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The Team of the Japanese:

A Concept and Politics of Reform in Greece (1906‒1908)

by

Nanako Sawayanagi

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment

of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Department of History

New York University

September, 2009

Katherine Fleming
UMI Number: 3380276

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In memory of

Anastasia Davili-Nemoto and Giorgos Paschalidis,

who encouraged my interest in the history of their country

iv
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am deeply grateful to my advisor, Katherine Fleming, for her

support and inspiration. I feel extremely fortunate to have had an opportunity

to work with her at New York University. Her generosity and warmth always

encouraged me to carry through my project. A special thanks goes also to the

committee members, Yanni Kotsonis, Mark Mazower, Larry Wolff, and

Liana Theodoratou, who made insightful and valuable comments on my

work.

I am also very indebted to all the faculty, staff, and student members

at the American School of Classical Studies at Athens to which I was

affiliated during my research in Greece. I am particularly grateful to the

director, Maria Georgopoulou, and the librarians, the archivists, and the staff

at the Gennadius Library for their kindness and hospitality. Their help was

indispensable to the research and writing of this dissertation. I am thankful to

Antonis Liakos at Athens University for his advice and encouragement. I

appreciate the support from Elizabeth Zachariadou at the Institute for

Mediterranean Studies. Thanks as well to Tassos Anastassiadis at 'Ecole

Française d'Athènes for his suggestions on my work and for his friendship.

I would like to thank my parents, Togo and Kazuko Murata, who

brought me up in a favorable environment which nurtured my intellectual

v
curiosity. I am also grateful to my husband, Keiichi Sawayanagi, for keeping

me sane. Although we lived separately since I started the doctoral program at

New York University, he continuously encouraged me from Japan not to give

up my project. Finally, many thanks to all of my friends who patiently

helped me maintain hope that I would complete this dissertation.

Thank you! Ευχαριστώ! ありがとう!

vi
ABSTRACT

At the turn of the 20th century in Greece, the Team of the Japanese

was the only parliamentary force to overtly criticize the prevalent political

stalemate and to advocate state reform. This reform-oriented opposition

party comprised only seven deputies and was active in the Greek parliament

from 1906 to 1908. The Team rejected conventional patronage-based politics

that relied on personal relationships. Instead, the Team argued for the

development of policies based on Greek national interest as a whole, so that

the Greek state might overcome the domestic and international crises it then

faced.

This dissertation explores the short life of this tiny political party

from its establishment to its dissolution. Focusing on its concrete activities in

the Greek parliament, I discuss the Team’s efforts to reform the state and I

assess the Team’s importance in Greek political history. Uniquely, the Team

was avowedly uninterested in seizing power. Instead, it intended to supervise

government behavior and, for the good of the nation, to induce the

government to reorganize the state system. Hence, the Team actively

supported government polices where it judged them beneficial to the nation.

In this way, the Team tried to play a central role in the rebirth of the state.

The Team of the Japanese finally failed to bring substantial change

vii
to Greek politics. But their various attempts to create effective policies for

the nation and to encourage virtuous and ‘clean’ politics did become a real

threat to politicians who had long been immersed in petty party politics. The

activities of the Team prove that there certainly existed the will and

commitment to reform a state system in which apathy and disorder had been

dominant.

viii
CONTENTS

DEDICATION iv

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS v

ABSTRACT vii

LIST OF FIGURES xi

LIST OF ABBREVIATION xii

NOTE ON CALENDAR xiv

CHAPTER 1

Introduction: The Establishment of the Team of the Japanese 1

CHAPTER 2

“Japan” and the “Japanese” in Greek Society in the Early

Twentieth Century 50

CHAPTER 3

Vision of the State and Desire for Change: Proposals to

Reform Public Service and Economic Policies 88

ix
CHAPTER 4

Refugee Settlement and Land Distribution in Thessaly 123

CHAPTER 5

Educational Reform 175

CHAPTER 6

The Currant Scandal and the Parliamentarianism of the Team

of the Japanese 213

CHAPTER 7

The Dissolution of the Team of the Japanese 245

CHAPTER 8

Epilogue 296

BIBLIOGRAPHY 330

x
LIST OF FIGURES

Fig.1

Stefanos Dragoumis

in the Greek Traditional Costume of a Chief Shepherd 327

Fig. 2

Stefanos Dragoumis in Japanese-Style Clothes 328

Fig. 3

The Japanese as Chinese 329

xi
LIST OF ABBREVIATION

ΑΣΔ: Αρχείο Στέφανου Ν. Δραγούμη [Archive of Stefanos N. Dragoumis].

ΕΕΕ: Εκπαιδευτική Ελληνική Εγκυκλοπαίδεια: Παγκόσμιο βιογραφικό λεξικό


[Educational Greek Encyclopedia: Universal Biographical Dictionary].

ΜΕΕ: Μεγάλη Ελληνική Εγκυκλοπαίδεια [Great Greek Encyclopedia].

ΝΕΛ: Νεώτερον Εγκυκλοπαιδικόν Λεξικόν [Modern Encyclopedic


Dictionary]

ΠΕΒΒ: Παράρτημα της Εφημερίδος της Βουλής της Β΄ Συνόδου της ΙΗ΄
Βουλευτικής Περιόδου [Supplement of Parliamentary Gazette of the
Second Session of the Eighteenth Parliamentary Period].

ΠΕΒΕ: Παράρτημα της Εφημερίδος της Βουλής της Εκτάκτου Συνόδου της
ΙΗ΄ Βουλευτικής Περιόδου [Supplement of Parliamentary Gazette of the
Extraordinary Session of the Eighteenth Parliamentary Period].

ΠΣΒΑ: Πρακτικά των Συνεδριάσεων της Βουλής της Α΄ Συνόδου της ΙΗ΄
Βουλευτικής Περιόδου [Parliamentary Proceedings of the Meetings of the
First Session of the Eighteenth Parliamentary Period].

ΠΣΒΒ: Πρακτικά των Συνεδριάσεων της Βουλής της Β΄ Συνόδου της ΙΗ΄
Βουλευτικής Περιόδου [Parliamentary Proceedings of the Meetings of the

xii
Second Session of the Eighteenth Parliamentary Period].

ΠΣΒΕ: Πρακτικά των Συνεδριάσεων της Βουλής της Εκτάκτου Συνόδου της
ΙΗ΄ Βουλευτικής Περιόδου [Parliamentary Proceedings of the Meetings
of the Extraordinary Session of the Eighteenth Parliamentary Period].

xiii
NOTE ON CALENDAR

The dates given in this dissertation follow, in principle, the Julian calendar

which Greece used until 1923. In some cases, however, the dates are

indicated with the Gregorian calendar marked with NS, e.g. January 1, 1900

(NS).

xiv
CHAPTER 1

Introduction: The Establishment of the Team of the Japanese

The Historical Setting

The first modern international Olympic Games commenced in

Athens on March 25, 1896. The world attentively watched the athletic

spectacle in which about 250 athletes from fourteen countries participated.

The Olympic hymn, written by Greek leading poet Kostis Palamas, was sung

during the opening ceremony. This global sports festival filled the Greeks

and foreign visitors alike with euphoria. The Greek people were excited the

most when Greek runner Spiros Louis, the victor of the marathon race,

entered the Olympic stadium that held 100,000 spectators. Louis’ victory

stirred Greek patriotism and inspired confidence in the Greeks. Their success

in hosting the Olympic Games under difficult financial conditions led to a

hope that Greece could revive and transform itself into a modern civilized

state on par with the European Great Powers. 1

1
Ρέτγκεν, «Η αναγέννησις του ελληνισμού. Η 25 Μαρτίου 1896» [The Rebirth of
Hellenism: March 25, 1896], Ακρόπολις, 26 Μαρτίου 1896, 1; John J. MacAloon, This
Great Symbol: Pierre de Coubertin and the Origins of the Modern Olympic Games
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1981), 195-255; Konstantinos Georgiadis,
Olympic Revival: The Revival of the Olympic Games in Modern Times (Athens:
Ekdotike Athenon, 2003), 170-199; The Olympic Games were held from March 25
(April 6, NS) to April 3 (April 15, NS), 1896. March 25 has a symbolic meaning in
Greece. It is a national holiday to commemorate Greek liberation from Ottoman Turks
as well as the Annunciation in Christian tradition. Thomas W. Gallant points out, “[B]y
combining the celebration of the birth of the nation with Christian festival of the

1
On March 30, five days after the opening ceremony of the Olympics,

Charilaos Trikoupis, former Prime Minister, passed away in voluntary exile

in Cannes, France. He was a distinguished politician who had staunchly

grappled with the reform for modernization in various domestic sectors, such

as the development of a communication system and the rationalization of the

large state bureaucracy. Trikoupis’ party and Theodoros Diligiannis’ party

between them had constituted a two-party system in Parliament since the

1880s. Trikoupis was defeated in the election of 1895 and then retired from

Greek politics. Trikoupis’ retirement and death, rather than the Olympic

festivities, were seen as an omen of a series of events that would take place

in Greece during the ensuing more than ten years. As contemporary British

historian Arnold Toynbee puts it, “The fifteen years that followed 1895 were

indeed a black period in modern Greek history.” 2

The debacle of the Greek–Turkish War of 1897 had the most serious,

protracted impact on Greek politics as well as Greek society for more than a

decade. The Greek army waged war for the first time since its independence

with disastrous results. It was totally defeated by the Ottoman forces in some

thirty days. The Great Powers’ intervention resulted in an armistice. The

Annunciation, the bond between religion and nationalism was drawn even tighter. The
day on which the announcement of the coming of Christ was made thus became now
also the day on which the birth of the new nation was foretold.” Thomas W. Gallant,
Modern Greece (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 69.
2
Arnold J. Toynbee, Greek Policy since 1882 (London: Oxford University Press, 1914),
10.

2
Greeks’ dismal failure made it clear that the “Great Idea (Μεγάλη Ιδέα),” the

Greek irredentist ideology, focusing on Macedonia and Crete, was a mere

dream that was impossible to realize. 3 The miserable defeat compelled the

3
The origin of the term the “Great Idea” is attributed to the speech of the Prime
Minister Ioannis Kolettis at the Constituent Assembly in January 1844. Although the
initial purpose of its use was to secure a post of the public service for the heterochthon
Greeks (those who were originally inhabitants of continental Greece or of the islands
outside the Greek kingdom), and not to declare Greek national territorial aspiration, the
“Great Idea” came to be understood and to be used as the general expression of Greek
nationalism of the nineteenth century which aspired to unify all the “unredeemed”
Greeks within a greater Greek state at the expense of the Ottoman territory. Analyzing
the discourses of the “Great Idea” from 1830 to 1880, Elli Skopetea argues that the
most distinctive feature of this term lies in its vagueness, which allowed it to be
deployed in the varied circumstances of successive crises and acted as a flexible
mechanism for postponing the resolution of more urgent challenges. Although all the
Greeks in the Greek kingdom accepted the expansionism of the “Great Idea” as
legitimate, there were two positions with regard to the way it would be achieved. One
position proposed the Greek kingdom as the “model kingdom,” based on the Western
values of modernization and capable of gaining its territorial aspiration by winning the
trust of the European Great Powers as well as that of the “unredeemed” Greeks in the
Ottoman Empire. The other could be described as more conservative and anti-Western.
It saw the malfunction of the Greek kingdom as the direct result of the too-narrow
territory the European Great Powers imposed on the Greeks and argued that the present
Greek kingdom was merely a staging post on the road to a renewed Byzantine Empire
with Constantinople as its capital, not with Athens. These two positions could not be
always clearly dichotomized and sometimes intermingled. They exerted a powerful
influence not only over the political, but also over economic, social, and cultural
spheres in nineteenth-century Greece. The burning of Smyrna in 1922 that resulted in
the compulsory population exchange between Greece and Turkey in 1923 is considered
as the end of the dream of the “Great Idea.” See Έλλη Σκοπετέα, Το «Πρότυπο
Βασίλειο» και η Μεγάλη Ιδέα: Όψεις του εθνικού προβλήματος στην Ελλάδα
(1830‒1880) [The “Model Kingdom” and the Great Idea: Aspects of National Problem
in Greece (1830‒1880)] (Αθήνα: Πολύτυπο, 1988); Molly Greene, "Great Idea," in
Encyclopedia of Greece and the Hellenic Tradition, vol.1, ed. Graham Speake (London:
Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers, 2000): 688-90; Stathis Gourgouris sees the “Great Idea”
as “ a commonplace topos in the geography of nineteenth-century European politics,
part and parcel of colonialist logic” like “the Panslavism of the Russians or the notion
of ‘Empire’ for the English, not as a unique expression of Greek nationalism.” In
addition, he argues that it is the Russian-Slav threat that led European Powers to
abandon their habitual Philhellenism, which ultimately made the “Great Idea” “the
decrepit phantasm of an opportunist expansionist vision.” This phantasm had a huge
ideological impact, but, contrary to its initial purpose, contributed paradoxically to the

3
Greeks to acknowledge the fact that not only did they not have enough

military capacity to fight against their alleged enemies, but also that they

ultimately had to rely on the political support of the Great Powers with

respect to the fate of their own country and nation. Herbert Wilson remarks

sarcastically in The National Review: “High aspirations do not, unfortunately,

compensate for the total lack of material strength in this world of ours, much

less when men do not live up to them.” 4

Public opinion blamed the royal family and the political leadership

for the humiliating defeat. Crown Prince Constantine, who was a

commander of the troops in Thessaly during the war, was accused of poor

military leadership, while King George was criticized for negligence in

failing to mobilize the fleet. Anti-dynasty feeling became so strong that the

king seriously thought of stepping down from the throne. He could escape

from an assassination attempt in February 1898, which helped him to

recover public sympathy, although he was never able to entirely regain the

confidence of the people. 5

final destruction of “Hellenic culture as the prevalent cultural idiom of the Balkan and
Aegean region.” The failure of the Asia Minor expedition in 1922 was the end of the
hope of territorial expansion and at the same time brought the establishment of the
Turkish nation-state. Stathis Gourgouris, Dream Nation: Enlightenment, Colonization
and the Institution of Modern Greece (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996),
145-146.
4
Herbert Wrigley Wilson, “The Downfall of Greece,” The National Review, June
(1897): 535.
5
S. Victor Papacosma, The Military in Greek Politics: The 1909 Coup d’État (Kent,
Ohio: The Kent State University Press, 1977), 14-15; Douglas Dakin, The Unification

4
In spite of constant calls for the reform of every aspect of the state

system, the political leadership remained impotent to push an ambitious

program of national reconstruction. There was neither action among

politicians to unite for the common goal of rebuilding the country, nor any

politician willing to seriously consider taking the initiative in carrying out

genuine state reforms. Neither party was united around a definite political

principle. Factionalism and petty politics in pursuit of party interests

dominated the political scene. As Geroge Th. Mavrogordatos mentions,

“Parties in Greece were no longer denied the name itself, but were diagnosed

as being purely ‘personal,’ that is, loose and unstable alliances of deputies

around a leader, bound together solely for the conquest of power and

distribution of patronage.” 6

Diligiannis and Georgios Theotokis, who took over Trikoupis’ party

in 1898 by defeating his colleague, Stefanos Dragoumis, led the two most

powerful parties. Although the conservative Diligiannis’ government was

discredited by the defeat of the war of 1897, Theotokis could not be a strong

enough alternative to be trustworthy. Theotokis was far inferior to his

predecessor in ability, and failed to direct his followers in effectively

grappling with the existing difficulties of the state. Diligiannis soon

of Greece 1770–1921 (London: Ernest Benn, 1972), 153.


6
George Th. Mavrogordatos, Stillborn Republic: Social Coalition and Party Strategies
in Greece, 1922–1936 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), 65.

5
recovered from his disgrace. In addition to these two parties, Dimitrios Rallis,

a former Trikoupist, had non-negligible influence. Alexandros Zaimis, a

nephew of Diligiannis and a king’s favorite, also formed a small new party.

The war further crippled the poor national economy, as Greece had

already gone into bankruptcy in 1893. In 1898, the state finances were under

scrutiny by the International Financial Commission that comprised of

representatives from Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia,

Austria–Hungary, and Italy. This body of foreign representatives oversaw the

payment of the war indemnity and the repayment of large foreign loans.

These external restrictions not only damaged the prestige of Greece as an

independent state, but also made it difficult for the government to draw

credit in a relatively easy manner as it used to do. 7 As Ioannis Kokkinakis

puts it, “[T]he parties [could] not rely any more on a dues ex machina of

loans in order to apply an expansive fiscal policy, to improve means of

transport, or to make up a deficit of national policy.” 8 Consequently, the

distinction between the two major parties—the Western style,

reform-oriented Trikoupis’ party versus the traditional populist Diligiannis’

party—which used to be distinctly perceived now became blurred. Neither

party could propose any long-standing vision for the future.

7 Papacosma, The Military in Greek Politics, 27.


8
Ιωάννης Κοκκινάκης, Νόμισμα και πολιτική στην Ελλάδα 1830–1910 [Currency and
Politics in Greece 1830–1910] (Αθήνα: Αλεξάνδρεια, 1999), 579.

6
On the one hand, political life in Greece stagnated in terms of

deliberation over constructive programs for the nation’s rebirth. On the

other hand, political power struggles intensified. An opposition party

resorted to whatever means it could employ so as to sweep the government

party of power. Filibustering and the failure of many opposition deputies to

meet a quorum in Parliament often took place. Party politics developed at

an extra-parliamentary level. An opposition party took advantage of mass

demonstrations on the streets and stirred up, within the populace, a distrust

of the government. Diligiannis’ party was active supporting the Gospel

Riots of 1901, which were apparently caused by a religious and

nationalistic fever to protest the translation of the original Gospel into the

colloquial Greek. The Theotokis’ government collapsed after the bloody

event, with eight people dead. In the following year, Diligiannis’ party

again aroused the mass to stage demonstrations so that Diligiannis could

organize his cabinet. The king eventually was forced to yield to the demand.

There was no longer any constitutional or parliamentary legitimacy. 9

Diligiannis was assassinated in March 1905. His party was soon

split. Two factions—Rallis’ and Kiriakoulis Mavromichalis’—absorbed

former Diligiannis’ deputies respectively, which only added to the political

9
Papacosma, The Military in Greek Politics, 16-17; Philip Carabott, “Politics,
Orthodoxy and the Language Question in Greece: The Gospel Riots of November
1901,” Journal of Mediterranean Studies 3, no.1 (1993): 117-138.

7
instability. Parties competed to fulfill shortsighted self-seeking purposes

through the use of demagogic, opportunistic propaganda; bribery and

patronage prevailed. Georgios Aspreas describes the political situation of

this period as follows:

The party conflict reached the point of incredible enmity, and caused
damage to what was generally regarded as useful both in the capital
city and in provinces. Most beneficial works were messed up and
their completion was obstructed so that the works done by rival
parties would be neglected or that their political prestige would
decline. Petty politics of antagonism and corruption undermined
rational reasoning. Only those who made sound judgment and were
mentally composed, though they were exceptional and small in
number, perceived the dangers. They recognized that above all things
the change of the political system was now necessary. But they were
stigmatized as enemies of the parties and of the political leaders and,
according to imperative usage, enemies of the fatherland. 10

Governments changed eleven times from April 1897 (Rallis succeeded

Diligiannis) to December 1905 (Theotokis succeeded Rallis). The principle

of the dedilomeni was not observed strictly. 11 Both Rallis’ and Zaimis’

10
Γεώργιος Κ. Ασπρέας, Πολιτική ιστορία της νεωτέρας Ελλάδος 1821–1928 [Political
History of Modern Greece 1821–1928], τόμος Γ΄ [vol. 3] (Αθήνα: Ιωάννης Ν. Σιδέρης,
1930), 38.
11
The principle of dedilomeni was the obligation of the king to ask the party leader of
the declared majority in Parliament to form a government. Trikoupis argued the need of
this principle and King George accepted it in 1875. It aimed at restraining the king’s
authority and at making a more stable government. It was a prerequisite of a two-party
system as well. Alexander Nicholaou Damianakos, “Charilaos Trikoupes and the
Modernization of Greece, 1874–1894” (PhD diss., New York University, 1977), 97-107.

8
parties also had opportunities to form a government though they were the

minority. The rapid sequence of governments did nothing effective in spite

of the high socio-political tension. The Greek political world was at a

deadlock.

In the March 1906 election, Theotokis’ party won a great victory

and occupied 110 of the total 177 seats. The second party was Rallis’, and it

won some 30 seats. 12 Parliament included, however, seven deputies, all of

whom were highly conscious of existing political deadlock and impending

state crises, and who would eventually form a group and establish

themselves as the Third Party. They would be later called the Team of the

Japanese (η Ομάδα των Ιαπώνων).

The Japanese in Parliament

If varying methods of combat are as much a part of politics as of


war, the Third Party in our parliament has taken up a new tactic. It
has adopted an entirely Japanese one. Like Japanese generals, the
members of the Third Party are very brave. They do not know the
meaning of secret political bargaining. They do not accept a
backroom deal…. When, in discussion, they discover the mistakes
of the government party, they deliver a vigorous and prompt front
attack on it even in a peaceful atmosphere. They bewilder, confuse,

12
Αλκιβιάδης Προβατάς, Πολιτική ιστορία της Ελλάδος 1821–2002: Νομοθετικά και
εκτελεστικά σώματα [Political History of Greece 1821–2002: Legislative and Executive
Bodies] (Αθήνα: Χρυσή Πέννα, 2003), 354.

9
and strike their enemy. 13

The article under the headline “The Japanese in Parliament” appeared in

Vlasis Gavriilidis’ newspaper Akropolis on February 10, 1907. 14 The author

of the article saw the Third Party, the opposition party to the incumbent

Theotokis’ government, as the one that would open a new horizon in Greek

politics. Ηe compared the bold and fearless attack by the members of the

Third Party, which had been without parallel in Greek political history, to

that of the Japanese who had won a victory over Russia in the

Russo–Japanese War of 1904–1905. 15 In so doing, he lent his full support to

the party whose stated vocation was to realize the reformation of the state

and a national rebirth by putting parliamentary life back into the hands of the

Greeks as a whole and thereby rebuilding a political system that had been

considered almost dead.

13
«Οι Ιάπωνες της Βουλής» [The Japanese in Parliament], Ακρόπολις,10 Φεβρουαρίου
1907, 1.
14
Vlasis Gavriilidis, an owner of the newspaper Akropolis, was known as one of the
best journalists with reformist critical spirit in Greece of the beginning of the twentieth
century. J. Dimakis, “The Greek Press,” ιn Greece in Transition: Essays in the History
of Modern Greece 1821-1974, ed. John T. A. Koumoulides (London: Zeno, 1977), 217.
For further detail of Gavriilidis’ career as a journalist and the comments on him by his
contemporaries, see Δημήτρης Σταμέλος, Πρωτοπόροι και ήρωες της ελληνικής
δημοσιογραφίας: Βλάσης Γαβριηλίδης, Κλεάνθης Τριαντάφυλλος-Ραμπαγάς [Pioneers
and Heroes of Greek Journalism: Vlasis Gavriilidis, Kleanthis Triantafillos-Rambagas]
(Αθήνα: Γλάρος, 1982), 9-90, 153-202.
15
Historians claim that Gavriilidis wrote the above article. However, as it is not the
bylined article, we cannot identify a writer. Two days before this article appeared,
Akropolis had already called Dimitrios Gounaris “parliamentary Japanese warrior.” «Ο
κ. Γούναρης» [Mr. Gounaris], Ακρόπολις, 8 Φεβρουαρίου 1907, 1.

10
The article provoked a large response. From then on, the Third

Party came to be known as the Team of the Japanese and this designation

acquired widespread popularity. The word “Japanese,” the name of a rising

progressive new power in the Far East at that time, reflected people’s feeling

of expectation for a new kind of party in Greek political life.

The Team of the Japanese consisted of seven deputies: Stefanos

Dragoumis (1842–1923), Andreas Panagiotopoulos (1851–1936), Petros

Protopapadakis (1860–1922), Charalambos Vozikis (1862–1937),

Emmanouil Repoulis (1863–1924), Dimitrios Gounaris (1867–1922), and

Apostolos Alexandris (1879–1961).

When and How Was the Team of the Japanese Formed?

Opinions vary about the date of the original launching of the Team

of the Japanese. None of them, however, has been predicated on certain

evidence, and they all fall short of giving convincing explanations.

Grigorios Dafnis mentions that the Team appeared in Parliament on

March 26, 1906, and began to fiercely attack the Theotokis’ government. 16

It was on that day that the national parliamentary election was held. It is true

that all the members who would join the Team of the Japanese were

victorious and became deputies; however, they did not run for the election as
16
Γρηγόριος Δαφνής, Τα ελληνικά πολιτικά κόμματα [The Greek Political Parties]
(Αθήνα: Γαλαξίας, 1961), 91.

11
members of the Team of the Japanese. Moreover, there was no reference to

the establishment of a new party in the newspapers shortly after the election.

The parliamentary proceedings of the first session of the eighteenth

parliamentary period that was convened after the election did not record any

action of the members in a body. Thus we can hardly say that Dafnis’ dating

reflects the fact with regard to the inception of the party.

Dimitrios Chronopoulos, a biographer of Gounaris, claims that

Gounaris’ speech on May 22, 1906, was the start of a historic movement of

the so-called “Japanese.” 17 His speech was about reorganization of the

constituency system. Gounaris opposed the bill that aimed at a broad

constituency system which contributed to strengthening the power of a local

party boss; instead he advocated the advantages of a single-member

constituency. 18 It is not clear at all, however, why Chronopoulos regarded

this speech as the commencement of the party. He does not give any

convincing explanation.

Dionisios Alikaniotis, also a biographer of Gounaris, writes that the

date of June 3, 1906, should be regarded as the birth of the Team of the

Japanese. According to him, on that day, Gounaris, Protopapadakis, and

Dragoumis argued that legislative proceedings were necessary in order to

17
Δημήτριος Χρονόπουλος, Δημήτριος Γούναρης [Dimitrios Gounaris] (Αθήνα:
Ελληνική Ευρωεκδοτική, 1987), 25.
18
There was no meeting on that day in Parliament. In fact, Gounaris made his speech
about reorganization of the constituency system on May 20, 1906. ΠΣΒΑ, 96.

12
protect the Greek emigrants and asked the government to set up a committee

to investigate the issue as a whole. 19 But what actually took place seems

slightly different from Alikaniotis’ explanation. The parliamentary

proceedings of June 3, 1906, and articles in several newspapers on that day

indicate that Gounaris insisted protective measures should be taken on behalf

of the Greek emigrants. Dragoumis did not claim this together with Gounaris,

but agreed with the latter only after Gounaris proposed to set up a committee.

Some other deputies also supported Gounaris’ proposal. On the other hand,

we cannot confirm from the sources available that Protopapadakis took part

in the discussion about the emigrant issue on that day. 20

Gunnar Hering also mentions, though in a somewhat reserved

manner, that the nucleus of the party emerged together with a proposal to

protect the Greek emigrants. 21 Indeed, the committee to investigate the

increasing number of Greek emigrants that Gounaris had insisted on

establishing was the original initiative in Greek history that would grapple

with this topic. As a sponsor of the committee, Gounaris submitted a report

that examined the existing emigration situation and put forward a proposal to

19
Διονύσιος Π. Αλικανιώτης, Δημήτριος Γούναρης:Μικρή συμβολή στην κατανόηση
ενός προδρόμου της εποχής μας [Dimitrios Gounaris: Small Contribution to
Understanding a Forerunner of Our Epoch] (Αθήνα: Φιλιππότης, 1983), 78.
20
ΠΣΒΑ, 188-190.
21
Gunnar Hering, Die politischen Parteien in Griechenland 1821–1936, Teil 2
(München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1992), 657.

13
legislate on June 29, 1906. 22 However, this dating is not convincing either,

as both Alikaniotis and Hering fail to explain why this action of Gounaris

can be interpreted as the launch of the Team of the Japanese.

There are several primary sources that historians and biographers

have not previously consulted, and they provide useful information as to

when and how the Team of the Japanese came into existence. The documents

are articles in contemporary newspapers, including those written by

members of Team of the Japanese, Alexandris’ memoirs, and a letter from

Alexandris to Dragoumis. We can reconstruct, to some degree, from these

sources when and how the members joined together to form a new party.

It would be safe to say that the members formally initiated their

political activity as a group in November 1906, when the extraordinary

session of the eighteenth parliamentary period commenced. In the

parliamentary proceedings on November 22, 1906, we find for the first time

an account that gives a picture that all the members, except Repoulis, who

were to be later called the Japanese, showed up as a unit. Dragoumis

addressed a questionnaire concerning the foreign policy of the government

with his signature and those of Gounaris, Panagiotopoulos, Vozikis,

Protopapadakis, and Alexandris. 23 This can be regarded as their first joint

22
ΠΣΒΑ, 470-471.
23
ΠΣΒΕ, 13. We do not know why the parliamentary proceedings did not record
Repoulis’ name. As we shall discuss shortly, Repoulis was one of the first three men

14
action in Parliament.

Prior to the opening of a new parliamentary session, the interview

with Dragoumis, entitled “An Interview with a Panhellenic Politician,”

appeared on October 31, 1906, in the newspaper Akropolis and formally

heralded the formation of a new political party to the public. 24 In his

interview, Dragoumis discussed what had motivated the members to decide

to establish a new party.

According to Dragoumis, the destruction of Anchialos, a city on the

west coast of the Black Sea, by the Bulgarians in the summer of 1906 led the

members to take up a new political movement. 25 The violence of the

Bulgarians ruined Anchialos for the Greek community that had flourished

for a long time. The Greek state itself neither took any effective measures

against the Bulgarian vandalism, nor had foreign arbitration. In regard to the

disaster of Anchialos, Dragoumis said, “We all saw that the lessons of our

inglorious defeat of the war of 1897 passed away fruitlessly.” 26 The country

had not recovered from the aftermath of the war and was in a state of turmoil

and unrest. Naturally enough, he contended, “the danger of the destruction of

our national lineage forced all the Greeks to turn their eyes more carefully to

who took an initiative to form a new political party.


24
«Μία συνέντευξις με πανελλλήνιον πολιτευτήν» [An Interview with a Panhellenic
Politician], Ακρόπολις, 31 Οκτωβρίου 1906, 1.
25
We shall discuss the disastrous event of Anchialos and its repercussions on Greece in
Chapter 4.
26
«Μία συνέντευξις με πανελλλήνιον πολιτευτήν», 1.

15
the domestic condition and to be convinced that the present domestic

situation was giving courage and permission to our enemies to usurp the

rights of the Greeks.” 27 Dragoumis continued to explain how the event of

Anchialos influenced would-be members of his party.

Politicians more persistently paid attention to the urgent necessity


for domestic restoration (επανόρθωσις). Most of them came to think
about how they could use their abilities in a more useful manner for
the sake of restoration. And the decision to form the so-called third
party …was indebted to this firm idea … so that they could unite
their efforts for the common end and concentrate their activities,
and that they could become stronger through the alliance and enter
with greater courage into the struggle for regeneration
(ανόρθωσις). 28

Dragoumis pointed out that their enthusiasm for actively working for state

domestic reform made them decide to take up a new political movement.

They discussed many pending important topics and discovered that they had

similar opinions on many subjects, which provided the ground for their

common action.

Dragoumis mentioned that members had a meeting a few days after

the event of Anchialos. 29 The disastrous attack by the Bulgarians against the

Greek inhabitants of Anchialos had taken place on July 31, 1906. Therefore,
27
«Μία συνέντευξις με πανελλλήνιον πολιτευτήν», 1.
28
«Μία συνέντευξις με πανελλλήνιον πολιτευτήν», 1.
29
«Μία συνέντευξις με πανελλλήνιον πολιτευτήν», 1.

16
the members must have gotten together at some point at the beginning of

August. It is hard to say, however, that all seven members who were to act

together later were present from the first meeting. It was probably only

Gounaris, Protopapadakis, and Repoulis that were present.

In his open letter to the newspaper Estia, published on June 29, June

30, and July 1, 1908, Repoulis retrospectively looked back on how the Team

of the Japanese was established and what events took place among the

members during their, almost, two years of activity in Parliament. Repoulis

mentioned that Gounaris, Protopapadakis, and he were the first members of

the Team. 30 All of them were still affiliated with the government party in the

summer of 1906. According to Repoulis, they were extremely tired of the

existing political situation. He wrote, “I will never forget the tone of the

voice and the pain of the soul, which emphasized that it would be far better

to shatter the old things in order to change the present political situation,

rather than being subordinated to it so as to satisfy whatever ambition.” 31

According to Repoulis, Protopapadakis in particular was disillusioned with

the existing situation. “Before and after the Team of seven members was

established, Mr. deputy of Naxos [i.e. Protopapadakis] was afraid that any

attempt to reach agreement with Mr. Theotokis would be meaningless

30
Εμμανουήλ Ρέπουλης, «Από τα παρασκήνια των πολιτικών μας ηθών» [Our Political
Ethics as Seen from behind the Scenes], Εστία , 29 Ιουνίου 1908, 1.
31
Ρέπουλης, «Από τα παρασκήνια των πολιτικών μας ηθών», Εστία , 29 Ιουνίου 1908,
1.

17
because, he said, there was no success from Mr. Theotokis.” 32 Indeed,

Protopapadakis overtly demonstrated a critical attitude toward government

policy, though he was still a member of the government party. In June 1906,

for example, Protopapadakis fiercely criticized the governmental bill on

electrification contract of the railways of Athens, Piraeus, and the environs

as he considered it had not been carefully thought out. At that time, Gounaris

supported him in this. 33

Yet, Repoulis, Gounaris, and Protopapadakis do not seem to venture

from the beginning to leave Theotokis’ party and to establish their own

political party. Their movement started as an attempt to persuade Theotokis

to follow the reform plans that they believed could advance the state in a

better direction. In other words, though it seems contradictory, they intended

to break a deadlock on the Greek domestic situation through the existing

government party. In this sense, they could be characterized as

unadventurous. 34 At the same time, however, they also looked for

32
Ρέπουλης, «Από τα παρασκήνια των πολιτικών μας ηθών», Εστία , 30 Ιουνίου 1908,
1.
33
Αλέξανδρος Α. Οικονόμου, Πέτρος Πρωτοπαπαδάκης 1859–1922 [Petros
Protopapadakis 1859–1922] (Αθήνα, 1972), 114; Concerning his whole speech on this
topic, see «Ο λόγος του κ. Π. Πρωτοπαπαδάκη, βουλευτού εκ Νάξου περί
ηλεκτροκινήσεως των τροχιοδρόμων κατά την συνεδρίασιν της 28 Ιουνίου» [The
Speech of Mr. P. Protopapadakis, Deputy of Naxos, about the Electrification of the
Railways at the Meeting on June 28], Ακρόπολις, 1 Ιουλίου 1906, 2-4.
34
The newspaper Akropolis reported on August 21, 1906, that some deputies of the
government party began to discuss the necessity to reform the existing political system.
Akropolis does not mention who they were, but there is a possibility that they were
Repoulis, Gounaris, and Protopapadakis. Akropolis wrote, “The deputies in question

18
like-minded deputies beyond Theotokis’ party. In addition, they began to

discuss who would become their leader to advocate their reform movement.

We do not know exactly how and when the first three members

recruited others. It is certain, however, that Alexandris was the last to join. In

his memoirs, Alexandris vividly described the day when he was asked to

become a member of their new party.

In September 1906 after I returned from Europe, I was with others


at the then popular confectionary “Giannaki,” when Ch. Vozikis, a
deputy for Kinouria, approached me in a polite way and asked me to
step aside for a moment’s talk. He said, “What do you think of our
colleagues D. Gounaris, P. Protopapadakis, Emm. Repoulis and An.
Panagiotopoulos?” He added with a smile, “I know that you have
the best opinion about me.” I said to him, “I cannot give any
opinion about them on the basis of the parliamentary discussions
because none of them have yet involved themselves in the
discussions. But past political activities of P. Protopapadakis and A.
Panagiotopoulos, articles about politics by E. Repoulis as a director
of the newspaper Akropolis and especially Gounaris’ physiognomy,
which is like an already established politician and lawyer, are so
trustworthy that I would say they are the political figures of the
future on whom Greece can rely.” Then Vozikis said, “I have been
entrusted to inform you that all those figures I have just mentioned

have made it a necessary condition for cooperation that they should consider how to
realize through Mr. Theotokis, leader of the majority party, reform plans they propose.
It is evident that they do not intend to overthrow the Theotokis’ government. Rather,
they are making efforts to strengthen the government by convincing Mr. Theotokis to
change the political system.” «Μια ευχάριστος πολιτική ζύμωσις» [A Favorable
Political Activity], Ακρόπολις, 21 Αυγούστου 1906, 3.

19
have determined to form a political team and they wish to ask you
to participate in it. The team will consist of only seven members,
and no more.” I interrupted him, saying “Six, not seven.” “Because
S. Dragoumis will be also a member, whom we intend to appoint as
the leader,” Vozikis added. I expressed some apprehension because
Dragoumis belonged to the bygone political world. Vozikis said,
“Although only Gounaris is really fit to be the leader, he did not
agree to assume the leadership of our team. He thinks that his
leadership would be considered a premature political ambition and
that would not be a good omen for us.” 35

As the passage above shows, six members except for Alexandris had been

almost fixed at some point in September 1906. The passage also

demonstrates that although Alexandris did not have intimate relations with

other members before, he now expressed a positive and favorable impression

about them.

Yet the passage tells us more than simply that. According to

Alexandris, Vozikis said, “S. Dragoumis will be also a member, whom we

intend to appoint as the leader (Θα είναι και ο Σ. Δραγούμης, τον οποίον και

θα ονομάσωμεν αρχηγόν).” Judging from the future tense used by Vozikis

with regard to Dragoumis’ participation, it appears most reasonable to

suppose that Dragoumis had already been approached for a new party by its

35
Απόστολος Αλεξανδρής, Πολιτικαί αναμνήσεις [Political Memoirs] (Πάτρα: Δ.
Φραγκούλης και Κ. Βαρζάνης, 1947), 5. In this passage, Alexandris wrote that Repoulis
was the director of Akropolis. In reality, however, Repoulis used to be an editor-in-chief.
Vlasis Gavriilidis was the owner-director of Akropolis. .

20
members, but had not yet made a final decision on whether to join it as the

leader.

Dragoumis’ statement is more suggestive on this matter. In his

above-mentioned interview with Akropolis, Dragoumis used only the

third-person plural form, such as “they examined (εξήτασαν),” “they

analyzed (ανέλυσαν),” and “they did not hesitate (δεν εδίστασαν),” when he

described how the would-be members had been determined to form a new

political party. It was not until the very end of his interview that he expressed

the aspirations of the party with the use of the first-person plural form, as in

“we will support (θέλομεν υποστηρίξει).” 36 We can draw the conclusion

from these examples that Dragoumis was neither among the first members

who took the initiative in establishing a new party, nor participated in the

discussions immediately following the disaster of Anchialos. It is most

probable that the members singled out Dragoumis as a potential leader and

approached him with an offer of leadership after Gounaris declined to be the

leader. In short, Dragoumis was seen as the second best by the members of

the aspiring Team of the Japanese.

According to Alexandris’ memoirs, Gounaris did not want to

become a leader because he was afraid that people would consider the

formation of a new party as just a tool to help him attain his personal

36
«Μία συνέντευξις με πανελλλήνιον πολιτευτήν», 1.

21
political ambitions. At that time, Gounaris was thirty-nine years old, the

youngest of the three men who were launching their new political

movement. 37 Taking into consideration the fact that Theotokis, Prime

Minister, was sixty-two, and Dimitrios Rallis, the leader of the second

largest party, was also sixty-two, it might have been accurate to say that

people would see him as not sufficiently mature to be a leader. Thus his

hesitation could be understandable. 38 Dragoumis was then sixty-four years

old.

However, as Alexandris correctly pointed out, Dragoumis might be

seen as a deputy who belonged to the old political regime that the members

of a new political party wanted to reform. The choice of Dragoumis as a

leader was clearly contradictory to their intentions. Why did the members

convince Dragoumis to join them? Furthermore, why did Dragoumis finally

accept the leadership of the party? He had been active enough as an

independent deputy and had had influence over Parliament for almost ten

years after he left Trikoupis’ party. Why did he need to work together with

others after such a long time? We cannot provide convincing answers. One

possibility is that the Bulgarian vandalism of Anchialos in the summer of

1906 was so disastrous that Dragoumis might have thought it inevitable to

37
In 1906 Repoulis was 43 years old while Protopapadakis was 46.
38
In 1910 when Eleftherios Venizelos became the Prime Minister, he was 46 years old.
He was older than Gounaris by three years.

22
make an all-out effort to reorient the state at that critical juncture and thus to

collaborate with others through his own initiatives. It also could be said from

the other members’ point of view that though he was part of the old system,

Dragoumis would be a good match against the Theotokis’ government, as the

former had been defeated by the latter over the appointment of Trikoupis’

successor in 1898.

As mentioned above, Vozikis and Panagiotopoulos had already

joined the Team at some point in September 1906. Yet we cannot but make a

guess as to how these two men were recruited. We know, to some degree,

what relations the first three members had with Vozikis and Panagiotopoulos

before these two men became members. As for Vozikis, he was a member of

the committee called upon to investigate the issue of Greek emigrants in the

first session of the eighteenth parliamentary period in which Gounaris played

a central role. They worked together and must have known each other well.

There is a possibility that Gounaris saw that Vozikis had a sense of crisis

similar to his with regard to the then current political situation. The

participation of Panagiotopoulos could be assessed from his relations with

Protopapadakis. Both men had been the members of the Association for the

Promotion of Beneficial Books. 39 This is pure speculation, but they

39
Protopapadakis was one of the founder members of the association which established
in 1899. Panagiotopoulos became a member in 1901. Ελένη Δ. Μπελιά, Σύλλογος προς
Διάδοσιν Ωφελίμων Βιβλίων: Διαδρομή μιας εκατονταετίας 1899–1999 [The Association

23
probably did find themselves on the same wavelength.

Then, what were the criteria for membership? Alexandris’ memoirs

provide some hints about this. Alexandris did not have personal relations

with the other members prior to the establishment of a new political party.

He was elected as a deputy for the first time only six months earlier and had

not yet taken an active role in Parliament. Thus he asked Vozikis why they

wanted him to be a member. Vozikis explained that Greece needed

personalities with a sense of politics, and that two events confirmed that

Alexandris was the person necessary for Greek politics. First, Alexandris

was not scared when he was attacked at the screening of the result of the

election by the criticism that he was not qualified to be a deputy due to his

relative youth. Second, he boldly censured both Theotokis and Rallis when

these two established politicians insulted each other in Parliament. Vozikis

admired Alexandris’ political courage. 40

Chronopoulos mentions, without providing any evidence, that

Gounaris, Protopapadakis, and Dragoumis initiated first Vozikis, then

Alexandris and Repoulis, and finally Panagiotopoulos. Alikaniotis also

argues that Dragoumis, Gounaris, and Protopapadakis were the first three

for the Promotion of Beneficial Books: The Course of One Hundred Year 1899–1999]
(Αθήνα: Σύλλογος προς Διάδοσιν Ωφελίμων Βιβλίων, 1999), 47, 319.
40
Αλεξανδρής, Πολιτικαί αναμνήσεις, 6-7.

24
members. 41 But their claims cannot be accepted if we look carefully at first

hand materials. We can conclude that Gounaris, Protopapadakis, and

Repoulis started a new political movement and recruited Vozikis and

Protopapadakis. Then they asked Dragoumis to become their leader. Finally,

Alexandris joined them. 42

Repoulis mentioned that he had met Theotokis as a representative of

the Team several times to talk about its reform ideas before and after the

Team was established completely under the leadership of Dragoumis. 43 The

Team members drew up specific plans for legislative and administrative

reform. Protopapadakis made up a suitable closing sentence of their proposal.

It read, “It would be desirable that the Prime Minister, leading a great

majority and above all else acknowledging in conversation with his friends

the miserable situation in all respects, stand in vanguard of the legislative

and administrative reform policy we suggest.” 44

Repoulis took pains to make the Prime Minister understand their

true purpose in conferring with him. As he put it, “It goes without saying that

41
Χρονόπουλος, Δημήτριος Γούναρης, 25; Αλικανιώτης, Δημήτριος Γούναρης, 78-79.
42
Alexandris made his final decision to join the Team after Dragoumis assumed its
leadership. In his letter to Dragoumis dated October 29, 1906, Alexandris wrote that he
was pleased that Dragoumis became the leader of the Team, and asked the latter to
count him as its member. ΑΣΔ, Φακ. 156, υποφακ. 156.2, εγγρ. 33.
43 Ρέπουλης, «Από τα παρασκήνια των πολιτικών μας ηθών», Εστία , 30 Ιουνίου 1908,

1.
44
Ρέπουλης, «Από τα παρασκήνια των πολιτικών μας ηθών», Εστία , 30 Ιουνίου 1908,
1.

25
my position was extremely weak before the Prime Minister. Above all I had

to convince Mr. Theotokis not that we wanted to demonstrate ourselves

worthy of being ministers of his cabinet, but that we asked him to form a

new ministry that would like to and would be able to realize the plans we

suggested.” 45

Theotokis warmly listened to Repoulis, and regarded their reform

plans as reasonable. But he did not agree to put them into practice. Instead,

he was more willing to convince Repoulis that it was too bold to execute

their plans that might bring negative result to his party. He also showed his

displeasure when Repoulis pointed out what the Team regarded as

governmental defects. Theotokis and Repoulis did not eventually reach any

agreement. Theotokis rejected the proposal on the ground that his

government had to make every effort to maintain power in order to carry out

military reorganization. He judged that their proposal would make it

impossible for his party to hold on to power, to which Repoulis said to

Theotokis, “Mr. Prime Minister, you have as the starting point of

consideration the necessity to maintain the government for its military policy,

while we have as the starting point of consideration the necessity to impose

several principles which we said and which the government declined. Thus I

am afraid that we will not be able to come to an understanding between


45
Ρέπουλης, «Από τα παρασκήνια των πολιτικών μας ηθών», Εστία , 30 Ιουνίου 1908,
1.

26
us.” 46

At this point, the Team made a final firm decision to take the next

step, that is, to start their political activity in Parliament as an opposition

camp in order to reform the state system.

Prosopography of the Japanese

Different numbers and names of members have been proposed with

regard to those who made up the Team of the Japanese. 47 Taking into

consideration the original materials available, however, it is clear that the

Team of the Japanese was formed of seven deputies only and no one joined

later, before its disintegration. The Team consisted of Dragoumis,

Panagiotopoulos, Protopapadakis, Vozikis, Repoulis, Gounaris, and

Alexandris. 48

46
Ρέπουλης, «Από τα παρασκήνια των πολιτικών μας ηθών», Εστία , 30 Ιουνίου 1908,
1.
47
For example, Georgios Aspreas did not mention the names of Alexandris and
Panagiotopoulos. Ασπρέας, Πολιτική ιστορία νεωτέρας Ελλάδος, 85-86; Grigorios
Dafnis named the six members except for Dragoumis. Δαφνής, Τα ελληνικά πολιτικά
κόμματα, 91; According to Douglas Dakin, the Dragoumis–Gounaris party was
composed of 4-6 members. Dakin, The Unification of Greece, 311; The entry “the Team
of the Japanese” («Ιαπώνων, ομάς») in the Great Greek Encyclopedia mentions that
Dragoumis, Gounaris, Protopapadakis, Repoulis, Vozikis, and Epameinondas
Mavromatis were the members of the Team. ΜΕΕ, τομ. ΙΒ΄ [vol. 12], 793; The entry
“Dragoumis, Stefanos” («Δραγούμης, Στέφανος») in Great Greek Biographical
Dictionary states that Epameinondas Mavromatis collaborated with the Team of the
Japanese. Κωνσταντίνος Α. Βοβολίνης, Μέγα Ελληνικόν Βιογραφικόν Λεξικόν [Great
Greek Biographical Dictionary], τόμος Γ’ [vol. 3] (Αθήνα: Βιομηχανική Επιθεώρηση,
1958), 466.
48
Alexandris’ memoirs refer to only these names as the members. We also find the
expression of “the team of the seven members (η ομάς επταμελής)” in Repoulis’ open

27
As mentioned above, Dragoumis was the oldest member of the

group and he became the leader of the Team of the Japanese. He was from an

established political family in Athens. His father Nikolaos Dragoumis had

been involved in politics since the establishment of the Greek kingdom.

Dragoumis studied law in Paris and returned to Greece to work as a judge of

a court of the first instance and then as a lawyer. He had been one of the

most distinguished members of Trikoupis’ party since 1878, and been

successively Minister of Foreign Affairs (1886–1889, 1892–1893), Minister

of the Interior (1888–1890), and Minister of Justice (1890) of his

government. After Trikoupis’ death, Dragoumis distanced himself from the

party because he was not content with the stance of Theotokis, Trikoupis’

successor. Dragoumis was affiliated with no party and continued his political

career independently. He was elected as an independent deputy for Attica in

March 1906. In addition to his activity in Parliament, it is known that

Dragoumis, whose family was of Macedonian origin, was deeply concerned

about the Greek interest in Macedonia. He enthusiastically supported Greek

nationalist activities in the Macedonian struggle against the Slav nations. He

was also a scholar and wrote many articles in the fields of political science,

archeology, philology, and history. 49

letter to the newspaper Estia. Ρέπουλης, «Από τα παρασκήνια των πολιτικών μας
ηθών», Εστία, 30 Ιουνίου 1908, 1.
49
«Δραγούμης, Στέφανος» [Dragoumis, Stefanos], in ΜΕΕ, τόμος Θ΄ [vol. 9], 531;

28
Panagiotopoulos was also already an established politician. In his

youth he studied law in Athens and then returned to Aigio of the

Peloponnese, his hometown, to administer his family’s property which his

father had acquired through currant trade. Panagiotopoulos was also

occupied with the currant trade, but soon abandoned it. In 1878, he published

a newspaper, Kokoras, and then spent his time reading classical Greek works

and studying problems related to education. He was first involved in national

politics as a deputy of Aigialeia in 1885 and had been repeatedly reelected

since then. He assumed the post of Minister of Education in the Zaimis’

government of 1897. 50

Although these two men were over fifty years old and had already

established their position in Parliament, the other members of the Team were

relatively young and less experienced. Vozikis was from Kinouria in the

Peloponnese. His family ancestry went back to the medieval period. He

graduated from the Law Faculty of Athens University and worked as a

lawyer in Tripoli. He entered politics in his early 30s and served as a deputy

for eleven terms. When he was first elected as a deputy for Kinouria in 1895,

he followed Diligiannis’ party. After the Greek–Turkish War in 1897, he

«Δραγούμης, Στέφανος» [Dragoumis, Stefanos], in Κωνσταντίνος Α. Βοβολίνης, Μέγα


Ελληνικόν Βιογραφικόν Λεξικόν, τόμος Γ’, 454.
50
«Παναγιωτόπουλος, Ανδρέας» [Panagiotopoulos, Andreas], in ΜΕΕ, τόμος ΙΘ΄ [vol.
19], 501; Αριστ. Σταυρόπουλος, Ιστορία της πόλεως Αιγίου [History of the City of
Aigio] (Πάτρα: Αγγ. Κουλουμπής, 1954), 522.

29
moved to Zaimis’ party and had been affiliated with it until 1903. He was

elected in 1906 as a deputy of Theotokis’ party, but was a follower of

Zaimis’ party just before he joined the Team of the Japanese. 51

Repoulis studied law at Athens University and then got actively

involved in journalism from 1890 onward. He started his career as a

proofreader for the newspaper Kathimerini. Then he worked as an

editor-in-chief and columnist of several Athenian newspapers, such as

Akropolis, Skrip, Neon Asti, and Estia for ten years and published many

articles on politics and the economy. In 1899, he was first elected to

Parliament as a deputy for Ermionida in the Peloponnese, where he came

from. He was affiliated with Theotokis’ party. Soon he distinguished himself

in the political arena and became a sponsor of the state budget of the year

1899. Although he lost the national election in 1903, Repoulis was appointed

as a general secretary for the Ministry of Finance, which he resigned shortly

because he felt appalled by the frequent jobbery. He was elected repeatedly

in 1905 and 1906 as a member of Theotokis’ party. 52

51 «Βοζίκης, Χαράλαμπος» [Voz ikis, Charalambos], in ΜΕΕ, τόμος Ζ΄ [vol. 7], 445;
«Βοζίκης, Χαράλαμπος» [Vozikis, Charalambos], in ΝΕΛ, τόμος Δ΄ [vol. 4], 615;
«Ποιοί εξελέγησαν βουλευταί» [Who Were Elected as Deputies?], Ακρόπολις, 26
Μαρτίου 1906, 4; It is not certain when Vozikis moved from Theotokis’ party to
Zaimis’. The article of the newspaper Athens on October 18, 1906, however, reported
that there was a rumor that Vozikis, deputy of Zaimis’ party, would move to the
government party. «Η πολιτική κατάστασις» [The Political Situation], Αθήναι, 18
Οκτωβρίου 1906, 2.
52 «Ρέπουλης, Εμμανουήλ» [Repoulis, Emmanouil], in ΜΕΕ, τόμος ΚΑ΄ [vol. 21],

109; «Ρέπουλης, Εμμανουήλ» [Repoulis, Emmanouil], in ΕΕΕ, τόμος Θ΄Α [vol. 9Α],

30
Protopapadakis was a deputy for Naxos Island in the Cyclades. He

was a member of Theotokis’ party since he was first elected in 1902.

Protopapadakis had rare qualities as a politician, in that he had knowledge of

mathematics, physics, and engineering, while most of the Greek politicians

at that time studied law. He completed his education in France from 1879 to

1887 with the support of Dimitrios Vikelas, a great Greek prose writer of that

time, and Egger Emile and Gustav d’Eichthal, Grecophile French

intellectuals. On his return to Greece, he taught engineering at several

schools, such as the Naval Practice School. In addition to teaching, he

worked as a chief engineer of the railroad of Piraeus–Athens–Peloponnese

and also assumed responsibility for the construction of the Corinth Canal

from 1890 to 1892. He also addressed the problem of the water supply in

Athens and contributed to the sanitation of the capital city. He was virtually

regarded as the best engineer in Greece at that time. He married Vikelas’

sister’s daughter. Protopapadakis, probably under the influence of Vikelas,

was also concerned with the educational movement. He worked together

with Vikelas for the Association for the Promotion of Beneficial Books from

1899 onward, with the intention of further spreading literacy and learning

among the Greek people. At the same time he himself wrote several booklets

63-64; «Ρέπουλης, Εμμανουήλ» [Repoulis, Emmanouil], in ΝΕΛ, τόμος ΙΣΤ΄ [vol. 16],
423.

31
for educational purposes. 53

Historians and biographers hold virtually the same view on the

practical leadership of the Team of the Japanese. They regard Gounaris as

the real leader of the party, while they see Dragoumis as a figurehead

elevated as a token of respect for his long political career and his

independent stance. Gounaris, twenty-five years younger than Dragoumis,

graduated from Athens University and continued to study law at the

universities of Leipzig, Heidelberg, Göttingen and Munich in Germany, and

then political science in Paris and London from 1889 to 1892. After he

returned to Greece, he worked as a lawyer in his hometown of Patras in the

Peloponnese. He was first elected as an independent deputy for Patras in

1902 and was affiliated with Theotokis’ party in 1904. He failed to be

reelected in the election in 1905, but won again in 1906 as a deputy of

Theotokis’ party. 54

Alexandris was the youngest member. After he studied law at

53 «Πρωτοπαπαδάκης, Πέτρος» [Protopapadakis, Petros], in ΜΕΕ, τόμος Κ΄ [vol. 20],


835-836; «Πρωτοπαπαδάκης, Πέτρος» [Protopapadakis, Petros], in ΕΕΕ, τόμος Η΄ [vol.
8], 384; «Πρωτοπαπαδάκης, Πέτρος» [Protopapadakis, Petros], in ΝΕΛ, τόμος ΙΣΤ΄
[vol. 16], 469; According to Alexandris, Protopapadakis was deeply concerned with the
Greek nationalist activities in Macedonia and highly respected Ion Dragoumis, Stefanos
Dragoumis’ son. Αλεξανδρής, Πολιτικαί αναμνήσεις, 12-13; Vikelas was also known as
President of the First Modern Olympic Games of 1896. For his life and work, see
«Βικέλας, Δημήτριος» [Vikelas, Dimitrios], in ΜΕΕ, τόμος Ζ΄ [vol. 7], 270-271;
Concerning Egger Emile and Gustav d’Eichthal, see Οικονόμου, Πέτρος
Πρωτοπαπαδάκης, 22n1, 25n1.
54
«Γούναρης, Δημήτριος» [Gounaris, Dimitrios], in ΜΕΕ, τόμος Η΄ [vol. 8], 652-54;
«Γούναρης, Δημήτριος» [Gounaris, Dimitrios], in ΕΕΕ, τόμος Γ΄ [vol. 3], 194-196;
«Γούναρης, Δημήτριος» [Gounaris, Dimitrios], in ΝΕΛ, τόμος E΄ [vol. 5], 629-630.

32
Athens University and in Paris, he entered politics. He did not have any

political experience before he was elected as an independent deputy of

Trikala in Thessaly in 1906. He was the only member who published

memoirs about his political career and who reviewed the activities of the

Team of the Japanese and their achievements over the years 1906–1908. 55

In a series of “Portraits from Parliament” in the newspaper

Akropolis, in December 1906, just when the Team of the Japanese started its

parliamentary activity, Spiros Melas selected some of the deputies and

vividly described them. He referred to all the members of the Team, which

proves that they were considered worthy of attention. It is interesting to look

at how the members were characterized and what impression they gave to

the contemporary public.

Melas described Dragoumis as “the first that represent[ed] certain

power in Parliament and the only person that exercise[d] it because he [had]

been involved in politics for some time as an independent deputy.” He wrote,

“One word characterizes him, that is, prudent.” 56 Gounaris was “the first

young man (πρωτοπαλλήκαρον) of Dragoumis’ party” and “a conqueror.”

Melas greatly appreciated Gounaris’ speaking ability and put it, “His speech

55 «Αλεξανδρής, Απόστολος» [Alexandris, Apostolos], in ΕΕΕ, τόμος Α΄ [vol. 1],


133-134; According to Percy F. Martin, Alexandris also studied law in Germany and
Austria. Percy F. Martin, Greece of Twentieth Century (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1913),
65.
56
Σπύρος Μέλας, «Εικόνες από την Βουλήν: Σ. Δραγούμης» [Portraits from
Parliament: S. Dragoumis], Ακρόπολις, 22 Δεκεμβρίου 1906, 1.

33
sounds as if he said to you, ‘Follow me!’” 57 Protopapadakis was “a realist in

Parliament” and spoke like “an Englishman.” According to Melas, “When he

speaks, numbers get soul, live, and always present mathematical truth.” 58

Vozikis was depicted as “an eagle, like a Spartan, and big, like a

mountaineer.” He was “a brave and upstanding man (λεβέντης) in all aspects

either in words, or in appearance, or spirit.” 59 Melas observed a lack of

experience in Parliament in Alexandris’ manner, but watched over him

fondly, saying, “He does not get the hang of the platform. His voice and

figure are timid without demonstrating his significance. But he will

undoubtedly become one of the best warriors of speech. Even now he does

not give up when attacked.” 60 Repoulis was regarded as a proudly

independent person. “He does not simply agree with anyone because he does

not want to be a follower. He prefers to be one system.” 61 Panagiotopoulos

was a person that “[took] a strong action against favor.” Yet he was a very

popular among his local people. He was also regarded as one of the most

skilled orators in Parliament. According to Melas, his rhetorical power was

57 Σπύρος Μέλας, «Εικόνες από την Βουλήν: Ν. Γούναρης» [Portraits from Parliament:
N. Gounaris], Ακρόπολις, 22 Δεκεμβρίου 1906, 1. «Ν. Γούναρης» [N. Gounaris] in the
title is a typo, it should be «Δ. Γούναρης» [D. Gounaris].
58
Σπύρος Μέλας, «Εικόνες από την Βουλήν: Ο κ. Πρωτοπαπαδάκης» [Portraits from
Parliament: Mr. Protopapadakis], Ακρόπολις, 23 Δεκεμβρίου 1906, 1.
59
Σπύρος Μέλας, «Εικόνες από την Βουλήν: Ο κ. Βοζίκης» [Portraits from Parliament:
Mr. Vozikis], Ακρόπολις, 23 Δεκεμβρίου 1906, 1.
60
Σπύρος Μέλας «Εικόνες από την Βουλήν: Ο κ. Αλεξανδρής» [Portraits from
Parliament: Mr. Alexandris], Ακρόπολις, 23 Δεκεμβρίου 1906, 1.
61 Σπύρος Μέλας, «Εικόνες από την Βουλήν: Ο κ. Ρέπουλης» [Portraits from

Parliament: Mr. Repoulis], Ακρόπολις, 29 Δεκεμβρίου 1906, 2.

34
so strong that “the people of Aigio stayed out in the rain to listen to him in

the previous election campaign.” 62

The Party’s Goal

In October 1906, the members finally determined to start their

activities in the upcoming parliamentary session and assembled at

Dragoumis’ house in Athens. At the meeting, Dragoumis, as the leader of the

newly established party, declared that he was not interested in seizing power,

and that he only wished to play a more beneficial role in the resolution of

national issues through the activity of the party. 63

In his front-page interview with the newspaper Akropolis on

October 31, 1906, Dragoumis publicly presented the party’s goal that it

would carry out domestic restoration not from a parochial and partisan

standpoint, but from a panhellenic perspective. He criticized the inability of

the successive governments since the defeat of 1897 to deal with necessary

projects for rebuilding the state. Though the governments would have had to

be highly self-controlled in order to achieve substantial progress on the

principal aspects of administration, defense, education, agriculture, industry,

and many other domains, they had neglected these issues. Instead, they had

62
Σπύρος Μέλας «Εικόνες από την Βουλήν: Ο κ. Παναγιωτόπουλος» [Portraits from
Parliament: Mr. Panagiotopoulos], Ακρόπολις, 29 Δεκεμβρίου 1906, 2.
63
Ρέπουλης, «Από τα παρασκήνια των πολιτικών μας ηθών», Εστία, 30 Ιουνίου 1908,
1.

35
spent money wastefully and brought administrative disorder. Moreover, there

was no sign of recovering in terms of the quality of domestic life eight years

after the war. Likewise, Dragoumis argued, Greece was diplomatically in a

very difficult situation. Without friends and protectors, it had been exposed

to every kind of attack and intrigue from abroad. It was also confronted by

the crisis arising from the general neglect of Hellenism beyond the

boundaries of the state. The event of Anchialos was the most recent and

archetypal example. He attributed the cause of Greece’s miserable

international relations to its severe domestic confusion. Greeks should have

paid more attention to a thorough domestic political restoration in order to

save the nation. He explained that a new party had been formed in order to

launch the struggle for the restoration. He emphasized that although they

were a small group of deputies, they had determined to deal with state

reform through the power of ideas.

In regard to the strategy of the new party, Dragoumis insisted, it did

not aim at overthrowing the present government, which it considered would

be a futile and even harmful pursuit. Rather, the party intended to contribute

to reforming the way in which the present Theotokis’ government behaved.

This did not mean that the party members would propose fawning

amendments to the government, but to impose upon themselves a

supervisory role over the activities of the government. They intended to

36
measure the government’s actions according to the highest standards, to put

the brakes on its inability to govern, and to contribute to legislative

procedures via the ministers’ initiative. They would also courageously

express their opinions on a bill when the government called for a vote on it.

What was significant for the members was to benefit the state in a positive

way by their activities in Parliament. Thus, they would not randomly oppose

every bill, but positively support the government as long as they judged its

proposals suitable for the nation’s good. They also declared that they would

on their own initiative bravely submit bills to aid national restoration. 64

According to Alexandris, each member took charge of a specific issue:

Gounaris was in charge of economic policy, and Protopapadakis supported

him; Protopapadakis also oversaw education with Panagiotopoulos;

Repoulis’ concern was with the Ministry of the Interior; Vozikis’ attention

was directed to the Ministry of Justice and other ministries; Alexandris was

in charge of agriculture and education; Dragoumis was responsible for

foreign affairs. 65 In short, the Team of the Japanese organized a kind of

shadow cabinet and tried to deal with reform of the state.

The Team of the Japanese professed that it was not interested in

usurping the present government, but intended to play a major national role

in regenerating the state. Clearly there was a tension between these two
64
«Μία συνέντευξις με πανελλλήνιον πολιτευτήν», 1.
65
Αλεξανδρής, Πολιτικαί αναμνήσεις, 7.

37
concepts, as they were contradictory and unrealistic at a glance. How did the

Team of seven members consider it possible to accomplish their goals

without seizing power? No political party that proposed such a goal had

existed in Greece before the Team of the Japanese appeared. In this sense,

the Team was indeed unprecedented. It is also evident that the Team did not

aim at throwing out the current regime in a radical manner. In fact, its stance

was rather moderate, or could even be characterized as paternalistic.

Dragoumis’ words indicate that the Team intended to teach the government

how to deal with the affairs of the state for the good of the nation, and induce

it to reform every necessary sphere of the state. The goal of the Team of the

Japanese is regarded as paradoxical and too optimistic when we take into

account the power struggle among the parties of that period, which were

indifferent to benefitting Greece on a national basis. Yet, the members

believed that they could become a force to make politics beneficial and

honorable for the sake of the nation as a whole. With this strong awareness

of duty, they tried to demonstrate a good example of national reformers with

highly-disciplined political ethics.

Historical Assessment of the Team of the Japanese

There has been no previous study focusing on the Team of the

Japanese. Some historians refer to this group when they explain the Greek

38
political conditions of the first decade of the twentieth century. However,

their understanding of the Team of the Japanese varies and their assessment

of it has not been at all firm.

Tasos Vournas characterizes the Team as an opposition party that

delivered criticism of the government in an organized manner for the first

time in Greek parliamentary history. Yet he mentions that the Team had

“basic shortcomings that were attributable to the lack of cohesion among the

members.” As a result, “except for their appearance of bourgeois liberalism,

the members of the Team neither had common ideological direction, nor a

uniform goal.” Thus he argues that the Team of the Japanese cannot be

considered as “a party of principles.” 66

Gunnar Hering regards the activity of the Team of the Japanese as

an attempt to create a party of bourgeois radicalism. He argues at the same

time that the Team clearly embodied the weakness of Greek bourgeois

radicalism. In contrast to the radicalism of central and western Europe that

went against the existing political order, Greek radicalism presupposed the

political order as defined in the Constitution of 1864 that unquestionably

ensured people’s sovereign rights, the universal suffrage of men, a

66
Τάσος Βουρνάς, Ιστορία της νεώτερης και σύγχρονης Ελλάδας, τόμος Α΄: Ιστορία της
νεώτερης Ελλάδας από την Επανάσταση του 1821 ως το κίνημα του Γουδί (1909)
[History of Modern and Contemporary Greece, vol.1: History of Modern Greece from
the Revolution of 1821 to the Movement of Goudi (1909)], έκτη έκδοση [6th ed.]
(Αθήνα: Πατάκης, 2003), 585.

39
parliamentary regime, political freedom, etc., and did not oppose the existing

institutions such as the privileged classes of the society, the monarchy, and

the church. Greek radicalism, Hering argues, did not question the legitimacy

of the present political order, and focused on constitutional issues and the

rights of citizens. Its demand was concerned with “the effectiveness of the

political system, administrative in particular, the realization of constitutional

rights, and the socioeconomic system.” Therefore, such a view was easily

incorporated into the existing political system and was less influential in

terms of a political movement that could attract the masses. 67

Thomas W. Gallant mentions that the members of the Team

“eschewed partisanship and argued instead for political, economic, and

social modernization.” According to Gallant, “they aimed to reform Greece

in manner reminiscent of what the Meiji dynasty had recently accomplished

in Japan.” 68

S. Victor Papacosma depicts the Team of the Japanese as “a small

but energetic opposition in the Boule (Parliament) to challenge the Theotokis

government and all members of the ‘old’ parties.” Ideologically, he contends,

it was “neither socialist nor left-oriented, but demanded efficiency and

high-principled methods in politics and public administration.” 69

67
Hering, Die politischen Parteien, 657.
68
Gallant, Modern Greece, 119.
69
Papacosma, The Military in Greek Politics, 32.

40
Georgios Ventiris argues that the activity of Team of the Japanese

can be categorized as “the movement that provoked the overthrow of

oligarchy.” Ventiris assumes that Gounaris was the real leader of the Team,

and he identifies the group’s activity exclusively with Gounaris’ political

stance. According to Ventiris, Gounaris soon abandoned his initial hostility

to oligarchy and made a radical concession to parliamentarianism, “either

mistakenly thinking, or just thinking that his activity would be constructive

only if it was made within the existing political system.” Thus he worked at

the narrow parliamentary level with other members of the Team, though he

developed illuminated criticism, animated discussions, and introduced the

reform spirit into Parliament. Ventiris also contends that Gounaris had a firm

faith in the parliamentary system and intended to replicate what Trikoupis

had done in a totally different political and socio-economical environment

from that of the Trikoupis period twenty years earlier. Gounaris did not

effectively respond to the voices of the rising bourgeoisie who had built up

discontent about the elitist political rule of the few. Ventiris concludes that

the Japanese who “did not realize the ascent of the bourgeoisie” were

eventually “behind their epoch.” 70

Aspreas describes the Team as a leaderless opposition party. He

writes: “This Team was the most serious opposition against G. Theotokis in
70
Γεώργιος Βεντήρης, Η Ελλάς του 1910–1920: Ιστορική μελέτη [Greece in
1910–1920: Historical Research], τόμος Β΄ [vol. 2] (Αθήνα: Πυρσός, 1931), 30-32.

41
terms of parliamentary criticism of the government activities. The Team was

unfairly characterized by contemporaries as the group of ministry hunters.

But afterwards, the policy of the ‘Japanese,’ their political struggles, and

their dedication to their political conviction through belief and self-denial

lead the ‘Japanese’ to win their reputation as able politicians.” 71

Dafnis sees the Team as radical though it operated within the

framework of the existing regime. The Team, he writes, “was opposed to the

Theotokis’ government, demanding major economic reforms.” 72

Hariton Korisis refers to the Team as an example of ideological

efforts in the political arena. According to him, “‘the Team of the Japanese’

… appeared in Parliament in 1906 and became a strong opposition group

against the Theotokis’ government. It strove for carrying out major economic

reforms.” 73

Giorgos Dertilis maintains that the movement of the Japanese

demonstrated the “pettiness of the political ideology of the bourgeoisie.” He

regards it as an example of the “ideological stagnation in the bourgeois

class.” According to Dertilis, “the only thing that the Greek Japanese

actually achieved was to keep playing at war until the day when conservative

71
Ασπρέας, Πολιτική ιστορία νεωτέρας Ελλάδος, 85-86.
72
Δαφνής, Τα ελληνικά πολιτικά κόμματα, 91.
73
Hariton Korisis, Die politischen Parteien Griechenlands: Ein neuer Staat auf dem
Weg zur Demokratie 1821–1910 (Hersbruck/ Nürnberg: Verlag Karl Pfeiffer, 1966),
161.

42
Theotokis offered the finance portfolio to Gounaris, one of the Samurai

soldiers.” 74

There are some references to the Team of the Japanese in several

critical biographies of Gounaris. Ioannis Mallosis characterizes the activity

of the Team of the Japanese as “the sole ideological revolution in Greece

since its liberation from Ottoman rule.” It was “a revolution with ethical

principles and with the program for the national rebirth, the reform of state

machine, the improvement of parliamentarianism, and the restoration of the

fatherland so that it could accomplish its mission.” Mallosis maintains that

the struggle of this small party made a deep impression on the minds of the

Greek people. He writes: “Clean politicians, perfect experts, and

parliamentary orators who demanded attention and admiration in Parliament,

bringing new ideas and new systems. The members with independent

character, who composed the Team under the leadership of the unforgettable

Stefanos Dragoumis, a distinguished figure of Trikoupis’ party, gave a new

impetus to the political life of the country. The political life, through the

reform-oriented and entirely revolutionary activity of the Japanese in

Parliament, became livelier, generated high-principled hopes for the

restoration of the state, and guaranteed the shaking off of the lethargy that

74
Γιώργος Δερτιλής, Κοινωνικός μετασχηματισμός και στρατιωτική επέμβαση
1880–1909 [Social Transformation and Military Intervention 1880–1909], πρώτος
έκδοση [1st ed.] (Αθήνα: Εξάντας, 1977), 169. In the third edition of this book
published in 1985, Dertilis does not refer to the Team of the Japanese at all.

43
had then crept over the Greek political world.” 75

Alikaniotis stresses that the activity of the Japanese should be

considered as “the first ideological revolution in Greece after its liberation,”

and also as “the first attempt in Greece to form a party of principles.” He

writes, “Nobody can deny that the struggles of the ‘Japanese’ were the

starting-point of the rebirth, at least the rebirth of parliamentarianism.”

Throughout their activity in Parliament, he argues, “the ‘Japanese’ were not

characterized either as the maniac opposition, or as those who desired to gain

power. They were always fair and respectable. Those who comprised the

Team were not the type of politicians that showed off their knowledge. They

were worried for the good future of the state. Their activities were not only

those of censors, fault-finders, and critics, but also of creators, teachers, and

guides. They aimed at uplifting the state so that it would reach a

well-governed, high standing. They struggled by any means against

irregularities of the past, political defects of that time, and practices and

conditions that had been irreversible.” 76

Chronopoulos defines the Japanese as “the forerunners and the

reformers who did not belong to the old-partyism (παλαιοκομματισμός).” He

also considers the activity of the Japanese as “the first revolution and the
75
Ιωάννης Η. Μάλλωσης, Η πολιτική ιστορία του Δημητρίου Π. Γούναρη, 1902–1920
[Political History of Dimitrios P. Gounaris, 1902–1920] (Αθήνα: Νέα εποχή, 1926),
109-110.
76
Αλικανιώτης, Δημήτριος Γούναρης, 85-87.

44
first rebellion against the old-partyism, three years before the military coup

of Goudi took place.” Admitting that both the movement of the Japanese and

the military revolt in 1909 intended to break down the existing political

regime, he points out the difference between the two in terms of the method

they employed. “The second [i.e. the military revolt] used armed force while

the ‘Japanese’ had the power of words.” The activity of the reform-minded

Japanese in Parliament was “a ray of light penetrating into the apathy and

lethargy of old parties,” and “the truly first blow against the old-partyism of

that time.” 77

The Team of the Japanese was the sole parliamentary force in

Greece at the beginning of the twentieth century that overtly argued for the

need for the state reform. It was a short-lived party and active in Parliament

only from 1906 to 1908. In August 1909, about one year after the Team was

disbanded, a military coup took place. This event brought the advent of

Eleftherios Venizelos in Greek political life. The efforts of the Team of the

Japanese was almost forgotten, left behind by the Venizelos period, which

was full of prosperity and achievements in terms of domestic reform and

economic and political modernization, together with the active attempt to

realize the “Great Idea.”

77
Χρονόπουλος, Δημήτριος Γούναρης, 25-26.

45
The Team of the Japanese was a reform-oriented opposition party.

Yet it is hard to find an appropriate expression that further characterizes the

nature of the Team. The only clear goal that the Team aimed at was to

contribute positively to regenerating the state for the sake of the nation,

which is too general to classify the Team within the paradigm of political

orientation. The Team of the Japanese was neither a personal party that had

been a major feature of Greek politics of that time, nor a party of principles

with concrete agendas. It was neither right, nor left wing. Nor did it defend

the interests of a specific social class, like the bourgeoisie and the working

population, either. It did not necessarily demonstrate a high degree of

solidarity as a party. Furthermore, unlike the Young Turks who thought of

inviting actual Japanese specialists in order to realize their reform-oriented

program of modernization, 78 Greece’s “Japanese” did not have in mind an

attempt to make direct contact with real Japanese. There is no evidence,

either, proving that they intended to emulate the modernization project that

Meiji Dynasty of Japan had successfully carried out. However, it is true that

the discussions, which the Team members participated in, brought life to

Parliament, and made it plain that the Theotokis’ government was often

ill-prepared. Public opinion highly valued their struggle against the

government.
78
Feroz Ahmad, The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish
Politics 1908‒1914 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), 23n1.

46
In this dissertation I shed light on the concrete parliamentary

activities of the Team of the Japanese from its foundation to its dissolution,

and describe exactly what legislation the members contributed to and what

aspects of the existing political system they criticized so as to regenerate the

state. The case study approach makes it possible to draw a more complete

picture of the Team of the Japanese. It also helps us consider what the Team

of the Japanese eventually meant in Greek politics in the first decade of the

twentieth century.

Before examining the concrete activities of the Team of the

Japanese, I explore in Chapter 2 what image the words “Japan” and

“Japanese” evoked among the Greek people in the beginning of the twentieth

century, and why a newly founded opposition party originally called the

Third Party came to be widely known as the Team of the Japanese. I

emphasize that the Japanese victory in the Russo–Japanese War of

1904–1905 formed a certain consensus in Greek society about Japan and the

Japanese as a successful symbol of state regeneration. Chapters 3, 4, and 5

deal with the activities of the Team in the extraordinary session of the

eighteenth parliamentary period, from November 11, 1906 to July 31, 1907.

In Chapter 3, I first examine Gounaris’ vision of the state and demonstrate

that Gounaris claimed the state should work for the good of the people and

society. Then I look at what arguments the members developed to reform the

47
inefficient public administration and to build up a sound economy for the

truly national benefit. Chapter 4 deals with the legislation concerning the

settlement of Greek refugees persecuted in the Balkan states and land

distribution to them. This was the first attempt by the Greek state to grapple

with the issue of ethnic Greek refugees. Dragoumis and Alexandris in

particular contributed to the legislation. Chapter 5 explores an attempt at

educational reform that intended to expel the commercialism of publishers

and authors from the school textbook business and to introduce a new

efficient method of learning to schools. Panagiotopoulos played a central

role in passing the bill on this reform. These two pieces of legislation,

discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, are the good concrete examples that exhibit

the political ideals of the Team of the Japanese. That is, the Team supported

the government for the nation’s good. Chapter 6 explores the so-called

Currant Scandal in December 1907–February 1908, during the second

session of the eighteenth parliamentary period. The Team disclosed a

backroom deal between the government and the Privileged Company to

Foster the Production and Trade of Currants. The Team of the Japanese

stressed the importance of transparency in politics and argued that every

issue should be openly discussed in Parliament as long as it concerned the

well-being of the nation. The members of the Team demonstrated their

strong belief in parliamentarianism. Chapter 7 examines what caused the

48
Team’s disintegration and how this process occurred. In Chapter 8, referring

to the mass media’s reaction to the activities of the Team of the Japanese as

well as to the episodes of the members after the Team was disbanded, I try to

discuss what the Team did in terms of the state reform and what meaning we

can attach to the Team in Greek political history.

49
CHAPTER 2

“Japan” and the “Japanese” in Greek Society

in the Early Twentieth Century

When we examine the Team of the Japanese, it is meaningful to

look at what contemporary Greeks called to mind with the words “Japan”

and “Japanese.” We cannot but regard it as strange that Greeks employed the

name of the nation, extremely far from Greece, for a Greek political party.

Considering the fact that the Team was originally called the Third Party, and

that the Team of the Japanese, as a sort of a nickname for the party, was

widely accepted by Greek society, we can imagine that the words “Japan”

and “Japanese” must have evoked a concrete image, most probably

something positive, among Greek people. 1 The members of the party neither

expressed negative feelings with respect to the nickname, nor asked the

media refrain from using the eponym. The first chapter of Alexandris’

memoirs, published in 1947, is entitled as “the Party of the Japanese.” 2

1
As an example to show the extent to which the party was known as the Team of the
Japanese, see Figures 1 and 2. In October 1906, just before the Team began its activity
in Parliament, the weekly satirical newspaper Romios illustrated Dragoumis as the head
of the Third Party in the traditional Greek consume of a chief shepherd (Figure 1). In
March 1907, the newspaper Athens portrayed Dragoumis as the leader of the Team of
the Japanese, wearing Japanese-style clothes, and modified his Greek name to make it
sound Japanese (Figure 2).
2
Απόστολος Αλεξανδρής, Πολιτικαί αναμνήσεις [Political Memoirs] (Πάτρα: Δ.
Φραγκούλης και Κ. Βαρζάνης, 1947), 5; A document of British Foreign Office reported
that Dragoumis’ small party was “nicknamed the Japanese party.” “Doc. 51: Inclosure

50
There must have been a tacit common understanding among

contemporary Greek people invoked by the terms “Japan” and “Japanese.”

This is why the name of the Team of the Japanese could spread and become

widely used. What was the content of this common understanding? When

and how was it shaped? What kind of resonance did the words trigger among

people? Answering these questions will pave the way for illuminating how

Greek people regarded the party and what they expected from its members.

The Russo–Japanese War

The Russo–Japanese War of 1904–1905 provided a perfect

opportunity for Greeks to consider Japan and its people. Althoguh the

official relationship between the two countries began through the conclusion

of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Shipping in June 1899, 3

ordinary Greek people had little knowledge of the small island nation in the

in Doc. 50, ‘General Report on Greece for the Year 1907,’” in British Documents on
Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print: Part I
From the Mid-Nineteenth Century to the First World War: Series F Europe, 1848–1914:
Volume 14 Greece, 1847–1914, ed. John F. V. Keiger (University Publication of
America, 1989), 299; In his book published in 1916, Charles Ibanes de Ibero wrote that
Gounaris used to be a member of “Groupe japonais.” Charles Ibanez de Ibero,
D’Athènes à Constantinople: la situation politique en Orient (Paris: Attinger Frère,
1916), 46.
3
Υπουργείον Εξωτερικών, Γενικόν ευρετήριον συνθηκών, συμβάσεων και συμφωνιών
διμερών και πολυμερών 1832–1956 [General Catalogue of Treaties, Conventions, and
Bilateral and Trilateral Agreements 1832–1956] (Αθήνα: Εθνικό τυπογραφείο, 1956),
45; Japan opened its diplomatic legation in Greece in 1922. Πρεσβεία της Ιαπωνίας
στην Ελλάδα, «Ιστορική περίληψη» [Brief History],
http://www.gr.emb-japan.go.jp/portal/gr/relations/index.htm (accessed on March 30,
2009).

51
Far East. At that time Japan had already won in the war of 1894–1895

against the Qing dynasty of China and had come to be recognized in the

diplomatic arena as a rising new imperial power. Yet the Sino–Japanese War

was only a distant concern for most Greeks. Japan’s victory over the Russian

Empire, however, had totally different meaning for ordinary Greeks. This

time the war was regarded not as someone else’s distant affair, but as Greeks’

own concern, in a sense. Indeed, the war and the Japanese victory

engendered great excitement, as well as trepidation, among ordinary Greeks.

British historian and journalist William Miller was living in Athens when the

Russo–Japanese War broke out in 1904. He wrote:

When the war broke out between Russia and Japan, the excitement in
Athens was so intense that most of the papers brought out ‘extra
specials,’ in the shape of small fly-sheets, containing the latest lie
about the Japanese victories, and the Constitution Square used to ring
every evening at seven o’clock with the shouts of the newsboys
offering these startling ‘telegrams’ for the modest sum of five lepta,
or less than a halfpenny apiece. 4

Miller also reported that the Greeks were so eager for information about the

war that they gathered in a café at the center of Athens to discuss what was

taking place on the battlefields and to map out mock strategies. Newspapers

4
William Miller, Greek Life in Town and Country (London: George Newnes Limited,
1905), 114.

52
and periodicals devoted constant attention to the war and gave daily updates

on its development. 5

Against the backdrop of Greeks’ enthusiasm with the

Russo‒Japanese War lay the contemporary rivalry among the Balkan nations.

Greeks had been carrying out a territorial expansion project in Macedonia

and had clashed with the similarly irredentist ambitions of Slav nations.

Their conflicts had brought about fierce armed struggles, and inveterate

antagonism among them reached its apex in the beginning of the twentieth

century. Greeks firmly believed that Russia, the leader of Panslavism, held

sway over the Slav nations, especially Bulgarians, which the Greeks were

fighting against.

The term “Panslavism” bears different connotations in different

contexts. Even among the Slav nations this term often had contested

dimensions. However, as Elli Skopetea mentions, for Greece which had

ignored the existence of Slav ethnic groups in its neighborhood, assuming a

haughty attitude based on Greek cultural supremacy, anti-slavism developed

first and foremost as anti-Russianism during the nineteenth century. 6

Panslavism never ceased to be understood in the minds of the Greeks as a

5
See the series of articles of Greeks Newspapers such as Akropolis, Athens, Kairoi and
Chronos from January 1904 onward.
6
Έλλη Σκοπετέα, Το «Πρότυπο Βασίλειο» και η Μεγάλη Ιδέα: Όψεις του εθνικού
προβλήματος στην Ελλάδα (1830–1880) [The “Model Kingdom” and the Great Idea:
Aspects of National Problem in Greece (1830–1880)] (Αθήνα: Πολύτυπο, 1988),
325-336.

53
Russian enterprise in conjunction with other Slavs with the purpose of

uniting all Slavs at the expense of Hellenism. And this was even after the

course of the events in Macedonia revealed the fact that the intentions of

Bulgaria, Greece’s real enemy, were not necessarily aligned with those of

Russia. 7 Greece tended to see the shadow of Russia behind every movement

of the Balkan Slavs.

The Gospel Riots of 1901 in Athens clearly demonstrated Greeks’

belief that Russia was operating behind the scenes to endanger the Greek

territorial ambition in Macedonia. The riots were connected with the attempt

on the part of Queen Olga to translate the Gospel into colloquial Greek.

Since she was of Russian descent, her project of translation was plausibly

alleged as Russian covert maneuvers in order to deprive the Greeks of the

sacred depository of their Hellenistic cultural and historical traditions, thus

giving Slav nations an advantage over territorial conflicts in Macedonia. 8 In

7
For the transformation of the relationship between Russia and the Balkan Slavs, see
Barbara Jelavich, Russia’s Balkan Entanglements 1806‒1914 (Cambridge, New York,
Port Chester, Melbourne & Sydney: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Yasamee
argues that there were different attitudes toward Panslavism even in Bulgaria. The
Bulgarian Exarch Yoshif, who was usually regarded as a symbol of Bulgarian
nationalism, thought that the Russo-Bulgarian ties were indispensable for the success of
Bulgarian “national” movement. F. A. K. Yasamee, “Religion, Irreligion and
Nationalism in the Diaries of the Bulgarian Exarch Yoshif,” in Religious Quest and
National Identity in the Balkans, eds. Celia Hawkesworth, Muriel Heppell and Harry
Norris (New York: Palgrave in association with School of Slavonic and East European
Studies, University College, London, 2001), 203-217.
8
J. N. Psichari, “The Gospel Riots in Greece,” in The Language Question in Greece,
ed. Chiensis (Calcutta: The Baptist Mission Press, 1902), 61-62; Philip Carabott,
“Politics, Orthodoxy and the Language Question in Greece: The Gospel Riots of
November 1901,” Journal of Mediterranean Studies 3, no.1 (1993): 117-138.

54
November 1901 the streets were filled with people’s shouts of “Down with

Olga!” and “Down with Russia!” 9

Therefore, in this narrow sense, the Greeks saw Japan waging a

kind of a proxy war against Russia on behalf of Greece. Since Russians had

not treated Greeks seriously and had been supporting Bulgarians, many

Greeks thought that Russia deserved to be defeated at the hands of the

Japanese. This position argued that Greece should take sides with Japan for

Greek national interest. 10 During the war, Miller met an old Greek man who

told him that the Russian reverse in the East was the judgment of Heaven

upon Russia for the way in which it had treated Greece. 11

9
Roman Romanovich Rosen Baron, Forty Years of Diplomacy, vol.1 (London: George
Allen & Unwin Ltd.; New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1922), 184.
10
Τιμ. Σταθ., «Ο πόλεμος» [The War], Ακρόπολις, 15 Φεβρουαρίου 1904, 1.
11
Miller, Greek Life, 46-47; It should be noted, however, that there existed also a
pro-Russian atmosphere in Greece during the Russo–Japanese War. Miller referred to
Queen Olga and wrote, “When she returns from her annual outing in Russia, there is no
display of enthusiasm, but during the present war there has been considerable sympathy
with her.” Miller, Greek Life, 53; Moreover, several dimoi (municipalities) such as
Athens and Zakinthos formally performed doxologies for the victory of Russian army.
The authorities of dimos of Athens signaled that Greeks had an obligation to support
Russia as it was one of the Protecting Powers of Greece and had contributed to the
establishment of the Greek kingdom. Several Greek communities outside the Greek
state also performed doxologies for Russia and sent financial assistance. In contrast,
there were cases like the mayor of Patras, who strongly opposed to any doxology for
Russia. «Μνημόσυνον υπέρ των Ρώσσων» [Memorial Service for the Russians],
Ακρόπολις, 31 Ιανουαρίου 1904, 2; «Ο Δήμαρχος Πατρών κατά των Ρώσσων» [Mayor
of Patras against the Russians], Ακρόπολις, 5 Φεβρουαρίου 1904, 4; «Δοξολογία εν
Ζάκυνθω υπέρ των Ρώσσων» [Doxology for the Russians in Zakinthos], Ακρόπολις, 10
Φεβρουαρίου 1904, 2; «Υπέρ των Ρώσσων δοξολογία εις τον ελληνικόν ναόν εν
Πετρούπολει» [Doxology for the Russians in a Greek Church at St. Petersburg],
Ακρόπολις, 11 Φεβρουαρίου 1904, 1; «Οι Έλληνες υπέρ των Ρώσσων. Συνεισφοραί
υπέρ των αγωνιζομένων.» [The Greeks in Support of the Russians. Contributions for the
Fighters], Κράτος, 25 Μαρτίου 1904, 2.

55
In the same vein, the Greeks understood that the Russo–Japanese

War had improved the situation for Greece in contested Macedonia. Russia’s

engagement in the Far East and its domestic turmoil appeared to decrease the

strength of Panslav movements in the Balkans, which meant that Greece

could take advantage of the on-going struggle in Macedonia. The newspaper

Asti wrote in an editorial “Free Hands” on January 18, 1905:

Russia has withdrawn its attention from the Balkans for a year. The
main body of Panslavism is being threatened at present. A
scandalous enterprise …of expanding its body turns to be
impossible. The Japanese are keeping Russia engaged in external
issues. People’s insurrection, riots, and the big general bloody
revolution in its home territory are causing very serious and
tremendous diversions domestically. 12

Russia’s disappearance from the Balkans placed Bulgaria in a lamentable

situation. The same article mentioned:

In fact, Bulgaria was the country that suffered the most pain from
Russia’s mishaps. One dares to say without exaggeration that today
the Bulgarians are lamenting the catastrophes of the Great [Russian]
Empire more than a crowd of rude and ignorant Russian peasants. 13

12
«Αι χείρες ελεύθεραι» [The Free Hands], ΄Αστυ, 18 Ιανουαρίου 1905, 1; The “big
general bloody revolution” indicates the Bloody Sunday massacre which took place in
St. Petersburg on January 9, 1905 (January 22, NS). This event became a signal for the
revolution of the same year.
13
«Αι χείρες ελεύθεραι», 1.

56
Furthermore, Allen Upward, who visited Macedonia in the winter of

1907–1908, met a Greek priest who had been persecuted by the Bulgarian

bands and lived as a refugee in Salonica. The priest considered that the

situation of the Greeks in Macedonia had changed for the better after the

victory of Japan over Russia. He said, “The first Bulgarian bands that came

against us were armed with Russian rifles. Russia’s defeat has broken the

influence of the bands.” According to Upward, this “Mikado’s protégé” in

Salonica could even go out on the streets after dark, which he had never

ventured to do before the Russo–Japanese War. 14

In reality, for the Balkan Slavs, the defeat of Russia was a shocking

incident that made them realize that Russia, their protector, was not strong

any longer. 15 Yet there is no concrete historical event to prove that Greek

irredentism greatly benefitted from Russia’s warfare in the Far East. In

addition, the extent to which the alleged Russian decline had a negative

impact on Bulgarian tactics in Macedonia leaves room for doubt. What is

important, however, is the fact that there existed a discourse which

connected Greek national interests with the outcome of the Russo–Japanese

War. 16

14
Allen Upward, The East End of Europe: The Report of an Unofficial Mission of the
European Provinces of Turkey on the Eve of the Revolution (New York: E.P. Dutton,
1909), 171-172.
15
Richard C. Hall, The Balkan Wars 1912–1913: Prelude to the First World War
(London; New York: Routledge, 2000), 7.
16
It is worth mentioning that Bulgarians found the method of Japanese fighting against

57
However, the Greeks’ understanding of the Russo–Japanese War

was not confined merely to their anticipation of the side-effects of Japan’s

victory over Panslavism. The Greeks also observed the Russo–Japanese War

in a broader global perspective. Throughout the period of the war, Greek

newspapers constantly mentioned that this event might bring about a change

in the established world order. Indeed the rapid advance of Japan as a world

power caused shock and consternation all over the world. On the one hand,

European Great Powers perceived that Japan was threatening the world

system founded on their dominance. On the other hand, Japan’s

accomplishment encouraged other countries that had been exposed to the

influence and control of European colonialism. Japan gave a hope to them by

demonstrating how successful its efforts to modernize itself were in order to

maintain independence as a nation. Christopher Alan Bayly describes the

repercussions of the rise of Japan as follows:

Most extraordinary of all in upsetting the older consensus was the


rise of Japan, which defeated China in 1894–5 and went on to

Russia useful to them and tried to emulate it in order to combat against the Greeks in
Macedonia. A report of the Ottoman Second Army Commander in April 1907 read,
“Bulgarians in the region of Karinabad who had received “Japanese training” (“Japon
Talimi”) the year before were now instructing guerillas for fifteen days in the same
techniques, including rifle-handling.” Quoted from Renée Worringer, “Comparing
Perceptions: Japan as Archetype for Ottoman Modernity, 1876–1918” (PhD diss., The
University of Chicago, 2001), 185n58; Henry Noel Brailsford reported that the Moscow
Panslavist League had exhibited signs of resuming activity after the Russo-Japanese
War ended and that it was showing interest in the Balkans again. Henry Noel Brailsford,
Macedonia: Its Races and Their Future (London: Methuen, 1906), 299nI.

58
humiliate the Russian Empire ten years later. In the meantime,
Japan, already entrenched as a colonial power in Taiwan, expanded
into Korea…. The psychological significance of the rise of Japan
and its successful competition with European powers should not be
underestimated. Throughout the non-European world, nationalist
leaders, newspaper editors, and even ordinary people suddenly saw
that Western dominance was neither inevitable nor everlasting. In
Indian villages distant from the battlegrounds of Mukden and
Tsushima, where the Russians were defeated, newborn babies were
given the names of Japanese admirals. Nationalist artists in Calcutta
began to adopt Japanese techniques and sensibilities to mark
themselves out from European influences. In French Indochina,
Phan Boi Chau inaugurated the “look to the east” movement which
was to take many young people to Tokyo, where they mingled with
expatriate Chinese, Korean, and Indian students. Even in distant
Abyssinia, buoyed up by its own recent victory against the Italians
at Adowa in 1896, the country’s first social scientist urged his
countrymen to look to the Japanese example of modernity. 17
17
Christopher Alan Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World 1780‒1914: Global
Connections and Comparisons (Malden, MA, USA & Oxford, UK: Blackwell
Publishing, 2004), 461; It is noteworthy, however, that the impact of Japan’s victory
over Russia on non-European countries was not universal or uniform, and that the
degree of reaction to it varied across countries. Paul A. Rodell argues that only the
Philippines and Vietnam among Southeast Asian countries were directly influenced by
the Russo–Japanese War and connected Japan’s victory to their nationalistic movements.
Paul A. Rodell, “Inspiration for Nationalist Aspirations? Southeast Asia and the 1905
Japanese Victory,” in The Russo–Japanese War in Global Perspective: World War Zero,
eds. by Bruce W. Menning John, W. Steinberg, David Schimmelpenninck Van Der Oye,
David Wolff and Shinji Yokote, (Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2005), 629-654; In
Mid-Eastern and South Asian countries, Egypt and India under British control
responded remarkably to the Russo–Japanese War. Steven G. Mark contends that the
war provided these two countries with the first opportunity to “perceive their
circumstances in a nation-wide and global context and by convincing them that their
dreams of taking charge in their own lands were realizable.” Steven G. Mark. “‘Bravo,
Brave Tiger of the East!’ The Russo–Japanese War and the Rise of Nationalism in
British Egypt and India,” in The Russo–Japanese War in Global Perspective: World
War Zero, eds. by Bruce W. Menning John W. Steinberg, David Schimmelpenninck Van

59
Although Greece never had experienced direct colonization by any

specific European power, it had always been under the tentacles of European

states both politically and economically. Britain, France, and Russia had

remained as the Protecting Powers since the Greek kingdom established.

Since 1898, one year after the defeat of Greece in the war against the

Ottoman Empire, the national revenue had been under the control of the

International Financial Commission which consisted of six representatives of

the governments of Britain, France, Russia, Germany, Italy and

Austria–Hungary. Therefore, the shadow of these foreign powers had always

loomed large in Greek politics and economics. Voices in the media

constantly argued that Greece should stand on its own feet and be recognized

as a country which European countries treated on equal terms.

In this sense, Greece had faced a more or less similar—though not

the same—situation as most of the countries where the Great Power

interference was more rampant. Therefore, the great concern with Japan and

Der Oye, David Wolff and Shinji Yokote (Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2005), 611; Ottoman
Turkey showed great concern with the Meiji Japan’s progress long before the war. The
Sultan, Young Turk advocates, and common people regarded Japan’s successful
“civilizing” process as a reference point for modernization of their empire, but each of
them interpreted it in different ways for their own benefit. See Worringer, “Comparing
Perceptions.”; It is also interesting that the Japanese victory over Russia also functioned
as counterevidence to the view among contemporary human scientists influenced by
Darwin’s evolutionary theory. For example, “Herbert Spencer adapted some of his
theories to explain the development of human societies through the ‘survival of the
fittest.’ Spencer was taken up in turn by Chinese, Indian, and Arab intellectuals. These
men fears for the organic health of their own societies, yet hoped that weak nations, like
endangered spices, might finally adapt and survive. Japan’s risorgimento provided them
with a glimmer of light.” Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World, 316-317.

60
Japanese in the Greek media during the Russo–Japanese War can be

considered as a latent desire of Greek society to know how Japan, a

late-comer non-European country, could succeed in being a vital independent

country that competed with European powers. This is why Greek

newspapers and periodicals not only reported the progress of the bloodshed

battlefields in the Far East and the military strategies of Russia and Japan,

but also paid attention to what Japan and Japanese people were like. Their

interest in Japan covered a wide range of topics, from Japan’s political

regime to the culture and customs of common Japanese people.

Japan and the Japanese: A Happy Country and the Strangest People

An article titled “Japan and the Japanese” appeared in the

newspaper Athens on January 18, 1904, just before the outbreak of the

Russo–Japanese War. Then the series, “The Japanese and Japan: the

Strangest People on Earth,” was published in the same newspaper from

January 27 to February 8. 18 The essays dealt with numerous topics about

Japan and its people, including its history, system of governance, culture and

customs. They described Japan as an exotic country beyond comprehension

from a European perspective. In addition, as the subtitle of “the Strangest

People on Earth” indicates, the Japanese were regarded as alien and as

18
The Russo–Japanese War began on January 24 (February 6, NS), 1904.

61
having a sometimes fairy-tale-like existence. In this case, the word

“strangest” implies that Japanese people followed completely different

cultural and social codes from European ones.

It should be noted that the essays investigated Japan and the

Japanese exclusively from a European standpoint. Considering the fact that

the pendulum of modern Greek identity always swung between the West and

the East, we find the stance of the essays towards Japan and the Japanese

quite intriguing and suggestive. There is no sign of any ambiguity about

Greece’s “in-betweeness.” These essays were written definitely through a

Western eye. 19

Japan was depicted as a heavenly place with many natural blessings.

“Every attraction is concentrated exactly in the mainland of Japan. It has

perfectly healthy weather, wonderful land, sufficient volcanoes, a large

number of inhabitants, and blue sky.” 20 It was also said to contain abundant

minerals and fertile land. The rich land apparently yielded sufficient produce

with relatively little effort on the farmers’ parts. Therefore, the Japanese did

not have to work a lot. “Peasants work a little before sunrise—but whenever

19
When the terms “West” and “East” are used in relation to modern Greek identity,
they do not imply actual geographical dichotomy. The “West” stands for Europe and its
civilization originated in ancient Greece while the “East” the heritage of Byzantine
Empire and Eastern Orthodox Chritsianity. See Artemis Leontis, Topography of
Hellenism: Mapping the Homeland (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995).
20
«Ιάπωνες και Ιαπωνία. Ο περιεργότερος λαός της γής» [The Japanese and Japan: The
Strangest People on Earth], Αθήναι, 5 Φεβρουαρίου 1904, 1.

62
the cloudless sky presents the full moon, they spend sensuous sleepless

nights—and continue to work until noon. In the afternoon they work a bit,

but are engaged more often in family enjoyment.” 21 This pleasant

impression had a positive influence on the Europeans. “Various flowers,

either wild or cultivated, appear everywhere. Charming nature opens the

heart of a man and indeed attracts the dull European soul which has been

saturated with the pleasures of life of the West.” 22 In fact, some Europeans

admitted that they could spend their whole life happily in Japan. 23

Japan established a constitution in 1889 and maintained

constitutional monarchy with the Mikado, an emperor, at its head. Parliament,

which was convened for the first time in November 1890, had a bicameral

system. The House of Peers consisted of aristocrats while the House of

Representatives was composed of upper-bracket male taxpayers over 25

years old. 24 There were the differentiated classes—the Imperial Family, the

21
«Ιάπωνες και Ιαπωνία», Αθήναι, 1 Φεβρουαρίου 1904, 1.
22
«Ιάπωνες και Ιαπωνία», Αθήναι, 1 Φεβρουαρίου 1904, 1.
23
«Ιάπωνες και Ιαπωνία», Αθήναι, 5 Φεβρουαρίου 1904, 1; It is worth referring here to
the example of Lafcadio Hearn, an Irish-Greek writer. He was born in 1850 on a present
Greek island, Lefkada, of the Ionian Sea under British control. He came to Japan in
1890. He was so fascinated with the country that he became naturalized as Japanese and
married a Japanese woman. He died on September 16, 1904 (NS) during the
Russo–Japanese War. He wrote many works in English about Japan and the Japanese,
including Glimpses of Unfamiliar Japan (1894), In Ghostly Japan (1898), and Japan:
An Attempt at Interpretation (1904). He is still very popular in present-day Japan, where
he is known by his Japanese name KOIZUMI Yakumo. His obituary in a newspaper of
Liverpool was translated into Greek and placed in the contemporary Greek periodical
Noumas. «Λευκάδιος Hearn» [Lefkadios Hearn], Νουμάς, Αριθ. 116, 3 Οκτωβρίου
1904, 3.
24
«Ιαπωνία και Ιάπωνες» [Japan and the Japanese], Αθήναι, 18 Ιανουαρίου 1904, 1.

63
aristocracy, and common people. The essays emphasized, however, that the

class difference was not so substantial in Japanese society. Although the

common people acknowledged only the Mikado as the highest existence of

the country, there was no actual difference between rulers [i.e. aristocrats]

and people. There existedmerely an apparent difference between them,

which could be described as symbolic. That difference was operative only

when commoners and rulers met face to face. 25 According to an article,

“City and country dwellers and peasants are happy because the class

differences are only superficial, especially in the mainland.” 26 As Japanese

society functioned based on the idea that everyone lives happily, “mutual

agreement for general and individual happiness even[ed] all things out.” 27

The seemingly happy life of the Japanese influenced the formation

of Japan’s national character in the minds of the Greeks. “If there are a

people who are truly cheerful, joyful, innocent and humorous, the Japanese

are such people.” 28 Common people were apparently free from living and

social concerns and described as “most forgiving.” 29

The essays also paid special attention to Japanese women. An article

According to the essay, a man who paid 15 yen could have the right to be elected. One
yen was equivalent to 5.15 francs.
25
«Ιάπωνες και Ιαπωνία», Αθήναι, 27 Ιανουαρίου 1904, 1.
26
«Ιάπωνες και Ιαπωνία», Αθήναι, 5 Φεβρουαρίου 1904, 1.
27
«Ιάπωνες και Ιαπωνία», Αθήναι, 27 Ιανουαρίου 1904, 1.
28
«Ιάπωνες και Ιαπωνία», Αθήναι, 27 Ιανουαρίου 1904, 1.
29
«Ιάπωνες και Ιαπωνία», Αθήναι, 28 Ιανουαρίου 1904, 1.

64
said, “Both Europeans’ and natives’ most significant interest was the

commoner woman.” 30 It went so far as to write that Japanese women

embodied happiness in Japan:

Happiness of Japanese people is mainly due to the Japanese woman


who does not belong to the Mikado’s court, neither to the
aristocracy including Daimyo, but who is a member of all other
remaining classes of people in cities and villages. 31

In what sense could common Japanese women be the source of happiness for

the Japanese? We can easily imagine the roles of a woman who entertained a

man in various ways—oftentimes sexual relations got embedded in the

stereotypical image of a Japanese woman in the discourse of Orientalism in

the modern era. To be precise, the “happiness of Japanese people” meant

happiness of Japanese men.” As such, both European and native men were

highly interested in Japanese women.

Interestingly enough, the behavior of the stereotypical Japanese

woman, which was considered moral degeneration by “civilized” European

30
«Ιάπωνες και Ιαπωνία», Αθήναι, 29 Ιανουαρίου 1904, 1.
31
«Ιάπωνες και Ιαπωνία», Αθήναι, 29 Ιανουαρίου 1904, 1; This passage includes an
anachronism. The Daimyo did not exist any longer in Japan when this article was
published. The Daimyo were the feudal loads of the Samurai class. The feudal caste
system was abolished in 1869 as one of a series of reforms. The Daimyo were
incorporated into the aristocratic class together with Court nobles. They were called
kazoku. W.G. Beasley, The Meiji Restoration (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1972), 335.

65
standards, was explained as the outcome of women’s freedom in Japanese

society. “Neither any prejudice, nor any social and family obligations do not

restrain her [i.e. the Japanese woman]. She is free to do what she wants,

what she desires, and what her capricious mind comes up with.” 32 The

Japanese woman was not forced to occupy herself with such alleged

wickedness. She was not socially disadvantaged, either. She chose to do

what she wanted of her own free will.

The essay stressed that Japan had a different set of cultural and

social codes from civilized Europe. It noted:

One may suppose reasonably that a Japanese woman indulges in


wickedness (κακοήθεια) in which women of the civilized world are
engaged due either to their idiosyncrasy, or to earn their living for
daily bread.…But if one takes into consideration that in Japan the
foremost principle in daily life is the freedom of men and women
alike in every aspect, and if one is convinced that Japanese customs
and practices are ones that the customs of the civilized life
stigmatizes as dishonorable wickedness, one will not be surprised
naturally to discover complete moral depravity, which is perceived
as such only by those who live outside Japan. 33

32
«Ιάπωνες και Ιαπωνία.», Αθήναι, 29 Ιανουαρίου 1904, 1.
33
«Ιάπωνες και Ιαπωνία», Αθήναι, 29 Ιανουαρίου 1904, 1; The essay only employs the
words “wickedness” (κακοήθεια) to describe Japanese women’s alleged immoral
behavior and never gives a concrete example of exactly what this behavior entails. Yet
we can easily guess that the “wickedness” implies that Japanese women pursued
prostitute-like professions. It seems that the moral standard of contemporary Greek
society, which did not tolerate obscenity, prevented the writer of the essay from
providing further detailed description. Concerning Greek moral standards of that period,
Miller wrote, “There is no capital where vice is so little conspicuous as at

66
Indifferent to the judgment of the Europeans, Japanese men

frequented entertainment quarters where young women were readily

available, and which were demarcated from other districts of a town and a

village. Men had a good time with women who sang and danced from dusk

to midnight. Boy clowns also joined them and would entertain them with

their performing arts. “The world of the Japanese goes through the most

beautiful moment in its life there and Europeans are so attached that they do

not want to leave the quarters.” 34 Men would spend hours to their heart

content, entranced there. Therefore, “the Japanese do not use opium and

other narcotics like the Chinese and other peoples in the Far East. They do

not have to be intoxicated to enjoy themselves.” 35

The way in which Japanese enjoyed themselves to the full was also

observed in the formal dinner of common people. According to an article,

the formal dinner in Japan meant that common people held a banquet in an

effort to imitate aristocratic manners. Many relatives and neighbors were

invited and the banquet lasted from sundown to sunrise. “In Europe this kind

of banquet would be held once the doors were hermetically closed. But in

Japan almost all neighbors surround those who are holding the banquet.

Athens.…With the exception of two illustrated rags, one of which was prosecuted for
indecency, and the now almost universal Parisian postcards, there is little to corrupt the
morals of the passer-by. As a distinguished Greek novelist once said to me: ‘We are not
yet sufficiently civilised to be immoral.’” Miller, Greek Life, 199-200.
34
«Ιάπωνες και Ιαπωνία», Αθήναι, 29 Ιανουαρίου 1904, 1.
35
«Ιάπωνες και Ιαπωνία», Αθήναι, 29 Ιανουαρίου 1904, 1.

67
Some of them actively participate and others simply serve as spectators. As

the fete is held in most cases in the garden, it is within reach for all who are

outside of the surrounding fence [of the house of the host].” 36 Whether male

or female, young or old, they apparently had unrestrained revels, eating and

drinking. Professional dancers, singers, performers, musicians and poets also

participated. Boisterous merrymaking continued all night. “This kind of

formal dinners, to be sure, can be regarded as unique in the whole world,

especially compared to European banquets in which different etiquettes,

obligations of more or less mandatory reciprocity and other similar things

have to proceed and ensue.” 37

The “strangeness” of the Japanese people was particularly

remarkable to the Greek observer in Japanese attitudes toward religion. They

were not religiously fanatical at all and tolerant of just about any form of

faiths. The essay noted that the Japanese were Buddhist, but at the same time

respected “the spirits of the kami,” which was recognized as the national

religion of Japan, and which considered the Mikado Mutsuhito, the great

grandson of the sun, as divine. 38 Previously, thousands of Japanese

Christians were persecuted and killed, and Christianity in Japan had been set

36
«Ιάπωνες και Ιαπωνία», Αθήναι, 6 Φεβρουαρίου 1904, 1.
37
«Ιάπωνες και Ιαπωνία», Αθήναι, 6 Φεβρουαρίου 1904, 1.
38
«Ιάπωνες και Ιαπωνία», Αθήναι, 27 Ιανουαρίου 1904, 1; Kami means god in
Japanese. The essay never uses the word, “Shintoism,” the traditional polytheistic
religion of Japan, but “the spirits of the kami” refers to it.

68
back by the prohibition orders of the seventeenth century. But now the ban

on Christian faith was officially withdrawn and the number of Japanese

Christians increased little by little. An article mentioned that not only

Christianity, but “hundreds of creeds and heresies function[ed] in this very

paradoxical country.” 39 This was a product not only of the official religious

policy of the new Meiji government, but also of people’s instincts of

religious tolerance or eclecticism. “Since the Mikado permitted, or rather

forced the Japanese to be civilized, they have accepted new religions that

spread steadily. Even when a creed is paradoxical, the Japanese are not

deterred by the differences between it and their own creeds. Instead they

introduce new names of deities for worship. This is the chief explanation for

the big and wide concept which the Japanese have of Christianity.” 40 The

Japanese did not seem to care what the name of the deity they worshipped

was—kami, Sabaoth or Jehovah. It did not matter for the Japanese who the

great teacher of their religion was—Buddha or Christ. However, the essay

also stated that, although the Japanese learned about Christianity only

superficially in the beginning, they often later were eager to become

complete Christians. 41

One article went on to say, “People never criticize or mock others

39
«Ιάπωνες και Ιαπωνία», Αθήναι, 6 Φεβρουαρίου 1904, 1; A ban against Christianity
was officially cancelled in 1873.
40
«Ιάπωνες και Ιαπωνία», Αθήναι, 6 Φεβρουαρίου 1904, 1.
41
«Ιάπωνες και Ιαπωνία», Αθήναι, 8 Φεβρουαρίου 1904, 2.

69
because of their creed. On the contrary, everyone respects others’ beliefs

because his own creed needs to be respected.” 42 An example of the religious

tolerance of the Japanese was made based on their behavior when visiting a

church or temple of a religion different from their own. “The most beautiful

of all manifestations which Christianity presents in Japan is the respect

which it inspires among Christians and non-Christians alike. A non-Christian

Japanese comes to a Christian church and kneels like a Christian believer. As

he knows how to make the sign of the cross, he crosses himself like the

others do.” 43 Likewise, “when they visit a temple of either the kami or

Buddha, Christian Japanese kneel, grovel, and put their foreheads on the

stones of the ground.” 44

42
«Ιάπωνες και Ιαπωνία», Αθήναι, 27 Ιανουαρίου1904, 1.
43
«Ιάπωνες και Ιαπωνία» Αθήναι, 8 Φεβρουαρίου 1904, 2.
44
«Ιάπωνες και Ιαπωνία» Αθήναι, 27 Ιανουαρίου1904, 1; On June 21, 1904 (NS),
during the Russo–Japanese War, the newspaper The Times of London reported what
measures the Japanese government took to eliminate the racial and religious prejudices
among Japanese people against the Russians and Christians and also what action the
Christians in Japan took. The Japanese government officially opposed radial and
religious discrimination. It issued special orders to protect Russian subjects in the
country so as to repress the increasing tendency in Japanese society to discriminate the
Russian Orthodox Christians and other Christians of different denominations. A
conference of all religious bodies in Japan was held on May 16, 1904 (NS), and
declared, “The war now existing between Japan and Russia has for its object, on the
part of Japan, the security of the empire and the permanent peace of the East. It is
carried on in the interests of justice, humanity, and the civilization of the world. With
differences between races or religions it has nothing whatever to do. We, therefore,
meeting together without distinction of race or religion, agree that we will endeavour to
publish to the world, each in a manner accordant with the methods observed in the
religious body to which he belongs, the real purpose of the present war as now
described. We also express a most earnest desire for the speedy accomplishment of an
honourable peace.” The representative of “Greek Church” [i.e. Russian Orthodox
Church] in Japan also participated in the conference. Therefore, the article wrote,

70
Material Progress in Japan

In contrast to the series of essays in the newspaper Athens that were

greatly concerned with cultural and social aspects of Japan, and that

emphasized the differences from Europe, an article “The Astonishing

Progress of Japan” in the annual magazine Encyclopedic Diary of 1906

published in 1905 focused on material progress in Japan. It articulated how

Japan had successfully modernized its country based on the model of

European civilized countries from the time when it was determined to strive

for obtaining national strength sufficient to compete with European powers.

The article demonstrated the extent to which Japan had attained the level of

“civilization” of Europe by providing concrete figures.

“Japan was inferior to China about forty years ago with respect to

civilization. There was the system of feudalism in Japan.” 45 The Tokugawa

“[F]rom the foreign and native followers of her own State faith in Japan, Russia
receives an emphatic protest against the cruel injustice she is doing to a most liberal and
fair-minded nation.” The tone of the argument of the article was favorable to Japan. The
author provided concrete examples to prove the sincere consideration of the Japanese
government for different races and religions, such as the holding of a Japanese state
funeral of Mr. Davidoff, a Russian representative, in which “the use of Greek ritual”
was allowed. The article read, “There is probably no part of the world where religious
bigotry and racial prejudice have less influence than in Japan.” However, we should
keep in mind that Britain had been allied with Japan since 1902. “Christianity and the
Russo-Japanese War,” The Times, June 25, 1904 (NS), 4; There were not only Russian
inhabitants, but also Japanese Eastern Orthodox Christians in Japan. The Eastern
Orthodox believers in Japan numbered 28,397 in 1903, 28,597 in 1904, and 28,920 in
1905. Элеонора Саблина, 150 лет Православия в Японии: История Японской
Православной Церкви и её основатель Святитель Николай [150 Years of
Orthodoxy in Japan: History of Japanese Orthodox Church and its Founder Prelate
Nikolai] (Москва; Санкт-Петербург: AИРО, 2006), 118.
45
«Καταπληκτικαί πρόοδοι της Ιαπωνίας» [The Astonishing Progress of Japan], in Ι.Α.

71
Shogunate officially ended in November 1867. Since then Japan had

successfully undergone through the so-called Meiji Restoration, which

reinstalled the Emperor as the head of the state and pushed forward

vigorously toward political and social progress to catch up with European

powers. “In 1867 everything changed suddenly. Japan has made a jump of

ten centuries within forty years.” 46

The Meiji government eagerly introduced European political

institutions. Feudalism was abolished and the parliamentary system was

introduced. Japanese subjects were all considered equals before the law. As

an example which demonstrated most clearly the desire to become civilized,

the article quoted Article 5 of the Charter Oath issued by the Japanese

Emperor in 1868. It read, “Knowledge shall be sought throughout the world

so as to strengthen the foundation of imperial rule.” 47 According to this

principle, many Japanese studied in Europe and gained the advanced

knowledge in the fields of science and technology from civilized countries at

public expense in order to apply it to Japan’s reform and modernization

efforts. Thus, Japanese efforts had borne fruit.

Βρετός, Ημερολόγιον εγκυκλοπαιδικόν του 1906 [Encyclopedic Diary of 1906], (Αθήνα:


Εστία, 1905), 107.
46
«Καταπληκτικαί πρόοδοι της Ιαπωνίας», 107.
47
«Καταπληκτικαί πρόοδοι της Ιαπωνίας», 107. The English translation is quoted from
“The Charter Oath,” in Sources of Japanese Tradition, vol. 2: 1600 to 2000, Abridged
Part 2: 1868 to 2000, 2nd ed., complied by William Theodore de Bary, Carol Gluck, and
Arthur E. Tiedemann (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 8.

72
Japan had made huge material progress in many sectors. In the field

of transportation, the railway system showed remarkable development. There

was only one railroad of 28 kilometers between Tokyo and Yokohama in

1870. By 1903 the railroad in Japan had reached 8,982 kilometers in total.

The number of locomotives also increased from 522 (48,000,000 passengers)

in 1896 to 1,273 (113,000,000 passengers). Telecommunication also

improved. The telegraph was first introduced at the end of 1868 and the total

length of telegraphic lines increased from 13,756 kilometers in1893 to

30,449 kilometers in 1903. The postal system was unknown thirty years

previously, but by 1903 there were 4,567 post offices, and they dealt with

896,740,000 letters between 1901 and 1903. 48

The number of the banks and companies (130 banks and 1,006

stock companies in 1894) demonstrated that the rate with which business

was flourishing in Japan as well. These companies handled some

300,000,000 francs. 49 Commercial shipping had been booming as well. In

1890 there were only 855 sailing-ships, but in 1904 Japan had 1,441

European-built steamers with a total tonnage of 583,000, and 3,997

Japanese-built sailing-ships with a tonnage of 334,000, and 18,743

Japanese-built ships. 50

48
«Καταπληκτικαί πρόοδοι της Ιαπωνίας», 108.
49
«Καταπληκτικαί πρόοδοι της Ιαπωνίας», 109.
50
«Καταπληκτικαί πρόοδοι της Ιαπωνίας», 109-10.

73
The transformation from household-based industry to large-scaled

manufacture had also been remarkable. Twenty thousand people worked at

20 factories in 1880, and by 1903, 3,200 factories had 300,000 workers. A

spinning mill in Tokyo had 45,000 spindles and 3,000 workers. In the mining

industry, Japan produced silver (worth 10,000,000 francs), gold (worth

7,000,000 francs) and coal (worth 62,000,000 francs). 51 In Kyushu a

state-run manufacturing plant annually produced 100,000 tons of steel. 52

The development of agriculture was not ignored either. Arable land

has expanded by 25% in the previous 25 years. On farms, 750,000 horses

and 300,000 oxen worked in the fields. Rice was cultivated under very good

conditions and the yield of tea had increased. The cultivation rate of

mulberry had doubled. 53

By enriching the country through modernization, the Japanese

government had also benefitted from it. The national revenue had been

trebled in twenty years. In 1903 it amounted to 713,330,000 francs. 54

The Japanese government did not only concentrate on building up

the strength of the country by emulating various European apparatuses and

by developing national production power. It intended at the same time to

amass modern military forces. The battlefield was the place where the

51
«Καταπληκτικαί πρόοδοι της Ιαπωνίας», 109.
52
«Καταπληκτικαί πρόοδοι της Ιαπωνίας», 111.
53
«Καταπληκτικαί πρόοδοι της Ιαπωνίας», 110.
54
«Καταπληκτικαί πρόοδοι της Ιαπωνίας», 110.

74
modern technology and scientific capabilities of a state could be fully

demonstrated. As the Russo–Japanese war turned in favor of Japan, it could

be said that the war itself was visible proof of the success of Japanese

modernization. The same article wrote, “Sword-bearing Samurai plunderers

gave way to a regular army.” 55 In 1900, the total size of the army in peace

time was 640,700. To be more precise, there were 1,237 generals and

officers of higher rank, 10,374 officers, 43,576 non-commissioned officers,

578,000 soldiers, and 7,503 assistants. 56 Concerning the Japanese Navy, the

article said, “Today Japan is one of the first-ranked naval powers and proved

that fairly in battle at sea against the Russian Navy.” 57 The article explained

that the steam corvette that Lord Elgin, the British Ambassador to Tokyo,

gave as a present to the Mikado was the first steam ship in Japan. In 1867

Japan bought from Europe 7 battleships, 7 cruisers, 17 smaller ships, and 30

torpedo-boats. Later it developed its own navy shipyards. These had built 80

warships by 1902. The navy had 21 admirals, 730 officers of higher rank,

2,051 officers, 1,220 ensigns etc., 6,610 non-commissioned officers, 29,784

sailors. 58

The power of the figures the article offered one after another was so

overwhelming that readers probably felt convinced of Japan’s advancement

55
«Καταπληκτικαί πρόοδοι της Ιαπωνίας», 108.
56
«Καταπληκτικαί πρόοδοι της Ιαπωνίας», 109.
57
«Καταπληκτικαί πρόοδοι της Ιαπωνίας», 109.
58
«Καταπληκτικαί πρόοδοι της Ιαπωνίας», 109.

75
although they probably could not grasp the extent to which each of these

figures actually proved Japan’s advancement. The bigger the numbers were,

the more readers would have been impressed with Japan’s progress.

Lessons from Japan

During the Russo–Japanese War, apart from the essays which

descriptively provided the information on Japan and Japanese people and on

Japan’s success in modernization, there were also discourses in the Greek

media which looked at the progress of Japan from a comparative perspective.

They compared the present Greek situation with that of Japan, and even

suggested that Greece should learn from Japan how to lead the Greek state in

a better direction.

Konstantinos Mitsopoulos, a professor at the University of Athens

and a director of the Polytechnic, contributed a long essay on the front page

in the newspaper Athens on February 10, 1904, under the title of “Lessons

from Japan.” The essay revealed his impatience with Greece’s inability to

catch up with the times of progress and attempted to show what difference

existed between Greece and Japan. Examining and comparing several

aspects, he concluded that Greece has to imitate Japan’s example.

First of all, Mitsopoulos deplored the present miserable situation of

Greece, which remained exposed to Bulgarian attacks while Japan had been

76
civilized enough to confront one of European powers:

We, the children of glorified fathers and ancestors, have been


threatened by Bulgarians who were swineherds up until yesterday,
while Japan has obtained power of the first class. The civilized
world observed with great concern the enormous progress of Japan
which, since the day when it accepted European civilization,
impetuously launched itself into material and intellectual progress.
And now the achievements of a young giant of the Far East, which
dared to confront a Russian colossus with strategic skill and
incomparable bravery, are amazing. 59

What attracted him most concerning the rise of Japan in world

politics was the fact that Japan, which had been once a “half-barbarian and

xenophobic country” 60 and was located far from Europe, now almost

equaled European powers. He wrote, “The European world was amazed at

the easy success of the experiment to promptly rouse half-barbarian

people.” 61 Japan threw out its past and voluntarily copied every detail of

European civilization. The Japanese learned all branches of knowledge in

Europe and America as students. Then they returned to their country to

enlighten it in order to make it civilized.

In contrast to Japan’s miracle within a short time period, he argued,

59
Κωνσταντίνος Μητσόπουλος, «Διδάγματα από την Ιαπωνίαν» [Lessons from Japan],
Αθήναι, 10 Φεβρουαρίου 1904, 1.
60
Μητσόπουλος, «Διδάγματα από την Ιαπωνίαν», 1.
61
Μητσόπουλος, «Διδάγματα από την Ιαπωνίαν», 1.

77
Greece did not achieved anything, even though the Greeks had been

liberated for seventy four years and living in Europe with direct contact to

the civilized world. Concerning the acquirement of knowledge from Europe,

he said, “We also did the same [like the Japanese did], but we bear no

resemblance to Japan.” 62

Exactly what difference existed between Japan and Greece?

Mitsopoulos paid attention to university education in Japan. The University

of Tokyo, the leading national university, was much bigger than the

University of Athens in terms of the number of departments, professors, and

students. What was more notable than its size was that the University of

Tokyo had various departments of practical sciences, and that professors

specialized in subjects like shipbuilding and blasting technology which were

not yet known to Greece. 63

According to Mitsopoulos, the Japanese government had effectively

exploited the achievements of academia to develop every sector of the

domestic industry such as agriculture, sericulture, forestry, shipbuilding and

military manufacturing. In this manner, Japan succeeded in increasing its

national wealth. He also mentioned that, as Japan was full of mineral

62
Μητσόπουλος, «Διδάγματα από την Ιαπωνίαν», 1.
63
According to Mitsopoulos, the University of Tokyo had 41 professors who
specialized in agronomy, forestry, agricultural science, zootechny and other subjects
which were unknown to Greece, while the University of Athens had 55 professors of
whom only five specialized in the natural sciences. The University of Tokyo was
founded in 1877, forty years after the establishment of the University of Athens.

78
resources, the Japanese scientifically studied subjects concerning mineral

and metallurgy to turn their knowledge to advantage in promoting mining

industry. In contrast to Japan, he deplored on behalf of Greece: “Although

our country is metalliferous, we have not yet been able to make any proper

law concerning minerals.” 64 He also compared the two countries and wrote

that Japan had utilized its mineral resources to manufacture arms, canons,

warships, rails etc. while Greece had barely benefitted from the abundant

iron beds and coals. He even condemned the behavior of the Greeks because

they were contributing to the devastating decline in Greek forestry. “The

forest produces the most excellent timbers and camphor [in Japan] because

the inhabitants do not burn it as the Greeks do.” 65

The comparison of the two countries regarding national defense

budgeting also betrayed Mitsopoulos’ dissatisfaction with his own country.

In Japan the ordinary and extraordinary expenditures of Ministry of War

were estimated at 46,695,000 yen (116,737,000 gold francs) in 1903, which

corresponded with 16.5% of the national revenue. Mitsopoulos divided

116,737,000 by 178,000, the number of the effective force (ενεργός στρατός)

of Japanese army, and concluded that 655 francs was spent on for each

man. 66 In Greece, 21,952 effectives were recorded in 1904 and the Greek

64
Μητσόπουλος, «Διδάγματα από την Ιαπωνίαν», 1.
65
Μητσόπουλος, «Διδάγματα από την Ιαπωνίαν», 1.
66
According to the information Mitsopoulos relies on, the Japanese army had 640,000

79
state spent 15.3% of its annual revenue for a military purpose. According to

Mitsopoulos’ calculation, on average 540 francs was used for each miliraty

man.

There was not a big difference between the two countries

concerning the proportion of the military expenses to the national budget.

The sum of money that was supposed to maintain one military man did not

differ considerably, either. Although Mitsopoulos did not overtly mention it,

he probably intended to provoke readers to consider why Greece had not yet

achieved a strong modernized army in spite of the fact that it had spent

almost the same money as Japan did on each military man. Furthermore,

Japan had expended money on armament so effectually that its military

forces were now able to wage a war even against Russia. In reality,

successive Greek governments acknowledged the necessity of the drastic

reform of the Greek military forces since the humiliating defeat of

Greek–Turkish War of 1897, but the attempts to realize military

reorganization were proceeding at a snail’s pace. 67

men in peace time, of which 462,000 were held in the reserve The number of the
effective force (178,000) can be obtained by subtracting 462,000 from 640,000.
67
Ιστορία του Ελληνικού Έθνους: Νεώτερος ελληνισμός από το 1881 ως το 1913
[History of the Greek Nation: Modern Hellenism from 1881 to 1913], τόμος ΙΔ΄ [vol.
14] (Αθήνα: Εκδοτική Αθηνών, 1977), 186-188; The fourth administration of Theotokis
which started in December 1905 moved to discuss this issue seriously at a long last. For
the details of the military preparation project of the Theotokis’ government, see
Στυλιανός-Περικλής Καράβης, «Η δημοσιονομική πολιτική της κυβέρνησης Γ.
Θεοτόκη και η πολεμική προπαρασκευή της Ελλάδας (1905–1909)» [Fiscal Policy of
the G. Theotokis’ Government and the Preparations for War in Greece (1905–1909)]

80
Mitsopoulos explained that Japan had used its national expenditures

for various beneficial purposes except the military preparations. He wrote,

“Japan has spent its revenue not only on building up the army and the navy

like Mehmet Ali, an Egyptian leader, did, but also on educating its people

and increasing national product.” 68 For these purposes to be fulfilled the

Japanese government relied on tax revenues and public debt, just as the

Greek government did. Yet here again Mitsopoulos found a stark difference

between the two countries. In 1903, each Japanese individual paid as an

annual tax to the state 13.5 gold francs while each Greek paid 30 gold francs

at least. This means that Greek people paid more than twice as much as the

Japanese did. A huge disproportion between Japan and Greece could be also

observed concerning annual interest paid on the public debt. Japan paid

110,000,000 gold francs in 1903 as annual interest, which burdened each

Japanese with 2.23 francs. This sum of money corresponded to 15.6% of the

national revenue. In contrast, the annual interest on the national debt in

Greece of 1903 amounted to 24,443,000 gold francs, which imposed a

burden of 15 francs on each Greek. This amount of money accounted for

31% of the national revenue. Now that Japan had progressed enough,

Japanese people had been rewarded for their monetary contribution to the

state. How about Greece? The comparison of public financial burdens on the

(master’s thesis, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, 2007).


68
Μητσόπουλος, «Διδάγματα από την Ιαπωνίαν», 1.

81
citizenry of each country inevitably made Greek readers think of what had

been achieved through their enormous financial burden. 69

In his conclusion, Mitsopoulos contended that the success of Japan

not only lay in emulation of European civilization, but also in its individual

endeavor to take its place with European powers through increasing the

wealth of the nation. He wrote:

These few observations demonstrate that, in order to achieve


today’s power and strength, Japan was not satisfied with just
accepting European civilization, but took care to develop national
production by educating and illuminating its people. Unfortunately,
up until now we have not successfully accumulated national wealth.
What took place up until now automatically resulted from our
missteps. But in order that nations can accomplish great things and
achieve their destiny, which the Greek nation also has, they must
learn how to utilize the resources they have and the powers which
govern them because nothing can happen without money in the
world. Let the tremendous progress of Japan be our model, which,
though being half-barbarian thirty five years ago, has been
illuminated and become a civilized power of the first class. 70

Demand for Change: Criticism against Greek Politics

Such comparative perspectives constituted a form of criticism

against Greek politics. There was a discourse which took Japan as a

69
Μητσόπουλος, «Διδάγματα από την Ιαπωνίαν», 1.
70
Μητσόπουλος, «Διδάγματα από την Ιαπωνίαν», 1.

82
reference point and criticized the Greek political world. Why can the Greeks

not do what the former “half-barbarian” Japanese have done? What prevents

the state from moving ahead? Who is responsible for the malfunction of the

state? Naturally enough, not only the government but politicians allegedly

gathered in Parliament with theatrical greatness and little substantive

responsibilities bore the brunt of such attacks.

The article “What Do We Demand?” in the newspaper Akropolis on

September 30, 1906, demonstrated a self-denigrating view about the

contemporary Greek condition:

Are you aware that if you are inactive, if you remain stuck in the
evil past, and if you continue the comedy of the army, the navy, and
administration, you, unprincipled nation-eaters (εθνοβόροι), are
willingly inducing the members of the European Supreme Court (τα
μέλη του Ευρωπαϊκού Αρείου Πάγου) to cast votes against
Hellenism? How will Europe prefer us, the nation without army,
navy, and administration, to the Bulgarians who have an army and
an administration? 71

The article condemned in very strong words those who did not make any

effort and who only pursued political farces that had not had any effect

concerning Greece’s inadequacy in terms of national defense and state

administration. They were painted as the nation’s enemies because what they

71 «Τι ζητούμεν» [What Do We Demand?], Ακρόπολις, 30 Σεπτεμβρίου 1906, 1.

83
were doing effectively conveyed a negative impression of Hellenism to

European powers. Under the existing circumstances where Greece was

devoid of various fundamental institutions necessary for a state to function,

it was very natural that Europe attached no importance to the Greeks and

treated kindly the Bulgarians, the Greek archenemy, instead.

The article appealed to the need to change the present stagnated

situation. It wrote:

When we demand change from the government, we do not seek


only trivial reforms of persons and things. We do not mean that we
seek to lower our level of dissatisfaction, mathematically speaking,
from 100 to 98, or improve our level of satisfaction from one to one
and half.
We demand drastic reforms of persons and things. The army is
equal to nothing. But we want to create the army equal to
everything that Greece can give. The navy does not have a
commander. We want a Minister of the navy who can give birth to
the soul of the navy, the soul which expresses the sum total of navy
officers’ souls. 72

The article rejected halfway reform. Greece needed to pursue absolute

transition from the position of having essentially nothing to that of having

everything. Focusing on military preparations in particular, the article asked

for the transformation in terms not only of material equipments, but of

72
«Τι ζητούμεν», 1.

84
fighting spirits. Then it declared:

We want to become the Japanese of the Near East, triumphantly


entering a period of change which foreign powers here will watch
warily and which will blaze after a decade with the spirits of a new
true Greece and a new true Hellenism.
This change is possible. It is ready to take place. It is mature
enough to take place. All ideas of which it consists are afloat within
and on the minds of us all. And finally we have persons who will be
ready to enact these ideas. Strong public opinion indicates that the
Greek parliament is not be tolerated anymore, because it is
convened hypocritically to allegedly pursue national interests, but in
reality to pillage the budget as a standard-bearer of lies and disgrace
in all the departments of administration and government. 73

Here the word “Japanese” appears in a somewhat abrupt manner. There is no

reference either to Japan or to the Japanese in preceding part of this article.

Yet the common understanding conjured up by the words “Japanese” and

“Japan” must have already been widespread among Greek people. That is

why the author of the article could employ the word “Japanese” without any

introduction. Contemporary readers could understand without difficulty what

connotation the word “Japanese” carried. In the minds of the Greeks, the

word “Japanese” had come to connote a concept of change, which inspired

successful transformation from being backward to being progressive in terms

73
«Τι ζητούμεν», 1.

85
of modernization. “We want to become the Japanese of the Near East.” To

put it in another way, as the Japanese had accomplished, the Greeks also

wanted to realize their national rebirth by totally reforming the state so as to

be considered a full-fledged nation-state and to be treated with respect by

European powers. Everybody had already ideas for change and was

preparing for change, the article claimed. There were also talented

individuals who could advance the process of change. It was high time to

deliver an ultimatum to the Greek political arena which seemed only

interested in petty party politics and had never embarked on reform. 74

For all its geographical and cultural remoteness from Greece, Japan

had become a country conceptually within the reach of Greece. Japan had

gained an exclusively positive and powerful image as the newest rising

power in world politics on the mental map of the Greeks. The article

criticized the stagnant state system and politicians and called for change,

lifting up Japan as a model state. It did not give specific names of persons

who were talented enough to overhaul the country. This article, though, was

prophetic to some degree. About one month after it was issued, a new small

74
The Young Turks of the same period also identified Japan with the hopes of changing
the Ottoman Empire into a modern state and regarded themselves as the “Japan” of the
Near East. See Feroz Ahmad, The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress
in Turkish Politics 1908‒1914 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), 23n1;
According to Worringer, Young Turks Ahmed Riza and Dr. Nâzim first used the
expression “Turkey was the Japan of the Near East” when they offered an alliance to
Britain in November 1908. Worringer, “Comparing Perceptions,” 223n1, 256-258.

86
political unit of seven deputies began its energetic activities in the Greek

parliament. The party would soon be called the Team of the Japanese.

87
CHAPTER 3

Vision of the State and Desire for Change:

Proposals to Reform Public Service and Economic Policies

The Team of the Japanese emphasized the importance of

introducing reforms in the domestic political situation in order to bring about

the state’s rebirth. Although it did not announce the specific program of state

reformation to the public, it was most likely in keeping with their vision of

an ideal state. In this chapter, we shall analyze which factors the Team

regarded as problematic and therefore attempted to reform by criticizing the

government.

This chapter is divided into three sections: The first section presents

Gounaris’ vision of an ideal state. According to him, a state and society

should move ahead in tandem or, rather, a state should help society to

progress. As per this definition, he saw the relationship between the Greek

state and Greek society as being unbalanced—as society progressed, the

state was unable to catch up with it, thereby preventing society from further

advancing. Gounaris pointed out that oligarchy hindered the state from

moving forward. He contended that the state should exist for the good of the

people and society and should thus promptly sever its bond with the

oligarchic system.

88
The second section of this chapter describes the Team’s criticism of

the inefficient state administration. The members criticized how inaccurately

and carelessly the state functioned and how strong the arbitrary political

influence was on the hiring and firing of government staff. In order to

resolve these issues, they proposed that public servants be appointed on the

basis of merit alone and be guaranteed lifetime job security irrespective of

political influences.

The third section examines the Team’s proposals toward building a

sound state economy. Since Gounaris believed that the economy was the

basis of progress, the state had to be economically developed in order to lead

society. In this regard, the Team first criticized the government tariff policy

that claimed to protect domestic industry but in reality only benefited the

national treasury. What should be undertaken first, they argued, was to a

thorough preliminary investigation of domestic industry so that the

government could make an informed decision about which sector the state

should protect through the tariff policy. Second, the Team fiercely attacked

the state taxation system that laid disproportionate emphasis on indirect tax.

What was worse, the state imposed unreasonably high indirect taxes on

articles that were basic necessities of life. It followed that the less wealthy

bore a heavier financial burden. As a result, the number of emigrants kept

increasing. This resulted in the loss of man power, which would deprive the

89
state of national strength in the long run. Therefore, the Team contended that

though the state had unduly exploited the people thus far, hereafter it had to

establish sound economy policies.

To sum up, this chapter addresses the Team’s vision of the state with

respect to the public service, the tariff policy, the taxation system, and

emigration.

Gounaris’ Vision of the State

Among all the members of the Team, it is Gounaris who expressed a

theory of what a state should be like. Although he never exclusively focused

on his vision of an ideal state, in the two speeches he delivered during the

extraordinary session of the eighteenth parliamentary period, he criticized

the Greek state on the basis of his vision of an ideal state. 1

It is hard to estimate the extent to which his vision of the state

influenced that of the other members. However, considering the fact that

1
The first speech delivered on December 19, 1906, was about a new loan for military
reorganization and the second one made on April 12, 1907, was about the Greek
emigrants. The whole texts of his speeches appeared in the newspaper Akropolis.
«Αγόρευσις Δ. Γούναρη βουλευτού Πατρών επί του νομοσχέδιου περί δανείου
20,000,000 υπέρ ταμείου της Εθνικής Άμυνας» [The Speech of D. Gounaris, Deputy of
Patras, on the Bill of the Loan of 20,000,000 gold francs for the Fund of the National
Defense] , Ακρόπολις, 17 Ιανουαρίου 1907, 2-4; «Ολόκληρος η θαυμάσια αγόρευσις
του βουλευτού Πατρών κ. Δημήτριου Γούναρη επί του νομοσχέδιου περί των
μεταναστεύσεων» [The Whole Marvelous Speech of Mr. Dimitrios Gounaris, Deputy of
Patras, on the Bill of Emigration], Ακρόπολις, 21 Απριλίου 1907, 1-3.

90
Gounaris was initially nominated as the Team leader, 2 it is likely that his

ideas met with the approval of the other members. Furthermore, we can

assume that before they embarked upon concrete activities in Parliament as a

political unit, the members must have unanimously agreed upon a common

vision of the state, even though this had not been clearly formulated as part

of the party’s program.

Gounaris contended that a major role of the state was, among other

things, to support both the people and society. According to him, a state is a

topos of powers of individuals working together. However, a state is not a

mere fabric that is composed of the sum total of each individual’s power. He

said, “[B]y cooperating with one another and by complementing one another,

each individual’s power proliferates, expands, and reaches the point where a

single power of an individual cannot reach by itself.” 3 Within the

framework of a state every individual can influence another and all can work

together in a positive manner, thereby achieving what a single individual

would not be able to accomplish. Gounaris implied that a state was an

agency that helped an individual gain strength and thereby realize his or her

intentions.

Similarly, Gounaris emphasized the importance of the state helping

2
Απόστολος Αλεξανδρής. Πολιτικαί αναμνήσεις [Political Memoirs] (Πάτρα: Δ.
Φραγκούλης και Κ. Βαρζάνης, 1947), 5.
3
«Αγόρευσις Δ. Γούναρη βουλευτού Πατρών», 2.

91
society advance, especially at the beginning of the twentieth century, which

he characterized as “the epoch of excellent progress of civilization.” 4

Gounaris said:

The state is useful as long as the forward movement of the state


corresponds to the development of society. The movement of the
two has to be paralleled. The moment when there exists a distance
between the two with respect to progress, society is in danger of
dissolution, breaking its ties with the state. Then the state has no
reason to exist. 5

Gounaris witnessed the society he lived in constantly moving ahead toward

progress. However, there was one condition under which the development of

society could be secured—if it received help from the state. As the state

assisted society in making progress, he believed the two must move in

tandem. If not, he contended, society would be fragmented, which would

simultaneously mean the death of the state.

Gounaris argued that the present Greek state did not satisfy this

criterion. Though a state had to always focus on the needs of individuals and

to assist them in realizing their wishes, the Greek state fell short of these

expectations. He criticized it by saying:

4
«Ολόκληρος η θαυμάσια αγόρευσις του βουλευτού Πατρών», 2.
5 «Ολόκληρος η θαυμάσια αγόρευσις του βουλευτού Πατρών», 2.

92
[W]hen the state is so short-sighted that it can neither foresee nor
simply see what an individual catch sight of, we have the right to
say that the state is blind. What is the reason of the sickness of the
state? It is obvious. The state is not organized, which we see
everywhere. Our state is unorganized as a political entity in every
aspect, not only from the military point of view, but also from the
political one. 6

The Greek state had lost sight of the bigger picture of individual goals.

Therefore, it could not, he claimed, be regarded as healthy. According to

Gounaris, the Greek state’s blindness was attributed to the fact that it had not

been organized well in all aspects. For this reason, the state could not afford

to consider individuals’ concerns.

The Greek state was not helpful to society either. He regarded the

existing relationship between the Greek state and Greek society as

unbalanced. The state had not been able to keep pace with the advancement

of society, which would prove to be fatal to the existence of both the state

and society. He expressed his anxiety in the following words:

Gentlemen, I am afraid that there is a great disproportion of


progress between our state and our society. I am afraid that the state
does not follow the progress of society which is moving forward.
And this makes the defects of the state still greater and more

6
«Αγόρευσις Δ. Γούναρη βουλευτού Πατρών», 2.

93
dangerous. 7

This gave rise to the question of what Gounaris believed restrained the state

from beneficially serving the people and society. His answer to this question

was that oligarchy separated the state from the people and society.

I am afraid that we have an oligarchy ruling all things and


dominating all the spheres where the state is supposed to function.
An oligarchy exploits the state for its own benefits.… It has no
power, no ability, and no education to discern what it is possible to
do for the benefits of our unfortunate society… 8

By oligarchy, Gounaris meant a privileged group of people who were

parasitic on the state and lived off the public. They were interested only in

what the state offered them and did not care about the problems of society.

They obviously did not comprehend the necessity for the state and society to

forge an alliance so as to bring about progress. Gounaris even openly

criticized them stating that they were unable to contribute to society because

of their lack of capability and learning. They were, according to him,

“useless with all pompous titles.” 9

Gounaris is vague about exactly who the members of the oligarchy

7
«Ολόκληρος η θαυμάσια αγόρευσις του βουλευτού Πατρών», 2.
8
«Ολόκληρος η θαυμάσια αγόρευσις του βουλευτού Πατρών», 2.
9
«Ολόκληρος η θαυμάσια αγόρευσις του βουλευτού Πατρών», 2.

94
were. However, his concept of an oligarchy is seemingly similar to that of a

state bourgeoisie, a concept that scholars like Konstantinos Tsoukalas and

George Th. Mavrogordatos employ when describing the nature of the ruling

privileged social class of this period in Greece. According to them,

throughout the nineteenth century after the Greek kingdom was established,

the members of reputable traditional families whose ancestors either played

a distinguished role in the war of independence of 1821 or were notables and

leading military chieftains in the Ottoman period regarded the state as only a

source of power, and thereby occupied expanding state apparatus as

politicians, state officials, military officials, lawyers, and academics. They

comprised the state bourgeoisie and exclusively controlled politics and the

state budget. 10 Even though this seems similar to Gounaris’ idea of the

members of an oligarchy, we cannot consider the two concepts as completely

identical. While the concept of a state bourgeoisie presupposes other

analytical categories like a commercial bourgeoisie and a class of

landowners, Gounaris’ concept of oligarchy does not presume the

coexistence of such categories. Gounaris viewed contemporary society in a

simpler manner. For him, society was divided into two sections: one

10
Κωνσταντίνος Τσουκαλάς, Εξάρτηση και αναπαραγωγή: Ο κοινωνικός ρόλος των
εκπαιδευτικών μηχανισμών στην Ελλάδα (1830–1922) [Dependence and Reproduction:
The Social Role of Educational Devices in Greece (1830–1922)] (Αθήνα: Θεμέλιο,
1977), 209-226; George Th. Mavrogordatos, Stillborn Republic: Social Coalition and
Party Strategies in Greece, 1922–1936 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983),
122-125.

95
consisted of the privileged oligarchy exploiting the public purse, and the

other consisted of the people who were stripped of what they had earned. 11

According to Gounaris’ dichotomy, the oligarchy economically exploited

people by controlling and diverting the state from the path that it should

primarily follow.

He pointed out that the people had now come to realize that the state

had deceived them and that they had been unfairly exploited. He said:

Do not forget that up until today a Greek citizen, a Greek worker,


produces, but he has been deprived. As a result, he has awakened
and does not judge any longer his actual life by sophisms which we
have got accustomed to; sophisms to disguise real facts by inventing
elaborate stories and lies. Do not forget that a Greek peasant suffers
enough. He suffers so much that he is not amenable any longer to
the influence of these sophisms. He is conscious of the only truth
that the state as a beneficent power does not exist. On the contrary,
he sees the state emerge merely to take from him the largest part
produced by his labors and sweats. The worst thing is that he does
not know where what has been taken from him is being used. He
has never seen that being used for himself. 12

The ordinary Greek citizen was not so slow that he would endlessly accept

the casual and irresponsible remarks of politicians, especially since he had

11
«Μία νέα πολιτική φυσιογνωμία. Ένας πολιτικός που μας τον δίδει η Πάτρα. Ο
Δημήτριος Γούναρης» [A New Political Figure: A Politician Who Patras Gives Us.
Dimitrios Gounaris], Ακρόπολις, 12 Νοεμβρίου 1902, 2.
12 «Ολόκληρος η θαυμάσια αγόρευσις του βουλευτού Πατρών», 2-3.

96
already been “awakened” to reality. Although he contributed to the state by

offering what he had gained through his labor, a Greek citizen—be it a

worker or a peasant—was not rewarded by the state in turn. He one-sidedly

contributed to the state and now understood that the state existed only to

exploit him, never to offer him any benefits of his labor. Gounaris showed

how people were entirely disillusioned by the existing state, which was at the

opposite end of the spectrum from his vision of the ideal state.

Arguing against an oligarchy that perpetuated and sponsored such

exploitation, Gounaris stated the following:

[W]e all know from where we have to start. Above all we have to
break with the hands that bind and paralyze society. The hands
prevent society from keeping its momentum going forward, and
make it go backward. We all know and feel these hands. Those who
undertake public affairs have an obligation to discover and map out,
in various successive phases, the measures which will make it
possible to carry out surgery to cut off these hands. We will be able
to say that we have accomplished a political task in terms of
development and progress of the country only when this surgery
takes place; only when we completely cut off these hands which
have been unreasonably hindering society from making progress,
and producing the stagnation which causes social canker. 13

The “hands” here are a metaphor for the influence of the oligarchy, which

13 «Ολόκληρος η θαυμάσια αγόρευσις του βουλευτού Πατρών», 2.

97
handicapped society though the state apparatus. To begin with, Gounaris

contended that political leaders should determine how to get rid of this

obstacle and do so at once. This was an absolute must for the political

leaders. After the oligarchy was swept away, he believed that more efforts

would be needed to seriously overhaul the management of the state.

Gounaris emphasized that those who would run the state should be

high-minded and concerned with the good of the people and of society. He

suggested that the state be organized by those who had “high level of

intelligence as well as moral power and fortitude,” who would “guarantee

that they push society forward,” and who would “actually want to serve

society instead of exploiting it.” 14 In this manner, Gounaris implied, the

state would be able to regenerate and grow closer in nature to his vision of

the ideal state.

Reforms in Public Service

The Team’s criticisms of the state administration and government

policies reflected Gounaris’ vision of the ideal state. Above all else, the

members of the Team criticized the inefficiency of public service and the

short-sighted economic policies of the government. According to them, these

two aspects should be reformed to begin with, so that the state could better

14
«Ολόκληρος η θαυμάσια αγόρευσις του βουλευτού Πατρών», 2.

98
serve the general benefits of the nation.

Let us begin by looking at their criticism against the inefficiency of

public service and what reforms they proposed. The Team of the Japanese

persistently attacked the accounts department of the Ministry of Finance in

particular for their blatantly incompetent public administration.

In his speech delivered on December 19, 1906, 15 Gounaris pointed

out that, for the source of income of the Naval Fund of 1907, two different

figures appeared in two different documents—one was the document of the

Naval Fund and the other that of the Ministry of Finance. The former

showed 430,000 gold francs while the latter, 400,000 gold francs, with a

significant difference of 30,000 gold francs. Two figures should have been

identical as they were treated as the same item in the national treasury.

Gounaris argued that the problem was not whether the Naval Fund

would have had more or less money. According to him, the problem was that

public accounts were recorded in a very careless manner. In his opinion, this

kind of carelessness was fatal to the state. However, Anargiros Simopoulos,

Minister of Finance, in response to Gounaris stated that 30,000 gold francs

could not change the foundation of the economy and of the state budget.

This attitude betrayed his lack of responsibility for his duty as Minister of

Finance, which should be severely criticized.

15
«Αγόρευσις Δ. Γούναρη βουλευτού Πατρών», 3.

99
Gounaris repeatedly said that in drawing attention to this issue, his

intention was not to sponsor a no-confidence motion against the Minister of

Finance who had not appropriately checked the state budget in advance.

Instead, by providing a concrete example of the actual condition of the

state’s accounts, he wished to convince the government and other deputies

that the state system was not functioning as per its original expectations. He

wanted them to admit that the state was sick and lacked proper public

administration. Gounaris expressed this with the following words:

I only said that we do not have an effective public service. Because


of this, we do not have the accurate budget. If a banker finds
mistakes of this kind in his accounting service, those who have
made them will inevitably leave their positions before it dawns. I do
not know how seriously the Minister of Finance recognizes the
disorganization of the service which results in making mistakes. 16

Having said this, he emphasized that the government had to be responsible

for public administration, enforcing discipline among government

employees so that they could correctly conduct their duties.

Accounting errors were also observed elsewhere. Protopapadakis

presented before Parliament the issue of overpayment to the International

16
«Αγόρευσις Δ. Γούναρη βουλευτού Πατρών», 3.

100
Financial Commission. 17 According to his calculations, from1899 to 1900,

the International Financial Commission received 239,203 drachmas more

than it should have. At the end of 1899, for accounting purposes the

Commission ceased to employ the Gregorian calendar and adopted the Julian

one, which Greece used at that time. Due to this change, the receipts of the

first 12 days of 1900 as per the Gregorian calendar were not included in the

accounts of the money to be divided between the Greek government and the

Commission in accordance with the fixed proportions (40%:60%). So as to

prove to Parliament that the receipts of those 12 days had not been handled

properly from the accounting point of view, Protopapadakis submitted to

Parliament meticulous tables of the data of state revenues, the calculating

formula, and a detailed analysis that showed that the government had

overpaid a sum of 239,203 drachmas to the Commission. 18

His intention was not to ask the Commission to reimburse the sum

of money to the state. Rather, he wanted to draw attention to the

incompetence of the accounts department by demonstrating that the

department had been indifferent to the overpayment for years, or simply that

17
Protopapadakis first spoke of this topic at the 24th meeting on January 29, 1907.
ΠΣΒΕ, 228.
18
ΠΕΒΕ, αριθ. 92, 150-152, αριθ. 116, 198-203; «Το ζήτημα των 239,203 δραχμών
που μας πήρε ο Έλεγχος περιπλέον. Όλη η προχθεσινή αγόρευσις του βουλευτού
Παροναξίας Κου Π. Πρωτοπαπαδάκη» [The Issue on 239,203 Drachmas that the
Commission Took Us Extra. The Whole Speech of the Day before Yesterday by Mr. P.
Protopapadakis, a Deputy of Paronaxia], Ακρόπολις, 4 Φεβρουαρίου, 1907, 2.

101
it was incapable of understanding the importance of this issue. The

disclosure of these accounting errors shocked the public. 19 Furthermore, the

fact that Simopoulos needed all the above-mentioned documents submitted

by Protopapadakis so that the government could examine whether there were

further mistakes in the public accounts showed that the successive

governments did not have an accurate record of the state finances. 20

The accounting errors made by the state were too numerous to

mention. Yet the most extreme example was found in Protopapadakis’ long

report dated May 1907, which meticulously and critically analyzed the

national wealth. 21 It proved that the accounting errors were not of a one-off

nature and that there had been errors since the foundation of the Greek state.

Examining the official financial reports from 1833 to 1905, Protopapadakis

19
«Να υπουργός» [Here is the Minister], Ακρόπολις, 5 Φεβρουαρίου, 1907, 1
20
«Πολύκροτος αγόρευσις του Κου Π. Πρωτοπαπαδάκη περί του δασμολογίου και
κατά του Κου Α. Σιμοπούλου» [The Sensational Speech of Mr. P. Protopapadakis
concerning Tariff and against Mr. A. Simopoulos], Ακρόπολις, 11 Φεβρουαρίου 1907, 2.
21
Πέτρος Πρωτοπαπαδάκης, Έκθεσις της μειονοψηφίας της επί του προϋπολογισμού
του κράτους επιτροπής [Minority Report of the Committee on the State Budget] (Αθήνα:
Εστία, 1907). The report, comprised of more than 550 pages, is divided into two
sections. The first section examines the state economic activities and financial
management such as trade, taxation, national debt, salary and pension for public
servants, various industries etc. The second consists of a series of tables of the
accounting report of the public purse in 1880–1905, the comparison of the budgets
among the Balkan states, the assesment of direct taxes, the import and export trade, the
revenue and expenditure of municipalities, and the road-building project. According to
Adamantios Sirmaloglou, Protopapadakis’ report was the most extensive analysis of
national economy that had been ever submitted to the Greek parliament. Αδαμάντιος
Συρμαλόγλου, Φορολογία ή χρεοκοπία. Η φορολογική πολιτική στη Βουλή των Ελλήνων
1862–1910 [Taxation or Bankruptcy: The Tax Policy in Parliament of the Greeks,
1862‒1910] (Αθήνα: Μεταμεσονύκτιες Εκδόσεις, 2007), 166n566.

102
concluded that the national treasury today should have had a surplus of

200,000,000 drachmas, which it in fact did not. He wrote, “All these

so-called official accounts consist of a farrago of imaginary figures, which

have nothing to do with the reality.” 22

In order to overcome this defect in public administration, the

members of the Team argued that public servants should be appointed not on

the basis of political favoritism but by merit alone, and that they should

enjoy the benefits of the permanent employment system. This

recommendation was made in light of the fact that the appointment of almost

all public servants was through political influence. Politicians of the

governmental party arbitrarily assigned public service jobs to their friends

and party-followers in order to win their favor. Each time a government

changed, the civil servants of the previous government were replaced by

supporters of the new one. Those who had connections with powerful

politicians could obtain jobs in public administration without any

qualifications, knowledge, or aptitude. Such employees could only think of

keeping a tight hold on their jobs during the brief period before there was yet

another change of government, and they did not seriously consider working

for the general benefit of the state. Repoulis criticized such public servants

22
Πρωτοπαπαδάκης, Έκθεσις της μειονοψηφίας, 6; In the same report, Protopapadakis
also criticized that the state account report had not been confirmed by a specific law,
although Article 54 of Law 212, based on Article 60 of the Constitution, required its
confirmation. Πρωτοπαπαδάκης, Έκθεσις της μειονοψηφίας, 138.

103
who were detrimental to the state and people with the following words:

The spirit prevailing in the central [public offices] is, of course, the
one which protects neither the right of the state nor the right of
citizens. It is the paralytic spirit. In this kind of spirit, a servant, in
general, either becomes impertinently high-handed and brings harm
to citizens, or…ends up endangering the state. 23

Such continued political exploitation of public office led to a steady

inflow of incapable public servants. Thus, although public service was

primarily intended for the public, in Greece it was regarded as a mere device

in order to support the livelihood of the servants. Comparing Greece with

Romania, one of its rival Balkan countries, Gounaris sarcastically said,

“Romania has public servants to serve the public while we have public

service for public servants. Our servants are incessantly increasing. Their

number became doubled from 1886. Has the quality of our public service

been improved?” 24

Contemporary British journalist and historian William Miller

described the situation as follows:

[T]he radical defect of the Greek political organization, which lies

23
«Όλη αγόρευσις του κ. Εμμ. Ρέπουλη επί του δασμολογικού νομοσχέδιου.» [The
Whole Speech of Mr. Emm. Repoulis about the Tariff Bill], Ακρόπολις, 5 Φεβρουαρίου
1907, 2.
24
«Βουλή. Η χθεσινή συνεδρίασις», Ακρόπολις, 3 Ιουνίου 1907, 2.

104
at the root of all its numerous abuses, is what the Americans call
‘the spoils system.’ In Greece, as in the United States, the maxim
that ‘to the victors belong the spoils’ is carried out to its full extent.
With a few exceptions—such as the teachers in the elementary
schools and the university professors—practically every official in
the country is liable to dismissal, or removal to a less desirable post,
on the accession of every new Government to power. Hence the
whole civil service of the country is affected by party politics, and
every official, however petty, has to follow attentively the political
barometer at Athens, because his bread depends upon its movement.
Just as the candidate for the American Presidency promised his
supporter that ‘If you will get me into the White House, I will get
you into the lighthouse,’ so the Greek Minister enters office pledged
to the lips to appease this and that influential friend and that friend’s
minor satellites. 25

Such favoritism was being deplored not just by foreign observers but by the

Greeks themselves who believed it to be an evil practice hindering the

improvement of the state organization. Newspapers like Akropolis

condemned it as “the origin of all the woes of Greece.” 26

Once, in 1884, the Trikoupis’ government succeeded in legislating

for uniform qualifications of public servants and a guarantee of their tenure.

However, as soon as he was succeeded by Diligiannis in 1885, the law was

25
William Miller, Greek Life in Town and Country (London: George Newnes, Limited,
1905), 29.
26 William Miller, Travels and Politics in the Near East (London: Fisher Unwin, 1898),

318; According to Miller, when King George toured the Peloponnese after the defeat of
the Greek–Turkish War of 1897, he was asked everywhere by local magnates to put a
stop to favoritism in politics. Miller, Travels and Politics, 311.

105
abolished. 27 In this case as well, political corruption won, and no

government dared to eradicate this practice as long as it positively influenced

the number of votes in an election.

The members of the Team fully understood that any fundamental

reform of the state administration was doomed to fail unless public

employees were severed from political influence. Thus, they did not hesitate

to overtly criticize the political abuse of public offices and its adverse effect

on the general interests of the state. Protopapadakis presented a realistic

picture of the customs at Patras where constant change of personnel made it

impossible to provide the central statistics bureau with accurate data of

imports. Moreover, he criticized Simopoulos by name for taking the lead in

the practice of favoritism. Simopoulos readily promoted his friend at his

request at the central statistics bureau and dismissed an able and

conscientious servant, who had no political backing. 28

Apart from speaking out against nepotism and favoritism, the Team

also believed that public servants should be given preferential treatment with

respect to salary so that they had a greater incentive to work harder. The

salary of public servants was regarded as really low. According to

Protopapadakis’ analysis of the 1905 budget, Romania paid a public servant

27
Alexander Nicholaou Damianakos, “Charilaos Trikoupes and the Modernization of
Greece, 1874–1894” (PhD diss., New York University, 1977), 127-129, 249.
28
«Πολύκροτος αγόρευσις του Κου Π. Πρωτοπαπαδάκη», 3.

106
163.60 drachmas per month on average while Greece paid just 143.90

drachmas. 29

Yet Protopapadakis did not encourage a salary increase without

certain preconditions. He fully acknowledged that the public purse could not

afford to drain money like water to fulfill any request. He therefore proposed

that the government tackle public service reforms by employing servants on

the basis of merit alone and simultaneously stop hiring more persons than

needed by each office for its normal functioning. By doing so, he believed,

the government would be able to increase the salary of the public servants

without increasing the public expenses, thereby also achieving the desired

reforms in the public administration. 30 Moreover, restricting the number of

employees in each office would curtail the public expenditure on pension,

which the state had thus far been paying to an ever-increasing number of

former public servants. 31

Protopapadakis accepted the statement made by Salisbury, former

British Prime Minister, that the happiness of England was due to the

capability and the happiness of its servants. His opinion on this was as

follows:

29
Πρωτοπαπαδάκης, Έκθεσις της μειονοψηφίας, 82.
30
Πρωτοπαπαδάκης, Έκθεσις της μειονοψηφίας, 82.
31
Πρωτοπαπαδάκης, Έκθεσις της μειονοψηφίας, 236.

107
The servants of the state, in fact, are the parts of the state machine.
The state machine can regularly operate as long as these parts are in
good condition. A prudent factory manager is expected to take care
of and to attend to …the parts of the driving machine of his factory
so that the machine can appropriately run and give to the factory the
driving force necessary to perform its work. Likewise, the state, if
its happiness depends on its servants, has to seek all the means that
will enable them to be happy. 32

The position of public servant was not merely used as bait by politicians to

gain voters. The public servants were the “driving force” of the state and

played a crucial role in organizing and running the state properly. The

efficiency of the state administration was dependent on the capability of the

servants as well as on their happiness, that is, the degree to which they were

satisfied with their working conditions. Therefore, the government had to

take steps to reform the conditions of the state personnel. The Team

repeatedly brought to light corrupt practices of the government

administration and persistently appealed for the need to separate the public

service from politics in order to realize a well-organized state.

The Creation of a Sound Economy

Another effort the Team of the Japanese made was to persuade the

government to thoroughly review its economic policies, particularly its tariff

32
Πρωτοπαπαδάκης, Έκθεσις της μειονοψηφίας, 82.

108
measures and taxation system, so that the state could increase national

wealth and flourish in the long run. For this purpose, both Gounaris and

Protopapadakis contended that the government should not be swayed by the

short-term benefit of immediate gain but should consider, from a wider and

long-term standpoint, whether its present economic policy would have a

beneficial effect on progress and prosperity in the future. They argued that

the government should abandon the traditional approach to the national

economy predicated on habitual and random practices and adopt a policy

with a clearly formed plan based on convincing data.

Gounaris and Protopapadakis actively participated in the

discussions on the bill of modifications to the custom tariffs 33 and

developed their argument. On December 1, 1906, as the first speaker during

the first reading of the bill, Gounaris stated that the government had not

completed all the necessary steps required to modify the custom tariffs.

According to him, what the government had to do first was to acquire a clear

view of the actual situation of domestic industry through sufficient

preliminary research. Gounaris pointed out that the memoranda concerning

the bill submitted to Parliament by the government did not reflect reality and

did not prove at all that the proposed modifications to the tariffs would

33
Το νομοσχέδιο περί μεταβολών εις τον περί τελωνιακού δασμολογίου ˏΒΡΚΑ΄
νόμον και εις το τελωνιακόν δασμολόγιον εισαγωγής [The Bill of Modification in Law
2121 of the Custom Tariff and in the Custom Tariff of Import].

109
properly protect domestic industry.

Gounaris was not opposed to a policy of protectionism through

increasing the import tariffs. He believed that the state should play an active

role in encouraging the expansion of domestic productivity, which could aid

in the economic development of the country. However, he also called

Parliament’s attention to the fact that the increase in tariffs would constitute

an additional burden on the people. Therefore, he contended that a protective

policy of domestic industry should result in rewards for monetary

contributions made by the people. For this purpose, a preliminary research of

domestic industry based on the facts was indispensable even though it would

be a time-consuming and painstaking task. It was not until this preliminary

research was sufficiently conducted that the government could correctly

define its tariff policy by ascertaining “which sector of industries should be

focused on, why it should be protected, and which sector should be

discarded for the benefit of the state.” 34

Gounaris proposed the establishment of a committee for this

research, in the footsteps of Italy where industrialization had successfully

expanded in recent years due to the tariff policy determined on the basis of a

thorough investigation of national productivity. 35 In his proposal, he wrote,

34
«Η Βουλή. Το δασμολογικό νομοσχέδιον. Ο λόγος του κ. Γούναρη» [Parliament:
The Tariff Bill. The Speech of Mr. Gounaris], Πατρίς, 6 Δεκεμβρίου 1906, 2.
35
Luigi Luzzatti was a projector of the committee to conduct the research of domestic

110
“The committee is supposed to investigate all the sectors of domestic

production, of industry in particular, and the conditions of domestic

productions. It will collect necessary materials to draw advisable conclusions

and suggest the arrangement of tariff laws in harmony with proper

development of national production.” 36 Gounaris’ proposal noticeably

reflected his vision of ideal state, that is, a state that always considered the

nation’s good from a long-range perspective. The state just needed a

systematic plan that was based on the existing facts and fully took the future

into account as well. 37

industry in Italy. He became the Minister of Treasury of Italy in 1903 when Giovanni
Giolitti came to power for the second time. Frank J. Coppa, Planning, Protectionism,
and Politics in Liberal Italy: Economics and Politics in the Giolittian Age (Washington
D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1971), 33-34; In modern Italian history,
the years of 1896–1914 are considered as the period of the first economic progress,
which facilitated rapid industrialization. See Clark Martin, Modern Italy 1871‒1995, 2nd
edition (London & New York: Longman, 1996), 119-135.
36
ΠΕΒΕ, αριθ. 22, 57.
37
It should be noted that Gounaris’ speech gave a deep impression among the deputies
and the media. For instance, the newspaper Patris called Gounaris “a new star of
modern Greek politician.” It read, “Yesterday’s meeting in Parliament was the
memorable one for those who luckily attended.…The audience was impressed not only
by his really distinguished power of speech, but also by his expertise, which made the
whole parliament completely silent in admiration.…It is wonderful that this kind of
speech is delivered in Parliament. Yet how can one sympathize with a state that has
capable politicians, but has been unable to make good use of their creative work?
Fortunately, Gounaris is still young. He is so young that he always leaves us a hope that
he will lend himself to our state and nation through his political power.” «Από την
Βουλήν» [From Parliament], Πατρίς, 6 Δεκεμβρίου 1906, 1; Gounaris gained fame
outside of Greece. A Greek newspaper Nea Imera in Trieste, Italy, also favorably
referred to the impact of Gounaris’ speech on Parliament as following: “Mr. Gounaris
talked more than the subject under discussion. Through his enlightening speech, he did
not particularly criticize the government for its proposal to modify the tariffs, but
examined from high standing what our proper tariff policy should be like. The whole
parliament carefully and noiselessly listened to him. Then, certain vague
feelings—probably delightful feelings—seized Parliament with a hope that in no

111
The government, however, was not interested in Gounaris’ proposal.

Protopapadakis, who supported Gounaris, argued that the government was

not enthusiastic about forming the research committee because it did not in

fact intend to develop domestic industry through its tariff policy but to only

serve the fiscal purposes of the state. According to Protopapadakis,

modifications to the tariffs would merely contribute to increasing the

revenue of the national treasury in the name of industrial protection.

Protopapadakis contended that the tariff policy of the Greek state

had diverged from the role it was originally expected to play. As long as the

tariffs had been introduced to protect domestic products, the volume of the

imported items subject to custom duties was supposed to decrease. In this

manner, the production of the same items in the country could be encouraged

to increase under less competitive and more protective conditions. Yet, on

the basis of his examination of the items subject to custom duties,

Protopapadakis demonstrated that this was not necessarily the case in Greece.

On the contrary, the volume of most imported items subject to custom duties

was increasing year on year.

Protopapadakis provided concrete figures to support his argument.

distant future might frequent speeches of this kind influence indolence of those who are
engaged in and responsible for public affairs, and that a more innovative
method…would be gradually introduced…in great conformity to the principles and
necessities of today’s society.” «Τα εν Ελλάδι» [The Events in Greece], Νέα Ημέρα, 23
Δεκεμβρίου 1906 / 5 Ιανουαρίου 1907, 4.

112
He made a comparison between data on the volume of imports of some items

in 1895 and 1904. For example, 83,000 okas 38 of items such as lining etc.

were imported in 1895 while 152,000 okas were imported in 1904; 42,000

cubic meters of the timber of fir and pine were imported in 1895 while the

import was 55,000 cubic meters in 1904; 8,000 cubic meters of the beam and

plank of fir, pine, etc. were imported in 1894 while it was 21,000 cubic

meters in 1904; 200 cubic meters of the round timber were imported in 1895

while 1,000 cubic meters were imported in 1904. These facts only

demonstrated that the tariffs had not led to a decrease in volume of the

imports. This made Protopapadakis question whether the present tariff policy

could effectively promote the development of domestic industry. He could

not but arrive at the conclusion that the government exploited the tariffs to

expand the public purse. Since the government did not provide any

convincing proof, Protopapadakis expressed doubt over whether a further

increase in the tariffs, as proposed by the bill, was truly meant to protect and

stimulate national industry. 39

Gounaris and Protopapadakis regarded the tariff policy of the

government as undesirable for the nation’s benefit in two respects. First, as

mentioned above, it would not help national industry develop in a real sense

as long as it was not supported by a full-scale investigation of the domestic


38
An oka is a unit of weight. One oka is equivalent to 1,280 grams.
39
«Πολύκροτος αγόρευσις του Κου Π. Πρωτοπαπαδάκη», 2.

113
industry. Second, it would result in an increase in the monetary burden on

the Greek people in the form of indirect tax. While the tariffs brought more

money in the public purse, the people had to accept high prices of consumer

products because of the high tariff policy. As Greece’s taxation system

heavily depended on indirect tax, it followed that the present tariff policy

would leave the less wealthy in a position of disadvantage. Gounaris and

Protopapadakis therefore considered it necessary for the government to

reform this taxation mechanism as promptly as possible.

In addition, they believed that an economically healthy state should

be supported by a direct taxation system with income tax as its central pillar.

A state had to be responsible for redistributing wealth through direct taxation

to ensure a minimum standard of living to every citizen. However, the

existing taxation system of the state was just the opposite and its outcome

made people’s life difficult.

Gounaris claimed that the rate of indirect tax was excessively high

in the total amount of tax paid per Greek citizen. His calculations based on

the budget of 1907 showed that one Greek citizen was supposed to pay 43.75

drachmas in tax, of which only 8.05 drachmas was estimated to be direct tax.

This meant that indirect tax comprised over 80% of the total tax burden of

each citizen. What Gounaris regarded as most problematic was that the

government had imposed a high rate of custom duties on articles that were

114
basic necessities of life for ordinary consumers. This policy had a constant

negative impact on the people who were already exhausted and poor,

because nobody—rich and poor alike—could do without these items in their

daily life. 40

Based on the imports in 1905, Protopapadakis provided concrete

examples to prove that high custom duties were imposed on basic necessities

so that consumers had to purchase them at high prices. The duty on animals

for food worth 2,662,000 drachmas was 527,000 drachmas. The tariff rate on

the original import value was about 20%. Likewise, 236,000 drachmas were

imposed on fresh meats, cheese, and butter worth 446,000 drachmas. The

tariff rate was 53%. Then, 1,422,000 drachmas were imposed on fresh and

salted fish worth 5,624,000 drachmas. The tariff rate was 25%. Next,

13,786,000 drachmas were imposed on grains, flower, rice, pepper, and fruits

worth 39,663,000 drachmas. The tariff rate was 35%. Next, 6, 860,000

drachmas were imposed on sugar worth 2,888,000 drachmas. The tariff rate

was 238%. The average tariff rate on these articles amounted to 45%. 41

It was all the more obvious how conspicuously high the tariff rate in

Greece was when compared with that of other Balkan nations. According to

the table of the average tariff rate on all imported items as provided by

Protopapadakis, Greece’s tariff rate amounted to 26.41% whereas Romania’s


40
«Ολόκληρος η θαυμάσια αγόρευσις του βουλευτού Πατρών», 2.
41
Πρωτοπαπαδάκης, Έκθεσις της μειονοψηφίας, 22.

115
was 7.00%, Bulgaria’s 16.35%, and Serbia’s 18.11%. 42

Protopapadakis criticized successive governments saying that they

had resorted exclusively to indirect tax, the easiest method, to increase the

national revenue. In his report, Protopapadakis wrote:

“I take the tax from where I can collect it most easily.”


The government has embraced this principle for years as a dogma.
However, we have to recall the provision of the Constitution
(Article 3). It reads, “The Greeks contribute indiscriminately, in
proportion to their property, to public burdens.” This is not a mere
constitutional command that patriotism of the Greeks confirms, but
the supreme truth of economy that the ironbound necessity of the
things confirms….If quick measures are not taken for tax collection,
which will be assessed in proportion to each person’s property and
income, we will soon see the country economically broken down
and finally ruined. 43

Protopapadakis argued that the existing taxation system in which indirect tax

played a major role not only violated the constitution but also went against

the absolute rule of economy. As per his understanding, a taxation system

should not be used for a fiscal purpose but as an instrument to equalize

different levels of earning among citizens through its redistributive function.

Yet the Greek state had not introduced full-scale income tax but only

42
Πρωτοπαπαδάκης, Έκθεσις της μειονοψηφίας, 22.
43
Πρωτοπαπαδάκης, Έκθεσις της μειονοψηφίας, 236.

116
imposed it on limited companies. 44 Consequently, the rich, in spite of their

high incomes, did not have to pay more than the poor, whereas indirect tax

imposed a heavier burden on the poor than the wealthy. 45 Under these

conditions, Protopapadakis predicted that the life would be unbearable in

Greece any longer. 46

In fact, not a few Greeks had already felt that they could not put up

with the miserable financial condition and started to abandon their country.

Indeed, the emigration movement was “a true social phenomenon” 47 at the

beginning of the twentieth century when the number of Greek emigrants was

increasing at an accelerated pace. In 1899, only 2,395 Greek emigrants were

recorded. Yet 14,376 Greeks in 1903, 12,625 in 1904, 12,144 in 1905,

23,127 in 1906, and 46, 283 in 1907 left the country. 48 Therefore,

emigration became a significant part of Parliament’s agenda. A special

committee was established for the first time in Parliament to investigate the

issue of emigration. In June 1906, the committee drew up its report and

44
Miller, Greek Life, 305; The table provided by Dertilis shows that there was no
revenue from the category of income tax until 1911. Γ. Β. Δερτιλής, Ατελέσφοροι ή
τελεσφόροι; Φόροι και εξουσία στο νεοελληνικό κράτος [Ineffective or Effective? Taxes
and Power in the Modern Greek State] (Αθήνα: Αλεξάνδρεια, 1993), 250-251.
45
Miller wrote, “‘In no other country, perhaps,’ says a Greek specialist in finance, ‘has
the system of farming the taxes worked more disastrously.’ In Greece, as in Italy, the
burden falls heaviest upon the poor, while the rich pay comparatively little.” Miller,
Greek Life, 305.
46
Πρωτοπαπαδάκης, Έκθεσις της μειονοψηφίας, 24.
47
Henry Pratt Fairchild, “The Causes of Emigration from Greece,” The Yale Review,
August (1909): 188.
48
Εμμανουήλ Ρέπουλης, Μελέτη μετά σχεδίου νόμου περί μεταναστεύσεως [Research
with the Bill of Emigration] (Αθήνα: Υψηλάντης, 1912), 11.

117
proposed legislations to properly regulate the population outflow from the

country. 49

In his speech in April 1907, Gounaris demonstrated that the number

of recent Greek emigrants was just a little lower than that of Irish emigrants,

which ran into exceptionally large figures in the general statistics of

emigration. He pointed out that more than 10 out of every 1,000 Greeks

migrated based on the record of 1906, and said that a state that was being left

by such a large proportion of its population could not be seen as normal.

Like Protopapadakis, Gounaris also regarded the lack of sound economic

policy of the government as one of the major reasons of increasing

emigration. Most of the Greek emigrants left for the United States because,

Gounaris argued, Greek people had learned from their relatives and friends

who had already emigrated that the state par excellence was acting and

moving forward for the benefit of its citizens and offered them a completely

different life from that in Greece. Greeks who understood now that there was

no use expecting the state to improve their destitute life naturally desired to

live under better conditions outside the country. 50

In the face of an unending outflow of population, Gounaris argued

49
Η εξ Ελλάδος μετανάστευσις. Η έκθεσις της επιτροπής της Βουλής και η σχετική
πρότασις νόμου [The Emigration from Greece: The Report of the Committee of
Parliament and the Proposal for Relevant Law] (Αθήνα: Βασιλική τυπογραφία
Ραφτάνη-Παπαγεωργίου, 1906). Gounaris and Vozikis were among the committee
members.
50
«Ολόκληρος η θαυμάσια αγόρευσις του βουλευτού Πατρών», 2.

118
that it was necessary for the Greek state to protect the emigrants by

regulating dishonest brokers in the business of emigration as quickly as

possible, but at the same time to take measures to prevent the Greeks from

leaving the country. As mentioned above, he believed that reforms to the

taxation system in favor of less wealthy people would be a first step to

solving the emigration problem.

Taxation reforms were also necessary so that the country would not

lose its manpower. It was clear that the drain of the work force would have a

negative impact on the Greek economy in the future. In fact, 87% of Greek

emigrants were men between the age of 15 and 40 years who were typically

most expected to contribute to the national wealth. 51 Gounaris and

Protopapadakis warned that if the state did not implement taxation reforms

and ensure better living conditions for the people, it would collapse in the

face of labor shortage. Although the question of whether the loss of labor

force was compensated for by the inflow of the emigrants’ remittance was

still debatable, they supported the idea that a state should carry out

substantial economic measures so as to prevent Greek citizens from further

emigrating. 52

51
Πρωτοπαπαδάκης, Έκθεσις της μειονοψηφίας, 24.
52
According to Fairchild’s essay in 1909, approximately $8,000,000 (about 42,105,000
drachmas) per year was sent to Greece by Greek immigrants in US. Fairchild, “The
Causes of Emigration from Greece,” 186-187; The total amount of the state budget of
revenue in Greece during 1902–1908 was approximately 120,000,000‒137,000,000
drachmas. Foreign Office, Annual Series, No. 4289, Diplomatic and Consular Reports:

119
Emigration was visible proof of how badly successive governments

had neglected the well-being of the people. In Protopapadakis’ words,

political leaders considered the people as “cows which could give milk to

feed a small number of sluggards, but were given neither food nor care.” 53

The Team of the Japanese wanted to change this and contended that it was

time to take innovative steps so that the state could exist for the good of the

nation.

The Team did not criticize inefficiency of public service and

unsound economic policies with a view to oust Theotokis from power. It did

so merely with the expectation that his government would undertake the

state reformations. What the Team of the Japanese advocated was not new to

politicians in Parliament. Everyone knew what the sources of various evils in

the state were, but no politician had taken the trouble to follow the path of

reform. For politicians who had become accustomed to petty party politics,

reforms meant the loss of their power. No politician wished to sacrifice

himself for the good of the nation. The Team of the Japanese was the only

political party in Parliament that raised a clamor for reform and offered

visions for change. It was the first serious reform-seeking voice of a

Greece: Report on the Finances of Greece for the Years 1907–1908 (London: Harrison
and Sons, 1909), 23.
53
Πρωτοπαπαδάκης, Έκθεσις της μειονοψηφίας, 24.

120
parliamentary group in opposition that attempted to persuade other deputies

to recognize the necessity of cleaning up the political world and of

rebuilding the state for the benefit of the nation. In this sense, their criticisms

were of an unprecedented nature. They impressed other deputies in

Parliament with their political virtue. The mass media was delighted to see

that politicians themselves eventually started the process of self-criticism to

sweep the evil practices their political culture had maintained and to remedy

the shortcomings of the state administration and the policymaking process.

The power of the Team’s ideas, however, was not transformed into

action. The Team could not find any other deputy in Parliament who

supported its reform project. It could not inspire the government to take

action either. In response to criticism, the government made several promises

of reform. It admitted to the defects of the accounts department, and

recognized the necessity to consider reconstructing the department. 54 It also

promised to submit a bill on reforms to public service. 55 These promises

were ultimately not kept. When it came to tax reforms, the government was

utterly reluctant. 56

54
«Ιάπων και ο Σιμόπουλος» [Japanese and Simopoulos], Ακρόπολις, 20 Φεβρουαρίου,
1907, 1.
55
ΠΣΒΕ, 383-384.
56
Only in 1909 the bill on income tax submitted by Athanasios Eftaxias was passed.
However, its enforcement aborted after Eleftherios Venizelos came to power. Κώστας
Κωστής, «Δημόσια οικονομία » [State Economy], in Η ανάπτυξη της ελληνικής
οικονομίας τον 19ον αιώνα (1830‒1914) [The Development of Greek Economy in the
19th Century (1830‒1914)] eds. Κώστας Κωστής and Σωκράτης Πετμεζάς (Αθήνα:

121
Gounaris and Protopapadakis encountered difficulties in persuading

the government to accept their proposals to reform the public administration

and economic policies. However, the Team of the Japanese did not expend

its energy exclusively on realizing this enterprise. In parallel, other members

of the Team actively participated in different parliamentary discussions and

successfully achieved various goals of the Team. They supported the

government and contributed to formulating laws for the nation’s benefit. We

shall analyze examples of these successes in the following two chapters.

Αλεξάνδρεια, 2006), 316.

122
CHAPTER 4

Refugee Settlement and Land Distribution in Thessaly

Bulgarian vandalism in the summer of 1906 brought a catastrophic

disaster to the agelong Greek communities in Eastern Rumelia. Ethnic

Greeks (ομογενείς) were compelled to leave for good their hometowns

passed down from their ancestors, and flooded Greece as refugees. The

Greek state faced for the first time in its history a challenge to deal with a

refugee problem. The fact that the refugees were ethnically Greek—they

were Christians of the Patriarchate Eastern Orthodoxy and spoke the Greek

language—obliged the Greek state to assume the role as their protector.

Against the backdrop of this event, there were contested irredentist

aspirations between Greece and Bulgaria over Macedonia. Armed struggles

between the two nations had intensified since 1904 when the Theotokis’

government, which could not ignore any longer the nationalistic pressure of

public opinion, finally took a supportive position for the Greek volunteer

bands in Macedonia. 1 Since nationalism has a strong tendency to exclude

1
Basil C. Gounaris, “Social Gathering and Macedonian Lobbying: Symbols of
Irredentism and Living Legends in Early Twentieth-Century Athens,” in Greek Society
in the Making: Realities, Symbols, and Visions, ed. Philip Carabott (Aldershot,
Hampshire, Great Britain; Brookfield, Vt.: Ashgate/Variorum, 1997), 103; Peter
Mackridge and Eleni Yannakakis, “Introduction,” in Ourselves and Others: The
Development of a Greek Macedonian Cultural Identity since 1912, eds. Peter
Mackridge and Eleni Yannakakis (Oxford; New York: Berg, 1997), 9.

123
ethnically heterogeneous elements from the territories which a state intends

to secure, a boundary-(re)drawing enterprise with a nationalistic logic to

create a greater nation-state inevitably generates ethnic minorities. While

waging battles against Greek inhabitants in Macedonia, the Bulgarians

attacked the Greek communities in Eastern Rumelia and destroyed them in

order to make their future state ethnically homogeneous. Although Eastern

Rumelia was nominally an autonomous province within the Ottoman

territory, it had virtually been under Bulgarian control since 1885. The ethnic

Greeks living there had been vulnerable and became prime targets for the

Bulgarians as the conflict between the two countries heated up. On the Greek

side, the catastrophe of the Greek communities in Eastern Rumelia

represented shrinking Hellenism, a phenomenon quite unfavorable to the

“Great Idea.”

This chapter explores the first attempt of the Greek state to grapple

with the refugee problem and the contribution to the issue by two Japanese,

Dragoumis and Alexandris. How were the refugees regarded in the context

of Greek irredentist nationalism? What measures were taken to formally

incorporate the ethnic Greek refugees into the Greek state? What was

discussed in Parliament to distribute land to the refugees? How were the

relations between the incoming refugees and the native local Greeks

established over the issue of land distribution?

124
In this chapter, we first look at the development of the ethnic rivalry

in the Balkan states which eventually forced the ethnic Greeks to seek

refugee in the Greek state. Then we examine how Parliament began

undertaking a task of the refugee settlement. Here the contribution by

Dragoumis is emphasized. He had been actively involved in the nationalist

operations for the Greek cause in Macedonia. 2 He insistently urged the

government to quickly take measures to incorporate the refugees into the

Greek state from the standpoint of Greek national interests. As the first step,

Parliament made a law to give them Greek citizenship. Next, the debate

arose about land distribution to them. As Thessaly was the target place in

which the refugees were to be settled, Parliament had to consider the

so-called Thessalian problem at the same time. It involved the issue of

whether to retain the large private estate (çiftlik) system under which native

2
All Dragoumis family members were well-known as ardent supporters of the Greek
struggle for Macedonia. Stefanos was one of the core members of the Macedonian
Committee (Μακεδονική Επιτροπή) formed in 1904, which the government officially
supported. He also published a series of books titled “Macedonian Crisis” (Μακεδονική
κρίσις) from 1903 to 1907 under the name of Gnasios Makednos (Γνάσιος Μακεδνός).
He wrote them to call the attention of the general public to the ongoing events in
Macedonia and to justify the Greek cause. Ion Dragoumis, Stefanos’ son, wrote many
novels and articles to claim the Greek right to Macedonia. Pavlos Melas, a Greek
partisan, who was murdered in Macedonia in October 1904, was Stefanos’ son-in-law. It
should be noted that Ion Dragoumis published a novel Blood of Martyrs and Heroes
(Μαρτύρων και ηρώων αίμα) on the theme of the Macedonian struggle, which
provoked patriotic feelings among the Greeks, in early 1907 during the period when the
issue of the refugee settlement was under discussion in Parliament. For a brief summary
of the involvement of the Dragoumis family in the Macedonian struggle, see Anastasia
Karakasidou, “Affection of a Greek Hero: Pavlos Melas and Heroic Representations in
Greece,” in Balkan Identity: Nation and Memory, ed. Maria Todorova (New York: New
York University Press, 2004), 200-202.

125
cultivators had worked as sharecroppers. Alexandris played an important

role in making the law not only for the welfare of the refugees and

cultivators, but for promoting agricultural developments in Thessaly. As he

was a deputy from Trikala in Thessaly, his knowledge about the existing

conditions of the çiftlik system and the general Thessalian agricultural

problems were instrumental in realistically framing the law.

Finally, on April 7, 1907, Law 3202 of the Settlement and Land

Distribution and of the Establishment of the Thessalian Agricultural Fund

was enacted. Its major aim was to have ethnic Greeks from the Balkan states

promptly settle in Thessaly by providing them with land and money. They

were not only from Eastern Rumelia, but from Bulgaria and Romania where

the anti-Greek movements became powerful against the backdrop of the

rivalry over the territory in Macedonia. The law also declared that Thessalian

native sharecroppers were to obtain their own lands for cultivation with the

monetary aid. In this sense, it made the first breakthrough in the Thessalian

problem.

The Influx of Greek Refugees

The Exodus of Ethnic Greeks in Eastern Rumelia and Bulgaria

The anti-Greek movement in Eastern Rumelia and Bulgaria by the

Bulgarians in the summer of 1906 compelled huge numbers of Greeks to

126
leave their native land. Some of these Greek refugees headed for Athens

while others emigrated to Istanbul and Southern Thrace under the Ottoman

control. 3 The violent persecution by the Bulgarians forced ethnic Greeks to

abandon what had been their fatherland. There were 80,000 Greeks living in

these Eastern Rumelia and Bulgaria at that time. 4

Eastern Rumelia was originally established as an autonomous

province by the Treaty of Berlin signed on July 13, 1878 (NS), with Plovdiv

(Philippopolis) as its capital. 5 Article 13 of the Treaty of Berlin specified

that this province was still in the political and military jurisdiction of the

Ottoman Empire. Therefore, the rights of the Turkish and Greek minorities

were supposed to remain protected as before. It was planned that, at the

administrative level, the Permanent Council, with Turkish and Greek

minorities included, would become the cabinet of the elected assembly. In

reality, however, Bulgarians overwhelmingly dominated the administration.

Moreover, the school system, the alphabet taught at school, and the military

3
A.R. (Athos Romanos), The Persecution of the Greeks in Bulgaria (London: Ede,
Allom & Townsend Limited, 1907), 30.
4
A.R., The Persecution of the Greeks, 3; Another source mentions that Eastern
Rumelia alone had more than 150,000 Greeks. The Thracians' Patriotic Association at
Athens, Persecution against the Greeks in Bulgaria and Oriental Roumelia: An Appeal
both to the Great Powers and to the People of Europe and America (Athens: P.A.
Petrakos, 1906), 4.
5
Eastern Rumelia used to be a part of the territory of Greater Bulgaria founded by the
Treaty of San Stefano (signed on March 3, 1878, NS). The Treaty of Berlin, however,
excluded Eastern Rumelia from the territory of the re-established Bulgarian Principality.
Since then, Eastern Rumelia became one of the target regions for Bulgarian irredentism.
R. J. Crampton, A Concise History of Bulgaria (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2005), 83-84.

127
training were based on Bulgarian precedent. 6

In September 1885, the Committee for Union, an outgrowth of a

Bulgarian Secret Central Revolutionary Committee, whose ultimate goal was

to realize the union of Bulgarians within a single state, launched a coup

d'état in Eastern Rumelia. 7 Alexander of Battenberg, Prince of Bulgaria,

occupied Plovdiv and proclaimed the annexation of Eastern Rumelia to the

principality of Bulgaria. This was a bloodless revolution from the Bulgarian

point of view. Yet the international community did not recognize its

annexation as valid. After negotiations between the Great Powers and the

Ottoman state, the Treaty of Bucharest was concluded in April 1886.

According to the treaty, the prince of Bulgaria was appointed as

General-Governor (Vali) of Eastern Rumelia. He would need to be approved

every five years by the Sultan and the Great Powers. 8 In short, Eastern

Rumelia remained nominally an integral part of the Ottoman domain and its

legal status was not changed. Therefore, it was bound to the Organic Statute

6
Crampton, A Concise History of Bulgaria, 96.
7
Crampton, A Concise History of Bulgaria, 97.
8
Crampton, A Concise History of Bulgaria, 99-100; To put it more precisely, not all the
Great Powers resolutely opposed the Bulgarian coup and the annexation of Eastern
Rumelia to Bulgaria. According to John Mavrogordato, Britain claimed to recognize the
united Bulgaria so that Russia could not further influence Bulgaria. In Greece the
nationalistic anger at this event led pacific Trikoupis to leave the government. Then
Diligiannis came to power and made preparations for military mobilization, which was
not realized due to the pressure from the Great Powers. John Mavrogordato, Modern
Greece: A Chronicle and a Survey 1800‒1931 (London: Macmillan, 1931), 66-67.

128
formulated in 1878 when Eastern Rumelia was established. 9

In the summer of 1906 the first anti-Greek incident took place in

Varna in Bulgaria. Then Bulgarian enterprises against Greek communities

spread not only to neighboring towns of Varna, but also to Eastern Rumelia.

In Varna there were 9,000 Greeks, of whom 7,500 were Bulgarian subjects

out of a total population of 37,000. On June 24, a new Greek metropolitan

from Istanbul had to face the Bulgarians who prevented him from

disembarking from the vessel and was obliged to return. 10 This event was

followed by an outburst of violence by the Bulgarians against the Greeks

there. In other places Greek churches were occupied and converted to

Bulgarian exarchate churches. Greek schools were violently devastated and

Greek shops were looted. On July 15, Burgas, which had 12,000 inhabitants,

half of whom were Greek was exposed to Bulgarian rioters. 11 On July 16,

Plovdiv was attacked. There were only 5,000 Greeks among 45,000

inhabitants. Nevertheless it still retained Greek character. The Bulgarian mob

attacked the Greek quarter and went into the building of the Greek Literary

Society, breaking everything they saw. They also headed for archbishop’s

residence and attacked his chaplain who was left unconscious and perhaps

9
The Thracians' Patriotic Association, Persecution against the Greeks, 7-8.
10
A.R., The Persecution of the Greeks, 6-7.
11
A.R., The Persecution of the Greeks, 17.

129
only half alive. 12 Sténimachos with its 14,000 populations, of whom were

10,000 Greeks was also violated on July 23. 13 The Bulgarian authority dared

not intervene and the Bulgarian troops were not mobilized to stop these

atrocities. It was considered that the scope of the anti-Greek attacks was

attributed to Dragoulef who was the leader of the “Bolgarine Rodoliubetz.”

In this sense, these attacks were not spontaneous, but were rather

well-organized and well-planned. 14

The last and most atrocious event took place in Anchialos on July

30. It had 6,000 inhabitants, most of whom were Greek. It was originally

established in the sixth century B.C. as a Greek colony and Ovid sang about

its high walls in his poems in the year 9 A.D. This historic town was

completely burned down by the Bulgarians. Even before they set fire, they

shot against the inhabitants and pillaged their shops. As a result, more than

twenty people were killed and a great number wounded. The fire blazed all

day and destroyed some 900 houses and shops in the Greek quarter while in

the Bulgarian quarter 272 houses, shops and churches remained intact. Athos

Romanos, the only Greek politician that visited Anchialos relatively soon

12
A.R., The Persecution of the Greeks, 8-12.
13
A.R., The Persecution of the Greeks, 15-17.
14
A.R., The Persecution of the Greeks, 8; Concerning the list of the churches,
monasteries, schools, other properties of Greek communities in Eastern Rumelia sucked
by the Bulgarians, see Neocles Kasasis, Greeks & Bulgarians in the Nineteenth
Centuries. An Open Letter to the Right Hon. Sir Charles W. Dilke (London: Ballantyne,
1907), 38-43 and The Thracians' Patriotic Association, Persecution against the Greeks,
11-12.

130
after this devastation, depicted what he saw there in the following words:

“Amongst these ruins there is really nothing to be seen but ashes and burnt

stones. Of the magnificent church—once the pride of the Anchialites—and

of the School, only four walls are standing. The palace of the Archbishop

and its beautiful library were entirely destroyed. It was a heart-rending sight

to see despairing women wandering amongst the ruins of their burnt houses.

They fixed on the passer-by a look in which the horror of the fire was still

reflected, and they went shamefacedly to fetch the food distributed to them

by the authorities.” 15

Bulgarians explained a series of the anti-Greek undertakings in

Eastern Rumelia in the summer of 1906 as retaliation against Greeks who

dealt their fellow countrymen a severe blow in Macedonia. It is true that

Greeks set about in real earnest the task to battle against Bulgarians since

1904. Greeks went across the border to Macedonia to violently attack

Bulgarians and their sympathizers. According to the Greek side, this armed

enterprise was a self-defensive action against Bulgarians. 16 The Greeks in

Macedonia had put up with Bulgarian violence. They had been subjugated

by force to “Bulgarianization” without resistance and had waited for the

anticipated reform plans to come into force. However, the reform plans were

15
A.R., The Persecution of the Greeks, 23.
16
“No. 24 Memorandum, Communicated by M. Métaxas, October 4, 1906,” in Foreign
Office, Turkey, No.1(1907), Further Correspondence respecting the Affairs of
South-Eastern Europe (London: Harrison and Sons, 1907), 131-135.

131
never properly introduced. The patience of the Greeks ran out and they took

up arms. European powers blamed Greeks for their violence in the Ottoman

territory. They said that it was Greek bands that were fomenting acts of

violence in Macedonia. But, according to a Greek nationalist logic, how

could the Greeks ignore the peril of their compatriots exposed to ferocious

Bulgarian attacks in Macedonia? Was it not natural for the Greeks to take up

arms to help their compatriots to fight against the Bulgarians? 17 While

Bulgarians connected the Macedonian struggle to the Bulgarian raids against

Greeks in Eastern Rumelia and characterized them as revenges, Greeks

argued that these two events should be considered separately. Greeks

contended that Greeks in Eastern Rumelia were those who should be

protected on the basis of the rights stipulated in certain articles in the Treaty

of Berlin and the Organic Statute in 1878. 18

The ferocious events of the summer of 1906 gave a negative

impression of Bulgaria among “civilized” European countries. Although

European powers officially kept silence, many articles accusing the

Bulgarians’ inhuman acts in Eastern Rumelia appeared in European

newspapers. Even Bulgarian newspapers admitted that the Bulgarian

17
A.R., The Persecution of the Greeks, 4-5; Kasasis, Greeks & Bulgarians, 5, 116-119.
18
Concerning the details of the articles which stipulated the rights of the minority
inhabitants in Eastern Rumelia with respect to religion, education, language etc., see
Kasasis, Greeks & Bulgarians, 30-38 and The Thracians' Patriotic Association,
Persecution against the Greeks, 4-10.

132
government should take responsibility for them. 19 Bulgarians attempted to

seek a pretext for the catastrophic disaster in Anchialos and contended that

Greek resistants stirred up by a Greek archbishop led Bulgarians to set fire to

the Greek quarter. In December 1906 when Romanos wrote about his visit to

Anchialos, the archbishop was arrested and charged with the alleged crime

of misleading the Greek inhabitants there. 20

Immediately after these incidents, the Greeks in Eastern Rumelia as

well as in Bulgaria who understood that their security was not guaranteed

any longer began to leave their homeland. A letter dated August 16, 1906

(NS) by a correspondent at Pyrgos reported as follows: “On the 12th instant

the Greek steamer Antigone sailed from here with two hundred and fifty

families of refugees from Anchialos. Oh, if you could have witnessed that

scene! If you could have seen men and women, without boots, in tattered

clothes, hungry, miserable, and mourning the loss of dear relations,

abandoning their ruined houses, the land in which they lived.” 21 The

massive exodus of Greeks continued.

The Expulsion of the Greeks from Romania

The persecution against Greeks in Romania preceded Bulgarian

19
For concrete contents of newspaper articles, see Kasasis, Greeks & Bulgarians,
64-68, 75-90.
20
A.R., The Persecution of the Greeks, 25.
21
Kasasis, Greeks & Bulgarians, 80.

133
violence against Greek communities. The rivalry between the Greeks and the

Romanians over the Vlach population of Macedonia initiated the anti-Greek

movement in Romania.

The Vlachs were a people whose mother tongue was classified as a

kind of Romance languages, similar to Romanian. They had lived very

widespread over all the Balkans for centuries. Romania did not

geographically border on Macedonia and did not expect any territorial gain

there, but took precautions against Bulgarian expansion, which would

destroy the balance of power among the Balkan states. Thus, the Romanians

took advantage of the language similarity of the Vlachs with theirs and

attempted to use the Vlachs for their own political interests by offering them

extravagant amounts of money for such amenities as schools and churches. 22

This Romanian scheme was in conflict with the main Greek policy

toward the Vlachs. In the course of intensifying the conflict in Macedonia

between Slavs and Greeks from the end of the nineteenth century onward,

and in order to overcome the numerical disadvantage of the Greek

population there, Greece had to firmly reinforce the idea of Greek national

identity into the consciousness of the Vlachs, who had already been exposed

to the strong influence of the Greek language and culture. 23

22
Leften Stavros Stavrianos, The Balkans since 1453 (New York: Rinehart, 1958), 494.
23
For the Vlachs in Ottoman Macedonia, Greek was the main language of church,
education, and trade, even though they maintained their mother tongue at home.

134
As a result of both the Greek and the Romanian campaigns, the

Vlachs in Macedonia and Epirus were divided into pro-Greek and

pro-Romanian camps. The animosity between these two camps escalated.

Pro-Greek schools and churches were destroyed by Pro-Romanian Vlachs

and pro-Greek Vlachs paid them back in their own coin. They expelled each

other and even murdered opponent school teachers and clergy. 24

In May 1905 Sultan Abdul Hamid II recognized that there was a

Vlach nationality with equal in rights like other non-Muslim subjects of the

Ottoman Empire such as Greeks, Bulgarians, Serbs, and Albanians. 25 This

pleased Romanians and provoked anger among Greeks. 26 Abdurrahman,

Minister of Justice and Religion of the Ottoman State also issued the

document addressed to Ioakim III, Ecumenical Patriarch of Istanbul, to give

Concerning the overview of their history, customs, life and culture, see, Alan J. B. Wace
and M.S. Thompson, The Nomads of the Balkans: An Account of Life and Customs
among the Vlachs of Northern Pindus (New York, 1914); Rigas Velestinlis was typical
of the Vlachs who had been under strong influence of Greek culture. He planned a
general uprising of all Balkan peoples in the end of the eighteenth century in order to
found a Balkan republic in which the Greek language and culture would be dominant.
See C.M. Woodhouse, Rhigas Velestinlis: The Proto-Martyr of the Greek Revolution
(Limni, Evia, Greece: D. Harvey 1995).
24
With regard to case examples of mutual attacks, see Αντώνης Μιχ. Κολτσίδας,
Κουτσόβλαχοι. Οι Βλαχόφωνοι Έλληνες. Εθνολογική λαογραφική και γλωσσολογική
μελέτη [Koutsovlachs. The Vlach-Speaking Greeks. Ethnographic, Folklore, and
Linguistic Study] (Θεσσαλονίκη: Αδελφοί Κυριακίδη, 1993) and Ελευθερία Ι.
Νικολαΐδου, Η Ρουμανική προπαγάνδα στο βιλαέτι Ιωαννίνων και στα Βλαχόφωνα
χωριά της Πίνδου (μέσα 19ου αι.–1900) [The Romanian Propaganda in Vilayet Ioannina
and in Vlach-Speaking Villages of Pindos (the Middle of the 19th Century–1900)],
τόμος Α΄ [vol. 1] (Ιωάννινα: Εταιρεία Ηπειρωτικών Μελετών, 1995).
25
Constantin N. Velichi, “Les Relations roumano-grecques pendant la période
1879–1911,” Revue des études sud-est européennes 7, no.3 (1969): 535.
26
Ευάγγελος Α. Αβέρωφ-Τοσίτσας, Η πολιτική πλευρά του κουτσοβλαχικού ζητήματος
(Αθήνα: Εργοστάσιο Γραφικών Τεχνών Γερ. Σ. Χρήστου, 1948), 53-54.

135
encouragement to the Vlachs, who were Ottoman subjects, to use their

language at their schools and churches in order to protect their national

identity. 27 However, the rift among the Vlachs had widened too far to be

capable of healing. The Romanian propaganda did not cease and the

pro-Greek Vlachs and the Greeks kept countering it. Mutual attacks and

murders continued to ensue.

In June 1905, Papiniu, new Romanian ambassador to Athens,

accused the Greeks of attacking pro-Romanian Vlachs in Macedonia as well

as attempting to close Romanian schools there. He also insisted that the

Greek government should prevent the Greek bands from expelling the

“Romanian population” and, furthermore that it should ask the Ecumenical

Patriarch to obey the Sultan’s decision. He expressed the fear that Romanian

public opinion would be induced to bring the Greeks in Romania into an

unfavorable situation. 28

27
Επίσημα έγγραφα περί της εν Μακεδονία οδυνηράς καταστάσεως [Official Documents
about the Serious Situation in Macedonia](Κωνσταντινούπολη: Πατριαρχεικό
τυπογραφείο, 1906),100; The Patriarch Ioakim III opposed this decision and issued the
following announcement on June 21, 1905: “The Helleno-Vlachs are scattered over
European Turkey and their number is approximately 100,000 according to the
population statistics. From antiquity they never distinguished themselves from the
Greeks and even now neither do they. The Greeks say that the Vlachs are Greek and the
Vlachs call themselves Greek....The Romanian propaganda for the past forty years
attempted to imbue the minds of the Vlachs with Romanian national consciousness in
order to make Vlachs identify themselves with the Romanians, but it did so in vain. The
Romanian agents could eventually take only 10,000 Vlachs onto their side. This small
number of Vlachs is fragmented and isolated.” Επίσημα έγγραφα, 103.
28
Αβέρωφ-Τοσίτσας, Η πολιτική πλευρά, 54-55; In reply to Papiniu, Dimitrios Rallis,
then Minister of Foreign affairs as well as Prime Minister, told that there was no
Romanian population in Macedonia. Then he asked the Great Powers to protest against

136
In fact, public pressure on the Greek communities in Romania

gradually rose and an anti-Greek atmosphere prevailed. One of the victims

was Spiros Simos, an owner-editor of the Greek newspaper Patris. In June

1905, he published a map of Macedonia, which the Romanian authorities

judged to be insulting to “Romanian pride.” The Romanian government took

measures to prohibit the publication in Romania of Greek newspapers.

Under this pressure, Simos was finally obliged to leave the country. 29

The relations between the two countries deteriorated over the

summer of 1905. As a result, Tombazis, Greek ambassador to Bucharest, was

recalled to Greece on September 4 while the Romanian counterpart left

Athens on September 11.This was the beginning of the de facto break up of

the relationship. What was worse, on September 21, the Romanian

government notified the final denouncement of Greek‒Romanian

Commercial Convention of December 1900, which would bring further harm

the Romanian government, saying that retaliation against innocent Greeks in Romania
would take place. Αβέρωφ-Τοσίτσας, Η πολιτική πλευρά, 55; The French newspaper Le
Temps wrote in the summer of 1905 that the Greek government suggested that it would
break diplomatic relations with Romania. Papiniu reported on August 13, 1905 (NS),
that Rallis informed the Great Powers that if they did not intervene between the two
countries and work in favor of Greece, the Greek government would inevitably break
diplomatic relations with Romania. Velichi, “Les Relations roumano-grecques,” 535.
29
Gioula Koutsopanagou, "Spyros Simos' Newspaper Patris Bucharest‒Athens: A
Bridge of Intellectual Communication," in Relations gréco-roumaines: interculturalité
et identité nationale, eds. Paschalis M. Kitromilidès and Anna Tabaki (Athens: Institute
of Neohellenic Research, 2004), 282, 287; The Greeks in Bucharest launched the
newspaper Patris under editor-in chief P. Chrisdoulou in December 1889. Three years
later, Simos from Piraeus took over its publication. After he was deported to Greece, he
resumed the publication of Patris in Athens on November 20, 1905.

137
not only to Greek commercial activities, but also to Greek religious and

educational spheres in Romania. 30 A series of events followed, such as the

expulsion of Greeks, the persecution of Greek schools, and the confiscation

of Greek owned estates. Although the Great Powers made efforts to restore

amicable relations between the two countries, on May 30, 1906, the Greek

government eventually notified the Romanian government of its official

decision to terminate their relationship. This caused the further expulsion of

the Greeks from Romania. 31

The Greeks from the Caucasus

There was another category of the ethnic Greeks who would be

landowners and receive a subsidy according to Law 3202 although they were

small in number. They were the Greeks of the Caucasus of the Russian

Empire. In contrast to the Greeks arriving in their “motherland” as a result of

the persecution by other nations, the Caucasian Greeks came to Greece

30
Αβέρωφ-Τοσίτσας, Η πολιτική πλευρά, 56-59; A protocol which approved the status
of Greek churches in Romania as a corporate body accompanied the Convention of
1900. As Greek communities had totally depended on their churches, the denouncement
of the Convention caused the problem of whether the Greek communities themselves
would be able to continue. Georgios Streit argued from the legal standpoint that the
denouncement of the Convention did not have direct influence on the protocol and that
the protocol was still valid. See Georgios Streit, La Question des communautés
helléniques en Roumanie (Paris: Librairie de la société du recueil J.-B. Sirey & de
journal du palais, 1906).
31
Αβέρωφ-Τοσίτσας, Η πολιτική πλευρά, 56-59; Velichi, “Les Relations
roumano-grecques,” 537; National Archives and Records Service, Despatches from
United States Ministers to Greece, vol. 18: February 1‒August 12, 1906, No. 403, June
14, 1906 (NS).

138
mainly voluntarily from the end of the nineteenth century onward. The

Russian authorities neither treated the Caucasian Greeks badly nor pressured

them to leave their land. On the contrary, they showed their concern for

well-being and protection of the Caucasian Greeks. The Russian authorities

also further promoted the immigration of the Greeks of the Black Sea to the

Russian territory in many different ways. 32 However, after Thessaly was

incorporated in Greece in 1881, Trikoupis, then Prime Minister, envisaged

32
Μαργαρίτης Ευαγγελίδης, Αιτία της εις Ελλάδα μεταναστεύσεως των εν Καυκάσω
Ελλήνων του Πόντου και ιστορία των παθημάτων αυτών [Reason of Immigration of the
Pontus-Greeks of the Caucasus to Greece and History of Their Sufferings]
(Αθήνα,1900), 4-5; The mass colonization of Greeks from the Ottoman Pontus region to
the Caucasus went in tandem with the expansion of the Russian Empire toward south.
The Russian authorities intended to settle Greeks and Armenians in the places where the
Muslim population used to live. Charles King mentions, “The movement of Tatars,
Caucasus highlanders, and other Muslims out of the Russian Empire in the latter half of
the nineteenth century was spectacular—in round figures, perhaps 1.5 million migrants
from Crimea and the Caucasus, many of whom died on route or shortly after arrival at
their final destinations. According to one calculation, as a direct result of Muslim flight,
the population of Crimea may have dropped by as much as a quarter and the population
of the Caucasus uplands by a little more.” Charles King, The Black Sea: A History
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 208-9; He also mentions, “Russian tactics in
the Caucasus campaigns had been abominable, with villages scorched and men, women,
and children rounded up for movement to new locales. Yet the motive was not who the
Muslims were but where they were—in the path of Russian imperial expansion, in the
unconquered highlands that were seen as a security threat by the Russian state.” King,
The Black Sea, 210; Concerning the Russian policy of the settlement of the Greeks in
the Caucasus, M. P. Dobrohotov, who was in charge of the Greek‒Armenian
colonization, wrote, “The program of the systematic colonization started in 1864….It
intended to revitalize the vacant region and resume farming that had ceased since
highlander Muslims left for Turkey.…This region required more agricultural products.
The plan was mapped out that Greeks and Armenians would be settled because they
were considered to get adjust to the environment there.” Quoted from Βλάσης Αγτζίδης,
«Οι Έλληνες του Καυκάσου» [The Greeks of the Caucasus], in Η ιστορία των Ελλήνων
του Καυκάσου στο Καρς και στο Κιλκίς: εικονογραφημένη διαδρομή ενός αιώνα
1900–2000 [History of the Greeks of the Caucasus in Kars and in Kilkis: Illustrated
Episode of One Century 1900‒2000], ed. Αθανάσιος Διαμαντόπουλος (Αθήνα: 2001),
16.

139
the plan that the Greeks in the Caucasus should be made to colonize

Thessaly in order to develop the agriculture of its fertile plain, which

attracted many of the Caucasian Greeks. 33 They came to have “a passion to

live in a free fatherland, to finish the rest of their life under the beneficent

rule of their own national royal family, and to bring up their children within

the Greek language and culture.” 34 National feelings of this kind persuaded

some of them to descend upon Greece from around 1895 onward, even

before any specific law to assist them had been enacted. However, a series of

misfortunes—the death of Trikoupis in 1896, the crushing defeat of the

Greeks in the war of 1897, and its disastrous aftermath—happened to Greece.

Under these difficult circumstances the Greek government could not afford

to take care of them and hundreds of the Caucasian Greeks who had already

arrived at Greece were left without any legal status or protection. 35

The Total Number of the Refugees

The exact number of Greeks from Eastern Rumelia, Bulgaria, and

Romania who flooded Greece is difficult to estimate. They did not arrive in

33
Ευαγγελίδης, Αιτία της εις Ελλάδα μεταναστεύσεως, 1.
34
Ευαγγελίδης, Αιτία της εις Ελλάδα μεταναστεύσεως, 5.
35
After repeated appeals to the government to grant them a location where they could
get settled, a bill on the distribution of land in state-owned villages of the former
Stefanovik to the Caucasian Greeks was finally submitted to Parliament on June 21,
1906, though it did not become a law. It intended to cover the needs of 40 families.
ΠΣΒΑ, 365.

140
Piraeus, the port for Athens, by boat as a body, but intermittently from the

north to Greece. Some sought shelter in Istanbul or in southern Thrace under

Ottoman rule. 36

Racial migration continued and the number of refugees dramatically

increased. According to a British Foreign Office report, there were 4,991

refugees in Greece in December 1906. 37 The British delegation in Athens

reported on May 1, 1907 (NS), that 20,000 or 30,000 ethnic Greeks were

leaving Romania and Bulgaria with the expectation of obtaining land in

Greece. 38 The Greek weekly newspaper Oikonomiki Ellas dated May 5,

1907, wrote that the number of the refugees had risen to at least 14,000. 39 In

December 1907, 22,485 refugees, or more than four times as many as in the

same period of the previous year, were reported to have arrived in Greece. In

December 1908 there were 26,108 refugees. 40

Although the number of the refugees toward the end of 1906 was

relatively small in comparison with that of later years, about 5,000 people

were too large a number to be ignored. 41 It was evident that these refugees

36
A.R., The Persecution of the Greek, 30.
37
Foreign Office, Annual Series, No. 4289. Diplomatic and Consular Reports: Greece:
Report on the Finances of Greece for the Years 1907‒08 (London, Harrison and Sons,
1909), 7.
38
FO 371/264, No. 14701.
39
«Ο μέγα ζήτημα των προσφύγων» [The Big Issue of Refugees], Οικονομική Ελλάς ,
5 Μαΐου, 1907, 213.
40
Foreign Office, Annual Series, No. 4289. Diplomatic and Consular Reports, 7.
41
The population of Athens municipality (Δήμος Αθηνών) based on the national census
of October 1907 was 175,430. Piraeus, the second largest municipality, had 74,580 and

141
could not be smoothly settled without a political initiative. It was a state

obligation to take effective measures to help them. The necessity of solving

the refugee problem implied more than not only a simple philanthropy, but

the possibility of national benefits. The issue of the Greek refugees could be

interpreted as the flipside of the Macedonian struggle. These ethnic Greeks

were the victims of the rivalry between the Greeks of the Greek kingdom

and other Balkan nations over Macedonia. Therefore, refugee assistance was

an inevitable task for the Greek state to bolster its national cause. Moreover,

the refugee problem had to be also resolved in terms of social stability. Their

very existence could lead to social unrest if the matter of the refugees was

not properly arranged.

Start of the Debate on Refugees

On October 31, 1906, just before the opening of the extraordinary

session of the eighteenth parliamentary period, Dragoumis advanced his

opinion about the refugee issue on the front page of the newspaper Akropolis.

Dragoumis expressed strong dissatisfaction that the government had

postponed the opening of the new session, which had been expected at the

beginning of October. This postponement, he contended, delayed discussions

Patras, third municipality, had 51,932. Γιώργος Χωματιανός ed. Στατιστικά


αποτελέσματα της γενικής απογραφής του πληθυσμού κατά την 27 Οκτωβρίου 1907
[Statistical Results of the General Registration of the Population on October 27, 1907],
τόμος Β΄ [vol. 2] (Αθήνα: Εθνικό τυπογραφείο Μιχαήλ Νικολαΐδου, 1909), 434.

142
in Parliament on the relief arrangement for the refugees, which he

considered as a pressing issue. He said:

It was necessary to shed more sufficient light on the issue of Eastern


Rumelia and Bulgaria at the National Assembly. Parliament had to
assiduously examine the unprecedented persecution of the Greeks
and what the government had done in response to these events. It
was necessary to widely discuss the matter and determine what
should be done in order to bravely fight against the great difficulties
resulting from the persecution.…[If a new parliamentary session
had convened as scheduled,] the deliberation in Parliament would
more effectively provide our refugee-brothers with necessary shelter
and assistance. The vote in Parliament would make possible,
without risky delay, the effective provision for definitive settlement
of the Greeks, who were obliged to leave their native alters and
fireplaces, wishing to serve the great Greek national interests. As
the solution of this issue has been postponed for so long, the
countless numbers of persecuted people have been left up in the air
at present. The present situation is liable to bring about division,
dispersion, and decomposition of the Greek nation with the net
result that the first-class national force is lost. 42

Having said that, Dragoumis stressed that the government should take an

immediate action to provide care for the refugees as soon as the forthcoming

session commenced.

He fiercely criticized the lethargy of the government over many


42
«Μία συνέντευξις με πανελλλήνιον πολιτευτήν» [An Interview with a Panhellenic
Politician], Ακρόπολις, 31 Οκτωβρίου 1906, 1.

143
domestic and international impending issues. Especially, in the sphere of the

international relations Dragoumis stated that Greece was bogged down in a

situation of “totally extraordinary complexity.” He further expressed his

opinion saying, “[T]he complexity is of a rarer kind, or we would rather say

that it is unprecedented in the years of European discord ever since the

Greek revolution.” 43 According to him, this current confusing situation in

the international arena had caused the expulsion of the ethnic Greeks from

other Balkan states. The drifting refugees, now in Greece, embodied the

intersection of the domestic and international domains, neither of which the

Greek state had not been able to steer with sufficient skill. Dragoumis

emphasized that the sluggish domestic morale had to be changed first to

successfully face up to the present international political situation. So he

accentuated the importance of offering appropriate care to the refugees. He

warned the government that the situation of the refugees descending to

Greece would never improve if the state just stood idly by. Therefore, he

urged that Parliament should meet immediately to achieve these ends.

A new session of Parliament began on November 11 finally. In the

third meeting of the session, on November 22, Dragoumis took the first steps

to realize the relief arrangements necessary for the refugees. He presented

three questions about the international affairs, one of which was related to

43
«Μία συνέντευξις με πανελλλήνιον πολιτευτήν», 1.

144
the refugees from Eastern Rumelia and Bulgaria, and asked the government

to answer them. 44 It mentioned that as the events in Eastern Rumelia and

Bulgaria violated the rights of ethnic Greeks, the interests of the Greek state,

and the Greek citizens, the government had to mitigate the damage either by

promptly contacting the Bulgarian government, or by referring the matter to

the international community which had a right of intervention. Finally, it

called on the government to take measures on its own initiative to assist both

those who had already been expelled to Greece and those who would be

coming. 45

On December 7, in his main speech concerning Greek diplomacy,

Dragoumis referred to the refugee issue again. In Dragoumis’ opinion, none

of the Great Powers could be expected to work for the advantage of Greece.

Bulgaria was considered to be geopolitically more important in the Balkans

than Greece. The Powers knew that imposing sanctions on Bulgaria after the

series of ferocious events in the previous summer would no doubt further

kindle the Eastern Question. He demonstrated the data for the Greek

44
The other two questions were concerning the Cretan issue after the Therisso revolt
under the leadership of Venizelos for the union with Greece in spring 1905, and the
problem of the Greek interests after the diplomatic rapture between Romania and
Greece. ΠΣΒΕ, 13.
45
The Patriarch Ioakim III already delivered statements to the Great Powers and the
Ottoman state during the series of violent incidents in Eastern Rumelia and Bulgaria in
summer 1906 to ask them for intervention. See Patriarcat Œcuménique, Mémorandums
adressés aux représentants des grandes puissances a Constantinople et autres
documents relatif aux récents évènements de Bulgarie et Roumélie orientale
(Constantinople: Imprimerie du Patriarcat Œcuménique, 1906).

145
population of Eastern Rumelia that had been 120,000 in 1880 and decreased

to 60,000 at present, and affirmed that Hellenism in Bulgaria and Eastern

Rumelia would surely disappear sooner or later. Dragoumis proposed a very

realistic response to this crisis of Hellenism. He told Parliament that Greece

should not expect ethnic Greek refugees to return to their native land in

Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia. He also criticized the idea that the refugees

should colonize Macedonia and Thrace and be utilized to Greece’s advantage

in the Macedonian struggle, which implied that they would fall once more

into a continuously unstable situation. Rather, Dragoumis argued that

Parliament should consider how they could take root in Greece under better

conditions and how their sufferings could be compensated appropriately. It

was imperative, he claimed, to provide them with work and a place to settle

within the boundaries of the Greek state. 46

This time Romanos of Theotokis’ party, the only Greek deputy that

actually visited Anchialos after its destruction, supported Dragoumis.

Romanos described the refugees from Bulgaria and Romania as national

martyrs, and told Parliament that the Anchialites no longer cared about their

churches and houses in their hometown, which had already been ruined and

burnt to ashes. He insisted that although Greece was in poor economic

conditions, it should give a helping hand to the refugees who were, surely,
46
«Η εξωτερική πολιτική της κυβερνήσεως» [The Foreign Policy of the Government],
Ακρόπολις, 8 Δεκεμβρίου, 1906, 2.

146
adding a new splendor to the pages of Greek history. 47

The government at last started dealing with the problems of the

refugees. On December 10, the cabinet held a meeting. They discussed that

the refugees should be settled on the former Stefanovik estate in Thessaly by

distributing house-building plots, farming tools, seeds, and the necessary

food. 48

Dragoumis did not relax his efforts to make the government

seriously grapple with the refugee issue. On December 11, he contended that

the government had to submit, without delay, a bill on the land distribution

to those unfortunate people. He added that people from Eastern Rumelia and

especially from Anchialos had sacrificed everything and because of this they

deserved to receive proper protection from the state. Then he asked the

government to map out a specific program for bringing a state of happiness

to the “martyrs” 49

47
«Η εξωτερική πολιτική της κυβερνήσεως», 2; «Εκ της περί προσφύγων
βαρυσήμαντου αγορεύσεως του κ. Αθ. Ρωμανού» [From Mr. Ath. Romanos’
Momentous Speech about Refugees], Ακρόπολις, 11 Δεκεμβρίου, 1906, 1; Romanos
also sent a letter to the French newspaper Le Temps in order to make it known to the
French public that the Bulgarians violated the minority rights in Eastern Rumelia
guaranteed by the Treaty of Berlin. «Ο αγών του κ. Αθ. Ρωμανού» [The Struggle of Mr.
Ath. Romanos], Ακρόπολις, 1 Νοεμβρίου, 1906, 1.
48
«Το χθεσινόν υπουργικόν συμβούλιον. Η εγκατάστασις των προσφύγων»
[Yesterday’s Cabinet. The Settlement of the Refugees], Ακρόπολις, 11 Δεκεμβρίου,
1906, 4.
49
ΠΣΒΕ, 122.

147
Granting Greek Citizenship to the Refugees

What had to be done first for the refugees was to make them true

citizens of the Greek kingdom. Although they were Greek in terms of

ethnicity, most of the refugees were not Greek in a legal sense. They needed

to be accepted as Greek citizens in order to enjoy the benefits of life within

the Greek state.

Urged on by Dragoumis, Nikolaos Kalogeropoulos, Minister of the

Interior, submitted a bill of granting Greek citizenship to ethnic Greek

refugees from Eastern Rumelia, Bulgaria and Romania to Parliament on

December 13. In its preamble he mentioned:

Many of the ethnic Greek refugees in Greece, who have fled from
Eastern Rumelia, Bulgaria and Romania and desire to find a
bread-winning job, are in a hopeless situation because of their lack
of Greek citizenship, which is prerequisite for obtaining a job.
However, in accordance with the existing laws, it takes quite a long
time for an applicant to gain a status of Greek citizen after making
an application.
I think that the immediate acquisition of Greek citizenship by
the ethnic Greek refugees in question would help them to succeed in
finding different bread-winning jobs, while it would also bring
useful citizens to join the state. 50

Usually one who wished to obtain Greek citizenship had to spend a certain

50
ΠΕΒΕ, αριθ.43, 88.

148
period of time within the country according to Article 15 of Civil Law to be

qualified as citizen. This time, however, the government took bold initiative

to simplify the process. With small modifications, the bill quickly became

Law 3185 on December 29, 1906, and came into force by being published in

the Government Gazette on January 4, 1907. The law also prescribed that

Greeks from the Caucasus would be able to obtain Greek citizenship. 51

In addition to the citizenship law relating to the refugees, the

Ministry of the Interior established an office of refugee care. It was in charge

of temporary financial aid to the refugees, health care for them, and hygiene

maintenance in their makeshift housing etc. for the time being before their

final destination to be settled was decided. 52

Making Sharecroppers into Smallholders

Parliament then proceeded to a discussion in order to realize a

definitive project for the refugee settlement. There was a tacit agreement

among the deputies that Thessaly was the district where the refugees should

be settled. Although it had been incorporated into the Greek state in 1881,

Thessaly was still sparsely populated almost three decades later. Importantly,

as long as Thessaly was the target place to settle the refugees, the

51
Εφημερίς της Κυβερνήσεως του Βασιλείου Ελλάδος [Government Gazette of the
Greek Kingdom], τεύχος Α΄, 1907, Αριθμός Φύλλου 1, 4 Ιανουαρίου, 1907, 1-2.
52
ΑΣΔ, Φακ.186, υποφακ. 186.2, εγγρ. 86.

149
government could not ignore the request for land distribution from local

Thessalian sharecroppers. They had repeatedly asked the government for

many years to emancipate them from the large private estate (çiftlik) system

by distributing them land and thereby making them smallholders.

Most of the Thessalian plains were under the çiftlik system in which

landless sharecroppers cultivated the land and gave a part of their products to

their landowners. 53 The amount of the sharecroppers’ delivery to their

landowners depended on each çiftlik according to local customs, fertility, and

owners’ costs, but it was usually half or one third of the whole crop after

deducting seeds and tax. 54 During the Ottoman period, though çiftlik owners

could exercise their power over their çiftlik land based on complex titles they

held, full ownership for çiftlik land rarely existed. It did not pass down as

hereditary property. A third person usually took over its ownership. With

respect to sharecroppers, they were legally acknowledged as holders of

perpetual rights to cultivate the land and had a collective right to the natural

resources of the land. They were bonded to the land they cultivated and
53
According to Donald Quataert, the Ottoman state succeeded in confiscating the large
holdings in Asia Minor while the large estates in the Balkans survived into the Tanzimat
era. He writes, “The apparent absence of confiscation in the Balkan provinces may be
due to concerns that it would disturb the relations between the Christian cultivators and
Muslim landholders.” Donald Quataert, “The Age of Reforms 1812–1914” in An
Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, ed. Halil İnalcik and Donald
Quataert, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 873.
54
Σωκράτης Πετμεζάς, «Αγροτική οικονομία» [Rural Economy], in Ιστορία της
Ελλάδας του 20ού αιώνα. Οι απαρχές 1900‒1922 [History of Greece in the 20th Century:
The Beginnings 1900‒1922], τόμος Α΄-1 [vol.1-1] ed. Χρήστος Χατζηιωσήφ, (Αθήνα:
Βιβλιόραμα, 1999), 73.

150
could transfer their rights in a hereditary manner as long as they continued to

cultivate it and to deliver a portion of their yields to their çiftlik owners. 55

After Thessaly was incorporated into the Greek domain, the

situation of the çiftlik sharecroppers deteriorated. They faced a potential

danger that would strip them of any rights they used to enjoy in a hereditary

manner. The conceptual difference in property right between the Ottoman

law and the Roman–Byzantine law of Greece made the things confusing.

Sometimes limited titles under the Ottoman law were converted to full titles

under the Roman–Byzantine law, and sometimes the rights that the Ottoman

law had provided were reduced to nothing in the framework of the

Roman–Byzantine law. In this way, confusion and misunderstanding made

occupiers of the çiftlik unchallenged owners with full rights over their land,

while sharecroppers’ position became precarious because the çiftlik owners

came to deny the traditional perpetual rights of sharecroppers to the land.

The çiftlik owners claimed that the relationship between an owner and a

sharecropper was temporal, and that it would be dissolved when a contract

expired. Greek capitalists who had massively brought çiftlik land formed a

strong social group of landowners and could have a great influence on Greek

politics. Therefore, repeated appeals of Thessalian sharecroppers to

55
Πετμεζάς, «Αγροτική οικονομία», 74-75.

151
Parliament for improving their situation had not been accepted. 56

Under these circumstances the sharecroppers had no incentive to

cultivate more land than that from which they anticipated sufficient grain

necessary for their family after deducting the amount of delivery to their

landowners, the tax, and the expense of farming. The çiftlik owners did not

manage their land with a long-term vision of agricultural development in

Thessaly. They neither took up the structural reform of the çiftlik system, nor

introduced the new technology of farming. 57

Konstantinos Topalis reported in 1907 that there were 670 villages

in Thessaly of which 270 were kefalochoria where cultivators had their land

tenure, and that the rest, 400 villages, belonged to the çiftlik system. The

former villages were mostly in the mountainous upper area while the latter

were down on the plains and revenia. It was estimated that the total size of

the çiftlik amounted to 5,000,000 stremmata, 58 and that 11,000 families, that

56
Πετμεζάς, «Αγροτική οικονομία», 75-76; There was a tendency for the supreme
court and non-Thessalian courts to take the side of the sharecroppers while local courts,
administration and gendarmerie in Thessaly supported the çiftlik owners. In Parliament
there also had been acute debates over the issue. In 1896 the Diligiannis’ government
submitted five bills on Thessalian agrarian problem, one of which adopted the definition
of the real and perpetual rights of sharecroppers to the land they hereditarily cultivated,
and dramatically limited the rights of çiftlik owners. But those five bills met a furious
resistance from Thessalian deputies and landowners, and were finally abandoned. The
Theotokis’ government passed Law 2608 (June 9, 1899) legalizing the expulsion of
reluctant tenant farmers, which contributed to strengthening the power of çiftlik owners.
Πετμεζάς, «Αγροτική οικονομία», 76.
57
Πετμεζάς, «Αγροτική οικονομία», 76, 78.
58
A stremma is a measurement of an area of land which is equal to 1,000 square meters
(0.247acres). The plural form of stremma is stremmata. It was officially adopted as the
“royal” or “new” stremma through the decree of September 28, 1836. Once the value of

152
is, approximately 44,000 peoples lived under this system. 59

Thessaly had great potential for agriculture and had been regarded

as panacea for Greece which had heavily relied on the import of grain. 60 Yet,

as long as the vast majority of Thessalian plains was under the çiftlik system,

it was impossible to expect agricultural development there, or to enhance the

productivity of cereals, to be precise. It was absolutely necessary to

disintegrate the çiftlik system and to create landed independent farmers.

From the middle of the first decade of the twentieth century onward,

however, as a result of growing social pressure, çiftlik owners as well as

conservative politicians came to consider it inevitable to enact a law that

would allow çiftlik cultivators to have land tenure. As their profit from

agricultural products in the çiftlik land was relatively small in comparison

with that from the other resources of their income, the çiftlik owners were

willing to sell their land to the cultivators, with the aid of mediation by the

state, as a convenient way, if they could gain a fair price from the sale. 61

When such a favorable milieu to Thessalian cultivators gradually emerged,

stremma varied according to regions, like the Peloponnesian stremma and the Attica
stremma. William W. McGrew, Land and Revolution in Modern Greece, 1800-1881:
The Transition in the Tenure and Exploitation of Land from Ottoman Rule to
Independence (Kent, OH: The Kent University Press, 1985), 84 and n10.
59
Κωνσταντίνος Τοπάλης «Η γεωργική Θεσσαλία» [Agricultural Thessaly], Η μελέτη
(1907): 132-133.
60 Grain was one of the major import items, which occupied about more than 20 % of

the total import sum. See Γιώργος Δερτιλής, Ιστορία του Ελληνικού κράτους 1830‒1920
[History of the Greek State 1830‒1920], τόμος Β΄ [vol. 2] (Αθήνα: Εστία, 2005), 565.
61
Πετμεζάς, «Αγροτική Οικονομία», 78.

153
the issue of the refugee settlement accidentally came up. Therefore, the

project to distribute land in Thessaly to the refugees also acted as the best

incentive for the government to take up a task of making Thessalian local

sharecroppers under the çiftlik system into smallholders.

Legislation of Land Distribution in Thessaly

The initial government bill of land distribution in Thessaly was

submitted to Parliament on December 13, 1906. 62 Then the additional

government bill was submitted on January 29, 1907. 63 The special

committee of Parliament examined these bills and drew up a bill which

amended the original bills and incorporated their ideas. The committee

published its bill on February 16, 1907. 64 At first, the government did not

regard it as desirable to set up a committee to look into the governmental

bills because a committee of this kind tended to slow down every discussion

62
«Το νομοσχέδιον περί διανομής των εν Θεσσαλία εθνικών χωρίων πρώην
Στεφάνοβικ» [The Bill of Distribution of National Villages of the Former Stefanovik in
Thessaly], ΠΕΒΕ, αριθ. 42, 78-87.
63
«Νομοσχέδιον περί διανομής των εν τοις εθνικοίς εν Αλμυρώ λειβαδίοις
καλλιεργουμένων και καλλιεργησίμων γαιών, εκχωρήσεως του επί των
αγραναπαυομένων αλλοτρίων γαιών δικαιώματος βοσκής, και εκποιήσεως των εθνικών
λειβαδίων» [The Bill of Distribution of the Land under Cultivation and the Arable Land
in the National Meadows of Almiros, the Cession of the Right of Pasture in the Fallow
Expropriated Land, and the Sale of the National Meadows], ΠΕΒΕ, αριθ. 68, 123-127.
64
«Το νομοσχέδιον περί συνοικισμού και διανομής γαιών εν Θεσσαλία και ιδρύσεως
Θεσσαλικού Γεωργικού Ταμείου» [The Bill of Settlement and Distribution of Land in
Thessaly and the Establishment of Thessalian Agricultural Fund], ΠΕΒΕ, αριθ. 130,
260-270.

154
to make legislation impossible during a session. 65 Yet, this time, the

committee functioned promptly. It investigated the government bills and

submitted its own bill about two weeks after it was established. 66 The

immediate response of the committee owed much to the great enthusiasm

and determined will showed by Dragoumis to achieve a good solution for the

settlement of refugees. In fact, when the committee submitted its bill to

Parliament, Dionisios Stefanou, president of the committee, referred to

Dragoumis by name and expressed his appreciation for Dragoumis’ hard

work drafting the bill. 67

According to the government bill of December 13, 1906, the land to

be distributed was limited to the state owned land so-called Stefanovik. As it

used to be a private estate owned by Ioannis Stefanovik Skilitsis, a Greek

banker in London, it was called as such. The Stefanovik estate consisted of

twenty six çiftlik villages situated in Larissa, Trikala, and Karditsa. The

Greek state bought the estate on January 22, 1902, for ₤80,000 (3,320,000

drachmas) to nationalize it. 68 The bill specified, on the basis of the quality

65
«Η Βουλή. Η διανομή των Στεφανοβίκειων» [Parliament. The Distribution of the
Stefanovik Estate], Πατρίς, 30 Ιανουαρίου 1907, 2.
66
The formation of the committee was announced in Parliament on February 2, 1907.
The committee consisted of 21 deputies, among whom three—Dragoumis, Alexandris,
and Vozikis—were the members of the Team of the Japanese. ΠΣΒΕ, 252-253.
67
ΠΣΒΕ, 365; «Το πανελλήνιου σημασίας νομοσχέδιον. Αι διανεμόμεναι γαίαι» [The
Significant Bill for the Greek Nation. The Distributed Land], Ακρόπολις, 18
Φεβρουαρίου 1907, 1.
68
ΑΣΔ, Φακ. 184, υποφακ. 184.1, εγγρ.7; ΑΣΔ, Φακ. 185, υποφακ. 185.3, εγγρ. 68;
Among twenty six Stefanovik villages, fourteen of them were in Larissa, nine in Trikala,

155
of land, that each of 250 local cultivator families of Larissa would have 150

stremmata for farming while each of 250 local cultivator families of Trikala

and Karditsa would gain 75 stremmata. The cultivators would also receive

some additional portions of land for other needs like building a house and

garden. The farm servants would have rights of some small portion of land

as well. 69 Then, the rest of the land would be divided among about 1,200

refugee families. 70 The state would also provide financial aid for the

refugees to enable them to build a house, buy farm animals, tools, and seeds,

and feed their families up to 2,950 drachmas. 71 In principle, refugees from

the same village would live together, forming a community. Thus, there

would be a possibility that local cultivators were to be compelled to move to

other places to evacuate their village to concede to the refugees. In this case,

the cultivators would be able to obtain a loan of 1,000 drachmas from the

state. 72

The most distinguished difference between the original government

bill and the committee bill was that Almiros, in addition to Stefanovik, was

two in Karditsa, and one in Farsala.


69
«Το νομοσχέδιον περί διανομής», ΠΕΒΕ, αριθ. 42, 79-80, 83 (άρθρο 9).
70
«Το νομοσχέδιον περί διανομής», ΠΕΒΕ, αριθ. 42, 80-81; The refugees who were
grain cultivators would have the rights to the same amount of portion to be distributed
as the local cultivators. The refugees who were mainly engaged in sericulture,
viticulture, arboriculture, and tobacco-growing would have 60 stremmata in Larissa and
30 stremmata in Trikala and Karditsa respectively. «Το νομοσχέδιον περί διανομής»,
ΠΕΒΕ, αριθ. 42, 84 (άρθρο 16).
71
«Το νομοσχέδιον περί διανομής», ΠΕΒΕ, αριθ. 42, 86-87 (άρθρο 48).
72
«Το νομοσχέδιον περί διανομής», ΠΕΒΕ, αριθ. 42, 81, 87 (άρθρο 53).

156
included in the land to be distributed. The idea of land distribution in

Almiros to the Anchialites, the largest group of the refugees, originally was

proposed by Spiros Chasiotis, a director of Agriculture Station of Tirinthos,

on December 14, 1906. 73 On January 29, 1907, the government submitted

an additional bill that allowed the limited national land in Almiros to be

distributed to a small number of the refugees. But, due to the financial

burden on the state, the government opposed the proposal that private çiftlik

land in Almiros should be also distributed to the refugees. Dragoumis argued

that Almiros was the only appropriate region for the refugees from Anchialos,

and that the state should purchase private çiftlik land in Almiros by force, if

it considered the refugee matter from a patriotic point of view. 74

The refugees themselves were not silent either. On the next day, G.

A. Tsakiris, a representative of the Anchialites, expressed their opinion on

the front page of the newspaper Skrip with the title “Why Are the Anchialites

Asking to Be Settled around Almiros?” In this article, Tsakiris supported

Chasiotis’ research, and attempted to convince the government that Almiros

would be a better place for the Anchialites to live and work than Stefanovik.

As the Anchialites were accustomed to viticulture, it would be difficult for

73
Σπύρος Χασιώτης, Γνωμοδοτική έκθεσις προς την επιτροπήν των εξ Αγχιάλου
προσφύγων [Advisory Statement to the Committee of Refugees from Anchialos]
(Αθήνα: Π.Α. Πετράκος, 1906).
74
«Η Βουλή. Η διανομή των Στεφανοβίκειων» [Parliament. The Distribution of the
Stefanovik Estate], Πατρίς, 30 Ιανουαρίου 1907, 2; ΠΣΒΕ, 225.

157
them to successfully grow grain, the major product of Stefanovik. Referring

to Chasiotis, Tsakiris pointed out that grain farming would need to have

much larger capital reserves as a precaution in case of a bad harvest year,

which the Anchialites could not afford. In addition, they would not stand the

climate at Stefanovik—the severe summer heat and cold winter, as they had

previously lived in the mild coastal climate of the Black Sea. The reason

why they desired to live around Almiros was not only its similar coastal

environment to where they used to live. Around Almiros they could cultivate

profitable tobacco with the help of women and children whereas grain

cultivation could hardly make use of their help. Tsakiris also pointed out that

the Anchialites could work in horticulture, apiculture, and fruit-growing.

Moreover, he enumerated the advantages of their settlement around Almiros

by providing concrete financial assessment. He indicated that the refugees

from Anchialos and Tavoutlis, its neighborhood, and the native Thessalian

farmers would pay 1,500,000 drachmas for land in Almiros and 2,250,000

drachmas for other expenses, while the Anchialites were supposed to pay

2,750,000 drachmas expect for purchasing land in Stefanovik. He estimated

that each family would have to loan 8,000 drachmas in Stefanovik while

7,000 drachmas loan would be enough in Almiros. In this way he strongly

claimed that Stefanovik would be an appropriate place for other refugees

158
from Romania and Bulgaria, but not for them. 75

The committee complied with the Anchialites’ request. The

committee bill was framed on the basis of two categories according to a

district of settlement, that is, the coastal settlement (Almiros and its

neighboring area) and the inland settlement (Stefanovik). In the coastal area

the refugees from Anchialos and its environs, and those from Sozopoli,

Varna, Pirgos and other villages were intended to get settled. 76 It was

estimated that the land distribution in Almiros would include less than 100

native cultivator families. The bill specified that the cultivators would keep

their house and became members of the settlement. 77 The inland settlement

was for the local cultivators and the refugees from Romania, the Caucasus

and other area from Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia who were not considered

for the coastal settlement. 78 The inland settlement was subdivided into the

two districts—Larissa, Farsala, Agiia, and Tirnavos on the one hand, and

Trikala and Karditsa on the other.

In the inland settlement the cultivators, irrespective of their origin as

natives or refugees, would be given 200 stremmata per household for


75
Γ. Α. Τσακίρης, «Διατί Αγχιαλίται ζητούν να εγκατασταθώσι παρά τον Αλμυρόν»
[Why Are the Anchialites Asking to Be Settled around Almiros?], Σκρίπ, 30 Ιανουαρίου
1907, 1.
76
«Το νομοσχέδιον περί συνοικισμού και διανομής γαιών», ΠΕΒΕ, αριθ. 130, 263
(άρθρο 3)
77
«Το νομοσχέδιον περί συνοικισμού και διανομής γαιών», ΠΕΒΕ, αριθ. 130, 261, 263
(άρθρο 4).
78
«Το νομοσχέδιον περί συνοικισμού και διανομής γαιών», ΠΕΒΕ, αριθ. 130, 264
(άρθρα 11, 12).

159
farming land in Larissa, Farsala, Agiia, and Tirnavos while those in Trikala

and Karditsa would obtain 100 stremmata. 79 In both districts the refugees

who were silk-raising, vine-growing, arboricultural, tobacco-growing

farmers would be allotted only 60 stremmata per household. 80 In the coastal

settlement the bill defined the extent of land to be distributed to each family

would not exceed 80 stremmata. 81 Settlers in both coastal and inland

settlements were also to be granted some additional land for building houses

with gardens.

With respect to monetary loans, while the government bill specified

that only the refugees would have the right to apply for them, the committee

bill extended this benefit to local cultivators. Local cultivators in both

coastal and inland settlements would be able to receive1,000 drachmas per

household. 82 A refugee family of the inland settlement who had been

deprived of all the resources would receive at most 3,000 drachmas in total

to buy farming tools, seeds, animals and to sustain his family members. 83

The coastal settlement classified the refugees into two groups as to whether

79
«Το νομοσχέδιον περί συνοικισμού και διανομής γαιών», ΠΕΒΕ, αριθ. 130, 264
(άρθρο 13).
80
«Το νομοσχέδιον περί συνοικισμού και διανομής γαιών», ΠΕΒΕ, αριθ. 130, 265
(άρθρο 14)
81
«Το νομοσχέδιον περί συνοικισμού και διανομής γαιών», ΠΕΒΕ, αριθ. 130, 263
(άρθρο 6).
82
«Το νομοσχέδιον περί συνοικισμού και διανομής γαιών», ΠΕΒΕ, αριθ. 130, 264
(άρθρο 8), 265 (άρθρο 16).
83
«Το νομοσχέδιον περί συνοικισμού και διανομής γαιών», ΠΕΒΕ, αριθ. 130, 265
(άρθρο 16).

160
they were farmers or not. The former would gain 4,100 drachmas per

household while the latter would have 2,500 drachmas at most. 84

In the committee bill there were four points to take note of. First, it

stipulated that the value of portions to be distributed should be estimated by

a special committee. 85 The price-setting before the distribution was strongly

supported by Alexandris and Dragoumis. Second, surplus land would be

granted to those who had a diploma in agriculture and who wished to live in

Thessaly for the purpose of model instructive farming for agricultural

development. 86 Third, if sufficient land remained in the village of Tsamasi

after regular land distribution had been completed, refugee farmers from

Romania could obtain surplus portions. 87 Fourth, most importantly, the bill

defined the foundation of the Thessalian Agricultural Fund. The Fund was

intended to collect money that settlers were to pay for their land and to make

loans to them, and also to assume all other tasks related to the revenue raised

from the land distribution. 88

A major difference of opinion between the government and the

84
«Το νομοσχέδιον περί συνοικισμού και διανομής γαιών», ΠΕΒΕ, αριθ. 130, 264
(άρθρο 9).
85
«Το νομοσχέδιον περί συνοικισμού και διανομής γαιών», ΠΕΒΕ, αριθ. 130, 266
(άρθρο 20).
86
«Το νομοσχέδιον περί συνοικισμού και διανομής γαιών», ΠΕΒΕ, αριθ. 130, 268
(άρθρο 28).
87
«Το νομοσχέδιον περί συνοικισμού και διανομής γαιών», ΠΕΒΕ, αριθ. 130, 262,
267-268 (άρθρο 27).
88
«Το νομοσχέδιον περί συνοικισμού και διανομής γαιών», ΠΕΒΕ, αριθ. 130, 269-270
(άρθρο 39).

161
committee was the budget for the project. The committee resisted against the

government which tried to curtail the expense for the refugee settlement. The

government wanted to restrict the land distribution only to the refugees who

had already arrived in Greece for whom 3,000,000 drachmas would be

enough while the committee estimated 12,000,000 drachmas to fulfill the

whole program of the land distribution.89 The discussion continued outside

Parliament as well. Dragoumis was the person whom the government

directly made contact with. Anargiros Simopoulos, Minister of Finance,

visited Dragoumis to carry on negotiations. Simopoulos proposed that the

reduction of financial support for Thessalian cultivators and of the extent of

land to be distributed. He also claimed that the proposals to grant large

portions of land to the refugees from Romania and to settle agriculturists in

Thessaly should be abolished. 90

Law 3202 was the product of the compromise of the government

and the committee. Basically the general framework of the committee bill

was kept. The settlement area was divided into two—coastal and inland. The

latter was subdivided into the two districts as the committee bill prescribed.

89
«Η κυβέρνησις και τα Στεφανοβίκεια— Τα εκατομμύρια της επιτροπής» [The
Government and the Stefanovik Estate— Millions of the Committee], Ακρόπολις, 28
Φεβρουαρίου 1907, 2; «Η διανομή των Στεφανοβικείων» [Distribution of the
Stefanovik Estate], Θεσσαλία , 28 Φεβρουαρίου 1907, 2.
90
«Τα Στεφανοβίκεια. Διαφωνία μεταξύ επιτροπής και κυβερνήσεως. Ο κ. Α.
Σιμόπουλος επισκεπτόμενος τον κ. Στ. Δραγούμην» [The Stefanovik Issues.
Disagreement between the Committee and the Government. Mr. Simopoulos Visiting
Mr. St. Dragoumis], Ακρόπολις, 8 Μαρτίου, 1907, 2.

162
The coastal settlement was exclusively for the refugees from Anchialos and

its surrounding villages, and those from Sozopoli, Pirgos, and Varna, as they

wished. Native cultivators and other farm servants of the coastal area were to

move to Trikala and Karditsa district in the inland Stefanovik estate. 91 The

prior price-setting of land to be distributed, which the committee insisted on,

was defined. 92 The extent of the land to be distributed was reduced in

accordance with the opinion of the government. Both local and refugee grain

cultivators in the inland settlement would have 150 stremmata in Larissa,

Farsala, Agiia, and Tirnavos, and 80 stremmata in Trikala and Karditsa.

Other refugees would obtain 20–40 stremmata depending on their

professions. Refugees in the coastal settlement would not have more than 80

stremmata for cultivation. 93 The proposals to grant surplus portions of land

in the village of Tsamasi to refugees from Romania and to settle

agriculturalists in Thessaly were deleted, as the government wished. Instead,

the law prescribed that Greeks from the Caucasus would take part in the land

distribution of Tsamasi. 94 Concerning financial support, the refugees would

be provided less amount of money than that of the initial plan of the

91
Νόμος ˏΓΣΒ΄ υπ’αριθ. 3202 της 7 Απριλίου 1907 περί συνοικισμού και διανομής
γαιών εν Θεσσαλία και περί ιδρύσεως Θεσσαλικού Γεωργικού Ταμείου [Law 3202 on
April 7, 1907, of Settlement and Land Distribution in Thessaly and of the Establishment
of Thessalian Agricultural Fund], (Αθήνα: Εθνικό τυπογραφείο, 1907), 3-4,6 (άρθρα 3,
6).
92
Νόμος ˏΓΣΒ΄ υπ’αριθ. 3202 της 7 Απριλίου 1907, 14-15 (άρθρο 18).
93
Νόμος ˏΓΣΒ΄ υπ’αριθ. 3202 της 7 Απριλίου 1907, 4-5, 8-10 (άρθρα 4, 11, 12).
94
Νόμος ˏΓΣΒ΄ υπ’αριθ. 3202 της 7 Απριλίου 1907, 8 (άρθρο 10).

163
committee while the local cultivators would have more. According to the law,

In the inland settlement refugees were supposed to receive 3,000 drachmas

at most while local cultivators would have 1,500 drachmas. In the coastal

settlement farmers would have 3,000 drachmas and others would obtain

1,800 drachmas at the maximum.95

It is worth mentioning that Dragoumis persistently urged the

government to conclude the loan in order not to leave the legislation in

suspense. Without financial support, it was likely that the whole project

would be aborted. On April 13, 1907, Law 3205 was enacted by which the

government succeeded in concluding the loan from National, Athenian,

Ionian, and Anatolian Banks. It allowed the state to acquire private çiftlik

land of Almiros area to be distributed, to execute land distribution there, and

to build new communities. 96

95
Νόμος ˏΓΣΒ΄ υπ’αριθ. 3202 της 7 Απριλίου 1907, 6, 11 (άρθρα 7, 14).
96
«Νόμος ˏΓΣΕ΄ υπ’αριθ.3205 περί κυρώσεως της μεταξύ του Δημοσίου και των
Τραπεζών Εθνικής, Αθηνών, Ιονικής και Ανατολής συμβάσεως περί συνομολογήσεως
Γεωργικού Θεσσαλικού δανείου δραχ. 10,000,000 και περί χορηγίας έκτακτου
πιστώσεως εκ δραχ. 7,200,000 επί του ειδικού προϋπολογισμού των εξόδων του
Υπουργείου των Οικονομικών της χρήσεως του έτους 1907» [Law 3205 of the
Confirmation of the Contract between the State and the National, Athenian, Ionian, and
Anatolian Banks concerning the Agreement of the Agricultural Thessalian Loan of
10,000,000 Drachmas and concerning the Provision of the Extraordinary Credit of
7,200,000 Drachmas for the Special Budget of Expenses for the Ministry of Finance in
the Year 1907], Εφημερίς της κυβερνήσεως. Τεύχος Α΄. Αριθμός Φύλλου 70, 13
Απριλίου 1907, 275-279.

164
The Contribution of Dragoumis and Alexandris to the Project of Land

Distribution

Exactly what was the contribution made by the Team of the

Japanese concerning the project of land distribution? The committee

included three members of the Team—Dragoumis, Alexandris, and Vozikis.

Through the parliamentary proceedings and newspaper articles, we can

confirm how seriously Dragoumis and Alexandris grappled with the issue

although it is not clear whether Vozikis helped them or not. Broadly

speaking, Dragoumis was deeply committed to the project from both moral

and emotional standpoints while Alexandris approached the issue in terms of

more practical and social conditions which he saw at first hand in Thessaly.

Dragoumis continued to urge the government to actively tackle the

problem of refugee settlement to achieve the “salvation of Hellenism.” He

attacked the lukewarm attitude of the government as showing a lack of

patriotism. Dragoumis’ patriotic stance was most obvious in the preamble of

the committee bill written by himself. 97 Although the committee bill

promoted the idea of realizing both purposes—the refugee settlement and the

creation of smallholders—at a stroke, its preamble only touched lightly upon

the problem of native Thessalian sharecroppers, and instead made the

refugees the central motif. Dragoumis depicted in detail the sufferings that

97
ΑΣΔ, Φακ. 184, υποφακ. 184.1 εγγρ. 5.

165
the refugees experienced. He fiercely condemned the merciless vandalism

conducted by the Bulgarians against the ethnic Greeks living in Bulgaria and

Eastern Rumelia, and underlined the duty of their care by the state.

[T]he storm of savage feelings that exploded in Bulgaria led to an


unprecedented persecution in Christian countries in the modern
times, which caused a mass exodus of the inhabitants of our same
blood, especially after the slaughter, burning, plundering and indeed
the total destruction of Anchialos. They abandoned their fatherland
that had continued to exist for many centuries. Wandering naked
and hungry, they asked for salvation in a free Greek soil, their
mother.
As a consequence, the absolutely necessity arose that Greece
should help our seriously suffering brothers to be finally
rehabilitated. They are those who prefer abandoning their altars,
their hearths, and the graves of their forebears, to remaining there
exposed to brutal violence with the hope of miserable salvation at
the expense of their national belief and idea. 98

The preamble of the committee bill revealed the strong sense of national

obligation to immediately take tender care of the refugees, which Dragoumis

continued to speak out about in Parliament. We can easily imagine that

Dragoumis, who had earnestly supported the Greek activities in the

Macedonian struggle, tended to pay more attention to the destiny of the

refugees expelled from the Balkan states rather than that of Thessalian

98
«Το νομοσχέδιον περί συνοικισμού και διανομής γαιών», ΠΕΒΕ, αριθ. 130, 260.

166
sharecroppers. Another reason why Dragoumis emphasized the refugee issue

seems to lie in the fact that the land distribution project ultimately would

include more refugees than local sharecroppers. It was estimated that the

number of the refugee families would be two and a half times bigger than

that of the Thessalian sharecropper families. 99

Nevertheless, the committee bill did not entirely ignore the care of

the native sharecroppers. The committee fully acknowledged that the

legislation they had prepared would become “a foundation stone supporting

the land reform in Thessaly.” 100 For this purpose in particular, Alexandris

actively participated in the discussions.

Alexandris delivered three long speeches in the course of the

legislation processes. Each speech was made on the first day of the three

readings of the bill (on February 1, March 24, and March 30, 1907). In his

speeches he did not focus on the refugee settlement itself. Alexandris, as a

Thessalian deputy, wished to make the government understand the real

Thessalian agrarian problems and to convince it to promptly take steps to

solve the problems in a proper way. Within this rather large framework he

put the issue of the refugees.

99
The British delegate to the International Financial Commission in May 1907
reported that the number of the refugee families who would benefit from the land
distribution project was 1750 in total while that of the native cultivator families was 700.
FO371/264, No.14701.
100
«Το νομοσχέδιον περί συνοικισμού και διανομής γαιών», ΠΕΒΕ, αριθ. 130, 261.

167
Throughout his speeches, Alexandris expressed constructive

opinions in order to further not only the success of the land distribution

project, but also the development of Thessalian agriculture as a whole. He

believed that the emancipation of Thessalian sharecroppers from long lasting

misfortune would fail if the first attempt at reform was abortive. 101 First of

all, he pointed out that the land even for the Thessalian cultivators was

already in short supply and urged the government to purchase further private

çiftlik land for distribution to both Thessalians and refugees. He insisted that

the government distribute more, 100 stremmata, and not 70, to each

cultivator family so that cultivators could maintain a decent livelihood and

cover their expenses for their land and for the debts to the state. Second, He

also argued that the price of the land to be distributed should be

predetermined from the viewpoint of the protection of cultivators and

refugees. Otherwise there would be a possibility that those who obtained the

land would not be able to pay for it and consequently fail to become

independent landed farmers. Third, he proposed that native cultivators

should be provided 1,000 drachmas per each household for the establishment

of their new life against the government’s proposal that 500 drachmas would

be given. For these purposes, he contended, it was essential to set up the

Thessalian Agricultural Fund to manage financial matters for Thessalian


101
«Βουλή. Έλη και Στεφανοβίκεια» [Parliament. Marshes and Stefanovik Estate],
Ακρόπολις, 31, Μαρτίου 1907, 2.

168
cultivators and refugees. It should be also noted that he recommended that

agriculturists should take part in the land distribution to conduct experiments

on scientific farming to benefit future agriculture development in Thessaly.

Furthermore, he proposed that some hundred stremmata, a relatively larger

share, to be given to the refugees from Romania who had been unfamiliar

with fallow system, which Thessalian cultivators usually adopted. Although

the government opposed this plan, Alexandris contended that as Greeks from

Romania would work diligently, it would be a good model for local

cultivators. 102

He regarded it as the worst that the government was stingy with

money. He argued that a farmer and a worker were the two pillars which

supported the whole edifice of the state and society. The state would be

destroyed when these two elements became unstable. Alexandris

acknowledged that this phenomenon had not yet appeared in Greece. But in

any event, he contended, sufficient financial support was indispensable for

Thessalian cultivators in Stefanovik to prevent the disaster of the state’s

project beforehand. He referred to examples of land distribution attempted in

Germany, Italy and Romania which ended in miserable failure due to

102
«Η Βουλή» [Parliament], Πατρίς, 2 Φεβρουαρίου 1907, 2; «Η Βουλή» [Parliament],
Ακρόπολις, 2 Φεβρουαρίου 1907, 2; «Η Βουλή» [Parliament], Πατρίς, 15 Μαρτίου
1907, 2; «Βουλή» [Parliament], Ακρόπολις, 15 Μαρτίου 1907, 2; «Βουλή» [Parliament],
Ακρόπολις, 31 Μαρτίου 1907, 2.

169
insufficient farming capital. 103 As we have seen in the previous section,

Alexandris’ opinions were reflected in the committee bill to a high degree

and, of course, influenced the passage of the final law of land distribution.

His speeches caused him to be recognized as an expert of

Thessalian agrarian issues as well as a serious politician who looked current

politics from the standpoint of the whole Greek nation and of Hellenism.

However, it should be noted that narrow-minded localism attacked him

because he did not keep Thessaly exclusively for native people and

positively supported the program of the refugee settlement there. 104

The first state-sponsored legislative project to settle the refugees in

the Greek territory can be regarded quite successful. Once the government

started to seriously tackle the issue, urged by the importunate demand of

103
«Βουλή. Έλη και Στεφανοβίκεια», 2.
104
«Τα Θεσσαλικά» [Thessalian Issues], Πατρίς, 2 Φεβρουαρίου 1907, 1; «Ο. κ. Α.
Αλεξανδρής» [Mr. Alexandris], Ακρόπολις, 31 Μαρτίου 1907, 1; There was resistance
among native Thessalian people against the project of refugee settlement in Thessaly.
For examples, Sofoklis Triantafillidis, an editor of the newspaper Panthessalia and a
former deputy, objected to accepting the refugees even temporarily in Volos. According
to him, the refugee settlement would be accomplished at the expense of Thessalian
people. He criticized that the government in Athens intended to impose the burden
caused by the refugee problem on Thessalians and that it would soon forget the refugees.
He also argued that there was no room for the refugees in Thessaly and that they would
starve and suffer soon. Another Thessalian newspaper Thessalia attack his attitude was
as a lack of tolerance toward ethnic Greek brothers. It contended that the influx of the
refugees would act as an incentive to revitalize Thessaly. «Ο εχθρός του Βόλου» [The
Enemy of Volos], Θεσσαλία, 7 Μαρτίου 1907, 1; «Διατί δεν θέλουν τους Αγχιαλίτας εν
Βόλω» [Why Do They Not Want Anchialites in Volos], Θεσσαλία, 8 Μαρτίου 1907 1;
«Και εκ τρίτου» [Also from the Third], Θεσσαλία, 9 Μαρτίου 1907, 1.

170
Dragoumis to alleviate their difficulties with the initiative of the state, the

discussions progressed in a relatively short period of time. The refugees

legally acquired Greek citizenship and could secure land according to their

preference. British Foreign Office report wrote, “[T]he Hellenic Government,

with commendable energy, took steps to elaborate a plan of colonisation for

the new comers.” 105

One possible reason why Parliament could quickly respond to this

problem is that no opposing opinion was raised to interfere with foreign-born

ethnic Greeks becoming Greek citizens, since the principle of ius sanguinis,

not of ius soli, underpinned Greek citizenship. 106 In addition, Dragoumis

strongly appealed to Parliament for furnishing the refugees with prompt and

proper protection. He created an atmosphere in which all deputies, regardless

of their party affiliation, shared a keen sense of crisis of Hellenism and

provided a cooperative framework in Parliament.

The land distribution project was carried out not only for the

refugees but for the native cultivators. The attempt to make sharecroppers

into smallholders was secondary to the refugee problem. However, it was a

thorny issue which had remained unresolved for many years after Thessaly

105
Foreign Office, Annual Series, No. 4289, Diplomatic Consular Report, 6.
106
Αιμίλιος Μπεντερμάχερ-Γερούσης, Ελληνικόν δίκαιον ιθαγενείας [Greek
Citizenship Law], τρίτη έκδοση [3rd ed.] (Θεσσαλονίκη: Αδελφοί Π. Σάκκουλα, 1976),
15-18; John S. Koliopoulos and Thanos M. Veremis, Greece: The Modern Sequel from
1831 to the Present (New York: New York University Press, 2002), 257.

171
was incorporated into the Greek territory. A deputy like Alexandris was

highly instrumental to Parliament, since he was a native Thessalian with

adequate knowledge of agricultural problems there. His realistic suggestions

greatly contributed to making Law 3202 more feasible as well as more

beneficial, not only the refugees but also for the native cultivators.

At the turn of the twentieth century, a period when the Greek

territorial expansionist movement was at its zenith, the Greek nationalist

agents were enthusiastically engaged in cultivating Greek consciousness

among the population in Macedonia under Ottoman rule. The inhabitants’

national identity in Macedonia was still vague and fluid. 107 The efforts

devoted to the refugee settlement represent another side of contemporary

Greek nationalism. Although the “Great Idea” as a major unifying force of

the Greek nation was never thoroughly discarded, the Greeks in the Greek

kingdom recognized its clear setback and the impossibility of fully realizing

their irredentist aspiration after the defeat of the war of 1897. Instead, they

had to face the reality that other Balkan nations were encroaching upon the

territories where Hellenism had historically flourished. The Greek state was

powerless in military terms to fight back while it was unrealistic to expect

the Great Powers, with their realpolitik strategy, to support Greece’s

107
Anastasia N. Karakasidou, Fields of Wheat, Hill of Blood: Passage to Nationhood
in Greek Macedonia, 1870–1990 (Chicago & London: The University Chicago Press,
1997), 77-137.

172
ambition. Parliament had to find practical measures to protect the persecuted

Greek refugees, who might contribute to developing national strength, and

therefore should not be estranged from the Greek state. The state presented

itself as a benefactor for the refugees. Interestingly, this stance of the state

makes a clear contrast with what has been discussed in chapter 3, where we

noticed that the state exploited the people, thereby compelling the Greeks to

continuously emigrate.

The legislation of the land distribution project is not exclusively

attributed to the efforts of Dragoumis and Alexandris. It was the outcome of

fruitful discussions in Parliament. It should be noted, however, that these two

Japanese played central roles in the debate on this issue. They repeatedly

emphasized the nation’s good and made the presence of the Team

conspicuous in Parliament through their contributions.

On September 30, 1907, Prince George laid the first stone of New

Anchialos. The establishment of the new community for the Anchialites was

nationally celebrated. 108 It was regarded as a national triumph since the

refugees were expected to make Greece stronger in terms of manpower. 109

Law 3202 did not entirely resolve the problems of the refugee

settlement and of creating smallholders. A long-term endeavor was necessary

108
«Εθνική εορτή της χθες» [National Celebration of Yesterday], Θεσσαλία, 1
Οκτωβρίου 1907, 3.
109
Σπύρος Χασιώτης, «Η μεγάλη εθνική νίκη. Η Νέα Αγχίαλος» [The Great National
Victory. New Anchialos], Ακρόπολις, 1 Οκτωβρίου 1907, 1.

173
to solve them. Other legislative measures were taken while some royal

decrees were issued. 110 In 1911 the Office of the Thessalian Agricultural

Fund published A Report concerning the Achievement in the Settlement of

Locals and Ethnic Greek Colonists in Thessaly so as to inform the Ministry

of Finance of the results of the project started with the enactment of Law

3202. According to the report, a total of 4,704 households of local cultivators,

farm servants, and refugees had acquired land and had become settled. The

inland settlement consisted of 1,410 households of local cultivators and farm

servants, and 1,517 households of refugees. In the coastal settlement there

were 100 households of local cultivators and farm servants, and 1,677

refugee households. 111

110
Νόμος ˏΓΣΙΕ΄ της 1 Ιουνίου 1907 [Law 3215 on June 1, 1907], Β. Διάταγμα της 27
Ιουνίου 1907 [Royal Decree on June 27, 1907], Νόμος ˏΓΤΘ΄ της 14 Μαΐου 1908 [Law
3309 on May 14, 1908] , Β. Διάταγμα της 7 Δεκεμβρίου 1908 [Royal Decree on
December 7, 1908]. Νόμος ˏΓΤΞΘ΄ της 6 Οκτωβρίου 1909 [Law 3369 on October 6,
1909], Νόμος ˏΓΦΚΑ΄ της 9 Ιανουαρίου 1910 [Law 3521 on January 9, 1910].
111
Γραφείον Θεσσαλικού Γεωργικού Ταμείου, ΄Εκθεσις περί των εκτελεσθέντων προς
αποκατάστασιν των εγχώριων και εποίκων ομογενών εν Θεσσαλία [A Report of the
Achievement in the Settlement of Locals and Ethnic Greek Colonists in Thessaly]
(Αθήνα: Εθνικό τυπογραφείο, 1911), 17-18; In 1910 the Dragoumis’ government set up
the Ministry of Agriculture, Trade and Industry by Law 3824. It was a new ministry in
Greece that specialized in agricultural matters. Its name was changed to the Ministry of
National Economy in July 1911 under the Venizelos’ government. The constitutional
reform of 1911 and laws which followed it speeded up the process for expropriating
large estates and creating smallholders. Christine Agriantoni, “Venizelos and Economic
Policy,” in Eleftherios Venizelos: The Trials of Statesmanship ed. by Paschalis
Kitromilides (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006) 287-288; A. Andréadès,
“Les Progrès matériels de la Thessalie depuis sa libération,” La Revue de Grèce 1, no.1,
Septembre (1918): 17-18.

174
CHAPTER 5

Educational Reform

This chapter deals with the discussions over the bill of school

textbooks, which became Law 3201 on April 4, 1907. The law prescribed the

one school textbook system for secondary education. For primary education,

pupils were to have only one reader while teachers were supposed to orally

teach other subjects by using real objects. 1 The law indicated a welcome

sign of improvement in the field of education where new efficient methods

of leaning, in place of the traditional rote memorizing, had been sought for.

Panagiotopoulos played a central role to legislate the bill. He

persistently urged the government to present the reform bill to Parliament

and took a bold initiative to save it from strong objections on the part of

various interested parties. His leadership in the case of the educational

reform bill was another good concrete example which demonstrated the

politics that the Team of the Japanese envisioned. His behavior was

predicated not on party interests, but on his ideas of nation’s good. Being a

member of a small opposition party, Panagiotopoulos actively supported the

government and defended the bill because he considered it to be for the

1
Υπουργείον των Εκκλησιαστικών και της Δημόσιας Εκπαιδεύσεως, Ο περί
διδακτικών βιβλίων Νόμος ˏΓΣΑ΄ και τα προς εκτέλεσιν αυτού Β. διατάγματα κ.τ.λ. [Law
3201 of School Textbooks and the Royal Decrees for Ιts Enforcement] (Αθήνα: Εθνικό
τυπογραφείο, 1908).

175
nation’s benefit, to which the Team was committed.

In this chapter, the general picture of difficulties that Greek

educational circles encountered at the turn of the twentieth century is first

provided. Second, we look at the then flourishing trade of book-mongering

(βιβλιοκαπηλεία), which had negative impacts on education. Third, we

examine the bill, which intended to abolish the corrupt trade of

book-mongering and to introduce one textbook policy. Fourth, we explore

the grounds on which those who were opposed to the reforms attacked the

bill, focusing on the arguments of a group of textbook authors and of

Konstantinos Papamichalopoulos, the strongest opponent deputy to the bill.

We lastly discuss how Panagiotopoulos debunked their opponents and

successfully pushed through educational reforms.

The discussions in Parliament did not only reveal various stances of

the deputies on the proposed bill. The debate represented the ideas conceived

by Greeks, at least by the deputies, of how modern Greeks could negotiate

their ancient heritage, their language tradition in particular, in terms of

maintaining their national identity through education.

Dilemma in Educational Reforms

After the defeat of the war of 1897, voices to call for reforms in

every sphere of the country were heard in order to regenerate the state and

176
the nation. The educational reforms were among the issues that had to be

urgently discussed for this purpose. Since Germany’s victory in the

Franco–Prussian War of 1870–1871, education had been regarded as one of

the most important sources of national strength and progress in Greece as

well as in other European countries. Education was understood as the

measures to promote national interests and to ensure national prosperity. The

defeat of 1897 proved that Greece lacked the effective educational system to

promote Greek national cause. 2

The shift from the traditional “archaic” and “scholastic” learning to

the schooling focusing on more practical aspects was considered a crucial

step. It was claimed that Greek children should not spend their time at school

just memorizing what was written in textbooks, but efficiently obtain more

practical and useful knowledge for the actual life. The four bills of 1899

drafted by Athanasios Eftaxias, then Minister of Education, expressed this

spirit. They intended to overhaul the system from the primary school to the

university level in order to generate Greek citizens who would be able to

contribute to all the sectors of the country such as state administration,

industry, and commerce. However, there was strong resistance against these

reform bills not only from a conservative circle of the deputies, but also from

2
Στρατής Μπουρνάζος, «Η εκπαίδευση στο ελληνικό κράτος» [Education in the Greek
State], in Ιστορία της Ελλάδας του 20ού αιώνα. Οι απαρχές 1900–1922 [History of
Greece in the 20th Century: The Beginnings 1900–1922], τόμος Α΄-2 [vol.1-2] ed.
Χρήστος Χατζηιωσήφ (Αθήνα: Βιβλιόραμα, 1999), 199.

177
those who were in charge of education. Therefore, the bills of Eftaxias were

suspended to be voted. 3

Eftaxias’ idea of removing the ancient Greek language from the

curriculum of primary education was the one of what the opponents most

fiercely attacked. They claimed that it was antinational because it was an act

to sever the close link between the nation and the language, thereby

depriving Greek children of their Greek identity. So long as schools were

expected to play a role in promoting national cause, they argued, the ancient

Greek language that represented the historical continuity of Greek culture

and tradition should be definitely taught. Otherwise the Greeks would not be

able to successfully combat against the Bulgarians for Macedonia. 4

As education and language were closely connected, the “Language

Question” intervened in the debate of education. The “Language Question”

was a controversy as to what form of Greek should be official standard

written language in the Greek state. There were two camps: The one camp

supported katharevousa Greek, the artificially purified language closer to the

traditional written Greek, which reflected the direct relationship with ancient

Greece. It had been the language of state institutions and the law since

3 Μπουρνάζος, «Η εκπαίδευση στο ελληνικό κράτος», 203.


4
Ανδρονίκη Γ. Φωτιάδου, Πρώτον Ελληνικόν Εκπαιδευτικόν Συνέδριον, Αθήναι,
Μάρτιος–Απρίλιος 1904: Η αντίφαση του εκπαιδευτικού αιτήματος στην πρώτη δεκαετία
του 20ού αιώνα [The First Greek Educational Conference at Athens in March–April,
1904: The Contradiction of Educational Demands in the First Decade of the 20th
Century] (Θεσσαλονίκη: Αδελφοί Κυριακίδη, 1998), 25-27.

178
Greece gained its independence. The other camp was in favor of demotic

Greek based on modern spoken Greek. Both camps were predicated on their

own nationalism and argued that their stance would help the rebirth of the

Greek nation and would defend the Greek legitimacy in Macedonia. Both

employed the similar rhetoric emphasizing the strong organic ties between

the language and the Greek nation. On the one hand, Psycharis, major

protagonist of demoticism of that time, wrote in his provocative work My

Journey, “Language and fatherland are one and the same. To fight for the

fatherland or for the national language is one and the same struggle.” On the

other hand, G. Mistriotis, a university professor and one of the most ardent

katharevousa supporters, strongly condemned demoticists by saying, “Many

peoples have been enslaved but have not laid down their languages. The

Greek people risks losing its very existence for the sake of a few individuals

who call themselves demoticists….The Bulgarians are trying to detach from

mother Greece her dearest daughter [i.e. Macedonia], while those who call

themselves demoticists are taking a hatchet to the mother herself.” 5

The demoticist movement had acquired momentum at the turn of

the twentieth century. 6 It should be noted, however, that a strong

5
Quoted from Roderick Beaton, An Introduction to Modern Greek Literature, 2nd ed.
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), 315-316.
6
The periodical Noumas was first published in January 1903 and soon became a
bulwark of the demoticist movement. In 1907 the National Language Society whose
purpose was to promote the use of demotic Greek was founded. Gerasimos Augustinos,
Consciousness and History: Nationalist Critics of Greek Society 1897–1914 (New

179
conservative nationalism was dominant in the major state institutions such as

the church, the university, and other school systems. Furthermore, the

Gospel Riots of 1901 and another clashes of 1903 provoked by demotic

translation of Aeschylus’ Oresteia clearly illustrated the conservative

atmosphere of Greek society that emphasized the importance of tradition. 7

Accordingly, the predominance of katharevousa Greek over demotic Greek

did not seem to easily waver.

Katharevousa supporters, however, became more defensive and

were afraid that any educational reform would introduce “vulgar” [i.e.

demotic] language into school system. 8 There existed a consensus in the

whole society about the need for introducing new educational methods

which would make it possible for children to receive practical instruction.

According to the dominant conservative discourse, however, it had to be

carried out without infringing on the absolute position of katharevousa

York: Columbia University Press, 1977), 34-35; Makrigiannis’ Memoirs was first
published in 1907. Makrigiannis was a general in the War of the Greek Independence of
1821 and wrote his memoirs in the spoken Greek. Beaton, An Introduction to Modern
Greek Literature, 336.
7
Augustinos, Consciousness and History, 29-32; Philip Carabott, “Politics, Orthodoxy
and the Language Question in Greece: The Gospel Riots of November 1901,” Journal
of Mediterranean Studies 3, no.1 (1993): 117-138; Άννα Φραγκουδάκη, Ο
εκπαιδευτικός δημοτικισμός και ο γλωσσικός συμβιβασμός του 1911 [Educational
Demoticism and Language Reconciliation of 1911] (Ιωάννινα: Πανεπιστήμιο
Ιωαννίνων–Φιλοσοφική Σχολή, 1977), 27-28.
8
Demoticists like Kostis Palamas argued that educational reforms would not be
achieved without a radical change in language form used at school. Κωστής Παλαμάς,
«Πώς θα αντιμετωπίσωμεν τον απειλούντα ημας εθνικόν κίνδυνον;» [How Shall We
Confront the National Crisis Threatening Us?], Ακρόπολις, 3 Ιανουαρίου 1907, 2.

180
Greek at school. 9 Efficient acquisition of knowledge and maintenance of

katharevousa Greek were expected to be realized at the same time in the

reformed school system. It was a sort of dilemma hard to be resolved.

Flourishing Book-Mongering

The flourishing trade of book-mongering was considered one of the

most corrupt practices in the field of education at that time. So exactly what

did the word “book-mongering” mean? It signified the practice of making

money through the business of selling school textbooks. Those who were

engaged in this business, such as publishers, booksellers and writers, were

called “book-mongers” (βιβλιοκάπηλοι).

Law 2303 of 1895 was the cause of book-mongering. Law 2303 had

three main points to be noted. First, it abolished the single school textbook

policy which Law 1042 of 1882 had adopted. 10 Second, it placed gymnasia

out of the approval system for school textbooks, which primary schools and

Hellenic schools were subjected to. The law allowed gymnasia to be

completely free from any restrictions concerning the textbooks they used.

Third, it instituted an annual competition for the textbooks of primary and

9
«Τα εν τη Βουλή» [The Events in Parliament], Οικονομική Ελλάς, 24 Φεβρουαρίου
1907, 89.
10
«Κυριακούλη Π. Μαυρομιχάλη αγόρευσις κατά την εις β΄ ανάγνωσιν του
νομοσχεδίου περί διδακτικών βιβλίων» [The Speech of Kiriakoulis P. Mavromichalis
against the Bill of School Textbooks in the Second Reading], Ακρόπολις, 23
Φεβρουαρίου 1907, 1.

181
Hellenic schools. Once they were approved by a special committee, these

textbooks were valid for five years. The number of the books approved every

year was not limited, which meant that new books for primary and Hellenic

schools would be inevitably added to previous ones annually. 11

On the one hand, whatever books teachers chose, irrespective of

their content and the number of volumes, could be brought into gymnasia.

On the other hand, the annual competition for school textbooks for primary

and Hellenic schools was held. What resulted? The practice of

book-mongering developed. Large numbers of books were published, which

caused various negative effects. According to Georgios Drosinis, 12 608

books had been approved both for primary and Hellenic schools since the

regime of 1895 started, while textbooks used in gymnasia had been totally

out of the state control and their number was impossible to count. Under

these conditions, publishers worked to win approval by school teachers by

recommendation, pressures, and whatever measures they could take. Thus, it

followed that students did not always use the best books and were
11
Φωτιάδου, Πρώτον Ελληνικόν Εκπαιδευτικόν Συνέδριον, 104; Hellenic schools and
gymnasia constituted secondary education. Hellenic schools had a three-year course and
gymnasia had a four-year course. Secondary education was not obligatory. Children
who completed their primary education attended first Hellenic schools, then, if they
wanted or could afford, continued their studies at gymnasia to supplement the courses
of Hellenic Schools. J. Gennadius, A Sketch of the History of Education in Greece: A
Paper Presented to the World Federation of Education Association Conference in
Edinburgh July 1925 (Edinburgh, 1925), 26-29.
12
Georgios Drosinis was a poet and a novelist. He was concerned very much with
education and published the educational journal National Upbringing (Εθνική Αγωγή)
from 1898 to 1904.

182
unnecessarily mentally taxed by proliferation of books. 13 The excess of the

books also imposed extra financial burden on parents of school children. In

addition, Law 2303 negatively influenced the quality of school textbooks.

Book-mongers, who were concerned exclusively with realizing profits,

improvised textbooks of low quality. Such books were usually poorly bound

and often gave inappropriate—sometimes ridiculous—accounts from an

educational standpoint. 14 In these conditions, qualified authors began to

determine that they should not contribute to writing school textbooks and

withdrew from the task of preparing textbooks. 15 Finally the system of

book-mongering grew to be compared to “Lernaean Hydra that [drank]

people’s blood and poison[ed] the mental health of Greek children.” 16

13
Γεώργιος Δροσίνης, «Ο νόμος του ενός βιβλίου» [The Law of One Book], Η μελέτη,
Απρίλιο (1907): 229; A. Stefanopoulos, Minister of Education, mentioned that 644
books for primary and Hellenic schools were approved. «Ειδήσεις—τηλεγραφήματα. Η
Βουλή. Συζήτησις περί δ. εκπαιδεύσεως» [News—Telegrams. Parliament. Discussion
about Public Education], Πατρίς, 5 Δεκεμβρίου 1906, 2; In his speech Konstantinos
Papamichalopoulos told that 645 books had been approved and that the total number of
the books including the ones that were secretly brought in primary schools amounted to
1,000. «Αγόρευσις Κωνσταντ. Ν. Παπαμιχαλοπούλου, βουλευτού Επιδαύρου Λιμηράς,
επί του νομοσχεδίου περί διδακτικών βιβλίων» [The Speech of Konstant. N.
Papamichalopoulos, Deputy of Epidaurus Limira, about the Bill of School Textbooks],
Ακρόπολις, 1 Μαρτίου 1907, 2.
14
The examples of inappropriate accounts in some school textbooks are following:
“Cyprus must be incorporated quickly into Greece because the goddess Kipris
(Aphrodite) was worshipped in this island.” “Fustanella [i.e. a kind of Greek kilt] is a
white dress made up of many bias bands. It is useful to conceal what should not be
shown because it has to be concealed.” «Τα…διδακτικά»[The…School Textbooks],
Εστία, 20 Φεβρουαρίου 1907, 3.
15
Φωτιάδου, Πρώτον Ελληνικόν Εκπαιδευτικόν Συνέδριον, 105-106.
16
«Η βιβλιοκαπηλεία» [Book-Mongering], Ακρόπολις, 20 Δεκεμβρίου 1906, 1.

183
The Bill of School Textbooks

It was Panagiotopoulos that urged Andreas Stefanopoulos, Minister

of Education, to submit the bill of school textbooks. On December 4, 1906,

Panagiotopoulos criticized the Minister for too easily yielding to the

complaints of the committee of teachers and withdrawing the reform bill on

primary education submitted on November 28 before making any effort to

hold discussions on that agenda item in Parliament. He said, “Primary

education is the heartbeat of the national spirit.” 17 He emphasized the

importance of an education which could encourage the spiritual and ethical

development of children on whom the future existence of the state

depended. 18 But, he said, “Primary education is under fire as the public

considers it corrupted. If the Minister believes that things are to be corrected,

he must introduce reform bills and ask Parliament for help in working them

out fully.” 19

As a specific example of deteriorated educational situation,

Panagiotopoulos talked about widespread phenomenon of greedy

book-mongering. He pointed out that the bill of school textbooks was not

successfully passed the previous year, and that the problem of

17
«Βουλή. Επερωτήσεων το ανάγνωσμα. Το εκπαιδευτικόν σύστημα» [Parliament.
Reading of Questions. The Educational System], Ακρόπολις, 5 Δεκεμβρίου 1906, 2.
18
«Τα εν Ελλάδι» [The Events in Greece], Νέα Ημέρα, 23 Δεκεμβρίου 1906/ 5
Ιανουαρίου 1907, 4.
19
«Βουλή. Επερωτήσεων το ανάγνωσμα. Το εκπαιδευτικόν σύστημα», 2.

184
book-mongering continued to exist. Panagiotopoulos called book-mongering

plunder and criticized the contents and materials that book-mongers made.

Furthermore, he brought real textbooks published in Romania, Bulgaria,

Serbia, and Austria in order that deputies could compare Greek books with

them. He appreciated the foreign textbooks because their descriptions were

reliable and their printing technique and contents were more excellent than

Greek ones. 20 He declared that Greek textbooks were worst of all even

though they were four times as expensive as the foreign books. 21 He directly

criticized Stefanopoulos by saying, “It took more than 644 books to shake

your pride enough to submit a bill [of school textbooks].…In terms of their

contents, many of these books are so bad that they would provoke horror.” 22

He contended that the Minister should submit a bill to regulate

book-mongering through a state monopoly on school textbooks.

Panagiotopoulos insisted that there was no more vital topic than that of

school textbooks and successfully convinced Parliament to register this issue

on the agenda 23

Stefanopoulos, however, delayed submitting a government bill on

the expected date in December 1906. The bill was finally submitted to

Parliament on January 29, 1907. The preamble began with a criticism against

20
«Ειδήσεις—τηλεγραφήματα», 2.
21
«Βουλή. Επερωτήσεων το ανάγνωσμα», 2.
22
«Ειδήσεις—τηλεγραφήματα», 2.
23
«Ειδήσεις—τηλεγραφήματα», 2.

185
the existing law, which had allowed book-mongering to flourish. It read:

It goes without saying that the existing law of school textbooks is


not only inappropriate, but totally harmful.
Hundreds of textbooks that have accumulated are used and
circulated among learners through annual contests and approvals for
the past ten years since the existing law went into effect. As a result,
book-mongering flourished in scholarship. This situation has not
only served authors, publishers and booksellers that have been
obsessed with making money and degraded teachers’ awareness and
character. It also has put a great burden on young learners through
unnecessary books and mercilessly wrung money from the parents
and guardians of school children. For the benefit of learners and
society, parents and guardians often have to give up the idea of
sending their children to learn, or have to force them to leave
schools before they completed their schooling. For this reason,
book-mongering is stigma and disgrace to our education. 24

The centerpiece of the bill to end book-mongers’ blatant commercialism was

the principle of a single textbook. While one book for each subject

throughout a school year was to be allowed in secondary education, only one

reading textbook was to be introduced in primary education. Teachers at

primary schools were supposed to orally teach other subjects. Through the

one textbook policy, a system of object-based learning was expected to

become the mainstream of school education and to have beneficial and


24
«Αιτιολογική έκθεσις του περί διδακτικών βιβλίων νομοσχεδίου» [Preamble of the
Bill of School Textbooks], ΠΕΒΕ, αριθ. 66, 118.

186
practical effect on school children for knowledge acquisition.

In addition to that, the bill defined a book competition to be held

every six years so that a special committee would examine would-be school

textbooks and approve one of them for each subject of each grade. The bill

also specified the state ownership of the approved books after their authors

were financially awarded. The state would receive revenue from the auction

of publishing rights for each book and from copies of each book sold. The

revenue was to be used to purchase educational materials. 25

A committee of six members to examine the bill was established.

Panagiotopoulos was one of them. On February 12, 1907, he introduced the

modified bill of school textbooks into Parliament. 26 Based on the

government bill, the committee bill filled in the details, which were roughly

summarized as follows. A program of new textbooks for primary education

would be announced in the Government Gazette within two months after the

new law would be enacted and for secondary education within three months.

In these programs the details about the size of textbooks and their contents

would be exactly defined. The committee bill stipulated that publication

rights to each textbook would be sold by auction in order that one publisher

could not monopolize the right of publishing all the books. The amount of

25
«Αιτιολογική έκθεσις του περί διδακτικών βιβλίων νομοσχεδίου», ΠΕΒΕ, αριθ. 66,
120-122.
26 ΠΣΒΕ, 326.

187
money deposited in the National Bank through book revenue stamps would

be distributed to all the schools for educational purposes without any

favoritism. 27

Voices against the Bill

As was expected, voices against the bill emerged from interested

parties. One of them was from the authors of school textbooks, most of

whom were university professors or teachers of secondary education. If the

bill became law and the state obtained the right to monopolize approved

textbooks, they would lose all the profit that they had been earning together

with publishers. Yet authors did not openly deplore the loss of that source of

money. Instead, they criticized the potential state monopoly over school

textbooks because it would deprive them of authors’ freedoms.

One such example was a proposal presented by a group of authors

to Parliament on February 6, 1907. They contended that possible

improvement in school textbooks should be carried out through the

guarantee of authors’ rights. They pointed out that the bill included three

defects which would infringe authors’ freedoms: the state monopoly, the one

textbook policy, and the competition every six years.

First, according to the authors, the state monopoly that the bill
27
«Ο νόμος περί διδακτικών βιβλίων» [The Law of School Textbooks], Εστία, 13
Φεβρουαρίου 1907, 3.

188
stipulated would negatively affect the purpose of educational reforms. Under

a system in which the state would monopolize the approval of books and

receive revenue by imposing taxes on the intellectual works of approved

writers in the form of revenue stamps, writers would be discouraged from

participating in book competitions. It followed, they argued, that only

worthless writers would write books. Such a situation would seriously

damage the quality of school textbooks as well as education in general. 28

Second, the authors maintained that the present law of 1895 had

abolished the single textbook policy for several reasons. They pointed out

that, before the present law was enacted, millions of schemes involving the

examiners in charge of approving the books had emerged because only one

author would win and obtain high profits from his book. In addition, many

excellent books were rejected just because Law 1042 of 1882 specified that

only one book could be approved. It followed that writers abstained from

participating in the competition. In this way, authors’ literary license would

be violated if the proposed bill became law without modifications and the

single textbook policy was reintroduced to schools. The authors proposed

that, if it was necessary to limit the number of school textbooks, three books

28
«Το ζήτημα των διδακτικών βιβλίων. Αναφορά συγγραφέων προς την Σεβ. Βουλή
των Ελλήνων» [The Issue of School Textbooks. The Petition of Authors to the
Respectable Parliament of the Greeks], Ακρόπολις, 18 Φεβρουαρίου 1907, 3.

189
at least should be approved to guarantee authors’ rights. 29

Third, the proposal also regarded the six-year validity of approved

school textbooks as harmful to authors’ freedoms because it would certainly

engender idleness and sterility of authors’ intellectual activities. The group

of authors wrote, “Will one of the talented writers, who has failed to get his

book approved, want again to undergo the intellectual sufferings of editing

his own book and wait with little hope for the next competition to take place

six years hence?” If the restrictions on proliferation of school textbooks

should be imposed, the proposal argued, three years should be the maximum

interval in order to keep writers motivated. A competition every three years

was also justified in the view of rapid progress in science and of

ever-changing contemporary world. If textbooks were not revised in

accordance with the recent discoveries of scholarship, the authors contended,

Greek children would be out-of-date and left behind. 30

Deputies who opposed the bill advanced their opinions almost on

the same grounds as the group of the authors did. For example, Kiriakoulis

Mavromichalis opposed the bill because it intended, among other things, to

institutionalize a state monopoly over school textbooks, which would limit

freedom and intellectual progress on the part of textbook authors. He argued

that approving three books was more reasonable. He also expressed his fear
29
«Το ζήτημα των διδακτικών βιβλίων», 3.
30
«Το ζήτημα των διδακτικών βιβλίων», 3.

190
that a contest every six years would cause intellectual apathy and

degradation. Instead, he proposed a contest every four years. He claimed that

these two measures could curtail the book-mongers’ dominance. 31

Konstantinos Karapanos also asked for several modifications. First,

the competition at intervals of six years should be changed to every four

years. Second, multiple textbooks should be introduced. He agreed that the

number of textbooks should be limited, but he was not convinced that only

one book should be approved. Third, he disagreed with the idea of

abolishing the use of textbooks at primary schools except for a reader and

developed his view on this matter in particular. He was doubtful about

whether teachers could effectively teach without textbooks. Undoubtedly,

there were some who could teach excellently without books, but they were

exceptional. Most of teachers would not be able to teach in an appropriate

way. So long as school children had to understand what teachers taught

verbally, then the teaching abilities of teachers should be called into question.

Karapanos argued that the system of object-based learning without

textbooks—even though it was considered good—should not be totally and

drastically applied in primary education. He proposed that it should be

experimentally applied in a limited number of schools in the beginning and

31
«Κυριακούλη Π. Μαυρομιχάλη αγόρευσις», 1.

191
then gradually expanded. 32

Papamichalopoulos’ Attack on the Bill

Konstantinos Papamichalopoulos was the most powerful opponent

of the bill. In his speech on February 21, 1907, he not only defended the

intellectual property rights of the authors of school textbooks and fiercely

criticized the potential state monopoly over them. But he also attacked the

bill by focusing on the importance the Greek language in concepts of Greek

identity. 33

Papamichalopoulos deplored the present situation in which the word

“book-mongering” had been used to excess. He pointed out that the authors

of school textbooks, who had been a target of people’s severe criticism and

who were called “book-mongers,” were mostly the university professors

worthy of respect in reality. They were qualified intellectuals and those who

were preparing Greek children for destiny and shaping a bright future for the

Greek nation. As such, he contended, they should not have been abused. 34

Although Papamichalopoulos admitted that too many textbooks,

some of which were actually non-instructive, had been circulated and that he

32
«Αγόρευσις Κ. Καραπάνου βουλευτού Άρτης επί του νομοσχέδιου περί διδακτικών
βιβλίων κατά την συνεδρίασιν της 22 Φεβρουαρίου» [The Speech of K. Karapanos,
Deputy of Arta, about the Bill of School Textbooks in the Meeting on February 22],
Καιροί, 2 Μαρτίου 1907, 2-3.
33
«Αγόρευσις Κωνσταντ. Ν. Παπαμιχαλοπούλου», 2-4.
34
«Αγόρευσις Κωνσταντ. Ν. Παπαμιχαλοπούλου», 2.

192
did not always regard them as valuable, he attributed this phenomenon not to

the proliferation of book-mongering, but to the unique position of the Greek

language. Different from English, French, and German, which large numbers

of people could read, Greek was a language which only a small group of

people could understand. Therefore, those who were engaged in writing

scholarly works faced an economically difficult situation. University

professors had to, out of necessity, resort whatever means they could in order

to ensure widespread readership of their books. Otherwise, they would not

be able to keep writing academic books, which would qualify themselves as

recognized scholars. 35

The same was the case in school textbooks. According to

Papamichalopoulos, school textbooks were regarded as the intellectual

property of the authors. Therefore, the authors deserved to be rewarded for

their own writings. He argued that, since a state monopoly over school

textbooks might deprive authors of the ownership of their intellectual works,

he disagreed with it. 36

What Papamichalopoulos most furiously opposed, however, was the

single book policy, especially the bill’s proposal that primary school children

would not have a textbook except for a reader. He took up the “Language

Question” for discussion as his last trump card to quash the bill. He
35
«Αγόρευσις Κωνσταντ. Ν. Παπαμιχαλοπούλου», 2.
36 «Αγόρευσις Κωνσταντ. Ν. Παπαμιχαλοπούλου», 2.

193
expressed the fear that, if teachers orally taught children the Greek language

without a grammar book, demotic Greek would be diffused among children

and that this would be fatal to the destiny of the Greeks. He stressed that

school children had to learn Greek grammar in order to maintain their Greek

identity. He said, “The Greek language sustains the Greek nation.” 37 Yet, he

deplored that “[m]any and most Greeks [were] unfortunately ignorant of the

enormous power of the language and of its national mission.” 38 He

criticized the recent upsurge of the demoticist movement and rejected it by

calling demotic Greek “very miserable and dirty vomit.” 39 In his view,

demotic Greek was out of the trajectory the Greek language historically had

followed. For him, the Greek language was katharevousa Greek, which

reflected a direct relationship with the remote Greek past. Only this Greek

language, he asserted, could be taught at school. He said, “We have to teach

the Greek language as a single unit. It is necessary to have the powerful aids

of grammar in order for it to be taught.” 40

He emphasized that, unlike other languages, due to its glorious

historical heritage, Greek was difficult to learn without the help of logic, that

is, grammar. He warned that teaching the language without a grammar book

would help demotic Greek dominate with the result of making the Greeks

37
«Αγόρευσις Κωνσταντ. Ν. Παπαμιχαλοπούλου», 3.
38
«Αγόρευσις Κωνσταντ. Ν. Παπαμιχαλοπούλου», 3.
39
«Αγόρευσις Κωνσταντ. Ν. Παπαμιχαλοπούλου», 3.
40
«Αγόρευσις Κωνσταντ. Ν. Παπαμιχαλοπούλου», 3.

194
non-Greek. He bitterly criticized advocates of demotic Greek, which he saw

as threatening the coherence of Hellenism. He said:

[T]hey … have been teaching Greek people in recent years to blow


up the Parthenon with dynamite and make it disappear so that the
whole memory of the glorious Greek history would vanish, to
abandon the divine and sublime language, both for the ancient
Greeks and for us. Society here and everywhere Greeks exist is
advancing with much desire and persistence toward erasure [of the
past], to cut all ties [with the past], to throw the past into oblivion,
and to create a new people. A new people would like to live like
other peoples and do not have anything in common [with the
Greeks] in terms of history, past, and grandeur. A new people are
self-declared outcasts. They go against the ideas, with which they
have been brought up and raised, and through which they have
boosted their morale and lived. A new people declare that they have
cut their roots from which they [could] draw vitality and strength
for their present and future. Those who detest the memory of history
have been teaching and presenting these things to you, the Greeks. 41

In order to be Greek, the Greeks had to be tightly bound with their history

and with what the history taught to them. He contended that Greek history

still had a power to inspire contemporary Europe and that the Greeks had to

stick with that heritage. In his logic, it was through the past that the modern

Greeks could fully articulate their unique identity and be highly regarded

41
«Αγόρευσις Κωνσταντ. Ν. Παπαμιχαλοπούλου», 3.

195
among other nations. Therefore, learning Greek without a grammar book,

which would imply violation of history, was a “crime,” an “atrocity,” and a

“brutal insensibility.” 42 According to him, language study without a

grammar book was worse than the deliberate destruction of the Parthenon

because the Parthenon could be destroyed through a natural disaster like an

earthquake, while teaching the Greek language without a grammar book

signified the clear intentions of the Greeks to deny their historical past. 43

It should be noted, however, that Papamichalopoulos employed a

double standard when articulating his opinion against the bill. On the one

hand, he had as strong a faith in the concept of progress as his European

contemporaries did, and emphasized the importance of following the trend of

progress. He said, “As far as school matters are concerned, on such a big and

sweeping tide, it is impossible for us to remain motionless and fixed for an

entire millennium like the Chinese, with eyes closed and ears bocked. We

cannot but understand what is happening and follow the common tide of

progress.” 44 On the basis of this principle, he strongly argued that a single

textbook did not provide teachers with sufficient means to teach children

about an ever-progressing body of knowledge. Therefore, he proposed that

three textbooks for each subject should be approved. Furthermore, he also

42
«Αγόρευσις Κωνσταντ. Ν. Παπαμιχαλοπούλου», 3.
43
«Αγόρευσις Κωνσταντ. Ν. Παπαμιχαλοπούλου», 3.
44
«Αγόρευσις Κωνσταντ. Ν. Παπαμιχαλοπούλου», 3.

196
opposed the six-year validity for an approved book because such a long

interval would lead to intellectual stagnation in the fields of education,

science, technology and learning.

Interestingly, on the other hand, when it came to the language that

Greek children were supposed to learn, he steadfastly maintained a

retrogressive attitude. As we have seen, he stressed the continuity of Greek

history from antiquity and supported katharevousa Greek. He totally

denounced the view that demotic Greek could be considered to a certain

degree—by its adherents, at least—as a form which resulted from the

linguistic progress of the Greek language. He treated demotic Greek as if it

were a foreign tongue and warned that the one textbook policy would

inevitably help it to prevail at school.

Panagiotopoulos’ Arguments for the Bill

Deputies, who were against the bill, took into consideration the

benefits and rights of textbook authors and suggested compromise solutions

as to the number of the books to be approved and to the interval of time

between competitions. But their proposals implied that book-mongers would

be able to continue some of their business related to school textbooks in the

future. Deputies who supported the bill, however, rejected taking the middle

road on this issue. They were determined to root out book-mongering, which

197
they believed had to be done so as to introduce an object-based method of

learning and to improve the quality of education for the sake of school

children.

Panagiotopoulos was the leading actor who repelled the opposing

camp, while Stefanopoulos, Minister of Education, played an insignificant

role during the discussions about the bill. Panagiotopoulos’ speeches on

February 20 and 22, 1907, were so effective and convincing that the

opponents could not make any further arguments. These speeches were

decisive in the outcome of the discussions about the bill.

Panagiotopoulos strongly condemned book-mongers of their baleful

influence and contended that the system which the bill intended to introduce

would surely eliminate them. Although his opponents argued that authors’

freedoms and rights to write textbooks and to receive rewards for their work

should be protected, he did not compromise with them. Instead, he

demonstrated how negatively some authors who were immersed in

commercialism had influenced ethical standards related to school children.

As a blatant example, he talked about a disgusting incident caused by a

professor who was an author of a school textbook. The professor

successfully got his book approved for use at school and then gave his

daughter’s bridegroom the right to the royalties from his book as his

daughter’s dowry. The marriage was dissolved after several years. Though

198
the bridegroom willingly returned his bride to her father, he declined to

return the royalty rights from the textbook of his former father-in-law.

Therefore, the schools had to suspend the class in which the textbook was

used so that the former bridegroom would not exploit his former wife’s

dowry. Panagiotopoulos said:

Imagine how negatively professors who take these sorts of measures


can influence young learners in terms of morals. Think about what
kind of moral influence professors, who care about making money
from morning till night, may have [on learners]…[though] the state
has assigned to them a demanding task of detaching young learners
from materialistic ideas so that society will not be filled with the
herd that bloodthirstily eat each other. 45

Panagiotopoulos stressed ethical significance of education. He argued that it

was more urgent to crush authors who were riding on commercialism than to

consider the authors’ rights.

Panagiotopoulos also developed counterargument against his

opponents who criticized the one textbook approach. He emphasized that the

oral method of teaching which accompanied object-based learning would be

more effective than the conventional method depending only on textbooks.

He said:

45
«Ο λόγος του κ. Παναγιωτοπούλου» [The Speech of Mr. Panagiotopoulos], Νέον
Άστυ, 21 Φεβρουαρίου 1907, 2.

199
Books fill children’s brains with phrases and words of empty
meanings. No one can reject [the existence of] abstract concepts,
but it is impossible for school children of very young age to
understand them. Neither arithmetic, nor history, nor geography can
be taught well through books. The teaching of these subjects does
not aim at memory work of dates or terms, but intends to foster the
moral and intellectual worlds of learners. This purpose is best
achieved by way of the active and oral method with the use of real
things. 46

He argued the purpose of education was not to make school children

memorize what was written in books, but to help them to develop their

ethical and intellectual abilities. Oral teaching with objects, away from

books, was more suitable for this purpose because it would give pupils more

chances to think by themselves and to develop their creativity.

Protopapadakis, whose mathematics ability was highly recognized among

deputies, jumped into Panagiotopoulos’ speech and supported him by saying

that he had learned not through books, but through real objects. 47

Importantly, Panagiotopoulos reminded deputies of the fact that an

object-based learning was not completely unrelated to ancient Greek

tradition. He gave the example of Aristotle. Aristotle discovered the weight

of air neither by reading books, nor by asking the wise. His discovery

46
«Ο λόγος του κ. Παναγιωτοπούλου», 2.
47
«Ο λόγος του κ. Παναγιωτοπούλου», 2.

200
resulted from his own experiments. He discovered the weight of the air by

filling a skin bag with air. 48

Contrary to Papamichalopoulos, Panagiotopoulos argued that it was

not necessary for children to learn the Greek language with a grammar book.

He thought that the present method of language teaching had hindered

children from thinking freely and creatively. He said, “[T]he lesson of Greek

grammar is supposed to teach children their mother tongue. But, on the

contrary, it prevents them from learning their language and stifles their

thoughts. As a result, a unique phenomenon has occurred in that Greek

children cannot write a letter even of just three lines.” 49 He complained that

teachers did nothing but make their students memorize various texts. In

addition, he pointed out that it was really problematic that Greek children

had to learn katharevousa Greek at school, since it was very different from

what they were speaking in their daily lives. In fact, children were confused

at school and this hindered their thinking.

Panagiotopoulos did not intend to add fuel to the fire over the

language rivalry between demotic and katharevousa supporters. He assumed

a critical attitude toward the both camps. It seemed to him that both sides

were going to extremes. He said, “Do not be afraid of the ‘hairy ones’

48
«Βουλή. Νέος θρίαμβος του κ. Παναγιωτοπούλου εις το νομοσχέδιον των βιβλίων»
[Parliament. New Triumph of Mr. Panagiotopoulos for the Bill of Books], Νέον Άστυ,
23 Φεβρουαρίου 1907, 2.
49
«Ο λόγος του κ. Παναγιωτοπούλου», 2.

201
(μαλλιαροί) because they kill themselves through their excess. But dread the

pedants because they murder through their excess.” 50 In his view, one did

not have to pay serious attention to the claims of the supporters of demotic

Greek because they were destroying themselves with their campaign. But

one had to beware of the pedants who supported katharevousa Greek

because their campaign might “kill the Greek spirit and wipe out the natural

talent which characterize[d] the Greek soul.” 51 He attributed the loss of

Greekness to a traditional written Greek and clearly took the opposite

position from Papamichalopoulos. According to him, the best way was to

find a middle course between the two. He said:

I do not like either the “hairy ones” (μαλλιαροί) or the “bearded

50
«Χρυσά έπη από το λόγο πούβγαλε ο κ. Παναγιωτόπουλος στη Βουλή στις 22
Φλεβάρη» [Golden Epics from the Speech which Mr. Panagiotopoulos Delivered in
Parliament on February 22], Νουμάς, 4 Μαρτίου, 1907, 1; The “hairy ones” implies the
adherents of demotic Greek. It is a term used, in particular, for a sect of the demoticists
that consisted of Psycharis and his followers who took the “all-or-nothing
systematization” approach to demotic Greek. Beaton, An Introduction to Modern Greek
Literature, 318.
51
«Η Βουλή. Το νομοσχέδιον περί διδακτικών βιβλίων» [Parliament. The Bill of
School Textbooks], Αθήναι, 23 Φεβρουαρίου 1907, 2; It should be noted that,
concerning the “Language Question,” the Team of the Japanese did not have a
consensus. Alexandris wrote in his memoirs, “Gounaris was often opposed to
Protopapadakis over the language issue. Protopapadakis and I were adherents of
demotic Greek while Gounaris argued that the language should develop in an
unhindered manner. Gounaris said, ‘We do not have to put obstacles to our language.
Likewise we do not have to push it by force toward demotic Greek, which the
demoticists are unfortunately attempting to do.’” Απόστολος Αλεξανδρής, Πολιτικαί
αναμνήσεις [Political Memoirs] (Πάτρα : Δ. Φραγκούλης και Κ. Βαρζάνης),12. Here
Gounaris seems to criticize the extremist tendencies of his contemporary demoticists,
who even coined new words that did not exist in spoken Greek.

202
ones” (πωγωνάτοι). 52 I support an in-between language. I think that
these two categories of the Greek language must serve as the
lighthouses which indicate the middle and safe passage. 53

Simply put, for Panagiotopoulos, the true Greek language was the

one rooted in people’s everyday lives. It was not an exceptionally difficult

language which required a special method and grammar to learn, as

Papamichalopoulos contended. Greek should and could be taught in the

same way that other languages were. 54 Panagiotopoulos criticized

Papamichalopoulos’ intolerant and inflexible ideas. He said,

“Papamichalopoulos affirmed that exposing grammar to danger would

endanger the entire Greek language. According to him, those who alter the

language are tantamount to traitors. I do not think this sort of

characterization can be permitted. I believe that the first step to becoming a

traitor is when one calls a person who has an opposite opinion from oneself a

traitor.” 55

Panagiotopoulos’ views on the language and its relation to Greek


52
The “bearded ones” probably indicates the priests who were among the most
powerful katharevousa supporters.
53 «Ο λόγος του κ. Παναγιωτοπούλου», 2.
54
Gounaris had the same opinion as Panagiotopoulos. He criticized
Papamichalopoulos’ view that the Greek was an especially difficult language and that
school children inevitably needed the help of grammar to learn. He interrupted
Papamichalopoulos’ speech on February 21 and sarcastically said, “Greek children are
speaking Greek just as German children are. But you are depicting the situation as if
Greek children were speaking Albanian.” «Αγόρευσις Κωνσταντ. Ν.
Παπαμιχαλοπούλου», 4.
55
«Βουλή. Νέος θρίαμβος του κ. Παναγιωτοπούλου», 2.

203
national identity are crystallized in the following speech:

I am not interested in either [demotic or katharevousa] camp


because neither can do something to harm the Greek language.
Neither a hairy one, nor a scholar, nor a shoe polisher, nor I, nor
anyone else is in a position to create a language. Nor can anyone
force others to use the language one has created. All of us are
merely the vehicles of material which the national
consciousness—the aesthetic development of the Greek soul and
emotion—selects and classifies. On that basis, the national
consciousness moulds the language. No, gentlemen. It is not a
grammar book that promotes education. 56

He objected quietly but resolutely to the recent trend observed in the

linguistic debate that seemed to assume that one could rule over a language.

Instead, he showed more modest stance toward a language. In his view, the

Greek language was not what man could artificially produce, but that which

the shared national consciousness of contemporary Greek people generated.

Therefore, the language which did not follow the national consciousness was

not the people’s language in any real sense. The Greek that had been taught

through grammar textbook was exactly what he rejected.

Panagiotopoulos quoted Adamantios Korais’ phrase, “Those who

burn the grammar save the nation, and not those write it.” 57

56 «Βουλή. Νέος θρίαμβος του κ. Παναγιωτοπούλου», 2.


57
«Βουλή. Νέος θρίαμβος του κ. Παναγιωτοπούλου», 2; Adamantios Korais

204
Panagiotopoulos affirmed that the grammar which ancient Alexandrian

intellectuals had made to study the Greek language was not useful at all for

contemporary Greek children. He maintained that the simple brains of school

children could not penetrate the Greek grammar made in a spirit of great

erudition by the intellectuals in Alexandria. On the contrary, that grammar

could become an obstacle for children seeking to learn their own language.

He said, “Grammar is like the Great Wall of China. It has unfortunately

estranged Greek children from their ancestors’ masterpieces because those

who study grammar do not learn the language, but useless rules.” 58 He

emphasized that Grammar and syntax were not the measures which enabled

Greek children to communicate with ancient authors and the classical

literature. Rather, he argued, it was teachers who could bring children into

communication with the classics. 59

Panagiotopoulos did not completely reject the ancient heritage of

their great ancestors. Yet it seems that he was not content with the common

view that modern Greece and the Greeks always existed in the shadow of

their past. He wanted contemporary Greeks to be recognized in their own

right. He did not regard it proper for the Greeks to cling to their past, but

wished the Greeks to also become like other nations that had recently leaped

(1748–1833) was a leading intellectual of the Greek Enlightenment.


58
«Βουλή. Νέος θρίαμβος του κ. Παναγιωτοπούλου», 2.
59
«Βουλή. Νέος θρίαμβος του κ. Παναγιωτοπούλου», 2.

205
onto the world stage and gained international recognition. He thought that a

proper educational system—object-based learning without

textbooks—would enable the Greeks to achieve this. Therefore, he

concluded his victorious speech on February 22, 1907, with the following

impressive statements.

Prime Minister, you have an obligation to pass this bill. We need a


practical instruction. We need to take decisive action. When we
celebrate the anniversary of the Battle of Marathon, we should not
line up Greek children to beg for mercy from the Great Powers for
the sake of our brothers. Instead, we should have Greek children
who are physically like the Swedish, intellectually like the
Germans…, and spiritually like the Japanese. We do not need to get
Greek children prepared to celebrate the Battle of Marathon, but
rather prepared to repeat the Battle of Marathon. 60

Panagiotopoulos referred to the celebration of the anniversary of the Battle

of Marathon, which Papamichalopoulos had proposed. 61 Panagiotopoulos

criticized Papamichalopoulos’ blind worship of Greece’s distant past and the

latter’s intention to exploit the glorious ancient heritage so as to appeal to the

60 «Βουλή. Νέος θρίαμβος του κ. Παναγιωτοπούλου», 2.


61 Papamichalopoulos proposed on February 6, 1907, that the a ceremony should be
held in 1910 to celebrate the 2400th anniversary of the Battle of Marathon in 490 B.C.,
together with the International Olympic Games in Athens. He hoped that the ceremony
would defend civilization on behalf of Greece and the whole world. «Ελλάς» [Greece],
Νέα Ημέρα, 3/16 Μαρτίου 1907, 3; In his speech on February 21 about the bill of
school textbooks, Papamichalopoulos proudly mentioned that his proposal had created a
sensation in Europe, which, according to him, attested the power of the ancient Greek
civilization in the modern world. «Αγόρευσις Κωνσταντ. Ν. Παπαμιχαλοπούλου», 3.

206
Great Powers to help liberate the “unredeemed” Greeks. According to

Panagiotopoulos, what was needed for Greek children was not to look back

to the past for potential gains, but to face the real world in which they lived.

With this statement Panagiotopoulos expressed his expectation that Greek

children should be cultivated so as to achieve something great, equivalent to

the Battle of Marathon, which would find its proper place in modern history.

Some other deputies who supported the bill expressed almost the

same view as Panagiotopoulos. They stressed that the Greeks should stop

attaching such great importance to the ancient world, and instead have more

confidence in the abilities of the modern Greeks. For instance, Nikolaos

Gatsos argued that the value of modern Greek literature should be

recognized in school education. He said, “Let’s admire the classics. But let’s

care about modern literature as well. If ancient literature is our glory, then

modern literature is the pulse of our life. Foreigners will discover our

validity. Ancient times were so glorious that they belong to all human beings.

Only modern literature captures the unique spirit of the Greek nation.

Therefore, make room for modern literature, a testament of our spirit, to

demonstrate its worth and utility.” 62 Konstantinos Topalis likewise sought to

shatter the illusion that the modern Greeks occupied a privileged position

with regard to ancient Greece. He said, “Persistence in tradition has to be


62
«Τα εκπαιδευτικά βιβλία από τον λόγον του κου Ν. Γάτσου» [School Textbooks
from the Speech of Mr. N. Gatsos], Ακρόπολις, 21 Φεβρουαρίου, 1907, 1.

207
abolished. Among other things, the idea that we are under totally exceptional

and unique conditions in comparison with other nations has to be done away

with.” 63 He proposed that the Greeks should emulate the recent efforts of

other nations such as Germany, France, and Japan to strengthen the national

power. For this purpose, he contended, education based on practical

instruction would be most effective.

The bill became Law 3201 on April 4, 1907. Although several

compromises such as reducing the interval between book competitions from

six to four years, were made during the deliberations, the principle of one

textbook for each subject was finally instated.

Panagiotopoulos: Minister without Portfolio

It seems that a key for Panagiotopoulos to have successfully

overcome the opposing opinions toward the bill, thereby making Parliament

legislate the bill, lies in the fact that he was not too deeply involved with the

“Language Question.” He did not fall into the trap of language polarization

between katharevousa and demotic Greek, which would inevitably preclude

any possibility of educational reforms. He cautiously avoided placing the

language rivalry at the center of the debate. Papamichalopoulos contended

63
«Αγόρευσις Κωνστ. Τοπάλη βουλευτικού Βόλου επί του νομοσχεδίου περί
διδακτικών βιβλίων» [The Speech of Konst. Topalis, Deputy of Volos, about the Bill of
School Textbooks], Αθήναι, 3 Μαρτίου, 1907, 3.

208
that learning without a grammar book would spread demotic Greek at school

and endanger not only katharevousa Greek but also the very Greek identity,

accusing the bill supporters as accomplices in this “crime.” However,

Panagiotopoulos was a reformer of non-demoticist camp and did not

advocate the bill as a demoticist. He only justified the proposed reform plan

claiming that it would introduce an efficient method of learning for children

and provide them with opportunities to acquire more creative and intellectual

abilities.

Panagiotopoulos’ statements about the Greek language apparently

revealed a preference for demotic over katharevousa Greek. In fact, however,

he did not take either side of the two language camps. He regarded the

conflict between the two camps as meaningless. He proposed an in-between

language though he did not give any clear definition of it. Panagiotopoulos

guaranteed that this in-between language would manifest the national

consciousness of contemporary Greeks. His middle stance with respect to the

Greek language issue prevented the debate on the bill from getting involved

in the “Language Question” and created a climate in which other deputies

could freely express their opinions about educational reforms, irrespective of

their personal preference for the language form.

The vigorous debate over the bill was favorably observed outside

Parliament. Kallirroi Parren described the atmosphere of Parliament in

209
February 1907 as follows: “Some winds of freedom and progress are

recently blowing in the Greek parliament. Stereotypical speeches about

economic issues and monotonous and boring questions, both of which

perennially existed there before, have been set aside these days in the face of

the school textbook issue.” 64 She regarded the lively discussions about the

bill as a bright sign that something positive and groundbreaking was

occurring in stagnant Greek politics and therefore enabling the state to make

progress. Dimitrios Tagkopoulos, editor of the demoticist periodical Noumas,

also sensed emerging changes in the political arena. He praised

Panagiotopoulos’ speech on February 22 and wrote, “Our parliament

breathed again that night. The Greek nation breathed again at the same

time.” 65 He characterized Panagiotopoulos as a person embodying the

hopeful future with spiritual freedom and truth that was contrasted with

Papamichalopoulos who represented the past filled with lies and corruption.

The newspaper Athens called Panagiotopoulos “Minister without

Portfolio” and lavishly praised his painstaking efforts to push through

educational reforms. It wrote, “The strong voice of one deputy [i.e.

64 Καλλιρρόη Παρρέν, «Φως από το σκότος» [Light from the Darkness], Εστία, 28
Φεβρουαρίου, 1907, 1; Kallirroi Parren was a journalist and a writer. She was also one
of the first Greek feminists. She published a weekly magazine Journal of Ladies
(Εφημερίδα των Κυριών) in 1888–1918 and founded the Lycée for Greek Girls (Λύκειο
των Ελληνίδων) in 1911.
65
Δημήτριος. Π. Ταγκόπουλος, «Αρχή λευτεριάς» [Beginning of Freedom], Νουμάς, 4
Μαρτίου 1907, 1.

210
Panagiotopoulos], on behalf of his small group, reached the government. The

voice called for stirring up the stagnant waters of our educational system and

for the government’s decision to submit the bill. The government had been

afraid that the bill would not be passed because it would infringe on the

interests of the many involved. Therefore, the bill would only arouse violent

protests—indeed, meetings of those concerned were heated. But the voice of

Panagiotopoulos became dominant because it was right and fair, and

supported what was beneficial for the nation.” 66

The significance of the law was not limited only to its role in

abolishing the corrupt trade of book-mongering. The law paved the way for

more fundamental reforms in the field of education. 67 Actually, the principle

of a single textbook at school was widely recognized as the first step toward

general educational reforms that advocates of the bill had had in mind. The

deputies full of reform spirits discussed broader topics of education besides

the content of the bill.

Witnessing the energetic activities of Panagiotopoulos in Parliament,

the public held high opinion of him. Athens wrote, “Fortunately,

Panagiotopoulos is not a person who rests on his laurels not making any

further efforts! We face a mountain of educational problems, and he has the

66
«Υπουργός άνευ πορτοφολιού» [Minister without Portfolio], Αθήναι, 15 Μαρτίου,
1907, 1.
67
Δροσίνης, «Ο νόμος του ενός βιβλίου», 230.

211
enthusiasm needed to solve them. Therefore, we can expect more successes

from his vigorous activity.” 68

The enactment of a new policy on school textbooks proved that

even a member of a small party could convince the government to carry out

significant reforms. Panagiotopoulos’ accomplishment was also considered

as a success of the Team of the Japanese as a whole, and the expectation

grew that the Team would do something more for the nation’s benefit.

68 «Υπουργός άνευ πορτοφολιού», 1.

212
CHAPTER 6

The Currant Scandal and

the Parliamentarianism of the Team of the Japanese

This chapter examines the concept of parliamentarianism espoused

by the Team of the Japanese, focusing on the series of debates that followed

the disclosure of the Currant Scandal by Gounaris. The Team aimed at

rebuilding the parliamentary system, which had been considered moribund.

Throughout the discussions, by taking the attitude of the government toward

Parliament as a good example of how not to behave, the Team clarified its

intentions and definition of a properly functioning Parliament.

In December 1907, Gounaris disclosed a backroom deal between

the government and the Privileged Company to Foster the Production and

Trade of Currants. 1 He had discovered that the agreement between the

Theotokis’ government and the Privileged Company included terms that

would illegally benefit the company at the expense of currant producers. The

Currant Scandal sparked great criticism of the government in Parliament. In

particular, the attacks of the Team of the Japanese against the government for

its responsibility in this unjust arrangement pushed the government to the

1
The official name of the company in Greek is Η Προνομιούχος Εταιρία προς
Προστασίαν της Παραγωγής και της Εμπορίας της Σταφίδος. The company was
abbreviated as “Eniaia” (Ενιαία).

213
verge of collapse.

The Currant Scandal was not just an event through which the

opposition party exposed the government’s injustice. Notably, the debates

over the scandal crystallized the political platform of the Team of the

Japanese. The Team condemned backroom deals in politics and advocated

openly discussing every issue related to national interests. It argued that

Parliament should be ranked as the most important institution for

decision-making in the country, and the government should be accountable

to Parliament. Moreover, it proposed that the principle of the collective

responsibility of the cabinet should be maintained to insure proper

parliamentary life.

In this chapter, we first look at what extraordinary measures had

been taken with respect to the exportation of currants in 1907, which led to

the scandal. Next, we shall see that the persistent demands of the Team to

examine the agreement between the government and the Privileged

Company in Parliament brought the wrongdoing out into the open. Then, we

shall explore the debates following the scandal. In the debates the members

of the Team criticized the government’s belittling attitude toward Parliament,

defined how parliamentarianism should operate, and called on the

government to realize it.

214
The Currant Export of 1907

The Privileged Company to Foster the Production and Trade of

Currants was established through the approval of Law 3080 of 1905 to

handle the overproduction of currants. 2 The company contracted with the

government to regulate the entire currant trade for twenty years, and had to

maintain the current price remunerative for the producers. For this purpose,

it adjusted the volume of the exported currants by regulating the payment in

kind for retention and land tax, not exceeding the demand on the market. In

principle, those who dealt with currant exportation had to deliver 35% of the

currant they intended to export, to the warehouses of the company. When

shipments of the currants reached beyond the limit of the quantities on which

2
The currants, called korinthiaka, were really unique Greek products. They were
seedless grapes which were only produced in specific regions of Greece (the southern
area of the Corinthian Gulf to the northern part of the Peloponnese, Zakinthos and
Kefalonia islands of the Ionian Sea, and several regions of the Aegean Sea) until the
beginning of the twentieth century. Therefore, Greece continued to monopolize the
trade in currants on the international market. As the value of its export was more than
50 % of the whole Greek exports in the latter half of the nineteenth century, the currant
industry played an important role in Greek economy. The revenue from land tax on
currants ranked first in the category of the country’s direct tax. But the volume of
currants exported from Greece dropped sharply after 1893, one of the major reasons of
which was attributed to French policy of protectionism expressed in the Méline tariff of
1892. Currant suddenly fell into overproduction. The overproduction caused a slump in
the currant price. Successive Greek governments got involved in finding solutions in
this “currant crisis.” Concerning various measures to overcome the crisis before the
establishment of the Privileged Company, see V. Gabrielidis, “The Over-Production of
Greek Currants,” The Economic Journal 5, no. 18 (1895): 285-288; Theodore A.
Burlumi, “The Overproduction of Currants: A Novel Experiment in Protection,” The
Economic Journal 9, no. 36 (1899): 633-651; A. Andréadès, “Currant Crisis in Greece,”
The Economic Journal 16, no.16 (1906): 41-48; A. Andréadès, “Une Nouvelle
expérience économique: la crise de surproduction des raisins de Corinthe et la Société
Privilégiée,” Revue économique internationale 6, no.2 (1909): 130-134.

215
the payment in kind was imposed, then the company started to make the

exporters pay in cash instead. In this case they were obliged to pay 40.25

drachmas for every 1,000 Venetian lbs. of currants they intended to export. 3

The company and the government estimated the amount of the entire crop of

a new currant year and announced every year on August 10 the proportion

between the payment in kind and the payment in cash. 4

As usual, the representatives of the company and the government

assembled on August 9, 1907, one day before the export of new currant

crops began. In order that the currants would not be oversupplied on the

market, they decided that the payment in kind for retention and land tax

would be applied until shipments reached 140,000,000 Ven. lbs. According

to this decision, when 140,000,000 Ven. lbs. currants were exported,

approximately 50,000,000 Ven. lbs. currants, equivalent to 35% of

140,000,000 exported currants, were to be brought in the company’s

warehouses. 5

3
(Great) Venetian lb. is a unit of weight. It is expressed as ενετικό λίτρο in Greek and
as livre vénitienne in French. 1 Venetian lb. is equivalent to 478 grams.
4
Concerning the details of the business of the Privileged Company, see Foreign Office,
Annual Series, No. 3516, Diplomatic and Consular Report: Greece: Report on the
Finances of Greece for the Year 1905 (London: Harrison and Sons, 1905), 10-12;
Andréadès, “Currant Crisis in Greece,” 48-51; Andréadès, “Une Nouvelle experience
économique,” 135-149.
5
«Ο φόρος της σταφίδος» [The Tax on Currants], Ακρόπολις, 10 Αυγούστου 1907, 4;
«Η χθεσινή απόφασις του Συμβουλίου της Ενιαίας» [Yesterday’s Decision of the Board
of the Eniaia], Χρόνος, 10 Αυγούστου 1907, 3; «Σταφιδικά. Το χθεσινόν συμβούλιον
της Ενιαίας» [Currant Issues. Yesterday’s Board of the Eniaia], Αθήναι, 10 Αυγούστου
1907, 2.

216
In the course of this meeting, an unusual agreement was reached.

The company argued that retention warrants were running short and that

most of the exporters did not have them, which would prevent the currants

from being smoothly exported. In order to avoid this inconvenience, the

company proposed that the export in the form of cash deposit, not of the

presentation of retention warrants, should be permitted. 6

Simopoulos, Minister of Finance, accepted the claim of the

company and allowed the exportation in the form of cash deposit by the end

of August. They defined the price of the cash deposit per 1,000 Ven. lbs. as

140 drachmas. The cash deposit was supposed to be returned when a

retention warrant equivalent to the deposit was presented.

About 51,000,000 Ven. lbs. currants were shipped out in the form of

cash deposit by the end of August. If exported in a normal way with the

presentation of warrants, around 18,000,000 Ven. lbs. currants, equivalent to

35% of 51,000,000 Ven. lbs. exported currants, were supposed to be retained

at the warehouses of the company. Instead, the company gained about

6 “Retention warrants are delivered to any one depositing currants in the Privileged
Company’s warehouses and bear on their face the amount delivered. These warrants are
sold in the open market to exporters and are usually worth 10 per cent. less than the
value of currants.” Foreign Office, Annual Series, No. 3809, Diplomatic and Consular
Reports: Greece: Report for the Year 1906 on the Trade and Commerce of the Morea
and the Provinces of Aetolia and Acarnania (London: Harrison and Sons, 1907), 11.
Exporters had to obtain retention warrants in which the amount equivalent to 35% of
the amount of the currants they were to export was written. Exporters were allowed to
export after they presented retention warrants which proved completion of the
procedure of both retention and land tax.

217
2,500,000 drachmas in cash. 7 No exporter, however, appeared to ask the

company to return his deposit. After the exportation in the form of cash

deposit was completed, the price of retention warrants hovered between 150

and 160 per 1000 Ven. lbs., higher than 140 drachmas, the price temporarily

fixed by the company and the government when they had decided to

introduce the cash deposit in August. Therefore, a claim for reimbursement

by way of buying and submitting retention warrants to the company would

cause a loss to an exporter. 8

As a result, the price of currants fell below the price that would be

realized if 18,000,000 Ven. lbs. currants had been retained. This meant that

both the company whose purpose was to protect the economies of the currant

producers, and the government, which supported the former, had cheated the

producers. Yet neither the company nor the government took quick steps to

rectify this situation. Toward the end of 1907, currants producers frequently

submitted petitions to Parliament asking them to solve the issue of the

18,000,000 Ven. lbs. currants still on the market and the 2,500,000 drachmas

in the hands of the company. The government, at last, reluctantly began to

take action and met the representatives of the company.

7
Foreign Office, Annual Series, No. 3989, Diplomatic and Consular Report: Greece:
Report for the Year 1907 on the Trade and Commerce of the Morea and the Provinces of
Aetolia and Acarnania (London: Harrison and Sons, 1908), 10.
8
Foreign Office, Annual Series, No. 3989, Diplomatic and Consular Report, 10.

218
The Disclosure of the Currant Scandal

On December 17, 1907, Simopoulos informed Parliament that the

government and the company had reached an agreement as to how to deal

with the 2,500,000 drachmas the company had acquired in cash instead of

18,000,000 Ven. lbs. currants. He intended to put the agreement into practice

by way of administrative procedures within the government. Gounaris

opposed him, however, contending that as the agreement was directly

connected to the benefits of the nation, it should be carefully examined in

Parliament, and that a vote should be taken on the matter in order to make it

a law. Furthermore, he pointed out that the decision in the previous August

that adopted the cash deposit should also have had Parliament’s approval. To

begin with, he regarded the introduction of the cash deposit as illegal in the

light of the agreement of 1905 that established the company. 9

Simopoulos’ response to Gounaris’ criticisms not only fell short of

the latter’s expectation, but clearly demonstrated the attitude of the

government, which paid little attention to Parliament. Simopoulos argued

that he had not considered it necessary for Parliament to approve the

9
According to the agreement of 1905, the currant exportation in form of cash deposit,
instead of retention warrants, was permitted only in 1905, the year when the company
was founded. This decision was regarded as a temporary measure because there was not
enough time left to take a regular step for the exportation. The currant export had to
begin on August 10, 1905, less than one month after the company was established.
Αθανάσιος Ευταξίας, «Πού έγκειται το ζήτημα» [In What Does the Problem Consist?],
Αθήναι, 24 Δεκεμβρίου 1907, 1.

219
decision to introduce the cash deposit. According to him, he had thought that

he represented the opinion of Parliament when he allowed the exportation in

the form of cash deposit in the previous August. 10 Simopoulos contended

that the currant issue could be settled at the administrative level, and that it

was appropriate for him to introduce the cash deposit as an emergent

measure. He also claimed that the government should take quick steps this

time to solve the problem, in order to compensate the currant producers’

losses, and thus that the government would not have time to examine the

agreement in Parliament. Then Simopoulos implied that the government

would carry out the agreement without following the legislative procedure in

Parliament as it had the previous August. 11

Gounaris stood squarely against Simopoulos and intensified his

criticism. He pointed out the contradiction in the government’s behavior,

which had so far not provided any compensation for the damages caused to

the currant producers by the cash deposit and which had continued to be

indifferent to the matter. But suddenly the government regarded the solution

as urgent. Moreover, Gounaris criticized the government for driving

Parliament into a state of malfunction by ignoring its legislative power and

10
«Η Βουλή. Αι χρηματικαί εγγυήσεις» [Parliament. The Cash Deposit], Νέον Άστυ, 18
Δεκεμβρίου 1907, 2.
11
«Η Βουλή. Επίθεσις κατά της Ενιαίας» [Parliament. Attack against the Eniaia],
Ακρόπολις, 18 Δεκεμβρίου 1907, 2; «Η Βουλή. Ο σιδηρόδρομος και το σταφιδικά
ζήτημα» [Parliament. The Railroad and the Currant Problem], Αθήναι, 18 Δεκεμβρίου
1907, 2.

220
for allowing the Minister to monopolize the right to make whatever decision

he wanted. Dragoumis stood by Gounaris. He argued that the government’s

failure to present Parliament with any documents between itself and the

company probably helped the company earn a profit. Dragoumis as well as

Gounaris clearly maintained that the agreement in question should be

discussed and legislated in Parliament. 12

Attacked unexpectedly by Gounaris and Dragoumis, Simopoulos

was obliged to admit, although unwillingly, the necessity of parliamentary

approval of the agreement. He submitted the document of the terms

established between the government and the company to Parliament, thus

provoking the Currant Scandal.

The official document included a phrase in parenthesis that

Simopoulos had not mentioned when he verbally conveyed the content of the

agreement. What he had announced was that the cash deposit of August 1907

would be returned to the exporters in exchange for the presentation of

retention warrants by January 31, 1908. Nevertheless, he told, when some

exporters avoided this procedure, the company would still have parts of the

cash deposit in its hands. In this case the company would purchase the

currants delivered to its warehouses for 140 drachmas per 1,000 Ven. lbs. by

June 15, 1908. If the cash deposit remained at the company after these two

12 «Η Βουλή. Αι χρηματικαί εγγυήσεις», 2; «Η Βουλή. Ο σιδηρόδρομος και το


σταφιδικά ζήτημα», 2.

221
procedures, the government and the company would subsequently discuss

the matter. 13

Yet the parenthetical phrase in the document Simopoulos submitted

indicated that, if the cash deposit still remained at the company after June 15,

1908, the company could have some of the money, based on the stipulation

in the second paragraph of Article 6 of the agreement of 1905. 14 Gounaris

discovered in no time the hidden intention between the government and the

company. Taking into consideration that at present the market price of the

currants was hovering above 140 drachmas, one could easily predict that

nobody would appear, as had been the case before, to ask for the return of

the cash deposit in exchange for the presentation of the retention warrants, or

to have the company purchase his currants at the price of 140 drachmas. It

followed that the company would keep by June 15, 1908, the full deposit,

that is, 2,500,000 drachmas. Knowing this well enough in advance, the

government and the company had reached this agreement.

However, what Simopoulos spoke about was the mere surface of the

actual agreement. In reality, Gounaris argued, it was obvious that the

stipulation written in the parenthesis would be eventually executed. The

second paragraph of Article 6 read, “In a year when, due to the shortage of

currant product, it is impossible to pay in kind for land tax and retention, the

13 «Η Βουλή. Επίθεσις κατά της Ενιαίας», 2.


14 «Η Βουλή. Αι χρωματικέ εγγυήσεις», 2.

222
company has the right to permit exporters to pay at will in cash for retention

and land tax, partially or all in accordance with the company’s judgment. In

this case exporters have to pay 115 drachmas per 1,000 Ven. lbs.” 15

According to this requirement, it could be interpreted that 2,070,000

drachmas was paid in cash for retention and land tax instead of the delivery

of 18,000,000 Ven. lbs. currants as payment in kind. 16 It should be noted,

however, that the Privileged Company had the right to sell the currants per

1,000 Ven. lbs. at the price of 33 drachmas to the Greek Company of Wine

and Spirit. 17 If the Privileged Company had sold 18,000,000 Ven. lbs.

currants to the Greek Company, the former would have had 594,000

drachmas in cash. However, in reality, as the 18,000,000 Ven. lbs. currants

were not retained at the company’s warehouses, the Privileged Company

could not sell them to the Greek Company for the cash income. This could

be regarded as a loss to the Privileged Company. Therefore, to put it more

accurately, the agreement between the government and the Privileged

Company, which Simopoulos submitted to Parliament on that day, would

15
Προνομιούχος Εταιρία προς Προστασίαν της Παραγωγής και της Εμπορίαν της
Σταφίδος, Νόμος ˏΓΠ΄(3080) της 17 Ιουλίου 1905. Η δι’αυτού κυρωθείσα σταφιδική
σύμβασις της 8 Ιουλίου 1905 και το καταστατικού της Προνομιούχου Εταιρίας προς
Προστασίαν της Παραγωγής και της Εμπορίαν της Σταφίδος [Law 3080 of July 17, 1905.
The Currant Agreement of July 8, 1905 Approved by the Law, and the Statutes of the
Privileged Company to Foster the Production and Trade of Currants] (Αθήνα: Εθνικό
τυπογραφείο, 1905), 31.
16
18,000,000 Ven. lbs÷1,000 Ven. lbs.×115drachmas = 2,070,000 drachmas.
17
Its official name in Greek was η Ελληνική Εταιρεία Οίνων και Οινοπνευμάτων.

223
enable the company to apparently legally obtain about 1,500,000 drachmas.

Gounaris promptly discovered this tricky mechanism. However, he

contended, as the stipulation was based on the presupposed shortage of

currants, there was no legal basis on which it could be applied to the case of

the currant year of 1907, given the fact that 18,000,000 Ven. lbs. currants

remained on the market. 18

Simopoulos lost his composure in the face of Gounaris’ argument

that the agreement was scandalous and would ultimately benefit the

company. Simopoulos explained that the parenthetical phrase had been

written by mistake when the document was transcribed. In addition,

Theotokis asserted that the government had not approved the statement in

the parenthesis. Nevertheless he could not clearly explain matters so as to

remove suspicions about the backstage deal with the company. 19

The Parliamentarianism of the Team of the Japanese

The disclosure of the government’s offering of illegal profits to the

company and the irresponsible attitude of the government shocked and

18
In his interview with the newspaper Patris, Protopapadakis explained in detail the
trick of the agreement and how to compute the amount of money that the Privileged
Company would obtain. «Το σκάνδαλον της Ενιαίας. Σπουδαιόταται αποκαλύψεις των
κ.κ. Π. Πρωτοπαπαδάκη και Δ. Γούναρη» [The Scandal of the Eniaia. Very Important
Discoveries by Mr. P. Protopapadakis and Mr. D. Gounaris], Πατρίς, 24 Δεκεμβρίου
1907, 1.
19 «Η Βουλή. Αι χρηματικαί εγγυήσεις», 2.

224
enraged deputies in Parliament. The Currant Scandal went beyond the

framework of the economic problems caused by the introduction of the cash

deposit. It was now highlighted as a political issue. The discussion of the

agreement between the government and the company was temporarily

shelved. Parliament became the place where deputies censured the political

stance of the government. The government’s inept response to the

condemnation worsened the situation. In the course of repeated criticisms by

the opposition parties and the justifications by the government, the

difference between the government and the Team of the Japanese concerning

the concept of parliamentarianism became evident. The Team attempted to

rectify the government’s attitude toward politics by advocating its ideal

vision of parliamentarianism.

First of all, the Team regarded an open debate as an overriding

principle of parliamentarianism. As Gounaris and Dragoumis demonstrated

on December 17, all matters related to the national interest had to be

discussed in Parliament, which consisted of the representatives of the people.

In Greece, however, Parliament had been ignored, and important decisions

had often been made backstage. The Team criticized this situation that

hindered the state from developing.

Second, the Team of the Japanese emphasized that the cabinet had

to assume sincere responsibility for Parliament. On December 18, the day

225
following the disclosure of the scandal, Simopoulos submitted the revised

agreement devoid of the parenthesis in question as the “Bill of the Cash

Deposit Paid in the Substitution for Payment in Kind on the Occasion of the

Currant Export in August 1907,” 20 and asked for a vote. However, the Team

of the Japanese did not overlook Simopoulos’ irresponsible conduct. They

saw him behaving as if nothing disturbing had happened the previous day.

Gounaris started again to criticize Simopoulos in terms of the moral

responsibility that a minister should be expected to take. He maintained that

Simopoulos’ excuse that the phrase in parenthesis was a matter of a slip of

the pen was not enough to convince anyone as long as Simopoulos, a

representative of the government, had signed the original agreement.

Gounaris pointed out that such an irresponsible attitude as Simopoulos’

implied more serious problems that were connected with the national interest

than that of the monetary benefits the Privileged Company would gain.

Gounaris said in an accusing tone, “Can Parliament accept Simopoulos, who

had the impudence to keep his position, although he bungled it badly by

signing, without closely examining the agreement, and submitting it to

Parliament? I wonder whether Mr. Simopoulos fully understands that he is

facing Parliament, where the representatives of the people assemble.”

Gounaris regarded Simopoulos’ attitude as clear proof that the government

20
ΠΕΒΒ, αριθ. 78, 86-87.

226
attached no importance to Parliament. 21

The irresponsible attitude of the government toward Parliament was

not limited to the act of hushing up the scandal by deleting the parenthetical

phrase. A subsequent event complicated the episode, raising doubts whether

the agreement the government announced on December 17 did actually exist

or not. A board of directors of the Privileged Company published an apologia

for the Currant Scandal on December 21. This statement was inconsistent

with the explanation of the government to some degree. Concerning the

phrase in parenthesis, the company’s apologia conformed almost exactly to

the explanation the government had offered. The company admitted that it

had written the parenthetical phrase into the document by mistake, and that

the government had then transcribed it. The company mentioned, however,

that they had not yet reached the final agreement as to how to deal with the

cash deposit. The solution was postponed until after June 15, 1908. 22 This

statement left some room for the possibility that the stipulation in the

parenthetical phrase could be applied in the future despite the excuse of the

graphic error. This was not consistent with the remarks of Simopoulos and

Theotokis on December 17, who both strongly denied that the stipulation in

21
ΠΣΒΒ, 220-221; «Η Βουλή. Η χθεσινή συνεδρίασις. Και πάλιν το σταφιδικόν
ζήτημα» [Parliament. Yesterday’s Meeting. And Again the Currant Problem], Ακρόπολις,
19 Δεκεμβρίου 1907, 1-2.
22
«Η ιστορία του σκανδάλου. Τι λέγει και η Ενιαία» [The Story of the Scandal. What
Does the Eniaia Say?], Αθήναι, 23 Δεκεμβρίου 1907, 2.

227
parenthesis would be put into practice. Thus, the apologia of the company

exposed the suspicious relationship between the government and the

company.

Moreover, the newspaper Athens on January 8, 1908, suggested the

possibility that there was another hidden bargain between the government

and the company with regard to the introduction of the cash deposit. Athens

procured a telegram with the number 75385 that Simopoulos had sent to

prefects of the currant-growing districts on August 16, 1907. According to

the telegram, October 1, 1907, was the due date when the company would

accept a claim by exporters for the return of the cash deposit in exchange for

the presentation of retention warrants. The telegram also mentioned that the

company was compelled, after the reimbursement deadline, to purchase

currants until the amount of payment in kind reached approximately

50,000,000 Ven. lbs. currants, that is, 35 % of 140,000,000 Ven. lbs. currants

to be exported. The telegram indicated not only that the government had

predicted in advance that some exporters would not ask for the return of their

deposit, but that it had definitely imposed the obligation of a purchase on the

company. In reality, however, the company did not assume the obligation to

purchase the surplus of the currants on the market after October 1, 1907. 23

23
«Μεταμεσονύχτιοι ειδήσεις. Φοβερά αποκάλυψις κατά της κυβερνήσεως» [News
after Midnight. Stunning Disclosure against the Government], Αθήναι, 8 Ιανουαρίου
1908, 3.

228
During the recess of Parliament the company issued the

above-mentioned apologia for the scandal, and Athens published the

telegram that Simopoulos had sent. The members of the Team of the

Japanese did not relax their pursuit of the misconduct. The company’s

apologia appeared in major Athenian newspapers on December 23, 1907. On

the following day, Protopapadakis published his opinion on the entire front

page of the newspaper Patris. He strongly argued that all the facts related to

the scandal should be brought into light and that it was necessary to resolve

the unethical matter by calling for the resignation of the Prime Minister or

through an investigation by a public prosecutor. 24 With regard to the issue in

the telegram by Simopoulos, Protopapadakis also expressed his view in

Athens on January 9, 1908. He hinted that it was likely that the government

had taken into consideration the loss to the company that would be caused by

the obligation to purchase the currants as described in the telegram and thus

had left it undone. He claimed that the government was clearly in collusion

with the company. He concluded that it was not only Simopoulos but the

government as a whole that had to assume the responsibility for a series of

dubious activities with regard to the cash deposit. 25

24
«Το σκάνδαλον της Ενιαίας», 1.
25
«Τα σταφιδικά. Η χθεσινή αποκάλυψις των “Αθηνών.” Η εκτέλεσις της διαταγής.
Ειδήσεις—γνώμαι—συνεντεύξεις» [The Currant Scandal. Yesterday’s Discovery by
“Athens.” The Execution of the Order. News—Opinions—Interviews], Αθήναι, 9
Ιανουαρίου 1908, 2.

229
There was a good reason why Protopapadakis emphasized that both

Simopoulos and the government were accountable. It was because he

expected that Theotokis would evade his cabinet’s collective responsibility

for the scandal and shift the blame exclusively to Simopoulos. There had

already been a sign that Theotokis had tried to dodge the government’s

culpability when, on December 18, a vote of no-confidence in Simopoulos

was taken.

As we have seen, on that day, Simopoulos submitted the bill devoid

of the phrase in parenthesis. Then Gounaris fiercely attacked the government

by saying that it did not respect Parliament. Gounaris’ words and Dragoumis’

remarks that supported Gounaris provoked a barrage of sharp words between

the governmental party supporting Simopoulos and the opposition. Then

Ioannis Krestenitis, a member of an opposition party, made a proposal,

saying, “Following what has been discussed, Parliament considers to be

deplorable the method in accordance with which the Minister of Finance

carried out the matter of the cash deposit. Thus, we should place it on the

agenda today.” 26 This proposal virtually meant a no-confidence vote for

Simopoulos.

There were 40 votes for and 63 against the motion, and 6

abstentions in the total votes of 109. Five of the seven members of the Team

26
ΠΣΒΒ, 222.

230
of the Japanese voted “yes” for the motion. Two other

members—Panagiotopoulos and Alexandris—were absent from Parliament

on that day. As a result, the motion was rejected, and Simopoulos won the

confidence of Parliament. Given the fact that the deputies of the government

party occupied two thirds of the total seats in Parliament, the result was as

expected. But the voting outcome obviously demonstrated that the

government’s unifying force was abating. Not every member of the

government party cast a negative vote for the motion. When the vote began,

14 deputies of the government party left the chamber, and five voted in favor

of the motion. The voting behavior unintentionally revealed the chasm

within the government. It indicated that some deputies of the government

party regarded Simopoulos’ conduct with the company on the issue of

currant management as illegal. Moreover, the fact that Theotokis himself

abstained from voting was considered as his decision to reject assumption of

the government’s collective responsibility for the action his cabinet member

had committed. 27

The impact of this event dragged on during the recess of Parliament.

An article on the front page of the newspaper Akropolis that dealt with the

severe criticism of Team of the Japanese against the government

27
«Το χθεσινόν αποτέλεσμα της ψηφοφορίας κατά του κ. Σιμοπούλου» [Yesterday’s
Result of the Vote against Mr. Simopoulos], Ακρόπολις, 19 Δεκεμβρίου 1907, 3; «Η
Βουλή. Μια παράδοξος ψηφοφορία» [Parliament. A Paradoxical Vote], «Σημειώσεις»
[Notes], Αθήναι, 19 Δεκεμβρίου 1907, 2.

231
metaphorically described the Team members as man-eaters. The article

wrote, “But are they man-eaters or corpse-eaters? As the Prime Minister

Theotokis put an end to his government, it is more appropriate to consider

that the Japanese are eating a dead body.” 28 The government was regarded

as good as dead. Subsequently, the media continued to attack the government.

Newspapers featured daily the possibility of Simopoulos’ resignation and

argued at the same time whether the government was capable of sustaining

itself.

Facing the cabinet crisis, the government was slow in announcing

when a new meeting of Parliament would commence. Finally, on January 20,

1908, the day after the government and the Privileged Company reached a

new agreement, Parliament reconvened. On January 22, at the second

meeting of the new year, the event “unprecedented in political history of all

the countries of parliamentarianism” took place. 29 Unexpectedly enough,

Theotokis asked for a vote of confidence in his government. His proposal

reflected the government unrest caused by the Currant Scandal as well as the

anxiousness of the Prime Minister, who wanted to get out of this precarious

situation as soon as possible. According to Theotokis, the fact that some

deputies of his party had voted in favor of no-confidence in Simopoulos, or

28
«Ο νέος προφήτης» [The New Prophet], Ακρόπολις, 19 Δεκεμβρίου 1907, 1.
29
«Η αμφιβολία του κ. Γ. Θεοτόκη» [Uncertainty of Mr. G. Theotokis], Αθήναι, 23
Φεβρουαρίου 1907, 1.

232
had left the chamber on December 18, implied a state of distrust in the

government as a whole. Therefore, Theotokis argued that the present

political crisis should be solved by way of a vote of confidence in the

government. 30

All the opposition parties bitterly resisted his proposal. It was

obvious to them that the Prime Minister intended to maintain power by

winning a majority vote of confidence and to place responsibility for the

scandal solely on Simopoulos. The Team of the Japanese did not admit the

necessity of the motion of confidence and all its members abstained from

voting.

There were 82 votes for and 17 against the motion, and 14

abstentions, for a total of 113 votes, and the government won its confidence

vote. 31 Immediately afterwards, Simopoulos submitted the new agreement

with the Privileged Company as the “Bill of the Approval of the Agreement

Concluded between the Greek State and the Privileged Company on January

20, 1908, with Regard to the Cash Deposit Paid on the Occasion of the

Currant Exportation in August 1907.” 32 Then he expressed his intention to

resign his ministerial post. As the opposition parties had expected, the

30
ΠΣΒΒ, 235-236.
31
14 abstentions consisted of the seven members of the Team of the Japanese and
seven incumbent ministers. «Ποιοί και πόσοι εψήφισαν» [Who and How Many Voted?],
Ακρόπολις, 23 Ιανουαρίου 1908, 3.
32
ΠΕΒΒ, αριθ. 80, 87-88.

233
government chose the method that would allow it to stay in power, by

making Simopoulos the Currant Scandal scapegoat. 33

Contrary to what the government had anticipated, the opposition

criticism did not wane, but rather, it further intensified. At the meeting on the

day following the vote of confidence, a hot discussion took place between

the Team of the Japanese and the Prime Minister over parliamentarianism

and collective responsibility of the government.

Gounaris and Repoulis criticized the action of the Prime Minister on

the previous day, observing that it had caused critical damage to the concept

of collective responsibility of the cabinet, which was considered as the

principle of parliamentarianism. Although Simopoulos won the vote of

confidence on December 18, Theotokis probably induced him to resign

during the recess of Parliament, so that the government could weather the

scandal. Subsequently, Theotokis held the confidence vote in his government

and justified his holding on to power. Theotokis argued against Gounaris and

Repoulis that a prime minister could not assume the responsibility for all the

actions of his ministers. And he continued to say that the parliamentary

system did not always impose collective responsibility on the cabinet, except

33
ΠΣΒΒ, 233-242; «Η Βουλή. Η παραίτησις του κ. Α. Σιμοπούλου. Η σύμβασις δια
τας σταφιδικάς εγγυήσεις» [Parliament. Resignation of Mr. A. Simopoulos. The
Agreement for the Currant Deposit], Ακρόπολις, 23 Ιανουαρίου 1908, 2; «Η Βουλή. Η
παραίτησης του κ. Σιμοπούλου. Μια ιστορική συνεδρίασις. Ζήτημα εμπιστοσύνης»
[Parliament. Resignation of Mr. Simopoulos. A Historic Meeting. Issue of Confidence],
Αθήναι, 23 Ιανουαρίου 1908, 1-2.

234
for significant issues. Gounaris responded that political responsibility did not

mean the obligation to punish the fault of an individual, and that it was

absolutely necessary to pin down the responsibility of a minister as that of

the cabinet as a whole. 34

Here we can find an obvious difference in the attitude between

Theotokis and the Team of the Japanese toward Parliament. While Theotokis

fixed the ethical responsibility for the scandal upon Simopoulos, he tried to

avoid the collective responsibility of the cabinet with the excuse that the

government had won the confidence of Parliament and sought to stay in

power. In contrast, the Team persisted in interpreting parliamentarianism

from the viewpoint of the collective responsibility of the cabinet. It claimed

that the Prime Minister should acknowledge that the government was

answerable for the scandal. 35

34
ΠΣΒΒ, 242-249; «Η Βουλή. Το κατηγορητήριον του κ. Δ. Ράλλη. Απολογία του κ.
Θεοτόκη. Και άλλη πάλιν ψηφοφορία» [Parliament. Accusation of Mr. D. Rallis.
Apologia of M. Theotokis. And again Another Vot e], Αθήναι, 24 Ιανουαρίου 1908, 1-2;
«Η χθεσινή Βουλή. Νέον ζήτημα εμπιστοσύνης. Οι λόγοι των ρητόρων επί της
πολιτείας της κυβερνήσεως» [Yesterday’s Parliament. New Problem of Confidence. The
Speeches about the Regime of the Government], Πατρίς, 24 Ιανουαρίου 1908, 1-2.
35 The Greek Constitution of 1864, which was in force in the beginning of the

twentieth century, had two stipulations (Articles 58 and 78) related to the concept of
parliamentarianism. According to them, Parliament had the right to supervise ministers
appointed by the king, and ministers had to be accountable to Parliament. These
stipulations, however, did not have legal biding force to oblige a minister to resign in
case Parliement expressed lack of confidence in him. They did not mention either the
notion of collective responsibility of the cabinet. «κοινοβουλευτισμός»
[Parliamentarianism], in ΜΕΕ, τόμος ΙΔ΄ [vol. 14], 646; King George’s speech of 1875
which established the principle of dediolomeni (the principle of majority rule) was the
first example to regard—though vaguely—the cabinet members as a unity. The king
called them as oi kaloumenoi in the plural. But Law 586 of December 22, 1876, did not

235
The long speech of Dragoumis on January 23 can be regarded as a

summary of criticisms the Team had made against the government

concerning the concept of parliamentarianism. Dragoumis pointed out, from

the perspective of political ethics, that Theotokis lacked sensitivity to the

parliamentary system. He argued that Theotokis did not understand

parliamentary spirit correctly, and his sole concern was to maintain the

formality of parliamentarianism. This had led to Parliament becoming

stranded. In response to Gounaris and Repoulis, Theotokis said that the

entire cabinet was not always responsible for a minister’s conduct. However,

judging from the fact that the Prime Minister had asked for a vote of

confidence in his government on January 22, 1908, Dragoumis presumed

that Theotokis understood at heart that the motion of no-confidence in

Simopoulos on December 18, 1907, virtually meant a lack of confidence in

the government, based on the principle of collective responsibility of the

cabinet. According to Dragoumis, the first point that demonstrated

Theotokis’ insensitivity to parliamentarianism was that, although the number

of the votes of confidence did not matter as long as the government was

trusted by Parliament and the king, he thought that increasing the number of

votes for confidence was a valid way to maintain power, and he put this idea

include any notion of collective cabinet responsibility. Katerina Gardikas, “Parties and
Politics in Greece, 1875–1885: Towards a Two-Party System” (PhD diss., King’s
College, University London, 1987), 298.

236
into practice. Second, if he had had a sound sensitivity to parliamentarianism,

Theotokis would have immediately interpreted the motion for no-confidence

in Simopoulos as distrust in his cabinet as a whole, and asked on the spot for

the vote of confidence in the government. If the Prime Minister had faced

Parliament in such a fair-and-square manner, there would not have been

deputies of the government party who either supported the no-confidence

vote in Simopoulos or abstained from voting. On the contrary, Dragoumis

argued, party solidarity would have been further strengthened. Theotokis’

hesitation on that day had not only created further political instability, but

also had delayed the opening of a meeting of the new year, which aimlessly

reduced the days of meeting for deliberation in Parliament.

Dragoumis’ criticism was not confined to the incumbent

government crippled by the Currant Scandal. He expanded his critique to the

Greek political conditions of the last ten years. He maintained that both

Parliament and successive governments had lost sight of what they should

essentially be like and continued to exist under corrupt conditions.

Dragoumis emphasized that it was necessary to have a leader and his

government that would be able to seriously operate true parliamentarianism

under the present constitutional system, in order that the state could make

progress and that state power could be strengthened. 36

36
«Το κοινοβουλευτικόν πνεύμα και η κυβέρνησις Γ. Θεοτόκη. Αγόρευσις του κ. Στ.

237
The End of the Currant Scandal

On January 25, after the censure against the political stance of the

government reached a certain point, the discussion about a bill for a new

agreement between the government and the Privileged Company, which had

been left in suspense, finally began. The Team of the Japanese did not

slacken its attention. Gounaris was critical that the new agreement still

offered an illegal profit to the company and asked that it be amended. He

said in a sharp tone, “The state should not be a protector of private

companies. Let such a state be ruined!” 37

Panagiotopoulos asked the government to renounce acting as an

agent for the Privileged Company and to recover its good sense. He pointed

out that the company had succeeded in making its stock prices rise after

introducing the cash deposit in August 1907, and also provided several

examples proving that the company had considered making a profit as an

absolute must at the expense of the currant producers. He deplored that,

although Greece was destined to be a “model state” in the East, it now

looked like a model of a stock exchange since politicians had been

Δραγούμη βουλευτού Αττικής κατά την συνεδρίαν της 23 Ιανουαρίου 1908» [The
Parliamentary Spirit and the Government of G. Theotokis. The Speech of Mr. St.
Dragoumis, Deputy of Attica, at the Meeting of January 23, 1908], Αθήναι, 25
Ιανουαρίου 1908, 1-2.
37
«Ειδήσεις. Η Βουλή. Μακρά συζήτησις δια την ασφάλειαν. Αντίδρασις κατά της
σταφιδικής συμβάσεως.» [News. Parliament. Long Discussion about Security. Reaction
against the Currant Agreement], Καιροί, 26 Ιανουαρίου 1908, 3.

238
subjugated to capitalists. 38

These remarks also illustrated that the Team of the Japanese tried to

judge matters from a broader national perspective. Gounaris was a deputy of

Patras, the central port of currant export, while Panagiotopoulos was from

Aigio, a renowned currant production district, and his family’s property had

been acquired through currant trade. However, their words in Parliament did

not have the tinge of regionalism. They articulated their opinions on the

basis of the national interest, and did not intend to introduce any benefit to

their local constituencies. If they had wanted to do so, when some

associations of the currant trade in Patras presented petitions to pass a new

law as promptly as possible after the revised agreement was concluded in

January 20, 1908, the members of the Team would have immediately played

up to their potential voters and not examined it. 39 In reality, however, they

continued to look closely into the content of the agreement and to ask the

government to submit the documents that followed up the opinion exchange

between the government and the company. The Team of the Japanese

displayed a remarkably different attitude from that of successive

governments, which had been content with tentative solutions to temporarily

38
«Η Βουλή. Η αγόρευσις του κ. Παναγιωτοπούλου. Ο πρωθυπουργός απαντά. Αι
συζητήσεις δια την νέαν σύμβασιν» [Parliament. The Speech of Mr. Panagiotopoulos.
The Prime Minister Answers. Discussions about the New Agreement], Αθήναι, 27
Ιανουαρίου 1908, 1-2.
39
ΠΣΒΒ, 250, 261.

239
satisfy currant producers. The Team, in contrast, tried to confront the currant

problem through discussions in Parliament on the basis of a long-term

national vision.

What is to be noted is that the Team of the Japanese demonstrated

that the government’s political stance, exposed by the Currant Scandal,

would also influence more or less the state’s foreign policy. The reason why

he demanded that the agreement should be not for the benefit of the company,

but for the currant producers, Panagiotopoulos explained, was not merely to

dissolve the collusive relationship between the government and the company,

but to contribute to a larger purpose, that is, the better future of Greece. He

contended if the state lacked the ability to recognize what the Privileged

Company had done was wrong and if it ran short of the strength to force the

company to reorient itself in a proper direction, it would not be able to

confront the Turks and the Bulgarians, who were archenemies of the Greeks

in the enterprise of territorial expansion. He warned the government that

present Greece could possibly trace the same disastrous path as ancient

Rome if it failed to discern good from bad. He claimed that Greece’s prestige

would depend on whether the government could maintain an ethical attitude

toward Parliament. 40

The discussion of the new agreement to be approved

40
«Η Βουλή. Η αγόρευσις του κ. Παναγιωτοπούλου», 1-2.

240
continued. :After amendments on February 3 and 6, the bill was passed on

February 14 in Parliament. On February 18, 1908, with the signature of the

king, it was enacted as Law 3247. 41 The law limited as much as possible the

profit the Privileged Company would earn. It defined that the company

would assume the obligation to purchase the surplus currants up to

approximately 18,000,000 Ven. lbs. on the market by July 31, 1908, using

money deposited by exporters. Then, if the deposit still remained in the

hands of the company, the law stipulated that the company would receive a

part of it, and that the remainder would be spent to reduce the financial

burden of the producers. The interest yielded from the cash deposit was

obliged to be utilized for the national cause and humanitarian purposes. The

Currant Scandal had come to an end, but only after a fashion.

It could be said that the Currant Scandal would not have been

discovered if the Team of the Japanese had not insistently asked to deliberate

the agreement between the government and the Privileged Company in

Parliament. The members of the Team opposed the fact that the government

was going to seal an agreement with the Privileged Company by way of

administrative procedure within the government. Instead, the Team asked the

government to permit Parliament to examine and sanction the agreement.


41
Εφημερίς της Κυβερνήσεως του Βασιλείου Ελλάδος [Government Gazette of the
Greek Kingdom], τεύχος Α΄, Αριθμός φύλλου 36, 20 Φεβρουαρίου 1908, 117-119.

241
They insisted that all matters connected with the well-being of the nation

should be openly debated in Parliament, where representatives of the people

were supposed to sit. Otherwise, the Team would not regard such agreements

as valid. In addition, they criticized the conduct of Simopoulos, who had

submitted a bill without careful consideration, and pointed out that the

government should be answerable to Parliament. Moreover, they stressed

that the Prime Minister, as the head of the government, should assume the

responsibility for his ministers’ actions and cultivate sensitivity to

parliamentary system in order to appropriately grapple with state affairs.

These were the hallmarks of effective parliamentarianism in the minds of the

Team of the Japanese.

The concept of parliamentarianism that the Team of the Japanese

espoused had a strong tendency to judge a political approach from an ethical

point of view. What was at stake was each deputy’s awareness of being a

representative of the nation. If deputies had been engaged in politics as such,

they would not have disregarded Parliament or made any shady decisions

behind the scenes. They would have attached great importance to Parliament.

If they had been cabinet members of the government, they would have

respected Parliament all the more.

What the Team of the Japanese asserted can be interpreted as the

promotion of a project to transform the consciousnesses of deputies. It was

242
not a kind of reform that could be achieved simply by reorganizing the

political structure through legislation. Rather, it was a matter of one’s

psychological preparedness as a politician for national politics. Therefore,

we can easily imagine why the arguments of the Team were not promptly

accepted, since politicians had long been accustomed to acting based on

parochial personal relations rather than ethical considerations.

Moreover, we should not ignore the fact that it was the

government’s scandalous behavior that helped the Team to crystallize a

political platform with respect to parliamentarianism. The Team’s idea of a

“just” parliamentary method sounded plausible only by setting it over

against the “unjust” manner of the government. The Team could effectively

demonstrate its existence in Parliament as progressive and reform-oriented

so long as the government continued to be “corrupt.” Paradoxically, the

Team needed the present government in its unreformed state so that the

former could grow into a full-fledged party and articulate more clearly its

political program.

It is not true, however, that the Team’s criticisms against the

government after the disclosure of the Currant Scandal did not have any

impact at all on the government. Although it resolved the predicament

caused by the Currant Scandal, the government recognized the necessity of

reshuffling the cabinet in order to bolster and reunify its party. Furthermore,

243
at this moment, Theotokis and some members of his party were forced to

seriously consider how to deal with the Team of the Japanese, which had

become a genuine annoyance for the government. The tentacles of the

government that aimed at deactivating the small but troublesome force were

about to reach the Team of the Japanese.

244
CHAPTER 7

The Dissolution of the Team of the Japanese

Most historians believe that the Team of the Japanese was

disbanded when Gounaris became the Minister of Finance in the Theotokis’

government in June 1908. Historical narratives describe Gounaris as the

ringleader who brought an end to the activities of the Team. 1

However, the road to the Team’s dissolution was not as simple as

historians have so far considered. We should not assume for a fact that

Gounaris’ taking office directly caused the Team of the Japanese to dissolve.

To be precise, the Team did not disappear from Parliament once Gounaris

entered Theotokis’ cabinet. The group continued to exist, albeit with fewer

members and less prominence. In fact, discord among the members partially

caused by the tactless manners of Dragoumis resulted in Gounaris’ departure

from the Team. Dragoumis’ miscalculations as the leader of the Team

intensified the pre-existing distrust among the members.

From March 1908 onward, contemporary newspapers wrote almost

1
Gunnar Hering, Die politischen Parteien in Griechenland 1821–1936, Teil 2
(München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1992), 659; Γρηγόριος Δαφνής, Τα ελληνικά πολιτικά
κόμματα [The Greek Political Parties] (Αθήνα: Γαλαξίας, 1961), 91; Hariton Korisis,
Die politischen Parteien Griechenlands: Ein neuer Staat auf dem Weg zur Demokratie
1821–1910 (Hersbruck/ Nürnberg: Verlag Karl Pfeiffer, 1966), 161; Γεώργιος Κ.
Ασπρέας, Πολιτική ιστορία της νεωτέρας Ελλάδος 1821–1928 [Political History of
Modern Greece 1821–1928], τόμος Γ΄ [vol. 3] (Αθήνα: Ιωάννης Ν. Σιδέρης, 1930), 86.

245
daily about whether the Team would form a coalition with Theotokis’ party.

These newspaper articles speculated about which members of the Team of

the Japanese might assume ministerial posts when both parties reached an

agreement on collaboration. As we shall see in detail later, the tone of the

mass media’s comments on this matter was generally negative because they

considered the Team an independent entity founded in order to supervise and

check the activities of the government. Therefore, when it became obvious

that Gounaris and Protopapadakis would move to Theotokis’ party, the press

furiously attacked them. The media regarded the two men as traitors not only

to their colleagues, but also to the Greek people who had entrusted the Team

with the restoration of Greek politics.

It is important to note that contemporary Greek society was keenly

interested in the response that the Team of the Japanese would have to an

invitation by Theotokis to form a coalition. The Team was falling apart, not

in a sense that people could not see, but rather, directly in front of their

noses.

Sources

Thanks to the great concern of the mass media and the public about

the fate of the Team of the Japanese, there are plenty of newspaper articles

related to the group’s status. They not only trace the progress of plans to

246
form a coalition with Theotokis’ party, although frequently on the basis of

uncertain sources or information, but they also include the opinions of the

Team members themselves.

Two statements are, in particular, important to our overall

understanding of the event. One was written by Protopapadakis and appeared

in the newspaper Patris on June 26 and 27, 1908, under the title

“Illuminating Backstage Politics: The History of the Japanese Team.” 2 The

other was a long open letter by Repoulis, which the newspaper Estia serially

published on June 29 and 30, and July 1, 1908, under the title “Our Political

Ethics as Seen from behind the Scenes.” 3 Protopapadakis and Repoulis most

embodied the polarization that had developed among members of the Team

of the Japanese. The former wrote, on behalf of those who had finally moved

to Theotokis’ party, that is, Gounaris and himself, in order to justify their

actions. In response to Protopapadakis, Repoulis demonstrated how wrong it

was, in terms of political ethics, that Gounaris and Protopapadakis had not

clung to the stance of the Team and joined the government party.

In addition to newspaper sources, we also have the correspondence

of the members. These include Gounaris’ two letters to Dragoumis, dated

2
Πέτρος Πρωτοπαπαδάκης, «Άπλετον φως εις τα πολιτικά παρασκήνια. Η ιστορία της
Ιαπωνικής ομάδος» [Illuminating Backstage Politics: The History of the Japanese
Team], Πατρίς, 26 Ιουνίου 1908, 1-2 και Πατρίς, 27 Ιουνίου 1908, 1-2.
3
Εμμανουήλ Ρέπουλης, «Από τα παρασκήνια των πολιτικών μας ηθών» [Our Political
Ethics as Seen from behind the Scenes], Εστία, 29 Ιουνίου 1908, 1, Εστία, 30 Ιουνίου
1908, 1 και Εστία, 1 Ιουλίου 1908, 1-2.

247
April 10, 1908, and April 22, 1908; Alexandris’ letter to Dragoumis, dated

June 26, 1908; and Dragoumis’ draft of a letter to Alexandris, dated July 3,

1908. Gounaris’ letters were written before Gounaris and Protopapadakis

finally left the Team. The other two letters were written after Gounaris

accepted the ministerial post of the Theotokis’ government.

What Happened First?

Georgios Baltatzis met Gounaris on behalf of Theotokis around the

middle of January 1908. The former asked the latter to discern whether

Dragoumis had any intention of collaborating with the government. 4

Gounaris immediately informed Protopapadakis about this meeting.

According to Protopapadakis, both Gounaris and he did not consider the

offer of collaboration at that time as fatal to the future of their party because

this was not the first time Theotokis’ party had made an overture of this kind

to either man. Every time any member of Theotokis’ party had approached

them about collaboration, they typically said in reply, “If Mr. Theotokis

really desires our collaboration with his party, let him appeal to Mr.

4
«Φως εις τα των Ιαπώνων. Πώς έχουν τα γεγονότα» [Throwing Light on the Events
of the Japanese. How Are the Events?], Ακρόπολις, 25 Απριλίου 1908, 1;
Πρωτοπαπαδάκης, «Άπλετον φως εις τα πολιτικά παρασκήνια», Πατρίς, 26 Ιουνίου
1908, 2; The article in Akropolis stated that the date when Baltatzis met Gounaris was
around one month before Carnival. Protopapadakis also wrote that he had heard from
Gounaris the latter’s meeting with Baltatzis about one month before Carnival. As
Carnival started on February 17, 1908, we can presume that the meeting between
Baltatzis and Gounaris took place at some point in the middle of January 1908.

248
Dragoumis for it.” 5 Thus, they did not take Baltatzis’ words seriously and

did not let Dragoumis know that there was an offer from Theotokis’ party.

Soon after, Parliament went into recess on February 15 for Carnival

and adjourned until March 19. During this break, Gounaris happened to see

Baltatzis one day at a meeting of an association to which both of them

belonged. At that time, Baltatzis told Gounaris that someone had already

conveyed to Dragoumis Theotokis’ desire for collaboration with the Team of

the Japanese. According to Baltatzis, Dragoumis also knew that Baltatzis had

entrusted Gounaris to pass the message about a potential partnership along to

Dragoumis. 6

Surprised by these revelations, Gounaris, in the company of

Protopapadakis, immediately visited Dragoumis. The two men explained to

Dragoumis why they had not previously informed him of the offer for a

partnership with Theotokis’ party, an offer that they said they regarded as

negligible. Dragoumis replied that he had known of the proposal through his

sister and he did not accuse them of procrastination. Instead, he said that

Theotokis would need to seek out the Team’s collaboration, but that

Dragoumis could not provide an answer until all the members had discussed

the offer together. As a result, he suggested that the members of the Team

5 Πρωτοπαπαδάκης, «Άπλετον φως εις τα πολιτικά παρασκήνια», Πατρίς, 26 Ιουνίου


1908, 2.
6 «Φως εις τα των Ιαπώνων. Πώς έχουν τα γεγονότα», 1; Πρωτοπαπαδάκης, «Άπλετον

φως εις τα πολιτικά παρασκήνια», Πατρίς, 26 Ιουνίου 1908, 2.

249
would meet as soon as Parliament resumed. 7

The Meeting on March 20, 1908

On March 20, when Parliament resumed, all the members of the

Team, except Panagiotopoulos, came together. 8 Repoulis claimed that the

meeting was held at his request. Since mid-March, rumors had abounded in

the print media that the Theotokis’ government would offer two ministerial

posts to the Japanese in an upcoming cabinet reshuffle. Under these

circumstances, Repoulis demanded that Dragoumis explain what was really

happening with respect to the cabinet reorganization and where their Team

was situated at the moment. 9

The first thing Dragoumis said at the meeting was that Theotokis

had made no direct proposal for collaboration. Rather, Baltatzis was only

attempting to sound out Dragoumis’ views on collaboration. According to

Dragoumis, since he personally had always had friendly relations with

Theotokis, he could reach an agreement with Theotokis without hindrance.

However, he added, the Team had its principles and ideas to uphold.

Dragoumis argued that if Theotokis thought it inevitable to work with the

7 «Φως εις τα των Ιαπώνων», 1; Πρωτοπαπαδάκης, «Άπλετον φως εις τα πολιτικά


παρασκήνια», Πατρίς, 26 Ιουνίου 1908,2.
8
«Φως εις τα των Ιαπώνων», 1; Ρέπουλης, «Από τα παρασκήνια των πολιτικών μας
ηθών», Εστία, 1 Ιουλίου 1908, 1-2.
9
Ρέπουλης, «Από τα παρασκήνια των πολιτικών μας ηθών», Εστία, 1 Ιουλίου 1908, 1.

250
Team, then Theotokis himself, as the highest member of the government,

should come to see him. Neither Theotokis nor any direct envoy had visited

Dragoumis to date. 10

Gounaris proceeded to recommend that the Team discuss what the

party’s response would be to such an eventuality, since a proposal for

collaboration seemed likely. Dragoumis said, “We have definite principles

that we apply when evaluating persons and things. We should see if Mr.

Theotokis intends to agree with the ideas of the Team.” 11 Repoulis

categorically rejected collaboration with Theotokis’ party, believing that the

government only sought to reinforce its party through the collaboration with

the Team of the Japanese and would surely damage the Team’s principles. 12

At this point, Vozikis stated that it was not proper to decline in advance a

proposal that had not yet been made in reality and the concrete content of

which the members did not know. He even went so far as to say, “If we are

presented the opportunity to take over the leadership of the government party,

then shouldn’t we accept it?” Although Repoulis continued to oppose

collaboration, the other members concluded that they should wait to hear the

offer from Theotokis before discussing how they might respond. Gounaris

was tasked with delivering to Baltatzis the message that Dragoumis eagerly

10 Ρέπουλης, «Από τα παρασκήνια των πολιτικών μας ηθών», Εστία, 1 Ιουλίου 1908, 1.
11 Ρέπουλης, «Από τα παρασκήνια των πολιτικών μας ηθών», Εστία, 1 Ιουλίου 1908, 1.
12 Ρέπουλης, «Από τα παρασκήνια των πολιτικών μας ηθών», Εστία, 1 Ιουλίου 1908, 1.

251
awaited the proposal from Theotokis because the Team did not on principle

refuse any collaboration with the government. 13

Even though the Team had collectively decided to be open to an

offer from Theotokis, Repoulis was uncomfortable about Dragoumis’

attitude. He wrote retrospectively in his open letter about the meeting of that

day, “The final conclusion of Mr. Dragoumis was that…he did not expect it

would be easy to reach an agreement with Mr. Theotokis. Neither did he

truly believe that Mr. Theotokis would visit him to exchange their views.” 14

Conflicting Information and Criticism in the Mass Media

The news coverage of possible collaboration between the Team of

the Japanese and Theotokis’ party emerged subsequently in several Athenian

newspapers. It was unexpectedly conflicting and in most cases based on

uncertain sources.

According to the newspaper Chronos on March 21, 1908,

negotiations about forming a coalition comprised of the two parties had

entered the final stages. Chronos reported that the details of the agreement

would be defined in a couple of days. It mentioned that Gounaris and

Protopapadakis met Nikolaos Boufidis and Baltatzis, deputies of Theotokis’

13 «Φως εις τα των Ιαπώνων. Πώς έχουν τα γεγονότα», 1; Πρωτοπαπαδάκης, «Άπλετον


φως εις τα πολιτικά παρασκήνια», Πατρίς, 26 Ιουνίου 1908, 2.
14 Ρέπουλης, «Από τα παρασκήνια των πολιτικών μας ηθών», Εστία, 1 Ιουλίου 1908, 1.

252
party, on March 19 to discuss each side’s basic stance on their partnership. In

their discussions, Chronos reported, Boufidis admitted that Theotokis would

offer three ministerial posts to the Team of the Japanese, that is, Minister of

Foreign Affairs for Dragoumis, Minister of the Interior for Gounaris, and

Minister of Justice for Protopapadakis. 15

The article in the newspaper Estia on March 21 entitled

“Harakiri—Trap for a Wolf,” criticized the possibility that the Japanese were

to join hands with the Theotokis’ government. It wrote:

“Harakiri,” the act by which real Japanese disembowel themselves,


would make a favorable impression in comparison with the way in
which…our Japanese in Parliament are planning to commit suicide
by merging with Theotokis’ party.
But theirs is not even a suicide.…They only set a trap, which was
a well-known tactic in the Russo–Japanese War, for Theotokis.
Every issue they brought up and every opposition [they displayed]
were nothing but the presentation of an inaugural dissertation for
ministership (εναίσιμος διατριβή επί υπουργία). 16

Although it still suspected that the news of a coalition was merely a rumor,

Estia condemned the Team of the Japanese, which had been regarded as a

bold and excellent party in its activity, for faltering from its purpose and

succumbing to the lure of power.

15
«Οριστική σύμπραξις Ιαπώνων–Θεοτόκη» [Definite Collaboration of the Japanese
and Theotokis’ Party], Χρόνος, 21 Μαρτίου 1908, 4.
16
«Χαρακίρι—Λυκοπαγίδες» [Harakiri—Trap for a Wolf], Εστία, 21 Μαρτίου 1908, 1.

253
On March 22, the newspaper Chronos reported that bickering

among members of Theotokis’ party over who could be a cabinet member

suggested that only two ministerial posts would be offered to the Team of the

Japanese, that is, Minister of Foreign Affairs for Dragoumis and Minister of

the Interior for Gounaris. In addition, Chronos wrote, Repoulis and Vozikis

would not follow their colleagues when the Team collaborated with the

government. However, the newspaper also reported that Protopapadakis

claimed that such a plan had been called off, while Baltatzis denied all the

rumors of any cooperation between the two parties. 17

On the same day, the newspaper Skrip also addressed the political

unrest provoked by speculation that the Team of the Japanese would join

forces with Theotokis’ party. On the one hand, two additional opposition

parties—Mavromichalis’ and Rallis’—were cautiously waiting for the denial

of the rumors. On the other hand, members of Theotokis’ party eagerly

discussed ways in which they could work together with the Japanese. Some

said that they would take only Gounaris on their side, while others argued

that not only Gounaris but also Dragoumis and Protopapadakis would join

them. Another rumor making rounds was that all cooperation between the

two parties would be off. Some attributed the end of the talks about

17
«Τα του Φουρνιέ και τα των Ιαπώνων—Μόνον δύο υπουργεία
προσφέρονται—Ιαπωνικά ανακατώματα» [The Issues on Fournier and on the
Japanese—Only Two Ministries Are Offered—Japanese Confusions], Χρόνος, 22
Μαρτίου 1908, 4.

254
cooperation to the differences on diplomatic policy between Theotokis and

Dragoumis. Others guessed that the plan to join together had been

abandoned because Theotokis could not stomach the number of ministerial

posts the Team of the Japanese demanded. 18

On March 22, Skrip also carried a front-page editorial commenting

on the potential collaboration of the two parties. The editorial argued that it

might be a good idea that Theotokis would offer cabinet posts to Gounaris

and Protopapadakis who were ardently supported by public opinion. Since

the incumbent government had grown stale, only the injection of such new

blood could rejuvenate Theotokis’ party. Yet Skrip also addressed the

potentially negative aspects of collaboration. If Gounaris and Protopapadakis

joined hands with the government, they would lose their good reputations in

Parliament and therefore possibly suffer in terms of their future political

careers. It was likely that both men would come to be regarded as traitors.

Consequently, Skrip quietly objected to any alliance between the Team and

the government. 19

We do not know either where these newspapers got their

information about any possible collaboration between the two parties, or the

degree to which what they published was true. However, it appears that no

18
«Η δήθεν σύμπραξις Θεοτοκικών–Ιαπώνων» [The Alleged Collaboration between
the Theotokists and the Japanese], Σκριπ, 22 Μαρτίου 1908, 4.
19
«Η θέση των» [Their Position], Σκριπ. 22 Μαρτίου 1908, 1.

255
concrete negotiations for the alliance of the two parties were underway at

that point in March 1908. An official offer of ministerial posts to the Team of

the Japanese had not yet been made. These rumors were in fact fuelled by

the dearth of accurate information. Nevertheless, during this short period of

time, the underlying structure of the polarization within the

Team—Protopapadakis and Gounaris versus the other members—that would

deliver a fatal blow to the group’s continuation, was becoming clear in the

tone of the press.

Three months later, Protopapadakis would suggest that one of the

members of the Team of the Japanese had leaked the collaboration plans to

the mass media. He also mentioned that the person who had written at least

two of the articles—“Harakiri” in Estia and the editorial in Skrip—had

wanted to personally attack Gounaris and Protopapadakis for his own gain.

Although Protopapadakis did not mention who he thought had written them,

it was obvious that Protopapadakis believed that Repoulis was behind both

articles. 20 In return, Repoulis reported that he was falsely charged because

he did not have any authority to mobilize the media. 21

20
Πρωτοπαπαδάκης, «Άπλετον φως εις τα πολιτικά παρασκήνια», Πατρίς, 26 Ιουνίου
1908, 2.
21
Ρέπουλης, «Από τα παρασκήνια των πολιτικών μας ηθών», Εστία, 1 Ιουλίου 1908, 2.

256
Dragoumis’ Decision

Parliament adjourned its session after Lazarus Saturday in

preparation for the Easter holidays. The next day, on April 6, Boufidis

invited Gounaris to his house where the latter met Theotokis. The newspaper

Akropolis wrote, “Theotokis found out that Gounaris was a friend of the

followers of the [government] party, but not a friend of the government.” 22

It is not easy to interpret what this phrase really means, but one possibility is

that Theotokis made an offer of a ministerial post to Gounaris and the latter

declined it. We do not know the details of their encounter. What we do know,

however, was that Gounaris went immediately to see Protopapadakis and

appeared anxious. Gounaris reported that he had met Theotokis at Boufidis’

house and that Theotokis had entrusted Boufidis to relay an offer of

cooperation to Dragoumis. We can only guess why Gounaris looked nervous.

Did his anxiety come from the fact that Theotokis’ party would directly

approach Dragoumis about the issue of collaborating for the first time since

the Team was established? Or did something else disturb his peace of mind,

such an offer of a ministerial post? In any case, Alexandris and Vozikis

joined Gounaris and Protopapadakis later on that day and learned of

Gounaris’ meeting with Theotokis. 23

22
The newspaper Akropolis wrote about the meeting between Theotokis and Gounaris
though it did not reveal the source of information. «Φως εις τα των Ιαπώνων», 1.
23
Πρωτοπαπαδάκης, «Άπλετον φως εις τα πολιτικά παρασκήνια», Πατρίς, 27 Ιουνίου

257
On April 8, Protopapadakis, Gounaris, and Vozikis visited

Dragoumis because Dragoumis had determined that the Team of the

Japanese would collaborate with Theotokis’ party and wanted to explain his

decision in person. As Alexandris had to return to his constituency, he left a

message for Dragoumis saying that he would follow the decision Dragoumis

had already made. 24

Dragoumis announced that Boufidis had visited him on the previous

day on behalf of Theotokis to inform Dragoumis that Theotokis wished to

collaborate with the Team under Dragoumis’ leadership. Thus, although

Dragoumis would not personally join Theotokis’ party, he had resolved that

the Team of the Japanese would cooperate with the government.

Dragoumis then explained his reasoning. First, he was convinced

that their independent efforts as the Team of the Japanese were likely to end

in vain, considering the present political situation. He had expected, since

launching the Team, that other deputies would sympathize with their ideas

and join them. However, in reality, no one had approached them, which

discouraged him. Dragoumis said that he had already decided to withdraw

from the political world forever after the present parliamentary period was

over, and he predicted that this would spark the dissolution of the Team.

1908, 1.
24 Πρωτοπαπαδάκης, «Άπλετον φως εις τα πολιτικά παρασκήνια», Πατρίς, 27 Ιουνίου

1908, 1.

258
After the Team was disbanded, he believed that, in principle, every member

should be able to follow the road that each one regarded as proper. In a sense,

the offer from Theotokis’ party of collaboration only accelerated the demise

of the Team as an independent political unit, the idea which Dragoumis had

been already nursing in his mind. 25

Second, Dragoumis considered a two-party system in Parliament as

most conducive to the effective functioning of the constitutional mechanisms.

As such, the members of the Team of the Japanese, he thought, should join

an existing party after the Team’s disintegration. Dragoumis believed that

their abilities could be deployed more effectively in Theotokis’ party than in

any other bloc because that party was sufficiently rooted in the nation and

was destined to govern the state better than others. 26

He concluded his talk by saying that he desired to help his Team

members become active and effective members of Theotokis’ party without

damaging their reputations or political pride. In the end, Dragoumis added

that he had not summoned Panagiotopoulos and Repoulis to the meeting

because he understood that neither of them would agree to any cooperation

with Theotokis’ party. However, Dragoumis promised that he would inform

them of his decision and then meet Theotokis when the latter returned to

25
Πρωτοπαπαδάκης, «Άπλετον φως εις τα πολιτικά παρασκήνια», Πατρίς, 27 Ιουνίου
1908, 2.
26
Πρωτοπαπαδάκης, «Άπλετον φως εις τα πολιτικά παρασκήνια», Πατρίς, 27 Ιουνίου
1908, 2.

259
Athens from Kerkira. The meeting ended after all the members present

agreed to follow Dragoumis’ decision, even if that man would later change

his mind. 27

Gounaris’ Agony

There was one thing that Dragoumis did not relay to the members

present that day. When he had met Boufidis, Boufidis had not only proposed

cooperation with the Team of the Japanese, but he had also offered a

ministerial post to Gounaris. Dragoumis intentionally withheld this detail

from the members because he thought that it would hurt their feelings and

make Gounaris anxious. 28 Gounaris himself must have known at least

before April 10 that the content of the offer from Theotokis had included a

post for him in a new cabinet, though we cannot pinpoint when and how he

first received this proposal. Was it on the day when Gounaris met Theotokis?

Or did Dragoumis tell Gounaris before the other members assembled at his

house on April 8? Or did Dragoumis personally inform him of it after the

Team’s meeting on April 8? 29

27 Πρωτοπαπαδάκης, «Άπλετον φως εις τα πολιτικά παρασκήνια», Πατρίς, 27 Ιουνίου


1908, 2.
28 Πρωτοπαπαδάκης, «Άπλετον φως εις τα πολιτικά παρασκήνια», Πατρίς, 27 Ιουνίου

1908, 2.
29
The newspaper Chronos wrote on April 8, 1908, that Boufidis repeatedly saw
Gounaris to let him know that Theotokis wanted him as a minister. It reported that
Gounaris did not seem opposed to this offer, but he asked Boufidis to first reach an
agreement with Dragoumis. It foresaw that their discussion would proceed to Gounaris’

260
In any case, Gounaris was not pleasantly surprised by this overture.

What we notice first is that his letter to Dragoumis on April 10 is rather

agonized and self-deprecating. After Gounaris expressed his understanding

and appreciation that Dragoumis had been engaged in settling the ongoing

concerns about a cooperative arrangement, he wrote:

It is not precise to say that I am totally indifferent to whatever


solution has been found. I have to tell you precisely that a possible
solution to the matter, which would impose on me other obligations
besides those I have already assumed as a deputy, leaves me with a
certain anxiety. It is because I cannot overlook the fact that my
abilities are insufficient and that I have not properly prepared to
perform these duties. 30

Throughout the letter Gounaris did not specify what he meant by

“obligations.” He never used words like “minister” or “cabinet member.”

Taking into consideration, however, that the obligations he mentioned would

bring him a personal burden of greater responsibilities, we can guess that he

was confessing that he did not feel equipped to assume the commitment that

would accompany a ministerial position. This is clearer in the following

passage of the same letter.

I cannot but say to you that I would feel greatly relieved if you …

advantage. «Πολιτική ζύμωσις. Ο Γούναρης θεοτοκικός και υπουργός» [Political Game.


Gounaris, Theotokist and Minister], Χρόνος, 8 Απριλίου 1908, 6.
30
ΑΣΔ, Φακ. 156, υπoφακ. 156.2, εγγρ. 37.

261
were to judge other colleagues of our Team to be more capable in
the task and thereby release me from the duty which, I confess, I
consider quite difficult. 31

Thus, it is evident that Gounaris was writing about the responsibilities that

he would take on if he were to become a cabinet member of the Theotokis’

government. He even asked for Dragoumis to choose someone else from

their Team to bear the burden of responsibility in his stead. It is not obvious,

however, why Gounaris was so anxious about the duties entailed in a cabinet

position. On the one hand, as he wrote, he was simply uneasy about his

ability to serve as an effective minister. On the other hand, he may have

feared that his colleagues would conclude that he had worked with them so

far only for the purpose of fulfilling his personal political ambitions. In

reality, he admitted in his letter that disagreement among the members

concerning cooperation with the government unnerved him. In addition, he

wrote that groundless rumors about cabinet reshuffles, which were

oftentimes unfair and malicious, had crucially weakened the cohesion of the

members of the Team at this time.

Probably Gounaris sensed that his colleagues would not

wholeheartedly approve of his becoming a minister. Precisely for this reason,

he needed the firm support of Dragoumis, whom Gounaris believed was the

31
ΑΣΔ, Φακ. 156, υπoφακ. 156.2, εγγρ. 37.

262
only person that could dispel their colleagues’ suspicions against him. He

wrote:

I think that only under the condition that you think this is an
imperative and unavoidable obligation for the country, would it be
proper for us to follow the course which some colleagues find it
impossible to agree to. 32

Having said that, Gounaris asked Dragoumis to reconfirm that it was only

Dragoumis’ own initiative that was pushing the Team to work with

Theotokis’ party, which implied that Gounaris would assume such

obligations for the country. In another part of his letter Gounaris again

appealed to Dragoumis to deal with the matter in a way in which no doubts

would arise in volatile political spheres about Gounaris’ intention. That, he

emphasized, would depend entirely on Dragoumis.

As a final note he wrote that he trusted Dragoumis’ judgment and

experience and confirmed that he would agree to whatever solution future

negotiations gave rise to, as long as Dragoumis considered it appropriate. He

ended his letter by wishing Dragoumis a happy Easter, which was just three

days away.

32
ΑΣΔ, Φακ. 156, υποφακ. 156.2, εγγρ. 37.

263
The Mass Media’s Attack on Protopapadakis and Gounaris

In reality, Dragoumis’ intentions of dissolving the Team of the

Japanese by cooperating with Theotokis’ party proceeded somewhat

differently than he had had in mind. On April 14, the day after Easter Sunday,

the editorial in the newspaper Estia dealt with the issues of the cabinet

reform and a coalition with the Team of the Japanese. Even if, it argued,

Theotokis’ offers had enticed some within the Team, they were unlikely to

persuade all members to collaborate with the government. The editorial

emphasized that the Team had assumed obligations to society and earned its

fame in return through the support of the public. It predicted that any joint

cooperation would alienate the public and humiliate the members. Therefore,

it discouraged the Team from working together with the government. Instead,

it proposed that the Team keep faithful to public opinion, working under

Dragoumis’ leadership. 33

The above-mentioned editorial did not indicate who exactly was

supposed to have been tempted by Theotokis’ offers. However, it was clear

through the tone of the press generally that Protopapadakis and Gounaris

were widely suspected of being prepared to abandon the other Japanese

members for Theotokis’ party. By spreading such rumors, the press further

33
«Οι Ιάπωνες και το κόκκαλο» [The Japanese and the Bone], Εστία, 14 Απριλίου
1908, 1.

264
aggravated the alleged conflict between Protopapadakis and Gounaris on the

one hand, and the rest of the members on the other. Throughout the

subsequent week, the media continued to openly campaign against the two

men more aggressively than before. They accused Gounaris and

Protopapadakis of betraying the Team by concluding a secret agreement with

Theotokis. In a satirical periodical, Gounaris and Protopapadakis were no

longer called “Japanese” but rather “Korean.” 34 Akropolis severely

criticized those who had apparently forgotten the original ideas of the Team

and were leaving for the government.

For us, [the Team of] the Japanese was not a typical group whose
ideal was to enter the government by any means necessary. We had
considered them to be a revolutionary banner promising to restore
our entire political situation. [We had expected that] they would
work not only inside Parliament, but especially outside Parliament,
in order to lead people to stand up for political restoration. [We had
thought that] through their actions they would be able to win with
their sword and save the country, instead of seizing the first bone
that [Theotokis] threw. 35

An editorial in Estia on April 21 entitled “If You Want, Let All Be

Revealed—The Desertion of Two Japanese” finally caused Protopapadakis

to lose his temper. The article stated that, around the time of Parliament’s

34
«Σημείωσις» [Memorandum], Αθήναι, 18 Απριλίου, 1908, 2.
35
«Περιττός πλέον πας λόγος» [Enough of Any Word], Ακρόπολις, 20 Απριλίου, 1908,
1.

265
Carnival recess, both Gounaris and Protopapadakis had met deputies of

Theotokis’ party to realize collaboration plans with Theotokis, but that the

two men had not informed the other Team members of their intentions.

Furthermore, it asserted that after Theotokis’ party reached agreement with

the two men, an agent of Theotokis visited Dragoumis to enquire whether or

not he would consent to Theotokis’ giving a ministerial position to Gounaris

and Protopapadakis’ leaving the Team following Gounaris. Then, Dragoumis

had a meeting with the other Team members to discuss this issue. The

conclusion they had drawn was supposed that the Team, under the leadership

of Dragoumis, would assume a hands-off attitude toward Gounaris’ and

Protopapadakis’ possible departure. According to the editorial, the Team

judged that since the two men’s agreement with Theotokis’ party was

personal and irrelevant to the Team, it was inappropriate to comment on this

matter. 36 This claim was far from the reality of Dragoumis’ decision on

April 8 to directly notify Protopapadakis and other Team members present at

Dragoumis’ house. As soon as he read this editorial, Protopapadakis headed

for Dragoumis, and said that he could no longer tolerate such slanderous

accounts in newspapers. In addition, he thought it necessary to ask

Dragoumis whether the latter thought it proper to take measures to stop such

36
«Αν Θέλετε ας αποκαλυφθούν όλα—Η αποσκίρτησις των δυο Ιαπώνων» [If You
Want, Let All Be Revealed—The Desertion of Two Japanese], Εστία, 21 Απριλίου 1908,
1.

266
commentary. 37

Dragoumis’ “About-Face”

Protopapadakis heard something totally unexpected from

Dragoumis. Dragoumis said that the editorial in Estia did not seem

slanderous, which surprised Protopapadakis very much. Protopapadakis

claimed that it slandered both Gounaris and himself because it accused the

two of betraying Dragoumis. Protopapadakis tried to remind Dragoumis of

developments regarding cooperation with Theotokis’ party. Contrary to press

accounts, he insisted that he and Gounaris had in fact consulted Dragoumis

about the matter in advance. In addition, Protopapadakis reminded

Dragoumis of the latter’s own decision on April 8 that the Team would

collaborate with the government party. On that day, Gounaris,

Protopapadakis, Vozikis, and Alexandris had agreed that they would abide by

Dragoumis’ decision.

Somewhat out of the blue, Dragoumis replied to Protopapadakis

that the Team had agreed to collaborate with Theotokis’ party on one

condition, which was that no one in the Team would oppose such

cooperation. It was evident that this requirement had not been met from the

beginning. Dragoumis himself had said on April 8 that Panagiotopoulos and

37Πρωτοπαπαδάκης, «Άπλετον φως εις τα πολιτικά παρασκήνια», Πατρίς, 27 Ιουνίου


1908, 2.

267
Repoulis did not have the same opinion about the collaboration plan. In spite

of this fact, Dragoumis declared his decision that the Team would cooperate

with Theotokis. It seemed to Protopapadakis that Dragoumis’ attitude was

absurdly illogical and hard to understand.

Then Dragoumis began to speak about what had happened after the

meeting on April 8, which was all new to Protopapadakis. On April 14,

Dragoumis had invited Panagiotopoulos and Repoulis to come together with

Vozikis. Panagiotopoulos and Repoulis asserted that the Team should not

work together with the government as long as even one member objected.

Dragoumis apparently agreed with them, in this way going back on his

earlier decision of April 8. Since full support from all members of the Team

seemed unlikely, Dragoumis had deemed it no longer necessary to meet

Theotokis to negotiate the exact terms of a partnership.

Dragoumis added that Panagiotopoulos was deeply offended,

believing that negotiations to make Gounaris minister were proceeding

behind the scenes. According to Protopapadakis, this was the first time he

had heard that Boufidis had made an offer of a ministerial post to Gounaris

on April 7. At the meeting on April 8, Dragoumis had only said that Boufidis

proposed to join forces with the Team. Protopapadakis asserted that

Dragoumis had not even hinted that an offer of a portfolio had been made for

Gounaris. He demanded an explanation for Dragoumis’ deception.

268
Dragoumis revealed for the first time to Protopapadakis that he had kept the

proposal secret because he thought it would displease other members and

also that it would cause Gounaris anxiety. 38

Protopapadakis’ Anger and Gounaris’ Disappointment

A major question that occurred to Protopapadakis was why

Dragoumis had not informed the other members of his change of mind.

Furthermore, he was unconvinced by Dragoumis’ explanation.

Protopapadakis saw Dragoumis twice after the latter talked with Repoulis

and Panagiotopoulos. Since the members who gathered on April 8 had

agreed that they would follow Dragoumis even if he changed his decision, it

was Dragoumis’ duty to inform them of his new stance. Dragoumis clearly

sided with Panagiotopoulos and Repoulis without notifying Protopapadakis,

Gounaris, and Alexandris.

Dragoumis’ unfaithful “about-face” infuriated Protopapadakis. He

could no longer conceal his anger, especially after he read the letter from

Gounaris to Dragoumis dated April 10, which Dragoumis showed

Protopapadakis. Protopapadakis now understood that, although Dragoumis

had known from the letter that Gounaris placed full confidence in him, he

did not even inform Gounaris of his change of heart regarding the Team’s

38Πρωτοπαπαδάκης, «Άπλετον φως εις τα πολιτικά παρασκήνια», Πατρίς, 27 Ιουνίου


1908, 2.

269
cooperation with Theotokis’ party.

Protopapadakis thought that all plans for cooperation between the

two parties had come to nothing as a result of Dragoumis’ “about-face,” and

therefore deemed it useless to grapple with the matter any longer. What most

concerned him now was who was spreading the vicious rumors against

Gounaris and him. He claimed that Repoulis and Panagiotopoulos were the

persons responsible for the speculation. He added that Panagiotopoulos

called him “Gounaris’ political pimp” in front of his relatives because

Panagiotopoulos believed that Protopapadakis had laid the groundwork for

Gounaris to become a minister.

Finally, Protopapadakis asked Dragoumis. “How will we be able to

work with these two as before?” “Who should leave the Team, they or we?”

Dragoumis said, “Of course, I do not agree with either way, but I do not

think it possible for us all to work together in the future.” 39

Dragoumis’ change of mind was transmitted to Gounaris through

Protopapadakis, who left for Patras to see Gounaris on April 22. Gounaris

wrote the following letter to Dragoumis on the same day.

I was surprised to hear from Mr. Protopapadakis, who came here to


relate what you told him yesterday. I confess that I had difficulty
believing his words and the information I have surely obtained that

39
Πρωτοπαπαδάκης, «Άπλετον φως εις τα πολιτικά παρασκήνια», Πατρίς, 27 Ιουνίου
1908, 2.

270
the offensive tone against me and Mr. Protopapadakis in the media
emanated from your office. In spite of what Mr. Protopapadakis told
me, together with this information, there is nothing that I can do but
express my regret about what has happened. I also ask your
forgiveness because I have not known what you thought of me. I
thought that I was allowed to maintain ties with you. But I learned
at the last moment that you were displeased with our ties, which you
hastened to sever, particularly in this manner. 40

We do not know how accurately Protopapadakis described to Gounaris his

last meeting with Dragoumis. It is possible that he exaggerated Dragoumis’

breach of trust. In any case, however, Gounaris did believe Protopapadakis

and decided to leave the Team with him. Although he tried to be calm in his

letter quoted here, it conveyed his disappointment to Dragoumis in a quiet

but firm tone.

After returning from Patras, Protopapadakis said in an interview

with Akropolis on April 24, “As long as Mr. Dragoumis officially denies his

insults against Mr. Gounaris and me, neither of us can be his friends.” 41

Thus Gounaris and Protopapadakis broke off their relationship with the

Team of the Japanese, which now consisted of just five members.

40
ΑΣΔ, Φακ. 156, υποφακ. 156.2, εγγρ. 38.
41
«Η διάσπασις των Ιαπώνων» [The Split of the Japanese], Ακρόπολις, 24 Απριλίου
1908, 3.

271
The Remaining Five Members of the Team of the Japanese

On April 24, the same day that Protopapadakis announced his

departure from the Team to his colleagues in the newspaper, Parliament went

into recess. During the adjournment, however, the mass media continued to

follow the members of the Team. They reported rumors that Gounaris and

Protopapadakis had betrayed their fellow party members in order to obtain

ministerial posts. Although some thought this betrayal had provoked disunity

within the Team, the general public did not yet know the content of Team

discussions or the real source of dissension among members. They were

eager to know what had caused the schism in the Team and were concerned

about its future. What would become of the Team? Would it continue to exist

independently, or would it form a partnership with a party other than

Theotokis’? In public, Dragoumis was silent about these matters.

When Dragoumis, Vozikis, and Repoulis visited Panagiotopoulos at

Aigio in the beginning of May, there were various conjectures in the media

about the reason for their visit. The men rejected rumors that they had gone

to Aigio with some political intent and instead explained that

Panagiotopoulos had merely invited them there for a carefree outing. In fact,

they claimed that there was nothing to announce about the Team of the

Japanese. However, some sources said that the three men had gone to Aigio

to convince Panagiotopoulos not to defect to Rallis’ party. Others believed

272
that they got together in order to discuss possibly collaborating with

Rallis’. 42

A journalist of Neologos, the newspaper of Patras, was fortunate

enough to have arranged an interview with Dragoumis during his stay in

Aigio. However, Dragoumis did not give any specific answers to the

questions of why Gounaris and Protopapadakis had broken off relations with

the Team or of how Dragoumis intended to lead the Team from now on. He

only answered one question clearly. The journalist said, “We would like to

know at least whether the Team will continue to exist as before.” In reply,

Dragoumis said, “What is certain is that we used to be seven, but we are five

now.” The journalist also asked Panagiotopoulos. “Are you all going to

remain members of the Team, as Dragoumis said?” The latter said with a

smile, “Of course, we will continue to support our ideas and to work for the

nation’s good.” 43

Immediately after Repoulis and Vozikis left Aigio, Alexandris

arrived there. He had met with Gounaris before visiting Aigio. In response to

questions from the press, he denied that he had had conversations about the

ongoing unrest within their Team, either with Gounaris or with

Panagiotopoulos and Dragoumis. One journalist asked whether Alexandris

42
«Εκδρομή Ιαπώνων εις Αίγιον» [Excursion of the Japanese to Aigio], Νεολόγος, 3
Μαΐου 1908, 2.
43
«Εν μέσω Ιαπώνων» [Amidst the Japanese], Νεολόγος, 5 Μαΐου, 1908, 1.

273
was going to follow Gounaris and Protopapadakis. Alexandris went so far as

to say that he did not even know whether the two men had broken away from

the other members, or even the extent to which the pair had different ideas

from the others. However, he was more loquacious than his colleagues about

the future. He said that although he did not know what the Team was going

to look like, it could be considered a fait accompli that Gounaris would

become a minister after the cabinet reshuffle. 44

Behind the Scenes of the Cabinet Reshuffle

Contrary to Alexandris’ remarks, the cabinet reorganization did not

go without a hitch. A considerable number of twists and turns were taken

before Gounaris was appointed as Minister of Finance.

Newspapers circulated different information daily about which post

Gounaris might get. One day it was reported that Gounaris would become

the Minister of Justice, while the next day it was said that he would become

the Minister of the Interior. They also speculated that Theotokis would not

shake up his entire cabinet but only the post of Minister of Finance, to which

he intended to appoint Gounaris. In fact, not all the members of the

government party welcome Gounaris with open arms. It was reported that

some other candidates for ministerial posts showed their displeasure over the

44
«Τα Ιαπωνικά» [The Issues on the Japanese], Χρόνος, 9 Μαΐου, 1908, 4.

274
possibility of Gounaris entering the cabinet. 45 Interestingly enough,

Gounaris had been silent amid this frenzy over a cabinet reshuffle.

Gounaris was appointed as Minister of Finance at the last minute.

The new ministers took the oath of office on June 21. Surely Gounaris was

the most public personage in the new cabinet and therefore expected to

accomplish something fresh and different, just as he had inspired hopes

through his activity with the Team of the Japanese. Heron Goodhart of the

British Legation at Athens wrote in a report about the formation of the

reorganized cabinet, “M. Gounaris, deputy for Patras and an able lawyer, has

never before held office. He was previously a Dragoumist, and himself the

leader of a small party, and it will be interesting to see whether his followers

accompany him in his change of allegiance. He is said to be largely

responsible for the resignation of M. Simopoulos, whose place he has now

taken.” 46

45
«Η πολιτική κατάστασις. Η παραίτησις του κ. Βοκοτοπούλου. Τί λέγει για την
μεταρρύθμισιν» [The Political Situation. The Resignation of Mr. Vokotopoulos. What
Does He Say about the Reform?], Χρόνος, 2 Ιουνίου 1908, 3-4; «Η πολιτική
κατάστασις. Η συμπλήρωσις των δύο υπουργών. Ποίοι οι νέοι υπουργοί. Μία
απάντησις του κ. Σιμόπουλου. Η πρόσληψις του κ. Γούναρη» [The Political Situation.
The Replenishment of Two Ministers. Who Are New Ministers? An Answer of Mr.
Simopoulos. The Invitation of Mr. Gounaris], Χρόνος, 7 Ιουνίου 1908, 3; «Η πολιτική
κατάστασις. Διατί εναυάγησεν η μεταρρύθμισις» [The Political Situation. Why Did the
Reform Fail?], Χρόνος, 9 Ιουνίου 1908, 3; «Η πρόσληψις του κ. Γούναρη. Αντίδρασις
εκ μέρους των υπουργών» [The Invitation of Mr. Gounaris. Reaction from Ministers],
Χρόνος, 19 Ιουνίου 1908, 3.
46
FO 371/465, No. 24061. It seems that Goodhart believed that Gounaris had been the
leader of the Team of the Japanese.

275
Repoulis’ Criticism against Protopapadakis

The turmoil among the members of the Team that had been

provoked by the collaboration plan with Theotokis’ party persisted even after

Gounaris officially became Minister of Finance. In particular, the emotional

friction between Protopapadakis and Repoulis was increasing. The opinion

that Protopapadakis and Gounaris had forsaken their political ideals and

abandoned their colleagues midstream still dominated. Several days after

Gounaris took office, Protopapadakis published his long statement

articulating the series of events leading up to Gounaris’ and his break from

the Team of the Japanese. 47 The major purpose of these remarks was to

clarify that he and Gounaris had not betrayed their fellow members of the

Team, but rather had received and acted on Dragoumis’ permission to

collaborate with Theotokis’ party.

Repoulis reacted to Protopapadakis’ public statement with his open

letter a few days later. 48 In contrast to Protopapadakis and Gounaris,

Repoulis had been praised as a “model Japanese” ever since the rumor began

that the two men had made a secret promise to join Theotokis’ party. While

the two were denounced scathingly, Repoulis was highly praised because he

remained a fervent member of the Team of the Japanese in order to continue

47
Πρωτοπαπαδάκης, «Άπλετον φως εις τα πολιτικά παρασκήνια», Πατρίς, 26 Ιουνίου
1908, 1-2 και Πατρίς, 27 Ιουνίου 1908, 1-2.
48
Ρέπουλης, «Από τα παρασκήνια των πολιτικών μας ηθών», Εστία, 29 Ιουνίου 1908,
1, Εστία, 30 Ιουνίου 1908, 1 και Εστία, 1 Ιουλίου 1908, 1-2.

276
to pursue his group’s political ideals for the sake of the nation rather than

succumbing to temptations from the government party. 49

Repoulis bitterly criticized Protopapadakis mainly on moral grounds.

Repoulis did not accept Protopapadakis’ view that Repoulis and

Panagiotopoulos had convinced Dragoumis to reverse his decision, which

had brought about the irreversible rift within the Team. In his open letter,

Repoulis asked himself whether or not he had resisted collaboration with the

Theotokis’ government at the meeting on March 20. He wrote:

Of course, I resisted with all my might. I opposed [collaboration]


not because I was against the deputies of Patras and Naxos [i.e.
Gounaris and Protopapadakis], but because I wanted to save the
Team and thus its ideas. I desired and still desire to save the ideas
that the Team of the Japanese has embodied. I was and am still
thinking that, if we give priority to realistic calculations and move
forward in a direction that would harm the ideas of the Team, then
we will prove to have been unworthy of the affection and respect
that public opinion has shown to us. I reiterate that the ideas of our
Team come from the heart of public opinion. 50

What shocked Repoulis most about the meeting was that some members

thought that the Team should think more realistically and collaborate with

the government. He could not but question how to justify their two-year

battle for political reform, which had been tantamount to a declaration of war
49
«Ο κ. Ε. Ρέπουλης» [Mr. E. Repoulis], Ακρόπολις. 23 Απριλίου, 1908, 2.
50
Ρέπουλης, «Από τα παρασκήνια των πολιτικών μας ηθών», Εστία,1 Ιουλίου 1908, 2.

277
against the government, if the Team caved in to temptation from the

government. It was Protopapadakis, he wrote, that had become more realistic

and did not see how the Team could make progress alone. Protopapadakis

complained that he had received daily letters from Naxos, his constituency,

condemning the activities of the Team. 51

From Repoulis’ point of view, the Team of the Japanese had come

into existence by rebelling against the reality of existing political conditions,

which public opinion regarded as “fatally ruined.” 52 The members had

endeavored to change the state of politics. Therefore, it was irrelevant for the

Team to try to realistically assess the present political situation and make the

best of it. According to Repoulis, Dragoumis repeatedly said that the stance

of the Team should be serious and tough, and that the members should

expect neither quick rewards for their struggles nor public recognition.

Dragoumis also predicted that the importance of the Team would be

recognized one day in the distant future, and that the Japanese might even

succeed either of the largest parties. 53

On the other hand, Repoulis noted, though his attitude may have

seemed contradictory and irresponsible for the leader of the Team,

Dragoumis never wanted the members to be hedged in by restrictions.

51
Ρέπουλης, «Από τα παρασκήνια των πολιτικών μας ηθών», Εστία, 1 Ιουλίου 1908, 1.
52 Ρέπουλης, «Από τα παρασκήνια των πολιτικών μας ηθών», Εστία, 1 Ιουλίου 1908, 1.
53 Ρέπουλης, «Από τα παρασκήνια των πολιτικών μας ηθών», Εστία, 29 Ιουνίου 1908,
1.

278
Dragoumis seemed to respect the free will of the Team members. For

example, Dragoumis mentioned that he would understand them if some

members were hesitant to continue the Team’s political struggle, or even if

they decided to shift allegiance to another party in order to make more

timely use of their talents. 54 Repoulis did not interpret Dragoumis’ words

literally. He wrote, “Who does not understand the knightly spirit of these

words?”55 Repoulis implied that Dragoumis had probably assumed a

detached air, and had not expected the members to stick with the Team

because he understood well enough how difficult it would be to sustain the

new political movement that they had just inaugurated.

Repoulis also commented that one really had to appreciate the

politeness and patience Dragoumis has shown when Boufidis visited him on

April 7. Repoulis claimed that what Boufidis had proposed on behalf of

Theotokis’ party was only a promise to offer a ministerial post to Gounaris.

Boufidis had not said a single word to agree with the principles and ideas of

the Team of the Japanese. Nevertheless, Dragoumis did not voice any

personal objections to the proposal. He had said instead, “It is my pleasure to

see all the members of the Team use their ability for the best. I am not

opposed to Gounaris assuming a ministership. It is up to him.” According to

54
Ρέπουλης, «Από τα παρασκήνια των πολιτικών μας ηθών», Εστία, 29 Ιουνίου 1908,
1.
55 Ρέπουλης, «Από τα παρασκήνια των πολιτικών μας ηθών» Εστία, 29 Ιουνίου 1908,
1.

279
Repoulis, however, Dragoumis also said to Boufidis, “If there is even one

member of the Team who does not agree with collaboration with the

government, it goes without saying that I am responsible for remaining with

him.” 56

Repoulis went on to accuse Protopapadakis of attempting to blame

their abandonment of the Team for Dragoumis’ “about-face.” Repoulis was

particularly offended by Protopapadakis’ stance that he would have remained

in the Team if Dragoumis had been sincere about his promises. Repoulis

instead suggested that Protopapadakis had shown an unfaithful attitude

toward the activities of the Team long before the recent discord. Often, while

the members were discussing concrete plans for state reform, Protopapadakis

would respond negatively about them. To Repoulis’ surprise, Protopapadakis

was often very pessimistic about the future of the Team. Although public

opinion had always supported their struggle, Protopapadakis had said,

“Where is the public support? I cannot see it. What I see is only the letters

from Naxos. I do not know about you, but I at least will lose all my friends if

we continue to conduct ourselves like this in Parliament.” 57

In addition, Repoulis pointed out that there had been incessant

56
Repoulis mentioned that on April 7 Boufidis also offered Dragoumis the position of
ambassador to Constantinople. According to Repoulis, Dragoumis declined the offer
saying with a smile, “The Ottoman government would not issue a letter to accept me.”
Ρέπουλης, «Από τα παρασκήνια των πολιτικών μας ηθών», Εστία, 1 Ιουλίου 1908, 2.
57 Ρέπουλης, «Από τα παρασκήνια των πολιτικών μας ηθών», Εστία, 1 Ιουλίου 1908, 2.

280
rumors that Protopapadakis had approached other parties behind the scenes

about working together. Repoulis felt that most of the rumors could be

discarded as overly imaginative and malicious. But he implied that

Protopapadakis’ behavior had aroused suspicions that he would breach the

trust of the Team members sooner or later. 58

Furthermore, Repoulis wrote about an event that proved

Protopapadakis’ involvement in backroom dealings. At the beginning of

April 1908, around the time when Dragoumis met Boufidis, Panagiotopoulos

had received a telegram in code from Protopapadakis and Gounaris, asking

him to come to Protopapadakis’ house. Panagiotopoulos never talked about

what was written in the telegram or what his answer to it was. But he only

said to Repoulis, “Do you want me as well to participate in the farce that is

now underway?” Repoulis was certain that Protopapadakis intended to bring

Panagiotopoulos over to his side so that Panagiotopoulos would agree to

cooperate with Theotokis’ party. 59

Repoulis’ open letter demonstrated how Protopapadakis had waited

for a favorable moment to abandon the Team without being stigmatized. In

Repoulis’ view, Dragoumis’ change of mind had merely served as a plausible

pretext for Protopapadakis to leave the Team. Repoulis contended that

58 Ρέπουλης, «Από τα παρασκήνια των πολιτικών μας ηθών» Εστία, 30 Ιουνίου 1908,
1.
59 Ρέπουλης, «Από τα παρασκήνια των πολιτικών μας ηθών» Εστία, 1 Ιουλίου 1908, 2.

281
Theotokis neither sympathized with, nor intended to realize the ideas of the

Japanese. Repoulis sarcastically finished his letter by saying that he hoped

that Protopapadakis would not receive any more discouraging letters from

Naxos. 60

Interestingly, although both Protopapadakis and Gounaris rejoined

Theotokis’ party after all, Repoulis blatantly attacked only Protopapadakis.

Repoulis mentioned that Protopapadakis’ pessimism about the future of the

Team had infected Gounaris. But he did not openly speak ill of Gounaris. In

Replis’ open letter, Gounaris did not play a central role at all in bringing

about an unbridgeable chasm among the Team members. As far as Gounaris

was concerned, Repoulis only hoped that the new Minister of Finance would

be able at least to reduce the tax imposed on the people to the level of

Bulgarian taxation, as promised. 61

Dragoumis’ Leadership

The general tone in Repoulis’ letter defends Dragoumis. However, it

cannot be said that Dragoumis was entirely innocent concerning the

polarization of the Team, which would eventually result in its dissolution.

His qualifications as a leader are open to question from a retrospective point

of view.
60
Ρέπουλης, «Από τα παρασκήνια των πολιτικών μας ηθών», Εστία, 1 Ιουλίου 1908, 2.
61
Ρέπουλης, «Από τα παρασκήνια των πολιτικών μας ηθών», Εστία, 1 Ιουλίου 1908, 2.

282
First of all, the issue emerged as to whether his tactic of entrusting

the activities of the Team to members’ spontaneity was really meant in

earnest. As we have seen above, Repoulis interpreted this aspect of

Dragoumis’ attitude as imbued with good intentions, describing it as a

“knightly spirit.” A less charitable view of Dragoumis’ approach, however,

could lead us to infer that it was intended to help Dragoumis to evade his

responsibility as a leader.

In fact, in his draft of a letter to Alexandris, dated on July 3, 1908,

Dragoumis retrospectively recounted that around the end of the first

parliamentary session of their political activity, he had clearly declared to his

fellow members that, although they would work together in the form of a

political unit, he considered that they were bound by the ties based on their

totally free will. 62 Unfortunately, we have no record of the impressions of

the members when they heard his declaration. Would it have been possible

for them to renew their resolution to follow him? On the contrary, we can

imagine that they might have been confused and discouraged by his

hands-off approach.

Dragoumis also admitted in his draft that he had told Boufidis and

the two—Protopapadakis and Gounaris—in April 1908 that, if Theotokis

made him an offer of collaboration, he would not only consent to it but also

62
ΑΣΔ, Φακ. 156, υποφακ. 156.2, εγγρ. 41.

283
help as much as possible those of the Team who wanted to join Theotokis. 63

His remarks seem to reveal that he had lost his enthusiasm for the reform

project that the Team was pursuing.

In reality, as Protopapadakis mentioned in his statement in Patris,

Dragoumis had considered withdrawing from politics when the present

parliamentary period was over. This meant that the Team would be dissolved

then. 64 While Dragoumis repeatedly urged the members to persevere in their

effort to reform the political system as a whole, he also kept in mind the

likely disintegration of the Team. As such, his principles and actions were

inconsistent.

Moreover, Dragoumis woefully mismanaged intraparty

communication following his discussion with Repoulis and Panagiotopoulos.

At the meeting with these two men, Dragoumis faced strong objections from

them. Then he realized that he was not allowed to act upon his decision

without a concensus among all Team members. He became conviced that he

would continue work with those who still derised to pursue the ideas and

principles of the Team. 65 As a result, he reneged on his prior support of

Team members who were collaborating with Theotokis’ party.Why did he

not convey his change of heart to the rest of the Team? He did not even

63
ΑΣΔ, Φακ. 156, υποφακ. 156.2, εγγρ. 41.
64
Πρωτοπαπαδάκης, «Άπλετον φως εις τα πολιτικά παρασκήνια», Πατρίς 27 Ιουνίου
1908, 2.
65
ΑΣΔ, Φακ. 156, υποφακ. 156.2, εγγρ. 41.

284
inform Gounaris, who had sent him a letter expressing his anxiety about the

future burdens that were to fall on him. In short, Dragoumis proved unable to

manage relations among members of the Team, and he arguably worsened

internal disunity by failing to speak honestly about his own thoughts.

In the end, Dragoumis’ obfuscation contributed to widening the rift

that had emerged to a great extent among the members. He confessed that his

sense of obligation to the Team prohibited him from fulfilling his personal

wishes. In other words, he personally supported collaboration with the

government but decided to publicly back those who wanted to remain as the

Japanese and continue the Team’s activities. 66 Curiously, as if to conceal his

prior missteps, he expressed his opinion in his draft that much good would

come from the schism within the Team, in that each of the remaining

members was given permission to decide one’s future at will. 67

Dragoumis never made any public statement as the leader of the

Team of the Japanese after it became evident that Protopapadakis and

Gounaris had broken off relations with him. Therefore, the more the mass

media treated the two defectors as dishonorable, the more Dragoumis’

reputation improved. Voices sympathizing with Dragoumis abounded, and he

was regarded as a sort of victim who had been exploited by Protopapadakis

66
ΑΣΔ, Φακ. 156, υποφακ. 156.2, εγγρ. 41.
67
ΑΣΔ, Φακ. 156, υποφακ. 156.2, εγγρ. 41.

285
and Gounaris. 68 However, whether his vague and aloof approach to

leadership was appropriate for the head of an opposition party aiming to

promote state reform should be considered with the benefit of hindsight.

Alexandris’ Letter to Dragoumis and His Memoirs

Alexandris was unique among the remaining members in that he

stayed in contact with at least Gounaris after Protopapadakis and Gounaris

broke off relations with the Team. He remained sympathetic with these two

men even after a schism became inevitable. Their friendly relationship had

seemed to deepen during the period when they worked together as

colleagues on the Team of the Japanese. As Alexandris mentions in his

memoirs, Protopapadakis, Gounaris, and he often met and discussed various

matters at Protopapadakis’ office on Likavitos Street in Athens. 69 The

intimacy among them can be observed in the fact that Protopapadakis and

Alexandris referred to Gounaris by his nickname, Mimis.70

Alexandris wrote both in his memoirs and in his letter to Dragoumis,

dated June 28, 1908, about what Gounaris had personally told him regarding

the question of his ministerial post and how Gounaris felt in the face of

68
«Το τι είπεν ο κ. Σ. Δραγούμης» [What Did Mr. S. Dragoumis Say?], Ακρόπολις. 23
Απριλίου 1908, 2.
69
Απόστολος Αλεξανδρής, Πολιτικαί αναμνήσεις [Political Memoirs] (Πάτρα: Δ.
Φραγκούλης και Κ. Βαρζάνης, 1947), 8.
70 Αλεξανδρής, Πολιτικαί αναμνήσεις, 13, 16.

286
newspaper articles unanimously calling him a traitor. It should be noted,

however, that Alexandris’ accounts in his memoirs are sometimes incorrect

in light of facts ascertained from other primary sources. 71

Alexandris had the opportunity to congratulate Gounaris

immediately after the latter became the Minister of Finance. 72 Alexandris

confessed that on ethical grounds he was greatly shocked to know that

Gounaris had become a minister. 73 In his memoirs, Alexandris reported that

he avoided asking why Gounaris had finally decided to break their Team

apart. Gounaris started to seriously explain to Alexandris how things had

developed. When Gounaris met Theotokis at Baltatzis’ house, the Prime

Minister offered Gounaris the post of Minister of Finance by saying that the

latter would surely be effective. Gounaris particularly asked Theotokis

71 For example, he mentioned that he was in Istanbul when Gounaris assumed his
cabinet post and that he immediately left for Athens to meet Gounaris, leaving his work
there unfinished. He also added that no one of the Team predicted that Gounaris would
become a minister. In addition, Alexandris wrote that Gounaris had had to make his
decision within 24 hours when he met Theotokis. Gounaris therefore consulted only
Protopapadakis and accepted the offer. Αλεξανδρής, Πολιτικαί αναμνήσεις,14-15. But,
as we have seen, Alexandris was in Greece when this series of events was happening.
Moreover, the mass media continuously made a fuss about the cabinet reshuffle and
spread rumors that the Team of the Japanese would collaborate with the government
and obtain some ministerial posts. Alexandris himself admitted in the interview with
Neologos in early May 1908 that Gounaris would become a minister in the Theotokis’
government. It is impossible as well that Gounaris’ decision was made in just one day,
or that he spoke only with Protopapadakis. As far as we know, Gounaris met Theotokis
at Boufidis’ place on April 6, 1908. At least Gounaris’ letter to Dragoumis dated on
April 10, which is cited above, gives evidence of his drawn out agony over the issue.
Dragoumis also admitted that Boufidis came to the latter to offer Gounaris a ministerial
post. We do not know, however, whether Alexandris distorted the facts intentionally, or
if he had simply forgotten them when he wrote the memoirs forty years later.
72
ΑΣΔ, Φακ. 156, υποφακ. 156.2, εγγρ. 40.
73
Αλεξανδρής, Πολιτικαί αναμνήσεις, 14.

287
whether, if he became a minister and submitted bills regarding economic

reform programs, Theotokis would take responsibility as the Prime Minister

not only for accepting them, but for pushing for their passage even at the risk

of the government’s existence. Gounaris emphasized that this was the only

way he could realize his programs. Alexandris wrote that Theotokis gave

Gounaris his assurance. 74 It seemed that Theotokis’ party had offered

advance consent to Gounaris that it would adopt his economic reform plans

as a condition for the latter’s accepting the ministerial post. In his letter to

Dragoumis sent several days after Gounaris took the oath of office,

Alexandris also wrote that Gounaris had said that he would propose to

Parliament the economic programs of the Team of the Japanese, which he

had supported from the beginning of their activity and which had been

fundamentally accepted by the Theotokis’ government. 75

According to Alexandris, Gounaris wholly believed at that time

Theotokis’ promise to support the Team’s economic plans with all his power.

Therefore, Gounaris did not doubt that the bill containing his economic

reforms could be passed. 76 As reported in Alexandris’ memoirs, Gounaris

said to him:

74
Αλεξανδρής, Πολιτικαί αναμνήσεις, 15; Alexandris’ account that Gounaris met
Theotokis at Baltatzis’ house is incorrect. As we have seen earlier, Boufidis invited
Gounaris to his place where the latter saw the Prime Minister.
75
ΑΣΔ, Φακ. 156, υποφακ. 156.2, εγγρ. 40.
76 Αλεξανδρής, Πολιτικαί αναμνήσεις, 15-16.

288
You have long known my opinions. Only if Greece recovers
economically by the introduction of a better taxation system, will
people be relieved from the [heavy burden of] taxes. Then they will
be able to eat and get dressed more readily after we abolish
excessive protection of pseudo-industries. Moreover, landowners of
large estates will cease to exploit people and then an increase in
production will be expected. Only when, I repeat, [these things are
realized], will Greece see better days. All other things regarded as
miracles are unworthy of attention (αστεϊσμός). 77

This passage shows that Gounaris joined the cabinet with the stubborn

determination to execute his economic reforms for the sake of the people. As

a result, he was bitterly distressed when the media attacked him for changing

his allegiance to Theotokis’ party. As we have seen, the newspapers

unanimously criticized that, though the Team of Japanese had been expected

to reform Greece for the better, it could not discern or fulfill people’s

affection for their political aims. According to Alexandris, Gounaris said in

indignation, “If the affection toward the Team about which the press

incessantly writes truly represents the spirit of the people, then the Greek

people must be obsessed with secrecy the way a womanizer is. None of us

have noticed such affection toward us!” 78 Gounaris was genuinely upset

about the stance of the media, which claimed to represent the people.

77 Αλεξανδρής, Πολιτικαί αναμνήσεις, 15.


78 Αλεξανδρής, Πολιτικαί αναμνήσεις, 14.

289
Gounaris probably thought that the Greek people, in reality, had neither

understood nor correctly evaluated the Team’s activities and had been tainted

by unfair critical media coverage. In contrast to Repoulis, Gounaris as well

as Protopapadakis did not believe that public opinion had supported the

Team’s activity enthusiastically.

Alexandris’ letter to Dragoumis referred not only to his meeting

with Gounaris but also to his own views on the issue of collaboration with

Theotokis’ party. Although Alexandris still remained Japanese together with

the rest of the Team when he wrote to Dragoumis, he expressed a positive

attitude toward the Team’s cooperation with Theotokis. Though the

collaboration plan had already broken down, he stated that it had been

regarded as a favorable resolution if the Team of five members, without

Repoulis and Panagiotopoulos, would have worked together with the

government. 79

As such, Alexandris did not deny in his letter the possibility of his

converting to Theotokis’ party, though he had not yet decided what to do in

the future as a deputy. He mentioned that, if Theotokis’ party really gave

priority to the economic goals of the Team, as Gounaris believed it would,

then he could work together with the government. He also added that, if

Theotokis’ administration was less opposed than before to political agendas

79
ΑΣΔ, Φακ. 156, υποφακ. 156.2, εγγρ. 40.

290
of the Japanese in fields other than the economy, then he could join it. He

explained that the government seemed to agree to a great extent with the

political ideas of the Team, judging from the proposal of collaboration and

the acceptance of the Team’s economic agenda. However, he also wrote, if

the government did not keep its promise, he would join a different party, the

principles and agenda of which he regarded as closer to those of the Team of

the Japanese. In any case, at this point, Alexandris still believed Dragoumis’

decision to soon retire from the political world, which would automatically

bring the dissolution of the Team. Therefore, he wrote to Dragoumis that he

would intend to continue his political activity on the basis of the ideas the

Team had advocated even though he belonged to a different party. 80

The Young Turk Revolution that broke out in the Ottoman Empire

on July 11, 1908 (July 24, NS), unexpectedly influenced the political career

of Alexandris. Consequently, the moment when Alexandris switched to

Theotokis’ party came earlier than he himself had anticipated. Thanks to a

recommendation from Baltatzis, deputy of Theotokis’ party, and the

persuasion of King George, at the end of July, Alexandris was appointed as

special envoy of the Greek government to the Committee of Union and

Progress, an outgrowth of the Young Turk movement. He immediately left

for Istanbul and stayed there until the end of February 1909 to investigate the

80
ΑΣΔ, Φακ. 156, υποφακ. 156.2, εγγρ. 40.

291
situation of the Greeks in the empire after the revolution, and also to talk

with representatives of the new Turkish government about future relations

between Greece and Turkey. 81 In this manner Alexandris became a member

of the ruling party only one month after he had written to Dragoumis. He did

not wait to see if the Theotokis’ government would really support the goals

of the Team of the Japanese, which Gounaris was to announce in the coming

parliamentary session of autumn 1908.

Gounaris’ Misjudgment

The new parliamentary session, which was the first that Gounaris

attended as a minister, commenced on October 30, 1908. On November 11

Dragoumis made a speech on behalf of the Team of the Japanese, whose

diminished numbers could be now counted on “the fingers of one hand.” 82

He reaffirmed that the Team would continue to exist independently in

Parliament and operate on the basis of its own strict principles to achieve

practical and constructive policy solutions. He also asserted that the

members of his Team would not contribute to any party’s maneuvers to win

a majority of seats. Instead, he claimed that the members would only vote for

81
Αλεξανδρής, Πολιτικαί αναμνήσεις, 18-29.
82
«Η δήλωσις των Ιαπώνων» [The Statement of the Japanese], Εστία. 12 Νοεμβρίου
1908, 3.

292
bills of whose validity they were fully convinced. 83 Dragoumis’ party

continued to be called the “Japanese” in public discourse for a while, though

less often than before, and it gradually ceased to be regarded as an

independent political unit.

What happened to Gounaris then? Could he achieve his economic

aims with the support of Theotokis as the latter had allegedly pledged? The

answer is “No.” Gounaris ultimately lacked the Prime Minister’s support.

Gounaris submitted a series of economic reform proposals immediately after

the new parliamentary session began, in an effort to save state finance, which

had been going downhill. As expected, vested interests fiercely resisted

Gounaris’ proposals once they were offered. Those involved in the spirits

trade, in particular, became his biggest enemies. 84 Theotokis attempted to

sideline Gounaris’ plans in order to avoid conflict with those who opposed

them, even though Gounaris had requested from Theotokis that Parliament

deliberate on his proposals without any modifications. As a result, Gounaris

was completely disillusioned, and he resigned in February 1909. 85

After he stepped down, Gounaris often met with Alexandris, who

had returned from his work in Istanbul at the end of February 1909. Contrary

83
«Η δήλωσις των Ιαπώνων», 3.
84
The state treasury had gained a very small amount of money through the taxation of
spirits. Gounaris intended to impose a heavier tax on spirits in order to compensate for
the deficit in the state budget. FO 371/677, No. 1348.
85
FO 371/677, No. 9355.

293
to Alexandris’ expectations, Gounaris never spoke ill of Theotokis. Gounaris

just said, “I wish to completely forget the past. Greece needs general

unanimity in particular today.” 86

It is worth hearing Alexandris’ evaluation of Gounaris’ character

and actions since the two men had direct experience working together.

In my opinion, Gounaris possessed great political virtue and the


honesty. I do not accept what was said about him as if he had been
“stupid” (μωραϊτισμός) at the time he left the Team. He fully knew
that Theotokis did not like him. He also knew that Theotokis’ party
had already elected N. Kalogeropoulos as a successor, whom the
party liked. But Gounaris believed that his agenda would surely be
passed as long as Theotokis supported him. [He believed that,] if his
program was applied for a short period, the revitalization of the
national economy would be forthcoming. Then he could leave the
ministry as quickly as he had joined it, but with greater political
glory and popularity. 87

Alexandris’ testimony demonstrates that Gounaris did not abandon the Team

of the Japanese for his own political career. Instead, he joined Theotokis’

party confidently expecting that he would be able to realize his and the

Team’s reform goals. Gounaris’ judgment proved faulty in hindsight. He

became politically irrelevant before he could try to exercise his skills in

reorganizing the state. He could no longer be considered either an opposition

86
Αλεξανδρής, Πολιτικαί αναμνήσεις, 16.
87
Αλεξανδρής, Πολιτικαί αναμνήσεις, 16.

294
deputy who discriminatingly watched and criticized government policies, or

an out-and-out reformist minister within the government.

295
CHAPTER 8

Epilogue

The Reaction of the Mass Media

The activities of the Team of the Japanese were always at the center

of attention in the mass media during this group’s short-lived existence.

Repoulis mentioned that the idea for the Team came from the heart of public

opinion, which showed affection for the Team and supported it. 1 However,

in reality the media did not consistently consider the activities of the Team to

measure up to the expectations of public opinion.

With the benefit of hindsight, the Team of the Japanese might have

remain alive for a longer period of time if it had been more responsive to the

view of the general public, and it could have played a major role in reviving

Greek political life. In addition to the personal discord among the members

of the Team, the fact that their activities were confined exclusively to

Parliament determined their brief existence. The Japanese were sincere

politicians who were seriously concerned about the future of the state, but

they came up short in listening to the voices of the masses, which was

required to pave the way for a new political era.

1 Εμμανουήλ Ρέπουλης, «Από τα παρασκήνια των πολιτικών μας ηθών» [Our Political
Ethics as Seen from behind the Scenes], Εστία , 29 Ιουνίου 1908, 1 και 1 Ιουλίου 1908,
2.

296
Generally speaking, the reaction of the mass media toward the Team

of the Japanese shifted from positive to negative as time went on. The media

came to judge that there was a discrepancy between what public opinion

expected the Team to accomplish and what the Team actually did. In this

respect the newspaper Akropolis, which most ardently supported the Team at

the outset of its appearance on the political scene, provides sufficient articles

that present a gradual shift in the assessment of the Team.

At the beginning of April, 1907, Akropolis published an article

entitled “National Season Just before Spring with Trees Ready to Bloom.”

As its title symbolically suggests, it confidently heralded the coming of a

new epoch that would ensure national regeneration. The Greek state and

nation was at the threshold of flourishing like “the almonds of spring ready

to bloom.” The article read:

Constructive works are continuing probably in imperceptible,


discontinuous, periodic, and non-systematic manner as if it was the
time when buds were about to burst out. It does not matter if they
are being carried out here but not there, if they lack coherence, if
their directions are diverse, and if the state is not at the head of these
works. As long as these works are not lost, even if these works are
fragmented today, all their small streams will be united tomorrow to
form the River of National rebirth. 2

2
«Εθνική φουσκοδενδριά» [National Season Just before Spring with Trees Ready to
Bloom], Ακρόπολις, 2 Απριλίου 1907, 1.

297
The activities of the Team of the Japanese were a case in point. The author of

the article argued that the Team’s efforts most illustratively demonstrated

that a new flourishing period for the Greek nation was approaching. He

highly appreciated what the Team had done for about a half year since it had

established itself, and expressed his hope that the Team members were going

to lead the country. He wrote, “Is the work of the Japanese in Parliament

small? This work is nothing but training and preparation, so that they will

become leaders of the future. The Japanese are different from today’s leaders.

If the former is a painter, the latter is a plasterer. If the former is an expert,

the latter is a quack.” 3

The author of the article pointed out what most distinguished about

the members of the Team was. “They are not only training themselves, but

governing together with the government.” “They make more laws than the

government.” Moreover, “they not only legislate, but administer the country

at the same time.” 4 This article appeared when Parliament had almost

settled the issues of refugee settlement and land distribution in Thessaly, and

of school textbook reform. It also reflected the fact that the members of the

Team had criticized at every opportunity the malfunction of the state

administration and asked the government to formulate a viable policy to

build up the strength of the country. The author named each of the Team
3
«Εθνική φουσκοδενδριά», 1.
4
«Εθνική φουσκοδενδριά», 1.

298
members and approved each member’s achievement equally. He emphasized

how earnestly every member of the Team had contributed in bringing change

for the good of the state.

To whom else but Japanese Panagiotopoulos do we mainly owe the


greatest legislation in the present parliamentary session? The
legislation puts an end with an axe to the dehumanization of the
nation of young age caused by intellectually harmful book-mongers.
To whom but the Japanese Dragoumis and Alexandris, especially
the latter, do we owe the formation of the bill of the land
distribution of Stefanovik? To whom but Vozikis, the torpedo-like
Japanese, do we owe the effort to make a significant bill of the rural
guard more practical?…
…To whom but the most fantastic Yamogata 5 Protopapadakis are
we indebted for the uneasiness now prevailing at the accounts
department, [whose careless method of work has been disclosed by
him]? And when Gounaris, who thunders aloof rises, or when
Repoulis throws the lightning of his intellectual eloquence,
Parliament that follows the routine, Parliament that pillages, and
Parliament that has been mentally castrated pays attention to them.
Then Parliament is either overwhelmed or comes to its senses. 6

Newspapers praised the various activities of the Team since its formation.

This article was one that admired the members’ efforts without reservation

5
“Yamogata” should be corrected as “Yamagata.” The author seems to compare
Protopapadakis to Aritomo Yamagata, who was the Chief of the General Staff of the
Japanese troops in the Russo‒Japanese War. As his name repeatedly appeared in Greek
newspapers during the war, the Greek public was probably familiar with it.
6
«Εθνική φουσκοδενδριά», 1.

299
and most comprehensively. The author not only spoke highly of the talent of

the members as politicians, but also expressed his conviction that the

members were qualified to lead the country.

However, as early as May 1907, articles with a critical tinge

appeared in Akropolis. The article entitled “What Are the Immortal Japanese

Doing?” on May 5, displayed dissatisfaction with the Team. The Japanese

were not allowed to rest, but rather expected to take further actions as soon

as possible. The author wrote, “The fetal state of the Japanese party was over.

Now it has to go, probably to begin with, into the middle of the infant state.

A fantastic child in next to no time. Then an Anglo-Saxon lad. And then a

sportsman-like adolescent. Finally a matured man full of vigor who plays

Hercules’ role, continuing one feat after another and gaining one victory

after another.” 7

Broadly speaking, the article made two criticisms. First, the Team

had not presented its political program to the public. It read, “If they intend

to support the country from behind, the country absolutely needs to know the

Team’s reform program in detail as well as in terms of its practicality.” The

Japanese had to “formulate one program for administration, military,

education, economy, agriculture, stock-farming, marine, forestry, and

justice,” so that they could take up their duty immediately after they were
7
«Οι αθάνατοι Ιάπωνες τι κάνουν;» [What Are the Immortal Japanese Doing?],
Ακρόπολις, 5 Μαΐου 1907, 1.

300
called to come to power. 8

Second, the Japanese had not expanded their activity beyond

Parliament. The article stressed the necessity that the Japanese should leave

Parliament and create “what the French call[ed] agitation—something more

than action, but something less than disturbances.” 9 According to the author,

in order to successfully continue their political movement, the Team of the

Japanese had to win over to their side not only deputies, but also other

people from a broader range of society, thereby forming an

extra-parliamentry political organization. Potential candidates who would

cooperate with the Japanese consisted of journalists, professors, industrialists,

merchants, lawyers, representatives of guilds, and workers.

The author of the article pointed out that the Japanese, who

remained immobilized within Parliament, seemed to employ the wrong

tactics to gain a final victory for their political struggle. He impatiently

wrote:

No leader waited for people to come to wake him one morning


while he was asleep and to say to him, “Go ahead! We will follow
you.”
On the contrary, leaders go to the people who are usually asleep.
Pushing and shaking the people until they wake up and pouring

8 «Οι αθάνατοι Ιάπωνες τι κάνουν;», 1.


9
«Οι αθάνατοι Ιάπωνες τι κάνουν;», 1.

301
upon them every cognac of the rhetoric of truth and patriotism, only
then do leaders say to them, “Go ahead now! If you want to be
saved, follow our flag.” 10

The next day, Akropolis named the extra-parliamentary political

organization, which it had proposed to establish, the “Panhellenic Japanese

League.” The Team of the Japanese would certainly be successful,

“strengthened by other politicians with a Japanese flavor, but mainly by a

wide category of select and independent citizens.” The purpose of the

League was “to turn over the existing system placed under totally corrupt

and insufficient views.” 11

Although the author of the article assumed a critical attitude toward

the Japanese, he did not abandon them entirely. He still regarded them as the

only hope for the state’s rebirth, and claimed that the formation of the

Panhellenic Japanese League was “the last national trump card.” 12 He

advocated that it was possible for the League to carry out a “peaceful

revolution” under the leadership of the Japanese. He put it:

We do not see anything better than seeking gradual transformation


of our parliamentary political regime toward the best, the most
instrumental, the most popular, and the most effective one. [The
10
«Οι αθάνατοι Ιάπωνες τι κάνουν;», 1.
11
«Πανελλήνιον ιαπωνικόν σύνδεσμον» [The Panhellenic Japanese League],
Ακρόπολις, 6 Μαΐου 1907, 1.
12
«Πανελλήνιον ιαπωνικόν σύνδεσμον», 1.

302
regime we want is] the one with more capability and less corruption,
with the dominance of capability and the retreat of corruption, with
creative hands, with masterminds, with a non-plundering nature,
and with clean grounds.
We see the nucleus of such transformation in the tiny party of the
Japanese. Let’s reinforce the party and make it bigger. Let’s make it
prevail…
…[A]s the terrible famine that had struck Paris in 1789 caused
the tragic introduction of the Great French Revolution, so great
despair at economic conditions in the capital city and provinces [in
Greece] may precipitate our own peaceful revolution and make it
possible within a brief span of time. 13

By putting an epithet, “peaceful,” before “revolution,” the author denied that

an expected revolution would overthrow by force the existing political

regime as the French Revolution had done. The “peaceful revolution” was

rather a reformist enterprise that reform-minded politicians and citizens

would participate together in creating, within the framework of the

parliamentary system, a sphere where a cleaner, more constructive and

useful politics would develop. In the author’s view, this coordinated

movement was the key for the nation’s regeneration.

There were other criticisms in addition to the complaints that the

Team lacked a concrete political program, and that it did not try to link up

with those who shared the same reformist spirit outside of Parliament. An

13
«Πανελλήνιον ιαπωνικόν σύνδεσμον», 1.

303
article in the weekly newspaper Oikonomiki Ellas on June 2, 1907, harshly

commented that the Team of the Japanese was the “party of negation” (το

κόμμα της αρνήσεως). 14 Taking an example of Protopapadakis’ report which

analyzed the economic conditions of the state, 15 the author argued that what

the Japanese were doing was merely to find fault with the policy of the

Theotokis’ government and point out its negative aspects. They never offered

any positive proposals to improve these matters. They did not have “a

language of a new innovative party of young men with radical ideas that

promise[d] fundamental restoration.” 16 The attitude of the Japanese as

seemed by the author said, “We do not have to show you henceforward

[what the government should do]. Bring us into the government and you will

see.” The author concluded that the Team of the Japanese wanted to become

cabinet members in the long run. They were just the same as those who had

been occupied with a well-worn, petty politics. 17

Journalist Aristos Kambanis wrote a short essay titled “The Idealists

and Mr. Gounaris” for Akropolis on June 6, 1907. He mentioned that

Gounaris was considered as an idealist par excellence, which had a negative

influence to some degree on continuing the movement of the Team of the

14
«Οι Ιάπωνες» [The Japanese], Οικονομική Ελλάς, 2 Ιουνίου 1907, 262.
15
Πέτρος Πρωτοπαπαδάκης, Έκθεσις της μειονοψηφίας της επί του προϋπολογισμού
του κράτους επιτροπής [Minority Report of the Committee on the State Budget] (Αθήνα:
Εστία, 1907).
16
«Οι Ιάπωνες», 262.
17
«Οι Ιάπωνες», 262.

304
Japanese. Kambanis wrote a story to prove this. Some deputies of Theotokis’

and Rallis’ parties admired Gounaris. They had once thought of leaving their

parties and joining the Japanese, but they eventually did not because they

were not quite sure whether Gounaris could skillfully deal with reality since

he was too much of an idealist. Kambanis defended Gounaris’ idealism by

saying, “He is an idealist indeed. But does ideology exclude practicality? I

think that one has to be a good idealist so that his practicality could have

power.” He claimed that idealism was indispensable for a politician. It did

not matter to Kambanis whether Gounaris lacked pragmatism or not. He

found a problem with Gounaris somewhere else, writing, “[W]e writers, who

love ideas, who worship ideas and hate reality, feel a sort of resentment

(μνησικακία) against Gounaris. Although he is an amazing idealist, he

demonstrates a great lack of affection (αστοργία) toward us, who admire his

ideology, though we may be very humble and insignificant…” 18

Kambanis’ remark is very important when we consider the extent to

which there was a gap between the Team of the Japanese and the public

outside of Parliament. It seems to reveal that, though the Team had been

pursuing reforms for the Greek nation as a whole, their activities, Gounaris’

especially, in this case, did not strike a chord with the masses. Even

intellectuals like Kambanis had difficulties in understanding Gounaris’ true


18
Άριστος Καμπάνης, «Οι ιδεολόγοι και ο κ. Γούναρης» [The Idealists and Mr.
Gounaris], Ακρόπολις, 6 Ιουνίου 1907, 1.

305
intentions. How could the masses receive the message of state reform as

envisioned by the Team in the way in which the Japanese desired? The

expression of the “lack of affection” reflects the psychological distance

between the Team and the public. The only resolution would probably be

that the Japanese approach the people and take action together, as Akropolis

repeatedly advocated.

The Team of the Japanese, however, did not move out of Parliament.

On July 22, 1907, a caricature of the members of the Team appeared in

Akropolis, illustrating the men in Chinese clothes with their hair in a pigtail.

What the caricature expressed was obvious through the association with

what China evoked in the minds of contemporary Greeks. As China was a

symbol of indolence and backwardness at that time, the caricature sharply

criticized the inactivity of the Japanese by portraying them as Chinese. 19

The session of Parliament concluded at beginning of August.

Eventually, Akropolis took a very provocative attitude toward the Team of

the Japanese. An article on August 12, 1907, read, “[W]e, the first friends of

the Japanese, propose to become their first enemies, if we are convinced that

they remain on the path of dilettantism.” 20 The author of the article regarded

the Team as dull. He criticized that the Japanese had neither issued their

19
See Figure 3.
20
«Ιντερμέτσο. Μουσική ιαπωνική» [Intermezzo. Japanese Music], Ακρόπολις, 12
Αυγούστου 1907, 1.

306
program yet, nor taken further action outside of Parliament. He suspected

that the members of the Team were not true professional politicians, but

rather “mere amateurs [and] true Philistines.” 21 He requested in a strong

tone that the Team replace the existing corrupt oligarchy of deputies with a

popular government and form a governmental system which a million

Greeks could be satisfied. The author asked the members of the Team to

transform Parliament from a secluded place like “Jericho” into a sphere open

to the people. The method for carrying out this objective was again a

“peaceful revolution.” As the author put it:

The task and the obligation of the Japanese are thus very simple:
Let’s place them at the head of the people whose spirit has been
already revolutionized. [The Japanese] can transform this latent
revolutionary spirit [among the people] into an actual revolution and
provoke such a popular excitement that they can regard…incumbent
deputies as fellow-combatants and cooperators, not as enemies…
But for these goals, [the Japanese] need to work not after but
before Parliament convenes. Extraordinary, strenuous, true and
revolutionary work is necessary. 22

The Team of the Japanese never answered this appeal. From autumn 1907

onward, Akropolis and other media published few articles that place hope in

the Japanese.
21
«Ιντερμέτσο. Μουσική ιαπωνική», 1.
22
«Ιντερμέτσο. Μουσική ιαπωνική», 1.

307
It should be noted, however, that, interestingly, the concept of the

Japanese took on a life of its own in the discourse of the press. As the media

came to support the Team of the Japanese less enthusiastically, the term

“Japanese” was not necessarily used to indicate exclusively the seven

original deputies of the Team. Those who were advocating the liberation of

the Greek people from corrupt politics came to be called “Japanese.” First,

deputy Georgios Zografos was termed “Japanese” because he was judged to

serve the country through his parliamentary activities. He was said to be a

member of an “admirable phalanx of the Japanese that has ethically

conquered Parliament and public opinion.” 23 Then gradually the term

“Japanese” began to be also applied to extra-parliamentary organizations.

The Panhellenic Japanese League mentioned above is an illustrative example.

But the term “Japanese” still included the seven members of the Team, and it

was always used in conjunction with them. From autumn 1907 onward,

however, there were several examples in which the term “Japanese” was

used in a context from which the seven members of the Team were

completely absent. An article printed in Akropolis titled “They are

Japanese!” on November 4, 1907, discussed the establishment of an

extra-parliamentary political association at Piraeus that aimed at “the

political emancipation of the Greek people from the tyranny of parties and
23
«Ιάπωνος νέου ανατολή» [Rising of a New Japanese], Ακρόπολις, 16 Μαρτίου 1907,
1.

308
the rule of deputies (βουλευτοκρατία).” Its slogan was “Down with

corruption!” and those who rallied under this slogan were called “Japanese.”

None of the original seven Japanese deputies was among them. 24

When the media came to turn their back on the Team of the

Japanese, which they considered to be full of words but void of action, the

concept of the Japanese that continued to embody positive connotations for

political change ceased to be applied exclusively to the Team. Whereas the

seven Japanese members remained in Parliament, the concept of the

Japanese independently dispersed and came to be employed in new ways.

The Coup of 1909 and Afterwards

A “peaceful revolution” under the leadership of the Team of the

Japanese to sweep away age-old corrupt practices in the political arena and

to form a government for the people, which Akropolis had advocated, never

took place. Instead, a military intervention, the so-called “Goudi coup” on

August 15, 1909, eventually opened a new horizon in Greek politics.

The officers of the Military League successfully overthrew the

Rallis’ government in a bloodless manner. The masses enthusiastically

supported the coup because it “symbolized action at a time of national

24
«Αυτοί είνε Ιάπωνες!» [They are Japanese!], Ακρόπολις, 4 Νοεμβρίου 1907, 1.

309
malaise.” 25 Sir Francis Elliot, the British minister in Athens at that time,

wrote in his report on this event, “Public opinion, at all events at Athens, as

expressed by the pronouncements of the trade guilds and other bodies, was at

first decidedly in favour of the military movement, and the officers were

regarded as the heroes of the day and the saviours of the country.” 26 The

Military League did not intend to establish a military dictatorship, but rather

pursued political regeneration and reforms in many domestic sectors within

the existing political framework. It proposed that “reforms should aim at

achieving: respect for religion; honest administration; speedy and impartial

justice; education directed at the practical needs of the country and national

military requirements; security of life, honor and property; reorganization of

finances to provide relief from taxation for the people and for the

suppression of waste and jobbery; urgent military measures directed at the

immediate buildup of the army and navy.” 27 Once they staged the coup and

created a favorable environment of political change, the officers expected

civil politicians to deal with concrete law-making procedures for general

reform. The Mavromichalis’ puppet government that followed Rallis’


25
Thomas W. Gallant, Modern Greece (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001),
122.
26
“Doc. 56: Memorandum respecting the ‘Reform’ Movement in Greece Up to March
1910,” in British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign
Office Confidential Print: Part I From the Mid-Nineteenth Century to the First World
War: Series F Europe, 1848–1914: Volume 14 Greece, 1847–1914, ed. John F. V.
Keiger (University Publication of America, 1989), 339.
27
Victor S. Papacosma, The Military in Greek Politics: The 1909 Coup d’État (Kent,
Ohio: The Kent State University Press, 1977), 71-72.

310
grappled with the reformist proposals of the Military League in Parliament.

Yet toward the end of the year it became obvious that the government fell

short of expectations.

What was at stake was who would be the most perfect politician to

put the Military League’s reformist ideas into practice without a return to

politics under the former stagnated and corrupt conditions. The Military

League did not count on traditional political leaders any longer. They turned

their eyes outside Greece and singled out Eleftherios Venizelos, who was

then in charge of foreign affairs in the Cretan Executive Committee, for a

new political leader of Greece.

How did the former Team of the Japanese react to the coup? Did

they support the Military League? As both the Team and the Military League

aimed at political reform and state reconstruction, and some of the demands

of the military officers overlapped what the Team had intended to realize,

there was good reason for the former Japanese to express their approval of

the coup. Actually, not a few Greeks expected Gounaris to assume the task of

state regeneration by heading the League. Yet on August 27, 1909, Gounaris

declared in advance that he had no intention to form an alliance with the

Military League. On October 13, 1909, the Military League asked Gounaris

and Protopapadakis to form a government, but the two men declined on the

grounds that they did not regard the League, which had intervened in the

311
nation’s politics with threats of violence, as a legitimate representative of the

people. Gounaris, who was a devotee of the parliamentary regime, could not

accept the right of the military to play a decisive role in the political arena

for any cause. 28

Although we cannot gauge their true motives, Alexandris, Vozikis,

Repoulis, and some other deputies attempted to establish a new party during

this period. 29 Dragoumis was opposed to the Military League, but he

assumed his first and last premiership of the caretaker government from

January 1910 to October 1910, before Venizelos came to power.

Panagiotopoulos became Minister of Education in the Dragoumis’

government. It is worth mentioning that in this short time period of his

premiership, Dragoumis, who was also Minister of Finance, contributed to

the reconstruction of the shaky state finances that Greece had suffered with

28
«Γούναρης, Δημήτριος» [Gounaris, Dimitrios], in ΜΕΕ, τόμος Η΄ [vol. 8], 653;
«Γούναρης, Δημήτριος» [Gounaris, Dimitrios], in ΕΕΕ, τόμος Γ΄ [vol. 3], 195;
Αλέξανδρος Α. Οικονόμου, Πέτρος Πρωτοπαπαδάκης 1859–1922 [Petros
Protopapadakis 1859–1922] (Αθήνα, 1972), 140; Καίτη Αρώνη-Τσίχλη, «Δημήτριος
Γούναρης» [Dimitrios Gounaris] in Πρόσωπα του 20ού αιώνα: Έλληνες που σημάδεψαν
τον 20όν αιώνα [Persons of the 20th Century: The Greeks Who Marked the 20th Century],
ed. Βασίλης Παναγιωτόπουλος (Αθήνα: Νέα Σύνορα, 2000), 77.
29
Απόστολος Αλεξανδρής, Πολιτικαί αναμνήσεις [Political Memoirs] (Πάτρα: Δ.
Φραγκούλης και Κ. Βαρζάνης, 1947), 34; In October 1909 some newspapers wrote that
Alexandris was one of politicians who supported the aborted mutiny of the some
officers who claimed that the coup in August was not satisfactory for true reform plans.
Alexandris himself referred to this episode in his memoirs though he did not give any
clear words about whether he had been involved in this event or not. Αλεξανδρής,
Πολιτικαί αναμνήσεις, 33; Papacosma writes, “Ιt can be conjectured that Alexandris and
Stratos, as civilians, assumed a scapegoat role for the officers by being blamed in large
part for accentuating divisions within the Military League.” Papacosma, The Military in
Greek Politics, 94.

312
for so long. As a result of his efforts, and with the help of Ioannis Valaoritis,

a vice president of the National Bank of Greece, the fiscal year of 1910

brought a surplus budget of five million drachmas after many years of deficit,

which was an encouraging element for the next government in taking up a

reform program. 30

In contrast to Gounaris, Venizelos regarded the coup as a favorable

“revolution.” He overtly expressed his positive opinions about the cause of

the officers through the media in Crete. 31 Mark Mazower points out that one

of the major reasons why Venizelos was successful after he landed in Greece

was “his acceptance of revolution as a political instrument.” Venizelos did

not care what method was employed as long as it rejected “the past in favor

of the rapture which would make a rebirth possible.” 32

Venizelos’ entrance into politics on the Greek mainland and the

establishment of the Liberal Party under his leadership redrew the political

map in Greece. Parliament accommodated the large number of newcomers

who had nothing to do with the old parties. 33 Venizelos’ first government

30
Helen Gardikas-Katsiadakis, “Venizelos’ Advent in Greek Politics, 1909–12,” in
Eleftherios Venizelos: The Trials of Statesmanship, ed. Paschalis M. Kitromilides
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006), 110.
31
Gardikas-Katsiadakis, “Venizelos’ Advent in Greek Politics, 1909–12,” 90.
32
Mark Mazower, “The Messiah and the Bourgeoisie: Venizelos and Politics in Greece,
1909 -1912,” The Historical Journal 35, no. 4 (1992): 898.
33
In the elections of November 1910 Venizelos’ Liberal Party scored a great victory
with 307 seats in a total of 362. Among them 245 were new deputies who had not had
political experience in Parliament. Theotokis, Rallis, and Mavromihalis, the leaders of
the old parties, abstained from the elections. Gardikas-Katsiadakis, “Venizelos’ Advent

313
with these fresh deputies surely embodied the opening of new period of

Greek politics. In Venizelos’ first premiership, Repoulis became Minister of

the Interior, while Alexandris assumed the post of Minister of Education.

Repoulis, in particular, became one of the members of Venizelos’ inner circle.

He shared his political career with Venizelos, helping Venizelos as his

advisor and holding a ministerial post in each Venizelos’ government until

1920. Repoulis also acted in the premier’s place from 1918 to 1920 when

Venizelos was frequently out of Greece to participate in the meetings of the

peace conference. After the Liberal Party was defeated in the election of

1920, Repoulis went into exile in Paris with other Venizelist politicians.34

Gounaris reentered politics in 1912 as an independent deputy and

became an archenemy of Venizelos. In 1915, King Constantine, who

opposed Venizelos’ claim that Greece should participate in the Dardanelles

campaign of the Entante, first appointed Gounaris Prime Minister. At this

point, in George Th. Mavrogordatos’ words, “politicians hastening to

‘recognize’ Gounares as leader founded the Nationalist Party.” 35 The party

included politicians of the former old parties and became a major

anti-Veni zelos bloc. Political polarization between Venizelists and

anti-Venizelists had a huge traumatic impact not only on the Greek political

in Greek Politics, 1909–12,” 100.


34
«Ρέπουλης, Εμμανουήλ» [Repoulis, Emmanouil], in ΜΕΕ, τόμος ΚΑ΄ [vol. 21], 109.
35
George Th. Mavrogordatos, Stillborn Republic: Social Coalition and Party
Strategies in Greece, 1922–1936 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), 80.

314
arena, but also on its society for decades.

Gounaris held the premiership three times before he was executed

together with Protopapadakis in November 1922, according to a death

sentence given at the court martial under the control of Venizelists. As the

two men were among the leaders of the Asia Minor campaign, they were

charged with responsibility for the Catastrophe of Asia Minor of

August–September 1922—the crushing defeat of the Greek forces by their

Turkish opponents under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal—, which resulted

in the end of the “Great Idea.” Protopapadakis worked as Gounaris’

right-hand man and took up the position of Minister of Finance in each

Gounaris’ government. He also became Prime Minister just before the

Catastrophe took place.

Panagiotopoulos returned to national politics in 1915 and supported

Gounaris’ party. In 1918, one year after Venizelos seized power again,

Panagiotopoulos was condemned in absentia for political mobilization and

handed a five-year prison sentence. He kept himself hidden, and was

reelected in 1920 after he was granted an amnesty. 36

Vozikis had been an independent deputy since the military coup.

During the Balkan Wars the Venizelos’ government appointed him General

Governor of the Aegean Islands. Then he served the Gounaris’ government


36
Αριστ. Σταυρόπουλος, Ιστορία της πόλεως Αιγίου [History of the City of Aigio] ,
(Πάτρα: Αγγ. Κουλουμπής, 1954), 529.

315
as Minister of Education in 1915 and Minister of Justice in 1921. 37 He

wrote an introduction to the book The Apologiae of the Victims of November

15, 1922, published in 1925, which included Gounaris’ and Protopapadakis’

apologiae for the military campaign in Asia Minor. As the title shows,

Vozikis regarded the two men as prey of political retaliation on the part of

Venizelists. 38

An Interview with a Native Japanese

One interesting question remains unanswered. Did the

contemporary native Japanese know the Greek Japanese? One episode tells

us that there was at least one Japanese whom a Greek directly informed of

the existence of a Greek political party whose members were called

“Japanese.”

The Second Peace Conferences were held in the Hague from June

15, 1907 to October 8, 1907 (NS). The representatives of 44 countries

participated in the meetings to endeavor “to humanize the hardships

necessarily incident to war and to substitute for a resort to arms a pacific

settlement of international grievances.” 39 A group of ethnic Greek refugees

37
«Βοζίκης, Χαράλαμπος» [Vozikis, Charalambos], in ΜΕΕ, τόμος Ζ΄ [vol. 7], 445;
«Βοζίκης, Χαράλαμπος» [Vozikis, Charalambos], in ΝΕΛ, τόμος Δ΄ [vol. 4], 615.
38
Χαράλαμπος Βοζίκης, Αι απολογίαι των θυμάτων της 15 Νοεμβρίου 1922 [The
Apologiae of the Victims of November 15, 1922] (Αθήνα: Μακρής και Σία, 1925).
39
James Brown Scott, The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907: A Series of
Lectures Delivered Before the Johns Hopkins University in the Year 1908, vol.1,

316
from Eastern Rumelia sent a letter to the conferences, so that the world

would pay attention to their sufferings and miserable conditions after they

had been expelled by force from their hometowns along the Black Sea. 40

In August, during the conferences, a correspondent of Akropolis

interviewed with Keiroku Tsuzuki, Ambassador Extraordinary and

Plenipotentiary and First Delegate Plenipotentiary of Japan. Tsuzuki

welcomed a Greek interviewer and said, “Are you from Greece? Very

interesting! I have learned that Greece is now reviving, and I hope that will

work out fine because you are also an old race [like us]. You have good men

as long as I judge the Greek representatives you have here. They are very

serious men!” “We are trying to revive, your Excellency.” the interviewed

answered and then said, “Our hope actually lies in our new [political] party,

which we gave the reform-oriented name, ‘Japanese’!” Tsuzuki laughed and

said, “I know it. I hope the party will be successful as we are.” 41

It is not certain whether Tsuzuki already knew of the existence of

the Team of the Japanese in Greece. He might have said so out of mere

politeness. In any case, this brief episode was the only evidence that I have

found to prove that a native Japanese person obtained information about the

(Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1909), 1.


40 ΑΣΔ, Φακ.186, υποφακ. 186.2, εγγρ. 16.
41
«Το Συνέδριο της Χάγης. Η δεύτερα συνέντευξις μετά του Ιάπωνος αντιπροσώπου
Κεΐροκου Τσουτσούκη» [The Conference of the Hague: The Second Interview with the
Japanese Representative Keiroku Tsuzuki], Ακρόπολις, 27 Αυγούστου 1907, 1.

317
Greek Japanese.

What Was the Team of the Japanese?

The Team of the Japanese brought to light the problems the Greek

political world had at the turn of the twentieth century. The Team was

founded in order to solve these problems and regenerate the state for the

nation’s benefit. For this purpose, the Team launched a struggle in

Parliament. As we have examined the four concrete examples, the Team’s

activities during its short life demonstrate that the members faithfully kept

the Team’s initial purpose in mind. We recognize in all their activities the

strong sense of duty to make politics beneficial and honorable for the sake of

the nation as a whole. In this sense, we can say that the Team did not betray

the Greek nation.

However, we cannot give a positive answer to the question of

whether the Team of the Japanese could have been powerful enough to

fundamentally change the Greek political arena as it had expected to do. It

could contribute to the making of the laws, like the land distribution in

Thessaly for refugees and native sharecroppers, and the school textbook

reform. It could not, however, succeed in persuading the government to

reform politics, so that the Greek state could be substantially transformed

into a political entity that truly served the nation’s good. For the first step

318
toward this rebirth, the Team considered administrative improvement and

economic reforms to be indispensable. However, the Team failed to convince

the government to take any measures to solve these issues that would

influence the basis of the nation’s life from a long-term perspective. The

Team also preached the importance of open debate on every agenda related

to the national interest in Parliament, where the collective will of the people

was supposed to be expressed. By supervising and criticizing the way in

which the government dealt with politics, the Team endeavored to awaken in

the minds of the deputies a sense of responsibility as representatives of the

people. The members’ high-minded attitude toward politics and their

expertise in various fields impressed Parliament. Yet all their words

produced no practical solution. They ultimately went in one ear of the

government and out the other.

The members of the Team of the Japanese fully understood that

their attempts to reform politics would not be achieved at once. They were

quite conscious that it would take much time and unrelenting perseverance to

realize their political ideals. Dragoumis repeatedly told them that they should

not expect quick rewards for their political struggles, as there were many

obstacles in front of them. 42 Yet at the same time it seems also true, though

inconsistently, that they had an optimistic perspective on their ability to

42 Ρέπουλης, «Από τα παρασκήνια των πολιτικών μας ηθών», Εστία, 29 Ιουνίου 1908,
1.

319
expand their influence on Parliament. They expected at heart that the Team

could promote its reform movement at an inter-parliamentary level and make

other deputies espouse it in a relatively short period of time, but they did so

in vain. As we have seen, Dragoumis’ words at the meeting on April 8, 1908,

attest to this. 43 Furthermore, the fact that Protopapadakis soon expressed a

pessimistic view about the Team’s future and that Gounaris was infected by

Protopapadakis’ pessimism also indicates their inner thoughts. 44

Gounaris once said, “Politics is not theory, but action. A politician

will be judged by what he does, not by what he thinks.” 45 Having said that,

he urged the government to boldly take up necessary reforms to change the

state system. Paradoxically, however, he turned out to become a cabinet

member of the Theotokis’ government in order to be proactive. Naïve as he

was, retrospectively speaking, Gounaris believed that he could carry out the

economic reforms of the Team of the Japanese in the government the Team

had been attacking. Within the framework of a parliamentary regime in

which the Team had faith, a majority party wielded the ultimate

policymaking power. Gounaris had to be its member to exert action. He took

a big gamble in order to realize what he believed would benefit the nation,

which backfired in the end. His reconversion to the government party reveals

43
See p. 258.
44
Ρέπουλης, «Από τα παρασκήνια των πολιτικών μας ηθών», Εστία, 1 Ιουλίου 1908, 2.
45
«Βουλή. Η χθεσινή συνεδρίασις» [Parliament. Yesterday’s Meeitng], Ακρόπολις, 3
Ιουνίου 1907, 2.

320
that the Team could not overcome the initial contradiction between its goal

and its strategy—the Team aimed at playing a leading reformative role for

the nation’s good, whereas it was indifferent to seizing power in Parliament.

It should be noted that there was a difference between the Team of

the Japanese and the mass media, especially the newspaper Akropolis, the

most ardent supporter of the Team, in degrees of inclination toward political

reform. The Team advocated the necessity of reform in politics “for” the

people, but it never articulated that it was promoting a political reform

movement “with” the people. A potential partner with whom the Team had in

mind to struggle for changing the state system was not the people, but rather

the people’s elected representatives in Parliament. This stance of the Team

implies that the members regarded politics as a special skill that was not

available to the masses. Therefore, in spite of the repeated demands of

Akropolis that the Team should form a united front with extra-parliamentary

forces to sweep away the old corrupt politics and to establish a popular

government, the Team did not show any interest in the Akropolis’ appeals.

Although the Team talked a lot about the nation’s good, the members of the

Team did not think of standing abreast with the people to bring about change

in politics. This elitist flavor of the Team probably gave to some persons

outside Parliament, like above-mentioned Kambanis, a sense of distance

between the Team and the nation to whom the Team was supposedly

321
committed. Even though Repoulis commented that the idea for the Team

came from the heart of public opinion, this did not mean that the Team was

working together with the people. 46 In the discourse of the Team of the

Japanese, the people are receivers of politics, not its central actors.

George J. Andreopoulos describes the years between 1897 and 1909

as “the absence of a political force which could articulate a credible

hegemonic vision.” 47 After the “Great Idea,” which had been the only

trustworthy medium to maintain the unity of government and governed, was

almost shattered as a result of the disastrous defeat of the war of 1897, the

Team arguably wished to become such a political force that could provide a

new vision of the state and the nation, alluring as well as plausible, on par

with the “Great Idea.” The Team was not mistaken in that it denounced the

existing domestic political system and asserted that it should first be

reformed for the nation’s rebirth. The Team was also correct in openly

claiming that the future politics of the state should be practiced on a national

basis. The members of the Team without doubt acknowledged themselves as

representatives of the nation and developed their various arguments on its

behalf.

In a real sense, however, the Team could not serve as a bridge that

46
Ρέπουλης, «Από τα παρασκήνια των πολιτικών μας ηθών», Εστία, 29 Ιουνίου 1908,
1 και 1 Ιουλίου 1908, 2.
47
George J. Andreopoulos, “Liberalism and the Formation of the Nation-State,”
Journal of Modern Greek Studies 7, no. 2 (1989): 198.

322
connected the governed with their government. In comparison with the

“Great Idea,” which had been deeply-rooted among the Greeks as a telos of

the state and the nation, the Team’s domestic reform movement obviously

lacked the dynamism that could motivate the people. For that very reason,

the Team should have made a stronger effort to cultivate a sense of

participation among the people in its reform movement. It should have

presented its concrete plans to the public, explaining in detail why they were

needed and what positive outcomes they would bring to the nation. As the

reform program that the Military League demanded in the coup of 1909

indicates, there surely existed people’s discontent with the existing political

system, but their grievances and dissatisfaction were not clear-cut in nature,

including “a hodge podge of radicalized elements.” 48 If this is the case, the

Team of the Japanese, which existed before the military coup, had missed a

chance to help the people clarify their amorphous sense of dissatisfaction

with politics. The members of the Team, as professional politicians, had to

digest the people’s views and in Parliament set forth with lucidity the Team’s

reform plans as reflecting those views. This was probably the only way in

which the Team could be recognized among the people as a political force

with a credible hegemonic vision, irrespective of whether it would come to

power or not. Gounaris’ attempt to change a theory into an action should

48
Andreopoulos, “Liberalism and the Formation of the Nation-State,” 199.

323
have been realized not through his crossing over to the government party, but

through going outside of Parliament to hear the people.

Do we conclude that the entire activity of the Team of the Japanese

during less than two years was nothing but a farce played out on the stage of

Parliament after all? After he resigned as Minister of Finance, Gounaris told

Alexandris that he wanted to forget everything that had happened. He added

that Greece needed general unanimity. 49 His words sound like he criticized

himself and the Team for playing political dissenters and creating dissonance

in Parliament. Do we have to completely deny the Team’s parliamentary

activity, according to Gounaris’ self-assessment?

Although the Team could not have a great impact on realistic

political grounds, it could play a role in signaling that a new style of politics

could be possible only if politicians themselves, those of a government party

to be precise, were determined to adopt it. As we have seen, the keen sense

of national crisis initially impelled the members to form the Team of the

Japanese. According to the Team, conventional politics based on the personal

relations that successive governments had pursued was nothing but a hotbed

of political corruption and stagnation, and had to be abolished. Instead, the

activities of the Team of the Japanese emphasized the necessity that every

state agenda should be mapped out from the perspective of national interest,

49
Αλεξανδρής, Πολιτικαί αναμνήσεις, 16.

324
and in an accurate and feasible manner. In addition, the Team understood

politics in moral terms, and suggested that those who were engaged in

politics should be excellent in political virtue. The members desired to make

politics cleaner and more honorable in the eyes of the nation.

These messages the Team had sent out were not negligible in

Parliament. They were inspiring as well as dangerous. As a matter of fact, on

the one hand, there were some deputies of other political parties who held

the Team in high esteem. 50 On the other hand, the only seven members of

the Team became a sort of menace to the government in terms of its new

stance toward politics. As a precautionary measure not to further this

growing threat, the government gave sweet words to Gounaris and took him

back to its side.

Contrary to what Gounaris wished, historical narratives do not

forget that there was a small opposition party called the Team of the

Japanese at the turn of the twentieth century, though a serious study on it has

not been done before. For all its shortcomings, the fact that the Team of the

Japanese was the only parliamentary force that self-criticized Greek politics

and advocated the necessity of state reform for the nation’s good should be

highly evaluated. In the first decade of the twentieth century, when disorder

and apathy were dominant in Greek politics, the activities of the Team of the

50
Καμπάνης, «Οι ιδεολόγοι και ο κ. Γούναρης», 1.

325
Japanese prove that there certainly existed the will and efforts in the political

arena for changing the state system.

326
Fig. 1 ‒ Stefanos Dragoumis in the Greek Traditional Costume of A
Chief Shepherd
(Published in the Newspaper Romios on October 28, 1906, and entitled “The
Chief Shepherd of the New Third Party”)

327
Fig. 2 ‒ Stefanos Dragoumis in Japanese-Style Clothes
(Published in the Newspaper Athens on March 4, 1907, and entitled “The
Leader of the Six Japanese: Stefanouko Dragoumouko”)

328
Fig. 3 – The Japanese as Chinese
(Published in the Newspaper Akropolis on July 22, 1907)

329
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