 Decisions > G.R. No. 195654,
November 25, 2015 - REYNALDO INUTAN, HELEN CARTE, NOEL AYSON, IVY CABARLE, NOELJAMILI,
MARITES HULAR, ROLITOAZUCENA, RAYMUNDO TUNOG, ROGER BERNAL, AGUSTEV ESTRE, MARILOU
SAGUN, AND ENRIQUE LEDESMA, JR., Petitioners, v. NAPAR CONTRACTING & ALLIED SERVICES,
NORMAN LACSAMANA, JONAS INTERNATIONAL, INC., AND PHILIP YOUNG, Respondent.:

G.R. No. 195654, November 25, 2015 - REYNALDO INUTAN, HELEN CARTE, NOEL AYSON, IVY CABARLE,
NOELJAMILI, MARITES HULAR, ROLITOAZUCENA, RAYMUNDO TUNOG, ROGER BERNAL, AGUSTEV ESTRE,
MARILOU SAGUN, AND ENRIQUE LEDESMA, JR., Petitioners, v. NAPAR CONTRACTING & ALLIED
SERVICES, NORMAN LACSAMANA, JONAS INTERNATIONAL, INC., AND PHILIP YOUNG, Respondent.

G.R. No. 195654, November 25, 2015 - REYNALDO INUTAN, HELEN CARTE, NOEL AYSON, IVY
CABARLE, NOELJAMILI, MARITES HULAR, ROLITOAZUCENA, RAYMUNDO TUNOG, ROGER BERNAL,
AGUSTEV ESTRE, MARILOU SAGUN, AND ENRIQUE LEDESMA, JR., Petitioners, v. NAPAR CONTRACTING &
ALLIED SERVICES, NORMAN LACSAMANA, JONAS INTERNATIONAL, INC., AND PHILIP YOUNG,
Respondent.

PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 195654, November 25, 2015

REYNALDO INUTAN, HELEN CARTE, NOEL AYSON, IVY CABARLE, NOELJAMILI, MARITES HULAR,
ROLITOAZUCENA, RAYMUNDO TUNOG, ROGER BERNAL, AGUSTEV ESTRE, MARILOU SAGUN, AND
ENRIQUE LEDESMA, JR., Petitioners, v. NAPAR CONTRACTING & ALLIED SERVICES, NORMAN
LACSAMANA,*** JONAS INTERNATIONAL, INC., AND PHILIP YOUNG, Respondent.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

A judicially approved compromise agreement has the effect and authority of res judicata.2 It is final,
binding on the parties, and enforceable through a writ of execution. Article 2041 of the Civil Code,
however, allows the aggrieved party to rescind the compromise agreement and insist upon his original
demand upon failure and refusal of the other party to abide by the compromise agreement.

This Petition for Review on Certiorari2 assails the August 27, 2010 Decision3 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. SP No. 106724, which dismissed the Petition for Certiorari filed by Reynaldo Inutan (Inutan),
Helen Carte (Carte), Noel Ayson (Ayson), Ivy Cabarle (Cabarle), Noel Jamili (Jamili), Maritess Hular
(Hular), Rolito Azucena (Azucena), Raymundo Tunog (Tunog), Jenelyn Sancho, Wilmar Bolonias, Roger
Bernal (Bernal), Agustin Estre (Estre), Marilou Sagun (Sagun), and Enrique Ledesma, Jr. (Ledesma),
against respondents Napar Contracting & Allied Services (Napar), Norman Lacsamana (Lacsamana),
Jonas International, Inc. (Jonas), and Philip Young (Young), and affirmed the June 26, 2008 Decision4 and
October 14, 2008 Resolution5 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC CA No.
041474-04 dismissing the consolidated complaints against respondents for illegal dismissal with money
claims on the ground of res judicata. Likewise assailed is the CA's February 10, 2011 Resolution6 which
denied the Motion for Reconsideration.

Factual Antecedents

Petitioners Inutan, Carte, Ayson, Cabarle, Jamili, Hular, Azucena, Tunog, Bernal, Estre, Sagun, and
Ledesma were employees of respondent Napar, a recruitment agency owned and managed by
respondent Lacsamana. Napar assigned petitioners at respondent Jonas, a corporation engaged in the
manufacture of various food products with respondent Young as its President, to work as factory
workers, machine operator, quality control inspector, selector, mixer, and warehouseman.

Sometime in September of 2002, petitioners and other co-workers (complainants) filed before the
Arbitration Branch of the NLRC three separate complaints for wage differentials, 13th month pay,
overtime pay, holiday pay, premium pay for holiday and rest day, service incentive leave pay, and
unpaid emergency cost of living allowance (ECOLA) against respondents, docketed as NLRC NCR Case
Nos. 09-76698-2002, 09-08152-2002, and 09-08046-2002, which complaints were consolidated before
Labor Arbiter Jaime M. Reyno (LA Reyno).

On January 13, 2003, complainants and respondents entered into a Joint Compromise Agreement7
which reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

JOINT COMPROMISE AGREEMENT

COMPLAINANTS and the RESPONDENTS, through their' respective counsel, respectfully submit the
following Compromise Agreement.

WHEREAS, the parties (except Susana Larga) deciding to finally write "finis" to the instant case, have
agreed to settle the instant case and to enter into a Compromise Agreement.

NOW THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the terms and conditions herein below stipulated, the
parties do hereby agree:

That the complainants should be considered regular employees of Napar Contracting and Allied Services
reckoned from their date of hire and are entitled to all the benefits under the law due to regular
employees;

That the complainants shall be re-assigned by Napar Contracting and Allied Services and shall ensure
that they will be given work within forty five days (45) or until February 26,2002;
That in case Napar Contracting and Allied Services failed to re- assign or provide them work,
complainants shall be reinstated in their payroll or be given their salary equivalent to the existing
minimum wage x x x;

That the complainants shall each receive the amount of SEVEN THOUSAND PESOS as payment for their
monetary claims and which amount shall be considered in any future litigation;

That upon signing of this agreement and compliance with the stipulations herein provided, the cases
shall be deemed and considered fully and completely satisfied and the complainants hereby release,
remiss and forever discharge the herein respondents, from any and all claims arising from the above
cases;

The parties herein respectfully pray unto this Honorable Commission to approve this Compromise
Agreement and thereafter an Order be issued declaring the judgment in the above-entitled cases fully
and completely satisfied.

IN WITNESS WHEREFORE, the parties have hereunto set their hands this 13th day of January
2003.8ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

cralawlawlibrary

In an Order9 dated January 16, 2003, LA Reyno approved the Joint Compromise Agreement, enjoined
the parties to fully comply with its terms and dismissed the case without prejudice.

In accordance with the Joint Compromise Agreement, complainants, on several instances, reported to
Napar. They were paid P7,000.00 each as part of the agreement but were required by Napar; (1) to
submit their respective bio-data/resume and several documents such as Police Clearance, NBI
Clearance, Barangay Clearance, Mayor's Permit, Health Certificate, drug test results, community tax
certificate, eye test results and medical/physical examination results; (2) to attend orientation seminars;
(3) to undergo series of interviews; and (4) to take and pass qualifying examinations, before they could
be posted to their new assignments. These requirements, according to Napar, are needed to properly
assess complainants' skills for new placement with the agency's other clients.

Complainants failed to fully comply, hence they were not given new assignments.
Proceedings before the Labor Arbiter

Sensing Napar's insincerity in discharging its obligation in reassigning them, complainants filed anew
before the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC four separate Complaints10 for illegal dismissal, non-payment
of 13th month pay, wage differentials, overtime pay, service incentive leave pay, holiday pay, premium
pay for holiday and rest day, and moral and exemplary damages against respondents, docketed as NLRC
NCR Case Nos. 00-0505557-2003, 00-05-06187-2003, 00-05-06605-2003,11 and 00-07-07792-2003.
These complaints were consolidated.

In their Position Paper,12 complainants averred that Napar's failure to reinstate or provide them work
without any condition, in consonance with the terms of the Joint Compromise Agreement, constitutes
illegal constructive dismissal. They prayed for backwages plus separation pay in lieu of reinstatement.

Respondents, in their Position Paper,13 claimed that they have fulfilled their obligation under the
agreement when Napar required complainants to report for work, to submit documentary
requirements, to undergo seminars and training, and to pass qualifying exams. They contended that
complainants were the ones who violated the agreement when they refused to comply with the
foregoing requirements in order to assess their working capabilities and skills for their next posting. As
such, they were deemed to have waived their right to be reassigned. They argued that complainants
should not have filed new complaints but should have instead moved for the execution of the Joint
Compromise Agreement. They then argued that the Labor Arbiter who approved the said Joint
Compromise Agreement or LA Reyno has exclusive jurisdiction to act on the complaints.

In a Decision14 dated July 29, 2004, Labor Arbiter Pablo C. Espiritu, Jr. (LA Espiritu) held that the
conditions of the Joint Compromise Agreement particularly regarding reinstatement/reassignment of
complainants were violated thereby justifying rescission of the Joint Compromise Agreement. LA Espiritu
noted that complainants were correct in re-filing the complaints as this was an available remedy under
the NLRC Rules of Procedure when their previous complaints were dismissed without prejudice. He
struck down respondents' contention that a motion for execution of the compromise agreement was
the proper remedy, ratiocinating that the dismissal of the cases was approved without prejudice and
therefore cannot be the subject of an execution.
LA Espiritu then ruled that complainants were constructively dismissed as they were placed on
temporary off-detail without any work for more than six months despite being regular employees of
Napar. Doubting respondents' intention of reinstating complainants, LA Espiritu observed that the
submission of requirements and compliance with the procedures for rehiring should not be imposed on
complainants who are not newly-hired employees. Thus, Napar and Lacsamana were held jointly and
severally liable to pay complainants their separation pay in lieu of reinstatement due to the already
strainedrelations of the parties.

Respondents Jonas/Young, as indirect employers of complainants, were held jointly and severally liable
with Napar/Lacsamana for wage differentials, 13 month pay differentials, service incentive leave pay,
unpaid ECOLA, and holiday pay to some complainants, less the P7,000.00 already received from
respondents. The claims for premium pay for holiday, rest day, overtime pay, and moral and exemplary
damages were denied for lack of merit.

Proceedings before the National Labor Relations Commission

All parties appealed to the NLRC.

Complainants filed a partial appeal, arguing that LA Espiritu erred in not awarding backwages as well as
wage and 13th month pay differentials to nine of them.

Respondents, for their part, argued that LA Espiritu erred in failing to recognize the final and binding
effect of the Joint Compromise Agreement, contending that complainants are barred from rescinding
the agreement for having received P7,000.00 each as partial compliance and refusing to comply with the
requirements for their reassignment. Respondents Napar and Lacsamana, in their Memorandum on
Appeal,15 vehemently denied having illegally dismissed complainants and averred that they have the
prerogative to impose certain requirements in order to determine their working skills vis-a-vis their new
postings. And since they refused to comply, they have waived their right to be reassigned. Respondents
Jonas/Young, meanwhile, in its Notice of Appeal Memorandum of Appeal,16 asserted that they cannot
be held solidarity liable with respondents Napar and Lacsamana since only Napar is obligated to reassign
complainants under the Joint Compromise Agreement.

In a Decision17 dated June 26, 2008, the NLRC granted respondents' appeal. It ruled that the approval of
the Joint Compromise Agreement by LA Reyno operates as res judicata between the parties and renders
it unappealable and immediately executory. It held that complainants had no cause of action when they
re-filed their complaints for being barred by res judicata. The NLRC, in disposing of the case, ordered the
issuance of a writ of execution to enforce the Joint Compromise Agreement,
thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal of respondents is GRANTED, while that of the
complainants is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Decision of Labor Arbiter Pablo C. Espiritu, Jr. dated
July 29, 2004 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new one is rendered DISMISSING the above-entitled
complaints for having been barred by res judicata. The Order of Labor Arbiter Jaime Reyno dated
January 16, 2003 finding the Compromise Agreement entered into by the parties on January 13, 2003 to
be in order and not contrary to law and approving the same, stands valid, effective and should be
enforced. Let the records of this case be forwarded to the Labor Arbiter for the issuance of a writ of
execution to enforce the said Compromise Agreement.

SO ORDERED.18ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

cralawlawlibrary

Complainants filed a Motion for Reconsideration,19 averring that the NLRC gravely erred in ordering the
issuance of a writ of execution despite the absence of a final judgment or a judgment on the merits.
They stand on their right to rescind the Joint Compromise Agreement and to insist on their original
demands when respondents violated the compromise agreement and on their right to re-file their cases
as sanctioned by the rules in cases of provisional dismissal of cases,

Napar and Lacsamana, on the other hand, filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration20 praying for the
modification of the NLRC Decision in that complainants be declared to have waived their right to their
claims under the Joint Compromise Agreement for likewise violating the agreement.

Both motions were denied in the NLRC Resolution21 dated October 14, 2008.

Proceedings before the Court of Appeals

In their Petition for Certiorari22 filed before the CA, complainants insisted on their right to rescind the
Joint Compromise Agreement under Article 204123 of the Civil Code and on their right to re-file their
complaints under Section 16, Rule V of the NLRC Rules of Procedure.24

Napar and Lacsamana filed a Comment25 on the Petition. Jonas and Young, however, failed to file a
comment. As the CA did not acquire jurisdiction over Jonas and Young and on the basis of complainants'
manifestation that Jonas and Young had already ceased operation, Jonas and Young were dropped as
party respondents by the CA in its Resolution26 of December 16, 2009.

On August 27, 2010, the CA rendered a Decision27 affirming the NLRC. The CA considered the January
16, 2003 Order of LA Reyno, which approved the Joint Compromise Agreement, as a judgment on the
merits, and held that the second set of complaints was barred by res judicata. According to the C A, the
complainants, in re-filing their complaints due to respondents' unwarranted refusal to provide them
work, were essentially seeking to enforce the compromise agreement and were not insisting on their
original demands that do not even include a claim for illegal dismissal. Thus, the CA ruled that
complainants should have moved for the execution of the Joint Compromise Agreement instead of filing
a separate and independent action for illegal dismissal. The CA dismissed the Petition,
viz.:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Accordingly, the June 26, 2008 Decision and October 14, 2008 Resolution of public respondent National
Labor Relations Commission are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.28cralawlawlibrary

Complainants filed a Motion for Reconsideration29 but it was likewise denied by the CA in its
Resolution30 dated February 10, 2011.

Twelve of the complainants, herein petitioners, instituted the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.

Issues
Petitioners presented the following issues:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONERS' COMPLAINT IS
ALREADY BARRED BY RES JUDICATA.

II

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT, IN FILING THE SECOND
COMPLAINT, THE PETITIONERS ARE ENFORCING THE JOINT COMPROMISE AGREEMENT AND NOT
RESCINDING IT. THUS, THE PETITIONERS SHOULD HAVE MOVED FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF
EXECUTION BEFORE THE LABOR ARBITER INSTEAD OF FILING A SECOND COMPLAINT.

III

WHETHER THE PETITIONERS ARE ENTITLED TO SEPARATION PAY IN LIEU OF REINSTATEMENT AND FULL
BACKWAGES.31cralawlawlibrary

Petitioners argue that the CA, in ordering the execution of the Joint Compromise Agreement, has
deprived them of their right of rescission under Article 2041 of the Civil Code. They posit that due to the
blatant violation by the respondents of the provisions of the Joint Compromise Agreement, they only
exercised the option accorded to them by law of rescinding the agreement and of insisting upon their
original demands by filing anew their Complaints. The inclusion of illegal dismissal in their causes of
action is, for petitioners, a necessary consequence of their subsequent dismissal and the blatant
omission of respondents' commitment to reinstate them. Petitioners thus pray for the payment of
separation pay in lieu of reinstatement and full backwages as a consequence of their illegal dismissal.

Napar and Lacsamana on the other hand, aver that petitioners' sole remedy was to move for the
execution of the Joint Compromise Agreement. They aver that petitioners cannot be allowed to rescind
the agreement after having violated the same and having already enjoyed its benefits. After all, the Joint
Compromise Agreement is final, binding and constitutes as res judicata between them.

Our Ruling

The Petition has merit. Petitioners' right to rescind the Joint Compromise Agreement and right to re-file
their complaints must prevail.

Petitioners validly exercised the

option of rescinding the Joint

CompromiseAgreement under

Article 2041 of the Civil Code

Article 2028 of the Civil Code defines a compromise agreement as a contract whereby the parties make
reciprocal concessions in order to avoid litigation or put an end to one already commenced. If judicially
approved, it becomes more than a binding contract; it is a determination of a controversy and has the
force and effect of a judgment.32 Article 227 of the Labor Code provides that any compromise
settlement voluntarily agreed upon by the parties with the assistance of the Bureau of Labor Relations
or the regional office of the Department of Labor and Employment shall be final and binding upon the
parties. Compromise agreements between employers and workers have often been upheld as valid and
accepted as a desirable means of settling disputes.33

Thus, a compromise agreement, once approved, has the effect of res judicata between the parties and
should not be disturbed except for vices of consent, forgery, fraud, misrepresentation, and coercion.34
A judgment upon compromise is therefore not appealable, immediately executory, and can be enforced
by a writ of execution.35 However, this broad precept enunciated under Article 203736 of the Civil Code
has been qualified by Article 2041 of the same Code which recognizes the right of an aggrieved party to
either (1) enforce the compromise by a writ of execution, or (2) regard it as rescinded and insist upon his
original demand, upon the other party's failure or refusal to abide by the compromise. In a plethora of
cases,37 the Court has recognized the option of rescinding a compromise agreement due to non-
compliance with its terms. We explained in Chavez v. Court of Appeals:38chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
A compromise has upon the parties the effect and authority of res judicata; but there shall be no
execution except in compliance with a judicial compromise.cralawlawlibrary

Thus, we have held that a compromise agreement which is not contrary to law, public order, public
policy, morals or good customs is a valid contract which is the law between the parties themselves. It
has upon them the effect and authority of res judicata even if not judicially approved, and cannot be
lightly set aside or disturbed except for vices of consent and forgery.

However, in Heirs of Zari, et al v. Santos, we clarified that the broad precept enunciated in Art, 2037 is
qualified by Art. 2041 of the same Code, which provides:

If one of the parties fails or refuses to abide by the compromise, the other party may either enforce the
compromise or regard it as rescinded and insist upon his original demand.

We explained, viz.:

[B]efore the onset of the new Civil Code, there was no right to rescind compromise agreements. Where
a party violated the terms of a compromise agreement, the only recourse open to the other party was to
enforce the terms thereof.

When the new Civil Code came into being, its Article 2041 xxx created for the first time the right of
rescission. That provision gives to the aggrieved party the right to "either enforce the compromise or
regard it as rescinded and insist upon his original demand." Article 2041 should obviously be deemed to
qualify the broad precept enunciated in Article 2037 that "[a] compromise has upon the parties the
effect and authority of res judicata.

In exercising the second option under Art. 2041, the aggrieved party may, if he chooses, bring the suit
contemplated or involved in his original demand, as if there had never been any compromise
agreement, without bringing an action for rescission. This is because he may regard the compromise as
already rescinded by the breach thereof of the other party.cralawlawlibrary

To reiterate, Article 2041 confers upon the party concerned the authority, not only to regard the
compromise agreement as rescinded but also, to insist upon his original demand. We find that
petitioners validly exercised this option as there was breach and non-compliance of the Joint
Compromise Agreement by respondents.

It is undisputed that Napar failed to reassign and provide work to petitioners. Napar, however, puts the
blame on petitioners for their alleged deliberate refusal to comply with the requirements for
reassignment to other clients. Napar claims that the imposition of these so-called "reassessment
procedures" will efficiently guide them on where to assign petitioners; it likewise posits that it is a valid
exercise of its management prerogative to assign workers to their principal employer.

At the outset, it must be emphasized that there was no indication that petitioners deliberately refused
to comply with the procedures prior to their purported reassignment. Petitioners alleged that they
reported to Napar several times waiting for tlieir assignment and that Napar was giving them a run-
around even as they tried to comply with the requirements. These matters were not disputed by
respondents. Thus, we cannot agree with respondents were the ones who violated the compromise
agreement. Moreover, we are not persuaded by Napar's assertion that petitioners' reassignment cannot
be effected without compliance with the requirements set by it. Petitioners are regular employees of
Napar; thus, their reassignment should not involve any reduction in rank, status or salary.39 As aptly
noted by LA Espiritu, petitioners are not newly-hired employees. Considering further that they are
ordinary factory workers, they do not need special training or any skills assessment procedures for
proper placement. While we consider Napar's decision to require petitioners to submit documents and
employment clearances, to attend seminars and interviews and take examinations, which according to
Napar is imperative in order for it to effectively carry out its business objective, as falling within the
ambit of management prerogative, this undertaking should not, however, deny petitioners their
constitutional right of tenure. Besides, there is no evidence nor any allegation proffered that Napar has
no available clients where petitioners can be assigned to work in the same position they previously
occupied. Plainly, Napar's scheme of requiring petitioners to comply with reassessment procedures only
seeks to prevent petitioners' immediate reassignment.

"We have held that management is free to regulate, according to its own discretion and judgment, all
aspects of employment, including hiring, work assignments, working methods, time, place and manner
of work, processes to be followed, supervision of workers, working regulations, transfer of employees,
work supervision, lay off of workers and discipline, dismissal and recall of workers. The exercise of
management prerogative, however, is not absolute as it must be exercised in good faith and with due
regard to the rights of labor."40 Such "cannot be used as a subterfuge by the employer to rid himself of
an undesirable worker."41

Respondents' non-compliance with the strict terms of the Joint Compromise Agreement of reassigning
petitioners and ensuring that they will be given work within the required time constitutes repudiation of
the agreement. As such, the agreement is considered rescinded in accordance with Article 2041 of the
Civil Code. Petitioners properly chose to rescind the compromise agreement and exercised the option of
filing anew their complaints, pursuant to Art. 2041. It was error on the part of the CA to deny petitioners
the right of rescission.
Still, respondents insist that petitioners cannot seek rescission for they have already enjoyed the
benefits of the Joint Compromise Agreement. According to respondents, petitioners' acceptance of the
amount of P7,000.00 each bars them from repudiating and rescinding the agreement.

The contention lacks merit for the following reasons. First, petitioners never accepted the meager
amount of P7,000.00 as full satisfaction of their claims as they also expected to be reassigned and
reinstated in their jobs. In other words, their acceptance of the amount of P7,000.00 each should not be
interpreted as full satisfaction of all their claims, which included reinstatement in their jobs. The amount
of P7,000.00 is measly compared to the amount of monetary award granted by LA Espiritu and therefore
makes the agreement unconscionable and against public policy,42 At this point, it is worth noting that
even quitclaims are ineffective in barring recovery for the full measure of the worker's rights and that
acceptance of benefits therefrom does not amount to estoppel.43 Lastly, it must be emphasized that
the Joint Compromise Agreement expressly provided that each of the complainants shall receive
P7,000.00 as payment for their monetary claims and "which amount shall be considered in any future
litigation."44 By virtue of this stipulation, the parties in entering into the agreement did not rule out the
possibility of any future claims in the event of non-compliance. As correctly ruled by LA Espiritu, this
proviso showed that petitioners were not barred from raising their money claims in the future.

Section 16 of Rule V of the NLRC Rules

of Procedure allows petitioners to re-file their

complaints which were previously dismissed

without prejudice

The Court also takes into account the circumstance that petitioners' previous complaints were dismissed
without prejudice. "A dismissal without prejudice does not operate as a judgment on the merits."45 As
contrasted from a dismissal with prejudice which disallows and bars the filing of. a complaint, a dismissal
without prejudice "does not bar another action involving the same parties, on the same subject matter
and theory."46 The NLRC Rules of Procedure, specifically Section 16 of Rule V thereof, provides the
remedy of filing for a revival or re-opening of a case which was dismissed without prejudice within 10
days from receipt of notice of the order of dismissal and of re-filing the case after the lapse of the 10-
day period. Petitioners are thus not barred from re-filing their Complaints.
In choosing to rescind the Joint Compromise Agreement and re-file their complaints, petitioners can
rightfully include their claim of illegal dismissal. The CA took off from the wrong premise that
petitioners, in re-filing their case, cannot be said to have opted to rescind the compromise agreement
since they were not insisting on their original claim. It must be noted that when petitioners initially filed
their first set of complaints for wage differentials, 13th month pay, overtime pay, holiday pay, premium
pay for holiday and rest day, service incentive leave pay, and unpaid ECOLA (that does not include the
claim of illegal dismissal), subsequent events transpired which brought about their unceremonious
suspension and dismissal from work. This then led to the parties entering into the Joint Compromise
Agreement whereby respondents undertook to reinstate petitioners and pay them the sum of P7,000.00
in partial satisfaction of their claims. The compromise agreement evinces and shows that petitioners'
reinstatement was part of their original demands. Besides, respondents acknowledged that the first and
second sets of Complaints filed by petitioners are similar in nature. Respondents even admitted that the
issues raised in the first set of Complaints were similar to the issues raised by petitioners when they filed
anew their Complaints. Nevertheless, the filing of a separate action for illegal dismissal shall only go
against the rule on multiplicity of suits. It is settled that a plaintiff may join several distinct demands,
controversies or rights of action in one declaration, complaint or petition.47 This is to avert duplicity and
multiplicity of suits that would farther delay the disposition of the case.

In view of the foregoing, we find that both the NLRC and CA gravely erred in dismissing petitioners'
Complaints on the ground of res judicata. LA Espiritu correctly assumed jurisdiction and properly took
cognizance of petitioners' consolidated complaints for illegal dismissal and other monetary claims.

Petitioners are entitled to separation pay

and full backwages as well as to the other

monetary awards granted by the

Labor Arbiter

We, likewise, subscribe to LA Espiritu's ruling that petitioners, as regular employees, are deemed to have
been constructively and illegally dismissed by respondents. Being on floating status and off-detailed for
more than six months, not having been reinstated and reassigned by respondents, petitioners are
considered to have been constructively dismissed.48 Settled is the rule that an employee who is unjustly
dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement, or separation pay if reinstatement is no longer
viable, and to his full backwages.49
LA Espiritu awarded petitioners separation pay in lieu of reinstatement. The Court agrees that the award
of separation pay is warranted due to the already strained relations between the parties.50 However,
aside from separation pay, petitioners, for having been illegally dismissed, should also be awarded full
backwages, inclusive of allowances and their other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed
from November 9, 2002 (the date of their last work assignment or from the time compensation was
withheld from them) up to the date of finality of this Decision.

While petitioners failed to raise the matter of entitlement to backwages before the CA, this does not
prevent the Court from considering their entitlement to the same. The Court has discretionary authority
to take up new issues on appeal if it finds that their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just
decision.

Anent the other monetary claims in petitioners' complaints, the awards granted to them by LA Espiritu
stand undisturbed for petitioners' failure to question the same on appeal before the CA and even before
this Court. Hence, we sustain the award of wage differentials, 13th month pay differentials, service
incentive leave pay, unpaid ECOLA, and holiday pay less the P7;000.00 already received by them.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The August 27, 2010 Decision and February 10, 2011 Resolution
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 106724 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The July 29, 2004
Decision of the Labor Arbiter Pablo C. Espiritu, Jr. in NLRC NCR Case Nos. 00-05-05557-2003, 00-05-
06187-2003, 00-05-06605-2003 and 00-07-07792-2003 is REINSTATED. In addition, respondents Napar
Contracting & Allied Services and Norman Lacsamana are held jointly and severally liable to pay
petitioners Reynaldo Inutan, Helen Carte, Noel Ayson, Ivy Cabarle, Noel Jamili, Maritess Hular, Rolito
Azucena, Raymundo Tunog, Roger Bernal, Agustin Estre, Marilou Sagun, and Enrique Ledesma, Jr. full
backwages, inclusive of allowances and their other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed
from November 9, 2002 up to the date of finality of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Velasco, Jr.,* Brion, (Acting Chairperson), Mendoza, and Leonen, JJ., concur.chanrobleslaw

Endnotes:

* Per Special Order No. 2282 dated November 13, 2015.

** Per Special Order No. 2281 dated November 13, 2015.

*** Spelled as Laxamana in some parts of the records.

1 CIVIL CODE, Article 2037.

2Rollo, pp. 12-40.

3 CA rollo, pp. 299-313; penned by Associate Justice Mariflor P. Punzalan Castillo and concurred in by
Associate Justices Joserma Guevara-Salonga and Franchito N. Diamante.

4 Id. at 130-138; penned by Presiding Commissioner Gerardo C. Nograles and concurred in by

Commissioners Perlita B. Velasco and Romeo L, Go.

5 Id. at 172-174.

6 Id. at 324-325.

7 Id. at 48-50.

8 Id.

9 Id. at 51.

10Rollo, pp. 67-72.

11 Also indicated as 00-05-06205-2003 in some parts of the records.

12 CA rollo, pp. 23-42.

13 Id. at 43-47.

14 Id at 63-86; penned by Labor Arbiter Pablo C. Espiritu, Jr.

15 Id. at 100-113.

16 Id. at 114-124.

17 Id. at 130-138.

18 Id. at 137-138.

19 Id. at 140-148.

20 Id. at 149-158.

21 Id. at 172-174.

22 Id. at 2-20.
23 Art. 2041, If one of the parties fails or refuses to abide by the compromise, the other party may
either enforce the compromise or regard it as rescinded and insist upon his original demand.

24 Section 16. Revival And Re-Opening Or Re-Filing Of Dismissed Case. - A party may file a motion to
revive or re-open a case dismissed without prejudice, within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of
notice of the order dismissing the same; otherwise, his only remedy shall be to re-file the case in the
arbitration branch of origin.

25 CA rollo, pp. 183-194.

26 Id. at 214-215.

27 Id. at 299-313.

28 Id. at 313.

29 Id. at 314-321.

30 Id. at 324-325.

31Rollo, pp. 346-347.

32Magbanua v. Uy, 497 Phil. 511, 519 (2005).

33Galicia v. National Labor Relations Commission, 342, Phil. 342,348 (1997).

34Comista-Domingo v. National Labor Relations Commission, 535 Phil. 643, 661 (2006).
35United Housing Corporation v. Hon. Dayrit, 260 Phil. 301,310 (1990).

36 Art. 2037. A compromise has upon the parties the effect and authority of res judicata; but there shall
be no execution except in compliance with a judicial compromise.

37Catedrilla v. Lauron, G.R. No. 179011, April 15, 2013, 696 SCRA 341; Miguel v. Montanez, G.R. No.
191336, January 25, 2012, 664 SCRA 345; Iloilo Traders Finance Inc. v. Heirs of Sps. Soriano, Jr., 452 Phil.
82 (2003); Ramnani v. Court of Appeals, 413 Phil. 195 (2001); and Morales v. National Labor Relations
Commission,, 311 Phil. 121 (1995).

38 493 Phil. 945, 952-953 (2005).

39Republic v. Pacheo, G.R. No. 178021, January 31, 2012, 664 SCRA 497, 511.

40Julie's Bakeshop v. Amaiz, G.R. No. 173882, February 15, 2012, 666 SCRA 101, 115.

41Homeowners Savings and Loan Association v. National labor Relations Commission, 330 Phil. 797, 998
(1996).

42Malinao v. National Labor Relations Commission, 377 Phil. 68, 77-79, citing PEFTOK Integrated
Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 355 Phil. 247 (1998).

43 Id.

44 CA rollo, p. 49.

45Positos v. Chua, 623 Phil. 803, 809 (2009).

46Hasegawa v. Kitamura, 563 Phil. 572, 581 (2007).

47Ada v. Baylor,, G.R. No. 182435, August 13,2012,678 SCRA 293, 303-304.

48Nippon Housing Phil,, Inc. v. Leynes, G.R. No. 177816, August 3, 2011, 655 SCRA 77, 88.

49 Reyes v. RP Guardians Security Agency, Inc. G.R. No. 193756, April 10, 2013, 695 SCRA 620, 625-626.

50 Dreamland Hotel Resort v. Johnson, G.R. No. 191455, March 12, 2014, 719 SCRA 29, 48.

51Abra Valley College, Inc. v. Judge Aquino, 245 Phil. 83, 92 (1988).

G.R. No. 195654, November 25, 2015 - REYNALDO INUTAN, HELEN CARTE, NOEL AYSON, IVY CABARLE,
NOELJAMILI, MARITES HULAR, ROLITOAZUCENA, RAYMUNDO TUNOG, ROGER BERNAL, AGUSTEV ESTRE,
MARILOU SAGUN, AND ENRIQUE LEDESMA, JR., Petitioners, v. NAPAR CONTRACTING & ALLIED
SERVICES, NORMAN LACSAMANA, JONAS INTERNATIONAL, INC., AND PHILIP YOUNG, Respondent.

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