CASE ASSIGNMENT IN WILLS & SUCCESSION PALOY

ALVAREZ v IAC [ G.R. No. 4968, August 03, 1910 ]

185 SCRA 8 May 7, 1990
SALVADOR LOPEZ, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. RAFAEL ENRIQUEZ ET
Aniceto Yanes was survived by his children, Rufino, Felipe and AL., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES.
Teodora. Herein private respondents, Estelita, Iluminado and Jesus,
are the children of Rufino who died in 1962 while the other private
It is alleged in the complaint filed in this cause:
respondents, Antonio and Rosario Yanes, are children of Felipe.
Teodora was survivedby her child, Jovita (Jovito) Alib. There are two
First. That, under No. 1869, a case was tried in the Court of First
parcels of land which are involved in this case. Said lots
Instance of Manila concerning the testate estate of Antonio
were registered in the names of the heirs of Aniceto Yanes.
Enriquez and the intestate estate of Ciriaca Villanueva.
Fortunato D. Santiago was issued a Transfer Certificate of Title.
Santiago then sold the lots to Monico B. Fuentebella, Jr. The lots
Second. That in the said estates defendants appear as heirs to the
were sold thereafter Rosendo Alvarez. The Yaneses filed a
property left by the said spouses at their death.
complaint against Santiago, Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella, Alvarez
and the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental for the “return” of
Third. That the plaintiff held a claim against the said estates
the ownership and possession of the lots, and prayed for an
amounting to 10,557 francs, or their equivalent in Philippine
accounting of the produce of the land from 1944 up to the filing of
currency, which was allowed and ordered paid by the court on
the complaint, and that the share or money equivalent due
August 26, 1905.
the heirs be delivered to them, and damages. During the pendency
of the case, Alvarez sold the lots to Dr. Rodolfo Siason.
Fourth. That the administrator of the estates did not immediately
ISSUE: Whether the liability arising from the sale of the lots made by pay the said debt, alleging that at the time he did not have the
Rosendo Alvarez to Dr.Rodolfo Siason should be the sole liability of necessary cash, but that he would get the money to liquidate the
the late Rosendo Alvarez or of his estate, after his death. debt as soon as possible, which, up to the present time, he has not
done.
As a general rule is that a party’s contractual rights and obligations
are transmissible to the successors. However, in this case Petitioners
Fifth. That on the 2d of January, 1906, the heirs of the spouses
being the heirs of the late Rosendo Alvarez, cannot escape the
Enriquez and Villanueva executed ,an instrument of partition of
legal consequences of their father’s transaction, which gave rise to
property, which appears in the record of the said case No. 1869
the present claim for damages. That petitioners did not inherit the
and was approved by the court on January 25, 1906; that by virtue
property involved herein is of no moment because by legal fiction,
of the instrument aforesaid, the proceedings in case No. 1869
the monetary equivalent thereof devolved into the mass of their
above mentioned were concluded without the plaintiff's
father’s hereditary estate, and we have ruled that
knowledge.
the hereditary assets are always liable in their totality for the
payment of the debts of the estate.
Sixth. That as a result of the proceedings in the said case, without
It must, however, be made clear that petitioners are liable only to previous payment to the plaintiff, who is a recognized creditor in the
the extent of the value of their inheritance. suit, the plaintiff is obliged to file this complaint praying for the
rescission of the partition of the property of the deceased spouses
Enriquez and Villanueva, unless their heirs give a sufficient and
proper bond to secure the payment of his claim.

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CASE ASSIGNMENT IN WILLS & SUCCESSION
Seventh. That the plaintiff suffers great detriment by this delay in the
payment already authorized by the Court of First Instance, and by
having to file the new complaint.
On the grounds hereinbefore related, the plaintiff prays that
judgment be rendered against the defendants for the sum of 10,557
francs, or their equivalent in Philippine currency, with legal interest
thereon, and the costs, and that the partition already made
between the heirs be annulled, unless they give bond to secure the
payment of the amount claimed.
The defendants Francisco Enriquez and Carmen de la Cavada de
Enriquez denied in their answer, among other alleged facts, that
contained in paragraph 3 of the complaint, and alleged expressly
that the debt therein claimed was contracted solely and exclusively
by their codefendant Rafael Enriquez for the latter's use and
exclusive benefit and that such liability was incurred long after the
death of their predecessors in interest, Francisco Enriquez and
Ciriaca Villanueva. They further set up, as a special defense, the
agreement made in the instrument of partition of the property left
by their said predecessors, executed on January 2, 1906, in clause 9
of which their coheirs and codefendants in the present cause state,
textually, that they "release the aforementioned Don Francisco
Enriquez and his wife, Dona Carmen de la Cavada, from all
obligation by reason of any hereditary or testamentary debt,
inasmuch as they, the said codefendants and coheirs, do take
upon themselves the payment of all the debts and obligations of
both estates, with the exception of the mortgage of P7,500, and
interest, on the property situated at No. 42 Calle David, the
payment of which is assumed by the said Francisco Enriquez and his
wife, the other heirs being relieved and released from this mortgage
obligation." The partition and the agreement above mentioned
were judicially approved.
The other defendants confined themselves to a denial of the last
clause of paragraph 5 and the first clause of paragraph 6 of the
complaint, without denying either generally or specifically the other
facts alleged therein which, therefore, must be deemed to have
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been admitted by them, in accordance with the provisions of
section 94 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The trial having been conducted with all its necessary proceedings,
the defendants were acquitted with the costs against the plaintiff,
who appealed from the judgment to this court.
It is declared as approved in the judgment appealed from, without
such declaration having been impugned in the present instance,
that the administrator of the testate estate of Antonio Lopez (it must
be Enriquez), in his quality as such, bound himself to pay the credit
herein claimed to the attorney for the plaintiff, and that the judge
authorized the payment of the same in the special administration
proceedings. The order authorizing the said payment recognizes,
according to the judgment, that the claim mentioned in favor of
the plaintiff is a debt contracted by the estate. This being granted, it
follows as a necessary and inevitable consequence that it should
be paid out of the property of the estate itself.
It is no bar to this conclusion that the said debt was contracted
many years after the death of the testator Enriquez, because this
circumstance in itself alone does not show that it was not done in
the interest of the estate, to attend the needs and meet the
obligations of which it is very possible that the debt was contracted.
No precise and specific data appear in the record of the trial which
sufficiently support the allegation that it was contracted solely for
the personal and exclusive benefit of one of the defendants; on the
contrary, there is other data of much importance which tends
directly to connect the said debt with the estate in question. It is
insinuated in the testimony of one witness that the credit claimed in
the complaint originated from advances made by the plaintiff as a
pension that had to be paid to one of the heirs of the administrator
of the estate. It also appears to be indicated that a part of these
advances was paid, without opposition by the heirs, out of funds
pertaining to the estate; and, finally, the present administrator of the
same, in testifying with regard to some letters wherein reference is
made to plaintiff's credit, stated that "they must be among the
administrator's accounts which should be united with the records of
the cause in this court, as vouchers showing the fulfillment of his
CASE ASSIGNMENT IN WILLS & SUCCESSION
duty." If the debt in question was not properly one chargeable
against the estate, neither would a part of it have been paid out of
funds of the estate, nor would there be any reason for including the
documents relative thereto among the administrator's accounts,
with which, on such a supposition, they would have absolutely no
concern whatever.
But this is not the true aspect of the question. Our point of view is
that there exists an order, assented to and final, which recognized
and declared that the debt, the subject of the complaint, was a
debt contracted by the estate, and in consequence thereof
ordered the payment of the same by the administrator of the
estate, in the special proceedings had with reference thereto. No
appeal having been taken at any time against the order
mentioned, there is no reason for incidentally discussing herein
either the legality of the same, or, consequently, the nature of the
said debt already defined in a conclusive manner in the order itself
which, on account of such failure to appeal, has become final and
irrevocable in accordance with law. The authority of the matter thus
adjudged makes all further discussion on these points entirely
irrelevant and improper.
The complaint is directed against the heirs individually, upon the
allegation that the partition of the estate left by Antonio Enriquez
and Ciriaca Villanueva, the predecessors in interest of the said heirs,
has already been made and judicially approved. The judgment
appealed from relates, with regard to this point: First, that if the
estate is actually liable for the debt herein claimed, collection
thereof should be undertaken in the special administration
proceedings concerning the said estate, which are not yet entirely
terminated, as some houses belonging to the estate are still in
litigation; and, second, that a sufficient reason has not been
adduced for making the heirs individually liable for the debt in
question.
With respect to the first conclusion, it is found to be sufficiently
proven that the division of the estate, as alleged in the complaint,
was actually made. The defendants themselves admit it as true in
their respective written answers, and only deny that, by virtue of
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such division, the proceedings in the settlement of the testate estate
of Antonio Enriquez and of the intestate estate of Ciriaca Villanueva
were considered as terminated, without the knowledge of the
plaintiff, as also alleged in the complaint. So certain it is that the
partition was made that the defendants Francisco Enriquez and
Carmen de la Cavada base one of their defenses on the instrument
of partition of the property of both estates, then not in litigation, * * *
as they say textually. And, in conformity with this, the administrator
of the said estates testified at the trial that the property which had
not yet been divided among the heirs consisted of buildings that
were then in litigation, a litigation which in the first instance resulted
adversely to the within defendants, as stated, and without
contradiction, in appellant's brief. And if all the estate was divided,
with the exception of those houses in litigation, it is evident that
there is now nothing more to divide among the heirs, for what is
subject to the eventualities and contingencies of a lawsuit can not
at the present day be deemed to be actual property of the estate.
This being the case, one should not, nor can one oblige the creditor
or creditors of the estate to await the result, which may well be
unfavorable, of such litigation, in order to realize upon his or their
claim, as by virtue of the partition the heirs have in their possession
the property derived from the estate. The right of the creditors to
collect is one which has preference over that of the heirs to inherit,
in view of the well-known fact that the inheritance consists only of
what remains after the payment and settlement of all the debts and
liabilities outstanding against the entire hereditary assets.
With regard to the second conclusion, the theory of the lower court
would be correct, were it a question of an inheritance in the state of
administration. Under such circumstances the heir can not
personally be sued for either hereditary or testimentary debts, nor for
those of administration, which may lie against the estate, the legal
representation of which is assumed entirely by the executor or
administrator. This, briefly, is the doctrine that is deduced, in so far as
this point is concerned, from the judgment rendered in the case of
Pavia vs. De la Rosa (8 Phil. Rep., 70), cited in the judgment
appealed from. But such is not the present case. Here, the estate
has already been divided and the property belonging thereto is in
the possession of the heirs. The judicial administration has been
CASE ASSIGNMENT IN WILLS & SUCCESSION
practically terminated, for if it still subsists it is, apparently, for the sole
purpose of enabling a continuance and maintenance of some
pending suits, its purposes having come to an end with respect to
the totality of the divisible and cash assets from the succession
which, in fact and by law, have passed to the control and personal
and exclusive administration of the heirs by virtue of the partition.
Because of this circumstance, and because the legality of the
plaintiff's credit has been judicially recognized and the payment of
the same ordered in the special proceedings for the administration
of the testate and intestate estates of the predecessors in interest of
the said defendants, we believe that the provisions of section 731 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, the caption of which is "Devisees,
legatees, and heirs, in possession, must contribute" are applicable to
the present case. It is provided in the text of this section that the
persons who, as heirs, have received the estate not disposed of by
will, shall be liable to contribute like the devisees or legatees to the
payment of the debts and expenses, etc. Substantially identical with
this provision is that contained in section 749 of the same code in
reference to contingent claims, wherein it is provided that "* * * the
assets so distributed shall still remain subject to the liability of the
claim when established, and the creditor may maintain an action
against the distributees to recover his debt, and such distributees
and their estates shall be liable for such debts in proportion to the
estate they have respectively received from the property of the
deceased."
According to the spirit of these provisions, after the partition has
been made, the heirs become liable individually, in proportion to
the hereditary share received by each of them, for the payment of
the debts the legality of which has been duly and properly
recognized, such as the claim of the plaintiff, and which when the
partition was made may have remained yet unpaid. This avoids the
necessity of annulling the partition and restoring the succession to
the state of administration, as requested in the complaint, which
undoubtedly would be much more expensive and detrimental to
the heirs; by applying the legal provision above cited the same
result is obtained without the outlays and expenses of a new
administration.
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The proportionate liability of the heirs, as before stated, must be
understood to be limited to the part of the hereditary assets that
each shall have received or to the value thereof, for, in
accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, "it is
understood that a testate or intestate succession of a deceased
person is always accepted and received with benefit of inventory,
and his heirs, even after having taken possession of the estate of the
deceased, do not make themselves responsible for the debts of
said deceased with their own property, but solely with that property
coming from the testate or intestate succession of said deceased."
(Pavia vs. De la Rosa, herein above cited.)
It is maintained in appellees' brief that the plaintiff herein should
have appealed from the order approving or ordering the partition, if
he did not comply with the requirements prescribed by section 754
of the Code of Civil Procedure. According to this section, the heirs
or devisees shall not obtain the partition of the estate until after the
payment of the debts, unless they give a sufficient bond to secure
the payment of the same. It is not necessary to discuss here whether
the plaintiff could or could not have appealed from the said order;
be this as it may, it is unquestionable that, issued as it was without
the plaintiff being summoned or heard, it can in no manner injure
him, as it could only affect those interested in obtaining it. Besides,
the said order, by reason of its very nature, it having merely a
distributional effect among the heirs and not being declaratory of
the rights of third parties, can in no case deprive the plaintiff of the
right to collect his claim once it has been duly recognized in the
manner and form prescribed by law. The same section, 754, allows
the supposition that some debt may be pending payment at the
time of making the partition, in which case the heirs must give the
proper bond to secure the payment of the debt. It is the duty of the
judge to require the bond and the obligation of the heirs to furnish it;
but it would be entirely unjust that a noncompliance on the part of
the one or of the other should redound to the prejudice of the
creditors, who are not required to take any part whatever in the
partition. In the present case the partition was effected without prior
summons or knowledge of the plaintiff who, for this reason, was
unable opportunely to oppose it or to apply for the execution of the
bond to secure the payment of his claim.
CASE ASSIGNMENT IN WILLS & SUCCESSION
The agreement made among the heirs to release Francisco Enriquez
and Carmen de la Cavada from the obligation of paying the debts
of the estate, if effective among themselves, is not nor can it be
binding upon the plaintiff, who was not a party thereto. (Art. 1257,
Civil Code,) The heirs can not reduce by their own acts the creditor's
security by limiting the liability of the estate to specific portions of
the succession, which is equivalent to the release agreed upon of
all responsibility with respect to the portions adjudicated to the heirs.
The hereditary assets are always liable in their totality for the
payment of the debts of the estate.
Therefore the defense made by the defendants and which is based
on the agreement referred to, can not be admitted as valid.
By virtue of all the foregoing, the defendants should be adjudicated
to pay to the plaintiff the amount claimed in the complaint,
together with the legal interest thereon at the rate of 6 per cent per
annum to count from the date of the filing of the complaint,
proportionately to the part received by each one of them
respectively in the quality of heir, and only to the extent of its value,
from the testate estate of Antonio Enriquez and the intestate estate
of Ciriaca Villanueva. And the debt having been contracted in
francs and it being required that the payment of the same be
ordered to be made in Philippine currency (sec. 3, Act No. 1045), an
opportunity should be given to the parties to present evidence,
which was not adduced at the trial, relative to the present
equivalence between the two currencies, for which sole purpose, it
being absolutely necessary for the fulfillment of the purposes of the
Act cited, a new trial is ordered. So ordered.
DE BORJA v. VDA. DE BORJA
46 SCRA 577 (1972)
FACTS: Francisco de Borja, upon the death of his wife Josefa,fi led for
the probate of her will. When the will was probated, Francisco was
appointed as executor and administrator and herein appellee, Jose
de Borja, their son was appointed as coadministrator.Subsequently,
Francisco took upon himself, a secondwife, Tasiana Ongsingco (Vda.
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De Borja). Even before the estate of Josefa was settled, Francisco
died. Tasiana instituted testate proceedings wherein she was
appointed special Administratrix. The relationship between the
children of the first marriage and the second wife, Tasiana had been
plagued with numeroussuits and counter-suits and in order to put an
end to all theselitigation, a compromise agreement was entered into
betweenJose, in his personal capacity and as administrator of the
Testate Estate of Josefa, and by Tasiana, as the heir and surviving
spouse of Francisco. Pursuant to the compromise agreement, Jose
agreed and obligated himself to pay Tasiana the amount of P
800,000.00 as ‘”full and complete payment and settlement of her
hereditary share in the estate of the late Francisco de Borja as well as
the estateof Josefa, and to any properties bequeathed or devised in
her favor by the late Francisco de Borja by Last Will and Testament or
by Donation Inter Vivos or Mortis Causa or purportedly conveyed to
her for consideration or otherwise.” When Jose submitted the
compromise agreement for Court approval with the CFI of Rizal
(probate of will of fi rst wife) and the CFI of Nueva Ecija (probate of
will of Francisco), Tasiana opposed in both instances. She claims
among others, that the heirs cannot enter into such kind of
agreement without fi rst probating the will of Francisco de Borja.
ISSUE: Whether the compromise agreement is valid?
HELD: In assailing the validity of the agreement, Tasiana relies on this
Court’s decision in Guevara v. Guevara wherein the Court held the
view that presentation of a will for probate is mandatory and that the
settlement and distribution of an estateon the basis of intestacy when
the decedent left a will, is against the law and public policy.
However, the doctrine in said case is not applicable to the case at
bar. There was here no attempt to settle or to distribute the estate of
Francisco among the heirs thereto before the probate of his will. The
clear object of the contract was merely the conveyance by Tasiana
of any and all her individual share and interest, actual or eventual, in
the estate of Francisco and Josefa. Since a hereditary share in a
decedent’s estate is transmitted or vested immediately from the
moment of the death of such predecessor in interest, there is no legal
bar to a successor disposing of her or his hereditary share immediately
after such death, even if the actual extent of such share is not
determined until the subsequent liquidation of the estate. Of course,
the effect of such alienation is to be deemed limited to what is
ultimately adjudicated to the vendor heir.
CASE ASSIGNMENT IN WILLS & SUCCESSION
“Cross as a Signature”: A cross cannot be likened to a thumb mark
since it can be easily written by some other person whereas a thumb
mark may only be placed by the testator himself. Unless it can be
proven that the testator’s customary signature is a cross, then the will
cannot be considered to have been signed by the testator himself.
PAULMITAN V. CA- Co-ownership of Property
215 SCRA 866
When a co-owner sells the entire property without consent from the
other co-owners, only his pro indiviso share on the property is
transferred to the buyer.
FACTS:
The dispute covers 2 lots, Lot 757 and Lot 1091, which were owned
by Agatona Paulmitan. She had 2 children, Pascual and Donato.
Pascual’s (7) children (Alicio, Elena, Abelino, Adelina, Anita, Baking,
Anito) are the respondents and Donato and his daughter and son-
in-law are petitioners.
Donato executed an Affidavit of Declaration of Heirship,
adjudicating to himself Lot 757 claiming that he is the sole surviving
heir thus the OCT of Agatona was cancelled and a TCT was issued
in his name. He executed a deed of sale of Lot 1091 in favor of his
daughter, Juliana. For non-payment of taxes, the lot was forfeited
and sole at a public to the Provincial Gov’t of Negros Occidental,
however, Juliana was able to redeem the property. Upon learning
these, the children of Pascual filed w/ the CFI a complaint against
petitioners to partition the land plus damages. Petitioners’ defense
was that the action has already prescribed for it was filed more than
11 years after the issuance of the TCT and that Juliana has acquired
exclusive ownership thru the Deed of Sale and by redeeming the
said property.
The CFI dismissed the complaint and became final and executory.
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With respect to Lot 1091, the court decided in favor of respondents.
They are entitled to ½ of Lot 1091, pro indiviso. The redemption did
not in anyway prejudice their rights. The land was ordered to be
partitioned and the petitioners were ordered to pay the
respondents their share of the fruits and the respondents to pay their
share in the redemption of the land. The CA affirmed the decision
thus the case at bar.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not Pascual’s children and Donato and Juliana were
co-owners of their mother’s lot
(2) Whether or not Juliana acquired full ownership by redeeming the
property
HELD:
(1) YES: When Agatona died, her estate was still unpartitioned. Art.
1078 states that “Where there are 2 or more heirs, the whole estate
of the decedent is, before its partition, owned in common by such
heirs, subject to the payment of debts of the deceased”. Since
Pascual and Donato were still alive when she died, they are co-
owners of the estate. When Pascual died, his children succeeded
him in the co-ownership of the property.
When Donato sold to his daughter the lot, he was only a co-owner
of the same thus he can only sell his undivided portion of the
property. Art. 493 states that “each co-owner shall have the full
ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining
thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it and
even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when
personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or
mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the
portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the
termination of the co-ownership.”
Only the rights of the co-owner-seller are transferred making the
buyer (Juliana) a co-owner.
(2) NO: When she redeemed the property, it did not end the co-
CASE ASSIGNMENT IN WILLS & SUCCESSION
ownership. The right of repurchase may be exercised by a co-owner
w/ respect to his/her share alone as stated in Art. 1612. But she may
compel them to reimburse her for half of the repurchase price for a
co-owner has the right to compel other co-owners to contribute to
the expenses for the preservation of the thing and to taxes.
AZNAR V. DUNCAN
17 SCRA 590
FACTS:
Christensen died testate. The will was admitted to probate. The
court declared that Helen Garcia was a natural child of
the deceased. The Court of First Instance equally divided the
properties of the estate
of Christensen between Lucy Duncan (whom testator expressly
recognized in his will as his daughter) and Helen Garcia. In the
order, the CFI held that Helen Garcia was preterited in the will thus,
the institution of Lucy Duncan as heir was annulled and the
properties passed to both of them as if the deceased died intestate.
ISSUE:
Whether the estate, after deducting the legacies, should be equally
divided or whether the inheritance of Lucy as instituted heir should
be merely reduced to the extent necessary to cover the legitime
of Helen Garcia, equivalent to ¼ of the entire estate.
HELD:
The inheritance of Lucy should be merely reduced to cover the
legitime of HelenGarcia.
Christensen refused to acknowledge Helen Garcia as his natural
daughter and limited her share to a legacy of P3,600.00. When a
testator leaves to a forced heir a legacy worth less than the
legitime, but without referring to the legatee as an heir or even as a
relative, and willed the rest of the estate to other persons, the heir
could not ask that the institution of the heirs be annulled entirely, but
only that the legitime be completed.
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REYES V. BARRETTO-DATU
19 SCRA 85 (1967)
DOCTRINE:
Preterition is the omission of one, some or all compulsory heirs in the
direct line, whether living at the time of the death of the testator, or
born subsequent thereto. Among other things, Reyes holds that
omission from the inheritance, as an element of preterition, must be
a total omission, such that if a compulsory heir in the direct line
received something from the testator under the terms of the will,
such heir cannot be considered preterited
FACTS: Bibiano Barretto was married to Maria Gerardo. During their
lifetime they acquired a vast estate, consisting of real properties in
Manila, Pampanga, and Bulacan.
1. When Bibiano Barretto died on February 18, 1936, in the City
of Manila, he left his share of these properties in a will to
SaludBarretto (Salud), mother of plaintiff's wards, and Lucia
Milagros Barretto (Milagros) and a small portion as legacies to
his two sisters Rosa Barretto and FelisaBarretto and his nephew
and nieces. The usufruct of the fishpond situated in barrio San
Roque, Hagonoy, Bulacan, above-mentioned, however, was
reserved for his widow, Maria Gerard. In the meantime, Maria
Gerardo was appointed administratrix. By virtue, thereof, she
prepared a project of partition, which was signed by her in
her own behalf and as guardian of the minor Milagros
Barretto. Said project of partition was approved by the Court
of First Instance of Manila. The distribution of the estate and
the delivery of the shares of the heirs followed. As a
consequence, SaludBarretto took immediate possession of
her share and secured the cancellation of the original
certificates of title and the issuance of new titles in her own
name.
2. Maria Gerardo died and upon her death, it was discovered
that she executed two will. In the first will, she instituted Salud
and Milagros as her heirs. In the second will, she revoked the
same and left all her properties in favour of Milagros alone.
The later will was allowed and the first rejected.
CASE ASSIGNMENT IN WILLS & SUCCESSION
3. In rejecting the first will presented by Tirso Reyes, husband of
the deceasedSalud, as guardian of the children, it was
determined by the lower court that Salud was not a child of
Maria Gerardo and her husband, Bibiano. This ruling was
appealed to the Supreme Court, which affirmed the same.
4. Having thus lost this fight for a share in the estate of Maria
Gerardo as a legitimate heir of Maria Gerardo, plaintiff now
falls back upon the remnant of the estate of the deceased
BibianoBarretto, which was given in usufruct to his widow
Maria Gerardo (fishpond property). Hence, this action for the
recovery of one-half portion, thereof.
5. Milagros then moved to declare the project of partition
submitted in the proceedings for the settlement of the estate
of Bibiano to be null and void ab initio because the
Distributee, SaludBarretto, was not a daughter of the Sps.
The nullity of the project was based on Art. 1081 of the Civil
Code of 1889 which provided that :
“A partition in which a person was believed to be an
heir, without being so, has been included, shall be
null and void.”
The Court ordered the plaintiff to return the properties
received under the project
of partition.
ISSUE: WON the partition from which Salud acquired the fishpond is
void ab initio and that Salud did not acquire title thereto
HELD: NO
1. Salud Barretto admittedly had been instituted as an heir in the
late BibianoBarretto's last will and testament together with
defendant Milagros; hence, the partition had between them
could not be one such had with a party who was believed to
be an heir without really being one, and was not null and void
under said article. The legal precept (Article 1081) does not
speak of children, or descendants, but of heirs (without
distinction between forced, voluntary or intestate ones), and
the fact that Salud happened not to be a daughter of the
testator does not preclude her being one of the heirs expressly
named in his testament; for Bibiano Barretto was at liberty to
assign the free portion of his estate to whomsoever he chose.
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While the share (½) assigned to Salud impinged on the
legitime of Milagros, Salud did not for that reason cease to be
a testamentary heir of Bibiano Barretto.
2. Where the testator allotted in his will to his legitimate daughter
a share less than her legitime, such circumstance would not
invalidate the institution of a stranger as an heir, since there
was no prepetition or total omission of the forced heir.
3. Where a partition was made between two persons instituted
as heirs in the will, and one of them was found out later not to
be the testator’s daughter, while the other was really his
daughter, it cannot be said that the partition was a void
compromise on the civil status of the person who was not the
testator’s daughter. At the time of the partition, the civil status
of that person was not being questioned. There can be no
compromise on a matter that was not an issue. While the law
outlaws a compromise over civil status, it does not forbid a
settlement by the parties regarding the share that should
correspond to the claimant to the hereditary estate.
4. A project of partition is merely a proposal for the distribution
of the hereditary estate, which the court may accept or
reject. It is the court alone that makes the distribution of the
estate and determines the persons entitled thereto. It is the
final judicial decree of distribution that vests title in the
distributees. If the decree was erroneous, it should have been
corrected by an opportune appeal; but once it had become
final, its binding effect is like that of any other judgment in rem,
unless properly set aside for lack of jurisdiction or fraud. Where
the court has validly issued a decree of distribution and the
same has become final, the validity or invalidity of the project
of partition becomes irrelevant.
5. A distribution in the decedent’s will, made according to his
will should be respected. The fact that one of the distributees
was a minor (Milagros) at the time the court issued the decree
of distribution does not imply that the court had no jurisdiction
to enter the decree of distribution. The proceeding for the
settlement of a decedent’s estate is a proceeding in rem. It
is binding on the distributee who was represented by her
mother as guardian.
6. Where in a partition between two instituted heirs, one of them
did not know that she was not really the child of the testator,
it cannot be said that she defrauded the other heir who was
the testator’s daughter. At any rate, relief on the ground of
CASE ASSIGNMENT IN WILLS & SUCCESSION
fraud must be obtained within 4 years from its discovery.
When Milagros was 16 years old in 1939, when the fraud was
allegedly perpetrated and she became of age in 1944, and
became award of the fraud in 1946, her action in 1956 to set
aside the partition was clearly barred.
AUSTRIA V. REYES
31 SCRA 754
FACTS:
Basilia Austria vda. de Cruz filed with the CFI of Rizal a petition for
probate, ante mortem, of her last will and testament. The probate
was opposed by the present petitioners, who are nephews and
nieces of Basilia. The will was subsequently allowed with the bulk of
her estate designated for respondents, all of whom were Basilia’s
legally adopted children. The petitioners, claiming to be the nearest
of kin of Basilia, assert that the respondents had not in fact been
adopted by the decedent in accordance with law, thereby making
them mere strangers to the decedent and without any right to
succeed as heirs. Petitioners argue that this circumstanceshould
have left the whole estate of Basilia open to intestacy with
petitioners being the compulsory heirs.
It is alleged by petitioners that the language used imply that Basilia
was deceived into believing that she was legally bound to
bequeath one-half of her entire estate to the respondents as the
latter’s legitime, with the inference that respondents would not have
instituted the respondents as heirs had the fact of spurious adoption
been known to her. The petitioners inferred that from the use of the
terms, “sapilitang tagapagmana” (compulsory heirs) and
“sapilitang mana” (legitime), the impelling reason or cause for the
institution of the respondents was the testatrix’s belief that under the
law she could not do otherwise. Thus Article 850 of the Civil Code
applies whereby, “the statement of a false cause for the institution
of an heir shall be considered as not written, unless it appears from
the will that the testator would not have made such institution if he
had known the falsity of such cause.”
ISSUE:
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PALOY
W/N the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion in barring
the petitioners nephews and niece from registering their claim even
to properties adjudicated by the decedent in her will.
HELD:
No. Before the institution of heirs may be annulled under article 850
of the Civil Code, the following requisites must concur: First, the
cause for the institution of heirs must be stated in the will; second,
the cause must be shown to be false; and third, it must appear from
the face of the will that the testator would not have made such
institution if he had known the falsity of the cause. The decedent’s
will does not state in a specific or unequivocal manner the cause for
such institution of heirs. Absent such we look at other considerations.
The decedent’s disposition of the free portion of her estate, which
largely favored the respondents, compared with the relatively
small devise of land which the decedent left for her blood relatives,
shows a perceptible inclination on her part to give the respondents
more than what she thought the law enjoined her to give to them.
Excluding the respondents from the inheritance, considering that
petitioner nephews and nieces would succeed to the bulk of the
testate by virtue of intestacy, would subvert the clear wishes of the
decedent.
Testacy is favored and doubts are resolved on its side, especially
where the will evinces an intention on the part of the testator
to dispose of practically his whole estate, as was done in this case.
Intestacy should be avoided and the wishes of the testator should
be allowed to prevail. Granted that a probate court has found, by
final judgment, that the decedent possessed testamentary
capacity and her last will was executed free from falsification, fraud,
trickery or undue influence, it follows that giving full expression to her
will must be in order.
CAMAYA V. PATULANDONG
423 SCRA 480
FACTS:
On November 17, 1972, Rufina Reyes (testatrix) executed a
notarized will wherein she devised Lot no. 288-A to her
CASE ASSIGNMENT IN WILLS & SUCCESSION
grandson Anselmo Mangulabnan. During her lifetime, the
testatrix herself filed the petition for the probate of her will before
the CFI. Later, on June 27, 1973, the testatrix executed a codicil
modifying her will by devising the said Lot 288-A in favor of her
four children Bernardo (the executor), Simplicia, Huillerma and Juan
(all surnamed Patulandong), and her grandson Mangulabnan – to
the extent of 1/5 each.
Mangulabnan later sought the delivery to him
by executor Patulandong of the title of Lot 288-A, but Patulandong
refused to heed the request because of the codicial which
modified the will of the testatrix. Thus, Mangulabnan filed an ‘action
for partition’ against Patulandong in the RTC. The court in this
partition ordered the partitioning of the property. However, the
court holds that ‘the partition is without prejudice to the probate of
the codicil in accordance with the Rules of Court.’ So, by virtue of
the decision in partition case, Mangulabnan caused the
cancellation of the title of the testatrix over Lot 288-A, and another
TCT was issued in his name. Mangulabnan later sold to herein
petitioners Camayas Lot no. 288-A by a Deed of Sale, and thus, a
TCT was issued under the name of the Camayas.
However, come now the decision of the probate court admitting
the codicil, and disposing that the Deed of Sale in favor of the
Camayas, and the corresponding TCT issued in their name are null
and void, and that the Register of Dees was ordered to issue instead
corresponding certificates of titles to the aforesaid four children of
the testatrix, and her grandson Mangulabnan to the extent of 1/5
each pursuant to the codicil.
The Camayas and Mangulabnan filed an MR. But the probate court
denied this. The CA affirmed the decision of the probate court. Thus,
the case was brought to the SC via a petition for review on
certiorari.
ISSUES:
1.Whether the probate court exceeded its jurisdiction when it
declared null and void and ordered the cancellation of the TCT of
Camayas and the deed of sale.
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PALOY
2.Whether the final judgment in partition case bars the allowance of
the codicil.
HELD:
1.As to the first issue, the probate court exceeded its jurisdiction
when it declared the deed of sale as null and void, and also as to
the cancellation of the TCTs under the name of the Camayas. It is
well-settled rule that a probate court or one in chargeof
proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or
determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and
which are equally claimed to belong to outside parties. All that said
court could do as regards said properties is to determine whether
they should not be included in the inventory. If there is no dispute,
well and good; but if there is, then the parties, the administrator,
and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action for
final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the
probate court cannot do so. Having been apprised of the fact that
the property in question was in the possession of third parties and
more important, covered by a transfer certificate of title issued in
the name of such third parties, the respondent court should have
denied the motion of the respondent administrator and excluded
the property in question from the inventory of the property of the
estate. It had no authority to deprive such third persons of their
possession and ownership of the property. The probate court
exceeded its jurisdiction when it declared the deed of sale and the
titles of the Camayas as null and void, it having had the effect of
depriving them possession and ownership of the property.
2.As to the second issue, petitioners argue that by allowing the
codicil to probate, it in effect amended the final judgment in the
partition case which is not allowed by law; and that petitioner
Camayas are innocent purchasers for value and enjoy the legal
presumption that the transfer was lawful. Petitioners’ argument does
not persuade. Though the judgment in the partition case had
become final and executory as it was not appealed, it specifically
provided in its dispositive portion that the decision was “without
prejudice [to] … the probate of the codicil.” The rights of the
prevailing parties in said case were thus subject to the outcome of
the probate of the codicil.
CASE ASSIGNMENT IN WILLS & SUCCESSION
The probate court being bereft of authority to rule upon the validity
of petitioners’ titles, there is no longer any necessity to dwell on the
merits of petitioners Camayas’ claim that they
are innocent purchasers for value and enjoy the legal presumption
that the transfer was lawful.
The petition is granted in part. The decision of the probate court
allowing the codicil is affirmed. But, the declaration of the
aforesaid Deed of Sale, and the order to reissue corresponding
certificates of titles to the four children of the testratrix, and her
grandson Mangulabnan are set aside, without prejudice to the
respondent’s ventilation of their right in an appropriate action.
DOROTHEO V. CA
GR NO. 108581, DECEMBER 8, 1999
FACTS:
Aniceta Reyes died in 1969 without her estate being settled.
Thereafter, her husband Alejandro also died. In 1977, Lourdes
Dorotheo filed a special proceeding for the probate of Alejandro’s
last will and testament. The children of spouses filed their opposition.
The RTC ruled that Lourdes being not the wife of Alejandro the will is
intrinsically void; the oppositors are the only heir entitled to the
estate. Lourdes filed a Motion for Consideration arguing that she is
entitled to some compensationsince she took care
of Alejandro prior to his death although they were not legally
married to each other. This was denied by the trial court. The CA
dismissed her appeal for her failure to wile the same within the
extended period.
ISSUE:
May a last will and testament admitted to probate but declared
intrinsically void in an order that has become final and executor still
be given effect?
RULING:
No. A final and executor decision or order can no longer be
disturbed or reopened no matter how erroneous it may be.
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PALOY
The Supreme Court ruled that the will of Alejandro was extrinsically
valid but the intrinsic provisions thereof are void. Alejandro gave
all the property to the concubine. Such is invalid because one
cannot dispose what he does not own. In this case, the whole
property is the conjugal property of Alejandro and Aniceta. Such
has become final and executor. The only instance where a party
interested in probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set
aside is when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his
control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to
negligence with circumstances do not concur herein.
REYES V. CA
281 SCRA 277
FACTS:
This case involves a 383 sq.m. parcel of land owned by pettitioner’s
and respondents’ father. Petitioner alleges that a Deed of
Exrajudicial Partition (Deed) was entered into between him and the
respondents. Petitioner managed to register335 sq.m. of the land
under his name; while 50 sq.m. of the land was registeredunder the
name of his sister, Paula (one of the respondents). After discovering
the registration of the Deed, respondents denied having knowledge
of its execution and disclaimed having signed the same; nor did
they ever waive their rights, shares and interest in the subject parcel
of land. According to respondents, subject Deed was fraudulently
prepared by petitioner and that their signatures thereon were
forged. They also assert that one Atty. Jose Villena, the Notary Public
who notarized the said Deed was not even registered in the
list of accredited Notaries Public of Pasay City.
Thereafter, petitioner executed a Deed of Absolute Sale selling 240
square meters of the land to his children. After the property was
partitioned, petitioner, his childrenand private respondent Paula
allegedly executed a Deed of Co-owners’ Partition dividing the
property among themselves. This led the respondents to file a
Complaint for “Annulment of Sale and Damages With Prayer for
Preliminary Injunction/Restraining Order” before the RTC, which
ruled that private respondents’ signatures on the questioned Deed
CASE ASSIGNMENT IN WILLS & SUCCESSION
of Extrajudicial Partition and Settlement were indeed forged and
simulated. The CA affirmed. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
1.Whether the Deed was forged.
2.Whether petitioner(s) had become absolute owners of the subject
property by virtue of acquisitive prescription.
RULING:
1.YES. Petitioner(s) cast doubt on the findings of the lower court as
affirmed by the Court of Appeals regarding the existence of forgery.
Factual findings of the trial court, adopted and confirmed by
the Court of Appeals, are final and conclusive and may not be
reviewed on appeal. Petitioners’ ludicrous claim that private
respondents imputed no deception on his part but only forgery of
the subject Deed and the simulation of their signatures is nothing
short of being oxymoronic. For what is forgery and simulation of
signatures if not arrant deception! The allegation made by
petitioner that the execution of a public document ratified before a
notary public cannot be impugned by the mere denial of the
signatory is baseless. It should be noted that there was a finding that
the subject Deed was notarized by one Atty. Villena who at that
time was not commissioned as a notary in Pasay City.
2.NO. Petitioners cannot justify their ownership and possession of the
subject parcel of land since they could not ave been possessors in
good faith of the subject parcel of land considering the finding that
at the very inception they forged the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition
and Settlement which they claim to be the basis for their just title.
Having forged the Deed and simulated the signatures of private
respondents, petitioners, in fact, are in bad faith. The forged Deed
containing private respondents’ simulated signatures is a nullity and
cannot serve as a just title. There can be no acquisitive prescription
considering that the parcel of land in dispute is titled property, i.e.,
titled in the name of the late Bernardino Reyes, the father of both
petitioner Florentino and the private respondents.
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PALOY
NEPOMUCENO V. CA
139 SCRA 206
FACTS:
Martin Jugo left a duly executed and notarized Last Will and
Testament before he died. Petitioner was named as sole executor. It
is clearly stated in the Will that he was legally married to a certain
Rufina Gomez by whom he had two legitimate children, but he had
been estranged from his lawful wife. In fact, the testator Martin Jugo
and the petitioner were married despite the subsisting first marriage.
The testator devised the free portion of his estate to petitioner. On
August 21, 1974, the petitioner filed a petition for probate. On May
13, 1975, Rufina Gomez and her children filed an opposition alleging
undue and improper influence on the part of the petitioner; that at
the time of the execution of the Will, the testator was already very
sick and that petitioner having admitted her living in concubinage
with the testator.
The lower court denied the probate of the Will on the ground that
as the testator admitted in his Will to cohabiting with the petitioner.
Petitioner appealed to CA. On June 2, 1982, the respondent court
set aside the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal denying
the probate of the will. The respondent court declared the Will to be
valid except that the devise in favor of the petitioner is null and
void.
ISSUE:
W/N the CA acted in excess of its jurisdiction when after declaring
the last Will and Testament of the deceased Martin Jugo
validly drawn, it went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the
testamentary provision.
HELD:
No. The respondent court acted within its jurisdiction when after
declaring the Will to be validly drawn, it went on to pass upon the
intrinsic validity of the Will and declared the devise in favor of the
petitioner null and void. The general rule is that in probate
proceedings, the court’s area of inquiry is limited to an examination
and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the Will. The rule, however, is
CASE ASSIGNMENT IN WILLS & SUCCESSION
not inflexible and absolute. Given exceptional circumstances, the
probate court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it
to do and pass upon certain provisions of the Will.
The probate of a will might become an idle ceremony if on its face
it appears to be intrinsically void. Where practical considerations
demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even
before it is probated, the court should meet the issue (Nuguid v.
Nuguid)
The Will is void under Article 739. The following donations shall be
void: (1) Those made between persons who were guilty of adultery
or concubinage at the time of the donation; and Article 1028. The
prohibitions mentioned in Article 739, concerning donations inter
vivos shall apply to testamentary provisions.
There is no question from the records about the fact of a prior
existing marriage when Martin Jugo executed his Will. The very
wordings of the Will invalidate the legacy because the testator
admitted he was disposing the properties to a person with whom he
had been living in concubinage.
ROBERTS V. LEONIDAS
129 SCRA 754
FACTS:
Grimm, an American resident of Manila, died in 1977. He was
survived by his second wife (Maxine), their two children (Pete and
Linda), and by his two childrenby a first marriage (Juanita and Ethel)
which ended by divorce.
Grimm executed two wills in San Francisco, California on January 23,
1959. One will disposed of his Philippine estate described
as conjugal property of himself and his second wife. The second
will disposed of his estate outside the Philippines. The two wills and a
codicil were presented for probate in Utah by Maxine on March
1978. Maxine admitted that she received notice of the intestate
petition filed in Manila by Ethel in January 1978. The Utah Court
admitted the two wills and codicil to probate on April 1978 and was
issued upon consideration of the stipulation between the attorneys
for Maxine and Ethel.
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PALOY
Also in April 1978, Maxine and Ethel, with knowledge of the intestate
proceeding in Manila, entered into a compromise agreement in
Utah regarding the estate.
As mentioned, in January 1978, an intestate proceeding was
instituted by Ethel. On March 1978, Maxine filed an opposition and
motion to dismiss the intestate proceeding on the ground of
pendency of the Utah probate proceedings. She submitted to the
court a copy of Grimm’s will. However, pursuant to the compromise
agreement, Maxine withdrew the opposition and the motion to
dismiss. The court ignored the will found in the record.The estate was
partitioned.
In 1980, Maxine filed a petition praying for the probate of the two
wills (already probated in Utah), that the partition approved by the
intestate court be set aside and the letters of administration
revoked, that Maxine be appointed executrix and Ethel be ordered
to account for the properties received by them and return the same
to Maxine. Maxine alleged that they were defrauded due to the
machinations of Ethel, that the compromise agreement was illegal
and the intestate proceeding was void because Grimm died
testate so partition was contrary to the decedent’s wills.
Ethel filed a motion to dismiss the petition which was denied by
Judge Leonidas for lack of merit.
ISSUE:
Whether the judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction in denying Ethel’s motion to dismiss.
HELD:
We hold that respondent judge did not commit any grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in denying Ethel’s
motion to dismiss.
A testate proceeding is proper in this case because Grimm died
with two wills and “no will shall pass either real or personal property
unless it is proved and allowed” (Art. 838, Civil Code; sec. 1, Rule 75,
Rules of Court).
CASE ASSIGNMENT IN WILLS & SUCCESSION
The probate of the will is mandatory. It is anomalous that the estate
of a person who died testate should be settled in an intestate
proceeding. Therefore, the intestate case should
be consolidated with the testate proceeding and the judge
assigned to the testate proceeding should continue hearing the
two cases.
GALLANOSA V. ARCANGEL
83 SCRA 676
FACTS:
Florentino Hitosis was a childless widower and was survived by his
brother Lito. In his will, Florentino bequeathed his ½ share in
the conjugal estate to his second wife, Tecla, and, should Tecla
predecease him, as was the case, his ½ share would be assigned to
spouses Gallanosa. Pedro Gallanosa was Tecla’s son by her first
marriage who grew up under the care of Florentino. His other
properties were bequeathed to his protégé Adolfo Fortajada.
Upon his death, a petition for the probate of his will was wile.
Opposition was registered by Florentino’s brother, nephews and
nieces.
After a hearing, where the oppositors did not present any evidence,
the Judge admitted the will to probate.
The testator’s legal heirs did not appeal from the decree of probate
and from the order of partition and distribution.
Later, the legal heirs filed a case for recovery of 61 parcels of land
against Pedro alleging that they had been in continuous possession
of those lands and praying that they be declared owners thereof.
Pedro moved for a dismissal which was later granted by the Judge
on the ground of res judicata.
The legal heirs did not appeal from the order of dismissal.
15 years after the dismissal of the first civil case and 28 years after
the probate of the will, the legal heirs filed a case for “annulment of
the will” alleging fraud and deceit.
PALOY
The court dismissed said action. However, the court set aside the
dismissal after the heirs filed a motion for reconsideration. Hence,
this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether the legal heirs have a cause of action for the “annulment”
of the will of Florentino and for the recovery of the 61 parcels of land
adjudicated under that will to the petitioners.
HELD:
NO. The SC held that the lower court committed a grave abuse of
discretion in setting aside its order of dismissal and ignoring the
testamentary case and the first civil case which is the same as the
instant case. It is evident that second civil case is barred by res
judicata and by prescription.
The decree of probate is conclusive as to the due execution or
formal validity of the will. That means that the testator was of sound
and disposing mind at the time he executed the will and was not
acting under duress, menace, fraud, or undue influence; that the
will was signed by him in the presence of the required number of
witnesses, and that the will is genuine.
Accordingly, these facts cannot again be questioned in a
subsequent proceeding, not even in a criminal action for the
forgery of the will.
After the finality of the allowance of a will, the issue as to the
voluntariness of its execution cannot be raised anymore.
The SC also held that the decree of adjudication, having rendered
in a proceeding in rem, is binding upon the whole world. Moreover,
the dismissal of the first civil case, which is a judgment in personam,
was an adjudication on the merits. Thus. It constitutes a bar by
former judgment under the Rules of Court.
The SC also held that the lower court erred in saying that the action
for the recovery of the lands had not prescribed. The SC ruled that
the Art. 1410 of NCC (the action or defense for the declaration of

14
CASE ASSIGNMENT IN WILLS & SUCCESSION
the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe) cannot apply to
last wills and testaments.
The Rules of Court does not sanction an action for “annulment” of a
will.
A final decree of probate is conclusive as to the due execution of
the will.
A decree of adjudication in a testate proceeding is binding on the
whole world.After the period for seeking relief from a final order or
judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules of court has expired, a final
judgment or order can be set aside only on the grounds of: (a) lack
of jurisdiction or lack of due process of law or (b) that the judgment
was obtained by means of extrinsic or collateral fraud. In the latter
case, the period for annulling the judgment is four (4) years from the
discovery of fraud.
The Civil Law rule that an action for declaration of inexistence of a
contract does not prescribe cannot be applied to last wills and
testaments.
CASIANO V. CA
158 SCRA 451
FACTS:
On October 20, 1963, Adriana Maloto died leaving as heirs her
niece and nephews, the petitioners Aldina Maloto-Casiano and
Constancio, Maloto, and the private respondents Panfilo Maloto
and Felino Maloto. Believing that the deceased did not leave
behind a last will and testament, these four heirs commenced on
November 4, 1963 an intestate proceeding for the settlement of
their aunt’s estate in the CFI of Iloilo. While the case was still pending
the parties — Aldina, Constancio, Panfilo, and Felino — executed
an agreement of extrajudicial settlement of Adriana’s estate. The
agreement provided for the division of the estate into four equal
parts among the parties. The Malotos then presented the
extrajudicial settlement agreement to the trial court for approval
which the court did on March 21, 1964.
3 years later, Atty. Sulpicio Palma, a former associate of
Adriana’s counsel, the late Atty. Eliseo Hervas, discovered a
15
PALOY
document entitled “KATAPUSAN NGA PAGBUBULAT-AN
(Testamento),” dated January 3,1940, and purporting to be the last
will and testament of Adriana. Atty. Palma claimed to have found
the testament, the original copy, while he was going through some
materials inside the cabinet drawer formerly used by Atty. Hervas.
The document was submitted to the clerk of court of the Iloilo CFI.
Incidentally, while Panfilo and Felino are still named as heirs in the
said will, Aldina and Constancio are bequeathed much bigger and
more valuable shares in the estate of Adriana than what they
received by virtue of the agreement of extrajudicial settlement they
had earlier signed. The will likewise gives devises and legacies to
other parties, among them being the petitioners Asilo de Molo, the
Roman Catholic Church of Molo, and Purificacion Miraflor.
Aldina and Constancio, joined by the other devisees and legatees
named in the will, filed in the same court which approved the EJ
settelement a motion for reconsideration and annulment of the
proceedings therein and for the allowance of the will which was
denied by the CFI. Upon petition to the SC for certiorari and
mandamus, the SC dismissed that petition and advised that a
separate proceeding for the probate of the alleged will would be
the appropriate vehicle to thresh out the matters raised by the
petitioners. The CFI and CA found that the will to be probated had
been revoked by the burning thereof by the housemaid upon
instruction of the testatrix.
ISSUE:
W/N the will was revoked by Adriana.
HELD:
No. The provisions of the new Civil Code pertinent to the issue can
be found in Article 830.
The physical act of destruction of a will, like burning in this case,
does not per se constitute an effective revocation, unless the
destruction is coupled with animus revocandi on the part of the
testator. It is not imperative that the physical destruction be done by
the testator himself. It may be performed by another person but
under the express direction and in the presence of the testator. Of
CASE ASSIGNMENT IN WILLS & SUCCESSION
course, it goes without saying that the document destroyed must be
the will itself.
“Animus revocandi” is only one of the necessary elements for the
effective revocation of a last will and testament. The intention to
revoke must be accompanied by the overt physical act of burning,
tearing, obliterating, or cancelling the will carried out by the testator
or by another person in his presence and under his express direction.
There is paucity of evidence to show compliance with
these requirements. For one, the document or papers burned by
Adriana’s maid, Guadalupe, was not satisfactorily established to be
a will at all, much less the will of Adriana Maloto. For another, the
burning was not proven to have been done under the express
direction of Adriana. And then, the burning was not in her presence.
Both witnesses, Guadalupe and Eladio, were one in stating that they
were the only ones present at the place where the stove
(presumably in the kitchen) was located in which the papers
proffered as a will were burned.
The two witnesses were illiterate and does not appear to be
unequivocably positive that the document burned was indeed
Adriana’s will. Guadalupe believed that the papers she destroyed
was the will only because, according to her, Adriana told her so.
Eladio, on the other hand, obtained his information that the burned
document was the will because Guadalupe told him so, thus, his
testimony on this point is double hearsay.
It is an important matter of public interest that a purported win is not
denied legalization on dubious grounds. Otherwise, the very
institution of testamentary succession will be shaken to its very
foundations.
GAGO VS. MAMUYAC
G.R. NO. L-26317 JANUARY 29, 1927
Facts:
1. Previously, Francisco Gago filed a petition for the probate of a will
of Miguel Mamuyac executed on July 27, 1918. The oppositors
alleged that the said will was already annulled and revoked. It
appeared that on April 16, 1919, the deceased executed another
16
PALOY
will. The lower court denied the probate of the first will on the
ground of the existence of the second will.
2. Another petition was filed to seek the probate of the second will.
The oppositors alleged that the second will presented was merely a
copy. According to the witnesses, the said will was allegedly
revoked as per the testimony of Jose Tenoy, one of the witnesses
who typed the document. Another witness testified that on
December 1920 the original will was actually cancelled by the
testator.
3. The lower court denied the probate and held that the same has
been annulled and revoked.
Issue: Whether or not there was a valid revocation of the will
RULING: Yes. The will was already cancelled in 1920. This was inferred
when after due search, the original will cannot be found. When the
will which cannot be found in shown to be in the possession of the
testator when last seen, the presumption is that in the absence of
other competent evidence, the same was deemed cancelled or
destroyed. The same presumption applies when it is shown that the
testator has ready access to the will and it can no longer be found
after his death.
Gonzales v. CA
90 SCRA 183
FACTS:
Isabel Gabriel died on June 7, 1961 without issue. Lutgarda Santiago
(respondent), niece of Isabel, filed a petition for probate of Isabel’s
will designating her as the principal beneficiary and executrix. The
will was typewritten in Tagalog and was executed 2 months prior to
death of Isabel.
The petition was opposed by Rizalina Gonzales (petitioner), also a
niece of Isabel, on the following grounds: 1. the will is not genuine, 2.
will was not executed and attested as required by law, 3. the
decedent at the time of the making of the will did not have
testamentary capacity due to her age and sickness, and 4. the will
CASE ASSIGNMENT IN WILLS & SUCCESSION
was procured through undue influence.
The trial court disallowed the probate of the will but the Court of
Appeals Reversed the said decision of the trial court. The petitioner
filed a petition for review with SC claiming that the CA erred in
holding that the will of the decedent was executed and attested as
required by law when there was absolutely no proof that the 3
instrumental witnesses are credible.
ISSUE:
1. 1. Can a witness be considered competent under Art 820-821 and
still not be considered credible as required by Art. 805?
2. Is it required that there must be evidence on record that the
witness to a will has good standing in his/her community or that
he/she is honest or upright?
HELD:
1.Yes. The petitioner submits that the term credible in Article 805
requires something more than just being competent and, therefore,
a witness in addition to being competent under Articles 820-821
must also be credible under Art. 805. The competency of a person
to be an instrumental witness to a will is determined by the statute
(Art. 820 and 821), whereas his credibility depends on the
appreciation of his testimony and arises from the belief and
conclusion of the Court that said witness is telling the truth. In the
case of Vda. de Aroyo v. El Beaterio del Santissimo Rosario de Molo,
No. L-22005, May 3, 1968, the Supreme Court held and ruled that:
“Competency as a witness is one thing, and it is another to be a
credible witness, so credible that the Court must accept what he
says. Trial courts may allow a person to testify as a witness upon a
given matter because he is competent, but may thereafter decide
whether to believe or not to believe his testimony.”
2.No. There is no mandatory requirement that the witness testify
initially or at any time during the trial as to his good standing in the
community, his reputation for trustworthiness and for being reliable,
his honesty and uprightness (such attributes are presumed of the
witness unless the contrary is proved otherwise by the opposing
party) in order that his testimony may be believed and accepted
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PALOY
by the trial court. It is enough that the qualifications enumerated in
Article 820 of the Civil Code are complied with, such that the
soundness of his mind can be shown by or deduced from his
answers to the questions propounded to him, that his age (18 years
or more) is shown from his appearance, testimony , or competently
proved otherwise, as well as the fact that he is not blind, deaf or
dumb and that he is able to read and write to the satisfaction of the
Court, and that he has none of the disqualifications under Article
821 of the Civil Code.
KALAW V. RELOVA
G.R. NO. L-40207 SEPTEMBER 28, 1984
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J. (PONENTE)
Facts:
1. Gregorio Kalaw, the private respondent, claiming to be the sole
heir of sister Natividad, filed a peition for probate of the latter's
holographic will in 1968. The will contained 2 alterations: a) Rosa's
name, designated as the sole heir was crossed out and instead
"Rosario" was written above it. Such was not initialed, b) Rosa's
name was crossed out as sole executrix and Gregorio's ma,e was
written above it. This alteration was initialed by the testator.
2. Rosa contended that the will as first written should be given effect
so that she would be the sole heir. The lower court denied the
probate due to the unauthenticated alterations and additions.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the will is valid
RULING: No, the will is voided or revoked since nothing remains in
the will which could remain valid as there was only one disposition in
it. Such was altered by the substitution of the original heir with
another. To rule that the first will should be given effect is to
disregard the testatrix' change of mind. However, this change of
mind cannot be given effect either as she failed to authenticate it
in accordance with Art. 814, or by affixing her full signature.
CASE ASSIGNMENT IN WILLS & SUCCESSION PALOY
AJERO V. CA its probate. If the testator fails to sign and date some of the
236 SCRA 488 dispositions, the result is that these dispositions cannot be
effectuated. Such failure, however, does not render the whole
FACTS:
testament void.
The holographic will of Annie San was submitted for probate. Likewise, a holographic will can still be admitted to probate
Private respondent opposed the petition on the grounds that: notwithstanding non-compliance with the provisions of Article 814.
neither the testament’s body nor the signature therein was in
Unless the authenticated alterations, cancellations or insertions were
decedent’s handwriting; it contained alterations and corrections
made on the date of the holographic will or on testator’s signature,
which were not duly signed by decedent; and, the will was
their presence does not invalidate the will itself. The lack of
procured by petitioners through improper pressure and undue
authentication will only result in disallowance of such changes.
influence.
It is also proper to note that he requirements of authentication of
The petition was also contested by Dr. Ajero with respect to
changes and signing and dating of dispositions appear in provisions
the disposition in the will of a house and lot. He claimed that said
(Article 813 and 814) separate from that which provides for the
property could not be conveyed by decedent in its entirety, as she
necessary conditions for the validity of the holographic will (Article
was not its sole owner.
810).
However, the trial court still admitted the decedent’s holographic
This separation and distinction adds support to the interpretation
will to probate.
that only the requirements of Article 810 of the NCC – and not those
The trial court held that since it must decide only the question of the
found in Articles 813 and 814 – are essential to the probate of a
identity of the will, its due execution and the testamentary capacity
holographic will.
of the testatrix, it finds no reason for the disallowance of the will for
its failure to comply with the formalities prescribed by law nor for Section 9, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court and Article 839 of the Civil
lack of testamentary capacity of the testatrix. Code enumerate the grounds for disallowance of wills. These lists
are exclusive; no other grounds can serve to disallow a will.
On appeal, the CA reversed said Decision holding that the
decedent did not comply with Articles 313 and 314 of the NCC. It In a petition to admit a holographic will, the only issues to be
found that certain dispositions in the will were either unsigned or resolved are:
undated, or signed by not dated. It also found that the
1.whether the instrument submitted is, indeed, the decedent’s last
erasures, alterations and cancellations made had not been
will and testament;
authenticated by decedent.
2.whether said will was executed in accordance with the formalities
ISSUE:
prescribed by law;
Whether the CA erred in holding that Articles 813 and 814 of the
3.whether the decedent had the necessary testamentary capacity
NCC were not complies with.
at the time the will was executed; and
HELD:
4.whether the execution of the will and its signing were the
YES. A reading of Article 813 shows that its requirement affects the voluntary acts of the decedent.
validity of the dispositions contained in the holographic will, but not

18
CASE ASSIGNMENT IN WILLS & SUCCESSION
The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to
close the door against bad faith and fraud; accordingly, laws on
this subject should be interpreted to attain these primordial ends.
In the case of holographic wills, what assures authenticity is the
requirement that they be totally authographic or handwritten by
the testator himself. Failure to strictly observe other formalities will no
result in the disallowance of a holographic will that is
unquestionable handwritten by the testator.
CODOY V. CALUGAY
312 SCRA 333
FACTS:
On 6 April 1990, Evangeline Calugay, Josephine Salcedo and
Eufemia Patigas, devisees and legatees of the holographic will of
the deceased Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal, filed a petition for
probate of the said will. They attested to the genuineness and due
execution of the will on 30 August 1978.
Eugenio Ramonal Codoy and Manuel Ramonal filed their
opposition claiming that the will was a forgery and that the same is
even illegible. They raised doubts as regards the repeated
appearing on the will after every disposition, calling the same out of
the ordinary. If the will was in the handwriting of the deceased, it
was improperly procured.
Evangeline Calugay, etc. presented 6 witnesses and various
documentary evidence.
The first witness was the clerk of court of the probate court who
produced and identified the records of the case bearing the
signature of the deceased.
The second witness was election registrar who was made to
produce and identify the voter’s affidavit, but failed to as the same
was already destroyed and no longer available.
The third, the deceased’s niece, claimed that she had acquired
familiarity with the deceased’s signature and handwriting as she
used to accompany her in collecting rentals from her various
tenants of commercial buildings and the deceased always issued
receipts. The niece also testified that the deceased left a
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PALOY
holographic will entirely written, dated and signed by said
deceased.
The fourth witness was a former lawyer for the deceased in the
intestate proceedings of her late husband, who said that the
signature on the will was similar to that of the deceased but that he
can not be sure.
The fifth was an employee of the DENR who testified that she was
familiar with the signature of the deceased which appeared in the
latter’s application for pasture permit. The fifth, respondent
Evangeline Calugay, claimed that she had lived with the deceased
since birth where she had become familiar with her signature and
that the one appearing on the will was genuine.
Codoy and Ramonal’s demurrer to evidence was granted by the
lower court. It was reversed on appeal with the Court of
Appeals which granted the probate.
ISSUE:
1. W/N Article 811 of the Civil Code, providing that at least three
witnesses explicitly declare the signature in a contested will as the
genuine signature of the testator, is mandatory or directory.
2. Whether or not the witnesses sufficiently establish the authenticity
and due execution of the deceased’s holographic will.
HELD:
1. YES. The word “shall” connotes a mandatory order, an imperative
obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion and that
the presumption is that the word “shall”, when used in a statute, is
mandatory.
In the case at bar, the goal to be achieved by the law, is to give
effect to the wishes of the deceased and the evil to be prevented is
the possibility that unscrupulous individuals who for their benefit will
employ means to defeat the wishes of the testator.
The paramount consideration in the present petition is to determine
the true intent of the deceased.
CASE ASSIGNMENT IN WILLS & SUCCESSION
2. NO. We cannot be certain that the holographic will was in the
handwriting of the deceased.
The clerk of court was not presented to declare explicitly that the
signature appearing in the holographic will was that of the
deceased.
The election registrar was not able to produce the voter’s affidavit
for verification as it was no longer available.
The deceased’s niece saw pre-prepared receipts and letters of the
deceased and did not declare that she saw the deceased sign a
document or write a note.
The will was not found in the personal belongings of the deceased
but was in the possession of the said niece, who kept the fact about
the will from the children of the deceased, putting in issue her
motive.
Evangeline Calugay never declared that she saw the decreased
write a note or sign a document.
The former lawyer of the deceased expressed doubts as to the
authenticity of the signature in the holographic will.
(As it appears in the foregoing, the three-witness requirement was
not complied with.)
A visual examination of the holographic will convinces that the
strokes are different when compared with other documents written
by the testator.
The records are remanded to allow the oppositors to adduce
evidence in support of their opposition.
The object of solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close
the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills
and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity.
Therefore, the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a
way as to attain these primordial ends. But, on the other hand, also
one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law
to restrain and curtail the exercise the right to make a will.
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PALOY
However, we cannot eliminate the possibility of a false document
being adjudged as the will of the testator, which is why if the
holographic will is contested, the law requires three witnesses to
declare that the will was in the handwriting of the deceased.
Article 811, paragraph 1. provides: “In the probate of a holographic
will, it shall be necessary that at least one witness who knows the
handwriting and signature of the testator explicitly declare that the
will and the signature are in the handwriting of the testator. If the will
is contested, at least three of such witnesses shall be required.”
The word “shall” connotes a mandatory order, an imperative
obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion and that
the presumption is that the word “shall”, when used in a statute, is
mandatory.
AZAOLA V. SINGSON
109 P 102
FACTS:
Fortunata S. Vda. De Yance died in Quezon City on September 9,
1957. Petitioner submitted for probate her holographic will, in which
Maria Azaola was made the sole heir as against the nephew, who is
the defendant. Only one witness, Francisoco Azaola, was presented
to testify on the handwriting of the testatrix. He testified that he had
seen it one month, more or less, before the death of the testatrix, as
it was given to him and his wife; and that it was in the testatrix’s
handwriting. He presented the mortgage, the special power of the
attorney, and the general power of attorney, and the deeds of sale
including an affidavit to reinforce his statement. Two residence
certificates showing the testatrix’s signature were also exhibited for
comparison purposes.
The probate was opposed on the ground that (1) the execution of
the will was procured by undue and improper pressure and
influence on the part of the petitioner and his wife, and (2) that the
testatrix did not seriously intend the instrument to be her last will, and
that the same was actually written either on the 5th or 6th day of
August 1957 and not on November 20, 1956 as appears on the will.
CASE ASSIGNMENT IN WILLS & SUCCESSION
The probate was denied on the ground that under Article 811 of the
Civil Code, the proponent must present three witnesses who could
declare that the will and the signature are in the writing of the
testatrix, the probate being contested; and because the lone
witness presented “did not prove sufficiently that the body of the will
was written in the handwriting of the testatrix.”
Petitioner appealed, urging: first, that he was not bound to produce
more than one witness because the will’s authenticity was not
questioned; and second, that Article 811 does not mandatorily
require the production of three witnesses to identify the handwriting
and signature of a holographic will, even if its authenticity should be
denied by the adverse party.
ISSUE:
W/N Article 811 of the Civil Code is mandatory or permissive.
HELD:
Article 811 is merely permissive and not mandatory. Since the
authenticity of the will was not contested, petitioner was not
required to produce more than one witness; but even if the
genuineness of the holographic will were contested, Article 811 can
not be interpreted to require the compulsory presentation of three
witnesses to identify the handwriting of the testator, under penalty
of having the probate denied. Since no witness may have been
present at the execution of a holographicwill, none being required
by law (Art. 810, new Civil Code), it becomes obvious that the
existence of witness possessing the requisite qualifications is a matter
beyond the control of the proponent. For it is not merely a question
of finding and producing any three witnesses; they must be
witnesses “who know the handwriting and signature of the testator”
and who can declare (truthfully, of course, even if the law does not
so express) “that the will and the signature are in the handwriting of
the testator”. There may be no available witness of the testator’s
hand; or even if so familiarized, the witnesses may be unwilling to
give a positive opinion. Compliance with the rule of paragraph 1 of
Article 811 may thus become an impossibility.
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PALOY
This is the reason why the 2nd paragraph of Article 811 allows the
court to resort to expert evidence. The law foresees the possibility
that no qualified witness may be found (or what amounts to the
same thing, that no competent witness may be willing to testify to
the authenticity of the will), and provides for resort to expert
evidence to supply the deficiency.
What the law deems essential is that the court should be convinced
of the will’s authenticity. Where the prescribed number of witnesses
is produced and the court is convinced by their testimony that the
will is genuine, it may consider it unnecessary to call for expert
evidence. On the other hand, if no competent witness is available,
or none of those produced is convincing, the Court may still, and in
fact it should, resort to handwriting experts. The duty of the Court, in
fine, is to exhaust all available lines of inquiry, for the state is as much
interested as the proponent that the true intention of the testator be
carried into effect.
Rodelas v. Aranza
G.R. No. L-58509 December 7, 1982
Relova, J. (Ponente)
Facts:
1. The appellant filed a petition for the probate of the holographic
will of Ricardo Bonilla in 1977. The petition was opposed by the
appellees on the ground that the deceased did not leave any will,
holographic or otherwise.
2. The lower court dismissed the petition for probate and held that
since the original will was lost, a photostatic copy cannot stand in
the place of the original.
Issue: Whether or not a holographic will can be proved by means of
a photocopy
RULING: Yes. A photocopy of the lost or destroyed holographic will
may be admitted because the authenticity of the handwriting of
the deceased can be determined by the probate court with the
standard writings of the testator.
CASE ASSIGNMENT IN WILLS & SUCCESSION
FAUSTO E. GAN v. ILDEFONSO YAP
G.R. No. L-12190
August 30, 1958
FACTS:
On November 20, 1951, Felicidad Esguerra Alto Yap died of heart
failure in the University of Santo Tomas Hospital, leaving properties in
Pulilan, Bulacan, and in the City of Manila.
On March 17, 1952, Fausto E. Gan initiated these proceedings in the
Manila court of first instance with a petition for the probate of a
holographic will allegedly executed by the deceased.
Opposing the petition, her surviving husband Ildefonso Yap asserted
that the deceased had not left any will, nor executed any
testament during her lifetime.
After hearing the parties and considering their evidence, the Hon.
Ramon R. San Jose, Judge, refused to probate the alleged will. A
seventy-page motion for reconsideration failed. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE:
WON a holographic will be probated upon the testimony of
witnesses who have allegedly seen it and who declare that it was in
the handwriting of the testator?
HELD:
NO. The court ruled that the execution and the contents of a lost or
destroyed holographic will may not be proved by the bare
testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read such will. The loss
of the holographic will entails the loss of the only medium of proof.
Even if oral testimony were admissible to establish and probate a
lost holographic will, we think the evidence submitted by herein
petitioner is so tainted with improbabilities and inconsistencies that it
fails to measure up to that “clear and distinct” proof required by
Rule 77, sec. 6. 11.
22
PALOY
Labrador v. CA
184 SCRA 170
FACTS:
Melecio died leaving behind a parcel of land to his heirs. However,
during probate proceedings, Jesus and Gaudencio filed an
opposition on the ground that the will has been extinguished
by implication of law alleging that before Melecio’s death, the land
was sold to them evidenced by TCT No. 21178. Jesus eventually sold
it to Navat.
Trial court admitted the will to probate and declared the TCT null
and void. However, the CA on appeal denied probate on the
ground that it was undated.
ISSUE:
W/N the alleged holographic will is dated, as provided for in Article
810 of CC.
HELD:
YES. The law does not specify a particular location where the date
should be placed in the will. The only requirements are that the date
be in the will itself and executed in the hand of the testator.
The intention to show March 17 1968 as the date of the execution is
plain from the tenor of the succeeding words of the paragraph. It
states that “this being in the month of March 17th day, in the year
1968, and this decision and or instruction of mine is the matter to
be followed. And the one who made this writing is no other than
Melecio Labrador, their father.” This clearly shows that this is a
unilateral act of Melecio who plainly knew that he was executing a
will.
Roxas vs. De Jesus Jr.
134 SCRA 245
FACTS:
-Pet.- Simeon R. Roxas, brother of the deceased Bibiana Roxas De
Jesus, was appointed administrator of the Holographic Will of the
deceased Bibiana Roxas De Jesus. 26-May-1973, Judge Colayco set
CASE ASSIGNMENT IN WILLS & SUCCESSION
the probate of the holographic will. Pet.-Simeon testified that he
found a notebook belonging to the deceased (Bibiana R. De
Jesus), that on pages 21-24, a Letter-Will address to her children and
entirely written and signed in the handwriting of the deceased
Bibiana was found. The Will dated "FEB./61" and states: “This is my
Will which I want to be respected although it is not written by a
lawyer. x x x". His testimony was supported by the testimonies of
Pedro R. De jesus and Manuel Roxas.-However, Respondent Luz R.
Henson (another compulsory heir), Opposed to probate the Will
because: a. It was not executed in accordance with the Law; b. It
was executed through force, intimidation and/or under duress,
undue influence and improper pressure, and c. the alleged testatrix
(Bibiana R. De jesus) acted by mistake and/or did not intend, nor
could have intended the said Will to be her Last Will and Testament
at the time of its execution.-Aug 24,1973, Judge Colayco dismissed
the appeal and allow the probate of the Holographic Will of Bibiana
R. De Jesus- Respondent file a motion for reconsideration opposing
that the said date "FEB./61" was not in accordance with Article 810
of the Civil Code which provides that in the holographic will, it
should provide the Day, month, and year the will was executed.
ISSUE:
-W/N the Date "FEB./61" appearing on the holographic will of the
deceased Bibiana R. De Jesus is a valid compliance with the Article
810 of the Civil Code.
HELD/RULING:
- Yes, as a general rule, the "date" in a Holographic Will should be
include the day, month, and year of its execution. HOWEVER, when
as in the case at bar, there is no appearance of fraud, bad faith,
undue influence and pressure and the authenticity of the Will is
established and the only issue is whether or not the date "FEB./61" is
a valid compliance with Article 810 of the Civil Code, probate of
the holographic will should be allowed under the principle of
substantial compliance.- There is no question that the holographic
will of the deceased Bibiana R. de Jesus was entirely written, dated
and signed by her, in the language of which she known. All of her
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PALOY
children agreed on the genuineness of the Holographic Will of their
mother
Caneda v. CA
222 SCRA 781
FACTS:
On December 5, 1978, Mateo Caballero, a widower without
any children and already in the twilight years of his life, executed a
last will and testament at his residence before 3 witnesses.
He was assisted by his lawyer, Atty. Emilio Lumontad.
In the will, it was declared that the testator was leaving by way of
legacies and devises his real and personal properties to several
people all of whom do not appear to be related to the testator.
4 months later, Mateo Caballero himself filed a case seeking the
probate of his last will and testament, but numerous postponements
pushed back the initial hearing of the probate court regarding the
will.
On May 29, 1980, the testator passed away before his petition could
finally be heard by the probate court.
Thereafter one of the legatees, Benoni Cabrera, sought his
appointment as special administrator of the testator’s estate.
Thereafter, the petitioners, claiming to be nephews and nieces of
the testator, instituted a second petition for intestate proceedings.
They also opposed the probate of the testator’s will and the
appointment of a special administrator for his estate.
Benoni Cabrera died and was replaced by William Cabrera as
special administrator and gave an order that the testate
proceedings for the probate of the will had to be heard and
resolved first.
In the course of the proceedings, petitioners opposed to the
allowance of the testator’s will on the ground that on the alleged
date of its execution, the testator was already in poor state of
CASE ASSIGNMENT IN WILLS & SUCCESSION
health such that he could not have possibly executed the same.
Also the genuineness of the signature of the testator is in doubt.
On the other hand, one of the attesting witnesses and the notary
public testified that the testator executed the will in question in their
presence while he was of sound and disposing mind and that the
testator was in good health and was not unduly influenced in any
way in the execution of his will.
Probate court then rendered a decision declaring the will in
question as the last will and testament of the late Mateo Caballero.
CA affirmed the probate court’s decision stating that it substantially
complies with Article 805. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE:
W/N the attestation clause in the will of the testator is fatally
defective or can be cured under the art. 809.
HELD:
No. It does not comply with the provisions of the law.
Ordinary or attested wills are governed by Arts. 804 to 809. The will
must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and
the attesting witnesses. The attestation clause need not be written in
a language known to the testator or even to the attesting witnesses.
It is a separate memorandum or record of the facts surrounding the
conduct of execution and once signed by the witnesses it
gives affirmation to the fact that compliance with the essential
formalities required by law has been observed.
The attestation clause, therefore, provides strong legal guaranties
for the due execution of a will and to insure the authenticity thereof.
It is contended by petitioners that the attestation clause in the will
failed to specifically state the fact that the attesting witnesses
witnessed the testator sign the will and all its pages in their presence
and that they, the witnesses, likewise signed the will and every page
thereof in the presence of the testator and of each other. And the
Court agrees.
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PALOY
The attestation clause does not expressly state therein
the circumstance that said witnesses subscribed their respective
signatures to the will in the presence of the testator and of each
other.
The phrase, “and he has signed the same and every page thereof,
on the space provided for his signature and on the left hand
margin,” obviously refers to the testator and not the instrumental
witnesses as it is immediately preceded by the words” as his last will
and testament.”
Clearly lacking is the statement that the witnesses signed the will
and every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of one
another. That the absence of the statement required by law is a
fatal defect or imperfection which must necessarily result in the
disallowance of the will that is here sought to be probated.
Also, Art. 809 does not apply to the present case because
the attestation clause totally omits the fact that the attesting
witnesses signed each and every page of the will in the presence of
the testator and of each other. The defect in this case is not only
with respect to the form or the language of the attestation clause.
The defectsmust be remedied by intrinsic evidence supplied by the
will itself which is clearly lacking in this case.
Therefore, the probate of the will is set aside and the case for the
intestate proceedings shall be revived.
Article 809 cannot be used to cure the defects of the will when it
does not pertain to the form or language of the will. This is because
there is not substantial compliance with Article 805.
Alvarado v. Gaviola
226 SCRA 347
FACTS:
On 5 November 1977, 79-year old Brigido Alvarado executed a
notarial will entitled “Huling Habilin” wherein he disinherited an
illegitimate son, petitioner Cesar Alvarado, and expressly revoked a
previously executed holographic will at the time awaiting probate
before the RTC of Laguna.
CASE ASSIGNMENT IN WILLS & SUCCESSION
According to Bayani Ma. Rino, private respondent, he was present
when the said notarial will was executed, together with three
instrumental witnesses and the notary public, where the testator did
not read the will himself, suffering as he did from glaucoma.
Rino, a lawyer, drafted the eight-page document and read the
same aloud before the testator, the three instrumental witnesses
and the notary public, the latter four following the reading with their
own respective copies previously furnished them.
Thereafter, a codicil entitled “Kasulatan ng Pagbabago ng Ilang
Pagpapasiya na Nasasaad sa Huling Habilin na May Petsa
Nobiembre 5, 1977 ni Brigido Alvarado” was executed changing
some dispositions in the notarial will to generate cash for the
testator’s eye operation.
Said codicil was likewise not read by Brigido Alvarado and was read
in the same manner as with the previously executed will.
When the notarial will was submitted to the court for probate,
Cesar Alvarado filed his opposition as he said that the will was not
executed and attested as required by law; that the testator was
insane or mentally incapacitated due to senility and old age; that
the will was executed under duress, or influence of fear or threats;
that it was procured by undue pressure and influence on the part of
the beneficiary; and that the signature of the testator was procured
by fraud or trick.
ISSUE:
W/N notarial will of Brigido Alvarado should be admitted to probate
despite allegations of defects in the execution
and attestation thereof as testator was allegedly blind at the time of
execution and the double-reading requirement under Art. 808 of
the NCC was not complied with.
HELD:
YES. The spirit behind the law was served though the letter was not.
Although there should be strict compliance with the
substantial requirements of law in order to insure the authenticity of
the will, the formal imperfections should be brushed aside when
they do not affect its purpose and which, when taken into account,
may only defeat the testator’s will.
25
PALOY
Cesar Alvardo was correct in asserting that his father was not
totally blind (of counting fingers at 3 feet) when the will and codicil
were executed, but he can be so considered for purposes of Art.
808.
That Art. 808 was not followed strictly is beyond cavil.
However, in the case at bar, there was substantial compliance
where the purpose of the law has been satisfied: that of making the
provisions known to the testator who is blind or incapable of reading
the will himself (as when he is illiterate) and enabling him to object if
they do not accord with his wishes.
Rino read the testator’s will and codicil aloud in the presence of the
testator, his three instrumental witnesses, and the notary public.
Prior and subsequent thereto, the testator affirmed, upon being
asked, that the contents read corresponded with his instructions.
Only then did the signing and acknowledgment take place.
There is no evidence that the contents of the will and the codicil
were not sufficiently made known and communicated to the
testator.
With four persons, mostly known to the testator, following the
reading word for word with their own copies, it can be safely
concluded that the testator was reasonably assured that what was
read to him were the terms actually appearing on the typewritten
documents.
The rationale behind the requirement of reading the will to the
testator if he is blindor incapable of reading the will to himself (as
when he is illiterate), is to make the provisions thereof known to him,
so that he may be able to object if they are not in accordance with
his wishes.
Although there should be strict compliance with the
substantial requirements of law in order to insure the authenticity of
the will, the formal imperfections should be brushed aside when
they do not affect its purpose and which, when taken into account,
may only defeat the testator’s will.
CASE ASSIGNMENT IN WILLS & SUCCESSION
Garcia v. Vasquez
32 SCRA 489
FACTS:
This is a petition for appeal from the CFI of Manila admitting to
probate the will of Gliceria Avelino del Rosario (“Gliceria”) executed
in 1960. Likewise, this is also an appeal to remove the current
administrator, Consuelo Gonzales-Precilla( “Consuelo”) as special
administratrix of the estate on the ground of Consuelopossesses
interest adverse to the estate and to order the RD of Manila to
annotate on the registered lands a notice of Lis Pendens.
When Gliceria died she had no descendants, ascendants, bros or
sisses and 90 yrs old. After which, her niece, Consuelo petitioned the
court to be the administratrix of the properties. The court approved
this because Consuelo has been was already managing the
properties of the deceased during her lifetime. What the
respondents allege is that in the last years of
the deceased, Consuelo sought the transfer of certain parcels of
land valued at 300k for a sale price of 30k to her husband Alfonso
through fraud and intimidation. In addition, the oppositors
presented evidence that Consuelo asked the court to issue new
Certificates of Titles to certain parcels of land for the purpose of
preparing the inventory to be used in the probate. Also shown was
that NEW TCTs were issued by the RD for certain lands of
the deceased after Consuelo asked for the old TCTs.
At the end of the probate proceedings, the court ruled that
Counsuelo should be made the administrator, and that the will was
duly executed because of these reasons: NO EVIDENCE HAS BEEN
PRESENTED to establish that the deceased was not of sound mind,
that eventough the allegations state that the deceased prepared
another will in 1956 (12pages), the latter is not prevented from
executing another will in 1960 (1page), and that inconsistencies in
the testimonies of the witnesses prove their truthfulness.
ISSUE:
Was the will in 1960 (1 page) duly/properly executed?
HELD:
26
PALOY
NO. Provision of Article 808 mandatory. Therefore, For all intents and
purposes of the rules on probate, the testatrix was like
a blind testator, and the due execution of her will would have
required observance of Article 808. The rationale behind the
requirement of reading the will to the testator if he is blind or
incapable of reading the will himself (as when he is illiterate) , is to
make the provisions thereof known to him, so that he may be able
to object if they are not in accordance with his wishes. Likewise, the
1970 will was done in Tagalog which the deceased is not well
versed but in Spanish. This creates doubt as to the due execution of
the will and as well as the typographical errors contain therein
which show the haste in preparing the 1 page will as compared to
the 12 page will created in 1956 written in Spanish. ALSO, as to
the blindness, there was proof given by the testimony of the doctor
that the deceased could not read at near distances because
of cataracts. (Testatrix’s vision was mainly for viewing distant objects
and not for reading print.) Since there is no proof that it was read to
the deceased twice, the will was NOT duly executed.
ALSO, Consuelo should be removed as administrator because she is
not expected to sue her own husband to reconvey the lands to the
estate alleged to have been transferred by the deceased to her
own husband.
The notice of lis pendens is also not proper where the issue is not an
action in rem, affecting real property or the title thereto.
LEE V. TAMBAGO
544 SCRA 393
FACTS:
Complainant, Manuel L. Lee, charged respondent, Atty. Regino B.
Tambago, with violation of Notarial Law and the Ethics of the legal
profession for notarizing a will that is alleged to be spurious in nature
in containing forged signatures of his father, the decedent, Vicente
Lee Sr. and two other witnesses. In the said will, the decedent
supposedly bequeathed his entire estate to his wife Lim Hock Lee,
save for a parcel of land which he devised to Vicente Lee, Jr. and
Elena Lee, half-siblings of complainant.
CASE ASSIGNMENT IN WILLS & SUCCESSION
The will was purportedly executed and acknowledged before
respondent on June 30, 1965.Complainant, however, pointed out
that the residence certificate of the testator noted in the
acknowledgment of the will was dated January 5, 1962.Furthermore,
the signature of the testator was not the same as his signature as
donor in a deed of donation which supposedly contained his
purported signature. Complainant averred that the signatures of his
deceased father in the will and in the deed of donation were “in any
way entirely and diametrically opposed from one another in all
angle[s].”
Complainant also questioned the absence of notation of the
residence certificates of the purported witnesses Noynay and Grajo.
He alleged that their signatures had likewise been forged and
merely copied from their respective voters’ affidavits.
Complainant further asserted that no copy of such purported will was
on file in the archives division of the Records Management and
Archives Office of the National Commission for Culture and
the Arts (NCCA).
ISSUE:
Was the will spurious?
HELD:
Yes, thus Tambago violated the Notarial Law and the ethics of legal
profession.
The law provides for certain formalities that must be followed in the
execution of wills. The object of solemnities surrounding the execution
of wills is to close the door on bad faith and fraud,
to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guarantee their
truth and authenticity.
A notarial will, as the contested will in this case, is required by law to
be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself. In addition,
it should be attested and subscribed by three
more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one
another. The will in question was attested by only two witnesses. On
PALOY
this circumstance alone, the will must be considered void. This is in
consonance with the rule that acts executed against the provisions
of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void, except when the law
itself authorizes their validity. The Civil Code likewise requires that a
will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator
and the witnesses. An acknowledgment is the act of one who has
executed a deed in going before some competent officer or court
and declaring it to be his act or deed. It involves an extra step
undertaken whereby the signatory actually declares to the notary
public that the same is his or her own free act and deed. The
acknowledgment in a notarial will has a two-fold purpose: (1) to
safeguard the testator’s wishes long after his demise and (2) to assure
that his estate is administered in the manner that he intends it to be
done.
A cursory examination of the acknowledgment of the will in question
shows that this particular requirement was neither strictly nor
substantially complied with. For one, there was the conspicuous
absence of a notation of the residence certificates of the notarial
witnesses Noynay and Grajo in the acknowledgment. Similarly, the
notation of the testator’s old residence certificate in the same
acknowledgment was a clear breach of the law. These omissions by
respondent invalidated the will.
As the acknowledging officer of the contested will, respondent was
required to faithfully observe the formalities of a will and those of
notarization. These formalities are mandatory and cannot be
disregarded.
GUERRERO V. BIHIS
521 SCRA 394
FACTS:
Felisa Tamio de Buenaventura, mother of petitioner Bella A.
Guerrero and respondent Resurreccion A. Bihis, died. Guerrero filed
for probate in the RTC QC. Respondent Bihis opposed her elder
sister’s petition on the following grounds: the will was not executed
and attested as required by law; its attestation clause and
or acknowledgment did not comply with the requirements of the law;
the signature of the testatrix was procured by fraud and petitioner
27
CASE ASSIGNMENT IN WILLS & SUCCESSION
and her children procured the will through undue and improper
pressure and influence. Petitioner Guerrero was appointes special
administratrix. Respondent opposed petitioner’s appointment but
subsequently withdrew her opposition. The trial court denied the
probate of the will ruling that Article 806 of the Civil Code was not
complied with because the will was “acknowledged” by the
testatrix and the witnesses at the testatrix’s residence at No. 40
Kanlaon Street, Quezon City before Atty. Macario O. Directo who
was a commissioned notary public for and in Caloocan City.
ISSUE:
Did the will “acknowledged” by the testatrix and the instrumental
witnesses before a notary public acting outside the place of his
commission satisfy the requirement under Article 806 of the Civil
Code?
HELD:
No. One of the formalities required by law in connection with the
execution of a notarial will is that it must be acknowledged before a
notary public by the testator and the witnesses. 6 This formal
requirement is one of the indispensable requisites for the validity of a
will. 7 In other words, a notarial will that is not acknowledged before
a notary public by the testator and the instrumental witnesses is void
and cannot be accepted for probate.
The Notarial law provides: SECTION 240.Territorial jurisdiction. — The
jurisdiction of a notary public in a province shall be co-extensive
with the province. The jurisdiction of a notary public in the City of
Manila shall be co-extensive with said city. No notary shall possess
authority to do any notarial act beyond the limits of his jurisdiction.
The compulsory language of Article 806 of the Civil Code was not
complied with and the interdiction of Article 240 of the Notarial Law
was breached. Ineluctably, the acts of the testatrix, her witnesses
and Atty. Directo were all completely void.
28
PALOY
Ortega v. Valmonte
478 SCRA 247
FACTS: Two years after the arrival of Placido from the United States
and at the age of 80 he wed Josefina who was then 28 years old.
But in a little more than two years of wedded bliss, Placido died.
Placido executed a notarial last will and testament written
in English and consisting of 2 pages, and dated 15 June 1983¸but
acknowledged only on 9 August 1983. The allowance to probate of
this will was opposed by Leticia, Placido’s sister. According to the
notary public who notarized the testator’s will, after the testator
instructed him on the terms and dispositions he wanted on the will,
the notary public told them to come back on 15 August 1983 to
give him time to prepare. The testator and his witnesses returned on
the appointed date but the notary public was out of town so they
were instructed by his wife to come back on 9 August 1983. The
formal execution was actually on 9 August 1983. He reasoned he no
longer changed the typewritten date of 15 June 1983 because he
did not like the document to appear dirty.
Petitioner’s argument:
1. At the time of the execution of the notarial will Placido was
already 83 years old and was no longer of sound mind.
2. Josefina conspired with the notary public and the 3 attesting
witnesses in deceiving Placido to sign it. Deception is allegedly
reflected in the varying dates of the execution and
the attestation of the will.
ISSUE:
1. W/N Placido has testamentary capacity at the time he allegedly
executed the will.
2. W/N the signature of Placido in the will was procured by fraud or
trickery.
HELD:
1. YES. Despite his advanced age, he was still able to identify
accurately the kinds of property he owned, the extent of his shares
in them and even their location. As regards the proper objects of
his bounty, it was sufficient that he identified his wife as sole
CASE ASSIGNMENT IN WILLS & SUCCESSION PALOY
beneficiary. The omission of some relatives from the will did not before a notary public. Now, the contestant, who happens to be
affect its formal validity. There being no showing of fraud in its one of the instrumental witnesses asserted that after the codicil was
execution, intent in its disposition becomes irrelevant. signed and attested at the San Pablo hospital, that Gimotea (the
notary) signed and sealed it on the same occasion. Gimotea,
2. NO. Fraud is a trick, secret devise, false statement, or pretense, by
however, said that he did not do so, and that the act of signing and
which the subject of it is cheated. It may be of such character that
sealing was done afterwards.
the testator is misled or deceived as to the nature or contents of the
document which he executes, or it may relate to some extrinsic
fact, in consequence of the deception regarding which the testator
2. One of the allegations was that the certificate of
is led to make a certain will which, but for fraud, he would not have
acknowledgement to the codicil was signed somewhere else or in
made.
the office of the notary. The ix and the witnesses at the hospital, was
The party challenging the will bears the burden of proving the
signed and sealed by the notary only when he brought it in his
existence of fraud at the time of its execution. The burden
office.
to show otherwise shifts to the proponent of the will only upon a
showing of credible evidence of fraud.
Omission of some relatives does not affect the due execution of a
will. Moreover, the conflict between the dates appearing on the will Issue:
does not invalidate the document, “because the law does not
Whether or not the signing and sealing of the will or codicil in the
even require that a notarial will be executed and acknowledged
absence of the testator and witnesses affects the validity of the will
on the same occasion. The variance in the dates of the will as to its
supposed execution and attestation was satisfactorily and RULING:
persuasively explained by the notary public and instrumental
witnesses. NO. Unlike in the Old Civil Code of 1899, the NCC does not require
that the signing of the testator, the witnesses and the notary be
Javellana vs. Ledesma accomplished in one single act. All that is required is that every will
must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and
G.R. No. L-7179
witnesses. The subsequent signing and sealing is not part of the
Facts: acknowledgement itself nor of the testamentary act. Their separate
execution out of the presence of the testator and the witnesses
1. The CFI of Iloilo admitted to probate a will and codicil executed cannot be a violation of the rule that testaments should be
by the deceased Apolinaria Ledesma in July 1953. This testament completed without interruption.
was deemed executed on May 1950 and May 1952. The contestant
was the sister and nearest surviving relative of the deceased. She Cruz v. Villasor
appealed from this decision alleging that the will were not 54 SCRA 752
executed in accordance with law.
FACTS:

The CFI of Cebu allowed the probate of Valente Z. Cruz’s last will
2. The testament was executed at the house of the testatrix. One and testament. His surviving spouse, Agapita Cruz, opposed the
the other hand, the codicil was executed after the enactment of allowance of the will alleging it was executed
the New Civil Code (NCC), and therefore had to be acknowledged through fraud, deceit, misrepresentation and undue influence; that

29
CASE ASSIGNMENT IN WILLS & SUCCESSION
the said instrument was execute without the testator having been
fully informed of the content thereof, particularly as to what
properties he was disposing and that the supposed last will and
testament was not executed in accordance with law. Agapita
appealed the allowance of the will by certiorari.
ISSUE:
W/N the will was executed in accordance with law (particularly
Articles 805 and 806 of the NCC, the first requiring at least
three credible witnesses to attest and subscribe to the will, and the
second requiring the testator and the witnesses to acknowledge the
will before a notary public.).
HELD:
NO. Of the three instrumental witnesses to the will, one of them
(Atty. Teves) is at the same time the Notary Public before whom the
will was supposed to have been acknowledged. The notary public
before whom the will was acknowledged cannot be considered as
the third instrumental witness since he cannot acknowledge before
himself his having signed the will. To acknowledge before means to
avow (Javellana v. Ledesma; Castro v. Castro); to own as genuine,
to assent, to admit; and “before” means in front or preceding in
space or ahead of. Consequently, if the third witness were the
notary public himself, he would have to avow assent, or admit his
having signed the will in front of himself. This cannot be done
because he cannot split his personality into two so that one will
appear before the other to acknowledge his participation in the
making of the will. To permit such a situation to obtain would be
sanctioning a sheer absurdity. Furthermore, the function of a notary
public is, among others, to guard against any illegal or immoral
arrangement (Balinon v. De Leon). That function would defeated if
the notary public were one of the attesting instrumental witnesses. It
would place him in inconsistent position and the very purpose of
acknowledgment, which is to minimize fraud, would be thwarted.
Admittedly, there are American precedents holding that notary
public may, in addition, act as a witness to the executive of the
document he has notarized. There are others holding that his signing
merely as notary in a will nonetheless makes him a witness thereon.
30
PALOY
But these authorities do not serve the purpose of the law in
this jurisdiction or are not decisive of the issue herein because
the notaries public and witnesses referred to in these cases merely
acted as instrumental, subscribing attesting witnesses, and not as
acknowledging witnesses. Here, the notary public acted not only as
attesting witness but also acknowledging witness, a situation not
envisaged by Article 805-06. Probate of will set aside.
TESTATE ESTATE OF
CAGRO VS. CAGRO
G.R. L-5826
Facts:
1. The case is an appeal interposed by the oppositors from a
decision of the CFI of Samar which admitted to probate a will
allegedly executed by Vicente Cagro who died in Pambujan,
Samar on Feb. 14, 1949.
2. The appellants insisted that the will is defective because the
attestation was not signed by the witnesses at the bottom although
the page containing the same was signed by the witnesses on the
left hand margin.
3. Petitioner contended that the signatures of the 3 witnesses on the
left hand margin conform substantially to law and may be deemed
as their signatures to the attestation clause.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the will is valid
HELD:
Will is not valid. The attestation clause is a memorandum of the facts
attending the execution of the will. It is required by law to be made
by the attesting witnesses and it must necessarily bear their
signatures.
An unsigned attestation clause cannot be considered as an act of
the witnesses since the omission of their signatures at the bottom
negatives their participation.
CASE ASSIGNMENT IN WILLS & SUCCESSION
Moreover, the signatures affixed on the let hand margin is not
substantial conformance to the law. The said signatures were merely
in conformance with the requirement that the will must be signed
on the left-hand margin of all its pages. If the attestation clause is
unsigned by the 3 witnesses at the bottom, it would be easier to
add clauses to a will on a subsequent occasion and in the absence
of the testator and any or all of the witnesses.
The probate of the will is denied.
ICASIANO V. ICASIANO
11 SCRA 422
FACTS:
Celso Icasiano filed a petition for the allowance and admission to
probate of the alleged will of Josefa Villacorte, and for his
appointment as executor thereof. Natividad and Enrique Icasiano,
a daughter and son of the testatrix, filed their opposition thereto.
During the course of the trial, on 19 March 1959, Celso, started to
present his evidence. But later, on 1 June 1959, he then filed
an amended and supplemental petition, alleging that the
decedent had left a will executed in duplicate and with all the
legal requirements, and that he was submitting the duplicate to the
court, which he found only on 26 May 1959. Natividad and Enrique
filed their opposition, but the will and its duplicate was admitted to
probate by the trial court. Hence, this appeal by the oppositors.
Oppositors-appellants (Natividad and Enrique) in turn introduced
expert testimony to the effect that the signatures of the testatrix in
the duplicate are not genuine, nor were they written or affixed on
the same occasion as the original, and further averthat granting
that the documents were genuine, they were executed through
mistake and with undue influence and pressure because the
testatrix was deceived into adopting as her last will and testament
the wishes of those who will stand to benefit from the provisions of
the will, as may be inferred from the facts
and circumstancessurrounding the execution of the will and the
provisions and dispositions thereof, whereby proponents- appellees
stand to profit from properties held by them as attorneys- in-fact of
the deceased and not enumerated or mentioned therein, while
31
PALOY
oppositors-appellants are enjoined not to look for other properties
not mentioned in the will, and not to oppose the probate of it, on
penalty of forfeiting their share in the portion of free disposal.
ISSUE:
Was the trial court correct in admitting the will and its duplicate to
probate given the allegations of forgery of the testator’s signature,
or that the will was executed under circumstances constituting
fraud and undue influence and pressure?
(Not raised by the appellants in the case but discussed by the Court
and in Sir’s book) Is the failure of one of the witnesses to sign a page
of the will fatal to its validity?
HELD:
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that both the will
and its duplicate are valid in all respects.
On the allegations of forgery, fraud and undue influence:
The Court is satisfied that all the requisites for the validity of a will
have been complied with. The opinion of a handwriting expert
trying to prove forgery of the testatrix’s signature failed to convince
the Court, not only because it is directly contradicted by another
expert but principally because of the paucity of the standards used
by him (only three other signatures), considering the advanced age
of the testatrix, the evident variability of her signature, and the
effect of writing fatigue.
Similarly, the alleged slight variance in blueness of the ink in the
admitted and questioned signatures does not appear reliable,
considering that standard and challenged writings were affixed to
different kinds of paper, with different surfaces and reflecting
power. On the whole, the testimony of the oppositor’s expert is
insufficient to overcome that of the notary and the two instrumental
witnesses as to the will’s execution, which were presented by Celso
during the trial.
CASE ASSIGNMENT IN WILLS & SUCCESSION
Nor is there adequate evidence of fraud or undue influence. The
fact that some heirs are more favored than others is proof of neither.
Diversity of apportionment is the usual reason for making a
testament; otherwise, the decedent might as well die intestate. The
testamentary disposition that the heirs should not inquire into other
property and that they should respect the distribution made in the
will, under penalty of forfeiture of their shares in the free part, do not
suffice to prove fraud or undue influence. They appear motivated
by the desire to prevent prolonged litigation which, as shown by
ordinary experience, often results in a sizeable portion of the estate
being diverted into the hands of non- heirs and speculators.
Whether these clauses are valid or not is a matter to be litigated on
another occasion. It is also well to note that fraud and undue
influence are mutually repugnant and exclude each other; their
joining as grounds for opposing probate shows absence of definite
evidence against the validity of the will.
On the failure of a witness to sign a page in the original, but signed
all pages in the duplicate:
The records show that the original of the will consists of five pages,
and while signed at the end and in every page, it does not contain
the signature of one of the attesting witnesses, Atty. Jose V.
Natividad, on page 3 thereof; but the duplicate copy attached to
the amended and supplemental petition is signed by the testatrix
and her three attesting witnesses in each and every page.
Witness Atty. Natividad, who testified on his failure to sign page 3 of
the original, admits that he may have lifted two pages instead of
one when he signed the same, but affirmed that page 3 was signed
in his presence.
The failure Atty. Natividad to sign page three (3) was entirely
through pure oversight is shown by his own testimony as well as by
the duplicate copy of the will, which bears a complete set of
signatures in every page. The text of the attestationclause and the
acknowledgment before the Notary Public likewise evidence that
no one was aware of the defect at the time. Therefore, Atty.
Natividad’s failure to signpage 3 of the original through mere
inadvertence does not affect the will’s validity.
32
PALOY
Impossibility of substitution of this page is assured not only the fact
that the testatrix and two other witnesses did sign the defective
page, but also by its bearing the coincident imprint of the seal of
the notary public before whom the testament was ratified by
testatrix and all three witnesses. The law should not be so strictly and
literally interpreted as to penalize the testatrix on account of the
inadvertence of a single witness over whose conduct she had no
control, where the purpose of the law to guarantee the identity of
the testament and its component pages is sufficiently attained, no
intentional or deliberate deviation existed, and the evidence on
record attests to the full observance of the statutory requisites.
This would not be the first time that this Court departs from a strict
and literal application of the statutory requirements, where the
purposes of the law are otherwise satisfied. Thus, despite the literal
tenor of the law, this Court has held that a testament, with the only
page signed at its foot by testator and witnesses, but not in the left
margin, could nevertheless be probated (Abangan vs. Abangan, 41
Phil. 476); and that despite the requirement for the correlative
lettering of the pages of a will, the failure to mark the first page
either by letters or numbers is not a fatal defect (Lopez vs. Liboro, 81
Phil. 429). These precedents exemplify the Court’s policy to require
satisfaction of the legal requirements in order to guard against fraud
and bad faith but without undue or unnecessary curtailment of the
testamentary privilege.
The appellants also argue that since the original of the will is in
existence and available, the duplicate is not entitled to probate.
Since they opposed probate of the original because it lacked one
signature in its third page, it is easily discerned that oppositors-
appellants run here into a dilemma: if the original is defective and
invalid, then in law there is no other will but the duly signed carbon
duplicate, and the same is probatable. If the original is valid and
can be probated, then the objection to the signed duplicate need
not be considered, being superfluous and irrelevant. At any rate,
said duplicate serves to prove that the omission of one signature in
the third page of the original testament was inadvertent and not
intentional.
CASE ASSIGNMENT IN WILLS & SUCCESSION
NERA V. RIMANDO
G.R. L-5971 FEBRUARY 27, 1911
PONENTE: CARSON, J.:
'Test of Presence'
Facts:
1. At the time the will was executed, in a large room connecting with
a smaller room by a doorway where a curtain hangs across, one of
the witnesses was in the outside room when the other witnesses were
attaching their signatures to the instrument.
2. The trial court did not consider the determination of the issue as to
the position of the witness as of vital importance in determining the
case. It agreed with the ruling in the case of Jaboneta v. Gustillo that
the alleged fact being that one of the subscribing witnesses was in
the outer room while the signing occurred in the inner room, would
not be sufficient to invalidate the execution of the will.
3. The CA deemed the will valid.
Issue: Whether or not the subscribing witness was able to see the
testator and other witnesses in the act of affixing their signatures.
HELD: YES
The Court is unanimous in its opinion that had the witnesses been
proven to be in the outer room when the testator and other witnesses
signed the will in the inner room, it would have invalidated the will
since the attaching of the signatures under the circumstances was
not done 'in the presence' of the witnesses in the outer room. The line
of vision of the witness to the testator and other witnesses was
blocked by the curtain separating the rooms.
The position of the parties must be such that with relation to each
other at the moment of the attaching the signatures, they may see
each other sign if they chose to.
In the Jaboneta case, the true test of presence is not whether or not
they actualy saw each other sign but whether they might have seen
each other sign if they chose to doso considering their physical,
mental condition and position in relation to each other at the
moment of the inscription of the signature.
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BARUT VS. CABACUNGAN
G.R. L-6825 FEBRIARY 15, 1912
Facts:
1.Pedro Barut applied for the probate of the will of Maria Salomon. It
is alleged in the petition that testatrix died on Nov. 1908 in Sinait,
Ilocos Sur leaving the will dated March 3, 1907. The said will was
witnessed by 3 persons. From the terms it appears that the
petitioner received a larger part of decedent's property. After this
disposition, the testatrix revoked all other wills and stated that since
she is unable to read nor write, the will was read to her and that she
has instructed Severino Agapan, one of the witnesses to sign her
name in her behalf.
2. The lower court ruled that the will is not entitled to probate on the
sole ground that the handwriting of the person who signed the
name of the testatrix does not appear to be that of Agapan but
that of another witness.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a will's validity is affected when the person instructed
by a testator to write his name did not sign his name
HELD:
No, it is immaterial who wrote the name of the testator provided it is
written at her request and in her present, and in the presence of the
witnesses. This is the only requirement under Sec. 618 of the Civil
Code of procedure at that time.
GARCIA V. LACUESTA
G.R. L-4067 NOVEMBER 29, 1951
PONENTE: PARAS, C.J.
Facts:
1. The CA disallowed the probate of the will of Antero Mercado
dated Jan 1943. The said will was written in Ilocano dialect.
CASE ASSIGNMENT IN WILLS & SUCCESSION
2. The will appears to have been signed by Atty. Florentino Javier
who wrote the name of the testator followed below by 'A ruego del
testador' and the name of Florentino Javier. In effect, it was signed
by another although under the express direction of the testator. This
fact however was not recited in the attestation clause. Mercado
also affixed a cross on the will.
3. The lower court admitted the will to probate but this order was
reversed by the Court of Appeals on the ground that the attestation
failed to recite the facts surrounding the signing of the testator and
the witnesses.
Issue:
Whether or not the attestation clause in the will is valid
HELD:
NO the attestation is fatally defective for its failure to state that
Antero or the testator caused Atty. Javier to write the former's name
under his express direction as required by Sec. 618 of the Civil
Procedure. Finally, on the cross affixed on the will by the testator,
the Court held that it is not prepared to liken the mere sign of a
cross to a thumbmark for obvious reasons- the cross does not have
the trustworthiness of a thumbmark so it is not considered as a valid
signature.
MATIAS VS. SALUD
G.R. L-10907 JUNE 29, 1957
PONENTE: CONCEPCION, J.
Facts:
1. This case is an appeal from a CFI Cavite order denying the probate
of the will of Gabina Raquel. The document consist of 3 pages and it
seems that after the attestation clause, there appears the signature
of the testatrix 'Gabina Raquel', alongside is a smudged in violet ink
claimed by the proponents as the thumbmark allegedly affixed by
the tetratrix. On the third page at the end of the attestation clause
appears signatures on the left margin of each page, and also on the
upper part of each left margin appears the same violet ink smudge
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PALOY
accompanied by the written words 'Gabina Raquel' with 'by Lourdes
Samonte' underneath it.
2. The proponent's evidence is to the effect that the decedent
allegedly instructed Atty. Agbunag to drat her will and brought to her
on January 1950. With all the witnesses with her and the lawyer, the
decedent affixed her thumbmark at the foot of the document and
the left margin of each page. It was also alleged that she attempted
to sign using a sign pen but was only able to do so on the lower half
of page 2 due to the pain in her right shoulder. The lawyer, seeing
Gabina unable to proceed instructed Lourdes Samonte to write
'Gabina Raquel by Lourdes Samonte' next to each thumbmark, after
which the witnesses signed at the foot of the attestation clause and
the left hand margin of each page.
3. The probate was opposed by Basilia Salud, the niece of the
decedent.
4. The CFI of cavite denied the probate on the ground that the
attestation clause did not state that the testatrix and the witnesses
signed each and every page nor did it express that Lourdes was
specially directed to sign after the testatrix.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the thumbprint was sufficient compliance with the law
despite the absence of a description of such in the attestation clause
HELD: YES
The absence of the description on the attestation clause that another
person wrote the testatrix' name at her request is not a fatal defect,
The legal requirement only ask that it be signed by the testator, a
requirement satisfied by a thumbprint or other mark affixed by him.
As to the issue on the clarity of the ridge impression, it is held to be
dependent on the aleatory circumstances. Where a testator employs
an unfamiliar way of signing and that both the attestation clause and
the will are silent on the matter, such silence is a factor to be
considered against the authenticity of the testament. However, the
failure to describe the signature itself alone is not sufficient to refuse
probate when evidence fully satisfied that the will was executed and
witnessed in accordance with law.
CASE ASSIGNMENT IN WILLS & SUCCESSION
NOBLE V. ABAJA
450 SCRA 265
FACTS:
The case is about the probate of the will of Alipio Abada (Not
respondent Abaja). Petitioner Belinda Noble is the administratrix of
the estate of Abada. Respondent Alipio Abaja filed a petition for the
probate of Abada’s will. Petitioner Noble moved for dismissal of the
petition for probate.
Caponong-Noble points out that nowhere in the will can one discern
that Abada knew the Spanish language. She alleges that such
defect is fatal and must result in the disallowance of the will.
ISSUE:
Should it be expressly stated in the will that it (the will) was in a
language known by the testator?
HELD:
No. There is no statutory requirement to state in the will itself that the
testator knew the language or dialect used in the will.[25] This is a
matter that a party may establish by proof aliunde. In this case, Alipio
testified that Abada used to gather Spanish-speaking people in their
place. In these gatherings, Abada and his companions would talk in
the Spanish language. This sufficiently proves that Abada speaks the
Spanish language.
SUROZA v. HONRADO
110 SCRA 381 (1981)
FACTS: Marcelina Suroza supposedly executed a notarial will in July
1973 when she was 73 years old. The will, which was in English, was
thumbmarked by Marcelina, who was illiterate. Upon her death, the
will which bequeathed all her estate to a supposed granddaughter
was presented for probate. Opposition to the probate was made by
Nenita Suroza, the wife of the alleged adopted son of Marcelina on
the ground of preterition of said son, Agapito, and on the ground that
the will was void because Marcelina did not appear before a notary
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PALOY
public and because it is written in English which is not known to
Marcelina. The presiding judge denied the opposition of Nenita
Suroza and admitted the will to probate.
ISSUE: Was there sufficient evidence on record to show that the will
on its face was void?
HELD: Upon perusing the will and noting that it was written in English
and was thumb marked by an obviously illiterate testatrix, respondent
Judge could have readily perceived that the will is void. In the
opening paragraph of the will, it was stated that English was a
language “understood and known” to the testatrix. But in its
concluding paragraph, it was stated that the will was read to the
testatrix “and translated into Filipino language.” That could only
mean that the will was written in a language not known to the
illiterate testatrix and, therefore, it is void because of the mandatory
provision of Article 804 of the Civil Code that every will must be
executed in a language or dialect known to the testator. Thus, a will
written in English, which was not known to the Igorot testator, is void
(Acop v. Piraso, 52 Phil.660).
“What constitutes a Signature”: A complete signature is not essential
to the validity of a will. Perhaps to provide for greater authenticity,
what should be found at the end of the will is the testator’s customary
signature. However, since the law does not require his full signature,
the initials or even a thumb mark by the testator may be deemed
sufficient to comply with this requirement. A thumb mark at the end
of the will may be considered as a valid signature especially when a
testator cannot affix his signature due to some medical condition
such as paralysis.
VITUG V. CA
183 SCRA 755
FACTS:
Romarico Vitug and Nenita Alonte were co-administrators of
Dolores Vitug’s (deceased) estate. Rowena Corona was the
executrix. Romarico, the deceased’s husband, filed a motion with
the probate court asking for authority to sell certain shares of stock
and real properties belonging to the estate to cover alleged
CASE ASSIGNMENT IN WILLS & SUCCESSION
advances to the estate, which he claimed as personal funds. The
advances were used to pay estate taxes.
Corona opposed the motion on ground that the advances came
from a savings account which formed part of
the conjugal partnership properties and is part of the estate. Thus,
there was no ground for reimbursement. Romarico claims that the
funds are his exclusive property, having been acquired through a
survivorship agreement executed with his late wife and the bank.
The agreement stated that after the death of either one of the
spouses, the savings account shall belong to and be the sole
property of the survivor, and shall be payable to and collectible or
withdrawable by such survivor.
The lower court upheld the validity of the agreement and granted
the motion to sell. CA reversed stating that the survivorship
agreement constitutes a conveyancemortis causa which did not
comply with the formalities of a valid will. Assuming that it was a
donation inter vivos, it is a prohibited donation (donation between
spouses).
ISSUE:
W/N the survivorship agreement was valid.
HELD:
YES. The conveyance is not mortis causa, which should
be embodied in a will. A will is a personal, solemn, revocable and
free act by which a capacitated person disposes of his property
and rights and declares or complies with duties to take effect after
his death. The bequest or devise must pertain to the testator.
In this case, the savings account involved was in the nature
of conjugal funds. Since it was not shown that the funds belonged
exclusively to one party, it is presumed to be conjugal.
It is also not a donation inter vivos because it was to take effect
after the death of one party. It is also not a donation between
spouses because it involved no conveyance of a spouse’s own
properties to the other.
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PALOY
It was an error to include the savings account in the inventory of the
deceased’s assets because it is the separate property of Romarico.
Thus, Romarico had the right to claim reimbursement.
A will is a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which a
capacitated person disposes of his his property and rights and
declares or complies with duties to take effect after his death.
Survivorship agreements
USON V. DEL ROSARIO
92 P 530
FACTS:
This is an action for recovery of the ownership and possession of five
(5) parcels of land in Pangasinan, filed by Maria Uson against Maria
del Rosario and her four illegit children. Maria Uson was the lawful
wife of Faustino Nebreda who upon his death in 1945 left the lands
involved in this litigation. Faustino Nebreda left no other heir except
his widow Maria Uson. However, plaintiff claims that when Faustino
Nebreda died in 1945, his common-law wife Maria del Rosario took
possession illegally of said lands thus depriving her of their possession
and enjoyment. Defendants in their answer set up as special
defense that Uson and her husband, executed a public document
whereby they agreed to separate as husband and wifeand, in
consideration of which Uson was given a parcel of land and in
return she renounced her right to inherit any other property that
may be left by her husband upon his death. CFI found for
Uson. Defendants appealed.
ISSUE:
W/N Uson has a right over the lands from the moment of death of
her husband.
W/N the illegit children of deceased and his common-law wife have
successional rights.
HELD:
CASE ASSIGNMENT IN WILLS & SUCCESSION
Yes. There is no dispute that Maria Uson, is the lawful wife of Faustino
Nebreda, former owner of the five parcels of lands litigated in the
present case. There is likewise no dispute that Maria del Rosario, was
merely a common-law wife with whom she had four
illegitimate children with the deceased. It likewise appears that
Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 much prior to the effectivity of the
new Civil Code. With this background, it is evident that when
Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 the five parcels of land he was
seized of at the time passed from the moment of his death to his
only heir, his widow Maria Uson (Art 777 NCC).As this Court aptly
said, “The property belongs to the heirs at the moment of the death
of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed and
delivered to them a deed for the same before his death”. From that
moment, therefore, the rights of inheritance of Maria Uson over the
lands in question became vested.
The claim of the defendants that Maria Uson had relinquished her
right over the lands in question because she expressly renounced
to inherit any future property that her husband may acquire and
leave upon his death in the deed of separation, cannot be
entertained for the simple reason that future inheritance cannot be
the subject of a contract nor can it be renounced.
No. The provisions of the NCC shall be given retroactive effect even
though the event which gave rise to them may have occurred
under the prior legislation only if no vested rights are impaired.
Hence, since the right of ownership of Maria Uson over the lands in
question became vested in 1945 upon the death of her late
husband, the new right recognized by the new Civil Code in favor
of the illegitimate children of the deceased cannot, therefore, be
asserted to the impairment of the vested right of Maria Uson over
the lands in dispute.
UNION BANK V. SANTIBANEZ
452 SCRA 228
FACTS:
On May 31, 1980, the First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC)
and Efraim Santibañez entered into a loan agreement in the
amount of P128,000.00. The amount was intended for the payment
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PALOY
of one (1) unit Ford 6600 Agricultural Tractor. In view thereof, Efraim
and his son, Edmund, executed a promissory note in favor of the
FCCC, the principal sum payable in five equal annual amortizations.
On Dec. 1980, FCCC and Efraim entered into another loan
agreement for the payment of another unit of Ford 6600 and one
unit of a Rotamotor. Again, Efraim and Edmund executed a
promissory note and a Continuing Guaranty Agreement for the later
loan. In 1981, Efraim died, leaving a holographic will. Testate
proceedings commenced before the RTC of Iloilo City. Edmund was
appointed as the special administrator of the estate. During the
pendency of the testate proceedings, the surviving heirs, Edmund
and his sister Florence, executed a Joint Agreement, wherein they
agreed to divide between themselves and take possession of the
three (3) tractors: (2) tractors for Edmund and (1) for Florence. Each
of them was to assume the indebtedness of their late father to
FCCC, corresponding to the tractor respectively taken by them. In
the meantime, a Deed of Assignment with Assumption of Liabilities
was executed by and between FCCC and Union Bank, wherein the
FCCC assigned all its assets and liabilities to Union Bank.
Demand letters were sent by Union Bank to Edmund, but the latter
refused to pay. Thus, on February 5, 1988, Union Bank filed a
Complaint for sum of money against the heirs of Efraim Santibañez,
Edmund and Florence, before the RTC of Makati City. Summonses
were issued against both, but the one intended for Edmund was not
served since he was in the United States and there was no
information on his address or the date of his return to the Philippines.
Florence filed her Answer and alleged that the loan documents did
not bind her since she was not a party thereto. Considering that the
joint agreement signed by her and her brother Edmund was not
approved by the probate court, it was null and void; hence, she
was not liable to Union Bank under the joint agreement.
Union Bank asserts that the obligation of the deceased had passed
to his legitimate heirs (Edmund and Florence) as provided in Article
774 of the Civil Code; and that the unconditional signing of the joint
agreement estopped Florence, and that she cannot deny her
liability under the said document.
CASE ASSIGNMENT IN WILLS & SUCCESSION
In her comment to the petition, Florence maintains that Union Bank
is trying to recover a sum of money from the deceased Efraim
Santibañez; thus the claim should have been filed with the probate
court. She points out that at the time of the execution of the joint
agreement there was already an existing probate proceedings. She
asserts that even if the agreement was voluntarily executed by her
and her brother Edmund, it should still have been subjected to the
approval of the court as it may prejudice the estate, the heirs or
third parties.
ISSUE:
W/N the claim of Union Bank should have been filed with the
probate court before which the testate estate of the late Efraim
Santibañez was pending. W/N the agreement between Edmund
and Florence (which was in effect, a partition of hte estate) was
void considering that it had not been approved by the probate
court. W/N there can be a valid partition among the heirs before
the will is probated.
HELD:
Well-settled is the rule that a probate court has the jurisdiction to
determine all the properties of the deceased, to determine whether
they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of
properties to be administered. The said court is primarily concerned
with the administration, liquidation and distribution of the estate.
In our jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no valid partition
among the heirs until after the will has been probated. In the
present case, Efraim left a holographic will which contained
the provision which reads as follows:
In our jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no valid partition
among the heirs until after the will has been probated. In the
present case, Efraim left a holographic will which contained
the provision which reads as follows:
(e) All other properties, real or personal, which I own and may be
discovered later after my demise, shall be distributed in the
proportion indicated in the immediately preceding paragraph in
favor of Edmund and Florence, my children.
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PALOY
The above-quoted is an all-encompassing provision embracing all
the properties left by the decedent which might have escaped his
mind at that time he was making his will, and other properties he
may acquire thereafter. Included therein are the three (3) subject
tractors. This being so, any partition involving the said tractors
among the heirs is not valid. The joint agreement executed by
Edmund and Florence, partitioning the tractors among themselves,
is invalid, specially so since at the time of its execution, there was
already a pending proceeding for the probate of their late father’s
holographic will covering the said tractors.
The Court notes that the loan was contracted by the decedent. The
bank, purportedly a creditor of the late Efraim Santibañez, should
have thus filed its money claim with the probate court in
accordance with Section 5, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court.
The filing of a money claim against the decedent’s estate in the
probate court is mandatory. This requirement is for the purpose of
protecting the estate of the deceased by informing the executor or
administrator of the claims against it, thus enabling him to examine
each claim and to determine whether it is a proper one which
should be allowed. The plain and obvious design of the rule is the
speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased and
the early delivery of the property to the distributees, legatees, or
heirs.
Perusing the records of the case, nothing therein could hold
Florence accountable for any liability incurred by her late father.
The documentary evidence presented, particularly the promissory
notes and the continuing guaranty agreement, were executed and
signed only by the late Efraim Santibañez and his son Edmund. As
the petitioner failed to file its money claim with the probate court, at
most, it may only go after Edmund as co-maker of the decedent
under the said promissory notes and continuing guaranty.