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T
he term ‘anti-tank guided weapon’ that linked it to the firing unit. The operator
(ATGW) is applied to a range of weap- often used a joystick to manually control the
ons, including guided mortar projec- direction of the projectile. This system required
& MARKETS
most commonly used to describe portable necessitated controlling the missile’s flight
guided missiles. The more specific term ‘anti- through a magnifying periscope or binocular
tank guided missile’ (ATGM) is also encoun- sights from a fixed position (Fulmer, Jenzen-
tered. These weapons were originally designed Jones, and Lyamin, 2016). Independently of
to disable armoured vehicles, but are frequently their relative effectiveness, a drawback of
employed against other targets, such as per- first-generation models was that the gunner
sonnel, light vehicles, and hardened structures. had to remain in the same position while the
Research Notes
ATGWs are distinguished from unguided anti- warhead was in flight. If the target was not
tank weapons, such as the RPG-7 and M72 effectively neutralized or if other opposing
LAW,2 by the incorporation of targeting and forces were within attacking range, the ATGW
guidance systems. The missiles fired by ATGM operator was often vulnerable.
systems are precision-guided munitions that The earliest first-generation ATGWs were
are capable of altering their course during developed when advances in tank armour
flight in order to more precisely strike a target made traditional anti-tank guns, recoilless
(Cross et al., 2016). ATGWs offer users the weapons, and rocket launchers less effective.
ability to engage targets from greater distances During the Second World War the Germans
and with greater accuracy than is possible with employed the X-7, the first MCLOS system
unguided anti-tank light weapons. These sys- and a precursor to modern ATGMs (Gander,
tems vary greatly in terms of lethality, port- 2000, pp. 136–52). After the war the French
ability, and guidance. Ranges of 2,000–5,000 m SS.10 and German Cobra, both modelled on
are common for most ATGMs; however, modern the X-7, were the first ATGWs available for
systems may be capable of extreme stand-off export, although they remained in production
ranges, as in the case of the Israeli Spike-ER, for only a short time (Jane’s, 1975, p. 743; 1985,
which is effective at ranges of up to 8,000 m p. 51). In 1963 the 9K11 Malyutka (NATO report-
(Jones and Ness, 2013). ing name: AT-3 ‘Sagger’) became the first Soviet-
Three distinct generations of ATGWs have made man-portable ATGW.3 The Malyutka was
been developed since the 1950s, with each widely exported and, subsequently, widely
generation largely corresponding to advances copied. China, for example, developed a series
in guidance methods. The earliest, ‘first- of missiles in the 1970s and 1980s based on this
generation’ ATGMs operated on the ‘manual weapon incorporating upgraded guidance sys-
command to line-of-sight’ (MCLOS) princi- tems and payloads (Jane’s, 2009). Early missiles
ple, requiring an operator to manually guide were fired from rails (such as the 9M11) or
the missile to target. Broadly speaking, first- boxy metal housings (such as the SS.10), while
generation ATGMs were guided to the target later, slimmer missiles were fired from self-
after launch by a wire in the rear of the missile contained launch tubes, effectively making the
launcher a reloadable weapon and the missiles
Spike series ATGW in its tube the ammunition.
Second-generation systems, which operated
on the semi-automatic command to line-of-sight
(SACLOS) principle, saw significant improve-
ments in performance. With these systems,
after the missile is launched the operator keeps
the weapon’s sight trained on the target, and
automatic guidance commands are sent to the
missile via wire, radio, or laser beam. SACLOS
systems require significantly less operator
training to achieve proficiency compared to
since 1950 (SIPRI, n.d.). Significantly, number of third-generation systems Yemen (ARES, 2017; Ferguson and
ATGWs have also been documented have been documented outside of Jenzen-Jones, 2014; Jenzen-Jones, 2015b;
in illicit arms markets organized state control. Those in possession of Smallwood, 2014; UNSC, 2017).
around social media platforms SACLOS ATGWs include militias in While ATGWs will continue to be
(Jenzen-Jones and Rice, 2016; Jenzen- Iraq, Syria, Ukraine, and Yemen developed to fulfil their initial role as
Jones and McCollum, 2017). Despite (ARES, 2017). Hezbollah, for instance, anti-armour systems, designers will
this, the international community has received hundreds of missiles for likely place greater emphasis on de-
continues to expend more energy and 9K111 Fagot (AT-4 ‘Spigot’), 9M131 feating fortified targets, such as bun-
resources on securing and destroying Metis-M (AT-13), 9M113 Konkurs (AT-5), kers and other fighting positions. De-
MANPADS—both under and outside and 9K135 Kornet (AT-14 ‘Spriggan’) signers can also be expected to focus
state control—than on similar meas- models and their copies from Iran and on increasing portability (e.g. reduced
ures for ATGWs. Syria (Wezeman et al., 2007, p. 410; weight and smaller sizes), technical
A wide range of non-state armed SIPRI, n.d.). In April 2011 Hamas noto- sophistication (e.g. non-line-of-sight
groups across the political and ideo- riously hit an Israeli school bus with targeting), and cost effectiveness.
logical spectrum possess ATGWs. a Russian-designed Kornet missile
Although available reporting is limited, (CNN, 2011). The 9K135, a relatively
at least several dozens of non-state advanced laser-guided system avail- Sourcing
armed groups are believed to have able with both tandem HEAT and This Research Note is based on Eric G. Berman
held ATGWs at some point since 1998 thermobaric warheads, or its 9M133 and Jonah Leff, ‘Light Weapons: Products,
(Rigual, 2014). Some groups possess or series missiles have also been docu- Producers, and Proliferation’, Small Arms
Survey 2008: Risk and Resilience, Cambridge:
have possessed only first-generation mented in the hands of pro-Russian
Cambridge University Press, pp. 6–41. The
MCLOS systems, although a substantial separatists, moderate and Islamist first edition was updated by Eric G. Berman
number now possess second-generation Syrian rebel groups, separatist groups and Jonah Leff. The second edition was up-
SACLOS models. Only a very small in South Sudan, and Houthi forces in dated by N.R. Jenzen-Jones.
2
see Jenzen-Jones (2015a).
Ruchnoy Protivotankovyy Granatomyot
Jane’s (Jane’s Information Group). 1975. Jane’s About the
Infantry Weapons 1975. Coulsdon: Jane’s
(‘hand-held anti-tank grenade launcher’) Information Group. Small Arms Survey
and Light Anti-tank Weapon, respectively. —. 1985. Jane’s Weapon Systems 1985–1986. The Small Arms Survey is a global
3 While the 9K11 was deployed on several Coulsdon: Jane’s Information Group. centre of excellence whose mandate
platforms, its predecessors—the 3M6 —. 2005. ‘Polish Live-firing Debut for Rafael’s is to generate impartial, evidence-
Schmel (AT-1 ‘Snapper’) and 3M11 Fleyta Spike-LR.’ Jane’s International Defence
(AT-2 ‘Swatter’)—were only launched
based, and policy-relevant knowl-
Review. Coulsdon: Jane’s Information
from armoured vehicles or helicopters. edge on all aspects of small arms and
Group. 1 April.
4 The seeker functions by continuously armed violence. It is the principal
––. 2007. Jane’s Ammunition Handbook 2007–
comparing target data captured before 2008. Coulsdon: Jane’s Information Group. international source of expertise,
launch to what the seeker sees using ––. 2009. ‘ATGWs Still Hit the Spot: Anti-tank information, and analysis on small
pattern recognition algorithms, and Guided Weapons.’ Jane’s Defence Weekly. arms and armed violence issues,
manoeuvring the missile appropriately. 7 September. and acts as a resource for govern-
Different seeker types may be used, includ- Jenzen-Jones, N.R. 2015a. Guided Mortar ments, policymakers, researchers,
ing infrared, millimeter wave, and others. Systems. Research Note No. 51. Geneva: and civil society. It is located in
5 The significant increase in ATGWs’ costs— Small Arms Survey. Geneva, Switzerland, at the Gradu-
combined with the complexity of learning —. 2015b. ‘Kornet Anti-tank Guided Weapon ate Institute of International and
how to operate these advanced systems— Captured from Sudanese Armed Forces.’
have resulted in procurers’ growing reli-
Development Studies.
The Hoplite (ARES company blog).
ance on simulators for training purposes.
The Survey has an international
17 January.
staff with expertise in security stud-
— and Ian McCollum. 2017. Web Trafficking:
Analysing the Online Trade of Small Arms ies, political science, law, economics,
development studies, sociology,
References and Light Weapons in Libya. Working Paper
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