Canadian Journal of Philosophy

Aristotle's "Metaphysics" Z 13
Author(s): Henry Teloh
Source: Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Mar., 1979), pp. 77-89
Published by: Canadian Journal of Philosophy
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CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
Volume IX, Number 7, March 1979

Aristotle's Metaphysics Z 13

HENRYTELOH,Vanderbilt University

Aristotle states in Metaphysics Z13 (1038b9-11) that nothing said

universally ( twv xa§dAou Aeyoyevajv ) is substance ( ouaua ),
rather the substance of each thing is particular to it ( ouaua
exaaxou n l6los eKaaxco ).1 The natural interpretation of this
statement is that being said universally is a sufficient condition for not
being substance.2 But this claim is very perplexing since it is the key
premiss in the following apparently inconsistent set:

(1) Form is substance.

(2) Form is universal.

(3) Nothing universal or said universally is substance, rather the

substance of something is particular ( l6los ) to it.

1 The Creek is from the Loeb edition of Aristotle, especially the Tredennick
translation of the Metaphysics (Harvard, 1933), and the translations are based
upon the same edition.
2 M.J. Woods, "Problems in Metaphysics Z , Chapter 13," printed in Aristotle,
ed. J.M.E. Moravcsik (New York, 1967), p. 216, argues that 1038b9-11 means
that being a universal is not a sufficient condition for being substance. I do
not see how the Creek can have this interpretation. Hereafter I will refer to
this article as Woods.

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There is cogent evidence in the Met. that Aristotle also holds (1) and
(2).3 So unless there are different senses of "form," "substance" or
"universal," (1)-(3) are inconsistent, and Aristotle's metaphysics is in
serious difficulty. Indeed, Aristotle recognizes the source of the
problem in the "knots for the intellect" of Met. B (1003a5-13): the
individual substance is real, but knowledge is of the universal.
Some commentators believe that Z13 attacks the claim that
Aristotle's universal is substance, and hence that (1)-(3) are
inconsistent. James Lesher holds this view.4 Others believe that Z13
attacks the rival claim of the Platonists' Forms to be substance, but
that the arguments of Z13 also score against some interpretation of
Aristotle's universal. M. J. Woods belongs to this class.5 He argues
that Aristotle distinguishes those universals that are and those that
are not said universally. Genera are said universally of their species,
while the species are not said universally of their instances.6 Woods
believes that the point of Z13 is that genera are not substances
because they are said universally, but that this does not affect the
claim of the species universals to be substance, because they are not
said universally.7 Finally, some commentators believe that Z13
attacks the claim that Aristotle's universal is substance, but they
attempt to remove the inconsistency by distinguishing different
senses of "form" in Aristotle. R. Albritton is an example of this class.8
He argues that Aristotle has both particular and universal forms. A
particular form is ontologically dependent on the individual whose

3 See James Lesher, "Aristotle on Form, Substance, and Universal: A

Dilemma," Phronesis 16 (1971), p. 169, notes 2 and 3 for this evidence.
Hereafter I will refer to this article as Lesher.

4 Lesher, pp. 169-78.

5 Woods, pp. 215-38.

6 Woods, especially pp. 220, 224-29.

7 Other commentators also hold that Z13 attacks the claim that genera are
substance, but not the status of species as substance, although their
arguments differ from those of Woods. See Reinaldo Elugardo, "Woods on
Metaphysics Zeta, Chapter 13," Apeiron 9 (1975), pp. 30-42, and Rogers
Albritton, "Forms of Particular Substances in Aristotle's Metaphysics/'
Journal of Philosophy 54 (1957), pp. 704-6. Hereafter I will refer to the latter
article as Albritton. I will show that Z13 equally attacks both species and
genera.
8 Albritton, pp. 699-708.

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 Aristotle's Metaphysics Z13

act it is; the particular form of Callias exists only if Callias exists. The
universal, on the other hand, depends on the existence of at least one
of its instances. Moreover, particular forms are cases of the
universal.9 Particular forms are, on this interpretation, the essences
of things and not the universal forms.
Nevertheless, the views of both Woods and Albritton have serious
difficulties. In the case of Woods there is no textual warrant for a
distinction between universal and being said universally;10 in the case
of Albritton there is, by his own admission, inconclusive textual
evidence for particular forms in Met. Z and H.11 Moreover,
Albritton's particular forms are also, in a sense, universal; for the case
of man in Simmias and the case of man in Cebes are one and the same
form. Since particular forms are also, in a sense, universal, we cannot
escape the apparent inconsistency of (1)-(3).12
I will argue that Z13 does not and is not intended to attack the
thesis that Aristotle's universal is substance. Z13 is part of an
extensive assault ( Z13-16) on the Platonists' Forms. Z13 gives us no
information about Aristotle's universal; rather it attacks the
Platonists' belief that their universals are also substances. Z13
criticizes the Platonists' view that what is "one over many" is both a
universal that is "one in form" and thus common to many, and a
substance that is "one in number" and hence individual. But no
individual can be common to many. The point of Z13 is, then, that
nothing universal is also individual.
Specifically I will argue that: (1) Aristotle by means of reductio
arguments in Z13 attacks the Platonists' belief that universals are also
individuals; (2) Z13 assaults Platonists' notions of both species and
genera; (3) the arguments of Z13 imply that there are numerically
distinct generic and specific forms; and (4) there is a cogent argument
in Z and H, independent of Z13, that there are particular,
numerically distinct forms for both natural entities and artifacts.
Finally, it is clear that since Aristotle's universal is "one in form" not in
number, it is consistent to argue that numerically distinct, particular

9 Albritton, p. 700.

10 Lesher makes these cogent attacks on Woods and Albritton, see Lesher, p.
170. Even in Z13 Aristotle uses "what is said universally" and "what belongs
by nature to many things" interchangeably. See 1038b9-13.
11 Albritton, p. 707.

12 See Lesher, pp. 174-75, and Met. 1033b32ff.

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forms are cases of the universal. Thus Z13 does not preclude the
possibility that Aristotle's universal is substance, and hence we
cannot appeal to Z13 to formulate the inconsistency between (1)-(3).
Z13 , in fact, does not tell us anything about whether or not Aristotle's
universal is substance, because it does not discuss what is "one in
form."

Aristotle opens Z13 with a list of candidates for substance:

substrate, essence, concrete whole, and universal. Previous chapters
of Z investigate the candidacy of the first two. Furthermore, other
lists of candidates for substance (1028b33-36, 1042a14-20) also
mention as distinct items the essence and the universal, which
suggests that they are not identical. But this appears to conflict with
two claims: (a) that the essence is (universal) from (1032b2-3,
1035b16), and (b) that definition is of the essence, form, or universal
(1016a33-5, 1035a4, 1036a1, 1042a17-18). We cannot, however, im-
mediately assume that Aristotle's universal is the target, for at least
some universals are not Aristotelian essences. In the "knots for the
intellect" of B Aristotle refers to the separate Forms as universals
(999a25ff, 1001a20-30, 1002b24-5). These Forms are universals because
they function as the "one over the many" (999b26-7, 1040b28-31).
Furthermore, Aristotle states in Z 13 that "the universal is thought by
some ( tuqlv ) to be especially a cause and principle" (1038b6-8),
and commentators frequently note that "by some" apparently refers
to the Platonists.13 Aristotle, moreover, frequently claims that the
Platonists believe their Forms to be causes and principles (988a12,
990b1 , 991 b3-5). There is, then, evidence that the universals at issue at
least include the Platonists' Forms, and for this reason Aristotle lists
and examines separately the essence and the universal.
Aristotle then claims that "it seems to be impossible that anything
said universally is substance. For first, the substance of each thing
( exdaxou ) is particular ( u6los ) to each, and does not belong to
another, but the universal is common ( x o uvdv ), for by 'universal' we

13 Woods, pp. 217-18, W. D. Ross, Aristotle's Metaphysics, vol. 2 (Oxford, 1924),

p. 209, andTredennick's Loeb translation, p. 376, n.c. Hereafter I will refer to
Aristotle's Metaphysics as Ross.

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 Aristotle's Metaphysics Z13

mean 'what belongs by nature to many"' (1038b9-13). There is

nothing in the context that specifies what exdaiou refers to, and
hence it can be quite general, referring either to a particular species
or to a concrete individual. In the former case the substance of a
species, its genus and differentia, is l6lo$ to it; in the latter case the
substance of a concrete individual is u6uog . Contra Woods's
interpretation Aristotle apparently attacks the claim that the genus
universal is substance as well as the claim that the species universal is
substance. Moreover, I will argue that 1038b13-16 attacks the species
universal, while 1038b17-24 attacks the genus universal. But why can't
the universal be substance, and why must the substance of each thing
be particular to it?
The argument at 1038b13-16 implies that the substance of each
thing is particular to it. A literal translation of this argument is: "Of
what then will this be the substance? Either it will be the substance of
all or of none. But it is not the substance of all, while if it is the
substance of one, the others will be that one, because things whose
substance and essence are one, are themselves one ( ev )." This
truncated argument provides the key to the position attacked in Z13.
The argument is a reductio : either the universal is the substance of all
or of none. We may dismiss the latter alternative because the
universal is thought to be the substance of something. But the
universal cannot be the substance of all, for if we arbitrarily pick one
thing that purports to have that universal as substance, the other
participants in that universal14will be that one, because "those things
whose substance and essence are one are themselves one."
As a reductio this argument is a miserable failure against
Aristotle's position. His universal is "one in form" (1016b33-4,
1033b31-2, 1034a7-9, 1052a32-b2, 1086b14-32, Cat 3b10-18), and
hence it can be common to numerically distinct individuals. Concrete
individuals are numerically distinct because they have a distinct
matter (1016b32-3, 1034a7-9).15For the reductio to have force, the last
"one" in "those things whose substance and essence are one are
themselves one" must mean "numerically identical." This
interpretation gains credence because Aristotle employs a similar
reductio in Z16 against Platonists' views of unity and being, and he
explicitly concludes that they cannot be substance because "those

14 See Ross, p. 210. At 1040a25-28 Aristotle states that every Form must have
many participants.
15 SeeLesher, p. 171.

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things whose substance is one in number (dpLdyu)) are one in

number (dp uSyuJ)" (1040b16-19).
The absurdity that the many are "one in number" follows only if
the universal is "one in number" and thus individual. For then a
numerically identical individual is common to different individuals,
and hence they are numerically identical, which is absurd.
Furthermore, Aristotle credits the Platonists with the inconsistent
belief that their Forms are both universal and individual (1002b24-5,
1040b28-31). The Forms are universals because they function as the
"one over the many" (999b26-7, 1040b28-31), and they are individual
because as paradigms they are "one in number" and what is "one in
number" is individual (999b33-1000a2, 1016b32-3, 1052a32-3).
Aristotle hits hard at Platonic paradigmatism, as he interprets it,
where the paradigms are also the common essences of things.16 The
precise point of the reductio is, then, that nothing universal is also
individual, and Aristotle emphasizes the incompatible natures of
individual and universal at 1038b16-18 when he states that substance
is not said of a subject while the universal is. Since the Platonists'
Forms are individual substances, they cannot have the function of a
universal, i.e., they cannot be common to many things. Finally,
Aristotle aims this argument especially at the Platonists' species,
since they are the purported essences of numerically distinct
concrete individuals,17 although as I will show, Aristotle employs,
mutatis mutandis, the same argument at 1038b17-24 against
Platonists' genera.
Moreover, the reductio at 1038b13-16 has an important
implication. Aristotle attacks the Platonist on the ground that if two or

16 Plato's middle period Forms are not universals in Aristotle's sense of

"universal," rather they are paradigmatic individuals. The Forms are
common only in that many things can imitate or resemble a single Form. But
in Z13 and 14 Aristotle treats the Platonists' universals as if they were in
things. Plato would, of course, reject this view, since his Forms are separate,
pure paradigms: see, for example, Symposium 210-12. Aristotle's
justification for this procedure is given in Met . Z 6; there he argues that the
substance or essence of x cannot exist apart from x, and since the Platonists'
Forms are, he believes, the substances of phenomena, they must exist in
phenomena. Also see 991a12-14, and 991 b1-9. The absurdities of Z13 and 14
thus result, in part, from treating the Platonists' Forms as if they were in
things. The Platonists would, undoubtedly, contest this treatment, for they
do not believe that phenomena are substances in Aristotle's sense, or that
the Forms are in phenomena as their substances.

17 See 1038b17-19, which implies that the argument at 1038b13-16 deals only
with species and not genera.

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 Aristotle's Metaphysics Z13

more individuals have a numerically identical substance, then they

are identical, which is absurd. But since individuals are numerically
distinct, they must have numerically distinct, particular substances;
hence the argument supports the claim at 1038b10-11 that substances
are particular ( l6los ). But even if particular substances are the
substances of individuals, this would not preclude the possibility that
Aristotle's universal is also substance, since it is "one in form" not in
number.
At 1038b17-24 Aristotle provides the Platonists' rejoinder that
while the universal is not the essence or species form, perhaps it is in
the essence as animal is in man and horse. He concludes that if this is
the case, then the "same thing" will happen again: "animal will be
the substance of each thing in which it belongs as particular
( u6uov ) to it" (1038b22-3). This argument is extremely truncated,
and we must presumably supply premises from the previous
argument at 1038b13-16. If the genus is a Platonists' substance that is
one in number and hence individual, and if it is in different species,
then there is only a single species, which is absurd. This reductio
implies that since there are distinct species, the genus must be
particular ( u6tov ) in each, which is Aristotle's conclusion at
1038b22-3. But this conclusion is not, for example, that man and horse
have genera that differ in genus, e.g., animal and fish, but rather that
the genera do not exist independent of their species (1038a6-7,
1053b22-3). A case of animal is a man, or a horse, etc., and there is a
distinct case of animal in each (1058a3-7), although the species of
animals are "one in genus" (1016a24-28, b33-4). Aristotle's attack on
Platonists' genera parallels the previous one on their species.18 For
the species do not exist independent of their instances. A case of man
is John or Frank, etc., and there is a distinct case of man in each,
although they are "one in species."
At 1038b29-3419Aristotle says, "Again a substance will be present
in Socrates who is a substance, so that it will be the substance of two

18 Hence Z13 does not support Woods's distinction between non-substance

genera and substance species.
19 The argument at 1038b23-29 denies that substances are composed of
qualities, for then qualities would be prior to substances in logos, time, and
generation, and hence the qualities would be separate. It is, of course,
absurd in Aristotle's system for qualities to exist apart from substances,
although the Platonists posit separate Forms of qualities. Perhaps 1038b23 -29
states a possible Platonists' rejoinder: If things are not composed of
substance Forms, then they are composed of qualities that are then prior to
substances. But this is absurd. This rejoinder has force only if these are the
only alternatives, but there is a further option: Aristotle's notions of form
and matter.

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things. And generally it follows that if man is substance, . . . none of

the things in the formula is the substance of anything I mean that,
for example, neither animal nor any other of those things in the
formula exists apart from the species." This cryptic passage contains
two parallel arguments: one against the Platonists' species and the
other against their genera.20 Aristotle assumes ab initio that Socrates
is a substance. But if the species, man, is also a substance, then it is
the substance both of itself and of its participant Socrates, who is a
substance.21 For in Z6 Aristotle argues that immaterial entities, the
examples used are Forms, are their own essence and substance;
moreover, he attributes to the Platonists the view that Forms are the
substances of their participants. By the same reasoning, if an element
of a formula, either a genus or a differentia, is substance, then it is the
substance both of itself and of its species. But the species is also a
substance. Aristotle then explains at 1039a3-14 why something cannot
be a substance with another substance in it: "A substance cannot
consist of substances actually present in it, for that which is actually
two cannot be actually one . . ." (1039a3-5). If Socrates who is a
substance has a substance species in him, then he will be a substance
with a substance, which is impossible; if the species is a substance
and it has a substance genus or a substance differentia in it, again one
thing will be many substances.22
The actual conclusion of Z1323 is that "none of those things that
belong universally is substance, because none of those things

20 See n. 18.

21 I disagree with Ross's interpretation of this passage. See Ross, p. 211.

22 A. R. Lacey, "Ousia and Form in Aristotle/' Phronesis 10 (1965), p. 66,

distinguishes, among others, two senses of "substance," "the concrete
individual," and "the substance of an object." Aristotle slides between these
two senses in Z13, but his arguments show that the Platonists' universal is not
substance in either sense, since for the Platonists the substance of an object
is an individual. If Z13 were to investigate Aristotle's universal, it would have
to ask whether what is "one in form" is "the substance of an object," but this
it does not do. Again the Platonists would hotly contest the argument at
1038b29ff.; for they would deny that phenomena are Aristotelian substances,
and that the Forms are in phenomena as their substance.

23 The last paragraph of Z13, at 1039a15-23, appears to be a false aporia,

perhaps designed for students. Aristotle states that since a substance is not
composed of substances or of non-substances, it is incomposite, and thus
indefinable. Aristotle's solution to this problem is that a substance is not
composed of "things" but rather is a unity of actuality (form) and potentiality
(matter, 1045b15-25).

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 Aristotle's Metaphysics Z13

predicated in common signifies a 'this' (id6e tu), but a 'such'

( ioudv6e ). Otherwise among many other consequences there is
'The Third Man'" (1038b35-1039a3). This conclusion appears to reject
the claim that Aristotle's universal is substance; his universal signifies
a "such," and nothing that signifies a "such" is substance. But there is
a better interpretation with greater contextual warrant: no Platonists'
universal is substance, because it signifies a "this/' i.e., an individual,
and no individual is a "such" that is common to many things. The
Platonists' "universal" is logically incoherent, and for this reason,
among others, it is not substance. Aristotle simply does not discuss
what signifies a "such" in Z13. Moreover, Aristotle's universal does
not generate the Third Man Argument, but the Platonists' does, for
they reify universals and make them individual. Reified universals or
Forms are, then, "synonymous entities" with their participants
(990b6-8, 991a6-9), and the Third Man Argument follows. I conclude
that Z13 purports to show that no reified universal is also substance,
because while a universal is common to many,24 a reified universal is
"one in number," and thus cannot be common.

II

In this section I will support my interpretation of Z13 with

passages from Z14, 16, and B.
Z13 and 14 are a single attack on the Platonists' universals,
although they approach the problem from opposite perspectives.
Z13 displays the absurd consequencesfortheparticipants if universals
are individuals; either substances have substances, or numerically
distinct entities are identical. Z14 shows the absurd consequences
for the universals themselves; if their participants are not identical,
then the universals are separated from themselves.
Aristotle opens Z14 with the statement that "from the same
considerations [as in Z13] it is clear what consequences follow for
those who say that Forms are substances and separable, and who at
the same time produce the species from the genus and the
differentia" (1039a24-27). The major undesirable consequence is that
if the animal in man and horse is one and the same, "just as you are
with yourself," then since it is in separate beings, it will be "separate

24 See1000a1-2

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from itself ( x^P^S auxou , 1039b1-2). Aristotle ends Z14 with:

"clearly there are not Forms of things as some ( Tuveg ) say that
there are" (1039b18-19). Since the universals in Z14 are one and the
same, "just as you are with yourself/' they are one in number and
individual. But an individual cannot be common to many things,
because it becomes split from itself. Moreover, the absurd
conclusion at1039b1-2 is similar both in language and thought to the
rejection of "physical" immanent Forms at Parmenides 131a-c.25 I
conclude that Z13 and 14 are both assaults on the Platonists'
universals.
In Z16 Aristotle applies the argument schema of Z13 to unity
(t3 ev) and being (to ov). If unity and being are substances, then
"those things whose substance is one in number ( dp bdyuj), are one
in number (dpudyuj)"; thus neither unity nor being are substance
(1040b16-19). In Met B we learn Aristotle's interpretation of the
Platonists' beliefs about unity and being: in contrast with those who
reduce unity and being to more intelligible entities, "Plato and the
Pythagoreans hold that neither being nor unity is different than itself,
and that this is their nature, their substance being simply being and
unity" (1001a10-12). Aristotle probably has in mind the following sort
of argument at 1040b16-19: If unity and being are Platonists'
individuals, then since all things "are" and "are one," all things are
identical. But this is absurd. Thus unity and being, reified, produce
the absurd consequence at 1040b16-19.
Aristotle offers at 1040b27-31 a succinct overview of his attack
against the Platonists, that could equally well serve as a description of
Z13: "Hence it is clear that no universal belongs apart from the
individuals, but those who say that there are Forms are partly correct
to claim that they are separate, if they are substance, but they are also
partly wrong, because they say that the Form is the one over the
many." If the Platonists' Forms are individuals, then they must be
separate; but if they are universals, then they cannot exist apart from
the individuals. Aristotle's argument against the Platonists is quite
simple; a universal is not an individual substance: individuals are
"one in number," universals "one in form"; individuals cannot be
common, universals can; individuals are themselves separate,
universals are separate only in logoi (1042a28-31).

25 For an analysis of this argument see H. Teloh, "Parmenides and Plato's

Parmenides 131a=132c,"Journal of the History of Philosophy, XIV (1976), pp.
127-8.

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 Aristotle's Metaphysics Z13

A "knot binding the intellect" in B (999a24-b24, also see

999b25-1000a1, 1001a3-1001b1, 1002b25-33 for passages relevant to
the arguments in Z13) encapsulates the arguments of both Z13 and 14.
The aporia is that for there to be knowledge, there must be some one
and the same universal apart from ( Tiapd - here signifying
Platonic separation) the sensible, perishable individuals (999a24-b5).
But if a numerically identical universal is the essence of many things,
absurdities result: ". . . for all things whose essence is one are one.
Then is it [the essence] many and diverse? This too is illogical"
(999b23-4). As in Z13 a numerically identical universal common to
different things, makes them identical; as in Z14 it is "equally
illogical" ( dXoyov ) for a numerically identical essence to be "many
and diverse." The arguments of Z13 and 14 appear to be stock moves
that Aristotle frequently uses against the Platonists.

Ill

An implication of the reductio in Z13 is that there are particular

generic and specific forms. For example, the particular form of man in
Simmias, the case of man in Simmias, exists only if Simmias exists.
The particular form of animal in man, the case of animal in man, exists
only if man exists. R. Albritton argues that there is clear evidence for
particular forms in Met. A, but at best Zand H only suggest particular
forms and only for natural entities.26 To support my interpretation of
Z13 I will show that there is a cogent argument in Z and H for
particular forms.27 Hence my interpretation of Z13 does not have an
implication unsupported by other passages.
In a frequently misunderstood argument at 1033a24ff. Aristotle
argues that while the concrete whole is generated and destroyed,

26 Albritton, p. 707.

27 A number of passages provide direct textual support for particular forms in

the Met.: 999b29-31, 1002b18-20, 1037a5-11, 1070a13-15, 21-25, 1071a26-30,
1087a7-21.

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neither matter nor form have a generation or destruction.28 For if

matter or form were generated or destroyed, then these processes
would go on idefinitely, since they presuppose an underlying matter
for change, and a form that is either gained or lost. Hence matter and
form are ungenerated and indestructible.
If the form is ungenerated and indestructible, then it is tempting
to conclude that it is temporally unlimited in existence, and hence
must be the universal in re. For the universal in re always exists, if it is
always instantiated, and Aristotle believes that the species are
indestructible. Nevertheless, there is good reason to reject these
conclusions. For Aristotle also claims that the ungenerated and
indestructible form "is and is not" (1039b27, 1044b21-3, 1060a23). He
distinguishes the generation and destruction of a concrete whole,
and another type of coming and ceasing to be. The shape of a bronze
sphere is not generated, only the bronze sphere is; nevertheless, the
shape comes to be with the generation of the bronze sphere.
The forms that "are and are not" are not the universals, for they
always exist. It is the particular form of Simmias that "is" when
Simmias is generated, and the particular form of the bronze sphere
that "is not" when the sphere is destroyed. Hence there is cogent
evidence in Z and H, independent of Z13, that Aristotle believes in
particular forms; moreover, there are particular forms for both
artifacts and natural entities, since both are generated and destroyed.
Aristotle even extends this argument to items in non-substance
categories (1034b8-19).
In conclusion: Some commentators think that Z13 attacks the
claim that Aristotle's universal is substance. I show that this is false.
Z13 attacks universals that are "one in number" and thus individual.
No universal that is "one in number" is substance. Aristotle's
universals are "one in form." Moreover, Z13 implies that there are
numerically distinct, particular generic and specific forms, and other
passages confirm this implication. But even though there are
numerically distinct cases of, for example, man in Simmias and
Cebes, they both can be "one in form." Hence Z13 is consistent with
the claim that Aristotle's universal is substance, although we do not

28 E. S. Haring, "Substantial Form in Aristotle's Metaphysics Z ," Review of

Metaphysics 10 (1957), p. 325, believes that in this passage Aristotle's form is
"timeless and indifferent to its context"; moreover, its "resemblance ... to a
Platonic Idea becomes marked." I show that this interpretation is mistaken.

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 Aristotle's Metaphysics Z13

learn anything about Aristotle's universal in Z13.29Thus we cannot

appeal to Z13 to formulate the apparent inconsistency between
(D-(3).30

July 1977

29 I argue in another paper, "The Universal in Aristotle," forthcoming in

Apeiron that Aristotle's universals are not the substances of concrete indi-
viduals. No universal is in re, since universals are unenmattered and in the
intellect (see Met . 1052a30-33, 1052b1-2, 1052b16-18, 1075a1-6, in conjunction
with DeAnima43la1-2, 417b23-24, and Posterior Analytics 100a6-9). Particular
forms are the substances of things because they are in them, but the univer-
sal is the result of intellectual processes, and hence it is in the intellect.

30 This paper was read at the Tennessee Philosophical Association (1977), and
the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association (1978). I am
indebted to an unnamed referee for the Canadian Journal of Philosophy for
helpful comments.

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