Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
International Phenomenological Society is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
http://www.jstor.org
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Vol. L, Supplement, Fall i990
and vice versa. Then to say that the properties and relations in set T are
logically supervenient upon the properties and relations in set S is to say
that, for any two worlds Wand W'-, if Wand W* agree with respect to the
properties and relations in set S, they must also agree with respect to the
properties and relations in set T.
Given these concepts, the reductionist theses that I shall be considering
may now be characterized as follows. First, reductionism with respect to
causal relations. This comes in two forms, depending upon what the
reduction base is claimed to be:
I See, for example, David Fair, "Causation and the Flow of Energy," Erkenntnis I4
(I979): 219-50.
'
C. J. Ducasse, "The Nature and the Observability of the Causal Relation," Journal of
Philosophy 2 3 (i9z6): 57-67, and reprinted in Ernest Sosa (ed.), Causation and Condi-
tionals (Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,I975), pp. 114-25. See p. ii8.
3 Ibid., p. ii6.
I For a much fuller discussion of the problem of distinguishing between laws and acciden-
tal uniformities, see Armstrong, op. cit., chap. z.
6 I have discussed the question of the possibility of uninstantiated basic laws in more detail
in Causation, pp. 47-5 I.
7 A fuller account of the problem posed by probabilistic laws can be found in Causation,
pp. 142-47.
8 For a discussion of this, see Rudolf Carnap, Logical Foundations of Probability, znd
edition (Chicago:Universityof ChicagoPress,i962), pp. 570-75.
9 See, for example, Jaakko Hintikka, "A Two-Dimensional Continuum of Inductive
Methods," in Jaakko Hintikka and Patrick Suppes (eds.), Aspects of Inductive Logic
(Amsterdam: North Holland, I966), pp. 113-32..
10 Causation,pp. 129-37.
ZZ MICHAEL TOOLEY
tionist accounts of the direction of causation either do not apply at all, or
else do apply, but give the wrong answers.
Secondly, there are objections involving what may be referred to as
problems of underdetermination. For what these objections attempt to
establish is that there can be worlds that agree with respect to, first, all of
the non-causal properties of, and relations between, events, secondly, all
causal laws, and thirdly, the direction of causation, but which disagree
with respect to the causal relations between corresponding events.
For the first, see Hans Reichenbach, The Direction of Time (Berkeley: University of Cal-
ifornia Press, 1956), pp. 117-43, and Adolf Grunbaum, Philosophical Problems of
Space and Time, znd edition (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1973), pp. 2 54-64. For the second,
see Karl Popper,"The Arrow of Time," Nature I77 (1956): 538. For the third, see Rei-
chenbach, op. cit., pp. i6i-63, and Wesley Salmon, "Why Ask 'Why?'?," Proceedings
and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 5' (1978): 696.
Possibility I Possibility z
Pa causes Qa, and Sa causes Ra Pa causes Ra, and Sa causes Qa
3 I have offered additional support for this claim in "Laws and Causal Relations," in P. A.
French, T. E. Uehling, and H. K. Wettstein (eds.), Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, i985), pp. 93-lIZ. See pp. 99-I07.
4 Compare Hartry Field's formulation of the theory of Newtonian spacetime in his Science
Without Numbers (Princeton: Princeton University Press, i980), pp. 52-53.
6. Summing Up
I have argued that reductionist accounts, both of causal laws and of causal
relations, are open to very serious objections. In the case of laws, I men-
tioned the problems posed by cosmic, but accidental uniformities, by
uninstantiated basic laws, and by probabilistic laws, together with the
difficulty of showing that one is justified in believing that laws obtain, if
one holds that laws are, basically, cosmic uniformities. In the case of
causal relations, I advanced two sorts of objections. First, there were the
objections that focused upon the problem of explaining the direction of
"
Causation, pp. 274-87.
"
Ibid., pp. z99-30z.
I am indebted to David Armstrong for detailed and very helpful comments on an earlier
draft.