Berlin Wall Crisis – origins (from J.Gearson, K.Schake (eds.

), The Berlin Wall Crisis: Perspectives on Cold

War Alliances, Palgrave, 2002)
The blockade was to last almost 11 months and witnessed the greatest airlift of material the world has ever
seen. Two and a-half million Berliners were supplied by the Luftbrücke (air-bridge) at the cost of 79 British
and American air crew and German ground staff, killed in accidents. The New York agreement of 5 May
1949, which terminated the blockade, in effect represented acceptance by the Soviets of Western access
rights to Berlin. It undertook to restore communications which had existed prior to the Berlin blockade and
by implication the German civilian rights of access.

Results of the blockade: The blockade underscored the division of Germany and hastened efforts towards
the establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany. In lieu of a constitution, which was to await
reunification, a ‘Basic Law’ was proclaimed on 8 May 1949. Overriding German objections, the Western
allies objected to Berlin acquiring the status of a separate Land or state, arguing it was an occupied city, thus
retaining the legal fiction of a four-power status – the basis of all subsequent Western rights. In the Basic
Law, the city is referred to as a Land, but an allied reservation of 13 May 1949 led to the compromise that
representatives from Berlin could attend Bundestag (parliamentary) meetings only as observers. Thus, the
West Berlin city assembly had to pass all West German laws before they could apply to West Berlin. Bonn
was picked as the provisional capital of the new state pending reunification and a return to Berlin. For West
Germans, Berlin was to be the custodian of the national future, in practice – the one place where the
unfinished business of World War II remained clear. Following the ending of the blockade the West
attempted to re-establish the operation of the fourpower Kommandatura but abandoned it when the Soviets
made clear that a veto was their price. The blockade, in its way, hastened a number of other developments
too. In April, before its end, the North Atlantic Treaty was signed, committing America to the defence of
Western Europe and, by clear implication, the whole of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation to the defence of
West Berlin.
The ambiguity of Berlin’s position was that while economically and politically, the city relied on the FRG for
its survival, its security depended on the protection of the Western allies. In this they were acting not under
the NATO agreements (although they would doubtless be invoked in a crisis) but under the wartime
agreements with the Soviets establishing four-power status and the right of armed presence in the city. The
NATO treaty also committed the new German state to the closest possible alignment with Western policies
and it is doubtful whether this would have been agreed so quickly without the pressure of the Berlin
blockade. The crisis had concentrated minds extraordinarily. Shortly after these developments on 7 October
1949, the German Democratic Republic (GDR) was proclaimed in Pankow. Berlin was left alone and the
division of Germany solidified.
Despite the lull following the lifting of the blockade, periodic harassment served to illustrate the continuing
vulnerability of the Western presence in Berlin. In May 1952, the East Germans cut telephone links and
denied allied access by road for a week. Aircraft were buzzed in the corridor and in 1953, a British bomber
was shot down over the Elbe just outside the Hamburg air corridor by a Mig fighter. The number of refugees
fleeing the Soviet zone periodically rose and fell but had been steadily high from the establishment of the
East German state onwards. Most migrants used Berlin as their escape route. In June of the same year,
following the death of Stalin, a building workers’ strike in the eastern sector of Berlin escalated into a
popular uprising which was put down by Soviet troops. The Western response was to disclaim any
complicity in the uprising. The status quo had apparently been accepted, but the period following Stalin’s
death did appear to offer new hope for solution of the German problem. In 1955, the Austrian State Treaty
was signed and with the first post-war summit conference in Switzerland, the so-called ‘Spirit of Geneva’
reflected the improved relations. A German settlement seemed possible. At Geneva the leaders directed their
foreign ministers to work towards reunification of Germany by free elections in discussions to follow the
summit. The hopes were short-lived. In the autumn, the Soviets accorded the DDR full diplomatic
recognition and gave them responsibility for all road traffic to and from Berlin, except that of allied forces.
There was little the West could do beyond stating that they continued to hold the Soviet Union responsible
for the fulfilment of all previous agreements regarding Berlin and refusing to recognise the DDR.
Berlin had become something of a liability. Konrad Adenauer, the first chancellor of the FRG, saw the
creation of a viable West German state as more pressing than the pursuit of reunification. For this purpose, he
worked to identify West Germany totally with the Atlantic alliance. This was to be achieved through the
gradual build-up of German economic and military strength to attain equality with the Western alliance.
Consequently, there was tendency at times to regard Berlin with apparent indifference and as a purely allied
concern. The three Western occupying powers determined to press upon the FRG its responsibilities
regarding Berlin and refused to allow the problem to be left entirely to them, but simultaneously denied the
West Germans representation in their meetings. In 1950, the Bundestag accepted the FRG’s role in Berlin,
which essentially took the form of economic support. Some German statesmen, such as Kurt Schumacher,
the leader of the SPD, saw the Berlin blockade as a Soviet attempt to divide Germany, while others such as
Reuter, the mayor of Berlin, saw it as part of a plan to conquer the whole of Germany and that the only hope
of salvation lay in alliance with the West. These two strands of German opinion preoccupied the FRG’s allies
for much of the post-war period.
Berlin posed a dilemma. It symbolised the Cold War division, but at the same time was a beacon of hope for
German reunification. As long as the occupation status for the city remained a fact, the principle of not
dividing Germany permanently was kept intact. Not only did many in the West regard such an outcome as a
mixed blessing (and one which they could live without), they also perceived the tensions which arose over
Berlin as artificial and avoidable. Of particular concern was the vulnerability to interference of the civilian
traffic, which was not covered by the wartime agreements. Harold Macmillan repeatedly emphasised this
point during the 1958–1961 crisis, arguing that the West would be powerless to prevent such a move and
indeed an answer was never forthcoming, but Khrushchev never took the step. These risks were endured
because if the West allowed its position in Berlin to be eroded, or worse was forced out it would be apparent
to the Germans that the Western alliance had given up all hope of reunification. To present them with this
stark admission before the integration of the FRG within Western Europe was irreversible would have
threatened a neutral Germany, undermining the entire basis of the post-war Western recovery. So, the cost of
paying lip-service to the goal of German reunification was the unstable Berlin situation. At times this cost
appeared too great.