Professional Documents
Culture Documents
by
Nanako Sawayanagi
Doctor of Philosophy
Department of History
September, 2009
Katherine Fleming
UMI Number: 3380276
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© Nanako Sawayanagi
iv
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
to work with her at New York University. Her generosity and warmth always
work.
I am also very indebted to all the faculty, staff, and student members
director, Maria Georgopoulou, and the librarians, the archivists, and the staff
at the Gennadius Library for their kindness and hospitality. Their help was
Française d'Athènes for his suggestions on my work and for his friendship.
v
curiosity. I am also grateful to my husband, Keiichi Sawayanagi, for keeping
vi
ABSTRACT
At the turn of the 20th century in Greece, the Team of the Japanese
was the only parliamentary force to overtly criticize the prevalent political
party comprised only seven deputies and was active in the Greek parliament
that relied on personal relationships. Instead, the Team argued for the
the Greek state might overcome the domestic and international crises it then
faced.
This dissertation explores the short life of this tiny political party
the Greek parliament, I discuss the Team’s efforts to reform the state and I
assess the Team’s importance in Greek political history. Uniquely, the Team
government behavior and, for the good of the nation, to induce the
In this way, the Team tried to play a central role in the rebirth of the state.
vii
to Greek politics. But their various attempts to create effective policies for
the nation and to encourage virtuous and ‘clean’ politics did become a real
threat to politicians who had long been immersed in petty party politics. The
activities of the Team prove that there certainly existed the will and
commitment to reform a state system in which apathy and disorder had been
dominant.
viii
CONTENTS
DEDICATION iv
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS v
ABSTRACT vii
LIST OF FIGURES xi
CHAPTER 1
CHAPTER 2
Twentieth Century 50
CHAPTER 3
ix
CHAPTER 4
CHAPTER 5
CHAPTER 6
CHAPTER 7
CHAPTER 8
Epilogue 296
BIBLIOGRAPHY 330
x
LIST OF FIGURES
Fig.1
Stefanos Dragoumis
Fig. 2
Fig. 3
xi
LIST OF ABBREVIATION
ΠΕΒΒ: Παράρτημα της Εφημερίδος της Βουλής της Β΄ Συνόδου της ΙΗ΄
Βουλευτικής Περιόδου [Supplement of Parliamentary Gazette of the
Second Session of the Eighteenth Parliamentary Period].
ΠΕΒΕ: Παράρτημα της Εφημερίδος της Βουλής της Εκτάκτου Συνόδου της
ΙΗ΄ Βουλευτικής Περιόδου [Supplement of Parliamentary Gazette of the
Extraordinary Session of the Eighteenth Parliamentary Period].
ΠΣΒΑ: Πρακτικά των Συνεδριάσεων της Βουλής της Α΄ Συνόδου της ΙΗ΄
Βουλευτικής Περιόδου [Parliamentary Proceedings of the Meetings of the
First Session of the Eighteenth Parliamentary Period].
ΠΣΒΒ: Πρακτικά των Συνεδριάσεων της Βουλής της Β΄ Συνόδου της ΙΗ΄
Βουλευτικής Περιόδου [Parliamentary Proceedings of the Meetings of the
xii
Second Session of the Eighteenth Parliamentary Period].
ΠΣΒΕ: Πρακτικά των Συνεδριάσεων της Βουλής της Εκτάκτου Συνόδου της
ΙΗ΄ Βουλευτικής Περιόδου [Parliamentary Proceedings of the Meetings
of the Extraordinary Session of the Eighteenth Parliamentary Period].
xiii
NOTE ON CALENDAR
The dates given in this dissertation follow, in principle, the Julian calendar
which Greece used until 1923. In some cases, however, the dates are
indicated with the Gregorian calendar marked with NS, e.g. January 1, 1900
(NS).
xiv
CHAPTER 1
Athens on March 25, 1896. The world attentively watched the athletic
The Olympic hymn, written by Greek leading poet Kostis Palamas, was sung
during the opening ceremony. This global sports festival filled the Greeks
and foreign visitors alike with euphoria. The Greek people were excited the
most when Greek runner Spiros Louis, the victor of the marathon race,
entered the Olympic stadium that held 100,000 spectators. Louis’ victory
stirred Greek patriotism and inspired confidence in the Greeks. Their success
hope that Greece could revive and transform itself into a modern civilized
1
Ρέτγκεν, «Η αναγέννησις του ελληνισμού. Η 25 Μαρτίου 1896» [The Rebirth of
Hellenism: March 25, 1896], Ακρόπολις, 26 Μαρτίου 1896, 1; John J. MacAloon, This
Great Symbol: Pierre de Coubertin and the Origins of the Modern Olympic Games
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1981), 195-255; Konstantinos Georgiadis,
Olympic Revival: The Revival of the Olympic Games in Modern Times (Athens:
Ekdotike Athenon, 2003), 170-199; The Olympic Games were held from March 25
(April 6, NS) to April 3 (April 15, NS), 1896. March 25 has a symbolic meaning in
Greece. It is a national holiday to commemorate Greek liberation from Ottoman Turks
as well as the Annunciation in Christian tradition. Thomas W. Gallant points out, “[B]y
combining the celebration of the birth of the nation with Christian festival of the
1
On March 30, five days after the opening ceremony of the Olympics,
grappled with the reform for modernization in various domestic sectors, such
1880s. Trikoupis was defeated in the election of 1895 and then retired from
Greek politics. Trikoupis’ retirement and death, rather than the Olympic
festivities, were seen as an omen of a series of events that would take place
in Greece during the ensuing more than ten years. As contemporary British
historian Arnold Toynbee puts it, “The fifteen years that followed 1895 were
The debacle of the Greek–Turkish War of 1897 had the most serious,
protracted impact on Greek politics as well as Greek society for more than a
decade. The Greek army waged war for the first time since its independence
with disastrous results. It was totally defeated by the Ottoman forces in some
Annunciation, the bond between religion and nationalism was drawn even tighter. The
day on which the announcement of the coming of Christ was made thus became now
also the day on which the birth of the new nation was foretold.” Thomas W. Gallant,
Modern Greece (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 69.
2
Arnold J. Toynbee, Greek Policy since 1882 (London: Oxford University Press, 1914),
10.
2
Greeks’ dismal failure made it clear that the “Great Idea (Μεγάλη Ιδέα),” the
dream that was impossible to realize. 3 The miserable defeat compelled the
3
The origin of the term the “Great Idea” is attributed to the speech of the Prime
Minister Ioannis Kolettis at the Constituent Assembly in January 1844. Although the
initial purpose of its use was to secure a post of the public service for the heterochthon
Greeks (those who were originally inhabitants of continental Greece or of the islands
outside the Greek kingdom), and not to declare Greek national territorial aspiration, the
“Great Idea” came to be understood and to be used as the general expression of Greek
nationalism of the nineteenth century which aspired to unify all the “unredeemed”
Greeks within a greater Greek state at the expense of the Ottoman territory. Analyzing
the discourses of the “Great Idea” from 1830 to 1880, Elli Skopetea argues that the
most distinctive feature of this term lies in its vagueness, which allowed it to be
deployed in the varied circumstances of successive crises and acted as a flexible
mechanism for postponing the resolution of more urgent challenges. Although all the
Greeks in the Greek kingdom accepted the expansionism of the “Great Idea” as
legitimate, there were two positions with regard to the way it would be achieved. One
position proposed the Greek kingdom as the “model kingdom,” based on the Western
values of modernization and capable of gaining its territorial aspiration by winning the
trust of the European Great Powers as well as that of the “unredeemed” Greeks in the
Ottoman Empire. The other could be described as more conservative and anti-Western.
It saw the malfunction of the Greek kingdom as the direct result of the too-narrow
territory the European Great Powers imposed on the Greeks and argued that the present
Greek kingdom was merely a staging post on the road to a renewed Byzantine Empire
with Constantinople as its capital, not with Athens. These two positions could not be
always clearly dichotomized and sometimes intermingled. They exerted a powerful
influence not only over the political, but also over economic, social, and cultural
spheres in nineteenth-century Greece. The burning of Smyrna in 1922 that resulted in
the compulsory population exchange between Greece and Turkey in 1923 is considered
as the end of the dream of the “Great Idea.” See Έλλη Σκοπετέα, Το «Πρότυπο
Βασίλειο» και η Μεγάλη Ιδέα: Όψεις του εθνικού προβλήματος στην Ελλάδα
(1830‒1880) [The “Model Kingdom” and the Great Idea: Aspects of National Problem
in Greece (1830‒1880)] (Αθήνα: Πολύτυπο, 1988); Molly Greene, "Great Idea," in
Encyclopedia of Greece and the Hellenic Tradition, vol.1, ed. Graham Speake (London:
Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers, 2000): 688-90; Stathis Gourgouris sees the “Great Idea”
as “ a commonplace topos in the geography of nineteenth-century European politics,
part and parcel of colonialist logic” like “the Panslavism of the Russians or the notion
of ‘Empire’ for the English, not as a unique expression of Greek nationalism.” In
addition, he argues that it is the Russian-Slav threat that led European Powers to
abandon their habitual Philhellenism, which ultimately made the “Great Idea” “the
decrepit phantasm of an opportunist expansionist vision.” This phantasm had a huge
ideological impact, but, contrary to its initial purpose, contributed paradoxically to the
3
Greeks to acknowledge the fact that not only did they not have enough
military capacity to fight against their alleged enemies, but also that they
ultimately had to rely on the political support of the Great Powers with
respect to the fate of their own country and nation. Herbert Wilson remarks
compensate for the total lack of material strength in this world of ours, much
Public opinion blamed the royal family and the political leadership
commander of the troops in Thessaly during the war, was accused of poor
failing to mobilize the fleet. Anti-dynasty feeling became so strong that the
king seriously thought of stepping down from the throne. He could escape
recover public sympathy, although he was never able to entirely regain the
final destruction of “Hellenic culture as the prevalent cultural idiom of the Balkan and
Aegean region.” The failure of the Asia Minor expedition in 1922 was the end of the
hope of territorial expansion and at the same time brought the establishment of the
Turkish nation-state. Stathis Gourgouris, Dream Nation: Enlightenment, Colonization
and the Institution of Modern Greece (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996),
145-146.
4
Herbert Wrigley Wilson, “The Downfall of Greece,” The National Review, June
(1897): 535.
5
S. Victor Papacosma, The Military in Greek Politics: The 1909 Coup d’État (Kent,
Ohio: The Kent State University Press, 1977), 14-15; Douglas Dakin, The Unification
4
In spite of constant calls for the reform of every aspect of the state
politicians to unite for the common goal of rebuilding the country, nor any
genuine state reforms. Neither party was united around a definite political
“Parties in Greece were no longer denied the name itself, but were diagnosed
as being purely ‘personal,’ that is, loose and unstable alliances of deputies
around a leader, bound together solely for the conquest of power and
distribution of patronage.” 6
in 1898 by defeating his colleague, Stefanos Dragoumis, led the two most
discredited by the defeat of the war of 1897, Theotokis could not be a strong
5
recovered from his disgrace. In addition to these two parties, Dimitrios Rallis,
nephew of Diligiannis and a king’s favorite, also formed a small new party.
The war further crippled the poor national economy, as Greece had
already gone into bankruptcy in 1893. In 1898, the state finances were under
payment of the war indemnity and the repayment of large foreign loans.
independent state, but also made it difficult for the government to draw
puts it, “[T]he parties [could] not rely any more on a dues ex machina of
6
On the one hand, political life in Greece stagnated in terms of
demonstrations on the streets and stirred up, within the populace, a distrust
nationalistic fever to protest the translation of the original Gospel into the
event, with eight people dead. In the following year, Diligiannis’ party
organize his cabinet. The king eventually was forced to yield to the demand.
9
Papacosma, The Military in Greek Politics, 16-17; Philip Carabott, “Politics,
Orthodoxy and the Language Question in Greece: The Gospel Riots of November
1901,” Journal of Mediterranean Studies 3, no.1 (1993): 117-138.
7
instability. Parties competed to fulfill shortsighted self-seeking purposes
The party conflict reached the point of incredible enmity, and caused
damage to what was generally regarded as useful both in the capital
city and in provinces. Most beneficial works were messed up and
their completion was obstructed so that the works done by rival
parties would be neglected or that their political prestige would
decline. Petty politics of antagonism and corruption undermined
rational reasoning. Only those who made sound judgment and were
mentally composed, though they were exceptional and small in
number, perceived the dangers. They recognized that above all things
the change of the political system was now necessary. But they were
stigmatized as enemies of the parties and of the political leaders and,
according to imperative usage, enemies of the fatherland. 10
of the dedilomeni was not observed strictly. 11 Both Rallis’ and Zaimis’
10
Γεώργιος Κ. Ασπρέας, Πολιτική ιστορία της νεωτέρας Ελλάδος 1821–1928 [Political
History of Modern Greece 1821–1928], τόμος Γ΄ [vol. 3] (Αθήνα: Ιωάννης Ν. Σιδέρης,
1930), 38.
11
The principle of dedilomeni was the obligation of the king to ask the party leader of
the declared majority in Parliament to form a government. Trikoupis argued the need of
this principle and King George accepted it in 1875. It aimed at restraining the king’s
authority and at making a more stable government. It was a prerequisite of a two-party
system as well. Alexander Nicholaou Damianakos, “Charilaos Trikoupes and the
Modernization of Greece, 1874–1894” (PhD diss., New York University, 1977), 97-107.
8
parties also had opportunities to form a government though they were the
deadlock.
and occupied 110 of the total 177 seats. The second party was Rallis’, and it
state crises, and who would eventually form a group and establish
themselves as the Third Party. They would be later called the Team of the
12
Αλκιβιάδης Προβατάς, Πολιτική ιστορία της Ελλάδος 1821–2002: Νομοθετικά και
εκτελεστικά σώματα [Political History of Greece 1821–2002: Legislative and Executive
Bodies] (Αθήνα: Χρυσή Πέννα, 2003), 354.
9
and strike their enemy. 13
of the article saw the Third Party, the opposition party to the incumbent
Theotokis’ government, as the one that would open a new horizon in Greek
politics. Ηe compared the bold and fearless attack by the members of the
Third Party, which had been without parallel in Greek political history, to
that of the Japanese who had won a victory over Russia in the
the party whose stated vocation was to realize the reformation of the state
and a national rebirth by putting parliamentary life back into the hands of the
Greeks as a whole and thereby rebuilding a political system that had been
13
«Οι Ιάπωνες της Βουλής» [The Japanese in Parliament], Ακρόπολις,10 Φεβρουαρίου
1907, 1.
14
Vlasis Gavriilidis, an owner of the newspaper Akropolis, was known as one of the
best journalists with reformist critical spirit in Greece of the beginning of the twentieth
century. J. Dimakis, “The Greek Press,” ιn Greece in Transition: Essays in the History
of Modern Greece 1821-1974, ed. John T. A. Koumoulides (London: Zeno, 1977), 217.
For further detail of Gavriilidis’ career as a journalist and the comments on him by his
contemporaries, see Δημήτρης Σταμέλος, Πρωτοπόροι και ήρωες της ελληνικής
δημοσιογραφίας: Βλάσης Γαβριηλίδης, Κλεάνθης Τριαντάφυλλος-Ραμπαγάς [Pioneers
and Heroes of Greek Journalism: Vlasis Gavriilidis, Kleanthis Triantafillos-Rambagas]
(Αθήνα: Γλάρος, 1982), 9-90, 153-202.
15
Historians claim that Gavriilidis wrote the above article. However, as it is not the
bylined article, we cannot identify a writer. Two days before this article appeared,
Akropolis had already called Dimitrios Gounaris “parliamentary Japanese warrior.” «Ο
κ. Γούναρης» [Mr. Gounaris], Ακρόπολις, 8 Φεβρουαρίου 1907, 1.
10
The article provoked a large response. From then on, the Third
Party came to be known as the Team of the Japanese and this designation
progressive new power in the Far East at that time, reflected people’s feeling
Opinions vary about the date of the original launching of the Team
March 26, 1906, and began to fiercely attack the Theotokis’ government. 16
It was on that day that the national parliamentary election was held. It is true
that all the members who would join the Team of the Japanese were
victorious and became deputies; however, they did not run for the election as
16
Γρηγόριος Δαφνής, Τα ελληνικά πολιτικά κόμματα [The Greek Political Parties]
(Αθήνα: Γαλαξίας, 1961), 91.
11
members of the Team of the Japanese. Moreover, there was no reference to
the establishment of a new party in the newspapers shortly after the election.
parliamentary period that was convened after the election did not record any
action of the members in a body. Thus we can hardly say that Dafnis’ dating
Gounaris’ speech on May 22, 1906, was the start of a historic movement of
this speech as the commencement of the party. He does not give any
convincing explanation.
date of June 3, 1906, should be regarded as the birth of the Team of the
17
Δημήτριος Χρονόπουλος, Δημήτριος Γούναρης [Dimitrios Gounaris] (Αθήνα:
Ελληνική Ευρωεκδοτική, 1987), 25.
18
There was no meeting on that day in Parliament. In fact, Gounaris made his speech
about reorganization of the constituency system on May 20, 1906. ΠΣΒΑ, 96.
12
protect the Greek emigrants and asked the government to set up a committee
to investigate the issue as a whole. 19 But what actually took place seems
of the Greek emigrants. Dragoumis did not claim this together with Gounaris,
but agreed with the latter only after Gounaris proposed to set up a committee.
Some other deputies also supported Gounaris’ proposal. On the other hand,
we cannot confirm from the sources available that Protopapadakis took part
manner, that the nucleus of the party emerged together with a proposal to
establishing was the original initiative in Greek history that would grapple
that examined the existing emigration situation and put forward a proposal to
19
Διονύσιος Π. Αλικανιώτης, Δημήτριος Γούναρης:Μικρή συμβολή στην κατανόηση
ενός προδρόμου της εποχής μας [Dimitrios Gounaris: Small Contribution to
Understanding a Forerunner of Our Epoch] (Αθήνα: Φιλιππότης, 1983), 78.
20
ΠΣΒΑ, 188-190.
21
Gunnar Hering, Die politischen Parteien in Griechenland 1821–1936, Teil 2
(München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1992), 657.
13
legislate on June 29, 1906. 22 However, this dating is not convincing either,
as both Alikaniotis and Hering fail to explain why this action of Gounaris
when and how the Team of the Japanese came into existence. The documents
sources when and how the members joined together to form a new party.
parliamentary proceedings on November 22, 1906, we find for the first time
an account that gives a picture that all the members, except Repoulis, who
22
ΠΣΒΑ, 470-471.
23
ΠΣΒΕ, 13. We do not know why the parliamentary proceedings did not record
Repoulis’ name. As we shall discuss shortly, Repoulis was one of the first three men
14
action in Parliament.
west coast of the Black Sea, by the Bulgarians in the summer of 1906 led the
Bulgarians ruined Anchialos for the Greek community that had flourished
for a long time. The Greek state itself neither took any effective measures
against the Bulgarian vandalism, nor had foreign arbitration. In regard to the
disaster of Anchialos, Dragoumis said, “We all saw that the lessons of our
inglorious defeat of the war of 1897 passed away fruitlessly.” 26 The country
had not recovered from the aftermath of the war and was in a state of turmoil
our national lineage forced all the Greeks to turn their eyes more carefully to
15
the domestic condition and to be convinced that the present domestic
situation was giving courage and permission to our enemies to usurp the
Dragoumis pointed out that their enthusiasm for actively working for state
They discussed many pending important topics and discovered that they had
similar opinions on many subjects, which provided the ground for their
common action.
the event of Anchialos. 29 The disastrous attack by the Bulgarians against the
Greek inhabitants of Anchialos had taken place on July 31, 1906. Therefore,
27
«Μία συνέντευξις με πανελλλήνιον πολιτευτήν», 1.
28
«Μία συνέντευξις με πανελλλήνιον πολιτευτήν», 1.
29
«Μία συνέντευξις με πανελλλήνιον πολιτευτήν», 1.
16
the members must have gotten together at some point at the beginning of
August. It is hard to say, however, that all seven members who were to act
together later were present from the first meeting. It was probably only
In his open letter to the newspaper Estia, published on June 29, June
30, and July 1, 1908, Repoulis retrospectively looked back on how the Team
of the Japanese was established and what events took place among the
the Team. 30 All of them were still affiliated with the government party in the
existing political situation. He wrote, “I will never forget the tone of the
voice and the pain of the soul, which emphasized that it would be far better
to shatter the old things in order to change the present political situation,
the existing situation. “Before and after the Team of seven members was
established, Mr. deputy of Naxos [i.e. Protopapadakis] was afraid that any
30
Εμμανουήλ Ρέπουλης, «Από τα παρασκήνια των πολιτικών μας ηθών» [Our Political
Ethics as Seen from behind the Scenes], Εστία , 29 Ιουνίου 1908, 1.
31
Ρέπουλης, «Από τα παρασκήνια των πολιτικών μας ηθών», Εστία , 29 Ιουνίου 1908,
1.
17
because, he said, there was no success from Mr. Theotokis.” 32 Indeed,
policy, though he was still a member of the government party. In June 1906,
as he considered it had not been carefully thought out. At that time, Gounaris
from the beginning to leave Theotokis’ party and to establish their own
to follow the reform plans that they believed could advance the state in a
32
Ρέπουλης, «Από τα παρασκήνια των πολιτικών μας ηθών», Εστία , 30 Ιουνίου 1908,
1.
33
Αλέξανδρος Α. Οικονόμου, Πέτρος Πρωτοπαπαδάκης 1859–1922 [Petros
Protopapadakis 1859–1922] (Αθήνα, 1972), 114; Concerning his whole speech on this
topic, see «Ο λόγος του κ. Π. Πρωτοπαπαδάκη, βουλευτού εκ Νάξου περί
ηλεκτροκινήσεως των τροχιοδρόμων κατά την συνεδρίασιν της 28 Ιουνίου» [The
Speech of Mr. P. Protopapadakis, Deputy of Naxos, about the Electrification of the
Railways at the Meeting on June 28], Ακρόπολις, 1 Ιουλίου 1906, 2-4.
34
The newspaper Akropolis reported on August 21, 1906, that some deputies of the
government party began to discuss the necessity to reform the existing political system.
Akropolis does not mention who they were, but there is a possibility that they were
Repoulis, Gounaris, and Protopapadakis. Akropolis wrote, “The deputies in question
18
like-minded deputies beyond Theotokis’ party. In addition, they began to
discuss who would become their leader to advocate their reform movement.
We do not know exactly how and when the first three members
recruited others. It is certain, however, that Alexandris was the last to join. In
his memoirs, Alexandris vividly described the day when he was asked to
have made it a necessary condition for cooperation that they should consider how to
realize through Mr. Theotokis, leader of the majority party, reform plans they propose.
It is evident that they do not intend to overthrow the Theotokis’ government. Rather,
they are making efforts to strengthen the government by convincing Mr. Theotokis to
change the political system.” «Μια ευχάριστος πολιτική ζύμωσις» [A Favorable
Political Activity], Ακρόπολις, 21 Αυγούστου 1906, 3.
19
have determined to form a political team and they wish to ask you
to participate in it. The team will consist of only seven members,
and no more.” I interrupted him, saying “Six, not seven.” “Because
S. Dragoumis will be also a member, whom we intend to appoint as
the leader,” Vozikis added. I expressed some apprehension because
Dragoumis belonged to the bygone political world. Vozikis said,
“Although only Gounaris is really fit to be the leader, he did not
agree to assume the leadership of our team. He thinks that his
leadership would be considered a premature political ambition and
that would not be a good omen for us.” 35
As the passage above shows, six members except for Alexandris had been
demonstrates that although Alexandris did not have intimate relations with
about them.
intend to appoint as the leader (Θα είναι και ο Σ. Δραγούμης, τον οποίον και
suppose that Dragoumis had already been approached for a new party by its
35
Απόστολος Αλεξανδρής, Πολιτικαί αναμνήσεις [Political Memoirs] (Πάτρα: Δ.
Φραγκούλης και Κ. Βαρζάνης, 1947), 5. In this passage, Alexandris wrote that Repoulis
was the director of Akropolis. In reality, however, Repoulis used to be an editor-in-chief.
Vlasis Gavriilidis was the owner-director of Akropolis. .
20
members, but had not yet made a final decision on whether to join it as the
leader.
analyzed (ανέλυσαν),” and “they did not hesitate (δεν εδίστασαν),” when he
described how the would-be members had been determined to form a new
political party. It was not until the very end of his interview that he expressed
the aspirations of the party with the use of the first-person plural form, as in
from these examples that Dragoumis was neither among the first members
who took the initiative in establishing a new party, nor participated in the
probable that the members singled out Dragoumis as a potential leader and
leader. In short, Dragoumis was seen as the second best by the members of
become a leader because he was afraid that people would consider the
formation of a new party as just a tool to help him attain his personal
36
«Μία συνέντευξις με πανελλλήνιον πολιτευτήν», 1.
21
political ambitions. At that time, Gounaris was thirty-nine years old, the
youngest of the three men who were launching their new political
Minister, was sixty-two, and Dimitrios Rallis, the leader of the second
largest party, was also sixty-two, it might have been accurate to say that
people would see him as not sufficiently mature to be a leader. Thus his
old.
seen as a deputy who belonged to the old political regime that the members
leader was clearly contradictory to their intentions. Why did the members
independent deputy and had had influence over Parliament for almost ten
years after he left Trikoupis’ party. Why did he need to work together with
others after such a long time? We cannot provide convincing answers. One
37
In 1906 Repoulis was 43 years old while Protopapadakis was 46.
38
In 1910 when Eleftherios Venizelos became the Prime Minister, he was 46 years old.
He was older than Gounaris by three years.
22
make an all-out effort to reorient the state at that critical juncture and thus to
collaborate with others through his own initiatives. It also could be said from
the other members’ point of view that though he was part of the old system,
former had been defeated by the latter over the appointment of Trikoupis’
successor in 1898.
joined the Team at some point in September 1906. Yet we cannot but make a
guess as to how these two men were recruited. We know, to some degree,
what relations the first three members had with Vozikis and Panagiotopoulos
before these two men became members. As for Vozikis, he was a member of
the committee called upon to investigate the issue of Greek emigrants in the
a central role. They worked together and must have known each other well.
There is a possibility that Gounaris saw that Vozikis had a sense of crisis
similar to his with regard to the then current political situation. The
Protopapadakis. Both men had been the members of the Association for the
39
Protopapadakis was one of the founder members of the association which established
in 1899. Panagiotopoulos became a member in 1901. Ελένη Δ. Μπελιά, Σύλλογος προς
Διάδοσιν Ωφελίμων Βιβλίων: Διαδρομή μιας εκατονταετίας 1899–1999 [The Association
23
probably did find themselves on the same wavelength.
provide some hints about this. Alexandris did not have personal relations
with the other members prior to the establishment of a new political party.
He was elected as a deputy for the first time only six months earlier and had
not yet taken an active role in Parliament. Thus he asked Vozikis why they
personalities with a sense of politics, and that two events confirmed that
Alexandris was the person necessary for Greek politics. First, Alexandris
was not scared when he was attacked at the screening of the result of the
election by the criticism that he was not qualified to be a deputy due to his
relative youth. Second, he boldly censured both Theotokis and Rallis when
argues that Dragoumis, Gounaris, and Protopapadakis were the first three
for the Promotion of Beneficial Books: The Course of One Hundred Year 1899–1999]
(Αθήνα: Σύλλογος προς Διάδοσιν Ωφελίμων Βιβλίων, 1999), 47, 319.
40
Αλεξανδρής, Πολιτικαί αναμνήσεις, 6-7.
24
members. 41 But their claims cannot be accepted if we look carefully at first
the Team several times to talk about its reform ideas before and after the
It read, “It would be desirable that the Prime Minister, leading a great
majority and above all else acknowledging in conversation with his friends
true purpose in conferring with him. As he put it, “It goes without saying that
41
Χρονόπουλος, Δημήτριος Γούναρης, 25; Αλικανιώτης, Δημήτριος Γούναρης, 78-79.
42
Alexandris made his final decision to join the Team after Dragoumis assumed its
leadership. In his letter to Dragoumis dated October 29, 1906, Alexandris wrote that he
was pleased that Dragoumis became the leader of the Team, and asked the latter to
count him as its member. ΑΣΔ, Φακ. 156, υποφακ. 156.2, εγγρ. 33.
43 Ρέπουλης, «Από τα παρασκήνια των πολιτικών μας ηθών», Εστία , 30 Ιουνίου 1908,
1.
44
Ρέπουλης, «Από τα παρασκήνια των πολιτικών μας ηθών», Εστία , 30 Ιουνίου 1908,
1.
25
my position was extremely weak before the Prime Minister. Above all I had
worthy of being ministers of his cabinet, but that we asked him to form a
new ministry that would like to and would be able to realize the plans we
suggested.” 45
plans as reasonable. But he did not agree to put them into practice. Instead,
he was more willing to convince Repoulis that it was too bold to execute
their plans that might bring negative result to his party. He also showed his
governmental defects. Theotokis and Repoulis did not eventually reach any
government had to make every effort to maintain power in order to carry out
consideration the necessity to maintain the government for its military policy,
several principles which we said and which the government declined. Thus I
26
us.” 46
At this point, the Team made a final firm decision to take the next
regard to those who made up the Team of the Japanese. 47 Taking into
Team of the Japanese was formed of seven deputies only and no one joined
Alexandris. 48
46
Ρέπουλης, «Από τα παρασκήνια των πολιτικών μας ηθών», Εστία , 30 Ιουνίου 1908,
1.
47
For example, Georgios Aspreas did not mention the names of Alexandris and
Panagiotopoulos. Ασπρέας, Πολιτική ιστορία νεωτέρας Ελλάδος, 85-86; Grigorios
Dafnis named the six members except for Dragoumis. Δαφνής, Τα ελληνικά πολιτικά
κόμματα, 91; According to Douglas Dakin, the Dragoumis–Gounaris party was
composed of 4-6 members. Dakin, The Unification of Greece, 311; The entry “the Team
of the Japanese” («Ιαπώνων, ομάς») in the Great Greek Encyclopedia mentions that
Dragoumis, Gounaris, Protopapadakis, Repoulis, Vozikis, and Epameinondas
Mavromatis were the members of the Team. ΜΕΕ, τομ. ΙΒ΄ [vol. 12], 793; The entry
“Dragoumis, Stefanos” («Δραγούμης, Στέφανος») in Great Greek Biographical
Dictionary states that Epameinondas Mavromatis collaborated with the Team of the
Japanese. Κωνσταντίνος Α. Βοβολίνης, Μέγα Ελληνικόν Βιογραφικόν Λεξικόν [Great
Greek Biographical Dictionary], τόμος Γ’ [vol. 3] (Αθήνα: Βιομηχανική Επιθεώρηση,
1958), 466.
48
Alexandris’ memoirs refer to only these names as the members. We also find the
expression of “the team of the seven members (η ομάς επταμελής)” in Repoulis’ open
27
As mentioned above, Dragoumis was the oldest member of the
group and he became the leader of the Team of the Japanese. He was from an
a court of the first instance and then as a lawyer. He had been one of the
party because he was not content with the stance of Theotokis, Trikoupis’
successor. Dragoumis was affiliated with no party and continued his political
was also a scholar and wrote many articles in the fields of political science,
letter to the newspaper Estia. Ρέπουλης, «Από τα παρασκήνια των πολιτικών μας
ηθών», Εστία, 30 Ιουνίου 1908, 1.
49
«Δραγούμης, Στέφανος» [Dragoumis, Stefanos], in ΜΕΕ, τόμος Θ΄ [vol. 9], 531;
28
Panagiotopoulos was also already an established politician. In his
occupied with the currant trade, but soon abandoned it. In 1878, he published
a newspaper, Kokoras, and then spent his time reading classical Greek works
government of 1897. 50
Although these two men were over fifty years old and had already
established their position in Parliament, the other members of the Team were
relatively young and less experienced. Vozikis was from Kinouria in the
lawyer in Tripoli. He entered politics in his early 30s and served as a deputy
for eleven terms. When he was first elected as a deputy for Kinouria in 1895,
29
moved to Zaimis’ party and had been affiliated with it until 1903. He was
Akropolis, Skrip, Neon Asti, and Estia for ten years and published many
in the political arena and became a sponsor of the state budget of the year
1899. Although he lost the national election in 1903, Repoulis was appointed
51 «Βοζίκης, Χαράλαμπος» [Voz ikis, Charalambos], in ΜΕΕ, τόμος Ζ΄ [vol. 7], 445;
«Βοζίκης, Χαράλαμπος» [Vozikis, Charalambos], in ΝΕΛ, τόμος Δ΄ [vol. 4], 615;
«Ποιοί εξελέγησαν βουλευταί» [Who Were Elected as Deputies?], Ακρόπολις, 26
Μαρτίου 1906, 4; It is not certain when Vozikis moved from Theotokis’ party to
Zaimis’. The article of the newspaper Athens on October 18, 1906, however, reported
that there was a rumor that Vozikis, deputy of Zaimis’ party, would move to the
government party. «Η πολιτική κατάστασις» [The Political Situation], Αθήναι, 18
Οκτωβρίου 1906, 2.
52 «Ρέπουλης, Εμμανουήλ» [Repoulis, Emmanouil], in ΜΕΕ, τόμος ΚΑ΄ [vol. 21],
109; «Ρέπουλης, Εμμανουήλ» [Repoulis, Emmanouil], in ΕΕΕ, τόμος Θ΄Α [vol. 9Α],
30
Protopapadakis was a deputy for Naxos Island in the Cyclades. He
at that time studied law. He completed his education in France from 1879 to
1887 with the support of Dimitrios Vikelas, a great Greek prose writer of that
and also assumed responsibility for the construction of the Corinth Canal
from 1890 to 1892. He also addressed the problem of the water supply in
Athens and contributed to the sanitation of the capital city. He was virtually
with Vikelas for the Association for the Promotion of Beneficial Books from
1899 onward, with the intention of further spreading literacy and learning
among the Greek people. At the same time he himself wrote several booklets
63-64; «Ρέπουλης, Εμμανουήλ» [Repoulis, Emmanouil], in ΝΕΛ, τόμος ΙΣΤ΄ [vol. 16],
423.
31
for educational purposes. 53
the real leader of the party, while they see Dragoumis as a figurehead
elevated as a token of respect for his long political career and his
then political science in Paris and London from 1889 to 1892. After he
Theotokis’ party. 54
32
Athens University and in Paris, he entered politics. He did not have any
memoirs about his political career and who reviewed the activities of the
Team of the Japanese and their achievements over the years 1906–1908. 55
Akropolis, in December 1906, just when the Team of the Japanese started its
vividly described them. He referred to all the members of the Team, which
at how the members were characterized and what impression they gave to
power in Parliament and the only person that exercise[d] it because he [had]
“One word characterizes him, that is, prudent.” 56 Gounaris was “the first
Melas greatly appreciated Gounaris’ speaking ability and put it, “His speech
33
sounds as if he said to you, ‘Follow me!’” 57 Protopapadakis was “a realist in
speaks, numbers get soul, live, and always present mathematical truth.” 58
Vozikis was depicted as “an eagle, like a Spartan, and big, like a
fondly, saying, “He does not get the hang of the platform. His voice and
undoubtedly become one of the best warriors of speech. Even now he does
independent person. “He does not simply agree with anyone because he does
was a person that “[took] a strong action against favor.” Yet he was a very
popular among his local people. He was also regarded as one of the most
57 Σπύρος Μέλας, «Εικόνες από την Βουλήν: Ν. Γούναρης» [Portraits from Parliament:
N. Gounaris], Ακρόπολις, 22 Δεκεμβρίου 1906, 1. «Ν. Γούναρης» [N. Gounaris] in the
title is a typo, it should be «Δ. Γούναρης» [D. Gounaris].
58
Σπύρος Μέλας, «Εικόνες από την Βουλήν: Ο κ. Πρωτοπαπαδάκης» [Portraits from
Parliament: Mr. Protopapadakis], Ακρόπολις, 23 Δεκεμβρίου 1906, 1.
59
Σπύρος Μέλας, «Εικόνες από την Βουλήν: Ο κ. Βοζίκης» [Portraits from Parliament:
Mr. Vozikis], Ακρόπολις, 23 Δεκεμβρίου 1906, 1.
60
Σπύρος Μέλας «Εικόνες από την Βουλήν: Ο κ. Αλεξανδρής» [Portraits from
Parliament: Mr. Alexandris], Ακρόπολις, 23 Δεκεμβρίου 1906, 1.
61 Σπύρος Μέλας, «Εικόνες από την Βουλήν: Ο κ. Ρέπουλης» [Portraits from
34
so strong that “the people of Aigio stayed out in the rain to listen to him in
newly established party, declared that he was not interested in seizing power,
and that he only wished to play a more beneficial role in the resolution of
October 31, 1906, Dragoumis publicly presented the party’s goal that it
would carry out domestic restoration not from a parochial and partisan
the successive governments since the defeat of 1897 to deal with necessary
projects for rebuilding the state. Though the governments would have had to
and many other domains, they had neglected these issues. Instead, they had
62
Σπύρος Μέλας «Εικόνες από την Βουλήν: Ο κ. Παναγιωτόπουλος» [Portraits from
Parliament: Mr. Panagiotopoulos], Ακρόπολις, 29 Δεκεμβρίου 1906, 2.
63
Ρέπουλης, «Από τα παρασκήνια των πολιτικών μας ηθών», Εστία, 30 Ιουνίου 1908,
1.
35
spent money wastefully and brought administrative disorder. Moreover, there
was no sign of recovering in terms of the quality of domestic life eight years
very difficult situation. Without friends and protectors, it had been exposed
to every kind of attack and intrigue from abroad. It was also confronted by
the crisis arising from the general neglect of Hellenism beyond the
boundaries of the state. The event of Anchialos was the most recent and
save the nation. He explained that a new party had been formed in order to
launch the struggle for the restoration. He emphasized that although they
were a small group of deputies, they had determined to deal with state
be a futile and even harmful pursuit. Rather, the party intended to contribute
This did not mean that the party members would propose fawning
36
measure the government’s actions according to the highest standards, to put
express their opinions on a bill when the government called for a vote on it.
What was significant for the members was to benefit the state in a positive
way by their activities in Parliament. Thus, they would not randomly oppose
every bill, but positively support the government as long as they judged its
proposals suitable for the nation’s good. They also declared that they would
Repoulis’ concern was with the Ministry of the Interior; Vozikis’ attention
was directed to the Ministry of Justice and other ministries; Alexandris was
usurping the present government, but intended to play a major national role
in regenerating the state. Clearly there was a tension between these two
64
«Μία συνέντευξις με πανελλλήνιον πολιτευτήν», 1.
65
Αλεξανδρής, Πολιτικαί αναμνήσεις, 7.
37
concepts, as they were contradictory and unrealistic at a glance. How did the
without seizing power? No political party that proposed such a goal had
existed in Greece before the Team of the Japanese appeared. In this sense,
the Team was indeed unprecedented. It is also evident that the Team did not
aim at throwing out the current regime in a radical manner. In fact, its stance
Dragoumis’ words indicate that the Team intended to teach the government
how to deal with the affairs of the state for the good of the nation, and induce
it to reform every necessary sphere of the state. The goal of the Team of the
account the power struggle among the parties of that period, which were
believed that they could become a force to make politics beneficial and
honorable for the sake of the nation as a whole. With this strong awareness
Japanese. Some historians refer to this group when they explain the Greek
38
political conditions of the first decade of the twentieth century. However,
their understanding of the Team of the Japanese varies and their assessment
time in Greek parliamentary history. Yet he mentions that the Team had
“basic shortcomings that were attributable to the lack of cohesion among the
the members of the Team neither had common ideological direction, nor a
uniform goal.” Thus he argues that the Team of the Japanese cannot be
time that the Team clearly embodied the weakness of Greek bourgeois
went against the existing political order, Greek radicalism presupposed the
66
Τάσος Βουρνάς, Ιστορία της νεώτερης και σύγχρονης Ελλάδας, τόμος Α΄: Ιστορία της
νεώτερης Ελλάδας από την Επανάσταση του 1821 ως το κίνημα του Γουδί (1909)
[History of Modern and Contemporary Greece, vol.1: History of Modern Greece from
the Revolution of 1821 to the Movement of Goudi (1909)], έκτη έκδοση [6th ed.]
(Αθήνα: Πατάκης, 2003), 585.
39
parliamentary regime, political freedom, etc., and did not oppose the existing
institutions such as the privileged classes of the society, the monarchy, and
the church. Greek radicalism, Hering argues, did not question the legitimacy
of the present political order, and focused on constitutional issues and the
rights of citizens. Its demand was concerned with “the effectiveness of the
rights, and the socioeconomic system.” Therefore, such a view was easily
incorporated into the existing political system and was less influential in
in Japan.” 68
67
Hering, Die politischen Parteien, 657.
68
Gallant, Modern Greece, 119.
69
Papacosma, The Military in Greek Politics, 32.
40
Georgios Ventiris argues that the activity of Team of the Japanese
oligarchy.” Ventiris assumes that Gounaris was the real leader of the Team,
only if it was made within the existing political system.” Thus he worked at
the narrow parliamentary level with other members of the Team, though he
reform spirit into Parliament. Ventiris also contends that Gounaris had a firm
from that of the Trikoupis period twenty years earlier. Gounaris did not
effectively respond to the voices of the rising bourgeoisie who had built up
discontent about the elitist political rule of the few. Ventiris concludes that
the Japanese who “did not realize the ascent of the bourgeoisie” were
writes: “This Team was the most serious opposition against G. Theotokis in
70
Γεώργιος Βεντήρης, Η Ελλάς του 1910–1920: Ιστορική μελέτη [Greece in
1910–1920: Historical Research], τόμος Β΄ [vol. 2] (Αθήνα: Πυρσός, 1931), 30-32.
41
terms of parliamentary criticism of the government activities. The Team was
But afterwards, the policy of the ‘Japanese,’ their political struggles, and
framework of the existing regime. The Team, he writes, “was opposed to the
efforts in the political arena. According to him, “‘the Team of the Japanese’
against the Theotokis’ government. It strove for carrying out major economic
reforms.” 73
class.” According to Dertilis, “the only thing that the Greek Japanese
actually achieved was to keep playing at war until the day when conservative
71
Ασπρέας, Πολιτική ιστορία νεωτέρας Ελλάδος, 85-86.
72
Δαφνής, Τα ελληνικά πολιτικά κόμματα, 91.
73
Hariton Korisis, Die politischen Parteien Griechenlands: Ein neuer Staat auf dem
Weg zur Demokratie 1821–1910 (Hersbruck/ Nürnberg: Verlag Karl Pfeiffer, 1966),
161.
42
Theotokis offered the finance portfolio to Gounaris, one of the Samurai
soldiers.” 74
since its liberation from Ottoman rule.” It was “a revolution with ethical
principles and with the program for the national rebirth, the reform of state
the struggle of this small party made a deep impression on the minds of the
bringing new ideas and new systems. The members with independent
character, who composed the Team under the leadership of the unforgettable
impetus to the political life of the country. The political life, through the
restoration of the state, and guaranteed the shaking off of the lethargy that
74
Γιώργος Δερτιλής, Κοινωνικός μετασχηματισμός και στρατιωτική επέμβαση
1880–1909 [Social Transformation and Military Intervention 1880–1909], πρώτος
έκδοση [1st ed.] (Αθήνα: Εξάντας, 1977), 169. In the third edition of this book
published in 1985, Dertilis does not refer to the Team of the Japanese at all.
43
had then crept over the Greek political world.” 75
writes, “Nobody can deny that the struggles of the ‘Japanese’ were the
power. They were always fair and respectable. Those who comprised the
Team were not the type of politicians that showed off their knowledge. They
were worried for the good future of the state. Their activities were not only
those of censors, fault-finders, and critics, but also of creators, teachers, and
irregularities of the past, political defects of that time, and practices and
also considers the activity of the Japanese as “the first revolution and the
75
Ιωάννης Η. Μάλλωσης, Η πολιτική ιστορία του Δημητρίου Π. Γούναρη, 1902–1920
[Political History of Dimitrios P. Gounaris, 1902–1920] (Αθήνα: Νέα εποχή, 1926),
109-110.
76
Αλικανιώτης, Δημήτριος Γούναρης, 85-87.
44
first rebellion against the old-partyism, three years before the military coup
of Goudi took place.” Admitting that both the movement of the Japanese and
the military revolt in 1909 intended to break down the existing political
regime, he points out the difference between the two in terms of the method
they employed. “The second [i.e. the military revolt] used armed force while
the ‘Japanese’ had the power of words.” The activity of the reform-minded
Japanese in Parliament was “a ray of light penetrating into the apathy and
lethargy of old parties,” and “the truly first blow against the old-partyism of
that time.” 77
Greece at the beginning of the twentieth century that overtly argued for the
need for the state reform. It was a short-lived party and active in Parliament
only from 1906 to 1908. In August 1909, about one year after the Team was
disbanded, a military coup took place. This event brought the advent of
Eleftherios Venizelos in Greek political life. The efforts of the Team of the
Japanese was almost forgotten, left behind by the Venizelos period, which
77
Χρονόπουλος, Δημήτριος Γούναρης, 25-26.
45
The Team of the Japanese was a reform-oriented opposition party.
nature of the Team. The only clear goal that the Team aimed at was to
contribute positively to regenerating the state for the sake of the nation,
which is too general to classify the Team within the paradigm of political
orientation. The Team of the Japanese was neither a personal party that had
been a major feature of Greek politics of that time, nor a party of principles
with concrete agendas. It was neither right, nor left wing. Nor did it defend
the interests of a specific social class, like the bourgeoisie and the working
either, proving that they intended to emulate the modernization project that
Meiji Dynasty of Japan had successfully carried out. However, it is true that
the discussions, which the Team members participated in, brought life to
Parliament, and made it plain that the Theotokis’ government was often
government.
78
Feroz Ahmad, The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish
Politics 1908‒1914 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), 23n1.
46
In this dissertation I shed light on the concrete parliamentary
activities of the Team of the Japanese from its foundation to its dissolution,
and describe exactly what legislation the members contributed to and what
state. The case study approach makes it possible to draw a more complete
picture of the Team of the Japanese. It also helps us consider what the Team
of the Japanese eventually meant in Greek politics in the first decade of the
twentieth century.
“Japanese” evoked among the Greek people in the beginning of the twentieth
century, and why a newly founded opposition party originally called the
1904–1905 formed a certain consensus in Greek society about Japan and the
deal with the activities of the Team in the extraordinary session of the
eighteenth parliamentary period, from November 11, 1906 to July 31, 1907.
that Gounaris claimed the state should work for the good of the people and
society. Then I look at what arguments the members developed to reform the
47
inefficient public administration and to build up a sound economy for the
truly national benefit. Chapter 4 deals with the legislation concerning the
distribution to them. This was the first attempt by the Greek state to grapple
and authors from the school textbook business and to introduce a new
role in passing the bill on this reform. These two pieces of legislation,
discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, are the good concrete examples that exhibit
the political ideals of the Team of the Japanese. That is, the Team supported
the government for the nation’s good. Chapter 6 explores the so-called
Foster the Production and Trade of Currants. The Team of the Japanese
48
Team’s disintegration and how this process occurred. In Chapter 8, referring
to the mass media’s reaction to the activities of the Team of the Japanese as
well as to the episodes of the members after the Team was disbanded, I try to
discuss what the Team did in terms of the state reform and what meaning we
49
CHAPTER 2
look at what contemporary Greeks called to mind with the words “Japan”
and “Japanese.” We cannot but regard it as strange that Greeks employed the
name of the nation, extremely far from Greece, for a Greek political party.
Considering the fact that the Team was originally called the Third Party, and
that the Team of the Japanese, as a sort of a nickname for the party, was
widely accepted by Greek society, we can imagine that the words “Japan”
something positive, among Greek people. 1 The members of the party neither
expressed negative feelings with respect to the nickname, nor asked the
media refrain from using the eponym. The first chapter of Alexandris’
1
As an example to show the extent to which the party was known as the Team of the
Japanese, see Figures 1 and 2. In October 1906, just before the Team began its activity
in Parliament, the weekly satirical newspaper Romios illustrated Dragoumis as the head
of the Third Party in the traditional Greek consume of a chief shepherd (Figure 1). In
March 1907, the newspaper Athens portrayed Dragoumis as the leader of the Team of
the Japanese, wearing Japanese-style clothes, and modified his Greek name to make it
sound Japanese (Figure 2).
2
Απόστολος Αλεξανδρής, Πολιτικαί αναμνήσεις [Political Memoirs] (Πάτρα: Δ.
Φραγκούλης και Κ. Βαρζάνης, 1947), 5; A document of British Foreign Office reported
that Dragoumis’ small party was “nicknamed the Japanese party.” “Doc. 51: Inclosure
50
There must have been a tacit common understanding among
This is why the name of the Team of the Japanese could spread and become
widely used. What was the content of this common understanding? When
and how was it shaped? What kind of resonance did the words trigger among
people? Answering these questions will pave the way for illuminating how
Greek people regarded the party and what they expected from its members.
opportunity for Greeks to consider Japan and its people. Althoguh the
official relationship between the two countries began through the conclusion
ordinary Greek people had little knowledge of the small island nation in the
in Doc. 50, ‘General Report on Greece for the Year 1907,’” in British Documents on
Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print: Part I
From the Mid-Nineteenth Century to the First World War: Series F Europe, 1848–1914:
Volume 14 Greece, 1847–1914, ed. John F. V. Keiger (University Publication of
America, 1989), 299; In his book published in 1916, Charles Ibanes de Ibero wrote that
Gounaris used to be a member of “Groupe japonais.” Charles Ibanez de Ibero,
D’Athènes à Constantinople: la situation politique en Orient (Paris: Attinger Frère,
1916), 46.
3
Υπουργείον Εξωτερικών, Γενικόν ευρετήριον συνθηκών, συμβάσεων και συμφωνιών
διμερών και πολυμερών 1832–1956 [General Catalogue of Treaties, Conventions, and
Bilateral and Trilateral Agreements 1832–1956] (Αθήνα: Εθνικό τυπογραφείο, 1956),
45; Japan opened its diplomatic legation in Greece in 1922. Πρεσβεία της Ιαπωνίας
στην Ελλάδα, «Ιστορική περίληψη» [Brief History],
http://www.gr.emb-japan.go.jp/portal/gr/relations/index.htm (accessed on March 30,
2009).
51
Far East. At that time Japan had already won in the war of 1894–1895
against the Qing dynasty of China and had come to be recognized in the
diplomatic arena as a rising new imperial power. Yet the Sino–Japanese War
was only a distant concern for most Greeks. Japan’s victory over the Russian
Empire, however, had totally different meaning for ordinary Greeks. This
time the war was regarded not as someone else’s distant affair, but as Greeks’
own concern, in a sense. Indeed, the war and the Japanese victory
British historian and journalist William Miller was living in Athens when the
When the war broke out between Russia and Japan, the excitement in
Athens was so intense that most of the papers brought out ‘extra
specials,’ in the shape of small fly-sheets, containing the latest lie
about the Japanese victories, and the Constitution Square used to ring
every evening at seven o’clock with the shouts of the newsboys
offering these startling ‘telegrams’ for the modest sum of five lepta,
or less than a halfpenny apiece. 4
Miller also reported that the Greeks were so eager for information about the
war that they gathered in a café at the center of Athens to discuss what was
taking place on the battlefields and to map out mock strategies. Newspapers
4
William Miller, Greek Life in Town and Country (London: George Newnes Limited,
1905), 114.
52
and periodicals devoted constant attention to the war and gave daily updates
on its development. 5
Russo‒Japanese War lay the contemporary rivalry among the Balkan nations.
and had clashed with the similarly irredentist ambitions of Slav nations.
Their conflicts had brought about fierce armed struggles, and inveterate
antagonism among them reached its apex in the beginning of the twentieth
century. Greeks firmly believed that Russia, the leader of Panslavism, held
sway over the Slav nations, especially Bulgarians, which the Greeks were
fighting against.
contexts. Even among the Slav nations this term often had contested
5
See the series of articles of Greeks Newspapers such as Akropolis, Athens, Kairoi and
Chronos from January 1904 onward.
6
Έλλη Σκοπετέα, Το «Πρότυπο Βασίλειο» και η Μεγάλη Ιδέα: Όψεις του εθνικού
προβλήματος στην Ελλάδα (1830–1880) [The “Model Kingdom” and the Great Idea:
Aspects of National Problem in Greece (1830–1880)] (Αθήνα: Πολύτυπο, 1988),
325-336.
53
Russian enterprise in conjunction with other Slavs with the purpose of
uniting all Slavs at the expense of Hellenism. And this was even after the
course of the events in Macedonia revealed the fact that the intentions of
Bulgaria, Greece’s real enemy, were not necessarily aligned with those of
Russia. 7 Greece tended to see the shadow of Russia behind every movement
belief that Russia was operating behind the scenes to endanger the Greek
territorial ambition in Macedonia. The riots were connected with the attempt
on the part of Queen Olga to translate the Gospel into colloquial Greek.
Since she was of Russian descent, her project of translation was plausibly
7
For the transformation of the relationship between Russia and the Balkan Slavs, see
Barbara Jelavich, Russia’s Balkan Entanglements 1806‒1914 (Cambridge, New York,
Port Chester, Melbourne & Sydney: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Yasamee
argues that there were different attitudes toward Panslavism even in Bulgaria. The
Bulgarian Exarch Yoshif, who was usually regarded as a symbol of Bulgarian
nationalism, thought that the Russo-Bulgarian ties were indispensable for the success of
Bulgarian “national” movement. F. A. K. Yasamee, “Religion, Irreligion and
Nationalism in the Diaries of the Bulgarian Exarch Yoshif,” in Religious Quest and
National Identity in the Balkans, eds. Celia Hawkesworth, Muriel Heppell and Harry
Norris (New York: Palgrave in association with School of Slavonic and East European
Studies, University College, London, 2001), 203-217.
8
J. N. Psichari, “The Gospel Riots in Greece,” in The Language Question in Greece,
ed. Chiensis (Calcutta: The Baptist Mission Press, 1902), 61-62; Philip Carabott,
“Politics, Orthodoxy and the Language Question in Greece: The Gospel Riots of
November 1901,” Journal of Mediterranean Studies 3, no.1 (1993): 117-138.
54
November 1901 the streets were filled with people’s shouts of “Down with
kind of a proxy war against Russia on behalf of Greece. Since Russians had
not treated Greeks seriously and had been supporting Bulgarians, many
Japanese. This position argued that Greece should take sides with Japan for
Greek national interest. 10 During the war, Miller met an old Greek man who
told him that the Russian reverse in the East was the judgment of Heaven
9
Roman Romanovich Rosen Baron, Forty Years of Diplomacy, vol.1 (London: George
Allen & Unwin Ltd.; New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1922), 184.
10
Τιμ. Σταθ., «Ο πόλεμος» [The War], Ακρόπολις, 15 Φεβρουαρίου 1904, 1.
11
Miller, Greek Life, 46-47; It should be noted, however, that there existed also a
pro-Russian atmosphere in Greece during the Russo–Japanese War. Miller referred to
Queen Olga and wrote, “When she returns from her annual outing in Russia, there is no
display of enthusiasm, but during the present war there has been considerable sympathy
with her.” Miller, Greek Life, 53; Moreover, several dimoi (municipalities) such as
Athens and Zakinthos formally performed doxologies for the victory of Russian army.
The authorities of dimos of Athens signaled that Greeks had an obligation to support
Russia as it was one of the Protecting Powers of Greece and had contributed to the
establishment of the Greek kingdom. Several Greek communities outside the Greek
state also performed doxologies for Russia and sent financial assistance. In contrast,
there were cases like the mayor of Patras, who strongly opposed to any doxology for
Russia. «Μνημόσυνον υπέρ των Ρώσσων» [Memorial Service for the Russians],
Ακρόπολις, 31 Ιανουαρίου 1904, 2; «Ο Δήμαρχος Πατρών κατά των Ρώσσων» [Mayor
of Patras against the Russians], Ακρόπολις, 5 Φεβρουαρίου 1904, 4; «Δοξολογία εν
Ζάκυνθω υπέρ των Ρώσσων» [Doxology for the Russians in Zakinthos], Ακρόπολις, 10
Φεβρουαρίου 1904, 2; «Υπέρ των Ρώσσων δοξολογία εις τον ελληνικόν ναόν εν
Πετρούπολει» [Doxology for the Russians in a Greek Church at St. Petersburg],
Ακρόπολις, 11 Φεβρουαρίου 1904, 1; «Οι Έλληνες υπέρ των Ρώσσων. Συνεισφοραί
υπέρ των αγωνιζομένων.» [The Greeks in Support of the Russians. Contributions for the
Fighters], Κράτος, 25 Μαρτίου 1904, 2.
55
In the same vein, the Greeks understood that the Russo–Japanese
War had improved the situation for Greece in contested Macedonia. Russia’s
engagement in the Far East and its domestic turmoil appeared to decrease the
Russia has withdrawn its attention from the Balkans for a year. The
main body of Panslavism is being threatened at present. A
scandalous enterprise …of expanding its body turns to be
impossible. The Japanese are keeping Russia engaged in external
issues. People’s insurrection, riots, and the big general bloody
revolution in its home territory are causing very serious and
tremendous diversions domestically. 12
In fact, Bulgaria was the country that suffered the most pain from
Russia’s mishaps. One dares to say without exaggeration that today
the Bulgarians are lamenting the catastrophes of the Great [Russian]
Empire more than a crowd of rude and ignorant Russian peasants. 13
12
«Αι χείρες ελεύθεραι» [The Free Hands], ΄Αστυ, 18 Ιανουαρίου 1905, 1; The “big
general bloody revolution” indicates the Bloody Sunday massacre which took place in
St. Petersburg on January 9, 1905 (January 22, NS). This event became a signal for the
revolution of the same year.
13
«Αι χείρες ελεύθεραι», 1.
56
Furthermore, Allen Upward, who visited Macedonia in the winter of
1907–1908, met a Greek priest who had been persecuted by the Bulgarian
bands and lived as a refugee in Salonica. The priest considered that the
situation of the Greeks in Macedonia had changed for the better after the
victory of Japan over Russia. He said, “The first Bulgarian bands that came
against us were armed with Russian rifles. Russia’s defeat has broken the
Salonica could even go out on the streets after dark, which he had never
In reality, for the Balkan Slavs, the defeat of Russia was a shocking
incident that made them realize that Russia, their protector, was not strong
any longer. 15 Yet there is no concrete historical event to prove that Greek
addition, the extent to which the alleged Russian decline had a negative
War. 16
14
Allen Upward, The East End of Europe: The Report of an Unofficial Mission of the
European Provinces of Turkey on the Eve of the Revolution (New York: E.P. Dutton,
1909), 171-172.
15
Richard C. Hall, The Balkan Wars 1912–1913: Prelude to the First World War
(London; New York: Routledge, 2000), 7.
16
It is worth mentioning that Bulgarians found the method of Japanese fighting against
57
However, the Greeks’ understanding of the Russo–Japanese War
victory over Panslavism. The Greeks also observed the Russo–Japanese War
newspapers constantly mentioned that this event might bring about a change
in the established world order. Indeed the rapid advance of Japan as a world
power caused shock and consternation all over the world. On the one hand,
European Great Powers perceived that Japan was threatening the world
Russia useful to them and tried to emulate it in order to combat against the Greeks in
Macedonia. A report of the Ottoman Second Army Commander in April 1907 read,
“Bulgarians in the region of Karinabad who had received “Japanese training” (“Japon
Talimi”) the year before were now instructing guerillas for fifteen days in the same
techniques, including rifle-handling.” Quoted from Renée Worringer, “Comparing
Perceptions: Japan as Archetype for Ottoman Modernity, 1876–1918” (PhD diss., The
University of Chicago, 2001), 185n58; Henry Noel Brailsford reported that the Moscow
Panslavist League had exhibited signs of resuming activity after the Russo-Japanese
War ended and that it was showing interest in the Balkans again. Henry Noel Brailsford,
Macedonia: Its Races and Their Future (London: Methuen, 1906), 299nI.
58
humiliate the Russian Empire ten years later. In the meantime,
Japan, already entrenched as a colonial power in Taiwan, expanded
into Korea…. The psychological significance of the rise of Japan
and its successful competition with European powers should not be
underestimated. Throughout the non-European world, nationalist
leaders, newspaper editors, and even ordinary people suddenly saw
that Western dominance was neither inevitable nor everlasting. In
Indian villages distant from the battlegrounds of Mukden and
Tsushima, where the Russians were defeated, newborn babies were
given the names of Japanese admirals. Nationalist artists in Calcutta
began to adopt Japanese techniques and sensibilities to mark
themselves out from European influences. In French Indochina,
Phan Boi Chau inaugurated the “look to the east” movement which
was to take many young people to Tokyo, where they mingled with
expatriate Chinese, Korean, and Indian students. Even in distant
Abyssinia, buoyed up by its own recent victory against the Italians
at Adowa in 1896, the country’s first social scientist urged his
countrymen to look to the Japanese example of modernity. 17
17
Christopher Alan Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World 1780‒1914: Global
Connections and Comparisons (Malden, MA, USA & Oxford, UK: Blackwell
Publishing, 2004), 461; It is noteworthy, however, that the impact of Japan’s victory
over Russia on non-European countries was not universal or uniform, and that the
degree of reaction to it varied across countries. Paul A. Rodell argues that only the
Philippines and Vietnam among Southeast Asian countries were directly influenced by
the Russo–Japanese War and connected Japan’s victory to their nationalistic movements.
Paul A. Rodell, “Inspiration for Nationalist Aspirations? Southeast Asia and the 1905
Japanese Victory,” in The Russo–Japanese War in Global Perspective: World War Zero,
eds. by Bruce W. Menning John, W. Steinberg, David Schimmelpenninck Van Der Oye,
David Wolff and Shinji Yokote, (Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2005), 629-654; In
Mid-Eastern and South Asian countries, Egypt and India under British control
responded remarkably to the Russo–Japanese War. Steven G. Mark contends that the
war provided these two countries with the first opportunity to “perceive their
circumstances in a nation-wide and global context and by convincing them that their
dreams of taking charge in their own lands were realizable.” Steven G. Mark. “‘Bravo,
Brave Tiger of the East!’ The Russo–Japanese War and the Rise of Nationalism in
British Egypt and India,” in The Russo–Japanese War in Global Perspective: World
War Zero, eds. by Bruce W. Menning John W. Steinberg, David Schimmelpenninck Van
59
Although Greece never had experienced direct colonization by any
specific European power, it had always been under the tentacles of European
states both politically and economically. Britain, France, and Russia had
Since 1898, one year after the defeat of Greece in the war against the
Ottoman Empire, the national revenue had been under the control of the
constantly argued that Greece should stand on its own feet and be recognized
interference was more rampant. Therefore, the great concern with Japan and
Der Oye, David Wolff and Shinji Yokote (Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2005), 611; Ottoman
Turkey showed great concern with the Meiji Japan’s progress long before the war. The
Sultan, Young Turk advocates, and common people regarded Japan’s successful
“civilizing” process as a reference point for modernization of their empire, but each of
them interpreted it in different ways for their own benefit. See Worringer, “Comparing
Perceptions.”; It is also interesting that the Japanese victory over Russia also functioned
as counterevidence to the view among contemporary human scientists influenced by
Darwin’s evolutionary theory. For example, “Herbert Spencer adapted some of his
theories to explain the development of human societies through the ‘survival of the
fittest.’ Spencer was taken up in turn by Chinese, Indian, and Arab intellectuals. These
men fears for the organic health of their own societies, yet hoped that weak nations, like
endangered spices, might finally adapt and survive. Japan’s risorgimento provided them
with a glimmer of light.” Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World, 316-317.
60
Japanese in the Greek media during the Russo–Japanese War can be
newspapers and periodicals not only reported the progress of the bloodshed
battlefields in the Far East and the military strategies of Russia and Japan,
but also paid attention to what Japan and Japanese people were like. Their
Japan and the Japanese: A Happy Country and the Strangest People
newspaper Athens on January 18, 1904, just before the outbreak of the
Russo–Japanese War. Then the series, “The Japanese and Japan: the
Japan and its people, including its history, system of governance, culture and
18
The Russo–Japanese War began on January 24 (February 6, NS), 1904.
61
having a sometimes fairy-tale-like existence. In this case, the word
the pendulum of modern Greek identity always swung between the West and
the East, we find the stance of the essays towards Japan and the Japanese
Western eye. 19
number of inhabitants, and blue sky.” 20 It was also said to contain abundant
minerals and fertile land. The rich land apparently yielded sufficient produce
with relatively little effort on the farmers’ parts. Therefore, the Japanese did
not have to work a lot. “Peasants work a little before sunrise—but whenever
19
When the terms “West” and “East” are used in relation to modern Greek identity,
they do not imply actual geographical dichotomy. The “West” stands for Europe and its
civilization originated in ancient Greece while the “East” the heritage of Byzantine
Empire and Eastern Orthodox Chritsianity. See Artemis Leontis, Topography of
Hellenism: Mapping the Homeland (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995).
20
«Ιάπωνες και Ιαπωνία. Ο περιεργότερος λαός της γής» [The Japanese and Japan: The
Strangest People on Earth], Αθήναι, 5 Φεβρουαρίου 1904, 1.
62
the cloudless sky presents the full moon, they spend sensuous sleepless
nights—and continue to work until noon. In the afternoon they work a bit,
heart of a man and indeed attracts the dull European soul which has been
saturated with the pleasures of life of the West.” 22 In fact, some Europeans
admitted that they could spend their whole life happily in Japan. 23
which was convened for the first time in November 1890, had a bicameral
years old. 24 There were the differentiated classes—the Imperial Family, the
21
«Ιάπωνες και Ιαπωνία», Αθήναι, 1 Φεβρουαρίου 1904, 1.
22
«Ιάπωνες και Ιαπωνία», Αθήναι, 1 Φεβρουαρίου 1904, 1.
23
«Ιάπωνες και Ιαπωνία», Αθήναι, 5 Φεβρουαρίου 1904, 1; It is worth referring here to
the example of Lafcadio Hearn, an Irish-Greek writer. He was born in 1850 on a present
Greek island, Lefkada, of the Ionian Sea under British control. He came to Japan in
1890. He was so fascinated with the country that he became naturalized as Japanese and
married a Japanese woman. He died on September 16, 1904 (NS) during the
Russo–Japanese War. He wrote many works in English about Japan and the Japanese,
including Glimpses of Unfamiliar Japan (1894), In Ghostly Japan (1898), and Japan:
An Attempt at Interpretation (1904). He is still very popular in present-day Japan, where
he is known by his Japanese name KOIZUMI Yakumo. His obituary in a newspaper of
Liverpool was translated into Greek and placed in the contemporary Greek periodical
Noumas. «Λευκάδιος Hearn» [Lefkadios Hearn], Νουμάς, Αριθ. 116, 3 Οκτωβρίου
1904, 3.
24
«Ιαπωνία και Ιάπωνες» [Japan and the Japanese], Αθήναι, 18 Ιανουαρίου 1904, 1.
63
aristocracy, and common people. The essays emphasized, however, that the
the country, there was no actual difference between rulers [i.e. aristocrats]
“City and country dwellers and peasants are happy because the class
society functioned based on the idea that everyone lives happily, “mutual
agreement for general and individual happiness even[ed] all things out.” 27
of Japan’s national character in the minds of the Greeks. “If there are a
people who are truly cheerful, joyful, innocent and humorous, the Japanese
are such people.” 28 Common people were apparently free from living and
According to the essay, a man who paid 15 yen could have the right to be elected. One
yen was equivalent to 5.15 francs.
25
«Ιάπωνες και Ιαπωνία», Αθήναι, 27 Ιανουαρίου 1904, 1.
26
«Ιάπωνες και Ιαπωνία», Αθήναι, 5 Φεβρουαρίου 1904, 1.
27
«Ιάπωνες και Ιαπωνία», Αθήναι, 27 Ιανουαρίου 1904, 1.
28
«Ιάπωνες και Ιαπωνία», Αθήναι, 27 Ιανουαρίου 1904, 1.
29
«Ιάπωνες και Ιαπωνία», Αθήναι, 28 Ιανουαρίου 1904, 1.
64
said, “Both Europeans’ and natives’ most significant interest was the
In what sense could common Japanese women be the source of happiness for
the Japanese? We can easily imagine the roles of a woman who entertained a
happiness of Japanese men.” As such, both European and native men were
30
«Ιάπωνες και Ιαπωνία», Αθήναι, 29 Ιανουαρίου 1904, 1.
31
«Ιάπωνες και Ιαπωνία», Αθήναι, 29 Ιανουαρίου 1904, 1; This passage includes an
anachronism. The Daimyo did not exist any longer in Japan when this article was
published. The Daimyo were the feudal loads of the Samurai class. The feudal caste
system was abolished in 1869 as one of a series of reforms. The Daimyo were
incorporated into the aristocratic class together with Court nobles. They were called
kazoku. W.G. Beasley, The Meiji Restoration (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1972), 335.
65
standards, was explained as the outcome of women’s freedom in Japanese
society. “Neither any prejudice, nor any social and family obligations do not
restrain her [i.e. the Japanese woman]. She is free to do what she wants,
what she desires, and what her capricious mind comes up with.” 32 The
Japanese woman was not forced to occupy herself with such alleged
The essay stressed that Japan had a different set of cultural and
32
«Ιάπωνες και Ιαπωνία.», Αθήναι, 29 Ιανουαρίου 1904, 1.
33
«Ιάπωνες και Ιαπωνία», Αθήναι, 29 Ιανουαρίου 1904, 1; The essay only employs the
words “wickedness” (κακοήθεια) to describe Japanese women’s alleged immoral
behavior and never gives a concrete example of exactly what this behavior entails. Yet
we can easily guess that the “wickedness” implies that Japanese women pursued
prostitute-like professions. It seems that the moral standard of contemporary Greek
society, which did not tolerate obscenity, prevented the writer of the essay from
providing further detailed description. Concerning Greek moral standards of that period,
Miller wrote, “There is no capital where vice is so little conspicuous as at
66
Indifferent to the judgment of the Europeans, Japanese men
available, and which were demarcated from other districts of a town and a
village. Men had a good time with women who sang and danced from dusk
to midnight. Boy clowns also joined them and would entertain them with
their performing arts. “The world of the Japanese goes through the most
beautiful moment in its life there and Europeans are so attached that they do
not want to leave the quarters.” 34 Men would spend hours to their heart
content, entranced there. Therefore, “the Japanese do not use opium and
other narcotics like the Chinese and other peoples in the Far East. They do
The way in which Japanese enjoyed themselves to the full was also
the formal dinner in Japan meant that common people held a banquet in an
invited and the banquet lasted from sundown to sunrise. “In Europe this kind
of banquet would be held once the doors were hermetically closed. But in
Japan almost all neighbors surround those who are holding the banquet.
Athens.…With the exception of two illustrated rags, one of which was prosecuted for
indecency, and the now almost universal Parisian postcards, there is little to corrupt the
morals of the passer-by. As a distinguished Greek novelist once said to me: ‘We are not
yet sufficiently civilised to be immoral.’” Miller, Greek Life, 199-200.
34
«Ιάπωνες και Ιαπωνία», Αθήναι, 29 Ιανουαρίου 1904, 1.
35
«Ιάπωνες και Ιαπωνία», Αθήναι, 29 Ιανουαρίου 1904, 1.
67
Some of them actively participate and others simply serve as spectators. As
the fete is held in most cases in the garden, it is within reach for all who are
outside of the surrounding fence [of the house of the host].” 36 Whether male
or female, young or old, they apparently had unrestrained revels, eating and
were not religiously fanatical at all and tolerant of just about any form of
faiths. The essay noted that the Japanese were Buddhist, but at the same time
respected “the spirits of the kami,” which was recognized as the national
religion of Japan, and which considered the Mikado Mutsuhito, the great
Christians were persecuted and killed, and Christianity in Japan had been set
36
«Ιάπωνες και Ιαπωνία», Αθήναι, 6 Φεβρουαρίου 1904, 1.
37
«Ιάπωνες και Ιαπωνία», Αθήναι, 6 Φεβρουαρίου 1904, 1.
38
«Ιάπωνες και Ιαπωνία», Αθήναι, 27 Ιανουαρίου 1904, 1; Kami means god in
Japanese. The essay never uses the word, “Shintoism,” the traditional polytheistic
religion of Japan, but “the spirits of the kami” refers to it.
68
back by the prohibition orders of the seventeenth century. But now the ban
paradoxical country.” 39 This was a product not only of the official religious
forced the Japanese to be civilized, they have accepted new religions that
spread steadily. Even when a creed is paradoxical, the Japanese are not
deterred by the differences between it and their own creeds. Instead they
introduce new names of deities for worship. This is the chief explanation for
the big and wide concept which the Japanese have of Christianity.” 40 The
Japanese did not seem to care what the name of the deity they worshipped
was—kami, Sabaoth or Jehovah. It did not matter for the Japanese who the
also stated that, although the Japanese learned about Christianity only
complete Christians. 41
39
«Ιάπωνες και Ιαπωνία», Αθήναι, 6 Φεβρουαρίου 1904, 1; A ban against Christianity
was officially cancelled in 1873.
40
«Ιάπωνες και Ιαπωνία», Αθήναι, 6 Φεβρουαρίου 1904, 1.
41
«Ιάπωνες και Ιαπωνία», Αθήναι, 8 Φεβρουαρίου 1904, 2.
69
because of their creed. On the contrary, everyone respects others’ beliefs
tolerance of the Japanese was made based on their behavior when visiting a
church or temple of a religion different from their own. “The most beautiful
he knows how to make the sign of the cross, he crosses himself like the
others do.” 43 Likewise, “when they visit a temple of either the kami or
Buddha, Christian Japanese kneel, grovel, and put their foreheads on the
42
«Ιάπωνες και Ιαπωνία», Αθήναι, 27 Ιανουαρίου1904, 1.
43
«Ιάπωνες και Ιαπωνία» Αθήναι, 8 Φεβρουαρίου 1904, 2.
44
«Ιάπωνες και Ιαπωνία» Αθήναι, 27 Ιανουαρίου1904, 1; On June 21, 1904 (NS),
during the Russo–Japanese War, the newspaper The Times of London reported what
measures the Japanese government took to eliminate the racial and religious prejudices
among Japanese people against the Russians and Christians and also what action the
Christians in Japan took. The Japanese government officially opposed radial and
religious discrimination. It issued special orders to protect Russian subjects in the
country so as to repress the increasing tendency in Japanese society to discriminate the
Russian Orthodox Christians and other Christians of different denominations. A
conference of all religious bodies in Japan was held on May 16, 1904 (NS), and
declared, “The war now existing between Japan and Russia has for its object, on the
part of Japan, the security of the empire and the permanent peace of the East. It is
carried on in the interests of justice, humanity, and the civilization of the world. With
differences between races or religions it has nothing whatever to do. We, therefore,
meeting together without distinction of race or religion, agree that we will endeavour to
publish to the world, each in a manner accordant with the methods observed in the
religious body to which he belongs, the real purpose of the present war as now
described. We also express a most earnest desire for the speedy accomplishment of an
honourable peace.” The representative of “Greek Church” [i.e. Russian Orthodox
Church] in Japan also participated in the conference. Therefore, the article wrote,
70
Material Progress in Japan
greatly concerned with cultural and social aspects of Japan, and that
European civilized countries from the time when it was determined to strive
The article demonstrated the extent to which Japan had attained the level of
“Japan was inferior to China about forty years ago with respect to
“[F]rom the foreign and native followers of her own State faith in Japan, Russia
receives an emphatic protest against the cruel injustice she is doing to a most liberal and
fair-minded nation.” The tone of the argument of the article was favorable to Japan. The
author provided concrete examples to prove the sincere consideration of the Japanese
government for different races and religions, such as the holding of a Japanese state
funeral of Mr. Davidoff, a Russian representative, in which “the use of Greek ritual”
was allowed. The article read, “There is probably no part of the world where religious
bigotry and racial prejudice have less influence than in Japan.” However, we should
keep in mind that Britain had been allied with Japan since 1902. “Christianity and the
Russo-Japanese War,” The Times, June 25, 1904 (NS), 4; There were not only Russian
inhabitants, but also Japanese Eastern Orthodox Christians in Japan. The Eastern
Orthodox believers in Japan numbered 28,397 in 1903, 28,597 in 1904, and 28,920 in
1905. Элеонора Саблина, 150 лет Православия в Японии: История Японской
Православной Церкви и её основатель Святитель Николай [150 Years of
Orthodoxy in Japan: History of Japanese Orthodox Church and its Founder Prelate
Nikolai] (Москва; Санкт-Петербург: AИРО, 2006), 118.
45
«Καταπληκτικαί πρόοδοι της Ιαπωνίας» [The Astonishing Progress of Japan], in Ι.Α.
71
Shogunate officially ended in November 1867. Since then Japan had
reinstalled the Emperor as the head of the state and pushed forward
powers. “In 1867 everything changed suddenly. Japan has made a jump of
introduced. Japanese subjects were all considered equals before the law. As
the article quoted Article 5 of the Charter Oath issued by the Japanese
72
Japan had made huge material progress in many sectors. In the field
1870. By 1903 the railroad in Japan had reached 8,982 kilometers in total.
improved. The telegraph was first introduced at the end of 1868 and the total
30,449 kilometers in 1903. The postal system was unknown thirty years
previously, but by 1903 there were 4,567 post offices, and they dealt with
The number of the banks and companies (130 banks and 1,006
stock companies in 1894) demonstrated that the rate with which business
1890 there were only 855 sailing-ships, but in 1904 Japan had 1,441
Japanese-built ships. 50
48
«Καταπληκτικαί πρόοδοι της Ιαπωνίας», 108.
49
«Καταπληκτικαί πρόοδοι της Ιαπωνίας», 109.
50
«Καταπληκτικαί πρόοδοι της Ιαπωνίας», 109-10.
73
The transformation from household-based industry to large-scaled
spinning mill in Tokyo had 45,000 spindles and 3,000 workers. In the mining
and 300,000 oxen worked in the fields. Rice was cultivated under very good
conditions and the yield of tea had increased. The cultivation rate of
government had also benefitted from it. The national revenue had been
amass modern military forces. The battlefield was the place where the
51
«Καταπληκτικαί πρόοδοι της Ιαπωνίας», 109.
52
«Καταπληκτικαί πρόοδοι της Ιαπωνίας», 111.
53
«Καταπληκτικαί πρόοδοι της Ιαπωνίας», 110.
54
«Καταπληκτικαί πρόοδοι της Ιαπωνίας», 110.
74
modern technology and scientific capabilities of a state could be fully
be said that the war itself was visible proof of the success of Japanese
gave way to a regular army.” 55 In 1900, the total size of the army in peace
time was 640,700. To be more precise, there were 1,237 generals and
578,000 soldiers, and 7,503 assistants. 56 Concerning the Japanese Navy, the
article said, “Today Japan is one of the first-ranked naval powers and proved
that fairly in battle at sea against the Russian Navy.” 57 The article explained
that the steam corvette that Lord Elgin, the British Ambassador to Tokyo,
gave as a present to the Mikado was the first steam ship in Japan. In 1867
torpedo-boats. Later it developed its own navy shipyards. These had built 80
warships by 1902. The navy had 21 admirals, 730 officers of higher rank,
sailors. 58
The power of the figures the article offered one after another was so
55
«Καταπληκτικαί πρόοδοι της Ιαπωνίας», 108.
56
«Καταπληκτικαί πρόοδοι της Ιαπωνίας», 109.
57
«Καταπληκτικαί πρόοδοι της Ιαπωνίας», 109.
58
«Καταπληκτικαί πρόοδοι της Ιαπωνίας», 109.
75
although they probably could not grasp the extent to which each of these
figures actually proved Japan’s advancement. The bigger the numbers were,
the more readers would have been impressed with Japan’s progress.
They compared the present Greek situation with that of Japan, and even
suggested that Greece should learn from Japan how to lead the Greek state in
a better direction.
and a director of the Polytechnic, contributed a long essay on the front page
in the newspaper Athens on February 10, 1904, under the title of “Lessons
from Japan.” The essay revealed his impatience with Greece’s inability to
catch up with the times of progress and attempted to show what difference
Greece, which remained exposed to Bulgarian attacks while Japan had been
76
civilized enough to confront one of European powers:
politics was the fact that Japan, which had been once a “half-barbarian and
xenophobic country” 60 and was located far from Europe, now almost
people.” 61 Japan threw out its past and voluntarily copied every detail of
59
Κωνσταντίνος Μητσόπουλος, «Διδάγματα από την Ιαπωνίαν» [Lessons from Japan],
Αθήναι, 10 Φεβρουαρίου 1904, 1.
60
Μητσόπουλος, «Διδάγματα από την Ιαπωνίαν», 1.
61
Μητσόπουλος, «Διδάγματα από την Ιαπωνίαν», 1.
77
Greece did not achieved anything, even though the Greeks had been
liberated for seventy four years and living in Europe with direct contact to
he said, “We also did the same [like the Japanese did], but we bear no
resemblance to Japan.” 62
of Tokyo, the leading national university, was much bigger than the
students. What was more notable than its size was that the University of
62
Μητσόπουλος, «Διδάγματα από την Ιαπωνίαν», 1.
63
According to Mitsopoulos, the University of Tokyo had 41 professors who
specialized in agronomy, forestry, agricultural science, zootechny and other subjects
which were unknown to Greece, while the University of Athens had 55 professors of
whom only five specialized in the natural sciences. The University of Tokyo was
founded in 1877, forty years after the establishment of the University of Athens.
78
resources, the Japanese scientifically studied subjects concerning mineral
our country is metalliferous, we have not yet been able to make any proper
law concerning minerals.” 64 He also compared the two countries and wrote
that Japan had utilized its mineral resources to manufacture arms, canons,
warships, rails etc. while Greece had barely benefitted from the abundant
iron beds and coals. He even condemned the behavior of the Greeks because
forest produces the most excellent timbers and camphor [in Japan] because
of Japanese army, and concluded that 655 francs was spent on for each
man. 66 In Greece, 21,952 effectives were recorded in 1904 and the Greek
64
Μητσόπουλος, «Διδάγματα από την Ιαπωνίαν», 1.
65
Μητσόπουλος, «Διδάγματα από την Ιαπωνίαν», 1.
66
According to the information Mitsopoulos relies on, the Japanese army had 640,000
79
state spent 15.3% of its annual revenue for a military purpose. According to
Mitsopoulos’ calculation, on average 540 francs was used for each miliraty
man.
The sum of money that was supposed to maintain one military man did not
differ considerably, either. Although Mitsopoulos did not overtly mention it,
he probably intended to provoke readers to consider why Greece had not yet
achieved a strong modernized army in spite of the fact that it had spent
almost the same money as Japan did on each military man. Furthermore,
forces were now able to wage a war even against Russia. In reality,
men in peace time, of which 462,000 were held in the reserve The number of the
effective force (178,000) can be obtained by subtracting 462,000 from 640,000.
67
Ιστορία του Ελληνικού Έθνους: Νεώτερος ελληνισμός από το 1881 ως το 1913
[History of the Greek Nation: Modern Hellenism from 1881 to 1913], τόμος ΙΔ΄ [vol.
14] (Αθήνα: Εκδοτική Αθηνών, 1977), 186-188; The fourth administration of Theotokis
which started in December 1905 moved to discuss this issue seriously at a long last. For
the details of the military preparation project of the Theotokis’ government, see
Στυλιανός-Περικλής Καράβης, «Η δημοσιονομική πολιτική της κυβέρνησης Γ.
Θεοτόκη και η πολεμική προπαρασκευή της Ελλάδας (1905–1909)» [Fiscal Policy of
the G. Theotokis’ Government and the Preparations for War in Greece (1905–1909)]
80
Mitsopoulos explained that Japan had used its national expenditures
“Japan has spent its revenue not only on building up the army and the navy
like Mehmet Ali, an Egyptian leader, did, but also on educating its people
Japanese government relied on tax revenues and public debt, just as the
Greek government did. Yet here again Mitsopoulos found a stark difference
annual tax to the state 13.5 gold francs while each Greek paid 30 gold francs
at least. This means that Greek people paid more than twice as much as the
Japanese did. A huge disproportion between Japan and Greece could be also
observed concerning annual interest paid on the public debt. Japan paid
Japanese with 2.23 francs. This sum of money corresponded to 15.6% of the
31% of the national revenue. Now that Japan had progressed enough,
Japanese people had been rewarded for their monetary contribution to the
state. How about Greece? The comparison of public financial burdens on the
81
citizenry of each country inevitably made Greek readers think of what had
not only lay in emulation of European civilization, but also in its individual
endeavor to take its place with European powers through increasing the
69
Μητσόπουλος, «Διδάγματα από την Ιαπωνίαν», 1.
70
Μητσόπουλος, «Διδάγματα από την Ιαπωνίαν», 1.
82
reference point and criticized the Greek political world. Why can the Greeks
not do what the former “half-barbarian” Japanese have done? What prevents
the state from moving ahead? Who is responsible for the malfunction of the
state? Naturally enough, not only the government but politicians allegedly
Are you aware that if you are inactive, if you remain stuck in the
evil past, and if you continue the comedy of the army, the navy, and
administration, you, unprincipled nation-eaters (εθνοβόροι), are
willingly inducing the members of the European Supreme Court (τα
μέλη του Ευρωπαϊκού Αρείου Πάγου) to cast votes against
Hellenism? How will Europe prefer us, the nation without army,
navy, and administration, to the Bulgarians who have an army and
an administration? 71
The article condemned in very strong words those who did not make any
effort and who only pursued political farces that had not had any effect
administration. They were painted as the nation’s enemies because what they
83
were doing effectively conveyed a negative impression of Hellenism to
it was very natural that Europe attached no importance to the Greeks and
situation. It wrote:
72
«Τι ζητούμεν», 1.
84
fighting spirits. Then it declared:
“Japan” must have already been widespread among Greek people. That is
why the author of the article could employ the word “Japanese” without any
connotation the word “Japanese” carried. In the minds of the Greeks, the
73
«Τι ζητούμεν», 1.
85
of modernization. “We want to become the Japanese of the Near East.” To
put it in another way, as the Japanese had accomplished, the Greeks also
European powers. Everybody had already ideas for change and was
preparing for change, the article claimed. There were also talented
individuals who could advance the process of change. It was high time to
For all its geographical and cultural remoteness from Greece, Japan
had become a country conceptually within the reach of Greece. Japan had
power in world politics on the mental map of the Greeks. The article
criticized the stagnant state system and politicians and called for change,
lifting up Japan as a model state. It did not give specific names of persons
who were talented enough to overhaul the country. This article, though, was
prophetic to some degree. About one month after it was issued, a new small
74
The Young Turks of the same period also identified Japan with the hopes of changing
the Ottoman Empire into a modern state and regarded themselves as the “Japan” of the
Near East. See Feroz Ahmad, The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress
in Turkish Politics 1908‒1914 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), 23n1;
According to Worringer, Young Turks Ahmed Riza and Dr. Nâzim first used the
expression “Turkey was the Japan of the Near East” when they offered an alliance to
Britain in November 1908. Worringer, “Comparing Perceptions,” 223n1, 256-258.
86
political unit of seven deputies began its energetic activities in the Greek
parliament. The party would soon be called the Team of the Japanese.
87
CHAPTER 3
the state’s rebirth. Although it did not announce the specific program of state
reformation to the public, it was most likely in keeping with their vision of
an ideal state. In this chapter, we shall analyze which factors the Team
government.
This chapter is divided into three sections: The first section presents
should move ahead in tandem or, rather, a state should help society to
progress. As per this definition, he saw the relationship between the Greek
state was unable to catch up with it, thereby preventing society from further
advancing. Gounaris pointed out that oligarchy hindered the state from
moving forward. He contended that the state should exist for the good of the
people and society and should thus promptly sever its bond with the
oligarchic system.
88
The second section of this chapter describes the Team’s criticism of
and carelessly the state functioned and how strong the arbitrary political
resolve these issues, they proposed that public servants be appointed on the
political influences.
sound state economy. Since Gounaris believed that the economy was the
society. In this regard, the Team first criticized the government tariff policy
that claimed to protect domestic industry but in reality only benefited the
government could make an informed decision about which sector the state
should protect through the tariff policy. Second, the Team fiercely attacked
the state taxation system that laid disproportionate emphasis on indirect tax.
What was worse, the state imposed unreasonably high indirect taxes on
articles that were basic necessities of life. It followed that the less wealthy
increasing. This resulted in the loss of man power, which would deprive the
89
state of national strength in the long run. Therefore, the Team contended that
though the state had unduly exploited the people thus far, hereafter it had to
To sum up, this chapter addresses the Team’s vision of the state with
respect to the public service, the tariff policy, the taxation system, and
emigration.
on his vision of an ideal state, in the two speeches he delivered during the
influenced that of the other members. However, considering the fact that
1
The first speech delivered on December 19, 1906, was about a new loan for military
reorganization and the second one made on April 12, 1907, was about the Greek
emigrants. The whole texts of his speeches appeared in the newspaper Akropolis.
«Αγόρευσις Δ. Γούναρη βουλευτού Πατρών επί του νομοσχέδιου περί δανείου
20,000,000 υπέρ ταμείου της Εθνικής Άμυνας» [The Speech of D. Gounaris, Deputy of
Patras, on the Bill of the Loan of 20,000,000 gold francs for the Fund of the National
Defense] , Ακρόπολις, 17 Ιανουαρίου 1907, 2-4; «Ολόκληρος η θαυμάσια αγόρευσις
του βουλευτού Πατρών κ. Δημήτριου Γούναρη επί του νομοσχέδιου περί των
μεταναστεύσεων» [The Whole Marvelous Speech of Mr. Dimitrios Gounaris, Deputy of
Patras, on the Bill of Emigration], Ακρόπολις, 21 Απριλίου 1907, 1-3.
90
Gounaris was initially nominated as the Team leader, 2 it is likely that his
ideas met with the approval of the other members. Furthermore, we can
political unit, the members must have unanimously agreed upon a common
vision of the state, even though this had not been clearly formulated as part
Gounaris contended that a major role of the state was, among other
things, to support both the people and society. According to him, a state is a
mere fabric that is composed of the sum total of each individual’s power. He
said, “[B]y cooperating with one another and by complementing one another,
each individual’s power proliferates, expands, and reaches the point where a
framework of a state every individual can influence another and all can work
agency that helped an individual gain strength and thereby realize his or her
intentions.
2
Απόστολος Αλεξανδρής. Πολιτικαί αναμνήσεις [Political Memoirs] (Πάτρα: Δ.
Φραγκούλης και Κ. Βαρζάνης, 1947), 5.
3
«Αγόρευσις Δ. Γούναρη βουλευτού Πατρών», 2.
91
society advance, especially at the beginning of the twentieth century, which
Gounaris said:
progress. However, there was one condition under which the development of
society could be secured—if it received help from the state. As the state
Gounaris argued that the present Greek state did not satisfy this
criterion. Though a state had to always focus on the needs of individuals and
to assist them in realizing their wishes, the Greek state fell short of these
4
«Ολόκληρος η θαυμάσια αγόρευσις του βουλευτού Πατρών», 2.
5 «Ολόκληρος η θαυμάσια αγόρευσις του βουλευτού Πατρών», 2.
92
[W]hen the state is so short-sighted that it can neither foresee nor
simply see what an individual catch sight of, we have the right to
say that the state is blind. What is the reason of the sickness of the
state? It is obvious. The state is not organized, which we see
everywhere. Our state is unorganized as a political entity in every
aspect, not only from the military point of view, but also from the
political one. 6
The Greek state had lost sight of the bigger picture of individual goals.
Gounaris, the Greek state’s blindness was attributed to the fact that it had not
been organized well in all aspects. For this reason, the state could not afford
The Greek state was not helpful to society either. He regarded the
unbalanced. The state had not been able to keep pace with the advancement
of society, which would prove to be fatal to the existence of both the state
6
«Αγόρευσις Δ. Γούναρη βουλευτού Πατρών», 2.
93
dangerous. 7
This gave rise to the question of what Gounaris believed restrained the state
from beneficially serving the people and society. His answer to this question
was that oligarchy separated the state from the people and society.
parasitic on the state and lived off the public. They were interested only in
what the state offered them and did not care about the problems of society.
They obviously did not comprehend the necessity for the state and society to
criticized them stating that they were unable to contribute to society because
7
«Ολόκληρος η θαυμάσια αγόρευσις του βουλευτού Πατρών», 2.
8
«Ολόκληρος η θαυμάσια αγόρευσις του βουλευτού Πατρών», 2.
9
«Ολόκληρος η θαυμάσια αγόρευσις του βουλευτού Πατρών», 2.
94
were. However, his concept of an oligarchy is seemingly similar to that of a
George Th. Mavrogordatos employ when describing the nature of the ruling
throughout the nineteenth century after the Greek kingdom was established,
leading military chieftains in the Ottoman period regarded the state as only a
comprised the state bourgeoisie and exclusively controlled politics and the
state budget. 10 Even though this seems similar to Gounaris’ idea of the
simpler manner. For him, society was divided into two sections: one
10
Κωνσταντίνος Τσουκαλάς, Εξάρτηση και αναπαραγωγή: Ο κοινωνικός ρόλος των
εκπαιδευτικών μηχανισμών στην Ελλάδα (1830–1922) [Dependence and Reproduction:
The Social Role of Educational Devices in Greece (1830–1922)] (Αθήνα: Θεμέλιο,
1977), 209-226; George Th. Mavrogordatos, Stillborn Republic: Social Coalition and
Party Strategies in Greece, 1922–1936 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983),
122-125.
95
consisted of the privileged oligarchy exploiting the public purse, and the
other consisted of the people who were stripped of what they had earned. 11
people by controlling and diverting the state from the path that it should
primarily follow.
He pointed out that the people had now come to realize that the state
had deceived them and that they had been unfairly exploited. He said:
The ordinary Greek citizen was not so slow that he would endlessly accept
11
«Μία νέα πολιτική φυσιογνωμία. Ένας πολιτικός που μας τον δίδει η Πάτρα. Ο
Δημήτριος Γούναρης» [A New Political Figure: A Politician Who Patras Gives Us.
Dimitrios Gounaris], Ακρόπολις, 12 Νοεμβρίου 1902, 2.
12 «Ολόκληρος η θαυμάσια αγόρευσις του βουλευτού Πατρών», 2-3.
96
already been “awakened” to reality. Although he contributed to the state by
contributed to the state and now understood that the state existed only to
exploit him, never to offer him any benefits of his labor. Gounaris showed
how people were entirely disillusioned by the existing state, which was at the
opposite end of the spectrum from his vision of the ideal state.
[W]e all know from where we have to start. Above all we have to
break with the hands that bind and paralyze society. The hands
prevent society from keeping its momentum going forward, and
make it go backward. We all know and feel these hands. Those who
undertake public affairs have an obligation to discover and map out,
in various successive phases, the measures which will make it
possible to carry out surgery to cut off these hands. We will be able
to say that we have accomplished a political task in terms of
development and progress of the country only when this surgery
takes place; only when we completely cut off these hands which
have been unreasonably hindering society from making progress,
and producing the stagnation which causes social canker. 13
The “hands” here are a metaphor for the influence of the oligarchy, which
97
handicapped society though the state apparatus. To begin with, Gounaris
contended that political leaders should determine how to get rid of this
obstacle and do so at once. This was an absolute must for the political
leaders. After the oligarchy was swept away, he believed that more efforts
Gounaris emphasized that those who would run the state should be
high-minded and concerned with the good of the people and of society. He
suggested that the state be organized by those who had “high level of
that they push society forward,” and who would “actually want to serve
state would be able to regenerate and grow closer in nature to his vision of
policies reflected Gounaris’ vision of the ideal state. Above all else, the
members of the Team criticized the inefficiency of public service and the
two aspects should be reformed to begin with, so that the state could better
14
«Ολόκληρος η θαυμάσια αγόρευσις του βουλευτού Πατρών», 2.
98
serve the general benefits of the nation.
public service and what reforms they proposed. The Team of the Japanese
out that, for the source of income of the Naval Fund of 1907, two different
Naval Fund and the other that of the Ministry of Finance. The former
showed 430,000 gold francs while the latter, 400,000 gold francs, with a
significant difference of 30,000 gold francs. Two figures should have been
identical as they were treated as the same item in the national treasury.
Gounaris argued that the problem was not whether the Naval Fund
would have had more or less money. According to him, the problem was that
public accounts were recorded in a very careless manner. In his opinion, this
could not change the foundation of the economy and of the state budget.
This attitude betrayed his lack of responsibility for his duty as Minister of
15
«Αγόρευσις Δ. Γούναρη βουλευτού Πατρών», 3.
99
Gounaris repeatedly said that in drawing attention to this issue, his
Finance who had not appropriately checked the state budget in advance.
that the state system was not functioning as per its original expectations. He
wanted them to admit that the state was sick and lacked proper public
16
«Αγόρευσις Δ. Γούναρη βουλευτού Πατρών», 3.
100
Financial Commission. 17 According to his calculations, from1899 to 1900,
than it should have. At the end of 1899, for accounting purposes the
Commission ceased to employ the Gregorian calendar and adopted the Julian
one, which Greece used at that time. Due to this change, the receipts of the
first 12 days of 1900 as per the Gregorian calendar were not included in the
accounts of the money to be divided between the Greek government and the
prove to Parliament that the receipts of those 12 days had not been handled
formula, and a detailed analysis that showed that the government had
His intention was not to ask the Commission to reimburse the sum
department had been indifferent to the overpayment for years, or simply that
17
Protopapadakis first spoke of this topic at the 24th meeting on January 29, 1907.
ΠΣΒΕ, 228.
18
ΠΕΒΕ, αριθ. 92, 150-152, αριθ. 116, 198-203; «Το ζήτημα των 239,203 δραχμών
που μας πήρε ο Έλεγχος περιπλέον. Όλη η προχθεσινή αγόρευσις του βουλευτού
Παροναξίας Κου Π. Πρωτοπαπαδάκη» [The Issue on 239,203 Drachmas that the
Commission Took Us Extra. The Whole Speech of the Day before Yesterday by Mr. P.
Protopapadakis, a Deputy of Paronaxia], Ακρόπολις, 4 Φεβρουαρίου, 1907, 2.
101
it was incapable of understanding the importance of this issue. The
mention. Yet the most extreme example was found in Protopapadakis’ long
report dated May 1907, which meticulously and critically analyzed the
national wealth. 21 It proved that the accounting errors were not of a one-off
nature and that there had been errors since the foundation of the Greek state.
19
«Να υπουργός» [Here is the Minister], Ακρόπολις, 5 Φεβρουαρίου, 1907, 1
20
«Πολύκροτος αγόρευσις του Κου Π. Πρωτοπαπαδάκη περί του δασμολογίου και
κατά του Κου Α. Σιμοπούλου» [The Sensational Speech of Mr. P. Protopapadakis
concerning Tariff and against Mr. A. Simopoulos], Ακρόπολις, 11 Φεβρουαρίου 1907, 2.
21
Πέτρος Πρωτοπαπαδάκης, Έκθεσις της μειονοψηφίας της επί του προϋπολογισμού
του κράτους επιτροπής [Minority Report of the Committee on the State Budget] (Αθήνα:
Εστία, 1907). The report, comprised of more than 550 pages, is divided into two
sections. The first section examines the state economic activities and financial
management such as trade, taxation, national debt, salary and pension for public
servants, various industries etc. The second consists of a series of tables of the
accounting report of the public purse in 1880–1905, the comparison of the budgets
among the Balkan states, the assesment of direct taxes, the import and export trade, the
revenue and expenditure of municipalities, and the road-building project. According to
Adamantios Sirmaloglou, Protopapadakis’ report was the most extensive analysis of
national economy that had been ever submitted to the Greek parliament. Αδαμάντιος
Συρμαλόγλου, Φορολογία ή χρεοκοπία. Η φορολογική πολιτική στη Βουλή των Ελλήνων
1862–1910 [Taxation or Bankruptcy: The Tax Policy in Parliament of the Greeks,
1862‒1910] (Αθήνα: Μεταμεσονύκτιες Εκδόσεις, 2007), 166n566.
102
concluded that the national treasury today should have had a surplus of
members of the Team argued that public servants should be appointed not on
the basis of political favoritism but by merit alone, and that they should
recommendation was made in light of the fact that the appointment of almost
supporters of the new one. Those who had connections with powerful
keeping a tight hold on their jobs during the brief period before there was yet
another change of government, and they did not seriously consider working
for the general benefit of the state. Repoulis criticized such public servants
22
Πρωτοπαπαδάκης, Έκθεσις της μειονοψηφίας, 6; In the same report, Protopapadakis
also criticized that the state account report had not been confirmed by a specific law,
although Article 54 of Law 212, based on Article 60 of the Constitution, required its
confirmation. Πρωτοπαπαδάκης, Έκθεσις της μειονοψηφίας, 138.
103
who were detrimental to the state and people with the following words:
The spirit prevailing in the central [public offices] is, of course, the
one which protects neither the right of the state nor the right of
citizens. It is the paralytic spirit. In this kind of spirit, a servant, in
general, either becomes impertinently high-handed and brings harm
to citizens, or…ends up endangering the state. 23
primarily intended for the public, in Greece it was regarded as a mere device
“Romania has public servants to serve the public while we have public
service for public servants. Our servants are incessantly increasing. Their
number became doubled from 1886. Has the quality of our public service
been improved?” 24
23
«Όλη αγόρευσις του κ. Εμμ. Ρέπουλη επί του δασμολογικού νομοσχέδιου.» [The
Whole Speech of Mr. Emm. Repoulis about the Tariff Bill], Ακρόπολις, 5 Φεβρουαρίου
1907, 2.
24
«Βουλή. Η χθεσινή συνεδρίασις», Ακρόπολις, 3 Ιουνίου 1907, 2.
104
at the root of all its numerous abuses, is what the Americans call
‘the spoils system.’ In Greece, as in the United States, the maxim
that ‘to the victors belong the spoils’ is carried out to its full extent.
With a few exceptions—such as the teachers in the elementary
schools and the university professors—practically every official in
the country is liable to dismissal, or removal to a less desirable post,
on the accession of every new Government to power. Hence the
whole civil service of the country is affected by party politics, and
every official, however petty, has to follow attentively the political
barometer at Athens, because his bread depends upon its movement.
Just as the candidate for the American Presidency promised his
supporter that ‘If you will get me into the White House, I will get
you into the lighthouse,’ so the Greek Minister enters office pledged
to the lips to appease this and that influential friend and that friend’s
minor satellites. 25
Such favoritism was being deplored not just by foreign observers but by the
25
William Miller, Greek Life in Town and Country (London: George Newnes, Limited,
1905), 29.
26 William Miller, Travels and Politics in the Near East (London: Fisher Unwin, 1898),
318; According to Miller, when King George toured the Peloponnese after the defeat of
the Greek–Turkish War of 1897, he was asked everywhere by local magnates to put a
stop to favoritism in politics. Miller, Travels and Politics, 311.
105
abolished. 27 In this case as well, political corruption won, and no
employees were severed from political influence. Thus, they did not hesitate
to overtly criticize the political abuse of public offices and its adverse effect
Apart from speaking out against nepotism and favoritism, the Team
also believed that public servants should be given preferential treatment with
respect to salary so that they had a greater incentive to work harder. The
27
Alexander Nicholaou Damianakos, “Charilaos Trikoupes and the Modernization of
Greece, 1874–1894” (PhD diss., New York University, 1977), 127-129, 249.
28
«Πολύκροτος αγόρευσις του Κου Π. Πρωτοπαπαδάκη», 3.
106
163.60 drachmas per month on average while Greece paid just 143.90
drachmas. 29
certain preconditions. He fully acknowledged that the public purse could not
afford to drain money like water to fulfill any request. He therefore proposed
the basis of merit alone and simultaneously stop hiring more persons than
needed by each office for its normal functioning. By doing so, he believed,
the government would be able to increase the salary of the public servants
without increasing the public expenses, thereby also achieving the desired
which the state had thus far been paying to an ever-increasing number of
British Prime Minister, that the happiness of England was due to the
capability and the happiness of its servants. His opinion on this was as
follows:
29
Πρωτοπαπαδάκης, Έκθεσις της μειονοψηφίας, 82.
30
Πρωτοπαπαδάκης, Έκθεσις της μειονοψηφίας, 82.
31
Πρωτοπαπαδάκης, Έκθεσις της μειονοψηφίας, 236.
107
The servants of the state, in fact, are the parts of the state machine.
The state machine can regularly operate as long as these parts are in
good condition. A prudent factory manager is expected to take care
of and to attend to …the parts of the driving machine of his factory
so that the machine can appropriately run and give to the factory the
driving force necessary to perform its work. Likewise, the state, if
its happiness depends on its servants, has to seek all the means that
will enable them to be happy. 32
The position of public servant was not merely used as bait by politicians to
gain voters. The public servants were the “driving force” of the state and
played a crucial role in organizing and running the state properly. The
servants as well as on their happiness, that is, the degree to which they were
take steps to reform the conditions of the state personnel. The Team
administration and persistently appealed for the need to separate the public
Another effort the Team of the Japanese made was to persuade the
32
Πρωτοπαπαδάκης, Έκθεσις της μειονοψηφίας, 82.
108
measures and taxation system, so that the state could increase national
wealth and flourish in the long run. For this purpose, both Gounaris and
short-term benefit of immediate gain but should consider, from a wider and
beneficial effect on progress and prosperity in the future. They argued that
the first reading of the bill, Gounaris stated that the government had not
completed all the necessary steps required to modify the custom tariffs.
According to him, what the government had to do first was to acquire a clear
the bill submitted to Parliament by the government did not reflect reality and
did not prove at all that the proposed modifications to the tariffs would
33
Το νομοσχέδιο περί μεταβολών εις τον περί τελωνιακού δασμολογίου ˏΒΡΚΑ΄
νόμον και εις το τελωνιακόν δασμολόγιον εισαγωγής [The Bill of Modification in Law
2121 of the Custom Tariff and in the Custom Tariff of Import].
109
properly protect domestic industry.
increasing the import tariffs. He believed that the state should play an active
Parliament’s attention to the fact that the increase in tariffs would constitute
domestic industry based on the facts was indispensable even though it would
expanded in recent years due to the tariff policy determined on the basis of a
34
«Η Βουλή. Το δασμολογικό νομοσχέδιον. Ο λόγος του κ. Γούναρη» [Parliament:
The Tariff Bill. The Speech of Mr. Gounaris], Πατρίς, 6 Δεκεμβρίου 1906, 2.
35
Luigi Luzzatti was a projector of the committee to conduct the research of domestic
110
“The committee is supposed to investigate all the sectors of domestic
reflected his vision of ideal state, that is, a state that always considered the
systematic plan that was based on the existing facts and fully took the future
industry in Italy. He became the Minister of Treasury of Italy in 1903 when Giovanni
Giolitti came to power for the second time. Frank J. Coppa, Planning, Protectionism,
and Politics in Liberal Italy: Economics and Politics in the Giolittian Age (Washington
D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1971), 33-34; In modern Italian history,
the years of 1896–1914 are considered as the period of the first economic progress,
which facilitated rapid industrialization. See Clark Martin, Modern Italy 1871‒1995, 2nd
edition (London & New York: Longman, 1996), 119-135.
36
ΠΕΒΕ, αριθ. 22, 57.
37
It should be noted that Gounaris’ speech gave a deep impression among the deputies
and the media. For instance, the newspaper Patris called Gounaris “a new star of
modern Greek politician.” It read, “Yesterday’s meeting in Parliament was the
memorable one for those who luckily attended.…The audience was impressed not only
by his really distinguished power of speech, but also by his expertise, which made the
whole parliament completely silent in admiration.…It is wonderful that this kind of
speech is delivered in Parliament. Yet how can one sympathize with a state that has
capable politicians, but has been unable to make good use of their creative work?
Fortunately, Gounaris is still young. He is so young that he always leaves us a hope that
he will lend himself to our state and nation through his political power.” «Από την
Βουλήν» [From Parliament], Πατρίς, 6 Δεκεμβρίου 1906, 1; Gounaris gained fame
outside of Greece. A Greek newspaper Nea Imera in Trieste, Italy, also favorably
referred to the impact of Gounaris’ speech on Parliament as following: “Mr. Gounaris
talked more than the subject under discussion. Through his enlightening speech, he did
not particularly criticize the government for its proposal to modify the tariffs, but
examined from high standing what our proper tariff policy should be like. The whole
parliament carefully and noiselessly listened to him. Then, certain vague
feelings—probably delightful feelings—seized Parliament with a hope that in no
111
The government, however, was not interested in Gounaris’ proposal.
not enthusiastic about forming the research committee because it did not in
fact intend to develop domestic industry through its tariff policy but to only
had diverged from the role it was originally expected to play. As long as the
tariffs had been introduced to protect domestic products, the volume of the
manner, the production of the same items in the country could be encouraged
Protopapadakis demonstrated that this was not necessarily the case in Greece.
On the contrary, the volume of most imported items subject to custom duties
distant future might frequent speeches of this kind influence indolence of those who are
engaged in and responsible for public affairs, and that a more innovative
method…would be gradually introduced…in great conformity to the principles and
necessities of today’s society.” «Τα εν Ελλάδι» [The Events in Greece], Νέα Ημέρα, 23
Δεκεμβρίου 1906 / 5 Ιανουαρίου 1907, 4.
112
He made a comparison between data on the volume of imports of some items
in 1895 and 1904. For example, 83,000 okas 38 of items such as lining etc.
were imported in 1895 while 152,000 okas were imported in 1904; 42,000
cubic meters of the timber of fir and pine were imported in 1895 while the
import was 55,000 cubic meters in 1904; 8,000 cubic meters of the beam and
plank of fir, pine, etc. were imported in 1894 while it was 21,000 cubic
meters in 1904; 200 cubic meters of the round timber were imported in 1895
while 1,000 cubic meters were imported in 1904. These facts only
demonstrated that the tariffs had not led to a decrease in volume of the
imports. This made Protopapadakis question whether the present tariff policy
not but arrive at the conclusion that the government exploited the tariffs to
expand the public purse. Since the government did not provide any
increase in the tariffs, as proposed by the bill, was truly meant to protect and
mentioned above, it would not help national industry develop in a real sense
113
industry. Second, it would result in an increase in the monetary burden on
the Greek people in the form of indirect tax. While the tariffs brought more
money in the public purse, the people had to accept high prices of consumer
heavily depended on indirect tax, it followed that the present tariff policy
be supported by a direct taxation system with income tax as its central pillar.
existing taxation system of the state was just the opposite and its outcome
Gounaris claimed that the rate of indirect tax was excessively high
in the total amount of tax paid per Greek citizen. His calculations based on
the budget of 1907 showed that one Greek citizen was supposed to pay 43.75
drachmas in tax, of which only 8.05 drachmas was estimated to be direct tax.
This meant that indirect tax comprised over 80% of the total tax burden of
each citizen. What Gounaris regarded as most problematic was that the
government had imposed a high rate of custom duties on articles that were
114
basic necessities of life for ordinary consumers. This policy had a constant
negative impact on the people who were already exhausted and poor,
daily life. 40
examples to prove that high custom duties were imposed on basic necessities
so that consumers had to purchase them at high prices. The duty on animals
for food worth 2,662,000 drachmas was 527,000 drachmas. The tariff rate on
the original import value was about 20%. Likewise, 236,000 drachmas were
imposed on fresh meats, cheese, and butter worth 446,000 drachmas. The
tariff rate was 53%. Then, 1,422,000 drachmas were imposed on fresh and
salted fish worth 5,624,000 drachmas. The tariff rate was 25%. Next,
13,786,000 drachmas were imposed on grains, flower, rice, pepper, and fruits
worth 39,663,000 drachmas. The tariff rate was 35%. Next, 6, 860,000
drachmas were imposed on sugar worth 2,888,000 drachmas. The tariff rate
was 238%. The average tariff rate on these articles amounted to 45%. 41
It was all the more obvious how conspicuously high the tariff rate in
Greece was when compared with that of other Balkan nations. According to
the table of the average tariff rate on all imported items as provided by
115
was 7.00%, Bulgaria’s 16.35%, and Serbia’s 18.11%. 42
had resorted exclusively to indirect tax, the easiest method, to increase the
Protopapadakis argued that the existing taxation system in which indirect tax
played a major role not only violated the constitution but also went against
Yet the Greek state had not introduced full-scale income tax but only
42
Πρωτοπαπαδάκης, Έκθεσις της μειονοψηφίας, 22.
43
Πρωτοπαπαδάκης, Έκθεσις της μειονοψηφίας, 236.
116
imposed it on limited companies. 44 Consequently, the rich, in spite of their
high incomes, did not have to pay more than the poor, whereas indirect tax
imposed a heavier burden on the poor than the wealthy. 45 Under these
In fact, not a few Greeks had already felt that they could not put up
with the miserable financial condition and started to abandon their country.
beginning of the twentieth century when the number of Greek emigrants was
23,127 in 1906, and 46, 283 in 1907 left the country. 48 Therefore,
committee was established for the first time in Parliament to investigate the
issue of emigration. In June 1906, the committee drew up its report and
44
Miller, Greek Life, 305; The table provided by Dertilis shows that there was no
revenue from the category of income tax until 1911. Γ. Β. Δερτιλής, Ατελέσφοροι ή
τελεσφόροι; Φόροι και εξουσία στο νεοελληνικό κράτος [Ineffective or Effective? Taxes
and Power in the Modern Greek State] (Αθήνα: Αλεξάνδρεια, 1993), 250-251.
45
Miller wrote, “‘In no other country, perhaps,’ says a Greek specialist in finance, ‘has
the system of farming the taxes worked more disastrously.’ In Greece, as in Italy, the
burden falls heaviest upon the poor, while the rich pay comparatively little.” Miller,
Greek Life, 305.
46
Πρωτοπαπαδάκης, Έκθεσις της μειονοψηφίας, 24.
47
Henry Pratt Fairchild, “The Causes of Emigration from Greece,” The Yale Review,
August (1909): 188.
48
Εμμανουήλ Ρέπουλης, Μελέτη μετά σχεδίου νόμου περί μεταναστεύσεως [Research
with the Bill of Emigration] (Αθήνα: Υψηλάντης, 1912), 11.
117
proposed legislations to properly regulate the population outflow from the
country. 49
of recent Greek emigrants was just a little lower than that of Irish emigrants,
emigration. He pointed out that more than 10 out of every 1,000 Greeks
migrated based on the record of 1906, and said that a state that was being left
emigration. Most of the Greek emigrants left for the United States because,
Gounaris argued, Greek people had learned from their relatives and friends
who had already emigrated that the state par excellence was acting and
moving forward for the benefit of its citizens and offered them a completely
different life from that in Greece. Greeks who understood now that there was
no use expecting the state to improve their destitute life naturally desired to
49
Η εξ Ελλάδος μετανάστευσις. Η έκθεσις της επιτροπής της Βουλής και η σχετική
πρότασις νόμου [The Emigration from Greece: The Report of the Committee of
Parliament and the Proposal for Relevant Law] (Αθήνα: Βασιλική τυπογραφία
Ραφτάνη-Παπαγεωργίου, 1906). Gounaris and Vozikis were among the committee
members.
50
«Ολόκληρος η θαυμάσια αγόρευσις του βουλευτού Πατρών», 2.
118
that it was necessary for the Greek state to protect the emigrants by
possible, but at the same time to take measures to prevent the Greeks from
Taxation reforms were also necessary so that the country would not
lose its manpower. It was clear that the drain of the work force would have a
negative impact on the Greek economy in the future. In fact, 87% of Greek
emigrants were men between the age of 15 and 40 years who were typically
Protopapadakis warned that if the state did not implement taxation reforms
and ensure better living conditions for the people, it would collapse in the
face of labor shortage. Although the question of whether the loss of labor
force was compensated for by the inflow of the emigrants’ remittance was
still debatable, they supported the idea that a state should carry out
emigrating. 52
51
Πρωτοπαπαδάκης, Έκθεσις της μειονοψηφίας, 24.
52
According to Fairchild’s essay in 1909, approximately $8,000,000 (about 42,105,000
drachmas) per year was sent to Greece by Greek immigrants in US. Fairchild, “The
Causes of Emigration from Greece,” 186-187; The total amount of the state budget of
revenue in Greece during 1902–1908 was approximately 120,000,000‒137,000,000
drachmas. Foreign Office, Annual Series, No. 4289, Diplomatic and Consular Reports:
119
Emigration was visible proof of how badly successive governments
political leaders considered the people as “cows which could give milk to
feed a small number of sluggards, but were given neither food nor care.” 53
The Team of the Japanese wanted to change this and contended that it was
time to take innovative steps so that the state could exist for the good of the
nation.
unsound economic policies with a view to oust Theotokis from power. It did
so merely with the expectation that his government would undertake the
state reformations. What the Team of the Japanese advocated was not new to
the state were, but no politician had taken the trouble to follow the path of
reform. For politicians who had become accustomed to petty party politics,
himself for the good of the nation. The Team of the Japanese was the only
political party in Parliament that raised a clamor for reform and offered
Greece: Report on the Finances of Greece for the Years 1907–1908 (London: Harrison
and Sons, 1909), 23.
53
Πρωτοπαπαδάκης, Έκθεσις της μειονοψηφίας, 24.
120
parliamentary group in opposition that attempted to persuade other deputies
rebuilding the state for the benefit of the nation. In this sense, their criticisms
Parliament with their political virtue. The mass media was delighted to see
sweep the evil practices their political culture had maintained and to remedy
The power of the Team’s ideas, however, was not transformed into
action. The Team could not find any other deputy in Parliament who
supported its reform project. It could not inspire the government to take
were ultimately not kept. When it came to tax reforms, the government was
utterly reluctant. 56
54
«Ιάπων και ο Σιμόπουλος» [Japanese and Simopoulos], Ακρόπολις, 20 Φεβρουαρίου,
1907, 1.
55
ΠΣΒΕ, 383-384.
56
Only in 1909 the bill on income tax submitted by Athanasios Eftaxias was passed.
However, its enforcement aborted after Eleftherios Venizelos came to power. Κώστας
Κωστής, «Δημόσια οικονομία » [State Economy], in Η ανάπτυξη της ελληνικής
οικονομίας τον 19ον αιώνα (1830‒1914) [The Development of Greek Economy in the
19th Century (1830‒1914)] eds. Κώστας Κωστής and Σωκράτης Πετμεζάς (Αθήνα:
121
Gounaris and Protopapadakis encountered difficulties in persuading
and economic policies. However, the Team of the Japanese did not expend
122
CHAPTER 4
passed down from their ancestors, and flooded Greece as refugees. The
Greek state faced for the first time in its history a challenge to deal with a
refugee problem. The fact that the refugees were ethnically Greek—they
were Christians of the Patriarchate Eastern Orthodoxy and spoke the Greek
between the two nations had intensified since 1904 when the Theotokis’
government, which could not ignore any longer the nationalistic pressure of
public opinion, finally took a supportive position for the Greek volunteer
1
Basil C. Gounaris, “Social Gathering and Macedonian Lobbying: Symbols of
Irredentism and Living Legends in Early Twentieth-Century Athens,” in Greek Society
in the Making: Realities, Symbols, and Visions, ed. Philip Carabott (Aldershot,
Hampshire, Great Britain; Brookfield, Vt.: Ashgate/Variorum, 1997), 103; Peter
Mackridge and Eleni Yannakakis, “Introduction,” in Ourselves and Others: The
Development of a Greek Macedonian Cultural Identity since 1912, eds. Peter
Mackridge and Eleni Yannakakis (Oxford; New York: Berg, 1997), 9.
123
ethnically heterogeneous elements from the territories which a state intends
territory, it had virtually been under Bulgarian control since 1885. The ethnic
Greeks living there had been vulnerable and became prime targets for the
Bulgarians as the conflict between the two countries heated up. On the Greek
“Great Idea.”
This chapter explores the first attempt of the Greek state to grapple
with the refugee problem and the contribution to the issue by two Japanese,
Dragoumis and Alexandris. How were the refugees regarded in the context
incorporate the ethnic Greek refugees into the Greek state? What was
relations between the incoming refugees and the native local Greeks
124
In this chapter, we first look at the development of the ethnic rivalry
in the Balkan states which eventually forced the ethnic Greeks to seek
Greek state from the standpoint of Greek national interests. As the first step,
Parliament made a law to give them Greek citizenship. Next, the debate
arose about land distribution to them. As Thessaly was the target place in
whether to retain the large private estate (çiftlik) system under which native
2
All Dragoumis family members were well-known as ardent supporters of the Greek
struggle for Macedonia. Stefanos was one of the core members of the Macedonian
Committee (Μακεδονική Επιτροπή) formed in 1904, which the government officially
supported. He also published a series of books titled “Macedonian Crisis” (Μακεδονική
κρίσις) from 1903 to 1907 under the name of Gnasios Makednos (Γνάσιος Μακεδνός).
He wrote them to call the attention of the general public to the ongoing events in
Macedonia and to justify the Greek cause. Ion Dragoumis, Stefanos’ son, wrote many
novels and articles to claim the Greek right to Macedonia. Pavlos Melas, a Greek
partisan, who was murdered in Macedonia in October 1904, was Stefanos’ son-in-law. It
should be noted that Ion Dragoumis published a novel Blood of Martyrs and Heroes
(Μαρτύρων και ηρώων αίμα) on the theme of the Macedonian struggle, which
provoked patriotic feelings among the Greeks, in early 1907 during the period when the
issue of the refugee settlement was under discussion in Parliament. For a brief summary
of the involvement of the Dragoumis family in the Macedonian struggle, see Anastasia
Karakasidou, “Affection of a Greek Hero: Pavlos Melas and Heroic Representations in
Greece,” in Balkan Identity: Nation and Memory, ed. Maria Todorova (New York: New
York University Press, 2004), 200-202.
125
cultivators had worked as sharecroppers. Alexandris played an important
role in making the law not only for the welfare of the refugees and
was a deputy from Trikala in Thessaly, his knowledge about the existing
was enacted. Its major aim was to have ethnic Greeks from the Balkan states
promptly settle in Thessaly by providing them with land and money. They
were not only from Eastern Rumelia, but from Bulgaria and Romania where
rivalry over the territory in Macedonia. The law also declared that Thessalian
native sharecroppers were to obtain their own lands for cultivation with the
monetary aid. In this sense, it made the first breakthrough in the Thessalian
problem.
126
leave their native land. Some of these Greek refugees headed for Athens
while others emigrated to Istanbul and Southern Thrace under the Ottoman
abandon what had been their fatherland. There were 80,000 Greeks living in
province by the Treaty of Berlin signed on July 13, 1878 (NS), with Plovdiv
that this province was still in the political and military jurisdiction of the
Ottoman Empire. Therefore, the rights of the Turkish and Greek minorities
Moreover, the school system, the alphabet taught at school, and the military
3
A.R. (Athos Romanos), The Persecution of the Greeks in Bulgaria (London: Ede,
Allom & Townsend Limited, 1907), 30.
4
A.R., The Persecution of the Greeks, 3; Another source mentions that Eastern
Rumelia alone had more than 150,000 Greeks. The Thracians' Patriotic Association at
Athens, Persecution against the Greeks in Bulgaria and Oriental Roumelia: An Appeal
both to the Great Powers and to the People of Europe and America (Athens: P.A.
Petrakos, 1906), 4.
5
Eastern Rumelia used to be a part of the territory of Greater Bulgaria founded by the
Treaty of San Stefano (signed on March 3, 1878, NS). The Treaty of Berlin, however,
excluded Eastern Rumelia from the territory of the re-established Bulgarian Principality.
Since then, Eastern Rumelia became one of the target regions for Bulgarian irredentism.
R. J. Crampton, A Concise History of Bulgaria (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2005), 83-84.
127
training were based on Bulgarian precedent. 6
point of view. Yet the international community did not recognize its
annexation as valid. After negotiations between the Great Powers and the
every five years by the Sultan and the Great Powers. 8 In short, Eastern
Rumelia remained nominally an integral part of the Ottoman domain and its
legal status was not changed. Therefore, it was bound to the Organic Statute
6
Crampton, A Concise History of Bulgaria, 96.
7
Crampton, A Concise History of Bulgaria, 97.
8
Crampton, A Concise History of Bulgaria, 99-100; To put it more precisely, not all the
Great Powers resolutely opposed the Bulgarian coup and the annexation of Eastern
Rumelia to Bulgaria. According to John Mavrogordato, Britain claimed to recognize the
united Bulgaria so that Russia could not further influence Bulgaria. In Greece the
nationalistic anger at this event led pacific Trikoupis to leave the government. Then
Diligiannis came to power and made preparations for military mobilization, which was
not realized due to the pressure from the Great Powers. John Mavrogordato, Modern
Greece: A Chronicle and a Survey 1800‒1931 (London: Macmillan, 1931), 66-67.
128
formulated in 1878 when Eastern Rumelia was established. 9
spread not only to neighboring towns of Varna, but also to Eastern Rumelia.
In Varna there were 9,000 Greeks, of whom 7,500 were Bulgarian subjects
from Istanbul had to face the Bulgarians who prevented him from
disembarking from the vessel and was obliged to return. 10 This event was
Greek shops were looted. On July 15, Burgas, which had 12,000 inhabitants,
half of whom were Greek was exposed to Bulgarian rioters. 11 On July 16,
Plovdiv was attacked. There were only 5,000 Greeks among 45,000
attacked the Greek quarter and went into the building of the Greek Literary
Society, breaking everything they saw. They also headed for archbishop’s
residence and attacked his chaplain who was left unconscious and perhaps
9
The Thracians' Patriotic Association, Persecution against the Greeks, 7-8.
10
A.R., The Persecution of the Greeks, 6-7.
11
A.R., The Persecution of the Greeks, 17.
129
only half alive. 12 Sténimachos with its 14,000 populations, of whom were
10,000 Greeks was also violated on July 23. 13 The Bulgarian authority dared
not intervene and the Bulgarian troops were not mobilized to stop these
atrocities. It was considered that the scope of the anti-Greek attacks was
In this sense, these attacks were not spontaneous, but were rather
The last and most atrocious event took place in Anchialos on July
30. It had 6,000 inhabitants, most of whom were Greek. It was originally
established in the sixth century B.C. as a Greek colony and Ovid sang about
its high walls in his poems in the year 9 A.D. This historic town was
completely burned down by the Bulgarians. Even before they set fire, they
shot against the inhabitants and pillaged their shops. As a result, more than
twenty people were killed and a great number wounded. The fire blazed all
day and destroyed some 900 houses and shops in the Greek quarter while in
the Bulgarian quarter 272 houses, shops and churches remained intact. Athos
Romanos, the only Greek politician that visited Anchialos relatively soon
12
A.R., The Persecution of the Greeks, 8-12.
13
A.R., The Persecution of the Greeks, 15-17.
14
A.R., The Persecution of the Greeks, 8; Concerning the list of the churches,
monasteries, schools, other properties of Greek communities in Eastern Rumelia sucked
by the Bulgarians, see Neocles Kasasis, Greeks & Bulgarians in the Nineteenth
Centuries. An Open Letter to the Right Hon. Sir Charles W. Dilke (London: Ballantyne,
1907), 38-43 and The Thracians' Patriotic Association, Persecution against the Greeks,
11-12.
130
after this devastation, depicted what he saw there in the following words:
“Amongst these ruins there is really nothing to be seen but ashes and burnt
of the School, only four walls are standing. The palace of the Archbishop
and its beautiful library were entirely destroyed. It was a heart-rending sight
to see despairing women wandering amongst the ruins of their burnt houses.
They fixed on the passer-by a look in which the horror of the fire was still
reflected, and they went shamefacedly to fetch the food distributed to them
by the authorities.” 15
Greeks set about in real earnest the task to battle against Bulgarians since
Bulgarians and their sympathizers. According to the Greek side, this armed
Macedonia had put up with Bulgarian violence. They had been subjugated
anticipated reform plans to come into force. However, the reform plans were
15
A.R., The Persecution of the Greeks, 23.
16
“No. 24 Memorandum, Communicated by M. Métaxas, October 4, 1906,” in Foreign
Office, Turkey, No.1(1907), Further Correspondence respecting the Affairs of
South-Eastern Europe (London: Harrison and Sons, 1907), 131-135.
131
never properly introduced. The patience of the Greeks ran out and they took
up arms. European powers blamed Greeks for their violence in the Ottoman
territory. They said that it was Greek bands that were fomenting acts of
could the Greeks ignore the peril of their compatriots exposed to ferocious
Bulgarian attacks in Macedonia? Was it not natural for the Greeks to take up
protected on the basis of the rights stipulated in certain articles in the Treaty
17
A.R., The Persecution of the Greeks, 4-5; Kasasis, Greeks & Bulgarians, 5, 116-119.
18
Concerning the details of the articles which stipulated the rights of the minority
inhabitants in Eastern Rumelia with respect to religion, education, language etc., see
Kasasis, Greeks & Bulgarians, 30-38 and The Thracians' Patriotic Association,
Persecution against the Greeks, 4-10.
132
government should take responsibility for them. 19 Bulgarians attempted to
seek a pretext for the catastrophic disaster in Anchialos and contended that
the Greek quarter. In December 1906 when Romanos wrote about his visit to
Anchialos, the archbishop was arrested and charged with the alleged crime
well as in Bulgaria who understood that their security was not guaranteed
any longer began to leave their homeland. A letter dated August 16, 1906
the Greek steamer Antigone sailed from here with two hundred and fifty
families of refugees from Anchialos. Oh, if you could have witnessed that
scene! If you could have seen men and women, without boots, in tattered
abandoning their ruined houses, the land in which they lived.” 21 The
19
For concrete contents of newspaper articles, see Kasasis, Greeks & Bulgarians,
64-68, 75-90.
20
A.R., The Persecution of the Greeks, 25.
21
Kasasis, Greeks & Bulgarians, 80.
133
violence against Greek communities. The rivalry between the Greeks and the
movement in Romania.
widespread over all the Balkans for centuries. Romania did not
geographically border on Macedonia and did not expect any territorial gain
destroy the balance of power among the Balkan states. Thus, the Romanians
took advantage of the language similarity of the Vlachs with theirs and
attempted to use the Vlachs for their own political interests by offering them
This Romanian scheme was in conflict with the main Greek policy
between Slavs and Greeks from the end of the nineteenth century onward,
population there, Greece had to firmly reinforce the idea of Greek national
identity into the consciousness of the Vlachs, who had already been exposed
22
Leften Stavros Stavrianos, The Balkans since 1453 (New York: Rinehart, 1958), 494.
23
For the Vlachs in Ottoman Macedonia, Greek was the main language of church,
education, and trade, even though they maintained their mother tongue at home.
134
As a result of both the Greek and the Romanian campaigns, the
and pro-Greek Vlachs paid them back in their own coin. They expelled each
Vlach nationality with equal in rights like other non-Muslim subjects of the
Minister of Justice and Religion of the Ottoman State also issued the
Concerning the overview of their history, customs, life and culture, see, Alan J. B. Wace
and M.S. Thompson, The Nomads of the Balkans: An Account of Life and Customs
among the Vlachs of Northern Pindus (New York, 1914); Rigas Velestinlis was typical
of the Vlachs who had been under strong influence of Greek culture. He planned a
general uprising of all Balkan peoples in the end of the eighteenth century in order to
found a Balkan republic in which the Greek language and culture would be dominant.
See C.M. Woodhouse, Rhigas Velestinlis: The Proto-Martyr of the Greek Revolution
(Limni, Evia, Greece: D. Harvey 1995).
24
With regard to case examples of mutual attacks, see Αντώνης Μιχ. Κολτσίδας,
Κουτσόβλαχοι. Οι Βλαχόφωνοι Έλληνες. Εθνολογική λαογραφική και γλωσσολογική
μελέτη [Koutsovlachs. The Vlach-Speaking Greeks. Ethnographic, Folklore, and
Linguistic Study] (Θεσσαλονίκη: Αδελφοί Κυριακίδη, 1993) and Ελευθερία Ι.
Νικολαΐδου, Η Ρουμανική προπαγάνδα στο βιλαέτι Ιωαννίνων και στα Βλαχόφωνα
χωριά της Πίνδου (μέσα 19ου αι.–1900) [The Romanian Propaganda in Vilayet Ioannina
and in Vlach-Speaking Villages of Pindos (the Middle of the 19th Century–1900)],
τόμος Α΄ [vol. 1] (Ιωάννινα: Εταιρεία Ηπειρωτικών Μελετών, 1995).
25
Constantin N. Velichi, “Les Relations roumano-grecques pendant la période
1879–1911,” Revue des études sud-est européennes 7, no.3 (1969): 535.
26
Ευάγγελος Α. Αβέρωφ-Τοσίτσας, Η πολιτική πλευρά του κουτσοβλαχικού ζητήματος
(Αθήνα: Εργοστάσιο Γραφικών Τεχνών Γερ. Σ. Χρήστου, 1948), 53-54.
135
encouragement to the Vlachs, who were Ottoman subjects, to use their
identity. 27 However, the rift among the Vlachs had widened too far to be
capable of healing. The Romanian propaganda did not cease and the
pro-Greek Vlachs and the Greeks kept countering it. Mutual attacks and
Greek government should prevent the Greek bands from expelling the
Patriarch to obey the Sultan’s decision. He expressed the fear that Romanian
unfavorable situation. 28
27
Επίσημα έγγραφα περί της εν Μακεδονία οδυνηράς καταστάσεως [Official Documents
about the Serious Situation in Macedonia](Κωνσταντινούπολη: Πατριαρχεικό
τυπογραφείο, 1906),100; The Patriarch Ioakim III opposed this decision and issued the
following announcement on June 21, 1905: “The Helleno-Vlachs are scattered over
European Turkey and their number is approximately 100,000 according to the
population statistics. From antiquity they never distinguished themselves from the
Greeks and even now neither do they. The Greeks say that the Vlachs are Greek and the
Vlachs call themselves Greek....The Romanian propaganda for the past forty years
attempted to imbue the minds of the Vlachs with Romanian national consciousness in
order to make Vlachs identify themselves with the Romanians, but it did so in vain. The
Romanian agents could eventually take only 10,000 Vlachs onto their side. This small
number of Vlachs is fragmented and isolated.” Επίσημα έγγραφα, 103.
28
Αβέρωφ-Τοσίτσας, Η πολιτική πλευρά, 54-55; In reply to Papiniu, Dimitrios Rallis,
then Minister of Foreign affairs as well as Prime Minister, told that there was no
Romanian population in Macedonia. Then he asked the Great Powers to protest against
136
In fact, public pressure on the Greek communities in Romania
Under this pressure, Simos was finally obliged to leave the country. 29
the Romanian government, saying that retaliation against innocent Greeks in Romania
would take place. Αβέρωφ-Τοσίτσας, Η πολιτική πλευρά, 55; The French newspaper Le
Temps wrote in the summer of 1905 that the Greek government suggested that it would
break diplomatic relations with Romania. Papiniu reported on August 13, 1905 (NS),
that Rallis informed the Great Powers that if they did not intervene between the two
countries and work in favor of Greece, the Greek government would inevitably break
diplomatic relations with Romania. Velichi, “Les Relations roumano-grecques,” 535.
29
Gioula Koutsopanagou, "Spyros Simos' Newspaper Patris Bucharest‒Athens: A
Bridge of Intellectual Communication," in Relations gréco-roumaines: interculturalité
et identité nationale, eds. Paschalis M. Kitromilidès and Anna Tabaki (Athens: Institute
of Neohellenic Research, 2004), 282, 287; The Greeks in Bucharest launched the
newspaper Patris under editor-in chief P. Chrisdoulou in December 1889. Three years
later, Simos from Piraeus took over its publication. After he was deported to Greece, he
resumed the publication of Patris in Athens on November 20, 1905.
137
not only to Greek commercial activities, but also to Greek religious and
of Greek owned estates. Although the Great Powers made efforts to restore
amicable relations between the two countries, on May 30, 1906, the Greek
landowners and receive a subsidy according to Law 3202 although they were
small in number. They were the Greeks of the Caucasus of the Russian
30
Αβέρωφ-Τοσίτσας, Η πολιτική πλευρά, 56-59; A protocol which approved the status
of Greek churches in Romania as a corporate body accompanied the Convention of
1900. As Greek communities had totally depended on their churches, the denouncement
of the Convention caused the problem of whether the Greek communities themselves
would be able to continue. Georgios Streit argued from the legal standpoint that the
denouncement of the Convention did not have direct influence on the protocol and that
the protocol was still valid. See Georgios Streit, La Question des communautés
helléniques en Roumanie (Paris: Librairie de la société du recueil J.-B. Sirey & de
journal du palais, 1906).
31
Αβέρωφ-Τοσίτσας, Η πολιτική πλευρά, 56-59; Velichi, “Les Relations
roumano-grecques,” 537; National Archives and Records Service, Despatches from
United States Ministers to Greece, vol. 18: February 1‒August 12, 1906, No. 403, June
14, 1906 (NS).
138
mainly voluntarily from the end of the nineteenth century onward. The
Russian authorities neither treated the Caucasian Greeks badly nor pressured
them to leave their land. On the contrary, they showed their concern for
also further promoted the immigration of the Greeks of the Black Sea to the
32
Μαργαρίτης Ευαγγελίδης, Αιτία της εις Ελλάδα μεταναστεύσεως των εν Καυκάσω
Ελλήνων του Πόντου και ιστορία των παθημάτων αυτών [Reason of Immigration of the
Pontus-Greeks of the Caucasus to Greece and History of Their Sufferings]
(Αθήνα,1900), 4-5; The mass colonization of Greeks from the Ottoman Pontus region to
the Caucasus went in tandem with the expansion of the Russian Empire toward south.
The Russian authorities intended to settle Greeks and Armenians in the places where the
Muslim population used to live. Charles King mentions, “The movement of Tatars,
Caucasus highlanders, and other Muslims out of the Russian Empire in the latter half of
the nineteenth century was spectacular—in round figures, perhaps 1.5 million migrants
from Crimea and the Caucasus, many of whom died on route or shortly after arrival at
their final destinations. According to one calculation, as a direct result of Muslim flight,
the population of Crimea may have dropped by as much as a quarter and the population
of the Caucasus uplands by a little more.” Charles King, The Black Sea: A History
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 208-9; He also mentions, “Russian tactics in
the Caucasus campaigns had been abominable, with villages scorched and men, women,
and children rounded up for movement to new locales. Yet the motive was not who the
Muslims were but where they were—in the path of Russian imperial expansion, in the
unconquered highlands that were seen as a security threat by the Russian state.” King,
The Black Sea, 210; Concerning the Russian policy of the settlement of the Greeks in
the Caucasus, M. P. Dobrohotov, who was in charge of the Greek‒Armenian
colonization, wrote, “The program of the systematic colonization started in 1864….It
intended to revitalize the vacant region and resume farming that had ceased since
highlander Muslims left for Turkey.…This region required more agricultural products.
The plan was mapped out that Greeks and Armenians would be settled because they
were considered to get adjust to the environment there.” Quoted from Βλάσης Αγτζίδης,
«Οι Έλληνες του Καυκάσου» [The Greeks of the Caucasus], in Η ιστορία των Ελλήνων
του Καυκάσου στο Καρς και στο Κιλκίς: εικονογραφημένη διαδρομή ενός αιώνα
1900–2000 [History of the Greeks of the Caucasus in Kars and in Kilkis: Illustrated
Episode of One Century 1900‒2000], ed. Αθανάσιος Διαμαντόπουλος (Αθήνα: 2001),
16.
139
the plan that the Greeks in the Caucasus should be made to colonize
live in a free fatherland, to finish the rest of their life under the beneficent
rule of their own national royal family, and to bring up their children within
the Greek language and culture.” 34 National feelings of this kind persuaded
some of them to descend upon Greece from around 1895 onward, even
before any specific law to assist them had been enacted. However, a series of
Under these difficult circumstances the Greek government could not afford
to take care of them and hundreds of the Caucasian Greeks who had already
Romania who flooded Greece is difficult to estimate. They did not arrive in
33
Ευαγγελίδης, Αιτία της εις Ελλάδα μεταναστεύσεως, 1.
34
Ευαγγελίδης, Αιτία της εις Ελλάδα μεταναστεύσεως, 5.
35
After repeated appeals to the government to grant them a location where they could
get settled, a bill on the distribution of land in state-owned villages of the former
Stefanovik to the Caucasian Greeks was finally submitted to Parliament on June 21,
1906, though it did not become a law. It intended to cover the needs of 40 families.
ΠΣΒΑ, 365.
140
Piraeus, the port for Athens, by boat as a body, but intermittently from the
Ottoman rule. 36
reported on May 1, 1907 (NS), that 20,000 or 30,000 ethnic Greeks were
1907, wrote that the number of the refugees had risen to at least 14,000. 39 In
December 1907, 22,485 refugees, or more than four times as many as in the
same period of the previous year, were reported to have arrived in Greece. In
Although the number of the refugees toward the end of 1906 was
relatively small in comparison with that of later years, about 5,000 people
were too large a number to be ignored. 41 It was evident that these refugees
36
A.R., The Persecution of the Greek, 30.
37
Foreign Office, Annual Series, No. 4289. Diplomatic and Consular Reports: Greece:
Report on the Finances of Greece for the Years 1907‒08 (London, Harrison and Sons,
1909), 7.
38
FO 371/264, No. 14701.
39
«Ο μέγα ζήτημα των προσφύγων» [The Big Issue of Refugees], Οικονομική Ελλάς ,
5 Μαΐου, 1907, 213.
40
Foreign Office, Annual Series, No. 4289. Diplomatic and Consular Reports, 7.
41
The population of Athens municipality (Δήμος Αθηνών) based on the national census
of October 1907 was 175,430. Piraeus, the second largest municipality, had 74,580 and
141
could not be smoothly settled without a political initiative. It was a state
the refugee problem implied more than not only a simple philanthropy, but
the possibility of national benefits. The issue of the Greek refugees could be
were the victims of the rivalry between the Greeks of the Greek kingdom
and other Balkan nations over Macedonia. Therefore, refugee assistance was
an inevitable task for the Greek state to bolster its national cause. Moreover,
the refugee problem had to be also resolved in terms of social stability. Their
very existence could lead to social unrest if the matter of the refugees was
opinion about the refugee issue on the front page of the newspaper Akropolis.
postponed the opening of the new session, which had been expected at the
142
in Parliament on the relief arrangement for the refugees, which he
Having said that, Dragoumis stressed that the government should take an
immediate action to provide care for the refugees as soon as the forthcoming
session commenced.
143
domestic and international impending issues. Especially, in the sphere of the
the international arena had caused the expulsion of the ethnic Greeks from
other Balkan states. The drifting refugees, now in Greece, embodied the
Greek state had not been able to steer with sufficient skill. Dragoumis
Greece would never improve if the state just stood idly by. Therefore, he
third meeting of the session, on November 22, Dragoumis took the first steps
three questions about the international affairs, one of which was related to
43
«Μία συνέντευξις με πανελλλήνιον πολιτευτήν», 1.
144
the refugees from Eastern Rumelia and Bulgaria, and asked the government
Bulgaria violated the rights of ethnic Greeks, the interests of the Greek state,
and the Greek citizens, the government had to mitigate the damage either by
called on the government to take measures on its own initiative to assist both
those who had already been expelled to Greece and those who would be
coming. 45
of the Great Powers could be expected to work for the advantage of Greece.
than Greece. The Powers knew that imposing sanctions on Bulgaria after the
kindle the Eastern Question. He demonstrated the data for the Greek
44
The other two questions were concerning the Cretan issue after the Therisso revolt
under the leadership of Venizelos for the union with Greece in spring 1905, and the
problem of the Greek interests after the diplomatic rapture between Romania and
Greece. ΠΣΒΕ, 13.
45
The Patriarch Ioakim III already delivered statements to the Great Powers and the
Ottoman state during the series of violent incidents in Eastern Rumelia and Bulgaria in
summer 1906 to ask them for intervention. See Patriarcat Œcuménique, Mémorandums
adressés aux représentants des grandes puissances a Constantinople et autres
documents relatif aux récents évènements de Bulgarie et Roumélie orientale
(Constantinople: Imprimerie du Patriarcat Œcuménique, 1906).
145
population of Eastern Rumelia that had been 120,000 in 1880 and decreased
should not expect ethnic Greek refugees to return to their native land in
Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia. He also criticized the idea that the refugees
in the Macedonian struggle, which implied that they would fall once more
Parliament should consider how they could take root in Greece under better
was imperative, he claimed, to provide them with work and a place to settle
This time Romanos of Theotokis’ party, the only Greek deputy that
martyrs, and told Parliament that the Anchialites no longer cared about their
churches and houses in their hometown, which had already been ruined and
conditions, it should give a helping hand to the refugees who were, surely,
46
«Η εξωτερική πολιτική της κυβερνήσεως» [The Foreign Policy of the Government],
Ακρόπολις, 8 Δεκεμβρίου, 1906, 2.
146
adding a new splendor to the pages of Greek history. 47
refugees. On December 10, the cabinet held a meeting. They discussed that
food. 48
seriously grapple with the refugee issue. On December 11, he contended that
the government had to submit, without delay, a bill on the land distribution
to those unfortunate people. He added that people from Eastern Rumelia and
especially from Anchialos had sacrificed everything and because of this they
deserved to receive proper protection from the state. Then he asked the
to the “martyrs” 49
47
«Η εξωτερική πολιτική της κυβερνήσεως», 2; «Εκ της περί προσφύγων
βαρυσήμαντου αγορεύσεως του κ. Αθ. Ρωμανού» [From Mr. Ath. Romanos’
Momentous Speech about Refugees], Ακρόπολις, 11 Δεκεμβρίου, 1906, 1; Romanos
also sent a letter to the French newspaper Le Temps in order to make it known to the
French public that the Bulgarians violated the minority rights in Eastern Rumelia
guaranteed by the Treaty of Berlin. «Ο αγών του κ. Αθ. Ρωμανού» [The Struggle of Mr.
Ath. Romanos], Ακρόπολις, 1 Νοεμβρίου, 1906, 1.
48
«Το χθεσινόν υπουργικόν συμβούλιον. Η εγκατάστασις των προσφύγων»
[Yesterday’s Cabinet. The Settlement of the Refugees], Ακρόπολις, 11 Δεκεμβρίου,
1906, 4.
49
ΠΣΒΕ, 122.
147
Granting Greek Citizenship to the Refugees
What had to be done first for the refugees was to make them true
ethnicity, most of the refugees were not Greek in a legal sense. They needed
Many of the ethnic Greek refugees in Greece, who have fled from
Eastern Rumelia, Bulgaria and Romania and desire to find a
bread-winning job, are in a hopeless situation because of their lack
of Greek citizenship, which is prerequisite for obtaining a job.
However, in accordance with the existing laws, it takes quite a long
time for an applicant to gain a status of Greek citizen after making
an application.
I think that the immediate acquisition of Greek citizenship by
the ethnic Greek refugees in question would help them to succeed in
finding different bread-winning jobs, while it would also bring
useful citizens to join the state. 50
Usually one who wished to obtain Greek citizenship had to spend a certain
50
ΠΕΒΕ, αριθ.43, 88.
148
period of time within the country according to Article 15 of Civil Law to be
qualified as citizen. This time, however, the government took bold initiative
to simplify the process. With small modifications, the bill quickly became
Law 3185 on December 29, 1906, and came into force by being published in
the Government Gazette on January 4, 1907. The law also prescribed that
of temporary financial aid to the refugees, health care for them, and hygiene
maintenance in their makeshift housing etc. for the time being before their
definitive project for the refugee settlement. There was a tacit agreement
among the deputies that Thessaly was the district where the refugees should
be settled. Although it had been incorporated into the Greek state in 1881,
Thessaly was still sparsely populated almost three decades later. Importantly,
as long as Thessaly was the target place to settle the refugees, the
51
Εφημερίς της Κυβερνήσεως του Βασιλείου Ελλάδος [Government Gazette of the
Greek Kingdom], τεύχος Α΄, 1907, Αριθμός Φύλλου 1, 4 Ιανουαρίου, 1907, 1-2.
52
ΑΣΔ, Φακ.186, υποφακ. 186.2, εγγρ. 86.
149
government could not ignore the request for land distribution from local
many years to emancipate them from the large private estate (çiftlik) system
Most of the Thessalian plains were under the çiftlik system in which
landless sharecroppers cultivated the land and gave a part of their products to
owners’ costs, but it was usually half or one third of the whole crop after
deducting seeds and tax. 54 During the Ottoman period, though çiftlik owners
could exercise their power over their çiftlik land based on complex titles they
held, full ownership for çiftlik land rarely existed. It did not pass down as
hereditary property. A third person usually took over its ownership. With
perpetual rights to cultivate the land and had a collective right to the natural
resources of the land. They were bonded to the land they cultivated and
53
According to Donald Quataert, the Ottoman state succeeded in confiscating the large
holdings in Asia Minor while the large estates in the Balkans survived into the Tanzimat
era. He writes, “The apparent absence of confiscation in the Balkan provinces may be
due to concerns that it would disturb the relations between the Christian cultivators and
Muslim landholders.” Donald Quataert, “The Age of Reforms 1812–1914” in An
Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, ed. Halil İnalcik and Donald
Quataert, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 873.
54
Σωκράτης Πετμεζάς, «Αγροτική οικονομία» [Rural Economy], in Ιστορία της
Ελλάδας του 20ού αιώνα. Οι απαρχές 1900‒1922 [History of Greece in the 20th Century:
The Beginnings 1900‒1922], τόμος Α΄-1 [vol.1-1] ed. Χρήστος Χατζηιωσήφ, (Αθήνα:
Βιβλιόραμα, 1999), 73.
150
could transfer their rights in a hereditary manner as long as they continued to
danger that would strip them of any rights they used to enjoy in a hereditary
law and the Roman–Byzantine law of Greece made the things confusing.
Sometimes limited titles under the Ottoman law were converted to full titles
under the Roman–Byzantine law, and sometimes the rights that the Ottoman
occupiers of the çiftlik unchallenged owners with full rights over their land,
The çiftlik owners claimed that the relationship between an owner and a
expired. Greek capitalists who had massively brought çiftlik land formed a
strong social group of landowners and could have a great influence on Greek
55
Πετμεζάς, «Αγροτική οικονομία», 74-75.
151
Parliament for improving their situation had not been accepted. 56
cultivate more land than that from which they anticipated sufficient grain
necessary for their family after deducting the amount of delivery to their
landowners, the tax, and the expense of farming. The çiftlik owners did not
Thessaly. They neither took up the structural reform of the çiftlik system, nor
in Thessaly of which 270 were kefalochoria where cultivators had their land
tenure, and that the rest, 400 villages, belonged to the çiftlik system. The
former villages were mostly in the mountainous upper area while the latter
were down on the plains and revenia. It was estimated that the total size of
the çiftlik amounted to 5,000,000 stremmata, 58 and that 11,000 families, that
56
Πετμεζάς, «Αγροτική οικονομία», 75-76; There was a tendency for the supreme
court and non-Thessalian courts to take the side of the sharecroppers while local courts,
administration and gendarmerie in Thessaly supported the çiftlik owners. In Parliament
there also had been acute debates over the issue. In 1896 the Diligiannis’ government
submitted five bills on Thessalian agrarian problem, one of which adopted the definition
of the real and perpetual rights of sharecroppers to the land they hereditarily cultivated,
and dramatically limited the rights of çiftlik owners. But those five bills met a furious
resistance from Thessalian deputies and landowners, and were finally abandoned. The
Theotokis’ government passed Law 2608 (June 9, 1899) legalizing the expulsion of
reluctant tenant farmers, which contributed to strengthening the power of çiftlik owners.
Πετμεζάς, «Αγροτική οικονομία», 76.
57
Πετμεζάς, «Αγροτική οικονομία», 76, 78.
58
A stremma is a measurement of an area of land which is equal to 1,000 square meters
(0.247acres). The plural form of stremma is stremmata. It was officially adopted as the
“royal” or “new” stremma through the decree of September 28, 1836. Once the value of
152
is, approximately 44,000 peoples lived under this system. 59
Thessaly had great potential for agriculture and had been regarded
as panacea for Greece which had heavily relied on the import of grain. 60 Yet,
as long as the vast majority of Thessalian plains was under the çiftlik system,
From the middle of the first decade of the twentieth century onward,
would allow çiftlik cultivators to have land tenure. As their profit from
with that from the other resources of their income, the çiftlik owners were
willing to sell their land to the cultivators, with the aid of mediation by the
state, as a convenient way, if they could gain a fair price from the sale. 61
stremma varied according to regions, like the Peloponnesian stremma and the Attica
stremma. William W. McGrew, Land and Revolution in Modern Greece, 1800-1881:
The Transition in the Tenure and Exploitation of Land from Ottoman Rule to
Independence (Kent, OH: The Kent University Press, 1985), 84 and n10.
59
Κωνσταντίνος Τοπάλης «Η γεωργική Θεσσαλία» [Agricultural Thessaly], Η μελέτη
(1907): 132-133.
60 Grain was one of the major import items, which occupied about more than 20 % of
the total import sum. See Γιώργος Δερτιλής, Ιστορία του Ελληνικού κράτους 1830‒1920
[History of the Greek State 1830‒1920], τόμος Β΄ [vol. 2] (Αθήνα: Εστία, 2005), 565.
61
Πετμεζάς, «Αγροτική Οικονομία», 78.
153
the issue of the refugee settlement accidentally came up. Therefore, the
project to distribute land in Thessaly to the refugees also acted as the best
amended the original bills and incorporated their ideas. The committee
published its bill on February 16, 1907. 64 At first, the government did not
bills because a committee of this kind tended to slow down every discussion
62
«Το νομοσχέδιον περί διανομής των εν Θεσσαλία εθνικών χωρίων πρώην
Στεφάνοβικ» [The Bill of Distribution of National Villages of the Former Stefanovik in
Thessaly], ΠΕΒΕ, αριθ. 42, 78-87.
63
«Νομοσχέδιον περί διανομής των εν τοις εθνικοίς εν Αλμυρώ λειβαδίοις
καλλιεργουμένων και καλλιεργησίμων γαιών, εκχωρήσεως του επί των
αγραναπαυομένων αλλοτρίων γαιών δικαιώματος βοσκής, και εκποιήσεως των εθνικών
λειβαδίων» [The Bill of Distribution of the Land under Cultivation and the Arable Land
in the National Meadows of Almiros, the Cession of the Right of Pasture in the Fallow
Expropriated Land, and the Sale of the National Meadows], ΠΕΒΕ, αριθ. 68, 123-127.
64
«Το νομοσχέδιον περί συνοικισμού και διανομής γαιών εν Θεσσαλία και ιδρύσεως
Θεσσαλικού Γεωργικού Ταμείου» [The Bill of Settlement and Distribution of Land in
Thessaly and the Establishment of Thessalian Agricultural Fund], ΠΕΒΕ, αριθ. 130,
260-270.
154
to make legislation impossible during a session. 65 Yet, this time, the
submitted its own bill about two weeks after it was established. 66 The
and determined will showed by Dragoumis to achieve a good solution for the
twenty six çiftlik villages situated in Larissa, Trikala, and Karditsa. The
Greek state bought the estate on January 22, 1902, for ₤80,000 (3,320,000
drachmas) to nationalize it. 68 The bill specified, on the basis of the quality
65
«Η Βουλή. Η διανομή των Στεφανοβίκειων» [Parliament. The Distribution of the
Stefanovik Estate], Πατρίς, 30 Ιανουαρίου 1907, 2.
66
The formation of the committee was announced in Parliament on February 2, 1907.
The committee consisted of 21 deputies, among whom three—Dragoumis, Alexandris,
and Vozikis—were the members of the Team of the Japanese. ΠΣΒΕ, 252-253.
67
ΠΣΒΕ, 365; «Το πανελλήνιου σημασίας νομοσχέδιον. Αι διανεμόμεναι γαίαι» [The
Significant Bill for the Greek Nation. The Distributed Land], Ακρόπολις, 18
Φεβρουαρίου 1907, 1.
68
ΑΣΔ, Φακ. 184, υποφακ. 184.1, εγγρ.7; ΑΣΔ, Φακ. 185, υποφακ. 185.3, εγγρ. 68;
Among twenty six Stefanovik villages, fourteen of them were in Larissa, nine in Trikala,
155
of land, that each of 250 local cultivator families of Larissa would have 150
stremmata for farming while each of 250 local cultivator families of Trikala
and Karditsa would gain 75 stremmata. The cultivators would also receive
some additional portions of land for other needs like building a house and
garden. The farm servants would have rights of some small portion of land
as well. 69 Then, the rest of the land would be divided among about 1,200
refugee families. 70 The state would also provide financial aid for the
refugees to enable them to build a house, buy farm animals, tools, and seeds,
the same village would live together, forming a community. Thus, there
other places to evacuate their village to concede to the refugees. In this case,
the cultivators would be able to obtain a loan of 1,000 drachmas from the
state. 72
bill and the committee bill was that Almiros, in addition to Stefanovik, was
156
included in the land to be distributed. The idea of land distribution in
Almiros to the Anchialites, the largest group of the refugees, originally was
burden on the state, the government opposed the proposal that private çiftlik
that Almiros was the only appropriate region for the refugees from Anchialos,
and that the state should purchase private çiftlik land in Almiros by force, if
The refugees themselves were not silent either. On the next day, G.
the front page of the newspaper Skrip with the title “Why Are the Anchialites
would be a better place for the Anchialites to live and work than Stefanovik.
73
Σπύρος Χασιώτης, Γνωμοδοτική έκθεσις προς την επιτροπήν των εξ Αγχιάλου
προσφύγων [Advisory Statement to the Committee of Refugees from Anchialos]
(Αθήνα: Π.Α. Πετράκος, 1906).
74
«Η Βουλή. Η διανομή των Στεφανοβίκειων» [Parliament. The Distribution of the
Stefanovik Estate], Πατρίς, 30 Ιανουαρίου 1907, 2; ΠΣΒΕ, 225.
157
them to successfully grow grain, the major product of Stefanovik. Referring
to Chasiotis, Tsakiris pointed out that grain farming would need to have
which the Anchialites could not afford. In addition, they would not stand the
climate at Stefanovik—the severe summer heat and cold winter, as they had
previously lived in the mild coastal climate of the Black Sea. The reason
why they desired to live around Almiros was not only its similar coastal
environment to where they used to live. Around Almiros they could cultivate
profitable tobacco with the help of women and children whereas grain
cultivation could hardly make use of their help. Tsakiris also pointed out that
from Anchialos and Tavoutlis, its neighborhood, and the native Thessalian
farmers would pay 1,500,000 drachmas for land in Almiros and 2,250,000
drachmas for other expenses, while the Anchialites were supposed to pay
that each family would have to loan 8,000 drachmas in Stefanovik while
158
from Romania and Bulgaria, but not for them. 75
district of settlement, that is, the coastal settlement (Almiros and its
neighboring area) and the inland settlement (Stefanovik). In the coastal area
the refugees from Anchialos and its environs, and those from Sozopoli,
Varna, Pirgos and other villages were intended to get settled. 76 It was
estimated that the land distribution in Almiros would include less than 100
native cultivator families. The bill specified that the cultivators would keep
their house and became members of the settlement. 77 The inland settlement
was for the local cultivators and the refugees from Romania, the Caucasus
and other area from Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia who were not considered
for the coastal settlement. 78 The inland settlement was subdivided into the
two districts—Larissa, Farsala, Agiia, and Tirnavos on the one hand, and
159
farming land in Larissa, Farsala, Agiia, and Tirnavos while those in Trikala
and Karditsa would obtain 100 stremmata. 79 In both districts the refugees
settlement the bill defined the extent of land to be distributed to each family
settlements were also to be granted some additional land for building houses
with gardens.
that only the refugees would have the right to apply for them, the committee
deprived of all the resources would receive at most 3,000 drachmas in total
to buy farming tools, seeds, animals and to sustain his family members. 83
The coastal settlement classified the refugees into two groups as to whether
79
«Το νομοσχέδιον περί συνοικισμού και διανομής γαιών», ΠΕΒΕ, αριθ. 130, 264
(άρθρο 13).
80
«Το νομοσχέδιον περί συνοικισμού και διανομής γαιών», ΠΕΒΕ, αριθ. 130, 265
(άρθρο 14)
81
«Το νομοσχέδιον περί συνοικισμού και διανομής γαιών», ΠΕΒΕ, αριθ. 130, 263
(άρθρο 6).
82
«Το νομοσχέδιον περί συνοικισμού και διανομής γαιών», ΠΕΒΕ, αριθ. 130, 264
(άρθρο 8), 265 (άρθρο 16).
83
«Το νομοσχέδιον περί συνοικισμού και διανομής γαιών», ΠΕΒΕ, αριθ. 130, 265
(άρθρο 16).
160
they were farmers or not. The former would gain 4,100 drachmas per
In the committee bill there were four points to take note of. First, it
granted to those who had a diploma in agriculture and who wished to live in
after regular land distribution had been completed, refugee farmers from
Romania could obtain surplus portions. 87 Fourth, most importantly, the bill
defined the foundation of the Thessalian Agricultural Fund. The Fund was
intended to collect money that settlers were to pay for their land and to make
loans to them, and also to assume all other tasks related to the revenue raised
84
«Το νομοσχέδιον περί συνοικισμού και διανομής γαιών», ΠΕΒΕ, αριθ. 130, 264
(άρθρο 9).
85
«Το νομοσχέδιον περί συνοικισμού και διανομής γαιών», ΠΕΒΕ, αριθ. 130, 266
(άρθρο 20).
86
«Το νομοσχέδιον περί συνοικισμού και διανομής γαιών», ΠΕΒΕ, αριθ. 130, 268
(άρθρο 28).
87
«Το νομοσχέδιον περί συνοικισμού και διανομής γαιών», ΠΕΒΕ, αριθ. 130, 262,
267-268 (άρθρο 27).
88
«Το νομοσχέδιον περί συνοικισμού και διανομής γαιών», ΠΕΒΕ, αριθ. 130, 269-270
(άρθρο 39).
161
committee was the budget for the project. The committee resisted against the
government which tried to curtail the expense for the refugee settlement. The
government wanted to restrict the land distribution only to the refugees who
and the committee. Basically the general framework of the committee bill
was kept. The settlement area was divided into two—coastal and inland. The
latter was subdivided into the two districts as the committee bill prescribed.
89
«Η κυβέρνησις και τα Στεφανοβίκεια— Τα εκατομμύρια της επιτροπής» [The
Government and the Stefanovik Estate— Millions of the Committee], Ακρόπολις, 28
Φεβρουαρίου 1907, 2; «Η διανομή των Στεφανοβικείων» [Distribution of the
Stefanovik Estate], Θεσσαλία , 28 Φεβρουαρίου 1907, 2.
90
«Τα Στεφανοβίκεια. Διαφωνία μεταξύ επιτροπής και κυβερνήσεως. Ο κ. Α.
Σιμόπουλος επισκεπτόμενος τον κ. Στ. Δραγούμην» [The Stefanovik Issues.
Disagreement between the Committee and the Government. Mr. Simopoulos Visiting
Mr. St. Dragoumis], Ακρόπολις, 8 Μαρτίου, 1907, 2.
162
The coastal settlement was exclusively for the refugees from Anchialos and
its surrounding villages, and those from Sozopoli, Pirgos, and Varna, as they
wished. Native cultivators and other farm servants of the coastal area were to
move to Trikala and Karditsa district in the inland Stefanovik estate. 91 The
accordance with the opinion of the government. Both local and refugee grain
professions. Refugees in the coastal settlement would not have more than 80
the law prescribed that Greeks from the Caucasus would take part in the land
be provided less amount of money than that of the initial plan of the
91
Νόμος ˏΓΣΒ΄ υπ’αριθ. 3202 της 7 Απριλίου 1907 περί συνοικισμού και διανομής
γαιών εν Θεσσαλία και περί ιδρύσεως Θεσσαλικού Γεωργικού Ταμείου [Law 3202 on
April 7, 1907, of Settlement and Land Distribution in Thessaly and of the Establishment
of Thessalian Agricultural Fund], (Αθήνα: Εθνικό τυπογραφείο, 1907), 3-4,6 (άρθρα 3,
6).
92
Νόμος ˏΓΣΒ΄ υπ’αριθ. 3202 της 7 Απριλίου 1907, 14-15 (άρθρο 18).
93
Νόμος ˏΓΣΒ΄ υπ’αριθ. 3202 της 7 Απριλίου 1907, 4-5, 8-10 (άρθρα 4, 11, 12).
94
Νόμος ˏΓΣΒ΄ υπ’αριθ. 3202 της 7 Απριλίου 1907, 8 (άρθρο 10).
163
committee while the local cultivators would have more. According to the law,
at most while local cultivators would have 1,500 drachmas. In the coastal
settlement farmers would have 3,000 drachmas and others would obtain
suspense. Without financial support, it was likely that the whole project
would be aborted. On April 13, 1907, Law 3205 was enacted by which the
Ionian, and Anatolian Banks. It allowed the state to acquire private çiftlik
95
Νόμος ˏΓΣΒ΄ υπ’αριθ. 3202 της 7 Απριλίου 1907, 6, 11 (άρθρα 7, 14).
96
«Νόμος ˏΓΣΕ΄ υπ’αριθ.3205 περί κυρώσεως της μεταξύ του Δημοσίου και των
Τραπεζών Εθνικής, Αθηνών, Ιονικής και Ανατολής συμβάσεως περί συνομολογήσεως
Γεωργικού Θεσσαλικού δανείου δραχ. 10,000,000 και περί χορηγίας έκτακτου
πιστώσεως εκ δραχ. 7,200,000 επί του ειδικού προϋπολογισμού των εξόδων του
Υπουργείου των Οικονομικών της χρήσεως του έτους 1907» [Law 3205 of the
Confirmation of the Contract between the State and the National, Athenian, Ionian, and
Anatolian Banks concerning the Agreement of the Agricultural Thessalian Loan of
10,000,000 Drachmas and concerning the Provision of the Extraordinary Credit of
7,200,000 Drachmas for the Special Budget of Expenses for the Ministry of Finance in
the Year 1907], Εφημερίς της κυβερνήσεως. Τεύχος Α΄. Αριθμός Φύλλου 70, 13
Απριλίου 1907, 275-279.
164
The Contribution of Dragoumis and Alexandris to the Project of Land
Distribution
confirm how seriously Dragoumis and Alexandris grappled with the issue
speaking, Dragoumis was deeply committed to the project from both moral
more practical and social conditions which he saw at first hand in Thessaly.
promoted the idea of realizing both purposes—the refugee settlement and the
refugees the central motif. Dragoumis depicted in detail the sufferings that
97
ΑΣΔ, Φακ. 184, υποφακ. 184.1 εγγρ. 5.
165
the refugees experienced. He fiercely condemned the merciless vandalism
conducted by the Bulgarians against the ethnic Greeks living in Bulgaria and
Eastern Rumelia, and underlined the duty of their care by the state.
The preamble of the committee bill revealed the strong sense of national
refugees expelled from the Balkan states rather than that of Thessalian
98
«Το νομοσχέδιον περί συνοικισμού και διανομής γαιών», ΠΕΒΕ, αριθ. 130, 260.
166
sharecroppers. Another reason why Dragoumis emphasized the refugee issue
seems to lie in the fact that the land distribution project ultimately would
include more refugees than local sharecroppers. It was estimated that the
number of the refugee families would be two and a half times bigger than
Nevertheless, the committee bill did not entirely ignore the care of
the land reform in Thessaly.” 100 For this purpose in particular, Alexandris
legislation processes. Each speech was made on the first day of the three
readings of the bill (on February 1, March 24, and March 30, 1907). In his
solve the problems in a proper way. Within this rather large framework he
99
The British delegate to the International Financial Commission in May 1907
reported that the number of the refugee families who would benefit from the land
distribution project was 1750 in total while that of the native cultivator families was 700.
FO371/264, No.14701.
100
«Το νομοσχέδιον περί συνοικισμού και διανομής γαιών», ΠΕΒΕ, αριθ. 130, 261.
167
Throughout his speeches, Alexandris expressed constructive
opinions in order to further not only the success of the land distribution
misfortune would fail if the first attempt at reform was abortive. 101 First of
all, he pointed out that the land even for the Thessalian cultivators was
already in short supply and urged the government to purchase further private
çiftlik land for distribution to both Thessalians and refugees. He insisted that
the government distribute more, 100 stremmata, and not 70, to each
cover their expenses for their land and for the debts to the state. Second, He
refugees. Otherwise there would be a possibility that those who obtained the
land would not be able to pay for it and consequently fail to become
should be provided 1,000 drachmas per each household for the establishment
of their new life against the government’s proposal that 500 drachmas would
168
cultivators and refugees. It should be also noted that he recommended that
share, to be given to the refugees from Romania who had been unfamiliar
the government opposed this plan, Alexandris contended that as Greeks from
cultivators. 102
money. He argued that a farmer and a worker were the two pillars which
supported the whole edifice of the state and society. The state would be
acknowledged that this phenomenon had not yet appeared in Greece. But in
102
«Η Βουλή» [Parliament], Πατρίς, 2 Φεβρουαρίου 1907, 2; «Η Βουλή» [Parliament],
Ακρόπολις, 2 Φεβρουαρίου 1907, 2; «Η Βουλή» [Parliament], Πατρίς, 15 Μαρτίου
1907, 2; «Βουλή» [Parliament], Ακρόπολις, 15 Μαρτίου 1907, 2; «Βουλή» [Parliament],
Ακρόπολις, 31 Μαρτίου 1907, 2.
169
insufficient farming capital. 103 As we have seen in the previous section,
and, of course, influenced the passage of the final law of land distribution.
politics from the standpoint of the whole Greek nation and of Hellenism.
because he did not keep Thessaly exclusively for native people and
the Greek territory can be regarded quite successful. Once the government
103
«Βουλή. Έλη και Στεφανοβίκεια», 2.
104
«Τα Θεσσαλικά» [Thessalian Issues], Πατρίς, 2 Φεβρουαρίου 1907, 1; «Ο. κ. Α.
Αλεξανδρής» [Mr. Alexandris], Ακρόπολις, 31 Μαρτίου 1907, 1; There was resistance
among native Thessalian people against the project of refugee settlement in Thessaly.
For examples, Sofoklis Triantafillidis, an editor of the newspaper Panthessalia and a
former deputy, objected to accepting the refugees even temporarily in Volos. According
to him, the refugee settlement would be accomplished at the expense of Thessalian
people. He criticized that the government in Athens intended to impose the burden
caused by the refugee problem on Thessalians and that it would soon forget the refugees.
He also argued that there was no room for the refugees in Thessaly and that they would
starve and suffer soon. Another Thessalian newspaper Thessalia attack his attitude was
as a lack of tolerance toward ethnic Greek brothers. It contended that the influx of the
refugees would act as an incentive to revitalize Thessaly. «Ο εχθρός του Βόλου» [The
Enemy of Volos], Θεσσαλία, 7 Μαρτίου 1907, 1; «Διατί δεν θέλουν τους Αγχιαλίτας εν
Βόλω» [Why Do They Not Want Anchialites in Volos], Θεσσαλία, 8 Μαρτίου 1907 1;
«Και εκ τρίτου» [Also from the Third], Θεσσαλία, 9 Μαρτίου 1907, 1.
170
Dragoumis to alleviate their difficulties with the initiative of the state, the
legally acquired Greek citizenship and could secure land according to their
ethnic Greeks becoming Greek citizens, since the principle of ius sanguinis,
strongly appealed to Parliament for furnishing the refugees with prompt and
The land distribution project was carried out not only for the
refugees but for the native cultivators. The attempt to make sharecroppers
thorny issue which had remained unresolved for many years after Thessaly
105
Foreign Office, Annual Series, No. 4289, Diplomatic Consular Report, 6.
106
Αιμίλιος Μπεντερμάχερ-Γερούσης, Ελληνικόν δίκαιον ιθαγενείας [Greek
Citizenship Law], τρίτη έκδοση [3rd ed.] (Θεσσαλονίκη: Αδελφοί Π. Σάκκουλα, 1976),
15-18; John S. Koliopoulos and Thanos M. Veremis, Greece: The Modern Sequel from
1831 to the Present (New York: New York University Press, 2002), 257.
171
was incorporated into the Greek territory. A deputy like Alexandris was
beneficial, not only the refugees but also for the native cultivators.
national identity in Macedonia was still vague and fluid. 107 The efforts
the Greek nation was never thoroughly discarded, the Greeks in the Greek
kingdom recognized its clear setback and the impossibility of fully realizing
their irredentist aspiration after the defeat of the war of 1897. Instead, they
had to face the reality that other Balkan nations were encroaching upon the
territories where Hellenism had historically flourished. The Greek state was
107
Anastasia N. Karakasidou, Fields of Wheat, Hill of Blood: Passage to Nationhood
in Greek Macedonia, 1870–1990 (Chicago & London: The University Chicago Press,
1997), 77-137.
172
ambition. Parliament had to find practical measures to protect the persecuted
therefore should not be estranged from the Greek state. The state presented
itself as a benefactor for the refugees. Interestingly, this stance of the state
makes a clear contrast with what has been discussed in chapter 3, where we
noticed that the state exploited the people, thereby compelling the Greeks to
continuously emigrate.
Japanese played central roles in the debate on this issue. They repeatedly
emphasized the nation’s good and made the presence of the Team
On September 30, 1907, Prince George laid the first stone of New
Anchialos. The establishment of the new community for the Anchialites was
Law 3202 did not entirely resolve the problems of the refugee
108
«Εθνική εορτή της χθες» [National Celebration of Yesterday], Θεσσαλία, 1
Οκτωβρίου 1907, 3.
109
Σπύρος Χασιώτης, «Η μεγάλη εθνική νίκη. Η Νέα Αγχίαλος» [The Great National
Victory. New Anchialos], Ακρόπολις, 1 Οκτωβρίου 1907, 1.
173
to solve them. Other legislative measures were taken while some royal
decrees were issued. 110 In 1911 the Office of the Thessalian Agricultural
of Finance of the results of the project started with the enactment of Law
farm servants, and refugees had acquired land and had become settled. The
were 100 households of local cultivators and farm servants, and 1,677
110
Νόμος ˏΓΣΙΕ΄ της 1 Ιουνίου 1907 [Law 3215 on June 1, 1907], Β. Διάταγμα της 27
Ιουνίου 1907 [Royal Decree on June 27, 1907], Νόμος ˏΓΤΘ΄ της 14 Μαΐου 1908 [Law
3309 on May 14, 1908] , Β. Διάταγμα της 7 Δεκεμβρίου 1908 [Royal Decree on
December 7, 1908]. Νόμος ˏΓΤΞΘ΄ της 6 Οκτωβρίου 1909 [Law 3369 on October 6,
1909], Νόμος ˏΓΦΚΑ΄ της 9 Ιανουαρίου 1910 [Law 3521 on January 9, 1910].
111
Γραφείον Θεσσαλικού Γεωργικού Ταμείου, ΄Εκθεσις περί των εκτελεσθέντων προς
αποκατάστασιν των εγχώριων και εποίκων ομογενών εν Θεσσαλία [A Report of the
Achievement in the Settlement of Locals and Ethnic Greek Colonists in Thessaly]
(Αθήνα: Εθνικό τυπογραφείο, 1911), 17-18; In 1910 the Dragoumis’ government set up
the Ministry of Agriculture, Trade and Industry by Law 3824. It was a new ministry in
Greece that specialized in agricultural matters. Its name was changed to the Ministry of
National Economy in July 1911 under the Venizelos’ government. The constitutional
reform of 1911 and laws which followed it speeded up the process for expropriating
large estates and creating smallholders. Christine Agriantoni, “Venizelos and Economic
Policy,” in Eleftherios Venizelos: The Trials of Statesmanship ed. by Paschalis
Kitromilides (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006) 287-288; A. Andréadès,
“Les Progrès matériels de la Thessalie depuis sa libération,” La Revue de Grèce 1, no.1,
Septembre (1918): 17-18.
174
CHAPTER 5
Educational Reform
This chapter deals with the discussions over the bill of school
textbooks, which became Law 3201 on April 4, 1907. The law prescribed the
one school textbook system for secondary education. For primary education,
pupils were to have only one reader while teachers were supposed to orally
teach other subjects by using real objects. 1 The law indicated a welcome
of leaning, in place of the traditional rote memorizing, had been sought for.
and took a bold initiative to save it from strong objections on the part of
reform bill was another good concrete example which demonstrated the
politics that the Team of the Japanese envisioned. His behavior was
predicated not on party interests, but on his ideas of nation’s good. Being a
1
Υπουργείον των Εκκλησιαστικών και της Δημόσιας Εκπαιδεύσεως, Ο περί
διδακτικών βιβλίων Νόμος ˏΓΣΑ΄ και τα προς εκτέλεσιν αυτού Β. διατάγματα κ.τ.λ. [Law
3201 of School Textbooks and the Royal Decrees for Ιts Enforcement] (Αθήνα: Εθνικό
τυπογραφείο, 1908).
175
nation’s benefit, to which the Team was committed.
the grounds on which those who were opposed to the reforms attacked the
the deputies on the proposed bill. The debate represented the ideas conceived
After the defeat of the war of 1897, voices to call for reforms in
every sphere of the country were heard in order to regenerate the state and
176
the nation. The educational reforms were among the issues that had to be
defeat of 1897 proved that Greece lacked the effective educational system to
step. It was claimed that Greek children should not spend their time at school
just memorizing what was written in textbooks, but efficiently obtain more
practical and useful knowledge for the actual life. The four bills of 1899
spirit. They intended to overhaul the system from the primary school to the
industry, and commerce. However, there was strong resistance against these
reform bills not only from a conservative circle of the deputies, but also from
2
Στρατής Μπουρνάζος, «Η εκπαίδευση στο ελληνικό κράτος» [Education in the Greek
State], in Ιστορία της Ελλάδας του 20ού αιώνα. Οι απαρχές 1900–1922 [History of
Greece in the 20th Century: The Beginnings 1900–1922], τόμος Α΄-2 [vol.1-2] ed.
Χρήστος Χατζηιωσήφ (Αθήνα: Βιβλιόραμα, 1999), 199.
177
those who were in charge of education. Therefore, the bills of Eftaxias were
suspended to be voted. 3
curriculum of primary education was the one of what the opponents most
fiercely attacked. They claimed that it was antinational because it was an act
to sever the close link between the nation and the language, thereby
expected to play a role in promoting national cause, they argued, the ancient
and tradition should be definitely taught. Otherwise the Greeks would not be
written language in the Greek state. There were two camps: The one camp
traditional written Greek, which reflected the direct relationship with ancient
Greece. It had been the language of state institutions and the law since
178
Greece gained its independence. The other camp was in favor of demotic
Greek based on modern spoken Greek. Both camps were predicated on their
own nationalism and argued that their stance would help the rebirth of the
Greek nation and would defend the Greek legitimacy in Macedonia. Both
employed the similar rhetoric emphasizing the strong organic ties between
the language and the Greek nation. On the one hand, Psycharis, major
Journey, “Language and fatherland are one and the same. To fight for the
fatherland or for the national language is one and the same struggle.” On the
other hand, G. Mistriotis, a university professor and one of the most ardent
peoples have been enslaved but have not laid down their languages. The
Greek people risks losing its very existence for the sake of a few individuals
mother Greece her dearest daughter [i.e. Macedonia], while those who call
5
Quoted from Roderick Beaton, An Introduction to Modern Greek Literature, 2nd ed.
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), 315-316.
6
The periodical Noumas was first published in January 1903 and soon became a
bulwark of the demoticist movement. In 1907 the National Language Society whose
purpose was to promote the use of demotic Greek was founded. Gerasimos Augustinos,
Consciousness and History: Nationalist Critics of Greek Society 1897–1914 (New
179
conservative nationalism was dominant in the major state institutions such as
the church, the university, and other school systems. Furthermore, the
were afraid that any educational reform would introduce “vulgar” [i.e.
whole society about the need for introducing new educational methods
York: Columbia University Press, 1977), 34-35; Makrigiannis’ Memoirs was first
published in 1907. Makrigiannis was a general in the War of the Greek Independence of
1821 and wrote his memoirs in the spoken Greek. Beaton, An Introduction to Modern
Greek Literature, 336.
7
Augustinos, Consciousness and History, 29-32; Philip Carabott, “Politics, Orthodoxy
and the Language Question in Greece: The Gospel Riots of November 1901,” Journal
of Mediterranean Studies 3, no.1 (1993): 117-138; Άννα Φραγκουδάκη, Ο
εκπαιδευτικός δημοτικισμός και ο γλωσσικός συμβιβασμός του 1911 [Educational
Demoticism and Language Reconciliation of 1911] (Ιωάννινα: Πανεπιστήμιο
Ιωαννίνων–Φιλοσοφική Σχολή, 1977), 27-28.
8
Demoticists like Kostis Palamas argued that educational reforms would not be
achieved without a radical change in language form used at school. Κωστής Παλαμάς,
«Πώς θα αντιμετωπίσωμεν τον απειλούντα ημας εθνικόν κίνδυνον;» [How Shall We
Confront the National Crisis Threatening Us?], Ακρόπολις, 3 Ιανουαρίου 1907, 2.
180
Greek at school. 9 Efficient acquisition of knowledge and maintenance of
Flourishing Book-Mongering
most corrupt practices in the field of education at that time. So exactly what
money through the business of selling school textbooks. Those who were
Law 2303 of 1895 was the cause of book-mongering. Law 2303 had
three main points to be noted. First, it abolished the single school textbook
policy which Law 1042 of 1882 had adopted. 10 Second, it placed gymnasia
out of the approval system for school textbooks, which primary schools and
completely free from any restrictions concerning the textbooks they used.
9
«Τα εν τη Βουλή» [The Events in Parliament], Οικονομική Ελλάς, 24 Φεβρουαρίου
1907, 89.
10
«Κυριακούλη Π. Μαυρομιχάλη αγόρευσις κατά την εις β΄ ανάγνωσιν του
νομοσχεδίου περί διδακτικών βιβλίων» [The Speech of Kiriakoulis P. Mavromichalis
against the Bill of School Textbooks in the Second Reading], Ακρόπολις, 23
Φεβρουαρίου 1907, 1.
181
Hellenic schools. Once they were approved by a special committee, these
textbooks were valid for five years. The number of the books approved every
year was not limited, which meant that new books for primary and Hellenic
their content and the number of volumes, could be brought into gymnasia.
On the other hand, the annual competition for school textbooks for primary
books had been approved both for primary and Hellenic schools since the
regime of 1895 started, while textbooks used in gymnasia had been totally
out of the state control and their number was impossible to count. Under
followed that students did not always use the best books and were
11
Φωτιάδου, Πρώτον Ελληνικόν Εκπαιδευτικόν Συνέδριον, 104; Hellenic schools and
gymnasia constituted secondary education. Hellenic schools had a three-year course and
gymnasia had a four-year course. Secondary education was not obligatory. Children
who completed their primary education attended first Hellenic schools, then, if they
wanted or could afford, continued their studies at gymnasia to supplement the courses
of Hellenic Schools. J. Gennadius, A Sketch of the History of Education in Greece: A
Paper Presented to the World Federation of Education Association Conference in
Edinburgh July 1925 (Edinburgh, 1925), 26-29.
12
Georgios Drosinis was a poet and a novelist. He was concerned very much with
education and published the educational journal National Upbringing (Εθνική Αγωγή)
from 1898 to 1904.
182
unnecessarily mentally taxed by proliferation of books. 13 The excess of the
improvised textbooks of low quality. Such books were usually poorly bound
determine that they should not contribute to writing school textbooks and
13
Γεώργιος Δροσίνης, «Ο νόμος του ενός βιβλίου» [The Law of One Book], Η μελέτη,
Απρίλιο (1907): 229; A. Stefanopoulos, Minister of Education, mentioned that 644
books for primary and Hellenic schools were approved. «Ειδήσεις—τηλεγραφήματα. Η
Βουλή. Συζήτησις περί δ. εκπαιδεύσεως» [News—Telegrams. Parliament. Discussion
about Public Education], Πατρίς, 5 Δεκεμβρίου 1906, 2; In his speech Konstantinos
Papamichalopoulos told that 645 books had been approved and that the total number of
the books including the ones that were secretly brought in primary schools amounted to
1,000. «Αγόρευσις Κωνσταντ. Ν. Παπαμιχαλοπούλου, βουλευτού Επιδαύρου Λιμηράς,
επί του νομοσχεδίου περί διδακτικών βιβλίων» [The Speech of Konstant. N.
Papamichalopoulos, Deputy of Epidaurus Limira, about the Bill of School Textbooks],
Ακρόπολις, 1 Μαρτίου 1907, 2.
14
The examples of inappropriate accounts in some school textbooks are following:
“Cyprus must be incorporated quickly into Greece because the goddess Kipris
(Aphrodite) was worshipped in this island.” “Fustanella [i.e. a kind of Greek kilt] is a
white dress made up of many bias bands. It is useful to conceal what should not be
shown because it has to be concealed.” «Τα…διδακτικά»[The…School Textbooks],
Εστία, 20 Φεβρουαρίου 1907, 3.
15
Φωτιάδου, Πρώτον Ελληνικόν Εκπαιδευτικόν Συνέδριον, 105-106.
16
«Η βιβλιοκαπηλεία» [Book-Mongering], Ακρόπολις, 20 Δεκεμβρίου 1906, 1.
183
The Bill of School Textbooks
he must introduce reform bills and ask Parliament for help in working them
out fully.” 19
book-mongering. He pointed out that the bill of school textbooks was not
17
«Βουλή. Επερωτήσεων το ανάγνωσμα. Το εκπαιδευτικόν σύστημα» [Parliament.
Reading of Questions. The Educational System], Ακρόπολις, 5 Δεκεμβρίου 1906, 2.
18
«Τα εν Ελλάδι» [The Events in Greece], Νέα Ημέρα, 23 Δεκεμβρίου 1906/ 5
Ιανουαρίου 1907, 4.
19
«Βουλή. Επερωτήσεων το ανάγνωσμα. Το εκπαιδευτικόν σύστημα», 2.
184
book-mongering continued to exist. Panagiotopoulos called book-mongering
plunder and criticized the contents and materials that book-mongers made.
Serbia, and Austria in order that deputies could compare Greek books with
reliable and their printing technique and contents were more excellent than
Greek ones. 20 He declared that Greek textbooks were worst of all even
though they were four times as expensive as the foreign books. 21 He directly
criticized Stefanopoulos by saying, “It took more than 644 books to shake
your pride enough to submit a bill [of school textbooks].…In terms of their
contents, many of these books are so bad that they would provoke horror.” 22
Panagiotopoulos insisted that there was no more vital topic than that of
on the agenda 23
the expected date in December 1906. The bill was finally submitted to
Parliament on January 29, 1907. The preamble began with a criticism against
20
«Ειδήσεις—τηλεγραφήματα», 2.
21
«Βουλή. Επερωτήσεων το ανάγνωσμα», 2.
22
«Ειδήσεις—τηλεγραφήματα», 2.
23
«Ειδήσεις—τηλεγραφήματα», 2.
185
the existing law, which had allowed book-mongering to flourish. It read:
the principle of a single textbook. While one book for each subject
primary schools were supposed to orally teach other subjects. Through the
186
practical effect on school children for knowledge acquisition.
every six years so that a special committee would examine would-be school
textbooks and approve one of them for each subject of each grade. The bill
also specified the state ownership of the approved books after their authors
were financially awarded. The state would receive revenue from the auction
of publishing rights for each book and from copies of each book sold. The
government bill, the committee bill filled in the details, which were roughly
would be announced in the Government Gazette within two months after the
new law would be enacted and for secondary education within three months.
In these programs the details about the size of textbooks and their contents
rights to each textbook would be sold by auction in order that one publisher
could not monopolize the right of publishing all the books. The amount of
25
«Αιτιολογική έκθεσις του περί διδακτικών βιβλίων νομοσχεδίου», ΠΕΒΕ, αριθ. 66,
120-122.
26 ΠΣΒΕ, 326.
187
money deposited in the National Bank through book revenue stamps would
favoritism. 27
parties. One of them was from the authors of school textbooks, most of
bill became law and the state obtained the right to monopolize approved
textbooks, they would lose all the profit that they had been earning together
with publishers. Yet authors did not openly deplore the loss of that source of
money. Instead, they criticized the potential state monopoly over school
guarantee of authors’ rights. They pointed out that the bill included three
defects which would infringe authors’ freedoms: the state monopoly, the one
First, according to the authors, the state monopoly that the bill
27
«Ο νόμος περί διδακτικών βιβλίων» [The Law of School Textbooks], Εστία, 13
Φεβρουαρίου 1907, 3.
188
stipulated would negatively affect the purpose of educational reforms. Under
a system in which the state would monopolize the approval of books and
Second, the authors maintained that the present law of 1895 had
abolished the single textbook policy for several reasons. They pointed out
that, before the present law was enacted, millions of schemes involving the
examiners in charge of approving the books had emerged because only one
author would win and obtain high profits from his book. In addition, many
excellent books were rejected just because Law 1042 of 1882 specified that
only one book could be approved. It followed that writers abstained from
be violated if the proposed bill became law without modifications and the
that, if it was necessary to limit the number of school textbooks, three books
28
«Το ζήτημα των διδακτικών βιβλίων. Αναφορά συγγραφέων προς την Σεβ. Βουλή
των Ελλήνων» [The Issue of School Textbooks. The Petition of Authors to the
Respectable Parliament of the Greeks], Ακρόπολις, 18 Φεβρουαρίου 1907, 3.
189
at least should be approved to guarantee authors’ rights. 29
of authors wrote, “Will one of the talented writers, who has failed to get his
his own book and wait with little hope for the next competition to take place
should be imposed, the proposal argued, three years should be the maximum
the same grounds as the group of the authors did. For example, Kiriakoulis
that approving three books was more reasonable. He also expressed his fear
29
«Το ζήτημα των διδακτικών βιβλίων», 3.
30
«Το ζήτημα των διδακτικών βιβλίων», 3.
190
that a contest every six years would cause intellectual apathy and
number of textbooks should be limited, but he was not convinced that only
abolishing the use of textbooks at primary schools except for a reader and
there were some who could teach excellently without books, but they were
verbally, then the teaching abilities of teachers should be called into question.
31
«Κυριακούλη Π. Μαυρομιχάλη αγόρευσις», 1.
191
then gradually expanded. 32
of the bill. In his speech on February 21, 1907, he not only defended the
criticized the potential state monopoly over them. But he also attacked the
identity. 33
“book-mongering” had been used to excess. He pointed out that the authors
of school textbooks, who had been a target of people’s severe criticism and
worthy of respect in reality. They were qualified intellectuals and those who
were preparing Greek children for destiny and shaping a bright future for the
Greek nation. As such, he contended, they should not have been abused. 34
some of which were actually non-instructive, had been circulated and that he
32
«Αγόρευσις Κ. Καραπάνου βουλευτού Άρτης επί του νομοσχέδιου περί διδακτικών
βιβλίων κατά την συνεδρίασιν της 22 Φεβρουαρίου» [The Speech of K. Karapanos,
Deputy of Arta, about the Bill of School Textbooks in the Meeting on February 22],
Καιροί, 2 Μαρτίου 1907, 2-3.
33
«Αγόρευσις Κωνσταντ. Ν. Παπαμιχαλοπούλου», 2-4.
34
«Αγόρευσις Κωνσταντ. Ν. Παπαμιχαλοπούλου», 2.
192
did not always regard them as valuable, he attributed this phenomenon not to
language. Different from English, French, and German, which large numbers
of people could read, Greek was a language which only a small group of
professors had to, out of necessity, resort whatever means they could in order
recognized scholars. 35
their own writings. He argued that, since a state monopoly over school
single book policy, especially the bill’s proposal that primary school children
would not have a textbook except for a reader. He took up the “Language
Question” for discussion as his last trump card to quash the bill. He
35
«Αγόρευσις Κωνσταντ. Ν. Παπαμιχαλοπούλου», 2.
36 «Αγόρευσις Κωνσταντ. Ν. Παπαμιχαλοπούλου», 2.
193
expressed the fear that, if teachers orally taught children the Greek language
and that this would be fatal to the destiny of the Greeks. He stressed that
school children had to learn Greek grammar in order to maintain their Greek
identity. He said, “The Greek language sustains the Greek nation.” 37 Yet, he
deplored that “[m]any and most Greeks [were] unfortunately ignorant of the
calling demotic Greek “very miserable and dirty vomit.” 39 In his view,
demotic Greek was out of the trajectory the Greek language historically had
followed. For him, the Greek language was katharevousa Greek, which
reflected a direct relationship with the remote Greek past. Only this Greek
the Greek language as a single unit. It is necessary to have the powerful aids
historical heritage, Greek was difficult to learn without the help of logic, that
is, grammar. He warned that teaching the language without a grammar book
would help demotic Greek dominate with the result of making the Greeks
37
«Αγόρευσις Κωνσταντ. Ν. Παπαμιχαλοπούλου», 3.
38
«Αγόρευσις Κωνσταντ. Ν. Παπαμιχαλοπούλου», 3.
39
«Αγόρευσις Κωνσταντ. Ν. Παπαμιχαλοπούλου», 3.
40
«Αγόρευσις Κωνσταντ. Ν. Παπαμιχαλοπούλου», 3.
194
non-Greek. He bitterly criticized advocates of demotic Greek, which he saw
In order to be Greek, the Greeks had to be tightly bound with their history
and with what the history taught to them. He contended that Greek history
still had a power to inspire contemporary Europe and that the Greeks had to
stick with that heritage. In his logic, it was through the past that the modern
Greeks could fully articulate their unique identity and be highly regarded
41
«Αγόρευσις Κωνσταντ. Ν. Παπαμιχαλοπούλου», 3.
195
among other nations. Therefore, learning Greek without a grammar book,
grammar book was worse than the deliberate destruction of the Parthenon
signified the clear intentions of the Greeks to deny their historical past. 43
double standard when articulating his opinion against the bill. On the one
progress. He said, “As far as school matters are concerned, on such a big and
entire millennium like the Chinese, with eyes closed and ears bocked. We
cannot but understand what is happening and follow the common tide of
textbook did not provide teachers with sufficient means to teach children
42
«Αγόρευσις Κωνσταντ. Ν. Παπαμιχαλοπούλου», 3.
43
«Αγόρευσις Κωνσταντ. Ν. Παπαμιχαλοπούλου», 3.
44
«Αγόρευσις Κωνσταντ. Ν. Παπαμιχαλοπούλου», 3.
196
opposed the six-year validity for an approved book because such a long
were a foreign tongue and warned that the one textbook policy would
Deputies, who were against the bill, took into consideration the
future. Deputies who supported the bill, however, rejected taking the middle
road on this issue. They were determined to root out book-mongering, which
197
they believed had to be done so as to introduce an object-based method of
learning and to improve the quality of education for the sake of school
children.
February 20 and 22, 1907, were so effective and convincing that the
opponents could not make any further arguments. These speeches were
influence and contended that the system which the bill intended to introduce
would surely eliminate them. Although his opponents argued that authors’
freedoms and rights to write textbooks and to receive rewards for their work
successfully got his book approved for use at school and then gave his
daughter’s bridegroom the right to the royalties from his book as his
daughter’s dowry. The marriage was dissolved after several years. Though
198
the bridegroom willingly returned his bride to her father, he declined to
return the royalty rights from the textbook of his former father-in-law.
Therefore, the schools had to suspend the class in which the textbook was
used so that the former bridegroom would not exploit his former wife’s
was more urgent to crush authors who were riding on commercialism than to
opponents who criticized the one textbook approach. He emphasized that the
He said:
45
«Ο λόγος του κ. Παναγιωτοπούλου» [The Speech of Mr. Panagiotopoulos], Νέον
Άστυ, 21 Φεβρουαρίου 1907, 2.
199
Books fill children’s brains with phrases and words of empty
meanings. No one can reject [the existence of] abstract concepts,
but it is impossible for school children of very young age to
understand them. Neither arithmetic, nor history, nor geography can
be taught well through books. The teaching of these subjects does
not aim at memory work of dates or terms, but intends to foster the
moral and intellectual worlds of learners. This purpose is best
achieved by way of the active and oral method with the use of real
things. 46
memorize what was written in books, but to help them to develop their
ethical and intellectual abilities. Oral teaching with objects, away from
books, was more suitable for this purpose because it would give pupils more
that he had learned not through books, but through real objects. 47
of air neither by reading books, nor by asking the wise. His discovery
46
«Ο λόγος του κ. Παναγιωτοπούλου», 2.
47
«Ο λόγος του κ. Παναγιωτοπούλου», 2.
200
resulted from his own experiments. He discovered the weight of the air by
not necessary for children to learn the Greek language with a grammar book.
children from thinking freely and creatively. He said, “[T]he lesson of Greek
contrary, it prevents them from learning their language and stifles their
children cannot write a letter even of just three lines.” 49 He complained that
teachers did nothing but make their students memorize various texts. In
addition, he pointed out that it was really problematic that Greek children
had to learn katharevousa Greek at school, since it was very different from
what they were speaking in their daily lives. In fact, children were confused
Panagiotopoulos did not intend to add fuel to the fire over the
a critical attitude toward the both camps. It seemed to him that both sides
were going to extremes. He said, “Do not be afraid of the ‘hairy ones’
48
«Βουλή. Νέος θρίαμβος του κ. Παναγιωτοπούλου εις το νομοσχέδιον των βιβλίων»
[Parliament. New Triumph of Mr. Panagiotopoulos for the Bill of Books], Νέον Άστυ,
23 Φεβρουαρίου 1907, 2.
49
«Ο λόγος του κ. Παναγιωτοπούλου», 2.
201
(μαλλιαροί) because they kill themselves through their excess. But dread the
pedants because they murder through their excess.” 50 In his view, one did
not have to pay serious attention to the claims of the supporters of demotic
Greek because they were destroying themselves with their campaign. But
because their campaign might “kill the Greek spirit and wipe out the natural
50
«Χρυσά έπη από το λόγο πούβγαλε ο κ. Παναγιωτόπουλος στη Βουλή στις 22
Φλεβάρη» [Golden Epics from the Speech which Mr. Panagiotopoulos Delivered in
Parliament on February 22], Νουμάς, 4 Μαρτίου, 1907, 1; The “hairy ones” implies the
adherents of demotic Greek. It is a term used, in particular, for a sect of the demoticists
that consisted of Psycharis and his followers who took the “all-or-nothing
systematization” approach to demotic Greek. Beaton, An Introduction to Modern Greek
Literature, 318.
51
«Η Βουλή. Το νομοσχέδιον περί διδακτικών βιβλίων» [Parliament. The Bill of
School Textbooks], Αθήναι, 23 Φεβρουαρίου 1907, 2; It should be noted that,
concerning the “Language Question,” the Team of the Japanese did not have a
consensus. Alexandris wrote in his memoirs, “Gounaris was often opposed to
Protopapadakis over the language issue. Protopapadakis and I were adherents of
demotic Greek while Gounaris argued that the language should develop in an
unhindered manner. Gounaris said, ‘We do not have to put obstacles to our language.
Likewise we do not have to push it by force toward demotic Greek, which the
demoticists are unfortunately attempting to do.’” Απόστολος Αλεξανδρής, Πολιτικαί
αναμνήσεις [Political Memoirs] (Πάτρα : Δ. Φραγκούλης και Κ. Βαρζάνης),12. Here
Gounaris seems to criticize the extremist tendencies of his contemporary demoticists,
who even coined new words that did not exist in spoken Greek.
202
ones” (πωγωνάτοι). 52 I support an in-between language. I think that
these two categories of the Greek language must serve as the
lighthouses which indicate the middle and safe passage. 53
Simply put, for Panagiotopoulos, the true Greek language was the
endanger the entire Greek language. According to him, those who alter the
traitor is when one calls a person who has an opposite opinion from oneself a
traitor.” 55
203
national identity are crystallized in the following speech:
linguistic debate that seemed to assume that one could rule over a language.
Instead, he showed more modest stance toward a language. In his view, the
Greek language was not what man could artificially produce, but that which
Therefore, the language which did not follow the national consciousness was
not the people’s language in any real sense. The Greek that had been taught
burn the grammar save the nation, and not those write it.” 57
204
Panagiotopoulos affirmed that the grammar which ancient Alexandrian
intellectuals had made to study the Greek language was not useful at all for
children could not penetrate the Greek grammar made in a spirit of great
could become an obstacle for children seeking to learn their own language.
who study grammar do not learn the language, but useless rules.” 58 He
emphasized that Grammar and syntax were not the measures which enabled
literature. Rather, he argued, it was teachers who could bring children into
their great ancestors. Yet it seems that he was not content with the common
view that modern Greece and the Greeks always existed in the shadow of
right. He did not regard it proper for the Greeks to cling to their past, but
wished the Greeks to also become like other nations that had recently leaped
205
onto the world stage and gained international recognition. He thought that a
concluded his victorious speech on February 22, 1907, with the following
impressive statements.
206
Great Powers to help liberate the “unredeemed” Greeks. According to
Panagiotopoulos, what was needed for Greek children was not to look back
to the past for potential gains, but to face the real world in which they lived.
the Battle of Marathon, which would find its proper place in modern history.
Some other deputies who supported the bill expressed almost the
same view as Panagiotopoulos. They stressed that the Greeks should stop
attaching such great importance to the ancient world, and instead have more
recognized in school education. He said, “Let’s admire the classics. But let’s
care about modern literature as well. If ancient literature is our glory, then
modern literature is the pulse of our life. Foreigners will discover our
validity. Ancient times were so glorious that they belong to all human beings.
Only modern literature captures the unique spirit of the Greek nation.
shatter the illusion that the modern Greeks occupied a privileged position
207
abolished. Among other things, the idea that we are under totally exceptional
and unique conditions in comparison with other nations has to be done away
with.” 63 He proposed that the Greeks should emulate the recent efforts of
other nations such as Germany, France, and Japan to strengthen the national
six to four years, were made during the deliberations, the principle of one
overcome the opposing opinions toward the bill, thereby making Parliament
legislate the bill, lies in the fact that he was not too deeply involved with the
“Language Question.” He did not fall into the trap of language polarization
63
«Αγόρευσις Κωνστ. Τοπάλη βουλευτικού Βόλου επί του νομοσχεδίου περί
διδακτικών βιβλίων» [The Speech of Konst. Topalis, Deputy of Volos, about the Bill of
School Textbooks], Αθήναι, 3 Μαρτίου, 1907, 3.
208
that learning without a grammar book would spread demotic Greek at school
and endanger not only katharevousa Greek but also the very Greek identity,
advocate the bill as a demoticist. He only justified the proposed reform plan
and provide them with opportunities to acquire more creative and intellectual
abilities.
he did not take either side of the two language camps. He regarded the
language though he did not give any clear definition of it. Panagiotopoulos
Greek language issue prevented the debate on the bill from getting involved
The vigorous debate over the bill was favorably observed outside
209
February 1907 as follows: “Some winds of freedom and progress are
perennially existed there before, have been set aside these days in the face of
the school textbook issue.” 64 She regarded the lively discussions about the
occurring in stagnant Greek politics and therefore enabling the state to make
breathed again that night. The Greek nation breathed again at the same
hopeful future with spiritual freedom and truth that was contrasted with
Papamichalopoulos who represented the past filled with lies and corruption.
64 Καλλιρρόη Παρρέν, «Φως από το σκότος» [Light from the Darkness], Εστία, 28
Φεβρουαρίου, 1907, 1; Kallirroi Parren was a journalist and a writer. She was also one
of the first Greek feminists. She published a weekly magazine Journal of Ladies
(Εφημερίδα των Κυριών) in 1888–1918 and founded the Lycée for Greek Girls (Λύκειο
των Ελληνίδων) in 1911.
65
Δημήτριος. Π. Ταγκόπουλος, «Αρχή λευτεριάς» [Beginning of Freedom], Νουμάς, 4
Μαρτίου 1907, 1.
210
Panagiotopoulos], on behalf of his small group, reached the government. The
voice called for stirring up the stagnant waters of our educational system and
for the government’s decision to submit the bill. The government had been
afraid that the bill would not be passed because it would infringe on the
interests of the many involved. Therefore, the bill would only arouse violent
The significance of the law was not limited only to its role in
abolishing the corrupt trade of book-mongering. The law paved the way for
of a single textbook at school was widely recognized as the first step toward
general educational reforms that advocates of the bill had had in mind. The
Panagiotopoulos is not a person who rests on his laurels not making any
66
«Υπουργός άνευ πορτοφολιού» [Minister without Portfolio], Αθήναι, 15 Μαρτίου,
1907, 1.
67
Δροσίνης, «Ο νόμος του ενός βιβλίου», 230.
211
enthusiasm needed to solve them. Therefore, we can expect more successes
even a member of a small party could convince the government to carry out
grew that the Team would do something more for the nation’s benefit.
212
CHAPTER 6
by the Team of the Japanese, focusing on the series of debates that followed
Parliament as a good example of how not to behave, the Team clarified its
the government and the Privileged Company to Foster the Production and
would illegally benefit the company at the expense of currant producers. The
particular, the attacks of the Team of the Japanese against the government for
1
The official name of the company in Greek is Η Προνομιούχος Εταιρία προς
Προστασίαν της Παραγωγής και της Εμπορίας της Σταφίδος. The company was
abbreviated as “Eniaia” (Ενιαία).
213
verge of collapse.
The Currant Scandal was not just an event through which the
over the scandal crystallized the political platform of the Team of the
parliamentary life.
been taken with respect to the exportation of currants in 1907, which led to
the scandal. Next, we shall see that the persistent demands of the Team to
Company in Parliament brought the wrongdoing out into the open. Then, we
shall explore the debates following the scandal. In the debates the members
214
The Currant Export of 1907
government to regulate the entire currant trade for twenty years, and had to
maintain the current price remunerative for the producers. For this purpose,
kind for retention and land tax, not exceeding the demand on the market. In
principle, those who dealt with currant exportation had to deliver 35% of the
shipments of the currants reached beyond the limit of the quantities on which
2
The currants, called korinthiaka, were really unique Greek products. They were
seedless grapes which were only produced in specific regions of Greece (the southern
area of the Corinthian Gulf to the northern part of the Peloponnese, Zakinthos and
Kefalonia islands of the Ionian Sea, and several regions of the Aegean Sea) until the
beginning of the twentieth century. Therefore, Greece continued to monopolize the
trade in currants on the international market. As the value of its export was more than
50 % of the whole Greek exports in the latter half of the nineteenth century, the currant
industry played an important role in Greek economy. The revenue from land tax on
currants ranked first in the category of the country’s direct tax. But the volume of
currants exported from Greece dropped sharply after 1893, one of the major reasons of
which was attributed to French policy of protectionism expressed in the Méline tariff of
1892. Currant suddenly fell into overproduction. The overproduction caused a slump in
the currant price. Successive Greek governments got involved in finding solutions in
this “currant crisis.” Concerning various measures to overcome the crisis before the
establishment of the Privileged Company, see V. Gabrielidis, “The Over-Production of
Greek Currants,” The Economic Journal 5, no. 18 (1895): 285-288; Theodore A.
Burlumi, “The Overproduction of Currants: A Novel Experiment in Protection,” The
Economic Journal 9, no. 36 (1899): 633-651; A. Andréadès, “Currant Crisis in Greece,”
The Economic Journal 16, no.16 (1906): 41-48; A. Andréadès, “Une Nouvelle
expérience économique: la crise de surproduction des raisins de Corinthe et la Société
Privilégiée,” Revue économique internationale 6, no.2 (1909): 130-134.
215
the payment in kind was imposed, then the company started to make the
exporters pay in cash instead. In this case they were obliged to pay 40.25
drachmas for every 1,000 Venetian lbs. of currants they intended to export. 3
The company and the government estimated the amount of the entire crop of
a new currant year and announced every year on August 10 the proportion
assembled on August 9, 1907, one day before the export of new currant
crops began. In order that the currants would not be oversupplied on the
market, they decided that the payment in kind for retention and land tax
warehouses. 5
3
(Great) Venetian lb. is a unit of weight. It is expressed as ενετικό λίτρο in Greek and
as livre vénitienne in French. 1 Venetian lb. is equivalent to 478 grams.
4
Concerning the details of the business of the Privileged Company, see Foreign Office,
Annual Series, No. 3516, Diplomatic and Consular Report: Greece: Report on the
Finances of Greece for the Year 1905 (London: Harrison and Sons, 1905), 10-12;
Andréadès, “Currant Crisis in Greece,” 48-51; Andréadès, “Une Nouvelle experience
économique,” 135-149.
5
«Ο φόρος της σταφίδος» [The Tax on Currants], Ακρόπολις, 10 Αυγούστου 1907, 4;
«Η χθεσινή απόφασις του Συμβουλίου της Ενιαίας» [Yesterday’s Decision of the Board
of the Eniaia], Χρόνος, 10 Αυγούστου 1907, 3; «Σταφιδικά. Το χθεσινόν συμβούλιον
της Ενιαίας» [Currant Issues. Yesterday’s Board of the Eniaia], Αθήναι, 10 Αυγούστου
1907, 2.
216
In the course of this meeting, an unusual agreement was reached.
The company argued that retention warrants were running short and that
most of the exporters did not have them, which would prevent the currants
company proposed that the export in the form of cash deposit, not of the
company and allowed the exportation in the form of cash deposit by the end
of August. They defined the price of the cash deposit per 1,000 Ven. lbs. as
About 51,000,000 Ven. lbs. currants were shipped out in the form of
cash deposit by the end of August. If exported in a normal way with the
6 “Retention warrants are delivered to any one depositing currants in the Privileged
Company’s warehouses and bear on their face the amount delivered. These warrants are
sold in the open market to exporters and are usually worth 10 per cent. less than the
value of currants.” Foreign Office, Annual Series, No. 3809, Diplomatic and Consular
Reports: Greece: Report for the Year 1906 on the Trade and Commerce of the Morea
and the Provinces of Aetolia and Acarnania (London: Harrison and Sons, 1907), 11.
Exporters had to obtain retention warrants in which the amount equivalent to 35% of
the amount of the currants they were to export was written. Exporters were allowed to
export after they presented retention warrants which proved completion of the
procedure of both retention and land tax.
217
2,500,000 drachmas in cash. 7 No exporter, however, appeared to ask the
company to return his deposit. After the exportation in the form of cash
deposit was completed, the price of retention warrants hovered between 150
and 160 per 1000 Ven. lbs., higher than 140 drachmas, the price temporarily
fixed by the company and the government when they had decided to
As a result, the price of currants fell below the price that would be
realized if 18,000,000 Ven. lbs. currants had been retained. This meant that
both the company whose purpose was to protect the economies of the currant
producers, and the government, which supported the former, had cheated the
producers. Yet neither the company nor the government took quick steps to
rectify this situation. Toward the end of 1907, currants producers frequently
18,000,000 Ven. lbs. currants still on the market and the 2,500,000 drachmas
7
Foreign Office, Annual Series, No. 3989, Diplomatic and Consular Report: Greece:
Report for the Year 1907 on the Trade and Commerce of the Morea and the Provinces of
Aetolia and Acarnania (London: Harrison and Sons, 1908), 10.
8
Foreign Office, Annual Series, No. 3989, Diplomatic and Consular Report, 10.
218
The Disclosure of the Currant Scandal
with the 2,500,000 drachmas the company had acquired in cash instead of
18,000,000 Ven. lbs. currants. He intended to put the agreement into practice
Parliament, and that a vote should be taken on the matter in order to make it
a law. Furthermore, he pointed out that the decision in the previous August
that adopted the cash deposit should also have had Parliament’s approval. To
begin with, he regarded the introduction of the cash deposit as illegal in the
9
According to the agreement of 1905, the currant exportation in form of cash deposit,
instead of retention warrants, was permitted only in 1905, the year when the company
was founded. This decision was regarded as a temporary measure because there was not
enough time left to take a regular step for the exportation. The currant export had to
begin on August 10, 1905, less than one month after the company was established.
Αθανάσιος Ευταξίας, «Πού έγκειται το ζήτημα» [In What Does the Problem Consist?],
Αθήναι, 24 Δεκεμβρίου 1907, 1.
219
decision to introduce the cash deposit. According to him, he had thought that
that the currant issue could be settled at the administrative level, and that it
measure. He also claimed that the government should take quick steps this
losses, and thus that the government would not have time to examine the
would carry out the agreement without following the legislative procedure in
which had so far not provided any compensation for the damages caused to
the currant producers by the cash deposit and which had continued to be
indifferent to the matter. But suddenly the government regarded the solution
10
«Η Βουλή. Αι χρηματικαί εγγυήσεις» [Parliament. The Cash Deposit], Νέον Άστυ, 18
Δεκεμβρίου 1907, 2.
11
«Η Βουλή. Επίθεσις κατά της Ενιαίας» [Parliament. Attack against the Eniaia],
Ακρόπολις, 18 Δεκεμβρίου 1907, 2; «Η Βουλή. Ο σιδηρόδρομος και το σταφιδικά
ζήτημα» [Parliament. The Railroad and the Currant Problem], Αθήναι, 18 Δεκεμβρίου
1907, 2.
220
for allowing the Minister to monopolize the right to make whatever decision
failure to present Parliament with any documents between itself and the
Simopoulos had not mentioned when he verbally conveyed the content of the
agreement. What he had announced was that the cash deposit of August 1907
exporters avoided this procedure, the company would still have parts of the
cash deposit in its hands. In this case the company would purchase the
currants delivered to its warehouses for 140 drachmas per 1,000 Ven. lbs. by
June 15, 1908. If the cash deposit remained at the company after these two
221
procedures, the government and the company would subsequently discuss
the matter. 13
indicated that, if the cash deposit still remained at the company after June 15,
1908, the company could have some of the money, based on the stipulation
discovered in no time the hidden intention between the government and the
company. Taking into consideration that at present the market price of the
currants was hovering above 140 drachmas, one could easily predict that
nobody would appear, as had been the case before, to ask for the return of
the cash deposit in exchange for the presentation of the retention warrants, or
to have the company purchase his currants at the price of 140 drachmas. It
followed that the company would keep by June 15, 1908, the full deposit,
that is, 2,500,000 drachmas. Knowing this well enough in advance, the
However, what Simopoulos spoke about was the mere surface of the
second paragraph of Article 6 read, “In a year when, due to the shortage of
currant product, it is impossible to pay in kind for land tax and retention, the
222
company has the right to permit exporters to pay at will in cash for retention
and land tax, partially or all in accordance with the company’s judgment. In
this case exporters have to pay 115 drachmas per 1,000 Ven. lbs.” 15
drachmas was paid in cash for retention and land tax instead of the delivery
however, that the Privileged Company had the right to sell the currants per
1,000 Ven. lbs. at the price of 33 drachmas to the Greek Company of Wine
and Spirit. 17 If the Privileged Company had sold 18,000,000 Ven. lbs.
currants to the Greek Company, the former would have had 594,000
could not sell them to the Greek Company for the cash income. This could
15
Προνομιούχος Εταιρία προς Προστασίαν της Παραγωγής και της Εμπορίαν της
Σταφίδος, Νόμος ˏΓΠ΄(3080) της 17 Ιουλίου 1905. Η δι’αυτού κυρωθείσα σταφιδική
σύμβασις της 8 Ιουλίου 1905 και το καταστατικού της Προνομιούχου Εταιρίας προς
Προστασίαν της Παραγωγής και της Εμπορίαν της Σταφίδος [Law 3080 of July 17, 1905.
The Currant Agreement of July 8, 1905 Approved by the Law, and the Statutes of the
Privileged Company to Foster the Production and Trade of Currants] (Αθήνα: Εθνικό
τυπογραφείο, 1905), 31.
16
18,000,000 Ven. lbs÷1,000 Ven. lbs.×115drachmas = 2,070,000 drachmas.
17
Its official name in Greek was η Ελληνική Εταιρεία Οίνων και Οινοπνευμάτων.
223
enable the company to apparently legally obtain about 1,500,000 drachmas.
currants, there was no legal basis on which it could be applied to the case of
the currant year of 1907, given the fact that 18,000,000 Ven. lbs. currants
that the agreement was scandalous and would ultimately benefit the
Theotokis asserted that the government had not approved the statement in
18
In his interview with the newspaper Patris, Protopapadakis explained in detail the
trick of the agreement and how to compute the amount of money that the Privileged
Company would obtain. «Το σκάνδαλον της Ενιαίας. Σπουδαιόταται αποκαλύψεις των
κ.κ. Π. Πρωτοπαπαδάκη και Δ. Γούναρη» [The Scandal of the Eniaia. Very Important
Discoveries by Mr. P. Protopapadakis and Mr. D. Gounaris], Πατρίς, 24 Δεκεμβρίου
1907, 1.
19 «Η Βουλή. Αι χρηματικαί εγγυήσεις», 2.
224
enraged deputies in Parliament. The Currant Scandal went beyond the
shelved. Parliament became the place where deputies censured the political
difference between the government and the Team of the Japanese concerning
vision of parliamentarianism.
had often been made backstage. The Team criticized this situation that
Second, the Team of the Japanese emphasized that the cabinet had
225
following the disclosure of the scandal, Simopoulos submitted the revised
Deposit Paid in the Substitution for Payment in Kind on the Occasion of the
Currant Export in August 1907,” 20 and asked for a vote. However, the Team
saw him behaving as if nothing disturbing had happened the previous day.
implied more serious problems that were connected with the national interest
than that of the monetary benefits the Privileged Company would gain.
20
ΠΕΒΒ, αριθ. 78, 86-87.
226
attached no importance to Parliament. 21
not limited to the act of hushing up the scandal by deleting the parenthetical
for the Currant Scandal on December 21. This statement was inconsistent
the explanation the government had offered. The company admitted that it
had written the parenthetical phrase into the document by mistake, and that
the government had then transcribed it. The company mentioned, however,
that they had not yet reached the final agreement as to how to deal with the
cash deposit. The solution was postponed until after June 15, 1908. 22 This
statement left some room for the possibility that the stipulation in the
parenthetical phrase could be applied in the future despite the excuse of the
graphic error. This was not consistent with the remarks of Simopoulos and
Theotokis on December 17, who both strongly denied that the stipulation in
21
ΠΣΒΒ, 220-221; «Η Βουλή. Η χθεσινή συνεδρίασις. Και πάλιν το σταφιδικόν
ζήτημα» [Parliament. Yesterday’s Meeting. And Again the Currant Problem], Ακρόπολις,
19 Δεκεμβρίου 1907, 1-2.
22
«Η ιστορία του σκανδάλου. Τι λέγει και η Ενιαία» [The Story of the Scandal. What
Does the Eniaia Say?], Αθήναι, 23 Δεκεμβρίου 1907, 2.
227
parenthesis would be put into practice. Thus, the apologia of the company
company.
possibility that there was another hidden bargain between the government
and the company with regard to the introduction of the cash deposit. Athens
procured a telegram with the number 75385 that Simopoulos had sent to
the telegram, October 1, 1907, was the due date when the company would
accept a claim by exporters for the return of the cash deposit in exchange for
the presentation of retention warrants. The telegram also mentioned that the
50,000,000 Ven. lbs. currants, that is, 35 % of 140,000,000 Ven. lbs. currants
to be exported. The telegram indicated not only that the government had
predicted in advance that some exporters would not ask for the return of their
deposit, but that it had definitely imposed the obligation of a purchase on the
company. In reality, however, the company did not assume the obligation to
purchase the surplus of the currants on the market after October 1, 1907. 23
23
«Μεταμεσονύχτιοι ειδήσεις. Φοβερά αποκάλυψις κατά της κυβερνήσεως» [News
after Midnight. Stunning Disclosure against the Government], Αθήναι, 8 Ιανουαρίου
1908, 3.
228
During the recess of Parliament the company issued the
telegram that Simopoulos had sent. The members of the Team of the
Japanese did not relax their pursuit of the misconduct. The company’s
the following day, Protopapadakis published his opinion on the entire front
page of the newspaper Patris. He strongly argued that all the facts related to
the scandal should be brought into light and that it was necessary to resolve
the unethical matter by calling for the resignation of the Prime Minister or
Athens on January 9, 1908. He hinted that it was likely that the government
had taken into consideration the loss to the company that would be caused by
the obligation to purchase the currants as described in the telegram and thus
had left it undone. He claimed that the government was clearly in collusion
with the company. He concluded that it was not only Simopoulos but the
24
«Το σκάνδαλον της Ενιαίας», 1.
25
«Τα σταφιδικά. Η χθεσινή αποκάλυψις των “Αθηνών.” Η εκτέλεσις της διαταγής.
Ειδήσεις—γνώμαι—συνεντεύξεις» [The Currant Scandal. Yesterday’s Discovery by
“Athens.” The Execution of the Order. News—Opinions—Interviews], Αθήναι, 9
Ιανουαρίου 1908, 2.
229
There was a good reason why Protopapadakis emphasized that both
for the scandal and shift the blame exclusively to Simopoulos. There had
already been a sign that Theotokis had tried to dodge the government’s
was taken.
by saying that it did not respect Parliament. Gounaris’ words and Dragoumis’
carried out the matter of the cash deposit. Thus, we should place it on the
Simopoulos.
abstentions in the total votes of 109. Five of the seven members of the Team
26
ΠΣΒΒ, 222.
230
of the Japanese voted “yes” for the motion. Two other
on that day. As a result, the motion was rejected, and Simopoulos won the
confidence of Parliament. Given the fact that the deputies of the government
party occupied two thirds of the total seats in Parliament, the result was as
government party cast a negative vote for the motion. When the vote began,
14 deputies of the government party left the chamber, and five voted in favor
the government’s collective responsibility for the action his cabinet member
had committed. 27
An article on the front page of the newspaper Akropolis that dealt with the
27
«Το χθεσινόν αποτέλεσμα της ψηφοφορίας κατά του κ. Σιμοπούλου» [Yesterday’s
Result of the Vote against Mr. Simopoulos], Ακρόπολις, 19 Δεκεμβρίου 1907, 3; «Η
Βουλή. Μια παράδοξος ψηφοφορία» [Parliament. A Paradoxical Vote], «Σημειώσεις»
[Notes], Αθήναι, 19 Δεκεμβρίου 1907, 2.
231
metaphorically described the Team members as man-eaters. The article
that the Japanese are eating a dead body.” 28 The government was regarded
argued at the same time whether the government was capable of sustaining
itself.
1908, the day after the government and the Privileged Company reached a
meeting of the new year, the event “unprecedented in political history of all
reflected the government unrest caused by the Currant Scandal as well as the
anxiousness of the Prime Minister, who wanted to get out of this precarious
28
«Ο νέος προφήτης» [The New Prophet], Ακρόπολις, 19 Δεκεμβρίου 1907, 1.
29
«Η αμφιβολία του κ. Γ. Θεοτόκη» [Uncertainty of Mr. G. Theotokis], Αθήναι, 23
Φεβρουαρίου 1907, 1.
232
had left the chamber on December 18, implied a state of distrust in the
government. 30
scandal solely on Simopoulos. The Team of the Japanese did not admit the
necessity of the motion of confidence and all its members abstained from
voting.
abstentions, for a total of 113 votes, and the government won its confidence
with the Privileged Company as the “Bill of the Approval of the Agreement
Concluded between the Greek State and the Privileged Company on January
20, 1908, with Regard to the Cash Deposit Paid on the Occasion of the
resign his ministerial post. As the opposition parties had expected, the
30
ΠΣΒΒ, 235-236.
31
14 abstentions consisted of the seven members of the Team of the Japanese and
seven incumbent ministers. «Ποιοί και πόσοι εψήφισαν» [Who and How Many Voted?],
Ακρόπολις, 23 Ιανουαρίου 1908, 3.
32
ΠΕΒΒ, αριθ. 80, 87-88.
233
government chose the method that would allow it to stay in power, by
criticism did not wane, but rather, it further intensified. At the meeting on the
day following the vote of confidence, a hot discussion took place between
the Team of the Japanese and the Prime Minister over parliamentarianism
the previous day, observing that it had caused critical damage to the concept
during the recess of Parliament, so that the government could weather the
and justified his holding on to power. Theotokis argued against Gounaris and
Repoulis that a prime minister could not assume the responsibility for all the
system did not always impose collective responsibility on the cabinet, except
33
ΠΣΒΒ, 233-242; «Η Βουλή. Η παραίτησις του κ. Α. Σιμοπούλου. Η σύμβασις δια
τας σταφιδικάς εγγυήσεις» [Parliament. Resignation of Mr. A. Simopoulos. The
Agreement for the Currant Deposit], Ακρόπολις, 23 Ιανουαρίου 1908, 2; «Η Βουλή. Η
παραίτησης του κ. Σιμοπούλου. Μια ιστορική συνεδρίασις. Ζήτημα εμπιστοσύνης»
[Parliament. Resignation of Mr. Simopoulos. A Historic Meeting. Issue of Confidence],
Αθήναι, 23 Ιανουαρίου 1908, 1-2.
234
for significant issues. Gounaris responded that political responsibility did not
mean the obligation to punish the fault of an individual, and that it was
Theotokis and the Team of the Japanese toward Parliament. While Theotokis
fixed the ethical responsibility for the scandal upon Simopoulos, he tried to
avoid the collective responsibility of the cabinet with the excuse that the
that the Prime Minister should acknowledge that the government was
34
ΠΣΒΒ, 242-249; «Η Βουλή. Το κατηγορητήριον του κ. Δ. Ράλλη. Απολογία του κ.
Θεοτόκη. Και άλλη πάλιν ψηφοφορία» [Parliament. Accusation of Mr. D. Rallis.
Apologia of M. Theotokis. And again Another Vot e], Αθήναι, 24 Ιανουαρίου 1908, 1-2;
«Η χθεσινή Βουλή. Νέον ζήτημα εμπιστοσύνης. Οι λόγοι των ρητόρων επί της
πολιτείας της κυβερνήσεως» [Yesterday’s Parliament. New Problem of Confidence. The
Speeches about the Regime of the Government], Πατρίς, 24 Ιανουαρίου 1908, 1-2.
35 The Greek Constitution of 1864, which was in force in the beginning of the
twentieth century, had two stipulations (Articles 58 and 78) related to the concept of
parliamentarianism. According to them, Parliament had the right to supervise ministers
appointed by the king, and ministers had to be accountable to Parliament. These
stipulations, however, did not have legal biding force to oblige a minister to resign in
case Parliement expressed lack of confidence in him. They did not mention either the
notion of collective responsibility of the cabinet. «κοινοβουλευτισμός»
[Parliamentarianism], in ΜΕΕ, τόμος ΙΔ΄ [vol. 14], 646; King George’s speech of 1875
which established the principle of dediolomeni (the principle of majority rule) was the
first example to regard—though vaguely—the cabinet members as a unity. The king
called them as oi kaloumenoi in the plural. But Law 586 of December 22, 1876, did not
235
The long speech of Dragoumis on January 23 can be regarded as a
parliamentary spirit correctly, and his sole concern was to maintain the
entire cabinet was not always responsible for a minister’s conduct. However,
judging from the fact that the Prime Minister had asked for a vote of
of the votes of confidence did not matter as long as the government was
trusted by Parliament and the king, he thought that increasing the number of
votes for confidence was a valid way to maintain power, and he put this idea
include any notion of collective cabinet responsibility. Katerina Gardikas, “Parties and
Politics in Greece, 1875–1885: Towards a Two-Party System” (PhD diss., King’s
College, University London, 1987), 298.
236
into practice. Second, if he had had a sound sensitivity to parliamentarianism,
in Simopoulos as distrust in his cabinet as a whole, and asked on the spot for
the vote of confidence in the government. If the Prime Minister had faced
hesitation on that day had not only created further political instability, but
also had delayed the opening of a meeting of the new year, which aimlessly
Greek political conditions of the last ten years. He maintained that both
Parliament and successive governments had lost sight of what they should
under the present constitutional system, in order that the state could make
36
«Το κοινοβουλευτικόν πνεύμα και η κυβέρνησις Γ. Θεοτόκη. Αγόρευσις του κ. Στ.
237
The End of the Currant Scandal
On January 25, after the censure against the political stance of the
government reached a certain point, the discussion about a bill for a new
agreement between the government and the Privileged Company, which had
been left in suspense, finally began. The Team of the Japanese did not
slacken its attention. Gounaris was critical that the new agreement still
agent for the Privileged Company and to recover its good sense. He pointed
out that the company had succeeded in making its stock prices rise after
introducing the cash deposit in August 1907, and also provided several
Δραγούμη βουλευτού Αττικής κατά την συνεδρίαν της 23 Ιανουαρίου 1908» [The
Parliamentary Spirit and the Government of G. Theotokis. The Speech of Mr. St.
Dragoumis, Deputy of Attica, at the Meeting of January 23, 1908], Αθήναι, 25
Ιανουαρίου 1908, 1-2.
37
«Ειδήσεις. Η Βουλή. Μακρά συζήτησις δια την ασφάλειαν. Αντίδρασις κατά της
σταφιδικής συμβάσεως.» [News. Parliament. Long Discussion about Security. Reaction
against the Currant Agreement], Καιροί, 26 Ιανουαρίου 1908, 3.
238
subjugated to capitalists. 38
These remarks also illustrated that the Team of the Japanese tried to
Patras, the central port of currant export, while Panagiotopoulos was from
Aigio, a renowned currant production district, and his family’s property had
been acquired through currant trade. However, their words in Parliament did
not have the tinge of regionalism. They articulated their opinions on the
basis of the national interest, and did not intend to introduce any benefit to
January 20, 1908, the members of the Team would have immediately played
up to their potential voters and not examined it. 39 In reality, however, they
continued to look closely into the content of the agreement and to ask the
between the government and the company. The Team of the Japanese
38
«Η Βουλή. Η αγόρευσις του κ. Παναγιωτοπούλου. Ο πρωθυπουργός απαντά. Αι
συζητήσεις δια την νέαν σύμβασιν» [Parliament. The Speech of Mr. Panagiotopoulos.
The Prime Minister Answers. Discussions about the New Agreement], Αθήναι, 27
Ιανουαρίου 1908, 1-2.
39
ΠΣΒΒ, 250, 261.
239
satisfy currant producers. The Team, in contrast, tried to confront the currant
national vision.
would also influence more or less the state’s foreign policy. The reason why
he demanded that the agreement should be not for the benefit of the company,
but for the currant producers, Panagiotopoulos explained, was not merely to
dissolve the collusive relationship between the government and the company,
but to contribute to a larger purpose, that is, the better future of Greece. He
contended if the state lacked the ability to recognize what the Privileged
Company had done was wrong and if it ran short of the strength to force the
confront the Turks and the Bulgarians, who were archenemies of the Greeks
present Greece could possibly trace the same disastrous path as ancient
Rome if it failed to discern good from bad. He claimed that Greece’s prestige
toward Parliament. 40
40
«Η Βουλή. Η αγόρευσις του κ. Παναγιωτοπούλου», 1-2.
240
continued. :After amendments on February 3 and 6, the bill was passed on
king, it was enacted as Law 3247. 41 The law limited as much as possible the
profit the Privileged Company would earn. It defined that the company
approximately 18,000,000 Ven. lbs. on the market by July 31, 1908, using
hands of the company, the law stipulated that the company would receive a
part of it, and that the remainder would be spent to reduce the financial
burden of the producers. The interest yielded from the cash deposit was
obliged to be utilized for the national cause and humanitarian purposes. The
It could be said that the Currant Scandal would not have been
discovered if the Team of the Japanese had not insistently asked to deliberate
Parliament. The members of the Team opposed the fact that the government
administrative procedure within the government. Instead, the Team asked the
241
They insisted that all matters connected with the well-being of the nation
were supposed to sit. Otherwise, the Team would not regard such agreements
submitted a bill without careful consideration, and pointed out that the
that the Prime Minister, as the head of the government, should assume the
point of view. What was at stake was each deputy’s awareness of being a
they would not have disregarded Parliament or made any shady decisions
behind the scenes. They would have attached great importance to Parliament.
If they had been cabinet members of the government, they would have
242
not a kind of reform that could be achieved simply by reorganizing the
we can easily imagine why the arguments of the Team were not promptly
against the “unjust” manner of the government. The Team could effectively
Team needed the present government in its unreformed state so that the
former could grow into a full-fledged party and articulate more clearly its
political program.
government after the disclosure of the Currant Scandal did not have any
reshuffling the cabinet in order to bolster and reunify its party. Furthermore,
243
at this moment, Theotokis and some members of his party were forced to
seriously consider how to deal with the Team of the Japanese, which had
government that aimed at deactivating the small but troublesome force were
244
CHAPTER 7
historians have so far considered. We should not assume for a fact that
Gounaris’ taking office directly caused the Team of the Japanese to dissolve.
To be precise, the Team did not disappear from Parliament once Gounaris
entered Theotokis’ cabinet. The group continued to exist, albeit with fewer
members and less prominence. In fact, discord among the members partially
1
Gunnar Hering, Die politischen Parteien in Griechenland 1821–1936, Teil 2
(München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1992), 659; Γρηγόριος Δαφνής, Τα ελληνικά πολιτικά
κόμματα [The Greek Political Parties] (Αθήνα: Γαλαξίας, 1961), 91; Hariton Korisis,
Die politischen Parteien Griechenlands: Ein neuer Staat auf dem Weg zur Demokratie
1821–1910 (Hersbruck/ Nürnberg: Verlag Karl Pfeiffer, 1966), 161; Γεώργιος Κ.
Ασπρέας, Πολιτική ιστορία της νεωτέρας Ελλάδος 1821–1928 [Political History of
Modern Greece 1821–1928], τόμος Γ΄ [vol. 3] (Αθήνα: Ιωάννης Ν. Σιδέρης, 1930), 86.
245
daily about whether the Team would form a coalition with Theotokis’ party.
the Japanese might assume ministerial posts when both parties reached an
mass media’s comments on this matter was generally negative because they
that Gounaris and Protopapadakis would move to Theotokis’ party, the press
furiously attacked them. The media regarded the two men as traitors not only
to their colleagues, but also to the Greek people who had entrusted the Team
interested in the response that the Team of the Japanese would have to an
invitation by Theotokis to form a coalition. The Team was falling apart, not
in a sense that people could not see, but rather, directly in front of their
noses.
Sources
Thanks to the great concern of the mass media and the public about
the fate of the Team of the Japanese, there are plenty of newspaper articles
related to the group’s status. They not only trace the progress of plans to
246
form a coalition with Theotokis’ party, although frequently on the basis of
uncertain sources or information, but they also include the opinions of the
in the newspaper Patris on June 26 and 27, 1908, under the title
other was a long open letter by Repoulis, which the newspaper Estia serially
published on June 29 and 30, and July 1, 1908, under the title “Our Political
Ethics as Seen from behind the Scenes.” 3 Protopapadakis and Repoulis most
embodied the polarization that had developed among members of the Team
of the Japanese. The former wrote, on behalf of those who had finally moved
to Theotokis’ party, that is, Gounaris and himself, in order to justify their
was, in terms of political ethics, that Gounaris and Protopapadakis had not
clung to the stance of the Team and joined the government party.
2
Πέτρος Πρωτοπαπαδάκης, «Άπλετον φως εις τα πολιτικά παρασκήνια. Η ιστορία της
Ιαπωνικής ομάδος» [Illuminating Backstage Politics: The History of the Japanese
Team], Πατρίς, 26 Ιουνίου 1908, 1-2 και Πατρίς, 27 Ιουνίου 1908, 1-2.
3
Εμμανουήλ Ρέπουλης, «Από τα παρασκήνια των πολιτικών μας ηθών» [Our Political
Ethics as Seen from behind the Scenes], Εστία, 29 Ιουνίου 1908, 1, Εστία, 30 Ιουνίου
1908, 1 και Εστία, 1 Ιουλίου 1908, 1-2.
247
April 10, 1908, and April 22, 1908; Alexandris’ letter to Dragoumis, dated
June 26, 1908; and Dragoumis’ draft of a letter to Alexandris, dated July 3,
finally left the Team. The other two letters were written after Gounaris
middle of January 1908. The former asked the latter to discern whether
offer of collaboration at that time as fatal to the future of their party because
this was not the first time Theotokis’ party had made an overture of this kind
to either man. Every time any member of Theotokis’ party had approached
them about collaboration, they typically said in reply, “If Mr. Theotokis
really desires our collaboration with his party, let him appeal to Mr.
4
«Φως εις τα των Ιαπώνων. Πώς έχουν τα γεγονότα» [Throwing Light on the Events
of the Japanese. How Are the Events?], Ακρόπολις, 25 Απριλίου 1908, 1;
Πρωτοπαπαδάκης, «Άπλετον φως εις τα πολιτικά παρασκήνια», Πατρίς, 26 Ιουνίου
1908, 2; The article in Akropolis stated that the date when Baltatzis met Gounaris was
around one month before Carnival. Protopapadakis also wrote that he had heard from
Gounaris the latter’s meeting with Baltatzis about one month before Carnival. As
Carnival started on February 17, 1908, we can presume that the meeting between
Baltatzis and Gounaris took place at some point in the middle of January 1908.
248
Dragoumis for it.” 5 Thus, they did not take Baltatzis’ words seriously and
did not let Dragoumis know that there was an offer from Theotokis’ party.
and adjourned until March 19. During this break, Gounaris happened to see
belonged. At that time, Baltatzis told Gounaris that someone had already
the Japanese. According to Baltatzis, Dragoumis also knew that Baltatzis had
Dragoumis. 6
Dragoumis why they had not previously informed him of the offer for a
partnership with Theotokis’ party, an offer that they said they regarded as
negligible. Dragoumis replied that he had known of the proposal through his
sister and he did not accuse them of procrastination. Instead, he said that
Theotokis would need to seek out the Team’s collaboration, but that
Dragoumis could not provide an answer until all the members had discussed
the offer together. As a result, he suggested that the members of the Team
249
would meet as soon as Parliament resumed. 7
meeting was held at his request. Since mid-March, rumors had abounded in
the print media that the Theotokis’ government would offer two ministerial
happening with respect to the cabinet reorganization and where their Team
The first thing Dragoumis said at the meeting was that Theotokis
had made no direct proposal for collaboration. Rather, Baltatzis was only
However, he added, the Team had its principles and ideas to uphold.
250
Team, then Theotokis himself, as the highest member of the government,
should come to see him. Neither Theotokis nor any direct envoy had visited
Dragoumis to date. 10
that we apply when evaluating persons and things. We should see if Mr.
government only sought to reinforce its party through the collaboration with
the Team of the Japanese and would surely damage the Team’s principles. 12
At this point, Vozikis stated that it was not proper to decline in advance a
proposal that had not yet been made in reality and the concrete content of
which the members did not know. He even went so far as to say, “If we are
presented the opportunity to take over the leadership of the government party,
collaboration, the other members concluded that they should wait to hear the
offer from Theotokis before discussing how they might respond. Gounaris
was tasked with delivering to Baltatzis the message that Dragoumis eagerly
10 Ρέπουλης, «Από τα παρασκήνια των πολιτικών μας ηθών», Εστία, 1 Ιουλίου 1908, 1.
11 Ρέπουλης, «Από τα παρασκήνια των πολιτικών μας ηθών», Εστία, 1 Ιουλίου 1908, 1.
12 Ρέπουλης, «Από τα παρασκήνια των πολιτικών μας ηθών», Εστία, 1 Ιουλίου 1908, 1.
251
awaited the proposal from Theotokis because the Team did not on principle
attitude. He wrote retrospectively in his open letter about the meeting of that
day, “The final conclusion of Mr. Dragoumis was that…he did not expect it
truly believe that Mr. Theotokis would visit him to exchange their views.” 14
uncertain sources.
entered the final stages. Chronos reported that the details of the agreement
252
party, on March 19 to discuss each side’s basic stance on their partnership. In
offer three ministerial posts to the Team of the Japanese, that is, Minister of
Foreign Affairs for Dragoumis, Minister of the Interior for Gounaris, and
“Harakiri—Trap for a Wolf,” criticized the possibility that the Japanese were
Although it still suspected that the news of a coalition was merely a rumor,
Estia condemned the Team of the Japanese, which had been regarded as a
bold and excellent party in its activity, for faltering from its purpose and
15
«Οριστική σύμπραξις Ιαπώνων–Θεοτόκη» [Definite Collaboration of the Japanese
and Theotokis’ Party], Χρόνος, 21 Μαρτίου 1908, 4.
16
«Χαρακίρι—Λυκοπαγίδες» [Harakiri—Trap for a Wolf], Εστία, 21 Μαρτίου 1908, 1.
253
On March 22, the newspaper Chronos reported that bickering
suggested that only two ministerial posts would be offered to the Team of the
Japanese, that is, Minister of Foreign Affairs for Dragoumis and Minister of
the Interior for Gounaris. In addition, Chronos wrote, Repoulis and Vozikis
would not follow their colleagues when the Team collaborated with the
claimed that such a plan had been called off, while Baltatzis denied all the
On the same day, the newspaper Skrip also addressed the political
unrest provoked by speculation that the Team of the Japanese would join
forces with Theotokis’ party. On the one hand, two additional opposition
discussed ways in which they could work together with the Japanese. Some
said that they would take only Gounaris on their side, while others argued
that not only Gounaris but also Dragoumis and Protopapadakis would join
them. Another rumor making rounds was that all cooperation between the
two parties would be off. Some attributed the end of the talks about
17
«Τα του Φουρνιέ και τα των Ιαπώνων—Μόνον δύο υπουργεία
προσφέρονται—Ιαπωνικά ανακατώματα» [The Issues on Fournier and on the
Japanese—Only Two Ministries Are Offered—Japanese Confusions], Χρόνος, 22
Μαρτίου 1908, 4.
254
cooperation to the differences on diplomatic policy between Theotokis and
Dragoumis. Others guessed that the plan to join together had been
on the potential collaboration of the two parties. The editorial argued that it
might be a good idea that Theotokis would offer cabinet posts to Gounaris
the incumbent government had grown stale, only the injection of such new
blood could rejuvenate Theotokis’ party. Yet Skrip also addressed the
joined hands with the government, they would lose their good reputations in
careers. It was likely that both men would come to be regarded as traitors.
Consequently, Skrip quietly objected to any alliance between the Team and
the government. 19
information about any possible collaboration between the two parties, or the
degree to which what they published was true. However, it appears that no
18
«Η δήθεν σύμπραξις Θεοτοκικών–Ιαπώνων» [The Alleged Collaboration between
the Theotokists and the Japanese], Σκριπ, 22 Μαρτίου 1908, 4.
19
«Η θέση των» [Their Position], Σκριπ. 22 Μαρτίου 1908, 1.
255
concrete negotiations for the alliance of the two parties were underway at
that point in March 1908. An official offer of ministerial posts to the Team of
the Japanese had not yet been made. These rumors were in fact fuelled by
deliver a fatal blow to the group’s continuation, was becoming clear in the
members of the Team of the Japanese had leaked the collaboration plans to
the mass media. He also mentioned that the person who had written at least
wanted to personally attack Gounaris and Protopapadakis for his own gain.
Although Protopapadakis did not mention who he thought had written them,
it was obvious that Protopapadakis believed that Repoulis was behind both
20
Πρωτοπαπαδάκης, «Άπλετον φως εις τα πολιτικά παρασκήνια», Πατρίς, 26 Ιουνίου
1908, 2.
21
Ρέπουλης, «Από τα παρασκήνια των πολιτικών μας ηθών», Εστία, 1 Ιουλίου 1908, 2.
256
Dragoumis’ Decision
preparation for the Easter holidays. The next day, on April 6, Boufidis
invited Gounaris to his house where the latter met Theotokis. The newspaper
Akropolis wrote, “Theotokis found out that Gounaris was a friend of the
It is not easy to interpret what this phrase really means, but one possibility is
that Theotokis made an offer of a ministerial post to Gounaris and the latter
declined it. We do not know the details of their encounter. What we do know,
Did his anxiety come from the fact that Theotokis’ party would directly
approach Dragoumis about the issue of collaborating for the first time since
the Team was established? Or did something else disturb his peace of mind,
22
The newspaper Akropolis wrote about the meeting between Theotokis and Gounaris
though it did not reveal the source of information. «Φως εις τα των Ιαπώνων», 1.
23
Πρωτοπαπαδάκης, «Άπλετον φως εις τα πολιτικά παρασκήνια», Πατρίς, 27 Ιουνίου
257
On April 8, Protopapadakis, Gounaris, and Vozikis visited
Japanese would collaborate with Theotokis’ party and wanted to explain his
message for Dragoumis saying that he would follow the decision Dragoumis
Dragoumis would not personally join Theotokis’ party, he had resolved that
that their independent efforts as the Team of the Japanese were likely to end
launching the Team, that other deputies would sympathize with their ideas
and join them. However, in reality, no one had approached them, which
from the political world forever after the present parliamentary period was
over, and he predicted that this would spark the dissolution of the Team.
1908, 1.
24 Πρωτοπαπαδάκης, «Άπλετον φως εις τα πολιτικά παρασκήνια», Πατρίς, 27 Ιουνίου
1908, 1.
258
After the Team was disbanded, he believed that, in principle, every member
should be able to follow the road that each one regarded as proper. In a sense,
the offer from Theotokis’ party of collaboration only accelerated the demise
of the Team as an independent political unit, the idea which Dragoumis had
As such, the members of the Team of the Japanese, he thought, should join
any other bloc because that party was sufficiently rooted in the nation and
them of his decision and then meet Theotokis when the latter returned to
25
Πρωτοπαπαδάκης, «Άπλετον φως εις τα πολιτικά παρασκήνια», Πατρίς, 27 Ιουνίου
1908, 2.
26
Πρωτοπαπαδάκης, «Άπλετον φως εις τα πολιτικά παρασκήνια», Πατρίς, 27 Ιουνίου
1908, 2.
259
Athens from Kerkira. The meeting ended after all the members present
agreed to follow Dragoumis’ decision, even if that man would later change
his mind. 27
Gounaris’ Agony
There was one thing that Dragoumis did not relay to the members
present that day. When he had met Boufidis, Boufidis had not only proposed
cooperation with the Team of the Japanese, but he had also offered a
from the members because he thought that it would hurt their feelings and
before April 10 that the content of the offer from Theotokis had included a
post for him in a new cabinet, though we cannot pinpoint when and how he
first received this proposal. Was it on the day when Gounaris met Theotokis?
Or did Dragoumis tell Gounaris before the other members assembled at his
1908, 2.
29
The newspaper Chronos wrote on April 8, 1908, that Boufidis repeatedly saw
Gounaris to let him know that Theotokis wanted him as a minister. It reported that
Gounaris did not seem opposed to this offer, but he asked Boufidis to first reach an
agreement with Dragoumis. It foresaw that their discussion would proceed to Gounaris’
260
In any case, Gounaris was not pleasantly surprised by this overture.
and appreciation that Dragoumis had been engaged in settling the ongoing
was confessing that he did not feel equipped to assume the commitment that
I cannot but say to you that I would feel greatly relieved if you …
261
were to judge other colleagues of our Team to be more capable in
the task and thereby release me from the duty which, I confess, I
consider quite difficult. 31
Thus, it is evident that Gounaris was writing about the responsibilities that
their Team to bear the burden of responsibility in his stead. It is not obvious,
however, why Gounaris was so anxious about the duties entailed in a cabinet
position. On the one hand, as he wrote, he was simply uneasy about his
feared that his colleagues would conclude that he had worked with them so
far only for the purpose of fulfilling his personal political ambitions. In
oftentimes unfair and malicious, had crucially weakened the cohesion of the
he needed the firm support of Dragoumis, whom Gounaris believed was the
31
ΑΣΔ, Φακ. 156, υπoφακ. 156.2, εγγρ. 37.
262
only person that could dispel their colleagues’ suspicions against him. He
wrote:
I think that only under the condition that you think this is an
imperative and unavoidable obligation for the country, would it be
proper for us to follow the course which some colleagues find it
impossible to agree to. 32
Having said that, Gounaris asked Dragoumis to reconfirm that it was only
Dragoumis’ own initiative that was pushing the Team to work with
obligations for the country. In another part of his letter Gounaris again
ended his letter by wishing Dragoumis a happy Easter, which was just three
days away.
32
ΑΣΔ, Φακ. 156, υποφακ. 156.2, εγγρ. 37.
263
The Mass Media’s Attack on Protopapadakis and Gounaris
differently than he had had in mind. On April 14, the day after Easter Sunday,
the editorial in the newspaper Estia dealt with the issues of the cabinet
reform and a coalition with the Team of the Japanese. Even if, it argued,
Theotokis’ offers had enticed some within the Team, they were unlikely to
emphasized that the Team had assumed obligations to society and earned its
fame in return through the support of the public. It predicted that any joint
cooperation would alienate the public and humiliate the members. Therefore,
it discouraged the Team from working together with the government. Instead,
it proposed that the Team keep faithful to public opinion, working under
Dragoumis’ leadership. 33
through the tone of the press generally that Protopapadakis and Gounaris
members for Theotokis’ party. By spreading such rumors, the press further
33
«Οι Ιάπωνες και το κόκκαλο» [The Japanese and the Bone], Εστία, 14 Απριλίου
1908, 1.
264
aggravated the alleged conflict between Protopapadakis and Gounaris on the
one hand, and the rest of the members on the other. Throughout the
subsequent week, the media continued to openly campaign against the two
criticized those who had apparently forgotten the original ideas of the Team
For us, [the Team of] the Japanese was not a typical group whose
ideal was to enter the government by any means necessary. We had
considered them to be a revolutionary banner promising to restore
our entire political situation. [We had expected that] they would
work not only inside Parliament, but especially outside Parliament,
in order to lead people to stand up for political restoration. [We had
thought that] through their actions they would be able to win with
their sword and save the country, instead of seizing the first bone
that [Theotokis] threw. 35
to lose his temper. The article stated that, around the time of Parliament’s
34
«Σημείωσις» [Memorandum], Αθήναι, 18 Απριλίου, 1908, 2.
35
«Περιττός πλέον πας λόγος» [Enough of Any Word], Ακρόπολις, 20 Απριλίου, 1908,
1.
265
Carnival recess, both Gounaris and Protopapadakis had met deputies of
Theotokis’ party to realize collaboration plans with Theotokis, but that the
two men had not informed the other Team members of their intentions.
had a meeting with the other Team members to discuss this issue. The
conclusion they had drawn was supposed that the Team, under the leadership
judged that since the two men’s agreement with Theotokis’ party was
matter. 36 This claim was far from the reality of Dragoumis’ decision on
for Dragoumis, and said that he could no longer tolerate such slanderous
Dragoumis whether the latter thought it proper to take measures to stop such
36
«Αν Θέλετε ας αποκαλυφθούν όλα—Η αποσκίρτησις των δυο Ιαπώνων» [If You
Want, Let All Be Revealed—The Desertion of Two Japanese], Εστία, 21 Απριλίου 1908,
1.
266
commentary. 37
Dragoumis’ “About-Face”
Dragoumis. Dragoumis said that the editorial in Estia did not seem
claimed that it slandered both Gounaris and himself because it accused the
Dragoumis of the latter’s own decision on April 8 that the Team would
Protopapadakis, Vozikis, and Alexandris had agreed that they would abide by
Dragoumis’ decision.
that the Team had agreed to collaborate with Theotokis’ party on one
condition, which was that no one in the Team would oppose such
cooperation. It was evident that this requirement had not been met from the
267
Repoulis did not have the same opinion about the collaboration plan. In spite
of this fact, Dragoumis declared his decision that the Team would cooperate
Then Dragoumis began to speak about what had happened after the
Vozikis. Panagiotopoulos and Repoulis asserted that the Team should not
work together with the government as long as even one member objected.
Dragoumis apparently agreed with them, in this way going back on his
earlier decision of April 8. Since full support from all members of the Team
behind the scenes. According to Protopapadakis, this was the first time he
had heard that Boufidis had made an offer of a ministerial post to Gounaris
on April 7. At the meeting on April 8, Dragoumis had only said that Boufidis
Dragoumis had not even hinted that an offer of a portfolio had been made for
268
Dragoumis revealed for the first time to Protopapadakis that he had kept the
Dragoumis had not informed the other members of his change of mind.
Protopapadakis saw Dragoumis twice after the latter talked with Repoulis
agreed that they would follow Dragoumis even if he changed his decision, it
was Dragoumis’ duty to inform them of his new stance. Dragoumis clearly
could no longer conceal his anger, especially after he read the letter from
had known from the letter that Gounaris placed full confidence in him, he
did not even inform Gounaris of his change of heart regarding the Team’s
269
cooperation with Theotokis’ party.
therefore deemed it useless to grapple with the matter any longer. What most
concerned him now was who was spreading the vicious rumors against
Gounaris and him. He claimed that Repoulis and Panagiotopoulos were the
work with these two as before?” “Who should leave the Team, they or we?”
Dragoumis said, “Of course, I do not agree with either way, but I do not
Protopapadakis, who left for Patras to see Gounaris on April 22. Gounaris
39
Πρωτοπαπαδάκης, «Άπλετον φως εις τα πολιτικά παρασκήνια», Πατρίς, 27 Ιουνίου
1908, 2.
270
the offensive tone against me and Mr. Protopapadakis in the media
emanated from your office. In spite of what Mr. Protopapadakis told
me, together with this information, there is nothing that I can do but
express my regret about what has happened. I also ask your
forgiveness because I have not known what you thought of me. I
thought that I was allowed to maintain ties with you. But I learned
at the last moment that you were displeased with our ties, which you
hastened to sever, particularly in this manner. 40
and decided to leave the Team with him. Although he tried to be calm in his
with Akropolis on April 24, “As long as Mr. Dragoumis officially denies his
insults against Mr. Gounaris and me, neither of us can be his friends.” 41
Thus Gounaris and Protopapadakis broke off their relationship with the
40
ΑΣΔ, Φακ. 156, υποφακ. 156.2, εγγρ. 38.
41
«Η διάσπασις των Ιαπώνων» [The Split of the Japanese], Ακρόπολις, 24 Απριλίου
1908, 3.
271
The Remaining Five Members of the Team of the Japanese
departure from the Team to his colleagues in the newspaper, Parliament went
into recess. During the adjournment, however, the mass media continued to
follow the members of the Team. They reported rumors that Gounaris and
ministerial posts. Although some thought this betrayal had provoked disunity
within the Team, the general public did not yet know the content of Team
eager to know what had caused the schism in the Team and were concerned
about its future. What would become of the Team? Would it continue to exist
Aigio in the beginning of May, there were various conjectures in the media
about the reason for their visit. The men rejected rumors that they had gone
Panagiotopoulos had merely invited them there for a carefree outing. In fact,
they claimed that there was nothing to announce about the Team of the
Japanese. However, some sources said that the three men had gone to Aigio
272
that they got together in order to discuss possibly collaborating with
Rallis’. 42
Aigio. However, Dragoumis did not give any specific answers to the
questions of why Gounaris and Protopapadakis had broken off relations with
the Team or of how Dragoumis intended to lead the Team from now on. He
only answered one question clearly. The journalist said, “We would like to
know at least whether the Team will continue to exist as before.” In reply,
Dragoumis said, “What is certain is that we used to be seven, but we are five
now.” The journalist also asked Panagiotopoulos. “Are you all going to
remain members of the Team, as Dragoumis said?” The latter said with a
smile, “Of course, we will continue to support our ideas and to work for the
nation’s good.” 43
arrived there. He had met with Gounaris before visiting Aigio. In response to
questions from the press, he denied that he had had conversations about the
42
«Εκδρομή Ιαπώνων εις Αίγιον» [Excursion of the Japanese to Aigio], Νεολόγος, 3
Μαΐου 1908, 2.
43
«Εν μέσω Ιαπώνων» [Amidst the Japanese], Νεολόγος, 5 Μαΐου, 1908, 1.
273
was going to follow Gounaris and Protopapadakis. Alexandris went so far as
to say that he did not even know whether the two men had broken away from
the other members, or even the extent to which the pair had different ideas
from the others. However, he was more loquacious than his colleagues about
the future. He said that although he did not know what the Team was going
Gounaris might get. One day it was reported that Gounaris would become
the Minister of Justice, while the next day it was said that he would become
the Minister of the Interior. They also speculated that Theotokis would not
shake up his entire cabinet but only the post of Minister of Finance, to which
government party welcome Gounaris with open arms. It was reported that
some other candidates for ministerial posts showed their displeasure over the
44
«Τα Ιαπωνικά» [The Issues on the Japanese], Χρόνος, 9 Μαΐου, 1908, 4.
274
possibility of Gounaris entering the cabinet. 45 Interestingly enough,
Gounaris had been silent amid this frenzy over a cabinet reshuffle.
The new ministers took the oath of office on June 21. Surely Gounaris was
the most public personage in the new cabinet and therefore expected to
through his activity with the Team of the Japanese. Heron Goodhart of the
reorganized cabinet, “M. Gounaris, deputy for Patras and an able lawyer, has
never before held office. He was previously a Dragoumist, and himself the
leader of a small party, and it will be interesting to see whether his followers
taken.” 46
45
«Η πολιτική κατάστασις. Η παραίτησις του κ. Βοκοτοπούλου. Τί λέγει για την
μεταρρύθμισιν» [The Political Situation. The Resignation of Mr. Vokotopoulos. What
Does He Say about the Reform?], Χρόνος, 2 Ιουνίου 1908, 3-4; «Η πολιτική
κατάστασις. Η συμπλήρωσις των δύο υπουργών. Ποίοι οι νέοι υπουργοί. Μία
απάντησις του κ. Σιμόπουλου. Η πρόσληψις του κ. Γούναρη» [The Political Situation.
The Replenishment of Two Ministers. Who Are New Ministers? An Answer of Mr.
Simopoulos. The Invitation of Mr. Gounaris], Χρόνος, 7 Ιουνίου 1908, 3; «Η πολιτική
κατάστασις. Διατί εναυάγησεν η μεταρρύθμισις» [The Political Situation. Why Did the
Reform Fail?], Χρόνος, 9 Ιουνίου 1908, 3; «Η πρόσληψις του κ. Γούναρη. Αντίδρασις
εκ μέρους των υπουργών» [The Invitation of Mr. Gounaris. Reaction from Ministers],
Χρόνος, 19 Ιουνίου 1908, 3.
46
FO 371/465, No. 24061. It seems that Goodhart believed that Gounaris had been the
leader of the Team of the Japanese.
275
Repoulis’ Criticism against Protopapadakis
The turmoil among the members of the Team that had been
provoked by the collaboration plan with Theotokis’ party persisted even after
that Protopapadakis and Gounaris had forsaken their political ideals and
articulating the series of events leading up to Gounaris’ and his break from
the Team of the Japanese. 47 The major purpose of these remarks was to
clarify that he and Gounaris had not betrayed their fellow members of the
Repoulis had been praised as a “model Japanese” ever since the rumor began
that the two men had made a secret promise to join Theotokis’ party. While
the two were denounced scathingly, Repoulis was highly praised because he
47
Πρωτοπαπαδάκης, «Άπλετον φως εις τα πολιτικά παρασκήνια», Πατρίς, 26 Ιουνίου
1908, 1-2 και Πατρίς, 27 Ιουνίου 1908, 1-2.
48
Ρέπουλης, «Από τα παρασκήνια των πολιτικών μας ηθών», Εστία, 29 Ιουνίου 1908,
1, Εστία, 30 Ιουνίου 1908, 1 και Εστία, 1 Ιουλίου 1908, 1-2.
276
to pursue his group’s political ideals for the sake of the nation rather than
had brought about the irreversible rift within the Team. In his open letter,
Repoulis asked himself whether or not he had resisted collaboration with the
What shocked Repoulis most about the meeting was that some members
thought that the Team should think more realistically and collaborate with
the government. He could not but question how to justify their two-year
battle for political reform, which had been tantamount to a declaration of war
49
«Ο κ. Ε. Ρέπουλης» [Mr. E. Repoulis], Ακρόπολις. 23 Απριλίου, 1908, 2.
50
Ρέπουλης, «Από τα παρασκήνια των πολιτικών μας ηθών», Εστία,1 Ιουλίου 1908, 2.
277
against the government, if the Team caved in to temptation from the
and did not see how the Team could make progress alone. Protopapadakis
complained that he had received daily letters from Naxos, his constituency,
From Repoulis’ point of view, the Team of the Japanese had come
endeavored to change the state of politics. Therefore, it was irrelevant for the
Team to try to realistically assess the present political situation and make the
best of it. According to Repoulis, Dragoumis repeatedly said that the stance
of the Team should be serious and tough, and that the members should
expect neither quick rewards for their struggles nor public recognition.
recognized one day in the distant future, and that the Japanese might even
On the other hand, Repoulis noted, though his attitude may have
51
Ρέπουλης, «Από τα παρασκήνια των πολιτικών μας ηθών», Εστία, 1 Ιουλίου 1908, 1.
52 Ρέπουλης, «Από τα παρασκήνια των πολιτικών μας ηθών», Εστία, 1 Ιουλίου 1908, 1.
53 Ρέπουλης, «Από τα παρασκήνια των πολιτικών μας ηθών», Εστία, 29 Ιουνίου 1908,
1.
278
Dragoumis seemed to respect the free will of the Team members. For
timely use of their talents. 54 Repoulis did not interpret Dragoumis’ words
literally. He wrote, “Who does not understand the knightly spirit of these
detached air, and had not expected the members to stick with the Team
politeness and patience Dragoumis has shown when Boufidis visited him on
Boufidis had not said a single word to agree with the principles and ideas of
the Team of the Japanese. Nevertheless, Dragoumis did not voice any
see all the members of the Team use their ability for the best. I am not
54
Ρέπουλης, «Από τα παρασκήνια των πολιτικών μας ηθών», Εστία, 29 Ιουνίου 1908,
1.
55 Ρέπουλης, «Από τα παρασκήνια των πολιτικών μας ηθών» Εστία, 29 Ιουνίου 1908,
1.
279
Repoulis, however, Dragoumis also said to Boufidis, “If there is even one
member of the Team who does not agree with collaboration with the
him.” 56
in the Team if Dragoumis had been sincere about his promises. Repoulis
toward the activities of the Team long before the recent discord. Often, while
the members were discussing concrete plans for state reform, Protopapadakis
was often very pessimistic about the future of the Team. Although public
“Where is the public support? I cannot see it. What I see is only the letters
from Naxos. I do not know about you, but I at least will lose all my friends if
56
Repoulis mentioned that on April 7 Boufidis also offered Dragoumis the position of
ambassador to Constantinople. According to Repoulis, Dragoumis declined the offer
saying with a smile, “The Ottoman government would not issue a letter to accept me.”
Ρέπουλης, «Από τα παρασκήνια των πολιτικών μας ηθών», Εστία, 1 Ιουλίου 1908, 2.
57 Ρέπουλης, «Από τα παρασκήνια των πολιτικών μας ηθών», Εστία, 1 Ιουλίου 1908, 2.
280
rumors that Protopapadakis had approached other parties behind the scenes
about working together. Repoulis felt that most of the rumors could be
April 1908, around the time when Dragoumis met Boufidis, Panagiotopoulos
what was written in the telegram or what his answer to it was. But he only
said to Repoulis, “Do you want me as well to participate in the farce that is
58 Ρέπουλης, «Από τα παρασκήνια των πολιτικών μας ηθών» Εστία, 30 Ιουνίου 1908,
1.
59 Ρέπουλης, «Από τα παρασκήνια των πολιτικών μας ηθών» Εστία, 1 Ιουλίου 1908, 2.
281
Theotokis neither sympathized with, nor intended to realize the ideas of the
that Protopapadakis would not receive any more discouraging letters from
Naxos. 60
Team had infected Gounaris. But he did not openly speak ill of Gounaris. In
Replis’ open letter, Gounaris did not play a central role at all in bringing
was concerned, Repoulis only hoped that the new Minister of Finance would
be able at least to reduce the tax imposed on the people to the level of
Dragoumis’ Leadership
of view.
60
Ρέπουλης, «Από τα παρασκήνια των πολιτικών μας ηθών», Εστία, 1 Ιουλίου 1908, 2.
61
Ρέπουλης, «Από τα παρασκήνια των πολιτικών μας ηθών», Εστία, 1 Ιουλίου 1908, 2.
282
First of all, the issue emerged as to whether his tactic of entrusting
could lead us to infer that it was intended to help Dragoumis to evade his
responsibility as a leader.
fellow members that, although they would work together in the form of a
political unit, he considered that they were bound by the ties based on their
the members when they heard his declaration. Would it have been possible
for them to renew their resolution to follow him? On the contrary, we can
imagine that they might have been confused and discouraged by his
hands-off approach.
Dragoumis also admitted in his draft that he had told Boufidis and
made him an offer of collaboration, he would not only consent to it but also
62
ΑΣΔ, Φακ. 156, υποφακ. 156.2, εγγρ. 41.
283
help as much as possible those of the Team who wanted to join Theotokis. 63
His remarks seem to reveal that he had lost his enthusiasm for the reform
parliamentary period was over. This meant that the Team would be dissolved
effort to reform the political system as a whole, he also kept in mind the
likely disintegration of the Team. As such, his principles and actions were
inconsistent.
At the meeting with these two men, Dragoumis faced strong objections from
them. Then he realized that he was not allowed to act upon his decision
would continue work with those who still derised to pursue the ideas and
not convey his change of heart to the rest of the Team? He did not even
63
ΑΣΔ, Φακ. 156, υποφακ. 156.2, εγγρ. 41.
64
Πρωτοπαπαδάκης, «Άπλετον φως εις τα πολιτικά παρασκήνια», Πατρίς 27 Ιουνίου
1908, 2.
65
ΑΣΔ, Φακ. 156, υποφακ. 156.2, εγγρ. 41.
284
inform Gounaris, who had sent him a letter expressing his anxiety about the
future burdens that were to fall on him. In short, Dragoumis proved unable to
that had emerged to a great extent among the members. He confessed that his
sense of obligation to the Team prohibited him from fulfilling his personal
government but decided to publicly back those who wanted to remain as the
prior missteps, he expressed his opinion in his draft that much good would
come from the schism within the Team, in that each of the remaining
Gounaris had broken off relations with him. Therefore, the more the mass
66
ΑΣΔ, Φακ. 156, υποφακ. 156.2, εγγρ. 41.
67
ΑΣΔ, Φακ. 156, υποφακ. 156.2, εγγρ. 41.
285
and Gounaris. 68 However, whether his vague and aloof approach to
broke off relations with the Team. He remained sympathetic with these two
men even after a schism became inevitable. Their friendly relationship had
intimacy among them can be observed in the fact that Protopapadakis and
dated June 28, 1908, about what Gounaris had personally told him regarding
the question of his ministerial post and how Gounaris felt in the face of
68
«Το τι είπεν ο κ. Σ. Δραγούμης» [What Did Mr. S. Dragoumis Say?], Ακρόπολις. 23
Απριλίου 1908, 2.
69
Απόστολος Αλεξανδρής, Πολιτικαί αναμνήσεις [Political Memoirs] (Πάτρα: Δ.
Φραγκούλης και Κ. Βαρζάνης, 1947), 8.
70 Αλεξανδρής, Πολιτικαί αναμνήσεις, 13, 16.
286
newspaper articles unanimously calling him a traitor. It should be noted,
he avoided asking why Gounaris had finally decided to break their Team
Minister offered Gounaris the post of Minister of Finance by saying that the
71 For example, he mentioned that he was in Istanbul when Gounaris assumed his
cabinet post and that he immediately left for Athens to meet Gounaris, leaving his work
there unfinished. He also added that no one of the Team predicted that Gounaris would
become a minister. In addition, Alexandris wrote that Gounaris had had to make his
decision within 24 hours when he met Theotokis. Gounaris therefore consulted only
Protopapadakis and accepted the offer. Αλεξανδρής, Πολιτικαί αναμνήσεις,14-15. But,
as we have seen, Alexandris was in Greece when this series of events was happening.
Moreover, the mass media continuously made a fuss about the cabinet reshuffle and
spread rumors that the Team of the Japanese would collaborate with the government
and obtain some ministerial posts. Alexandris himself admitted in the interview with
Neologos in early May 1908 that Gounaris would become a minister in the Theotokis’
government. It is impossible as well that Gounaris’ decision was made in just one day,
or that he spoke only with Protopapadakis. As far as we know, Gounaris met Theotokis
at Boufidis’ place on April 6, 1908. At least Gounaris’ letter to Dragoumis dated on
April 10, which is cited above, gives evidence of his drawn out agony over the issue.
Dragoumis also admitted that Boufidis came to the latter to offer Gounaris a ministerial
post. We do not know, however, whether Alexandris distorted the facts intentionally, or
if he had simply forgotten them when he wrote the memoirs forty years later.
72
ΑΣΔ, Φακ. 156, υποφακ. 156.2, εγγρ. 40.
73
Αλεξανδρής, Πολιτικαί αναμνήσεις, 14.
287
whether, if he became a minister and submitted bills regarding economic
not only for accepting them, but for pushing for their passage even at the risk
of the government’s existence. Gounaris emphasized that this was the only
way he could realize his programs. Alexandris wrote that Theotokis gave
advance consent to Gounaris that it would adopt his economic reform plans
as a condition for the latter’s accepting the ministerial post. In his letter to
Dragoumis sent several days after Gounaris took the oath of office,
Alexandris also wrote that Gounaris had said that he would propose to
had supported from the beginning of their activity and which had been
Theotokis’ promise to support the Team’s economic plans with all his power.
Therefore, Gounaris did not doubt that the bill containing his economic
said to him:
74
Αλεξανδρής, Πολιτικαί αναμνήσεις, 15; Alexandris’ account that Gounaris met
Theotokis at Baltatzis’ house is incorrect. As we have seen earlier, Boufidis invited
Gounaris to his place where the latter saw the Prime Minister.
75
ΑΣΔ, Φακ. 156, υποφακ. 156.2, εγγρ. 40.
76 Αλεξανδρής, Πολιτικαί αναμνήσεις, 15-16.
288
You have long known my opinions. Only if Greece recovers
economically by the introduction of a better taxation system, will
people be relieved from the [heavy burden of] taxes. Then they will
be able to eat and get dressed more readily after we abolish
excessive protection of pseudo-industries. Moreover, landowners of
large estates will cease to exploit people and then an increase in
production will be expected. Only when, I repeat, [these things are
realized], will Greece see better days. All other things regarded as
miracles are unworthy of attention (αστεϊσμός). 77
This passage shows that Gounaris joined the cabinet with the stubborn
determination to execute his economic reforms for the sake of the people. As
a result, he was bitterly distressed when the media attacked him for changing
unanimously criticized that, though the Team of Japanese had been expected
to reform Greece for the better, it could not discern or fulfill people’s
indignation, “If the affection toward the Team about which the press
incessantly writes truly represents the spirit of the people, then the Greek
people must be obsessed with secrecy the way a womanizer is. None of us
have noticed such affection toward us!” 78 Gounaris was genuinely upset
about the stance of the media, which claimed to represent the people.
289
Gounaris probably thought that the Greek people, in reality, had neither
understood nor correctly evaluated the Team’s activities and had been tainted
as Protopapadakis did not believe that public opinion had supported the
with Gounaris but also to his own views on the issue of collaboration with
collaboration plan had already broken down, he stated that it had been
government. 79
As such, Alexandris did not deny in his letter the possibility of his
then he could work together with the government. He also added that, if
79
ΑΣΔ, Φακ. 156, υποφακ. 156.2, εγγρ. 40.
290
of the Japanese in fields other than the economy, then he could join it. He
explained that the government seemed to agree to a great extent with the
political ideas of the Team, judging from the proposal of collaboration and
the government did not keep its promise, he would join a different party, the
the Japanese. In any case, at this point, Alexandris still believed Dragoumis’
decision to soon retire from the political world, which would automatically
would intend to continue his political activity on the basis of the ideas the
The Young Turk Revolution that broke out in the Ottoman Empire
on July 11, 1908 (July 24, NS), unexpectedly influenced the political career
for Istanbul and stayed there until the end of February 1909 to investigate the
80
ΑΣΔ, Φακ. 156, υποφακ. 156.2, εγγρ. 40.
291
situation of the Greeks in the empire after the revolution, and also to talk
of the ruling party only one month after he had written to Dragoumis. He did
not wait to see if the Theotokis’ government would really support the goals
of the Team of the Japanese, which Gounaris was to announce in the coming
Gounaris’ Misjudgment
The new parliamentary session, which was the first that Gounaris
Parliament and operate on the basis of its own strict principles to achieve
members of his Team would not contribute to any party’s maneuvers to win
a majority of seats. Instead, he claimed that the members would only vote for
81
Αλεξανδρής, Πολιτικαί αναμνήσεις, 18-29.
82
«Η δήλωσις των Ιαπώνων» [The Statement of the Japanese], Εστία. 12 Νοεμβρίου
1908, 3.
292
bills of whose validity they were fully convinced. 83 Dragoumis’ party
aims with the support of Theotokis as the latter had allegedly pledged? The
the new parliamentary session began, in an effort to save state finance, which
Gounaris’ proposals once they were offered. Those involved in the spirits
sideline Gounaris’ plans in order to avoid conflict with those who opposed
them, even though Gounaris had requested from Theotokis that Parliament
had returned from his work in Istanbul at the end of February 1909. Contrary
83
«Η δήλωσις των Ιαπώνων», 3.
84
The state treasury had gained a very small amount of money through the taxation of
spirits. Gounaris intended to impose a heavier tax on spirits in order to compensate for
the deficit in the state budget. FO 371/677, No. 1348.
85
FO 371/677, No. 9355.
293
to Alexandris’ expectations, Gounaris never spoke ill of Theotokis. Gounaris
just said, “I wish to completely forget the past. Greece needs general
and actions since the two men had direct experience working together.
Alexandris’ testimony demonstrates that Gounaris did not abandon the Team
of the Japanese for his own political career. Instead, he joined Theotokis’
party confidently expecting that he would be able to realize his and the
86
Αλεξανδρής, Πολιτικαί αναμνήσεις, 16.
87
Αλεξανδρής, Πολιτικαί αναμνήσεις, 16.
294
deputy who discriminatingly watched and criticized government policies, or
295
CHAPTER 8
Epilogue
The activities of the Team of the Japanese were always at the center
Repoulis mentioned that the idea for the Team came from the heart of public
opinion, which showed affection for the Team and supported it. 1 However,
in reality the media did not consistently consider the activities of the Team to
With the benefit of hindsight, the Team of the Japanese might have
remain alive for a longer period of time if it had been more responsive to the
view of the general public, and it could have played a major role in reviving
Greek political life. In addition to the personal discord among the members
of the Team, the fact that their activities were confined exclusively to
politicians who were seriously concerned about the future of the state, but
they came up short in listening to the voices of the masses, which was
1 Εμμανουήλ Ρέπουλης, «Από τα παρασκήνια των πολιτικών μας ηθών» [Our Political
Ethics as Seen from behind the Scenes], Εστία , 29 Ιουνίου 1908, 1 και 1 Ιουλίου 1908,
2.
296
Generally speaking, the reaction of the mass media toward the Team
of the Japanese shifted from positive to negative as time went on. The media
came to judge that there was a discrepancy between what public opinion
expected the Team to accomplish and what the Team actually did. In this
respect the newspaper Akropolis, which most ardently supported the Team at
the outset of its appearance on the political scene, provides sufficient articles
entitled “National Season Just before Spring with Trees Ready to Bloom.”
new epoch that would ensure national regeneration. The Greek state and
nation was at the threshold of flourishing like “the almonds of spring ready
2
«Εθνική φουσκοδενδριά» [National Season Just before Spring with Trees Ready to
Bloom], Ακρόπολις, 2 Απριλίου 1907, 1.
297
The activities of the Team of the Japanese were a case in point. The author of
the article argued that the Team’s efforts most illustratively demonstrated
that a new flourishing period for the Greek nation was approaching. He
highly appreciated what the Team had done for about a half year since it had
established itself, and expressed his hope that the Team members were going
to lead the country. He wrote, “Is the work of the Japanese in Parliament
small? This work is nothing but training and preparation, so that they will
become leaders of the future. The Japanese are different from today’s leaders.
The author of the article pointed out what most distinguished about
the members of the Team was. “They are not only training themselves, but
governing together with the government.” “They make more laws than the
government.” Moreover, “they not only legislate, but administer the country
at the same time.” 4 This article appeared when Parliament had almost
settled the issues of refugee settlement and land distribution in Thessaly, and
of school textbook reform. It also reflected the fact that the members of the
build up the strength of the country. The author named each of the Team
3
«Εθνική φουσκοδενδριά», 1.
4
«Εθνική φουσκοδενδριά», 1.
298
members and approved each member’s achievement equally. He emphasized
how earnestly every member of the Team had contributed in bringing change
Newspapers praised the various activities of the Team since its formation.
This article was one that admired the members’ efforts without reservation
5
“Yamogata” should be corrected as “Yamagata.” The author seems to compare
Protopapadakis to Aritomo Yamagata, who was the Chief of the General Staff of the
Japanese troops in the Russo‒Japanese War. As his name repeatedly appeared in Greek
newspapers during the war, the Greek public was probably familiar with it.
6
«Εθνική φουσκοδενδριά», 1.
299
and most comprehensively. The author not only spoke highly of the talent of
the members as politicians, but also expressed his conviction that the
appeared in Akropolis. The article entitled “What Are the Immortal Japanese
were not allowed to rest, but rather expected to take further actions as soon
as possible. The author wrote, “The fetal state of the Japanese party was over.
Now it has to go, probably to begin with, into the middle of the infant state.
Hercules’ role, continuing one feat after another and gaining one victory
after another.” 7
Broadly speaking, the article made two criticisms. First, the Team
had not presented its political program to the public. It read, “If they intend
to support the country from behind, the country absolutely needs to know the
justice,” so that they could take up their duty immediately after they were
7
«Οι αθάνατοι Ιάπωνες τι κάνουν;» [What Are the Immortal Japanese Doing?],
Ακρόπολις, 5 Μαΐου 1907, 1.
300
called to come to power. 8
Parliament. The article stressed the necessity that the Japanese should leave
than action, but something less than disturbances.” 9 According to the author,
Japanese had to win over to their side not only deputies, but also other
The author of the article pointed out that the Japanese, who
wrote:
301
upon them every cognac of the rhetoric of truth and patriotism, only
then do leaders say to them, “Go ahead now! If you want to be
saved, follow our flag.” 10
League was “to turn over the existing system placed under totally corrupt
the Japanese, he did not abandon them entirely. He still regarded them as the
only hope for the state’s rebirth, and claimed that the formation of the
advocated that it was possible for the League to carry out a “peaceful
302
regime we want is] the one with more capability and less corruption,
with the dominance of capability and the retreat of corruption, with
creative hands, with masterminds, with a non-plundering nature,
and with clean grounds.
We see the nucleus of such transformation in the tiny party of the
Japanese. Let’s reinforce the party and make it bigger. Let’s make it
prevail…
…[A]s the terrible famine that had struck Paris in 1789 caused
the tragic introduction of the Great French Revolution, so great
despair at economic conditions in the capital city and provinces [in
Greece] may precipitate our own peaceful revolution and make it
possible within a brief span of time. 13
regime as the French Revolution had done. The “peaceful revolution” was
Team lacked a concrete political program, and that it did not try to link up
with those who shared the same reformist spirit outside of Parliament. An
13
«Πανελλήνιον ιαπωνικόν σύνδεσμον», 1.
303
article in the weekly newspaper Oikonomiki Ellas on June 2, 1907, harshly
commented that the Team of the Japanese was the “party of negation” (το
analyzed the economic conditions of the state, 15 the author argued that what
the Japanese were doing was merely to find fault with the policy of the
Theotokis’ government and point out its negative aspects. They never offered
any positive proposals to improve these matters. They did not have “a
language of a new innovative party of young men with radical ideas that
seemed by the author said, “We do not have to show you henceforward
[what the government should do]. Bring us into the government and you will
see.” The author concluded that the Team of the Japanese wanted to become
cabinet members in the long run. They were just the same as those who had
14
«Οι Ιάπωνες» [The Japanese], Οικονομική Ελλάς, 2 Ιουνίου 1907, 262.
15
Πέτρος Πρωτοπαπαδάκης, Έκθεσις της μειονοψηφίας της επί του προϋπολογισμού
του κράτους επιτροπής [Minority Report of the Committee on the State Budget] (Αθήνα:
Εστία, 1907).
16
«Οι Ιάπωνες», 262.
17
«Οι Ιάπωνες», 262.
304
Japanese. Kambanis wrote a story to prove this. Some deputies of Theotokis’
and Rallis’ parties admired Gounaris. They had once thought of leaving their
parties and joining the Japanese, but they eventually did not because they
were not quite sure whether Gounaris could skillfully deal with reality since
think that one has to be a good idealist so that his practicality could have
found a problem with Gounaris somewhere else, writing, “[W]e writers, who
love ideas, who worship ideas and hate reality, feel a sort of resentment
demonstrates a great lack of affection (αστοργία) toward us, who admire his
which there was a gap between the Team of the Japanese and the public
outside of Parliament. It seems to reveal that, though the Team had been
pursuing reforms for the Greek nation as a whole, their activities, Gounaris’
especially, in this case, did not strike a chord with the masses. Even
305
intentions. How could the masses receive the message of state reform as
envisioned by the Team in the way in which the Japanese desired? The
between the Team and the public. The only resolution would probably be
that the Japanese approach the people and take action together, as Akropolis
repeatedly advocated.
The Team of the Japanese, however, did not move out of Parliament.
Akropolis, illustrating the men in Chinese clothes with their hair in a pigtail.
What the caricature expressed was obvious through the association with
the Japanese. An article on August 12, 1907, read, “[W]e, the first friends of
the Japanese, propose to become their first enemies, if we are convinced that
they remain on the path of dilettantism.” 20 The author of the article regarded
the Team as dull. He criticized that the Japanese had neither issued their
19
See Figure 3.
20
«Ιντερμέτσο. Μουσική ιαπωνική» [Intermezzo. Japanese Music], Ακρόπολις, 12
Αυγούστου 1907, 1.
306
program yet, nor taken further action outside of Parliament. He suspected
that the members of the Team were not true professional politicians, but
tone that the Team replace the existing corrupt oligarchy of deputies with a
Greeks could be satisfied. The author asked the members of the Team to
transform Parliament from a secluded place like “Jericho” into a sphere open
to the people. The method for carrying out this objective was again a
The task and the obligation of the Japanese are thus very simple:
Let’s place them at the head of the people whose spirit has been
already revolutionized. [The Japanese] can transform this latent
revolutionary spirit [among the people] into an actual revolution and
provoke such a popular excitement that they can regard…incumbent
deputies as fellow-combatants and cooperators, not as enemies…
But for these goals, [the Japanese] need to work not after but
before Parliament convenes. Extraordinary, strenuous, true and
revolutionary work is necessary. 22
The Team of the Japanese never answered this appeal. From autumn 1907
onward, Akropolis and other media published few articles that place hope in
the Japanese.
21
«Ιντερμέτσο. Μουσική ιαπωνική», 1.
22
«Ιντερμέτσο. Μουσική ιαπωνική», 1.
307
It should be noted, however, that, interestingly, the concept of the
Japanese took on a life of its own in the discourse of the press. As the media
came to support the Team of the Japanese less enthusiastically, the term
original deputies of the Team. Those who were advocating the liberation of
the Greek people from corrupt politics came to be called “Japanese.” First,
But the term “Japanese” still included the seven members of the Team, and it
was always used in conjunction with them. From autumn 1907 onward,
however, there were several examples in which the term “Japanese” was
used in a context from which the seven members of the Team were
political emancipation of the Greek people from the tyranny of parties and
23
«Ιάπωνος νέου ανατολή» [Rising of a New Japanese], Ακρόπολις, 16 Μαρτίου 1907,
1.
308
the rule of deputies (βουλευτοκρατία).” Its slogan was “Down with
corruption!” and those who rallied under this slogan were called “Japanese.”
When the media came to turn their back on the Team of the
Japanese, which they considered to be full of words but void of action, the
Japanese to sweep away age-old corrupt practices in the political arena and
to form a government for the people, which Akropolis had advocated, never
24
«Αυτοί είνε Ιάπωνες!» [They are Japanese!], Ακρόπολις, 4 Νοεμβρίου 1907, 1.
309
malaise.” 25 Sir Francis Elliot, the British minister in Athens at that time,
wrote in his report on this event, “Public opinion, at all events at Athens, as
expressed by the pronouncements of the trade guilds and other bodies, was at
first decidedly in favour of the military movement, and the officers were
regarded as the heroes of the day and the saviours of the country.” 26 The
Military League did not intend to establish a military dictatorship, but rather
justice; education directed at the practical needs of the country and national
finances to provide relief from taxation for the people and for the
immediate buildup of the army and navy.” 27 Once they staged the coup and
310
grappled with the reformist proposals of the Military League in Parliament.
Yet toward the end of the year it became obvious that the government fell
short of expectations.
What was at stake was who would be the most perfect politician to
put the Military League’s reformist ideas into practice without a return to
politics under the former stagnated and corrupt conditions. The Military
League did not count on traditional political leaders any longer. They turned
their eyes outside Greece and singled out Eleftherios Venizelos, who was
How did the former Team of the Japanese react to the coup? Did
they support the Military League? As both the Team and the Military League
aimed at political reform and state reconstruction, and some of the demands
of the military officers overlapped what the Team had intended to realize,
there was good reason for the former Japanese to express their approval of
the coup. Actually, not a few Greeks expected Gounaris to assume the task of
state regeneration by heading the League. Yet on August 27, 1909, Gounaris
Military League. On October 13, 1909, the Military League asked Gounaris
and Protopapadakis to form a government, but the two men declined on the
grounds that they did not regard the League, which had intervened in the
311
nation’s politics with threats of violence, as a legitimate representative of the
people. Gounaris, who was a devotee of the parliamentary regime, could not
accept the right of the military to play a decisive role in the political arena
Repoulis, and some other deputies attempted to establish a new party during
assumed his first and last premiership of the caretaker government from
the reconstruction of the shaky state finances that Greece had suffered with
28
«Γούναρης, Δημήτριος» [Gounaris, Dimitrios], in ΜΕΕ, τόμος Η΄ [vol. 8], 653;
«Γούναρης, Δημήτριος» [Gounaris, Dimitrios], in ΕΕΕ, τόμος Γ΄ [vol. 3], 195;
Αλέξανδρος Α. Οικονόμου, Πέτρος Πρωτοπαπαδάκης 1859–1922 [Petros
Protopapadakis 1859–1922] (Αθήνα, 1972), 140; Καίτη Αρώνη-Τσίχλη, «Δημήτριος
Γούναρης» [Dimitrios Gounaris] in Πρόσωπα του 20ού αιώνα: Έλληνες που σημάδεψαν
τον 20όν αιώνα [Persons of the 20th Century: The Greeks Who Marked the 20th Century],
ed. Βασίλης Παναγιωτόπουλος (Αθήνα: Νέα Σύνορα, 2000), 77.
29
Απόστολος Αλεξανδρής, Πολιτικαί αναμνήσεις [Political Memoirs] (Πάτρα: Δ.
Φραγκούλης και Κ. Βαρζάνης, 1947), 34; In October 1909 some newspapers wrote that
Alexandris was one of politicians who supported the aborted mutiny of the some
officers who claimed that the coup in August was not satisfactory for true reform plans.
Alexandris himself referred to this episode in his memoirs though he did not give any
clear words about whether he had been involved in this event or not. Αλεξανδρής,
Πολιτικαί αναμνήσεις, 33; Papacosma writes, “Ιt can be conjectured that Alexandris and
Stratos, as civilians, assumed a scapegoat role for the officers by being blamed in large
part for accentuating divisions within the Military League.” Papacosma, The Military in
Greek Politics, 94.
312
for so long. As a result of his efforts, and with the help of Ioannis Valaoritis,
a vice president of the National Bank of Greece, the fiscal year of 1910
brought a surplus budget of five million drachmas after many years of deficit,
reform program. 30
the officers through the media in Crete. 31 Mark Mazower points out that one
of the major reasons why Venizelos was successful after he landed in Greece
not care what method was employed as long as it rejected “the past in favor
establishment of the Liberal Party under his leadership redrew the political
who had nothing to do with the old parties. 33 Venizelos’ first government
30
Helen Gardikas-Katsiadakis, “Venizelos’ Advent in Greek Politics, 1909–12,” in
Eleftherios Venizelos: The Trials of Statesmanship, ed. Paschalis M. Kitromilides
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006), 110.
31
Gardikas-Katsiadakis, “Venizelos’ Advent in Greek Politics, 1909–12,” 90.
32
Mark Mazower, “The Messiah and the Bourgeoisie: Venizelos and Politics in Greece,
1909 -1912,” The Historical Journal 35, no. 4 (1992): 898.
33
In the elections of November 1910 Venizelos’ Liberal Party scored a great victory
with 307 seats in a total of 362. Among them 245 were new deputies who had not had
political experience in Parliament. Theotokis, Rallis, and Mavromihalis, the leaders of
the old parties, abstained from the elections. Gardikas-Katsiadakis, “Venizelos’ Advent
313
with these fresh deputies surely embodied the opening of new period of
1920. Repoulis also acted in the premier’s place from 1918 to 1920 when
peace conference. After the Liberal Party was defeated in the election of
1920, Repoulis went into exile in Paris with other Venizelist politicians.34
anti-Venizelists had a huge traumatic impact not only on the Greek political
314
arena, but also on its society for decades.
sentence given at the court martial under the control of Venizelists. As the
two men were among the leaders of the Asia Minor campaign, they were
Gounaris’ party. In 1918, one year after Venizelos seized power again,
During the Balkan Wars the Venizelos’ government appointed him General
315
as Minister of Education in 1915 and Minister of Justice in 1921. 37 He
apologiae for the military campaign in Asia Minor. As the title shows,
Vozikis regarded the two men as prey of political retaliation on the part of
Venizelists. 38
contemporary native Japanese know the Greek Japanese? One episode tells
us that there was at least one Japanese whom a Greek directly informed of
“Japanese.”
The Second Peace Conferences were held in the Hague from June
37
«Βοζίκης, Χαράλαμπος» [Vozikis, Charalambos], in ΜΕΕ, τόμος Ζ΄ [vol. 7], 445;
«Βοζίκης, Χαράλαμπος» [Vozikis, Charalambos], in ΝΕΛ, τόμος Δ΄ [vol. 4], 615.
38
Χαράλαμπος Βοζίκης, Αι απολογίαι των θυμάτων της 15 Νοεμβρίου 1922 [The
Apologiae of the Victims of November 15, 1922] (Αθήνα: Μακρής και Σία, 1925).
39
James Brown Scott, The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907: A Series of
Lectures Delivered Before the Johns Hopkins University in the Year 1908, vol.1,
316
from Eastern Rumelia sent a letter to the conferences, so that the world
would pay attention to their sufferings and miserable conditions after they
had been expelled by force from their hometowns along the Black Sea. 40
welcomed a Greek interviewer and said, “Are you from Greece? Very
interesting! I have learned that Greece is now reviving, and I hope that will
work out fine because you are also an old race [like us]. You have good men
as long as I judge the Greek representatives you have here. They are very
serious men!” “We are trying to revive, your Excellency.” the interviewed
answered and then said, “Our hope actually lies in our new [political] party,
the Team of the Japanese in Greece. He might have said so out of mere
politeness. In any case, this brief episode was the only evidence that I have
found to prove that a native Japanese person obtained information about the
317
Greek Japanese.
The Team of the Japanese brought to light the problems the Greek
political world had at the turn of the twentieth century. The Team was
founded in order to solve these problems and regenerate the state for the
activities during its short life demonstrate that the members faithfully kept
the Team’s initial purpose in mind. We recognize in all their activities the
strong sense of duty to make politics beneficial and honorable for the sake of
the nation as a whole. In this sense, we can say that the Team did not betray
whether the Team of the Japanese could have been powerful enough to
could contribute to the making of the laws, like the land distribution in
Thessaly for refugees and native sharecroppers, and the school textbook
into a political entity that truly served the nation’s good. For the first step
318
toward this rebirth, the Team considered administrative improvement and
the government to take any measures to solve these issues that would
influence the basis of the nation’s life from a long-term perspective. The
Team also preached the importance of open debate on every agenda related
to the national interest in Parliament, where the collective will of the people
which the government dealt with politics, the Team endeavored to awaken in
their attempts to reform politics would not be achieved at once. They were
quite conscious that it would take much time and unrelenting perseverance to
realize their political ideals. Dragoumis repeatedly told them that they should
not expect quick rewards for their political struggles, as there were many
obstacles in front of them. 42 Yet at the same time it seems also true, though
42 Ρέπουλης, «Από τα παρασκήνια των πολιτικών μας ηθών», Εστία, 29 Ιουνίου 1908,
1.
319
expand their influence on Parliament. They expected at heart that the Team
other deputies espouse it in a relatively short period of time, but they did so
pessimistic view about the Team’s future and that Gounaris was infected by
will be judged by what he does, not by what he thinks.” 45 Having said that,
was, retrospectively speaking, Gounaris believed that he could carry out the
economic reforms of the Team of the Japanese in the government the Team
which the Team had faith, a majority party wielded the ultimate
a big gamble in order to realize what he believed would benefit the nation,
which backfired in the end. His reconversion to the government party reveals
43
See p. 258.
44
Ρέπουλης, «Από τα παρασκήνια των πολιτικών μας ηθών», Εστία, 1 Ιουλίου 1908, 2.
45
«Βουλή. Η χθεσινή συνεδρίασις» [Parliament. Yesterday’s Meeitng], Ακρόπολις, 3
Ιουνίου 1907, 2.
320
that the Team could not overcome the initial contradiction between its goal
and its strategy—the Team aimed at playing a leading reformative role for
the Japanese and the mass media, especially the newspaper Akropolis, the
reform. The Team advocated the necessity of reform in politics “for” the
movement “with” the people. A potential partner with whom the Team had in
mind to struggle for changing the state system was not the people, but rather
implies that the members regarded politics as a special skill that was not
Akropolis that the Team should form a united front with extra-parliamentary
forces to sweep away the old corrupt politics and to establish a popular
government, the Team did not show any interest in the Akropolis’ appeals.
Although the Team talked a lot about the nation’s good, the members of the
Team did not think of standing abreast with the people to bring about change
in politics. This elitist flavor of the Team probably gave to some persons
between the Team and the nation to whom the Team was supposedly
321
committed. Even though Repoulis commented that the idea for the Team
came from the heart of public opinion, this did not mean that the Team was
working together with the people. 46 In the discourse of the Team of the
Japanese, the people are receivers of politics, not its central actors.
hegemonic vision.” 47 After the “Great Idea,” which had been the only
almost shattered as a result of the disastrous defeat of the war of 1897, the
Team arguably wished to become such a political force that could provide a
new vision of the state and the nation, alluring as well as plausible, on par
with the “Great Idea.” The Team was not mistaken in that it denounced the
reformed for the nation’s rebirth. The Team was also correct in openly
claiming that the future politics of the state should be practiced on a national
behalf.
In a real sense, however, the Team could not serve as a bridge that
46
Ρέπουλης, «Από τα παρασκήνια των πολιτικών μας ηθών», Εστία, 29 Ιουνίου 1908,
1 και 1 Ιουλίου 1908, 2.
47
George J. Andreopoulos, “Liberalism and the Formation of the Nation-State,”
Journal of Modern Greek Studies 7, no. 2 (1989): 198.
322
connected the governed with their government. In comparison with the
“Great Idea,” which had been deeply-rooted among the Greeks as a telos of
the state and the nation, the Team’s domestic reform movement obviously
lacked the dynamism that could motivate the people. For that very reason,
presented its concrete plans to the public, explaining in detail why they were
needed and what positive outcomes they would bring to the nation. As the
reform program that the Military League demanded in the coup of 1909
indicates, there surely existed people’s discontent with the existing political
system, but their grievances and dissatisfaction were not clear-cut in nature,
Team of the Japanese, which existed before the military coup, had missed a
digest the people’s views and in Parliament set forth with lucidity the Team’s
reform plans as reflecting those views. This was probably the only way in
which the Team could be recognized among the people as a political force
48
Andreopoulos, “Liberalism and the Formation of the Nation-State,” 199.
323
have been realized not through his crossing over to the government party, but
during less than two years was nothing but a farce played out on the stage of
that Greece needed general unanimity. 49 His words sound like he criticized
himself and the Team for playing political dissenters and creating dissonance
political grounds, it could play a role in signaling that a new style of politics
to be precise, were determined to adopt it. As we have seen, the keen sense
of national crisis initially impelled the members to form the Team of the
relations that successive governments had pursued was nothing but a hotbed
activities of the Team of the Japanese emphasized the necessity that every
state agenda should be mapped out from the perspective of national interest,
49
Αλεξανδρής, Πολιτικαί αναμνήσεις, 16.
324
and in an accurate and feasible manner. In addition, the Team understood
politics in moral terms, and suggested that those who were engaged in
These messages the Team had sent out were not negligible in
the one hand, there were some deputies of other political parties who held
the Team in high esteem. 50 On the other hand, the only seven members of
the Team became a sort of menace to the government in terms of its new
growing threat, the government gave sweet words to Gounaris and took him
forget that there was a small opposition party called the Team of the
Japanese at the turn of the twentieth century, though a serious study on it has
not been done before. For all its shortcomings, the fact that the Team of the
Japanese was the only parliamentary force that self-criticized Greek politics
and advocated the necessity of state reform for the nation’s good should be
highly evaluated. In the first decade of the twentieth century, when disorder
and apathy were dominant in Greek politics, the activities of the Team of the
50
Καμπάνης, «Οι ιδεολόγοι και ο κ. Γούναρης», 1.
325
Japanese prove that there certainly existed the will and efforts in the political
326
Fig. 1 ‒ Stefanos Dragoumis in the Greek Traditional Costume of A
Chief Shepherd
(Published in the Newspaper Romios on October 28, 1906, and entitled “The
Chief Shepherd of the New Third Party”)
327
Fig. 2 ‒ Stefanos Dragoumis in Japanese-Style Clothes
(Published in the Newspaper Athens on March 4, 1907, and entitled “The
Leader of the Six Japanese: Stefanouko Dragoumouko”)
328
Fig. 3 – The Japanese as Chinese
(Published in the Newspaper Akropolis on July 22, 1907)
329
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