mediaLaw

in
the Digital Age

September 25,2010

CLE MATERIALS
Produced by Kennesaw State University’s Center for Sustainable Journalism and
Harvard Law’s Berkman Center for Internet and Society.

This Conference is made possible in part by the generous

support of the Harnisch Foundation.

(www.thehf.org)
 MEDIA LAW IN THE DIGITAL AGE: THE RULES HAVE CHANGED, HAVE YOU? 
SEPTEMBER 25, 2010 
CLE Handouts 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 

Copyright: Using the Work of Others and Licensing Your Own Work 
1. Copyright Law and the Internet: Challenges of Today and Tomorrow 
2. Unbundling Copyright Owner’s Rights in the Licensing of “Atomized” Content 
3. The Rise of the News Aggregator: Legal Implications and Best Practices 
4. All the News That’s Fit to Own: Hot News on the Internet & the Commodification of 
News in Digital Culture 
5. Hot News Misappropriation: Barclays v. TheFlyontheWall.com 
Exercising Your Right to Know: Getting Access to Government Information 
1. Federal Open Records Law: Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 
2. Georgia Open Records Laws 
3. Comparison Between Florida and Georgia Public Records and Open Meetings Laws 
Libel and Privacy: Minimizing the Risks of Publishing Online 
1. Libel & Privacy: Minimizing the Risks of Publishing Online 
2. Recent Developments: Defamation and Invasion of Privacy 
Advertising Law for Online Publishers 
1. Legal Topics in Advertising Law for Online Publishers 
2. FTC Issues Final Guides on the Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in Advertising 
3. Some Online Advertising Law Lingo       
Newsgathering Law: How to Stay Out of Trouble When You’re Gathering Information  
for a Story 
1. Newsgathering Law: How to Stay Out of Trouble When You’re Gathering Information 
for a Story 
2. Topics in Newsgathering Law 
3. Update on the Free Flow of Information Act 
4. State Shield Laws: An Overview 
5. The Georgia Open Records Act – Caselaw Summary 
 
 Media Law in the Digital Age: The Rules Have Changed, Have You? 

Safe Harbors: Building and Managing Online Communities 
1. Recent Developments: Section 230, Communications Decency Act 
2. Recent Developments: Online Anonymity 
3. Recent Developments: Section 512, Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
Starting an Independent News Organization: Business Law and Other Considerations 
1. Starting an Independent News Organization: Business Law and Other Considerations 
2. Legal Entity/Liability Considerations for a New Media Company 
3. A Start‐up Independent News Organization’s Guide to Contributor Agreements 
4. Other Considerations When Launching an Online Publishing Venture 
5. The Newspaper Revitalization Act 
6. Protecting Your Intellectual Property: Trademark and Copyright Basics 
 

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COPYRIGHT LAW AND THE INTERNET:  CHALLENGES OF TODAY AND TOMORROW 
 
CHRISTOPHER A. WIECH 
Troutman Sanders LLP 
600 Peachtree Street, NE Suite 5200 
Atlanta, GA 30308‐2216  
T:  404.885.3691 
F: 404.962.6703 
E: chris.wiech@troutmansanders.com 
 
I. Introduction 
   
How we use and disseminate information, thoughts, and ideas has changed dramatically over 
the past 5‐10 years.  Traditional mediums – newspapers, books, magazines, encyclopedias, the 
nightly news – have, to some extent, given way to the Internet – blogs, YouTube, Facebook, 
Twitter, news websites – as society’s source for information and its preferred medium for the 
expression of thoughts and ideas.  Indeed, the Internet is becoming ubiquitous – anyone can 
access it from anywhere in the world with a mobile device or computer and a network 
connection.  Compared with traditional mediums, information on the Internet is also more 
easily published, distributed, updated, modified, and shared.  Content on one webpage can be 
cut and copied to another webpage, and then another, in an instant, which makes it difficult to 
keep track of who actually owns the content we view and use.   
   
Given these realities of the Internet, most people naively assume that just about everything on 
the web is free, unprotected, and theirs to use without limitation.  Is this good or bad?  Does 
the Internet encourage innovation and sharing, or does it stifle creativity?  On one hand, the 
Internet encourages the free flow of thoughts and ideas.  Take Wikipedia, for example, which 
aggregates the collective knowledge of anonymous users from around the world, without 
regard to who owns what.  But, on the other hand, the Internet is an emerging commercial 
marketplace, where ownership and revenues really do matter; and the stakes are high because 
of the potential revenue associated with the relative ease of distributing content to millions of 
users.  So, how do we balance free use with protection of ownership?  It’s not easy.  
Particularly, in the world of copyrights, the Internet poses many challenges.   
         
Despite Congress’ attempt to keep pace with the Internet by enacting the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act (“DMCA”),  which sought to extend federal copyright protection to Internet 
content, there is still much confusion over how to treat content on the Internet.  Traditional 
copyright laws are not well tailored to Internet content, leaving the courts to interpret and 
apply the law as best they can, which isn’t always consistent.  For now, in light of such 
uncertainty over how copyright law will evolve with the Internet, the best practice – whether 
you’re using someone else’s content on the Internet or you’re the owner of content – is to stay 
aware.  Stay aware of the content you use; stay aware of your content and how it’s being used; 
and stay aware of the law as it evolves.  For all you know, you may be pirating someone else’s 

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copyright‐protected work or your copyright‐protected work may be being pirated right under 
your nose. 
   
The purpose of this article is to promote a basic awareness of the legal issues pertaining to how 
we use and disseminate copyright‐protected information on the Internet, beginning with what 
constitutes copyright infringement (Section II), monetary relief for acts of infringement (Section 
III), and ways to avoid liability (Sections IV, V, and VI).    
 
II. Breaking the law:  what you need to know about copyright infringement 
   
A copyright owner has the exclusive right to reproduce his or her copyrighted work;  to prepare 
derivate works based on the copyrighted work;  distribute copies of the work to the public (sell 
rights, lease, etc.);  and publicly perform or display the work, including posting photographs or 
streaming music or video on the Internet.    
   
These exclusive rights can be infringed directly or indirectly.  Direct infringement can by shown 
(1) with direct evidence of copying – or, at least, by showing that the infringer had access to the 
copyrighted work – and (2) substantial similarity between the copyrighted work and the 
infringing work.  In the context of the Internet, courts have required some kind of direct 
volitional act in order to find direct infringement.  Direct infringement can be pretty black‐and‐
white, but indirect infringement has many shades of gray.  As a result, it’s much easier to fall 
victim to, or be a victim of, indirect infringement.   
   
Indirect infringement, at the outset, requires an underlying act of direct infringement.  And 
indirect infringement can be contributory or vicarious.  Contributory infringement is shown 
where the user (1) has actual or constructive knowledge – meaning they knew or should have 
known – of the direct infringement, and (2) the user contributed to or inducted the direct 
infringement by, for example, advertising or promoting the infringing work.  The standards for 
contributory infringement have evolved with two U.S. Supreme Court cases:  Sony Corp. v. 
Universal City Studios, Inc., in which the Supreme Court established that selling a product with 
substantially non‐infringing use is not contributory infringement;  and MGM Studios, Inc. v. 
Grokster, Ltd.,  in which the Supreme Court held that distributing a product with infringing and 
non‐infringing uses may nevertheless still constitute infringement if the promotion of the 
product and its ultimate use is infringing.  Ask yourself, is the primary objective of your website 
to encourage others to infringe copyright‐protected work?  If so, you could be liable for 
contributory infringement.     
   
Finally, vicarious infringement occurs when the vicarious infringer has (1) a financial interest in 
the infringing activity, which can be shown by examining its business model, and (2) the right or 
ability to control the direct infringer.  Consider, for example, YouTube.  Thousands of users post 
video content on YouTube each day.  YouTube has a financial interest in its users doing so – it’s 
what attracts users to its site and thus attracts advertising revenue.  Moreover, YouTube has 
the ability to control what content is posted on its site.  So, when a user knowingly and without 
authorization posts a copyrighted video on YouTube, YouTube can be vicariously liable for that 

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act.  Fortunate for YouTube and other websites like it, Congress has made life easier with safe 
harbors under the DMCA, which are discussed below in Section IV. 
 
III. Paying the piper for breaking the law 
   
Copyright owners whose works have been infringed are entitled to recover actual damages or 
statutory damages and/or injunctive relief from infringers.  Actual damages are your actual 
losses resulting from infringement (e.g., lost profits), which can be difficult to prove, and the 
reason why most copyright owners seek statutory damages, which are an amount of damages 
prescribed by the federal Copyright Act.  The Act allows for statutory damages of $750‐30,000 
for each instance of infringement, and the court has discretion to reduce (down to $200) or 
raise (up to $150,000) that amount depending on whether the infringement was innocent or 
willful.    
   
Moreover, because digital media on the Internet is so easily uploaded and frequently shared, 
the potential for a massive statutory damages award exists.  To put this in perspective, Viacom 
International, the multimedia conglomerate, which owns countless copyrights, has sued 
YouTube, alleging infringement of at least 150,000 video clips.   Statutory damages in that case, 
at a minimum, would be $112.5 million (i.e., $750 x 150,000), and that doesn’t account for 
multiple instances of infringement.  That’s why Viacom is seeking over $1 billion in damages.  
On a lesser scale – one you and I might better appreciate – a jury in Massachusetts awarded 
Sony statutory damages of $675,000 against a graduate student for willful infringement of 
songs – at $22,500 per song.   Depending on where you stand – content user or content owner 
– this may seem harsh or not harsh enough.     
 
IV. Congress tries to strike a balance:  the DMCA 
   
Undoubtedly, the Internet is the unknown frontier when it comes to copyrights.  What makes 
the Internet superior over traditional mediums (e.g., books, movies) – the relative ease with 
which copyrighted content can be inexpensively distributed to millions – also makes it riskier – 
acts of infringement are much grayer and, if found liable, staggering damages awards are 
possible because of the relative ease of distribution.  To balance these benefits and risks, 
Congress enacted the DMCA in 1998 to give “greater certainty to [Internet] service providers 
concerning their legal exposure for infringements that may occur in the course of their 
activities.”   A “service provider” is “an entity offering the transmission, routing, or providing of 
connections for digital online communications, between or among points specified by a user, of 
material of the user’s choosing, without modification to the content of the material as sent or 
received,” including “a provider of online services or network access, or the operator of 
facilities therefor.”   For example, Comcast, Google, and even some blogs qualify as “service 
providers” under the DMCA.      
   
In particular, the DMCA provides safe harbor from liability resulting from various activity on the 
Internet:   
•  acting as a conduit for transmission of infringing content;    

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•  temporary storage of infringing content for purposes of improving network efficiencies;  
•  providing server space for an infringer’s content, such as a website or blog;  or  
•  referring or linking users to an online location containing infringing material or infringing 
activity (e.g., search engines).  
   
To be eligible for safe harbor protection under the DMCA, the service provider must  
adopt and reasonably implement, and inform users of, a policy that provides for termination in 
appropriate circumstances of users who are repeat infringers.   
   
In adopting a policy, the most common way to protect yourself as a service provider is to 
require your users to accept your terms and conditions as a prerequisite to using your website.  
The terms and conditions should, among other things, set out the website’s right and discretion 
to remove content or use content added to it by users.  For example, we all had to agree to 
Facebook’s terms and conditions before we could create our profiles, and in doing so, we all 
granted Facebook “a non‐exclusive, transferable, sub‐licensable, royalty‐free, worldwide 
license” to use anything we post on Facebook, regardless of any intellectual property 
ownership rights we may have in what we post.  Notably, terms and conditions that require 
affirmative acceptance by the user – e.g., clicking “I accept these terms and conditions” – are 
more easily enforced than terms and conditions that are simply posted somewhere on the site.  
   
Reasonably implementing a policy typically requires some form of monitoring your website site 
to ensure infringing activity is not taking place, nor is infringing content being added to the site.  
Commercially available filtering software can be used to identify infringing material as well as 
repeat infringing users.   
   
In addition, service providers must accommodate, and not interfere with, standard technical 
measures used by copyright owners to identify or protect their copyrighted works.   This is 
known as copyright management information (“CMI”).  All copyright‐protected works should 
contain some type of identifier that alerts the user as to the author or owner of the work.  If 
you remove or alter the CMI on a work, the DMCA’s safe harbor provisions won’t apply to you.    
   
For user‐generated content, in addition to the requirements above, the service provider must 
not have actual knowledge that its systems or networks contain infringing material or infringing 
activity is occurring, nor can it turn a blind eye to red flags indicating possible infringement.  
Once the service provider is aware of the infringing activity – typically, upon receiving notice 
from the copyright owner – the service provider must act expeditiously to remove the infringing 
content or disable access to it.  However, if the service provider does actually remove content 
based on notice, knowledge, or even suspicion that the content is infringing, the service 
provider must notify the user whose content has been removed or disabled.   The user then 
may counter‐notify the service provider that its content has been removed or disabled by 
mistake, in which case, the service provider must put the content back up within 10‐14 days 
unless the copyright owner initiates legal action against the user.    
   

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Last, the service provider cannot receive a direct financial benefit from infringing activity that it 
has the right or ability to control.    
  Why be bothered with all of this?  By following these procedures under the DMCA, the 
service provider can immunize itself from liability for posting or removing content, regardless of 
whether the content infringed.   In a fight between the copyright owner and alleged infringer, 
the service provider is usually stuck in the middle.  Before the DMCA, the service provider could 
remain stuck in the middle based on potentially liability as an indirect infringer.  Now, by 
following the simple procedures set forth above, the service provider can extricate itself from 
the fight, and won’t be on the hook for damages.   Moreover, the copyright owner and user can 
both be liable to the service provider for misrepresenting whether content is protected.     
 
V. What’s fair is fair – the fair use defense to copyright infringement. 
   
Maybe you’re not a “service provider” and therefore not entitled to the safe harbor provisions 
under the DMCA, or the DMCA doesn’t apply to your circumstances?  In that case, traditional 
copyright law principles will apply.  Obviously, the best way to avoid liability for copyright 
infringement is to obtain permission from the copyright owner to use its copyrighted work.  
That’s not always possible, and sometimes, it’s too late because the work has already been 
used without permission.     
   
Permission aside, the most widely used and most widely litigated defense to copyright 
infringement is fair use.  A colleague once said, “Everything is fair use, and nothing is fair use.”   
That statement, perhaps, best sums up the law on fair use.  You can read countless court 
opinions, as well as treatises, about what is and is not fair use, and still not have a clear 
understanding.  That’s because the fair use defense is fact‐specific, and can vary greatly 
depending on the circumstances.  The Copyright Act, though, sets out factors to aid in 
determining whether use of a copyrighted work is fair.   This is important because if use is fair, 
there is no infringement – direct or indirect.           
   
Nature of the use.  This first factor considers how the copyrighted work is being used.  Socially 
desirable uses, such as for education or journalism, are more likely to qualify as fair use than 
are commercial uses.  In addition, transformative use – use that adds something new to the 
original content or alters the character or use of the work – is more likely to be considered fair 
use, whereas redistributive use – essentially repeating all or portions of the original work for 
the same intended purpose or use – is not as likely to be considered fair use.  For example, 
copying portions of a copyrighted material for purposes of providing commentary or criticism 
on it – a lot of what bloggers do – is generally transformative use because the copyrighted 
material is being used for a different purpose than its original purpose.  Moreover, the 
commentary or criticism is, itself, a new expression of thought.  But, simply verbatim copying of 
all or a portion of copyrighted work, without adding to or altering its original purpose, is not fair 
use. 
   
Parodies are a much discussed example of fair use.  A parody is a work that pokes fun at or 
criticizes another work.  Without reference to the original work, the parody wouldn’t be 

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understandable.  But the incorporation of the original work into the parody is permissible – it is 
fair use – because the parody transforms the original work.   
   
Nature of copyrighted work.  This second factor looks at the degree of creativity in the 
copyrighted material.  Is it fact or fiction?  Is the work published or unpublished?  Taking from 
factual works and published works is more likely to qualify as fair use.     
   
Amount of work copied.  This factor considers the quantity and quality of the work used.  
Wholesale verbatim copying is typically considered not fair use.  But, even copying a small 
portion of a work, if that small portion captures essentially the heart of the work, may not be 
fair use either.   
   
Market effect.  This last factor gives great weight to how the use affects the market for the 
copyrighted work.  Courts consider not only the market effect of the particular user’s use of the 
material, but also whether similar use (by others) would substantially and adversely impact the 
potential market for the copyrighted work or derivative works.   
   
A good example of these factors at work is United States v. American Society of Composers, 
Authors, and Publishers.   In that case, musicians and composers sued AT&T for copyright 
infringement for AT&T’s use of ringtone previews on its website.  AT&T defended on the 
grounds of fair use, but the court ruled against it.  The court found that AT&T’s use of the 
ringtone previews was not transformative, but rather for a commercial purpose, because AT&T 
used the previews to attract visitors to its site to facilitate ringtone sales and to attract third‐
party advertising.  Moreover, it did not matter that each ringtone preview was only 10‐30 
seconds long because these short snippets captured the heart of each song.  Finally, AT&T’s use 
impeded the market for licensing ringtone previews because AT&T used the ringtones for more 
than promotional purposes.     
 
VI. A factual wrinkle:  “hot news” misappropriation 
   
Fair use comes into play when the subject work being used is copyrighted.  Facts, however, 
cannot be copyrighted.  Indeed, a long‐standing principle of copyright law is that facts are in the 
public domain.  Websites, like Google News and the Drudge Report, that aggregate news 
headlines and excerpts from, as well as link to, other websites rely on this principle that facts 
are free.  However, while facts may be free, that doesn’t necessarily mean you’re free from 
liability for using them.   
   
“Hot news” misappropriation is a tort claim, which was first recognized by the U.S. Supreme 
Court in 1918 and is recently gaining popularity among news‐reporting organizations, that 
protects information conveyed as “breaking news.”  Just last March, Flyonethewall.com, an 
Internet‐based financial news website which aggregates and publishes stock recommendations 
taken from various Wall Street firms, was found liable for misappropriation by a federal court in 
New York, in Barclays Capital Inc. v. Flyonthewall.com.   The court found that this particular 
news aggregator was engaging in “free‐riding activity that is directly competitive with the [Wall 

6 
 
 

Street] Firms’ production of time‐sensitive information, thereby threatening their incentive to 
continue in the business.”     
   
However, in that case, Agora Financial, LLC v. Samler, the court found that the financial 
investment recommendations at issue were not “hot news,” but more likely subject to 
copyright protections.  The court noted, “[A] recommendation to invest in a company is not a 
fact, but instead an ‘original’ work, which . . . entails ‘judgment’ and ‘creativity.’ . . . While 
plaintiffs may be able to protect their ‘original’ investment recommendations under federal 
copyright law, they cannot protect these recommendations under the ‘hot news’ 
misappropriation theory.”  
   
The distinction, therefore, between the rights protected under a copyright infringement claim 
and a "hot news" misappropriation claim is that copyright law protects a copyright holder's 
exclusive right to reproduce, distribute, perform, or display "original" material while the "hot 
news" misappropriation theory protects an individual's exclusive right to profit or otherwise 
benefit from the labor expended in discovering, gathering, and generating certain "non‐
original" material, such as factual information.  
 
On their surface, Barclays and Agora both involved use of another’s financial investment advice, 
but each had a different outcome on whether the content at issue was subject to copyright law 
or the tort claim of hot news misappropriation.  What is for sure, like infringement and fair use, 
hot news misappropriation is also a highly factually dependent; there is no bright‐line rule.   
   
With the advent of news aggregator websites and original source news‐reporting websites 
starting to charge subscriber fees for full access, more lawsuits, whether grounded on copyright 
infringement or hot news misappropriation (in those states that recognize the claim), are sure 
to follow.  Perhaps, even facts aren’t safe anymore.  Just be aware of what’s being used and 
how it’s used.     
 
VII. Parting Suggestions 
   
When dealing with the Internet, simply being able to spot potential pitfalls with using and 
distributing content, puts you ahead of the curve.  Awareness is the key.   
   
For content users:  
• Consider the content itself – does it contain any CMI (copyright management 
information) signaling that it is copyright protected; is it the type of content that 
could be subject to copyright protects, like creative work as opposed to facts (if 
facts, though, are they time‐sensitive?) 
• Pay attention to the source of the content you’re using – are you taking content 
that’s already been infringed? 
• Consider your use of the content – is it infringing or fair use?  Should you obtain 
permission to use from the copyright owner?    

7 
 
 

• Consider whether the DMCA applies to you, if you’ve met its requirements, and are 
thus entitled to its safe harbors from monetary liability. 
 
For content owners: 
• Identify your ownership of your content – make sure it contains CMI. 
• Monitor, to the extent possible, use of your content by others on the Internet. 
• Rely on notice‐and‐take down provisions of DMCA. 
• Enforce your rights – send cease and desist letters to infringers, require licenses to 
use your content, and resort to litigation or alternative forms of dispute resolution, if 
necessary.   

8 
 
 

UNBUNDLING COPYRIGHT OWNERS’ RIGHTS IN THE LICENSING OF “ATOMIZED” CONTENT 
 
ERIC J. HANSON 
Hunton & Williams LLP 
Bank of America Plaza, Suite 4100 
600 Peachtree Street, NE 
Atlanta, Georgia 30308 
T: (404) 888‐4040 
F: (404) 602‐8850 
E: ehanson@hunton.com 
 
   Opportunities for creating and consuming licensed digital content are virtually limitless 
in today’s “app economy.”   As demand grows for quickly digestible digital content “nuggets,” 
digital works are increasingly “atomized” into extracted works for license and distribution to a 
variety of uses.   Original “parent” works, such as books, articles, content libraries, software 
programs, multimedia works, and audiovisual compositions, give rise to atomized content such 
as excerpts, images, audiovisual clips, feeds, and samplings.  Because copyright protection 
extends to such atomized content, a digital content owners’ copyright licensing options multiply 
beyond a basic license of an owner’s bundle of rights in an original work to a licensee.     
 
   Often the licensors’ and licensees’ needs for use and copying of atomized works is 
different from the licensing considerations for the use of the original digital parent works.  
Depending on, for example, what atomized content is to be used, the various distribution 
interfaces and scope of permitted redistribution, the copyright owner’s bundle of rights may be 
unbundled and licensed under content and distribution specific terms to meet the copyright 
owners’ and licensees’ needs.  Further, license fees for use of the original work may be very 
different than for use and distribution of the atomized content.    
 
  Under Section 106 of the U.S. Copyright Act (17 U.S.C. §106) a copyright owner’s 
primary bundle of rights  includes the exclusive right to do and to authorize any of the 
following: 
 
  (1)   to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;  
  (2)   to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;  
  (3)   to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public  
    by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;  
  (4)   in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,  
    pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform 
     the copyrighted work publicly;  
  (5)   in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,  
    pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the 
     individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display 
     the copyrighted work publicly; and  
  (6)   in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly 

1 
 
 

    by means of a digital audio transmission.  
 
From computer, television, mobile device and social network “apps” to embedded web page 
media and text feeds, given the increasing number of possible interfaces from which atomized 
content is served and re‐served to both end users and by third party digital content 
distributors, copyright licensors must consider how this bundle of rights might be licensed for 
their atomized content works in comparison to the original works.    
 
  For example, a web‐based magazine “WebZine” might provide a collection of reviews 
for various home theater products on its website.   Each product review includes, for example, 
a digital article with text expressing the author’s evaluation and opinion of a device together 
with review photographs and videos.   A typical article might therefore be a joint work of 
authorship of a technical review writer and the photographer/videographer.  If the parties only 
consider the basic end‐use of the entire review article on WebZine’s website through the 
interface of an Internet browser, the parties might contemplate only a simple transfer of the 
authors’ entire bundle of rights by assignment or license to WebZine.  Such basic “bundled” 
transfers might occur as “work for hire” employment or the authors’ individual license 
contracts with WebZine.  
 
  However, each WebZine review has the potential to be atomized and licensed for 
distribution of the atomized content by the authors, WebZine and/or third parties to many 
other digital content interfaces beyond WebZine’s web pages including only the full review.  
The valuable copyrighted atomized content may include product images, product video and 
text excerpts from the review.  Individually or in selectable combinations such atomized 
content may be specifically licensed for digital consumption to a variety of third party uses, 
such as other review and retail web sites, device apps, feeds, dashboard widgets, comparison 
interfaces, video platforms, image platforms and other distribution interfaces.   
 
  If the authors have already transferred all of their copyright interests to WebZine, 
WebZine is the owner and licensor to structure potential licensing relationships of both the full 
work and these potential atomized works.  WebZine would consider the unbundling of its 
copyright rights with respect to atomized content and what uses will be licensed to potential 
licensees.  WebZine might establish different content license fees for particular uses, particular 
distribution channels and for third party downstream sublicense rights. WebZine might also 
syndicate atomized content, require tracking of content use, require attribution and establish 
limits on how content may be repurposed. 
 
  If the authors have not transferred their copyright ownership interests by assignment or 
exclusive license to WebZine, such as under an existing employment relationship or contract, 
the authors remain individual owners and licensors for determining the licensing of their bundle 
of rights as to both the entire work and to atomized content.  In an author ownership scenario, 
the author‐licensors might grant certain rights to WebZine regarding use of the full review on 
the WebZine site while reserving rights to atomize and license content themselves.  The author‐
licensors might also grant exclusive rights to WebZine in both the full work and atomized 

2 
 
 

content, but establish different license fees applicable to different uses by WebZine in 
downstream licensing of the atomized content.  Such monetization strategies might include the 
authors attempting to establish an appropriate schedule of fees applicable to atomized content 
based on WebZine’s potential sublicensed distribution channels.  In addition, or alternatively, 
the authors might provide WebZine with general sublicense rights subject to a requirement of 
establishing license rates as WebZine’s sublicense opportunities arise.    
 
  Further, depending on the specific atomized content, such as atomized text, atomized 
images and atomized video, a particular author or authors of certain atomized content may 
have specific owner and licensor rights apart from the author(s) of other atomized content in 
the original work.  Different copyright owners of different atomized content might therefore 
have different license considerations and establish different agreements for their individual 
rights applicable to particular licensed content. 
 
  Whether WebZine or an author is a copyright owner and licensor of atomized content, 
some of the many considerations relating to licensing and unbundling of Section 106 rights 
under the hypothetical example may include: 
 
Right to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords 
• What portions may or may not be copied as atomized content? 
• In what forms and to what distribution interfaces can the content be reproduced? 
• Are there limits on the number of copies or how much copying is permitted? 
• What license fees are applicable to particular content, copiers 
(commercial/personal) and form and use of copied content? 
• Are there limitations on copying with respect to certain distribution channels, 
commercial uses, non‐commercial uses or those permitted to copy? 
• Are licensed reproduction rights exclusive or non‐exclusive as to particular content, 
copiers and distribution channels? 
• How long is a copier granted the reproduction right as to particular content? 
• Is attribution of copyright ownership, owner branding, website link or required 
notices required in connection with copied uses? 
• Is sublicensing of reproduction rights from licensee to other licensees permitted? 
• If sublicensing is permitted, is content and license tracking required to monitor 
locations and uses of copied atomized content? 
• Are there restrictions on the digital environment and context in which copied 
content will be used? 
• In what digital and non‐digital media is reproduction of the content permitted? 
• Will the copyright owner have audit rights to confirm the licensee’s copying and the 
copying by sublicensees to determine applicable license fees and compliance with 
license terms? 
• Are there restrictions on where licensed content resides and where it is reproduced 
for display and other licensed uses? 
o Copyright owner’s servers? 
o Licensee’s servers? 

3 
 
 

o Downloadable? 
 
Right to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work  
• Any restrictions on how atomized content may be incorporated to create new 
content? 
• Does the incorporation of licensed atomized content create any license‐back rights 
to the licensor in the licensee’s derivative work including the atomized content? 
• Does the incorporation of licensed atomized content create any licenses right to 
third parties (including other third party licensees of the atomized content) in a 
licensee’s derivative work including the atomized content? 
• Does the right to create different types of derivative works with the licensed content 
represent different license fees? 
• In what digital and non‐digital media may derivative works be created? 
• Who is granted the right to create derivative works and may the right be 
sublicensed? 
 
Right to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or 
other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending 
• What licensees and sublicensees are granted distribution rights to the atomized 
content? 
• What monetization rights (such as digital sales, rentals, subscriptions, syndication, 
etc.) are granted to licensees? 
• Is particular atomized content subject to different distribution rights than other 
atomized content? 
• Are different license fees applicable to obtaining a license of distribution rights 
compared to copying rights for a licensee’s end use? 
 
Right to perform the copyrighted work publicly ‐‐ literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic 
works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works 
• Apart from terms governing making copies of content, are further license terms to 
be applicable to publicly performing authorized copy of atomized content? 
o Content, such as audiovisual clips, to be publicly performed in transmission to an 
audience (e.g. trade show, instructional)? 
o Content to be publicly performed in commercial environment (e.g. retail home 
theater store publicly performing an authorized copy of an audiovisual clip from 
a review for customers) 
• Are specific license fees applicable to licensing a public performance right? 
 
Right to display the copyrighted work publicly ‐‐ literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic 
works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images 
of a motion picture or other audiovisual work 
• Apart from terms governing making copies of content, are further license terms to 
be applicable to publicly displaying an authorized copy of atomized content? 

4 
 
 

o Content, such as digital image or text, to be publicly displayed in transmission to 
an audience (e.g. trade show, instructional)? 
o Content to be publicly displayed in commercial environment (e.g. retail home 
theater store publicly displaying an authorized copy of text or image content 
from a review to customers) 
• Are specific license fees applicable to licensing a public display right? 
 
Right to perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio transmission ‐‐ 
sound recordings 
• Apart from terms governing making copies of content, are further license terms to 
be applicable to public performance of audio atomized content that is digitally 
transmitted? 
o Sound recording audio to be played publicly by digital transmission transmitted 
to an audience (e.g. Internet broadcast)? 
o Sound recording audio to be publicly played in commercial environment (e.g. 
retail home theater store publicly playing an authorized copy of an audio clip 
from a review to customers) 
 
Are specific license fees applicable to licensing a public performance of audio content digitally 
transmitted? 
 

5 
 
THE RISE OF THE NEWS AGGREGATOR:
Legal Implications and Best Practices

By Kimberley Isbell and the Citizen Media Law Project

During the past decade, the Internet has
become an important news source for
most Americans. According to a study
conducted by the Pew Internet and
American Life Project, as of January 2010,
nearly 61% of Americans got at least some content isn’t merely an academic question
of their news online in a typical day.1 This
increased reliance on the Internet as a
source of news has coincided with
declining profits in the traditional media
and the shuttering of newsrooms in
communities across the country.2 Some
commentators look at this confluence of
events and assert that, in this case,
correlation equals causation – the Internet
is harming the news business.
One explanation for the decline of the
traditional media that some, including
News Corporation owner Rupert Murdoch
and Associated Press Chairman Dean
Singleton, have seized upon is the rise of
the news aggregator. According to this
theory, news aggregators from Google
News to The Huffington Post are free-
riding, reselling and profiting from the
factual information gathered by traditional
media organizations at great cost. Rupert
Murdoch has gone so far as to call
Page 1
Google’s aggregation and display of
newspaper headlines and ledes “theft.”3 As
the traditional media are quick to point out,
the legality of a business model built
around the monetization of third-party
– it’s big business. Revenues generated
from online advertising totaled $23.4
billion in 2008 alone.4
Producing journalism is expensive. We  
invest tremendous resources in our project 
from technology to our salaries. To  
aggregate stories is not fair use. To be  
impolite, it is theft.  
  —   Rupert Murdoch, Chairman and  
  Chief Executive of News Corporation  
  December 1, 2009 
Building a business model around
monetizing another website’s content isn’t
novel, and methods for doing so have been
around for almost as long as the Internet
has been a commercial platform. Consider
the practice of framing, or superimposing
ads onto embeded websites.5 There’s also
in-line linking, or incorporating content
from multiple websites into one single
third-party site.6 These days, it’s news
aggregators that are generating a lot of
scrutiny. But are they legal?
WHAT IS A NEWS AGGREGATOR?
Before tackling the legal questions
implicated by news aggregators, we should differences among the various models.
first define the term. At its most basic, a
news aggregator is a website that takes
information from multiple sources and
displays it in a single place.7 While the
concept is simple in theory, in practice
news aggregators take many forms. For
this reason, any attempt to talk about the
legal issues surrounding “news
aggregation” is bound to fail, unless we
take into consideration the relevant
For the purposes of our discussion, we will
group news aggregators into four
categories: Feed Aggregators, Specialty
Aggregators, User-Curated Aggregators,
and Blog Aggregators.8

FEED AGGREGATORS 

As used in this discussion, a “Feed Aggregator” is closest to the traditional conception of a news  
aggregator, namely, a website that contains material from a number of websites organized into various 
“feeds,” typically arranged by source, topic, or story.  Feed Aggregators often draw their material from a 
particular type of source, such as news websites or blogs, although some Feed Aggregators will contain  
content from more than one 
type of source.  Some well 
known examples are Yahoo! 
News (and its sister site, My 
Yahoo!) and Google News.  
Feed Aggregators generally  
display the headline of a 
story, and sometimes the 
first few lines of the story’s 
lede, with a link to where the 
rest of the story appears on 
the original website.  The 
name of the originating  
website is often listed, as 
well. 

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CAN THEY DO THAT?
For all of the attention that news
aggregators have received, no case in the
United States has yet definitively
addressed the question of whether their
activities are legal. Only a small number of
lawsuits have been brought against news
aggregators, and all of them have settled
before a final decision on the merits.

SPECIALTY AGGREGATORS 

For the purposes of this white paper, a 
“Specialty Aggregator” is a website that  
collects information from a number of sources 
on a particular topic or location.  Examples of  
Specialty Aggregators are hyper‐local websites 
like Everyblock and Outside.In and websites 
that aggregate information about a particular 
topic like Techmeme and Taegan Goddard’s 
Political Wire.   

Like Feed Aggregators,  
Specialty Aggregators  
typically display the  
headline of a story, and  
occasionally the first few 
lines of the lede with a link 
to the rest of the story, 
along with the name of the 
website on which the story 
originally appeared.  Unlike 
Feed Aggregators, which 
cover many topics, Specialty  
Aggregators are more  
limited in focus and typically 
cover just a few topics or 
sources. 

Page 3
Before trying to answer the question of the search prowess to crawl through
legality of news aggregators under U.S. law, thousands of online media sources, Google
let’s take a closer look at the cases that News, as the service would be called,
have been brought to see what arguments featured various news stories published
both sides of the debate are making. over the past 30 days. At the time AFP
filed suit, Google News displayed the
AFP V. GOOGLE NEWS headline, lede, and accompanying photo of
articles published by the different news
While still a young company relying on providers accessed by Google’s news
private capital, Google launched a news crawler.10 Google also provided a link to
aggregator in 2002 that was intended as a the original story as it appeared on the
companion to its increasingly popular website from which the story was
search engine.9 Using Google’s Internet accessed.

USER‐CURATED AGGREGATORS 

A “User‐Curated Aggregator” is a website that features user‐submitted links and portions of text taken 
from a variety of web‐
sites.  Often, the links on 
a User‐Curated Aggrega‐
tor will be culled from a 
wider  
variety of sources than 
most news  
aggregators, and will  
often include links to 
blog posts and  
multimedia content like 
YouTube videos, as well 
as links to more  
traditional media 
sources.   

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BLOG AGGREGATORS 

Of the four types of news aggregators discussed in this 
paper, the final category, what we’re calling “Blog  
Aggregators,” looks the least like a traditional news 
aggregator.  Blog Aggregators are websites that use 
third‐party content to create a blog about a given 
topic.  The Gawker media sites are perhaps one of the 
best known examples of Blog Aggregators, and also  
illustrate the different forms that the use of third‐party 
content can take on these sites.  One method of using 
third‐party content on Blog Aggregators is as raw  
material for blogger‐written content, synthesizing  
information from a number of sources into a single 
story (occasionally, but not always, incorporating quotes from the original articles) and linking to the  
original content in the article, at the end, or both.  Elsewhere, a post 
may consist of a two to three sentence summary of an article from a 
third‐party source, with a link to the original article.  Yet other posts 
are composed of short excerpts or summaries from a number of  
articles strung together, all with links back to the original articles.  

Another popular Blog Aggregator is the Huffington 
Post, which likewise uses third‐party content in a  
number of different ways.  The Huffington Post  
website is organized into several sections, the front 
pages of which typically feature links to a mixture of 
different types of content, including original articles  
authored by Huffington Post writers, AP articles 
hosted on the Huffington Post website, and articles 
hosted on third‐party websites.  In linking to content 
on third party websites, the Huffington Post some‐
times uses the original headline, and other times will 
use a headline written by Huffington Post editors.

Page 5
Many of the articles that appeared in
Google News were written by wire services
such as Agence France Presse (“AFP”) and works it alleged Google to have infringed,13
The Associated Press, but displayed on
third-party websites.11 Wire services like
the AFP generally do not distribute news
freely on their own websites as do many
newspapers; instead, they license their
content to other news providers, such as
local newspapers. According to AFP, then,
the headline, lede and photo displayed by
Google News was licensed content, and
the only parties that were authorized to
publish them were those that paid
licensing fees. By providing this content,
even in an abbreviated form, AFP claimed,
Google News was infringing their copyrights
and stealing their product.
to dismiss: the first, based on AFP’s failure
to identify with particularity all of those
and the second, a partial motion to dismiss
AFP’s claim for copyright infringement of
AFP’s headlines, on the grounds that the
headlines constituted uncopyrightable
subject matter.14
After nearly two years of litigation and
extensive discovery, AFP and Google
settled the case, entering into a licensing
deal granting Google the right to post AFP
content, including news stories and
photographs, on Google News and on other
Google services.15
ASSOCIATED PRESS V. ALL HEADLINE NEWS

AFP filed a lawsuit against Google in Almost three years later, the Associated
federal district court in Washington, DC in Press (“AP”) filed a lawsuit against another
2005. The Amended Complaint asserted news aggregator, All Headline News. On its
claims against Google for copyright website, All Headline News described itself
infringement in AFP’s photos, headlines, as a “global news agency and content
and ledes; a claim for removal or alteration service.”16 According to the AP’s
of AFP’s copyright management complaint, however, All Headline News “ha
information; and a claim for “hot news” [d] no reporters,” and instead prepared its
misappropriation.12 Google responded to content by having employees “copy[] news
AFP’s claims by filing two separate motions stories found on the internet or rewrite[e]

Page 6
such stories.” All Headline News then GATEHOUSE MEDIA V. NEW YORK TIMES CO.
repackaged and sold this content to clients
that included newspapers, Internet web One of the more recent news aggregation
portals, websites, and other redistributors cases pitted two traditional media
of news content.17 The AP asserted claims companies against each other. GateHouse
against All Headline News for “hot news” Media, which at the time operated more
misappropriation, copyright infringement, than 375 local newspapers and their
removal or alteration of copyright respective websites, claimed that The New
management information, trademark York Times Co. copied the headlines and
infringement, unfair competition, and ledes from GateHouse’s Wicked Local
breach of contract.18 websites as part of its own local news
aggregation effort on the Boston.com
All Headline News filed a partial motion to website.23 GateHouse’s Complaint
dismiss most of the AP’s claims, except the asserted claims against The New York
claim for copyright infringement.19 Nearly Times Co. for copyright infringement,
a year later, the Southern District of New trademark infringement, false advertising,
York issued an order granting in part and trademark dilution, unfair competition, and
denying in part All Headline News’ breach of contract (for failure to comply
motion.20 The court dismissed the AP’s with the provisions of the Creative
trademark infringement claims, but Commons license under which the Wicked
retained the remaining claims against All Local content was distributed).24
Headline News, including hot news
misappropriation.21 Four months later, the Concurrently with filing the Complaint,
parties settled. Under the settlement GateHouse filed a motion requesting a
agreement, All Headline News agreed to temporary restraining order and
cease using AP content and paid an preliminary injunction prohibiting The New
unspecified sum “to settle the AP’s claim York Times Co. from using content from the
for past unauthorized use of AP expression Wicked Local websites.25 The court denied
and news content.”22 GateHouse’s motion for a restraining order

Page 7
and consolidated the motion for a
preliminary injunction with an expedited
trial on the merits.26 The parties settled on
the eve of trial, with both sides agreeing,
among other things, to remove the others’
RSS feeds from their websites.27
SO IS IT LEGAL?
As the foregoing discussion illustrates,
there are two doctrines that need to be
considered when attempting to determine
whether news aggregation is legal:
copyright and hot news misappropriation.
We turn to each of these below.
COPYRIGHT
Under U.S. copyright law, a work is
protected if it (1) is an original work of
authorship, and (2) is fixed in a tangible
medium of expression that can be read
directly or with the aid of a machine or
device (i.e., is recorded or embodied in
some manner for more than a transitory
duration).28 With certain exceptions, the
owner of a copyrighted work has the right
to prohibit others from reproducing,
preparing derivative works from,
Page 8
distributing copies of, or publicly
performing or displaying the work.29
While most news articles meet the second
prong of the copyrightability test, this does
not end the inquiry. To be protected by
copyright, the material copied by the news
aggregator also needs to be original (i.e.,
both independently created by the author
and minimally creative).30 Under U.S.
copyright law, ideas and facts cannot be
copyrighted, but the way a person
expresses those ideas or facts can be.31 It
is also a generally accepted proposition of
U.S. copyright law that titles and short
phrases are not protected under copyright
law.32
These last two propositions are cited by
many news aggregators to claim that the
headlines of news stories (and, less
frequently, the ledes) do not qualify for
copyright protection, and thus the
reproduction of this material on a news
aggregator’s website does not constitute
copyright infringement. According to this
argument, a headline is an uncopyrightable
title or short phrase. Moreover, the
argument goes, headlines are highly
factual and thus the merger doctrine would be “original” and thus protectable is
prohibit copyright protection. The merger extremely low — a work satisfies this
doctrine denies protection to certain requirement as long as it possesses some
expressions of an idea (or set of facts) creative spark, “no matter how crude,
where the idea and its expression are so humble or obvious it might be.”35
inseparable that prohibiting third parties
from copying the expression would FAIR USE
effectively grant the author protection of
the underlying idea.33 Assuming that headlines and ledes are
copyrightable subject matter, a news
In its litigation against AFP, Google aggregator’s reproduction of them is not
asserted a variant of this argument. Noting actionable if its use of the material
that AFP’s headlines “often consist of qualifies as a fair use. The Copyright Act
fewer than 10 words,” Google argued that, sets forth four nonexclusive factors for
though they may be “painstakingly courts to consider when determining
created,” they were nonetheless not whether a use qualifies as a fair use.
entitled to copyright protection because These factors include: (1) The purpose and
they “generally seek to encapsulate the character of the use, including whether the
factual content of the story,” and did not use is of a commercial nature or is for
contain protectable original expression that nonprofit educational purposes; (2) The
was separable from their factual content.34 nature of the copyrighted work; (3) The
While this argument has some appeal amount and substantiality of the portion
when directed at short, highly factual used in relation to the copyrighted work as
headlines, it becomes a harder argument a whole; and (4) The effect of the use upon
to make when directed at text from the the potential market for or value of the
article, such as the lede. For, as the copyrighted work.36 This section will take
Supreme Court noted in Feist Publications, each of these factors in turn, and apply
Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc., them to the four categories of news
the level of creativity required for a work to aggregators previously discussed.

Page 9
THE PURPOSE AND CHARACTER OF THE USE. The Aggregators. The Ninth Circuit has
first thing courts will consider when repeatedly found that certain
evaluating this factor whether the use is reproductions of copyrighted works by a
commercial in nature. Because most (but search engine are a “transformative” use.
not all) news aggregators contain In Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., the Ninth
advertisements, it is likely that a court Circuit found that the reproduction of
would find the use to be commercial, thumbnails of plaintiff’s photographs in
cutting against a finding of fair use.37 The defendant’s search engine results was
fact that the websites are commercial does transformative, noting that “[the search
not end the inquiry into the first fair use engine’s] use of the images serves a
factor, however.38 In addition to looking at different function than [plaintiff’s] use —
whether the use is commercial in nature, improving access to information on the
courts also look at whether the use is internet versus artistic expression.”40
“transformative” — namely, does the new Likewise, in Perfect 10, Inc v.
work merely serve as a replacement for the Amazon.com, Inc., the court noted the
original work, or does it instead add significant public benefit provided by
something new, either by repurposing the Google’s image search “by incorporating an
content, or infusing the content with a new original work into a new work, namely, an
expression, meaning, or message.39 electronic reference tool,” and observed
that “a search engine may be more
Applying the transformative test to the four transformative than a parody because a
categories of news aggregators yields search engine provides an entirely new use
slightly different results. of the original work, while a parody typically
has the same entertainment purpose as
Applied to Feed Aggregators, the first fair the original work.”41
use factor cuts slightly in favor of a finding
of fair use because of the transformative But, it is worth noting, the case for
nature of the categorization and indexing transformative use isn’t as strong for a
functions performed by the Feed news aggregation site as it was for a pure

Page 10
search engine. While the uses were clearly comparisons between sources covering a
of a different nature in Kelly and Perfect 10 story that would not otherwise be possible.
(artistic/entertainment purposes for the
original photographs versus an Similarly, User-Curated Aggregators can be
informational searching and indexing viewed as somewhat more transformative
function for the search engine’s than Feed Aggregators because users
reproduction of the images), a Feed collect the stories. This feature enables
Aggregator serves a similar function to a the additional function of determining what
newspaper’s website — to collect and stories are popular among a certain group
organize news stories so that they can be of Internet users. User-Curated
read by the public.42 Nonetheless, the Aggregators often further the additional
Feed Aggregator does provide its user with purpose of promoting community
the convenience of accessing stories from commentary on the posted stories.44
a large number of sources on one web
page, categorizing those feeds and In many cases, Blog Aggregators will have
permitting searching of the feeds, which is the strongest claim of a transformative use
at least minimally transformative. of the material because they often provide
additional context or commentary
In many cases, Specialty Aggregators will alongside the material they use.45 Blog
have an even stronger argument that their Aggregators also often bring to the material
use is transformative. Specialty a unique editorial voice or topic of focus,
Aggregators have a narrower focus than further distinguishing the resulting use
many of the websites from which they draw from the purpose of the original article.
material, providing readers with the benefit
of collecting all (or most) of the reporting THE NATURE OF THE COPYRIGHTED WORK. In
on a particular topic in one place.43 deciding whether the nature of the
Specialty Aggregators thus contribute copyrighted work favors a finding of fair
something new and socially useful by use, courts look to a number of factors,
providing context and enabling including, “(1) whether the work is

Page 11
expressive or creative, such as a work of lede. This would weigh in favor of finding
fiction, or more factual, with a greater fair use. Many content originators argue,
leeway being allowed to a claim of fair use however, that the portion of a story
where the work is factual or informational, reproduced by news aggregators is much
and (2) whether the work is published or more significant when looked at from a
unpublished, with the scope for fair use qualitative perspective. This is because,
involving unpublished works being they argue, the headline and lede often
considerably narrower.”46 Here, the factual contain the most important parts of the
nature of the news articles primarily used story — in other words, they constitute the
by all of types of news aggregators weighs “heart” of the article. The Supreme Court,
slightly in favor of a finding of fair use. The as well as a number of lower courts, has
Supreme Court has recognized that “[t]he found that the reproduction of even a short
law generally recognizes a greater need to excerpt can weigh against a finding of fair
disseminate factual works than works of use if the excerpt reproduces the “heart” of
fiction or fantasy.”47 Likewise, the fact that the work.48 Given the factual nature of this
news aggregators are making use of inquiry, it is not possible to say definitively
published stories would weigh in favor of a how courts would view all news
finding of fair use. aggregators. In some instances, the first
few sentences may contain the heart of the
THE AMOUNT AND SUBSTANTIALITY OF THE work. In other instances this will not be the
PORTION USED IN RELATION TO THE COPYRIGHTED case.
WORK AS A WHOLE. In evaluating this factor,
courts look at the amount of the THE EFFECT OF THE USE ON THE POTENTIAL
copyrighted work that is reproduced both MARKET FOR THE COPYRIGHTED WORK. This is
quantitatively and qualitatively. Looked at perhaps the most hotly debated of the four
from a quantitative perspective, most news fair use factors when it comes to the
aggregators use only a small portion of the practice of news aggregation. Content
original work — usually just the headline, originators like AFP, the AP, and others
and sometimes a few sentences from the would argue that a well-defined market

Page 12
currently exists for the reproduction and source of traffic for the newspapers’
syndication of news articles, and that news websites if the news aggregators did not
aggregators’ use of the content without exist.
paying a licensing fee directly threatens As the foregoing analysis shows, the
that market.49 Likewise, content question of whether news aggregators are
originators are likely to argue that for many making fair use of copyrighted content is a
consumers, the use of their content by the complicated inquiry, the outcome of which
news aggregators replaces the need for the heavily depends on the specific facts of
original articles. In support of this each case. Even within the four categories
contention, they can cite to studies like one of aggregators discussed here, there is
recently released by the research firm considerable variation in how the fair use
Outsell, which found that 44% of Google factors would likely play out. Websites that
News users scan the headlines without reproduce only headlines, and not ledes,
ever clicking through to the original articles are likely to have an easier time making a
on the newspapers’ websites.50 case for fair use.

In response, news aggregators like Google HOT NEWS MISAPPROPRIATION

News are likely to argue that, despite
studies like this, their services are still a Another theory of liability that has been
net benefit to newspapers by driving traffic asserted against news aggregators is hot
to their websites from consumers that news misappropriation. The hot news
would be unlikely to otherwise encounter misappropriation doctrine has its origins in
their content.51 Further, news aggregators a 1918 Supreme Court decision,
could argue that the type of consumer that International News Service v. Associated
would only skim the headlines and ledes Press.52 The case arose from a unique set
on the news aggregators’ website is not the of circumstances involving two competing
type of consumer that is likely to visit newsgathering organizations: the
individual news websites and read full International News Service (“INS”) and the
articles, and thus would be unlikely to be a Associated Press (“AP”). Both the INS and

Page 13
AP provided stories on national and before the Supreme Court, however, was
international events to local newspapers INS’s practice of purchasing copies of East
throughout the country, which subscribed Coast newspapers running AP stories
to their wire services and bulletin boards.53 about the war, rewriting the stories using
In this way, papers with subscriptions to the facts gleaned from the AP’s reporting,
either the INS or AP were able to provide and sending the stories to INS’s
their readers with news about far-flung subscribers throughout the United States.
events without undertaking the expense of In some cases, this practice led to INS
setting up their own foreign bureaus.54 subscribers on the West Coast “scooping”
the local competitor carrying the original AP
During World War I, however, the two story.57
services were not equally well positioned to
report on events occurring in the European In order to prevent this activity, the
theater. William Randolph Hearst, the Supreme Court crafted a new variant of the
owner of the INS, had been an outspoken common law tort of misappropriation,
critic of Great Britain and the United referred to by commentators as the “hot
States’ entry into the war and openly news” doctrine. As set forth in the Court’s
sympathized with the Germans. In opinion, the essence of the tort is that one
retaliation, Great Britain prohibited competitor free rides on another
reporters for the INS from sending cables competitor’s work at the precise moment
about the war to the United States, thus when the party whose work is being
hampering INS’s ability to report on war misappropriated was expecting to reap
developments.55 To ensure that its rewards for that work. The Court drew
subscribers were still able to carry news upon a view of property and human
about the war, INS engaged in a number of enterprise theories inspired by John Locke
questionable practices, including bribing in establishing the common law doctrine of
employees of newspapers that were hot news misappropriation: it wanted to
members of the AP for pre-publication reward the AP for the time and expense
access to the AP’s reporting.56 At issue involved in gathering and disseminating

Page 14
the news. The Court viewed INS’s undertake the costs and logistical hurdles
activities, through which it was able to reap of reporting on events in the European
the competitive benefit of the AP’s theater for newspaper readers in the
reporting without expending the time and United States. Thus, as a result of the
money to collect the information, as an British government’s sanctions against
interference with the normal operation of INS, the resulting costs of reporting on the
the AP’s business “precisely at the point war in Europe fell almost entirely on the AP.
where the profit is to be reaped, in order to This was also the decade where the
divert a material portion of the profit from number of U.S. daily newspapers peaked.61
those who have earned it to those who Every major city had multiple daily
have not.”58 The Court reasoned that “he newspapers, and thirty minutes of lead
who has fairly paid the price should have time for a paper could mean thousands of
the beneficial use of the property,” extra readers that day.
sidestepping arguments that there is no
true “property” to be had in the news by In addition, INS was decided before the
relying upon the court’s equitable powers advent of modern First Amendment
to address unfair competition.59 The Court jurisprudence, which can largely be traced
affirmed the circuit court’s decision, to two cases decided by the Supreme Court
leaving in place an injunction against INS the following year: Abrams v. United States,
taking facts from the AP’s stories “until [the 290 U.S. 616 (1919), and Schenck v.
facts’] commercial value as news to the United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).62
complainant and all of its members has Accordingly, the majority opinion in INS did
passed away.”60 not address the First Amendment at all,
and Justice Brandeis’s famous dissent,63
The INS case was decided in a unique while hinting at the tension between
historical context that in some ways differs freedom of expression and the theory of
from the contemporary competitive hot news misappropriation, likewise failed
landscape. At the time, there were to consider the First Amendment as an
relatively few news services able to independent limitation on the brand new

Page 15
doctrine. people to watch or listen to the games and
upload game statistics into a data feed,
While the current competitive landscape is which Motorola sent to its pager
different than in the time of INS, the customers. The NBA claimed that
modern doctrine of hot news Motorola’s operation of the pager service
misappropriation relies on the same constituted a form of misappropriation and
essential theoretical underpinnings as sought to enjoin the service.
those outlined by the Supreme Court in
that case. There is one key difference, At the start of its analysis, the Second
however. While the Supreme Court in INS Circuit Court of Appeals addressed whether
adopted the hot news misappropriation or not the 1976 Copyright Act, which
doctrine as federal common law, since INS, provides copyright protection only for
recognition of the misappropriation original expression, preempted the state-
doctrine has shifted to the states.64 Today, law misappropriation claim. After looking
only five states have adopted the INS hot at the legislative history behind the Act and
news tort as part of state unfair using the “extra-element” test for
competition law.65 preemption,67 the Second Circuit ruled that
a narrow version of the hot news
THE MODERN HOT NEWS DOCTRINE misappropriation tort survived the
enactment of the 1976 Copyright Act.68
The Second Circuit’s decision in NBA v. The NBA court formulated the elements of
Motorola typifies the modern application of the surviving hot news tort as follows:
the hot news misappropriation doctrine (i) a plaintiff generates or
gathers information at a cost;
and stands as its leading case.66 In NBA, (ii) the information is time-
the National Basketball Association sued sensitive; (iii) a defendant’s use
of the information constitutes
Motorola over a pager service by which free riding on the plaintiff’s
Motorola provided its customers with efforts; (iv) the defendant is in
direct competition with a
scores and other statistics about ongoing product or service offered by
NBA basketball games. Motorola paid the plaintiffs; and (v) the ability
of other parties to free-ride on

Page 16
 the efforts of the plaintiff or
others would so reduce the
incentive to produce the
product or service that its
existence or quality would be
substantially threatened.69
As articulated by the Second Circuit, the
modern form of the misappropriation
doctrine thus affords plaintiffs some
limited copyright-like protection for facts
under narrowly defined circumstances.
Applying its test to the facts of the case,
the Second Circuit found that the NBA
failed to make out a hot news claim
because operation of Motorola’s pager
service did not undermine the NBA’s
financial incentive to continue promoting,
marketing, and selling professional
basketball games. In other words, this was
not a situation in which “unlimited free
copying would eliminate the incentive to
create the facts in the first place.”70
The plaintiffs were more successful in a
recent case out of the Southern District of
New York. In Barclays Capital Inc. v.
TheFlyOnTheWall.com,71 the district court
issued a permanent injunction requiring
the financial news website
FlyOnTheWall.com (“Fly”) to delay its
Page 17
reporting of the stock recommendations of
research analysts from three prominent
Wall Street firms, Barclays Capital Inc.,
Merrill Lynch, and Morgan Stanley. The
injunction, which issued after a finding by
the district court that Fly had engaged in
hot news misappropriation, requires Fly to
wait until 10 a.m. E.S.T. before publishing
the facts associated with analyst research
released before the market opens, and to
postpone publication for at least two hours
for research issued after the opening bell.
Notably, the injunction prohibits Fly from
reporting on stock recommendations
issued by the three firms even if such
recommendations have already been
reported in the mainstream press.72
The decision is currently on appeal to the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals.
Like the Supreme Court in INS, however,
both the Second Circuit in NBA and the
district court in Barclays failed to
undertake any analysis of whether the hot
news misappropriation doctrine comports
with the requirements of the First
Amendment. Specifically, as the Supreme
Court has recognized on many subsequent
occasions, one of the principal aims of the
First Amendment is to “secure the ‘widest of the tort to news aggregators.
possible dissemination of information from Nonetheless, it is worth briefly reviewing
diverse and antagonistic sources.’”73 To the elements.
that end, the Supreme Court has PLAINTIFF GENERATES OR GATHERS INFORMATION
recognized — in cases decided subsequent AT A COST. As to this factor, a plaintiff that
to INS — that the First Amendment protects undertook original reporting and had some
truthful reporting on matters of public (or all) of the contents of that reporting
concern.74 Since the hot news repurposed by news aggregators would
misappropriation doctrine contemplates likely be able to satisfy this prong. Unlike
restrictions on or liability for the publication the fair use situation, however, Blog
of truthful information on matters of public Aggregators may be more vulnerable to a
concern, even when lawfully obtained, the hot news claim than Feed Aggregators or
doctrine as currently articulated raises First Specialty Aggregators, since the former
Amendment concerns. It is unclear at this usually incorporate more of the facts from
point how a court would ultimately weigh a story in their work. In contrast, Feed
the state interest in assisting news Aggregators and Specialty Aggregators
gatherers to reap the benefits of their work usually limit themselves to reproducing the
against the First Amendment interest in headline and some portion of the lede of
widely disseminating truthful information the source article, which may or may not
about matters of public import. contain information that was costly to
gather. (User-Curated Aggregators are
APPLICATION OF THE HOT NEWS likely to fall somewhere in the middle,
MISAPPROPRIATION DOCTRINE TO NEWS since additional information about the
AGGREGATORS contents of the article will often appear in
the comments below the article.75)
Because of the lack of decisions on the
merits in recent hot news misappropriation THE INFORMATION IS TIME-SENSITIVE. This
cases, it is difficult to determine how a factor, rather than looking at the
court would ultimately apply the elements defendant’s use of the information, looks

Page 18
exclusively to the nature of the plaintiff’s
information. Accordingly, application of
this factor is unlikely to vary among our
four types of news aggregators, and would
be determined on a case-by-case basis.
DEFENDANT’S USE OF THE INFORMATION
CONSTITUTES FREE RIDING ON THE PLAINTIFF’S
EFFORTS. Here, courts would likely look to
the nature of the defendant’s use of the
information. While plaintiffs are likely to
characterize any use of their material
without a license as “free riding,” Blog
Aggregators that add additional
information or context to a story are less
likely to be considered free riders than a
spam blog or service like All Headline News York Times, since they often cover many of
that merely rewrites and repurposes the
plaintiff’s content. Likewise, Feed
Aggregators, Specialty Aggregators and
User-Curated Aggregators arguably add
their own effort by collecting in one
location information from many places on
the web, making it more accessible to the
public, although the Barclays court found
that such aggregation activities were
insufficient to overcome a finding that
defendant’s activities constituted “free
riding.”
Page 19
THE DEFENDANT IS IN DIRECT COMPETITION WITH A
PRODUCT OR SERVICE OFFERED BY THE
PLAINTIFFS. In most of the hot news
misappropriation cases decided to date,
this has been one of the two most difficult
prongs for plaintiffs to successfully
establish. It is perhaps more likely that a
Feed Aggregator like Google News or
Yahoo! News would be found to be a direct
competitor of a newspaper website, than a
Specialty Aggregator, User-Curated
Aggregator or Blog Aggregator.76 This is
because Feed Aggregators can in some
cases serve as a replacement for visiting
the website of a newspaper like The New
the same stories, and the majority of the
stories found on the newspapers’ websites
are likely to be reproduced on the Feed
Aggregator’s website. In contrast, a
Specialty Aggregator like TechMeme would
contain only a small subset of the articles
one would find on the Times’ website, and
thus would be likely to serve a different
audience. (Of course, TechMeme would
likely be considered a direct competitor of
a highly-specialized publication like
Macworld.)
DEFENDANT’S ACTIONS WOULD REDUCE THE
INCENTIVE TO PRODUCE THE INFORMATION TO A
POINT WHERE ITS EXISTENCE OR QUALITY WOULD
BE SUBSTANTIALLY THREATENED. This has
likewise been a difficult prong for plaintiffs
to establish in hot news misappropriation
cases, and, in fact, formed the basis for the
Second Circuit holding in favor of the
defendant in NBA. Here, the analysis turns
less on the type of aggregator, than the use  
the aggregator makes of the information.
Two factors courts would likely consider
important in determining whether a news
aggregator engages in hot news
misappropriation are (1) the extent to
which viewing the information on the news
aggregator’s website would replace reading
the original content, and (2) the size and
nature of the news aggregator’s
readership. Thus, a Blog Aggregator that
summarizes all of the relevant information
from a news article or a Feed Aggregator
that reproduces the entire lede of the story
are likely to have a greater deleterious
effect on the plaintiff’s incentive to invest
in news gathering than a Feed Aggregator
or Specialty Aggregator that displays only a
headline or a few words from the lede.
Likewise, a news aggregator with a small
Page 20
BEST PRACTICES 
If you are the creator of a news  
aggregation website, what should you do 
to protect yourself against lawsuits?  
Short of licensing all of the content you 
use, there are certain best practices that 
you can adopt that are likely to reduce 
your legal risk. 
 Reproduce only those portions of the  
headline or article that are necessary 
to make your point or to identify the 
story.  Do not reproduce the story in its 
entirety. 
 Try not to use all, or even the majority, 
of articles available from a single 
source.  Limit yourself to those articles 
that are directly relevant to your  
audience. 
 Prominently identify the source of the 
article. 
 Whenever possible, link to the original 
source of the article. 
 When possible, provide context or 
commentary for the material you use. 
readership or a readership that did not While the authors anticipate that the
significantly overlap with the plaintiff’s core debate regarding news aggregators will
readership would be unlikely to threaten continue to be fought in the courts and in
the continued existence of a newspaper, public policy circles, we would like to sound
while Google News or a website that a note of caution for those seeking to
targets the same consumers could perhaps “save” journalism by addressing the issue
be more damaging.77 of news aggregation. We are in the midst
of a sea change in the way in which
CONCLUSION journalism is practiced in the United
States. The past few years have seen an
As the foregoing discussion illustrates, explosion of innovative approaches to both
there is a good bit of legal uncertainty the practice and business of journalism. At
surrounding news aggregation activities, a time of great flux in the media
and it is difficult to provide a definitive ecosystem, it would be premature, and
answer in a paper like this. Both fair use likely counterproductive, to create rules
and hot news misappropriation claims are which would have the effect, if not the
highly fact specific. There is great variation purpose, of privileging one journalistic
in the legal analysis between different business model over others. In order for
categories of news aggregators, as well as experimental business models to flourish,
within the categories. Further, it remains we need legal rules that promote flexibility
to be seen whether the hot news and free access to information, not closed
misappropriation doctrine as currently systems that tilt the playing field in favor of
formulated will remain viable in light of incumbents.
First Amendment concerns. Nonetheless,
there are certain steps that news ENDNOTES
aggregators can take to mitigate their legal
risks, as outlined in the “Best Practices” 1 Pew Internet & American Life Project,

section. Understanding the Participatory News Consumer, at

5, March 2010, available at http://

Page 21
www.pewinternet.org/Reports/2010/Online-
News.aspx (last visited Apr. 10, 2010).
2 The Pew Project for Excellence in Journalism
estimates that advertising revenue for American
newspapers dropped nearly 43% between the end
of 2006 and the end of 2009. Pew Project for
Excellence in Journalism, The State of the News
Media 2010, Chapter 4: Newspapers, March 15,
2010, available at http://
www.stateofthemedia.org/2010/
newspapers_summary_essay.php (last visited Apr.
10, 2010).
3 David Sarno, Murdoch accuses Google of news
‘theft’, Los Angeles Times, Dec. 2, 2009, available
at http://articles.latimes.com/2009/dec/02/
business/la-fi-news-google2-2009dec02 (last
visited Apr. 10, 2010). Murdoch has pointed to free page. Also called a news readers, feed reader or
riding by news aggregators as a hurdle to the
creation of quality news: “Without us, the
aggregators would have blank slides. Right now
content producers have all the costs, and the
aggregators enjoy [the benefits]. But the principle
is clear. To paraphrase a great economist, [there is] Case for a Federalized Hot News Misappropriation
no such thing as a free news story.” Mercedes
Bunz, Rupert Murdoch: ‘There’s no such thing as a
free news story’, guardian.co.uk, December 1,
2009, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/
media/2009/dec/01/rupert-murdoch-no-free-news weblog devoted to “Web Technology news, reviews
(last visited Apr. 10, 2010).
4 PricewaterhouseCoopers Industry Survey, IAB
Internet Advertising Revenue Report, March 2009,
http://www.iab.net/media/file/
Page 22
IAB_PwC_2008_full_year.pdf, (last visited Feb. 26,
2010).
5 See Digital Equip. Corp. v. AltaVista Tech., Inc.,
960 F. Supp. 456, 461 (D. Mass. 1997).
6 See Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811,
816 (9th Cir. 2003).
7 Many definitions of “news aggregator” use the
term interchangeably with the terms “news reader”
and “RSS aggregator.” See, e.g.,
BusinessBlogSchool, Blog Tips: A Glossary of Blog
Terms, available at http://businessblogschool.com/
business-blogging/blog-tips-a-glossary-of-blog-
terms/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2010) (“News
aggregator: A website or application that collates
feeds into a customised [sic] newspaper/home
RSS aggregator.”). Popular usage appears to have
expanded beyond this definition, however, as
websites like The Huffington Post are often
described as “aggregators.” See, e.g., Andrew L.
Deutsch, Protecting News in the Digital Era: The
Tort, 1003 PLI/Pat 511, 596 n.8 (Apr. 2010).
8 These are by no means the only ways to
categorize news aggregators. ReadWriteWeb, a
and analysis,” categorizes news aggregators into
five categories based on their aggregation
techniques: single stream aggregation, single page
aggregation, meme aggregation, people powered
aggregation, and edited aggregation. Josh Catone,
5 News Aggregation Methods Compared,
ReadWriteWeb, July 10, 2007, available at http://
www.readwriteweb.com/archives/
news_aggregation_methods.php (last visited Apr. 8, Judgment Dismissing The Complaint For Failure To
2010).
9 The Official Google Blog, And Now, News, Jan.
23, 2006, http://
googleblog.blogspot.com/2006/01/and-now-
news.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2010).
10 Similar to other types of websites, a newspaper 12, 2005).
that did not want its content indexed by Google
could exclude Google’s crawlers by modifying the
website’s Robots.txt file, which would effectively
render the site invisible to Google’s search engines. 2007, available at http://news.cnet.com/2100-
Google, News (publishers) Help: Additional Tips:
Robots, available at http://www.google.com/
support/news_pub/bin/answer.py?
hl=en&answer=93977 (last visited Apr. 8, 2010).
11 The relationship between Google and The
Associated Press would likewise prove contentious.
The two companies settled a dispute in 2006 over
the use of AP content on Google News and have
recently been renegotiating a new licensing
agreement. See Russell Adams, AP Stories
Reappear on Google News, Wall Street Journal
Digits Blog, Feb. 9, 2010, available at http://
blogs.wsj.com/digits/2010/02/09/ap-stories-
reappear-on-google-news/ (last visited Feb. 22,
2010).
12 First Amended Complaint, Agence France
Presse v. Google, Inc., No. 1:05CV00546 (GK)
Page 23
(D.D.C. Apr. 29, 2005).
13 Google’s Motion And Memorandum For
State A Claim, Agence France Presse v. Google, Inc.,
No. 1:05CV00546 (GK) (D.D.C. Oct. 12, 2005).
14 Google’s Motion and Memorandum for Partial
Summary Judgment Dismissing Count II for Lack of
Protectable Subject Matter, Agence France Presse
v. Google, Inc., No. 1:05CV00546 (GK) (D.D.C. Oct.
15 Caroline McCarthy, Agence France-Presse,
Google settle copyright dispute, CNET News, Apr. 6,
1030_3-6174008.html?part=rss&tag=2547-1_3-0-
20&subj=news (last visited Apr. 8, 2010).
16 All Headline News, About AHN / Company
Background, available at http://web.archive.org/
web/20071231082631/
www.allheadlinenews.com/corp/ (last visited May
29, 2010).
17 Complaint at ¶¶ 4-5, The Associated Press v. All
Headline News Corp., No. 1:08-cv-00323-PKC
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 2008).
18 Id.
19 Defendants’ Motion and Notice of Motion To
Dismiss Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12,
The Associated Press v. All Headline News Corp.,
No. 1:08-cv-00323-PKC (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 29, 2008).
20 The Associated Press v. All Headline News
Corp., 608 F. Supp.2d 454 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
21 Id. at 461. In declining to dismiss the AP’s
claim for hot news misappropriation, the Court
found that the AP, a New York-based company,
could assert a claim under New York common law
against the Florida-based All Headline News.
22 Press Release, Associated Press, AP and AHN
Media Settle AP’s Lawsuit Against AHN Media and
Individual Defendants (May 13, 2009), available at
http://www.associatedpress.com/pages/about/
pressreleases/pr_071309a.html (last visited May
29, 2010).
23 See Complaint, GateHouse Media, Inc. v. The
New York Times Co., No. 0-12114-WGY (D. Mass.
filed Dec. 22, 2008).
24 Id.
25 See Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary Restraining protection “[w]ords and short phrases such as
Order and Preliminary Injunction and Request for
Expedited Hearing, GateHouse Media, Inc. v. The
New York Times Co., No. 0-12114-WGY (D. Mass.
Dec. 22, 2008).
26 See Notes from Hearing, GateHouse Media, Inc. 843 F.2d 600, 609 n.9 (1st Cir. 1988).
v. The New York Times Co., No. 0-12114-WGY (D.
Mass. Dec. 22, 2008).
27 See Letter Agreement Re: GateHouse Media,
(Jan. 25, 2009), available at http://
www.citmedialaw.org/sites/citmedialaw.org/
files/2009-01-25-Letter%20Agreement.pdf (last
visited Feb. 26, 2010).
Page 24
28 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2010).
29 17 U.S.C. § 106. The two primary exceptions to
these exclusive rights are certain compulsory
licenses built into the Copyright Act, and the fair use
doctrine, which is discussed in detail below.
30 Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service
Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
31 Id. This is known as the idea/expression
dichotomy in copyright law.
32 See CMM Cable Rep., Inc. v. Ocean Coast
Props., Inc., 97 F.3d 1504, 1519-20 (1st Cir. 1996)
(titles and short phrases uncopyrightable); Aryelo v.
Am. Int'l Ins. Co., No. 95-1360, 1995 WL 561530 at
*1 (1st Cir. Sept. 21, 1995) (per curiam, table,
unpublished) ("The non-copyrightability of titles in
particular has been authoritatively established”); 37
C.F.R. § 202.1(a) (excluding from copyright
name, titles, and slogans. . . .").
33 See, e.g., Yankee Candle Co. v. Bridgewater
Candle Co., 259 F.3d 25, 34 (1st Cir. 2001);
Concrete Mach. Co. v. Classic Lawn Ornaments,
34 Google Inc.’s Answer and Counterclaims at 22,
Agence France Presse v. Google, Inc., No.
1:05CV00546 (GK) (D.D.C. May 19, 2005).
35 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
36 17 U.S.C. § 107.
37 Courts have previously found services like hyper-local blog, both of which covered the same
Google’s search services to be commercial because geographic area.
of the incorporation of advertising. See, e.g., Perfect
10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1166 44 Even if user-curated aggregation doesn’t qualify
(9th Cir. 2007). as fair use, the website operator is likely insulated
from liability for copyright infringement under the
38 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512(c),
569, 584, 114 S. Ct. 1164 (1994) (commercial which provides interactive service providers with a
nature of work is not dispositive on the first fair use safe harbor against copyright infringement claims
factor). based on content uploaded by third parties, so long
as they comply with the requirements of the statute
39 Id. at 578 (internal citations omitted). (such as registering a DMCA agent with the
Copyright Office and responding expeditiously to
40 Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 819 take-down notices).
(9th Cir. 2003).
45 Although, again, this is not always the case –
41 Perfect 10, Inc., 508 F.3d at 1165. such as when Gawker paraphrases an article
without providing additional commentary. (Although
42 A Feed Aggregator like Google News will Gawker would likely argue that the user comments
sometimes cover a broader range of topics than below the article provide additional commentary on
some of the news sources that it aggregates, but the piece, and thus increase the transformativeness
this is not always the case. It is not hard to imagine of the use.)
a situation where Google News and a national news
website, like CNN.com, would have many of the 46 Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 256 (2d Cir.
same stories on their front pages. 2006).

43 This will not always be true. For example, the 47 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters.,
transformative nature of the Specialty Aggregator 471 U.S. 539, 563, 105 S. Ct. 2218 (1985).
would be less when it draws its information from
another source with a similarly narrow focus, such 48 See, e.g., Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 564-65.
as a website that collects information about Apple
products reproducing news from a magazine 49 This argument is likely bolstered by the fact that
devoted to Apple fans. Likewise, in GateHouse Google ultimately negotiated a license for AFP and
Media, Inc. v. The New York Times Co., you had one AP content that appears on the Google News site.
hyper-local blog aggregating content from another

Page 25
50 Robin Wauters, Report: 44% Of Google News
Visitors Scan Headlines, Don't Click Through,
TechCrunch, Jan. 19, 2010, available at http://
techcrunch.com/2010/01/19/outsell-google-
news/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2010).
51 This argument is likely to be stronger when the
plaintiff is a small, regional newspaper or blog. For
larger news websites like The New York Times or
CNN.com, it is less likely that users would be
unlikely to find their content but for the news
aggregator. Of the four types of news aggregators
discussed herein, the Specialty Aggregator has
perhaps the strongest argument that it drives new
traffic to the content originator’s website, since the
niche audience targeted by the Specialty Aggregator Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information
will often not overlap significantly with the news
website’s current readership.
52 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
53 See INS, 248 U.S. at 230.
54 See id. at 231.
55 Douglas G. Baird, Common Law Intellectual
Property and the Legacy of International News
Service v. Associated Press, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 411,
412 (1983).
56 248 U.S. at 231.
57 Baird, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 412.
58 248 U.S. at 240.
Page 26
59 Id.
60 Id. at 245.
61 University of Minnesota, Media History Project,
http://www.mediahistory.umn.edu/timeline/1910-
1919.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2010).
62 See, e.g., David Lange & H. Jefferson Powell,
No Law: Intellectual Property in the Image of an
Absolute First Amendment, 149, 167, 171-72
(2009); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Information
as Speech, Information as Goods: Some Thoughts
on Marketplaces and the Bill of Rights, 33 Wm. &
Mary L. Rev. 665, 685 n.139, 726 (1992); Eugene
Privacy: The Troubling Implications of a Right to
Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 Stan. L.
Rev. 1049, 1070 (2000).
63 “The general rule of law is, that the noblest of
human productions—knowledge, truths ascertained,
conceptions, and ideas—become, after voluntary
communication to others, free as the air to common
use.” INS, 248 U.S. at 250 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
64 As an instance of federal common law, INS is
no longer authoritative after Erie Railroad v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
65 See McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530 (7th
Cir. 2003) (Illinois); Pollstar v. Gigmania Ltd., 170 F.
Supp.2d 94 (E.D. Cal. 2000) (California); Fred
Wehrenberg Circuit of Theatres, Inc. v. Moviefone,
Inc., 73 F. Supp.2d 1044 (E.D. Mo. 1999)
(Missouri); Pottstown Daily News Publ’g Co. v.
Pottstown Broad. Co., 192 A.2d 657 (Pa. 1963)
(Pennsylvania); NBA v. Motorola, 105 F.3d 841
(2nd Cir. 1997) (New York). Hot news
misappropriation has also been asserted in cases in
Massachusetts (Complaint, GateHouse Media, Inc.
v. The New York Times Co., No. 0-12114-WGY (D.
Mass. Dec. 22, 2008)) and the District of Columbia
(First Amended Complaint, Agence France Presse v.
Google, Inc., No. 1:05CV00546 (GK) (D.C. Dist.
April 29, 2005)), although neither court had
occasion to rule on whether the tort was recognized
in their state.
66 105 F.3d 841 (2nd Cir. 1997)
67 Id. at 850-53 (finding three extra elements in
hot news misappropriation claims).
68 It is unclear whether the Second Circuit’s
finding that the hot news misappropriation doctrine
is not preempted by the Copyright Act would survive
the Supreme Court’s holding in Dastar Corp. v.
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23
(2002).
69 105 F.3d at 845.
70 Richard Posner, Misappropriation: A Dirge, 40
Hous. L. Rev. 621, 631 (2003).
71 No. 06 Civ. 4908, --- F. Supp.2d ----, 2010 WL
1005160 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2010).
72 The district court noted that Fly obtained the
Page 27
information it reprinted from a variety of publicly-
available sources, describing the process thus:
According to Etergino, he checks first to
see what Recommendations have been
reported on Bloomberg Market News.
Then he checks Dow Jones, Thomson
Reuters, and Fly's competitors such as
TTN, StreetAcount.com, and Briefing.com.
Next, he visits chat rooms to which he
has been invited to participate by the
moderator. . . . Etergino also receives
“blast IMs” through the Bloomberg,
Thomson Reuters, or IMTrader messaging
services that may go to dozens or
hundreds of individuals. Finally, Etergino
exchanges IMs, emails, and more rarely
telephone calls with individual traders at
hedge funds, money managers, and other
contacts on Wall Street.
2010 WL 1005160, at *12.
73 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
266 (1964) (quoting Associated Press v. U.S., 326
U.S. 1, 20 (1945)).
74 See, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514,
527-28, 533-35 (2001) (First Amendment barred
imposition of civil damages under wiretapping law
for publishing contents of conversation relevant to
matter of public concern); Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491
U.S. 524, 534 (1989) (First Amendment barred
imposition of civil damages on newspaper for
publishing rape victim’s name); Smith v. Daily Mail
Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103-06 (1979) (First
Amendment barred prosecution under state statute
for publishing names of juvenile offenders without
court’s permission); Landmark Commc’ns, Inc. v. -
Va., 435 U.S. 829, 841-42 (1978) (First
Amendment barred criminal prosecution for
disclosing information from a confidential judicial
disciplinary proceeding); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn,
420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975) (First Amendment barred from the protections of Section 230.
civil cause of action for publishing name of rape
victim when information lawfully obtained from
court records).
47 U.S.C. §230, which bars claims against a
website operator based on content supplied by
users. This assumes that courts would not consider
a claim under the hot news misappropriation
doctrine to be an intellectual property claim, since
intellectual property claims are specifically excluded
76 Although many in the news business appear to
view The Huffington Post as a direct competitor.

75 It is possible that the owner of a User-Curated 77 In evaluating this factor, the court would need
Aggregator website would be considered immune to to balance additional traffic received by the news
hot news misappropriation claims based on website from the news aggregator against any
information contained in user comments under alleged harm.
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act,

Page 28
 WAKE FOREST
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LAW JOURNAL

VOLUME 10 2009 - 2010 NUMBER 1

ALL THE NEWS THAT’S FIT TO OWN:

HOT NEWS ON THE INTERNET & THE COMMODIFICATION OF NEWS
IN DIGITAL CULTURE

By Clay Calvert♣
Kayla Gutierrez⊗
Christina Locke⊕

INTRODUCTION

Thousands of hard copies of newspapers across the country—

particularly editions of college newspapers—are reported pilfered each
year.1 But just as the theft of print newspapers can occur at news
racks, can online news stories that flow on the Internet also be stolen?

♣
Brechner Eminent Scholar in Mass Communication at the University of Florida,
Gainesville, Fla. B.A., 1987, Communication, Stanford University; J.D. (Order of
the Coif), 1991, McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific; Ph.D., 1996,
Communication, Stanford University. Member, State Bar of California. Professor
Calvert thanks Dean John Wright, Executive Associate Dean Linda Hon and the
entire staff in the Dean’s Suite of the College of Journalism and Communications for
helping to make his transition from Penn State to the University of Florida a smooth
one.
⊗
Masters student in Media Law at the University of Florida, Gainesville, Fla. B.S.,
2008, Telecommunication, University of Florida.
⊕
Doctoral student and Joseph L. Brechner Graduate Assistant at the University of
Florida, Gainesville, Fla. J.D. (with Honors) and M.A.M.C. (with Distinction),
2007, University of Florida. Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1
See Student Newspapers Hit By Theft Nationwide, STUDENT PRESS L. CENTER REP.,
Spring 2009, at 35, available at
https://www.splc.org/report_detail.asp?id=1508&edition=49 (last visited Sept. 5,
2009) (observing that “theft of free student newspapers is one of the most common
means of censorship in college media,” and citing instances of theft of college
newspapers in 2009 at universities including, among others, Virginia
Commonwealth University, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and Catholic
University of America). See generally Clay Calvert, All the News That’s Fit to
Steal: The First Amendment, a “Free” Press & a Lagging Legislative Response, 25
LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 117 (2004) (providing an examination of the legal issues and
legislation surrounding the theft of free newspapers in the United States).
2 WAKE FOREST INTELL. PROP. L.J. Vol.10

That question, as this article demonstrates, is no idle academic

query or a wasted exercise in verbal gymnastics distinguishing
newspapers from news and news stories.2 In fact, it is at the heart of
some battles now being fought over news on the Internet.
It is, of course, a fundamental tenet of copyright law in the
United States that ideas cannot be owned.3 Similarly, as the United
States Supreme Court observed nearly twenty years ago, “facts are not
copyrightable,”4 adding that this proposition is “universally
understood.”5 The implication of these twin principles for the practice
of journalism and the often poorly explicated concept of news itself6 is
that while “the words and arrangement of a news story would be
copyrightable expression,”7 when they are assembled in an original
manner and fixed in a tangible medium of expression,8 “the underlying
news itself—the facts and events being recounted—of course could
not be the subject of copyright protection.”9 In other words, as one
federal appellate court put it, “[c]opyrightable material often contains
uncopyrightable elements within it.”10 This would seem to protect
rewrites of news articles when those rewrites involve re-ordering, re-
working, and using the underlying facts—the uncopyrightable
underlying “news element,” as the United States Supreme Court once
called it11—in different ways.

2
As Elvis Costello once so aptly put it in a way that attorneys and long-winded legal
scholars would be wise to obey, “spare us the theatrics and the verbal gymnastics.”
Elvis Costello, The Loved Ones, on IMPERIAL BEDROOM (Rykodisk 1982).
3
See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (b) (2006) (providing, in relevant part, that “in no case does
copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea”). See
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985) (noting
the distinction “between copyrightable expression and uncopyrightable facts and
ideas”).
4
Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 344 (1991).
5
Id.
6
See generally BRUCE D. ITULE & DOUGLAS A. ANDERSON, NEWS WRITING &
REPORTING FOR TODAY’S MEDIA 11 (7th ed. 2007) (writing that “the definition of
news is elusive,” observing that definitions of news range from “[s]omething you
haven’t heard before” to “[w]hat editors and reporters say it is,” and ultimately
determining that “[w]hatever it is, news is an extremely complex term, and it is
different things to different people”).
7
Gary Myers, The Restatement’s Rejection of the Misappropriation Tort: A Victory
for the Public Domain, 47 S.C. L. REV. 673, 675 (1996).
8
See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (a) (2006) (providing, in pertinent part, that “[c]opyright
protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works of authorship
fixed in any tangible medium of expression,” including literary works). The United
States Supreme Court long ago recognized that a news “article, as a literary
production, is the subject of copyright.” Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248
U.S. 215, 234 (1918).
9
Myers, supra note 7, at 675.
10
Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 849 (2d Cir. 1997).
11
Int’l News Serv., 248 U.S. at 234.
2009 ALL THE NEWS THAT’S FIT TO OWN: 3
HOT NEWS ON THE INTERNET & THE
COMMODIFICATION OF NEWS IN DIGITAL CULTURE

But that does not end the legal inquiry. Copyright principles
do not provide the only legal framework for considering possible
redress when one news agency or news service believes another
company is, in a nutshell, ripping off its news articles. As the
Associated Press proved in 2009, the common law tort of hot news
misappropriation provides a viable method—at least in those states
that recognize it12 and do not view it as pre-empted by the federal
Copyright Act13 and in those circumstances that fall within its rather
narrow confines14—of fighting back against the alleged digital piracy
of news stories online where, as one law journal article contended, the
“ease of free riding on the investment of others via Internet-related
technological advances threatens to be a serious disincentive to
investment in the development of data-based informational
products.”15
In July 2009, the Associated Press settled for an undisclosed
dollar amount16 a lawsuit asserting that, in layperson’s terms, its news
content was being stolen by the All Headline News Corp. (hereinafter
“AHN” or “All Headline News”), a Florida-based business that bills
itself as “a leading provider of news, weather, and other content for
web sites, wireless, digital signage, interactive applications, broadcast

12
The tort of hot news misappropriation originally was a “creature of the federal
common-law,” and “while the federal common-law no longer provides the source for
the action of misappropriation, state law can provide the basis for such protection.”
Schuchart & Assocs. v. Solo Serve Corp., 540 F. Supp. 928, 942, n.9 (W.D. Tex.
1982).
13
See 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2006) (providing, in general, for the preemption of “all legal
or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the
general scope of” federal statutes governing copyright, and governing preemption
issues of federal copyright law). Importantly, courts have held that the hot news
misappropriation tort is “a branch of the unfair competition doctrine not preempted
by the Copyright Act.” Fin. Info., Inc. v. Moody’s Investors Serv., Inc., 808 F.2d
204, 209 (2d Cir. 1986).
14
See infra note 81 and accompanying text (identifying the five elements of this
cause of action that, according to courts within one federal appellate circuit, must be
demonstrated in order for a plaintiff to succeed).
15
Rex Y. Fujichaku, Recent Development, The Misappropriation Doctrine in
Cyberspace: Protecting the Commercial Value of “Hot News” Information, 20 U.
HAW. L. REV. 421, 425 (1998).
16
See Press Release, Associated Press, AP and AHN Media Settle AP’s Lawsuit
Against AHN Media and Individual Defendants (July 13, 2009) (on file with Wake
Forest Intellectual Property Law Journal), available at
http://www.associatedpress.com/pages/about/pressreleases/pr_071309a.html (noting
that “[t]he settlement includes payment by AHN to AP of an unspecified sum to
settle the AP’s claim for past unauthorized use of AP expression and news
content.”).
4 WAKE FOREST INTELL. PROP. L.J. Vol.10

and print use.”17 The AP, which conversely trumpets itself as “the
largest and oldest news organization in the world”18 and “the backbone
of the world’s information system serving thousands of daily
newspaper, radio, television and online customers,”19 alleged in its
January 2008 complaint that “AHN has no reporters and is simply a
vehicle for copying news reports and misappropriating news gathered
and reported by real news services such as AP.”20 As such, the AP
asserted that AHN was “free-riding on AP’s significant and costly
efforts to collect, report and transmit newsworthy information,”21
thereby creating a low-cost news service with “no journalistic
infrastructure”22 that “directly competes with AP’s own news
services.”23
Although the AP’s complaint included multiple causes of
action, such as breach of contract,24 trademark infringement,25 and
copyright infringement,26 the most journalistically intriguing legal
theory upon which the AP sued AHN was for hot news
misappropriation under the common law of New York.27 In
Associated Press v. All Headline News Corp.,28 the AP successfully
reached back in time and stretched a ninety-one-year-old precedent—
one developed many decades before the Internet enabled the type of
appropriation engaged in by AHN—found in the United States
Supreme Court’s opinion in International News Service v. Associated
Press.29
In that 1918 decision, a majority of the United States Supreme
Court determined that, in situations of direct competition where “both
parties are seeking to make profits at the same time and in the same
field,”30 news that is gathered by one of those parties “must be

17
About AHN/Company Background, http://www.allheadlinenews.com/corp (last
visited Sept. 2, 2009).
18
Associated Press, Facts & Figures, http://www.ap.org/pages/about/about.html (last
visited Sept. 5, 2009).
19
Id.
20
Complaint at 2, Associated Press v. All Headline News Corp., 608 F. Supp. 2d 454
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (No. 08 Civ. 323) [hereinafter Complaint].
21
Id. at 19.
22
Id. at 24.
23
Id. at 19.
24
See id. at 26-27 (setting forth the AP’s seventh cause of action for breaches of
contract).
25
See id. at 22-23 (setting forth the AP’s fourth cause of action for infringement of a
registered trademark).
26
See id. at 20-21 (setting forth the AP’s second cause of action for copyright
infringement).
27
See id. at 19-20 (setting forth the AP’s first cause of action for hot news
misappropriation).
28
608 F. Supp. 2d 454 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
29
248 U.S. 215 (1918).
30
Id. at 236.
2009 ALL THE NEWS THAT’S FIT TO OWN: 5
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COMMODIFICATION OF NEWS IN DIGITAL CULTURE

regarded as quasi property”31 that possesses “an exchange value to one

who can misappropriate it.”32 In particular, the Court reasoned that
the “peculiar value of news is in the spreading of it while it is fresh,”33
implying that when news is no longer “fresh”—a term not defined in
International News Service—the property right that one news service
possesses against another disappears.
Rejecting as “untenable”34 the notion that “news is abandoned
to the public for all purposes when published in the first newspaper,”35
the Supreme Court focused instead on fiscal concerns—the concept of
unfair competition,36 “the business of making [news] known to the
world,”37 and the equitable principle “that he who has fairly paid the
price should have the beneficial use of the property.”38 Put more
bluntly, because the AP in International News Service had gathered
and distributed news due to “a large expenditure of money, skill, and
effort,”39 it deserved to profit from the “novelty and freshness”40 of its
news and to stop a free-riding rival news service from
“misappropriating it for the purpose of disposing of it to his own profit
and to the disadvantage of”41 the Associated Press.
The case has thus been called by one law professor “the most
famous reap/sow case”42 of the twentieth century, drawing from
Justice Mahlon Pitney’s underlying concern for fairness that defendant
International News Service was “endeavoring to reap where it has not
sown.”43 As Professor John Tehranian aptly summed up the majority
ruling, International News Service “granted news organizations
temporary ownership of factual information in order to preserve their
incentive to expend resources on news-gathering without fear of
having rivals free ride on the information by scooping them without
payment.”44

31
Id. (emphasis added).
32
Id. at 238.
33
Id. at 235.
34
Id. at 240.
35
Id.
36
See id. at 235 (“[I]t seems to us the case must turn upon the question of unfair
competition in business.”).
37
Id.
38
Id. at 240.
39
Id. at 238.
40
Id.
41
Id. at 240.
42
Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the
Restitutionary Impulse, 78 VA. L. REV. 149, 178 (1992).
43
Int’l News Serv., 248 U.S. at 239.
44
John Tehranian, Whither Copyright? Transformative Use, Free Speech, and an
Intermediate Liability Proposal, 2005 BYU L. REV. 1201, 1225.
6 WAKE FOREST INTELL. PROP. L.J. Vol.10

The “practical needs and requirements of the business” of

making and disseminating news thus prevailed before the Supreme
Court in International News Service. 45 The case represents, as
Professor Dale P. Olson put it a decade ago, “the genesis of
misappropriation,”46 and it “formed—and continues to form—the
basic contours of the doctrine of misappropriation of publicly
disclosed trade values.”47 The continuing formation and evolution of
that doctrine and, in particular, the tort of hot news misappropriation
in 2009 in Associated Press v. All Headline News Corp. is the focus of
this article. And although the federal common law that gave rise to the
International News Service decision is now long defunct,48 the hot
news misappropriation tort is alive and well in the age of the Internet
in New York.
Part I of this article analyzes the case of Associated Press v. All
Headline News Corp., tracing it from the filing of the complaint
through the July 2009 settlement. Importantly, it uses the actual
pleadings and briefs filed by the parties, as well as other background
information about the parties, to better contextualize the story behind
the case. Part II then explores the legal precedent underlying the hot
news misappropriation theory that was at issue in the case, as well as
some of the criticisms and comments that legal scholars have launched
against it over the years. Next, Part III goes beyond a pure legal
analysis to explore the potential implications of the hot news
misappropriation doctrine for a digital culture in which freshness and
up-to-the-minute information is privileged and prized. Part III also
identifies the different interests at stake in cases like Associated Press
v. All Headline News Corp. Finally, Part IV concludes by suggesting
future avenues of research related to the conduct of companies such as
All Headline News Corp., including analyzing their behavior from an
ethical perspective, not simply a legal one. In brief, journalism
ethicists should analyze both the case and hot news doctrine from their
viewpoint and position.

I.RE-WRITING THE NEWS OR RE-WRITING THE LAW?THE ASSOCIATED

PRESS’S BATTLE AGAINST ALL HEADLINE NEWS CORP.

45
Int’l News Serv., 248 U.S. at 241.
46
Dale P. Olson, Common Law Misappropriation in the Digital Era, 64 MO. L. REV.
837, 878 (1999).
47
Id.
48
See Gary R. Roberts, The Scope of the Exclusive Right to Control Dissemination
of Real-Time Sports Event Information, 15 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 167, 171 (2004)
(“The legal foundation for the INS decision, federal general common law, has since
been eliminated by the Supreme Court in the famous Erie Railroad case in 1938.”).
2009 ALL THE NEWS THAT’S FIT TO OWN: 7
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“AP is a leader in protecting intellectual property rights

through monitoring, licensing and enforcement efforts.”49

High-profile evidence buttressing that assertion, which the

Associated Press conveys on its website,50 was on full display in 2009
when the news service contended that artist Shepard Fairey engaged in
a “willful and blatant violation of The AP’s copyright in a photograph
of President Obama”51 that Fairey used to create his so-called Obama
Hope poster.52 Tom Curley, president and chief executive officer,
proclaimed that the AP’s countersuit against Fairey—the artist had
initially sued the AP—“is about protecting the content that The
Associated Press and its journalists produce every day, with creativity,
at great cost, and often at great risk.”53
Beyond this skirmish over a now iconic image,54 the
Associated Press in July 2009 announced it was “creating a way to
track and control the distribution of its articles online.”55 The move
arose because, as the Wall Street Journal reported, “some bloggers and
other Web sites run stories without permission.”56 Tom Curley, AP’s
chief executive, incorporated language in a press release echoing the
reap/sow principle at the heart of International News Service,57
emphasizing that the AP has “stood by too long and watched other
people make money off the hard work of our journalists. We have
decided to draw a line in concrete.”58

49
Associated Press, Protecting AP’s Intellectual Property,
http://www.associatedpress.com/iprights (last visited Sept. 1, 2009).
50
Id.
51
Answer, Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaims of Defendant, the Associated
Press at 10, Fairey v. Associated Press, No. 09-01123 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2009).
52
See generally Christopher Borrelli, Street Artist Fairey at a Crossroad, CHI. TRIB.,
Feb. 9, 2009, at 3 (reporting on “an allegation from The Associated Press that Fairey
infringed its copyright by appropriating one of its photos for the ‘Hope’ poster”).
53
Press Release, Associated Press, Associated Press Defends Lawsuit Brought by
Shepard Fairey over Obama Poster (Mar. 11, 2009) (on file with Wake Forest
Intellectual Property Law Journal), available at
http://www.ap.org/pages/about/pressreleases/pr_031109.html.
54
See James C. Goodale, What’s Fair is Fair. But What is Fair?, 241 N.Y. L.J. 3,
(2009) (“Mr. Fairey downloaded the photo from the Internet, cast Mr. Obama in red,
white and blue tones, and added ‘Hope’ underneath. The poster became a campaign
icon.”) (emphasis added).
55
Russell Adams & Shira Ovide, AP Creates Way to Track Distribution of Articles
Online, WALL ST. J., July 24, 2009, at B6.
56
Id.
57
See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text (discussing this principle within the
context of International News Service).
58
Press Release, Michael Liedtke, Business Editor, Associated Press, AP Setting Up
Tracking System for Web Content (July 23, 2009) (on file with Wake Forest
Intellectual Property Law Journal), available at
8 WAKE FOREST INTELL. PROP. L.J. Vol.10

In addition to such policing and monitoring of its content on

the Internet via built-in beacons that track where a story moves and
posts online,59 the AP demonstrated its resolve on intellectual property
matters in very different way in Associated Press v. All Headline News
Corp.60In particular, it used an aging doctrine that was developed at a
time when print newspapers ruled the day.
AHN, based in Wellington, Florida, is owned by a former
police officer named Jeffrey Brown, who founded the company after a
customer of another website he operated, BridalClicks.com, asked for
news content.61 He had no previous journalism experience.62 Despite
the lack of relevant bona fides, the business took off fast, and Brown
was quoted in 2008 as stating that “despite the troubling and uncertain
economy, we’re on track to double our revenues this year.”63
With AHN’s operation apparently becoming a success, AP
filed its lawsuit against AHN and Brown in federal court in New York
in January 2008.64 The AP alleged that AHN hires poorly paid
individuals, instructs them to surf the Internet for new stories, and then
has them either copy the stories verbatim or re-write them, all the
while carefully omitting any identifying information about their
origin.65 In its First Amended Complaint, filed in April 2008, the AP
asserted that AHN’s writers “do no independent research and
newsgathering in preparing news stories.”66 In fact, the AP contended
that—like so many businesses today in the United States—AHN off-
shored part of the re-writing process to people in Malaysia, with the
cost savings allowing AHN to sell what once really were the AP’s
stories at a price to subscribers cheaper than the AP could sell them.67
Once the stories are edited, the AP claimed they are “aggregated by
AHN into a news feed which it then distributes to its customers and
displayed and/or distributed via AHN’s servers.”68

http://www.ap.org/pages/about/whatsnew/wn_072309a.html.
59
Id. (stating that the AP will be “bundling its text stories in an ‘informational
wrapper’ that will include a built-in beacon to monitor where stories go on the
Internet”).
60
See Associated Press v. All Headline News Corp., 608 F. Supp. 2d 454 (S.D.N.Y.
2009).
61
Bill Frogameni, Associated Press Sues News Provider Based in Wellington, S.
FLA. BUS. J., June 20, 2008, available at
http://www.bizjournals.com/southflorida/stories/2008/06/23/story10.html.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
See Complaint, supra note 20.
65
Id. at 2-3.
66
First Amended Complaint at 16, Associated Press v. All Headline News Corp.,
608 F. Supp. 2d 454 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (No. 08 Civ. 323) [hereinafter First Amended
Complaint].
67
Id. at 20.
68
Id. at 16.
2009 ALL THE NEWS THAT’S FIT TO OWN: 9
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COMMODIFICATION OF NEWS IN DIGITAL CULTURE

Striking to the economic heart of its hot news misappropriation

claim, the AP asserted that AHN’s conduct
is likely to usurp AP’s business relationships and
opportunities. AHN’s “news service” directly competes
with AP’s own services. Both services are sold to the same
potential customer base. Most customers of news service
only carry one service. When a company or entity decides
to subscribe to AHN’s “news service,” this effectively
excludes AP from selling its service to that company or
entity.69
Asking the court to enjoin AHN’s actions, the AP closed its argument
on the hot news misappropriation cause of action by conjuring up the
proverbial parade of horrors that would result in the absence of such a
judicial decree:
If Defendants are not enjoined from misappropriating AP’s
efforts and investments in this manner, the acts of
Defendants and other free-riders will so reduce AP’s
incentive to gather and report the news that the existence
and/or quality of the news services that AP provides to AP
Members, subscribers and other licensees, and thereby to the
public, will be substantially threatened.70
AHN, of course, attempted to paint the case as a battle in the
David-and-Goliath tradition, arguing that “this case is an attempt by
Plaintiff Associated Press to crush by weight of litigation a small
company that it views as a competitor in the business of online news
distribution.”71 But it defended against the hot news misappropriation
cause of action not primarily on the merits of the case, but rather by
claiming that the law of Florida—not New York—applied, and Florida
did not recognize such a legal theory.72 As the attorneys for AHN and
Brown wrote, “Defendants are not aware of any Florida state court
opinions that have recognized a theory of misappropriation like that
asserted by Plaintiff here.”73 AHN also asserted that the International
News Service opinion itself was no longer good law,74 as it claimed the
hot news misappropriation doctrine found in International News
Service was part of the federal common law that was later eliminated

69
Id. at 20.
70
Id.
71
Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12 at 1, All Headline News Corp., 608 F. Supp. 2d 454 (No. 08
Civ. 323).
72
Id. at 3-10.
73
Id. at 9.
74
Id. at 7, n.2.
10 WAKE FOREST INTELL. PROP. L.J. Vol.10

by the U.S. Supreme Court in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.75

These arguments failed to gain traction, however, with the court.
In February 2009, U.S. District Judge P. Kevin Castel refused to
dismiss the Associated Press’s hot news misappropriation claim, as he
determined that the cause of action “remains viable under New York
law”76 and is not pre-empted by federal copyright law.77 Quoting from
a 1997 ruling by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit that also recognized such a theory under New York law,78
Judge Castel articulated five elements that must be present for a
successful cause of action for hot news misappropriation:
(i) a plaintiff generates or gathers information at a cost; (ii)
the information is time-sensitive; (iii) a defendant’s use of
the information constitutes free riding on the plaintiff's
efforts; (iv) the defendant is in direct competition with a
product or service offered by the plaintiffs; and (v) the
ability of other parties to free-ride on the efforts of the
plaintiff or others would so reduce the incentive to produce
the product or service that its existence or quality would be
substantially threatened.79
Judge Castel did not apply these elements to the facts of the case,
however, as AHN’s motion to dismiss focused only on the pre-emption
argument and the contention that Florida law, rather than New York,
controlled.80

75
Id. For an in-depth discussion of the Erie Doctrine, see generally Joseph R.
Oliveri, Converse-Erie: The Key to Federalism in an Increasingly Administrative
State, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1372, 1375-76 (2008) (observing that “the Erie
doctrine – the cornerstone of analysis of the relationship between federal and state
law in federal courts – provides that federal courts, except in matters governed by the
Constitution or federal statutes, shall apply the substantive law of the forum state,”
and adding that in Erie, “the Supreme Court overturned the previous rule of Swift v.
Tyson, rejecting the notion of a ‘federal general common law’ to which federal
courts had previously looked to find the applicable rule of decision”) (citations
omitted).
76
Associated Press v. All Headline News Corp., 608 F. Supp. 2d 454, 461 (S.D.N.Y.
2009).
77
Id.
78
See Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997)
(involving the application of the hot news misappropriation tort in the context of a
dispute about the transmission of scores and other data about NBA games in
progress via paging devices).
79
All Headline News Corp., 608 F. Supp. 2d at 461 (quoting Motorola, 105 F.3d at
845).
80
See All Headline News Corp., 608 F. Supp. 2d at 458 (writing that the motion to
dismiss the hot news misappropriation cause of action was based “on two grounds,”
including the contention that “choice of law requires that plaintiff’s claim of
misappropriation of hot news be considered under the law of Florida, which,
defendants contend, has rejected such a cause of action” and the assertion “that a
claim for misappropriation of hot news is preempted by the federal Copyright Act”).
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In lauding Judge Castel’s decision, the AP’s director of media

relations, Paul Colford, stated the “ruling reaffirms the viability of the
hot news misappropriation doctrine, and thereby protects AP’s
investments in news gathering and reporting against copying by free-
riders.”81 Colford also pointed out that the case was not simply about
the AP’s right to make money, but the public’s right to receive
information, as he stated that “by preserving the economic incentive to
gather and report hot news, this decision will further the public interest
in having access to such news and also encourage the efforts of
journalists.”82 This framing83 of the case attempts to place the AP in
the noble position of protecting the public interest rather than casting it
as a greedy entity trying to eliminate a competitor.
Significantly, when the case settled,84 the agreement between
the parties included a provision under which AHN acknowledged that
“the tort of ‘hot news misappropriation’ has been upheld by other
courts and was ruled applicable in this case by U.S. District Court
Judge P. Kevin Castel.”85 This appears to be a warning shot fired by
the AP—a shot targeting other news services and news aggregators86
like AHN—that the AP will use the same theory again to challenge
their actions. Ethan K. Ackerman, a Washington, D.C.-based attorney
who has worked in the U.S. Senate as technology counsel, observed
“settlements don’t validate legal theories, court opinions do. That
said, part of the settlement required AHN to pseudo-admit the viability
of the hot news misappropriation doctrine.”87In its own—albeit much
shorter—press release, AHN acknowledged paying the AP an

81
Press Release, Associated Press, AP Statement on All Headline News Court
Ruling (Feb. 18, 2009) (on file with Wake Forest Intellectual Property Law Journal),
available at http://www.ap.org/pages/about/pressreleases/pr_021809b.html.
82
Id.
83
See generally Jeongsub Lim & Hyunjin Seo, Frame Flow Between Government
and the News Media and its Effects on the Public: Framing of North Korea, 21 INT’L
J. PUB. OPINION RES. 204, 205-07 (2009) (providing an overview of the concept of
framing and framing effects).
84
See Order of Dismissal at 1, All Headline News Corp., 608 F. Supp. 2d 454 (No.
08 Civ. 323) (providing, in relevant part, that the court was “advised that all claims
asserted herein have been settled,” and dismissing the case without prejudice to re-
opening it within 60 days if the settlement was not consummated).
85
Press Release, Associated Press, AP and AHN Media settle AP’s lawsuit against
AHN Media and individual defendants (July 13, 2009) (on file with Wake Forest
Intellectual Property Law Journal), available at
http://www.associatedpress.com/pages/about/pressreleases/pr_071309a.html.
86
See generally Barb Palser, Is It Journalism?, AM. JOURNALISM REV., June 2002, at
62, ## (discussing the concept of news aggregators and, in particular, Yahoo! News).
87
Posting of Ethan Ackerman, to Technology & Marketing Law Blog,
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/ (July 22, 2009, 09:44 PST).
12 WAKE FOREST INTELL. PROP. L.J. Vol.10

undisclosed amount of money, but it continued to deny the AP’s

allegations.88
With this analysis of the Associated Press v. All Headline
News case in mind, the next part of this article turns to the
development of the tort at issue in it, as well as a review of scholarly
legal commentary about it.

II.THE EVOLUTION OF THE HOT NEWS MISAPPROPRIATION TORT:

A REVIEW OF LEGAL PRECEDENT AND SCHOLARLY LITERATURE

The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in International News

Service v. Associated Press was handed down in 1918, a time when
consolidation in the print newspaper industry was first beginning.89
Media mogul William Randolph Hearst had created what would
become the International News Service90 (“INS”) some twelve years
earlier to compete against the Associated Press, which had been
formed in the mid-1800s.91 The dispute at issue between the two news
services began when INS, lacking international cables connecting
Europe to the United States, began “clipping news from AP member
newspapers”92 and “copying it from AP bulletin boards.”93 By
pilfering AP-based content from early editions of East Coast
newspapers, INS was actually able to beat the AP, given time-zone
differences, to the West Coast newspapers with the AP’s own
content,94 As Professor Paul W. Sullivan observes in an excellent

88
Melvin Baker, Press Release, All Headline News, AHN, AP Settle Lawsuit (July
13, 2009) (on file with Wake Forest Intellectual Property Law Journal), available at
http://www.allheadlinenews.com/articles/7015776639?AHN,%2520AP%2520Settle
%2520Lawsuit.
89
“Let Munsey Kill It!”: The Birth of the Newspaper Chain, in 1 AMERICAN
DECADES 350, 350-51 (Vincent Tompkins ed., 1996) (writing that “[i]n 1890 New
York had fifteen English-language daily newspapers. By 1932 it had half that
number. The twentieth-century trend toward newspaper consolidation began in
earnest during the century’s first decade” and pointing out that “[i]n upstate New
York Frank E. Gannett bought a partial interest in the Elmira Gazette in 1906 and
then merged it with the Elmira Star. In the 1910s he bought two papers in Ithaca
and combined them, and in the 1920s acquired others in Rochester, Utica, and in
other northeastern states, laying the groundwork for the largest chain in the
country”).
90
In 1958, United Press absorbed International News Service to become United
Press International. Richard A. Schwarzlose, International News Service: William
Randolph Hearst’s News Wire, in HISTORY OF MASS MEDIA IN THE UNITED STATES:
AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 275 (Margaret A. Blanchard, ed., 1998).
91
Laura Bergheim, Press Associations, in 6 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN HISTORY
458, 458 (Stanley I. Kutler ed., 2003).
92
Paul W. Sullivan, News Piracy: An Interpretation of the Misappropriation
Doctrine, 54 JOURNALISM Q. 682, 683 (1977).
93
Id.
94
Id.
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examination of the case that should be read by anyone wanting a

complete analysis of it, the “AP objected that some of its own
members in the western part of the country were not receiving the
news as quickly as INS customers were receiving the pirated news.”95
Importantly, the AP did not argue that its stories were
copyrighted. As Professor Eric Easton writes, the “AP argued that
securing copyright for its dispatches was impractical and that those
dispatches were beyond the scope of the Copyright Act. AP’s
property interest lay exclusively in protecting its business from
freeriders.”96
As described in the Introduction, Justice Pitney and the
majority of the court sided with the Associated Press, expressing deep
concern about what it considered to be unfair competition by INS and
finding a quasi property right in the fresh news stories that it spent
time, money, and labor to gather and produce.97 The property interest
held by the AP, Justice Pitney made clear, was not as against all of the
world or the newspaper reading public, but only as against its
competitors, writing:
The question here is not so much the rights of either party as
against the public but their rights as between themselves.
And although we may and do assume that neither party has
any remaining property interest as against the public in
uncopyrighted news matter after the moment of its first
publication, it by no means follows that there is no
remaining property interest in it as between themselves. For,
to both of them alike, news matter, however little susceptible
of ownership or dominion in the absolute sense, is stock in
trade, to be gathered at the cost of enterprise, organization,
skill, labor, and money, and to be distributed and sold to
those who will pay money for it, as for any other
merchandise.98
From a public policy perspective that centers on an
unenumerated First Amendment right to receive speech,99 this is an
95
Id.
96
Eric B. Easton, Who Owns ’The First Rough Draft of History?’: Reconsidering
Copyright in News, 27 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 521, 547 (2004).
97
See supra footnotes 43-45 and accompanying text (describing Justice Pitney’s
opinion for the majority of the high court).
98
Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 236 (1918) (emphasis added)
(citation omitted).
99
See Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853,
867 (1982) (opining that “the right to receive ideas is a necessary predicate to the
recipient's meaningful exercise of his own rights of speech, press, and political
freedom”); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (writing that “the
right of freedom of speech and press includes not only the right to utter or to print,
but the right to distribute, the right to receive, the right to read”); Martin v. Struthers,
14 WAKE FOREST INTELL. PROP. L.J. Vol.10

important dichotomy. It suggests that the majority opinion is not

intended to deprive the public of news but is, instead, only intended to
provide profit and incentive for the gathering of that news by
depriving another business entity—a rival/competitor—from profiting
from it. In other words, the hot news misappropriation doctrine that
was to emerge from the case was not to be used against the public, but
against rival businesses.
The court also made it clear that, even as against a
rival/competitor, the quasi property interest held in news is ephemeral,
lasting only so long as the news at issue is fresh. As Justice Pitney
wrote:
[T]he view we adopt does not result in giving to complainant
the right to monopolize either the gathering or the
distribution of the news, or, without complying with the
copyright act, to prevent the reproduction of its news
articles; but only postpones participation by complainant’s
competitor in the processes of distribution and reproduction
of news that it has not gathered, and only to the extent
necessary to prevent that competitor from reaping the fruits
of complainants efforts and expenditure, to the partial
exclusion of complainant, and in violation of the principle
that underlies the maxim sic utere tuo, etc.100
Finally, Justice Pitney and the majority attempted to make it
clear that the misappropriation cause of action could not be used to
prevent or thwart one competitor from taking “the news of a rival
agency as a ‘tip’ to be investigated, and if verified by independent
investigation the news thus gathered is sold.”101 The Court here drew
another dichotomy, this time between the uses that a rival could
properly make of a competitor’s fresh news content:
• Permissible: Use the information as a tip to be
independently investigated and corroborated for one’s
own story.
• Forbidden: “the bodily appropriation of another’s
labor in accumulating and stating information.”102

319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943) (writing that the First Amendment freedom to distribute
literature “necessarily protects the right to receive it”).
100
Int’l News Serv., 248 U.S. at 241 (emphasis added). The phrase “sic utere tuo ut
alienum non laedas” reflects an ancient common law maxim in nuisance law that
means “use your own so as not to injure another.” Joseph H. Guth, Law for the
Ecological Age, 9 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 431, 447 (2008). As Professor Gregory
Alexander recently observed, “the negative obligation of the Anglo-American
common law to avoid committing nuisance” reflects an approach that “is captured by
the sic utere tuo maxim.” Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in
American Property, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 745, 753 (2009).
101
Int’l News Serv., 248 U.S. at 243.
102
Id. (quoting Associated Press v. Int’l News Serv., 245 F. 244, 247 (2d Cir. 1917)).
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In summary, the majority opinion, although failing to clearly

delineate the precise elements of the hot news misappropriation tort
that would evolve from the International News Service case, seemed
to place three limitations on it, at least in the opinion of the authors of
this article:
1. It can only be used by one rival against another
rival, not against the public.
2. The quasi property right in news that is instilled by
the tort does not last forever against a rival, but
merely “postpones participation”103 in the news by
the rival, hence the idea that it merely is a “hot
news” tort.
3. A rival is free to use a competitor’s fresh news for
purposes of providing it with a tip or lead to be
independently investigated and produced as its own
news story.
The majority opinion in International News Service has been
the subject of much legal commentary and writing over the years. For
instance, University of Chicago Law Professor Richard Epstein
observes that Justice Pitney’s opinion “rests upon the idea of property
rights in news,”104rights that the AP possessed in its fresh news as
against a direct competitor, INS.105 These rights, however, last only
while the news is fresh and, in addition, only against a direct
competitor.106 This echoes two of the three limitations set forth above.
The notion of finding a property right in news, however, is one
of the fundamental reasons that International News Service is
criticized by legal scholars. For example, Professor Leo J. Raskind
blasts the “‘quasi-property’ foundation on which the INS majority
relied”107 in order to side with the AP and divine a theory of
misappropriation as “question-begging.”108Raskind suggests that the
majority’s concern with unfair competition—the “unique commercial
‘dirty trick,’”109 in Raskind’s words, in which INS “took AP news in

103
Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 241 (1918) (emphasis added).
104
Richard A. Epstein, International News Service v. Associated Press: Custom and
Law as Sources of Property Rights in News, 78 VA. L. REV. 85, 112 (1992).
105
Id. at 92.
106
See id. at 114 (observing that Justice “Pitney describes the defendant’s interest in
its news as ‘quasi property,’ which is good only for a short period of time (less than
a day) and then only against the direct competitor of the plaintiff”).
107
Leo J. Raskind, The Misappropriation Doctrine as a Competitive Norm of
Intellectual Property Law, 75 MINN. L. REV. 875, 900 (1991).
108
Id.
109
Id. at 881.
16 WAKE FOREST INTELL. PROP. L.J. Vol.10

order to have a saleable product”110 and passed it off as its own

work—should not have led it to adopt a property foundation for
grounding the opinion. As Raskind writes:
Introducing the concept of “quasi-property” diverts the
inquiry. The defect in the majority opinion is that it relies on
a legal doctrine relating to the marketing side of competition
[passing off] and cloaks that doctrine with the status of
property. The majority then sought to provide an analysis of
a taking of an undefined property interest in the context of a
competitive market in which taking is the very nature of the
relationship.111
Others also object to the notion of using a property right to
protect information. Professor Michael Pendleton describes what he
calls “the inappropriateness of property as a conceptual/legal device
for ordering rights among the groups of persons who have legitimate
interests in protecting as well as accessing (within limits) the
substantial labour, skill, effort and investment of time and money
involved in creating information ‘products.’”112
Another criticism of the International News Service decision
relates to the separation of powers and roles between judges and
legislators. As Professor Douglas G. Baird writes, “[critics] argue that
judges are poorly situated to identify the policies at stake in an
intellectual property dispute and that judges therefore should not
recognize intellectual property rights until the legislature has done
so.”113 Supporting this proposition that legislators should create the
law here is the idea that “the federal system of intellectual property
derives from the clause of the Constitution that gives Congress the
power to give authors and inventors exclusive rights to their writings
and discoveries for a limited time for the purpose of promoting ‘the
Progress of Science and useful Arts.’”114In this line, Professor L. Ray
Patterson observes that International News Service actually “can be
viewed as a copyright case in the guise of unfair competition”115
because, although the AP’s stories were copyrightable, it had not
copyrighted them.116 As a copyright case in the United States, it would
be governed by legislative rules, not by a court-created doctrine that

110
Id. at 885.
111
Id. at 886-87.
112
Michael D. Pendleton, Balancing Competing Interests in Information Products: A
Conceptual Rethink, 14 INFO. & COMM. TECH. L. 241, 246 (2005).
113
Douglas G. Baird, Common Law Intellectual Property and the Legacy of
International News Service v. Associated Press, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 411, 417 (1983).
114
Id. at 415 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
115
L. Ray Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1, 59
(1987).
116
Id. at 58-59.
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was, as Professor Raskind contends, launched “in an ad hoc fashion”

to fill a vacuum in favor of the Associated Press.117
More generally but certainly not less importantly, the majority
opinion has been criticized as being at odds with the First Amendment
freedom of speech. As Professor Diane Zimmerman writes about the
majority’s rationale that hard work and effort in gathering news should
be rewarded with property rights for exclusive use:
Taken at face value, this principle suggests that property
rules are appropriately applied whenever someone exploits
for profit information generated by the personality,
activities, or intellectual efforts of someone else – and that
the First Amendment is not offended by the requirement that
the user first bargain for that right with the source of the
value. Certainly, no evidence suggests that First
Amendment jurisprudence has ever accepted this view.118
Given these criticisms of the opinion, it is not surprising that
the justices themselves split in International News Service. In
particular, Justice Louis Brandeis dissented at length,119 while Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. issued a very brief concurrence that was
joined by Justice Joseph McKenna.120 Brandeis, who parsimoniously
defined news as “a report of recent occurrences,”121 objected to the
idea that news is property. He opined:
An essential element of individual property is the legal right
to exclude others from enjoying it. If the property is private,
the right of exclusion may be absolute; if the property is
affected with a public interest, the right of exclusion is
qualified. But the fact that a product of the mind has cost its
producer money and labor, and has a value for which others
are willing to pay, is not sufficient to ensure to it this legal
attribute of property. The general rule of law is, that the
noblest of human productions – knowledge, truths
ascertained, conceptions, and ideas – become, after
voluntary communication to others, free as the air to
common use.122
Brandeis also emphasized the danger to the right of the public
to receive information that might be affected by extending a property

117
Raskind, supra note 107, at 881.
118
Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Information as Speech, Information as Goods:
Some Thoughts on Marketplaces and the Bill of Rights, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV.
665, 722 (1992).
119
Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 248-267 (1918) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
120
Id. at 246-248 (Holmes, J., concurring).
121
Id. at 249 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
122
Id. at 250.
18 WAKE FOREST INTELL. PROP. L.J. Vol.10

right in news, writing that an extension of property rights in news

would lead to “a corresponding curtailment of the free use of
knowledge and of ideas; and the facts of this case admonish us of the
danger involved in recognizing such a property right in news, without
imposing upon news-gatherers corresponding obligations.”123 Even if
one were to extend such a right, Brandeis opined that such a decision
should be made by a legislative body, not a judicial one, writing that
“courts are ill-equipped to make the investigations which should
precede a determination of the limitations which should be set upon
any property right in news or of the circumstances under which news
gathered by a private agency should be deemed affected with a public
interest.”124
Brandeis here seemed clearly concerned about potential harm
to the public’s interest in news that might be caused by the majority’s
holding. As Professor Geraldine Szott Moohr observes, Brandeis
believed that “a new rule, unless carefully crafted, could injure the
general public,”125 and thus “preferred a rule that encouraged free use
of knowledge and ideas.”126
A number of lower federal court opinions have since
considered, to varying degrees, the viability and elements of the hot
news misappropriation tort,127 but probably the most important
opinion for purposes of the AP’s case against AHN, given its decision
by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, is
National Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc.128 The case did not
involve either news stories or news agencies, but centered instead on
the real-time transmission of NBA game scores and statistics, taken
from television and radio broadcasts of games in progress, via a
paging device manufactured by Motorola and compiled by a service

123
Id. at 263.
124
Id. at 267.
125
Geraldine Szott Moohr, Federal Criminal Fraud and the Development of
Intangible Property Rights in Information, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 683, 695 (2000).
126
Id. at 696.
127
See, e.g., Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997);
Fin. Info., Inc. v. Moody’s Investors Serv., Inc., 808 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1986);
Scranton Times v. Wilkes-Barre Publ’g Co., No. 3:08-cv-2135, 2009 WL 585502
(M.D. Pa. Mar. 6, 2009); X17 v. Lavandeira, 563 F. Supp. 2d 1102 (C.D. Cal. 2007);
McGraw-Hill Cos. v. Int’l Sec. Exch., Inc., No. 05 Civ.1129(HB), 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 18674 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 1, 2005); Lowry’s Reports, Inc. v. Legg Mason, Inc.,
271 F. Supp. 2d 737 (D. Md. 2003); Scholastic, Inc. v. Stouffer, 124 F. Supp. 2d 836
(S.D.N.Y. 2000); Morris Commc’ns. Corp. v. PGA Tour, Inc., 117 F. Supp. 2d 1322
(M.D. Fla. 2000); Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc. v. Rock Valley Cmty. Press,
Inc., No. 93 C 20244, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15736 (N.D. Ill. 1994); Nash v. CBS,
Inc., 704 F. Supp. 823 (N.D. Ill. 1989); P.I.T.S. Films v. Laconis, 588 F. Supp. 1383
(E.D. Mich. 1984); Schuchart & Assocs. v. Solo Serve Corp., 540 F. Supp. 928
(W.D. Tex. 1982); Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 501 F. Supp.
848 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
128
105 F.3d 841.
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called Sports Team Analysis and Tracking Systems.129 The case is

important for two primary reasons: it recognized the existence of the
hot news misappropriation tort in New York,130 and it articulated the
same five elements131 of the cause of action spelled out by Judge
Castel in the AP’s battle against AHN. In specifying those elements,
the appellate court in Motorola called the hot news misappropriation
tort “properly narrowed,”132 suggesting it is cabined quite closely by
the Second Circuit.
The Second Circuit in Motorola interpreted the Supreme
Court’s International News Service decision as founded on the goal of
“the protection of property rights in time-sensitive information so that
the information will be made available to the public by profit-seeking
entrepreneurs.”133 As such, a viable hot news misappropriation claim
will only survive preemption by the Federal Copyright Act if three key
thingsare present: (i) the factual information at issue is time sensitive;
(ii) there is a free-riding defendant; and (iii) there is a threat to the very
existence of the product or service provided by the plaintiff.134 If it
survives preemption, then a court will turn to the five elements of the
tort itself.

III.NEWS, CULTURE AND CONTROL OF INFORMATION IN THE DIGITAL

AGE:RAMIFICATIONS OF THE HOT NEWS MISAPPROPRIATION TORT

The hot news misappropriation tort originated in 1918 when

people obtained their news via newspapers. Today, people get their
news on the Internet, BlackBerrys and iPhones, as well as on
television and even Twitter;135 an August 2008 report by the Pew
Research Center for the People & the Press, for instance, found that
“since the early 1990s, the proportion of Americans saying they read a
newspaper on a typical day has declined by about 40%.”136
Conversely, the same survey found that “since 2006, the proportion of
Americans who say they get news online at least three days a week has

129
Id. at 843-44.
130
Id. at 845.
131
See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
132
Motorola, 105 F.3d at 848.
133
Id. at 853.
134
Id.
135
See Bob Franklin, The Future of Newspapers, 9 JOURNALISM STUD. 630, 630-31
(2008) (observing that today’s news content is delivered on “multiple media
platforms” and “delivered by the Internet, pod casts and mobile telephony, more
often than by newspaper delivery boys and girls”).
136
PEW RESEARCH CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS, AUDIENCE SEGMENTS IN A
CHANGING NEWS ENVIRONMENT 3 (2008),
http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/444.pdf.
20 WAKE FOREST INTELL. PROP. L.J. Vol.10

increased from 31% to 37%.”137

We also live in a culture that thrives on the constant flow of
information. As the website for Twitter states, “In countries all around
the world, people follow the sources most relevant to them and access
information via Twitter as it happens—from breaking world news to
updates from friends.”138 Twitter has more than 20 million users,139
and as the Philadelphia Inquirer observed, it has played “a growing
role in disseminating news and organizing social and protest
movements.”140 Might the use of the hot news misappropriation tort
hinder or otherwise stanch the flow of news in such a faster-is-better
world?
The dramatic changes in the speed at which news is conveyed, as
well as the manner and mode of its receipt, can be a double-edged
sword when intellectual property concerns are put into the equation.
As Brian Cooper, the executive editor of the Telegraph Herald in
Dubuque, Iowa, recently observed:
In this Internet Age, with thousands of media outlets
available at the click of a mouse, it is easier than ever to
follow news events anywhere – from your hometown to the
other side of the world. And it is also easier than ever for
less-scrupulous outlets to appropriate that news and label it
their own. Simply copy, paste, delete credit lines and –
voila!141
The Associated Press clearly is concerned about the ease at
which such piracy can occur. It explains on its website why it has
chosen to fight such battles so aggressively:
The Associated Press is a not-for-profit news cooperative
that spends hundreds of millions of dollars every year
gathering and sharing news of public interest from around
the world. Licensing of this content by our members is
critical to support our news operations. In the new digital
content economy, however, a significant amount of AP news
and news from AP members is used without permission or
fair compensation. This situation has serious consequences:
it dilutes the value of news for licensors and advertisers; it
fragments and disperses content so widely that consumers
end up relying on fragmented coverage to get their news

137
Id. at 4.
138
About Twitter, http://twitter.com/about (last visited Sept. 1, 2009) (emphasis
added).
139
See Verne Kopytoff, Virtually Famous Folks, S.F. CHRON., July 27, 2009, at A1
(noting that Twitter has 21 million users and describing how it turns ordinary people
into popular figures on the service).
140
John Timpane, Tweeting Twitter Seriously, PHILA. INQUIRER, July 30, 2009, at
A1.
141
Brian Cooper, Say, Where Did That News Story Come From?, TELEGRAPH
HERALD (Dubuque, Iowa), June 3, 2008, at A4.
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despite the availability of comprehensive and authoritative

coverage on a 24-hour basis.142
The AP’s actions likely have a large impact on so-called online
news aggregating sites that, as attorney Jeffrey D. Neuburger writes,
“have become ubiquitous on the Internet.”143 An adjunct Professor at
Fordham University School of Law, Nueburger points out the AP had
previously been successful in obtaining settlements from other online
news aggregators, including Google News and Verisign.144 The AP’s
win in federal court against AHN gives it more leverage to obtain
further settlements in the future.
The potential ramifications of the AP’s current use of the hot
news misappropriation tort stretch beyond the Internet to also affect
television and radio journalism. As journalist Ken Robertson of the
Tri-City Herald in Washington State wrote in early 2009:
[I]t’s common practice for radio and TV “news” readers to
simply rip their stories off from their local newspaper,
seldom bothering to credit the newspaper.
This kind of theft has been commonplace for
decades, and we newspaper people called it “rip and read”
and joked that you could often hear the sound of the
newspaper being folded on the air.145
The practice of rip-and-read journalism on the radio may be
increasing today, Robertson points out, as economic pressures mean
that “radio and TV stations have even smaller staffs and thus even less
time to do any original reporting and must rely more and more on rip
and read.”146 The AP’s newspaper clients—who pay for and work
together with the AP—might now invoke the hot news
misappropriation tort to forbid a local radio station from reading its
stories on the air. “In Boise, Idaho, for example, the newspaper has
told AP to forbid Boise radio and TV stations from using the
newspaper’s news that is shared on the AP wire,”147 Robertson writes.
Perhaps one of the most interesting questions involving the
ramifications of Associated Press v. All Headline News Corp. is
whether the hot news misappropriation doctrine can be successfully
used to squelch the speech of bloggers and citizen journalists who
make use of online news like that conveyed by the AP. In other
142
Associated Press, Protecting AP’s Intellectual Property,
http://www.associatedpress.com/iprights/faqiprights.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2009).
143
Posting of Jeffrey D. Neuburger to New Media & Technology Law Blog,
http://newmedialaw.proskauer.com (Feb 26, 2009).
144
Id.
145
Ken Robertson, Opinion: AP’s Suit Over Theft of ‘Hot News’ Should Rattle TV,
Radio, TRI-CITY HERALD (Kennewick, Wash.), Feb. 20, 2009, at Commentary.
146
Id.
147
Id.
22 WAKE FOREST INTELL. PROP. L.J. Vol.10

words, will the hot news doctrine jeopardize the rapid and free
exchange of information on what the U.S. Supreme Court once called
“the vast democratic forums of the Internet?”148 Conversely, could a
blogger who gets a scoop and breaks an important political news story
be able to own the story, as it were, for a brief amount of time—as
long it is “hot” news—and thereby stifle its dissemination to the wider
public that relies on information conveyed by news services like the
Associated Press? This is particularly important because, as Paul
Farhi recently noted in the American Journalism Review:
Two of the biggest campaign trail scoops came not from a
professional journalist, but from a blogger named Mayhill
Fowler. . . . Using her own money to follow the campaign
around the country, the 61-year-old Fowler recorded
Obama’s comments, made at a fundraiser in San Francisco,
that “bitter” small-town voters “cling to guns and religion.”
(Fowler never identified herself as a blogger; she was
admitted to the closed event because she was an Obama
contributor.) In June she encountered Bill Clinton at a rally
in South Dakota and (again, failing to identify herself) asked
about an unflattering profile of him in Vanity Fair. When
Clinton launched into a tirade about the article's author,
former New York Times reporter Todd Purdum (“sleazy!” “a
scumbag!”), Fowler recorded that, too, and posted it
online.149
The answer to each these questions would generally seem to be
no. Why? Because the elements of the hot news misappropriation
cause of action frame the tort so narrowly that most cases involving
bloggers and citizen journalists on one side of the case, and a news
service like the AP on the other side, simply would not fall within it.
In particular, the fourth element of the tort as framed by Judge Castel
in Associated Press v. All Headline News Corp.—and quoting the
Second Circuit’s opinion in National Basketball Ass’n v.Motorola—
requires the plaintiff to prove that “the defendant is in direct
competition with a product or service offered by the plaintiffs.”150 The
operations of the Associated Press or a news service like the United
Press International151 simply are not in “direct competition” with the

148
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 868 (1997).
149
Paul Farhi, Off the Bus, AM. JOURNALISM REV., Dec. 2008-Jan. 2009, at 28, 31.
150
Associated Press v. All Headline News Corp., 608 F. Supp. 2d 454, 461
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (citing Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, 105 F.3d 841, 845 (2d
Cir. 1997)).
151
The United Press International describes itself as “a leading provider of critical
information to media outlets, businesses, governments and researchers worldwide.
UPI is a global operation with offices in Beirut, Hong Kong, London, Santiago,
Seoul and Tokyo.” About United Press International, http://about.upi.com (last
visited Sept. 5, 2009).
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services provided by a blogger or citizen journalist. The tort will only

be successful if there are rivals in direct competition with each other.
Bloggers simply are not news services; both may supply
important information that many people may consider to be news, but
merely trafficking in similar information does not put them in direct
competition. For instance, the Associated Press: 1) has more than 240
bureaus in 97 countries; 2) features 4,100 editorial, communications
and administrative employees worldwide; 3) is owned by its 1,500
newspaper members; and 4) offers to its members news, photos,
graphics, audio, and video.152 The stereotypical “blogger in his
pajamas,”153 in comparison, may hit an important scoop from time to
time, but he or she simply does not fulfill the same function—
supplying newspapers, radio stations, and websites across the country
with a constant and steady stream of information and different formats
of mediated content—and consistently discover the same type of
information that is dug up “by skilled reporters working beats day in
and day out.”154 The AP can, to put it bluntly, be in many different
places at one time, spanning the globe; the isolated blogger simply
cannot. If the AP thus sued an individual blogger for taking one of its
breaking news stories and posting it on the blogger’s website, as his or
her own work, without either attribution or permission, the blogger
certainly may have violated fundamental ethical tenets of journalism
prohibiting plagiarism,155 but surely he or she has not committed the
tort of hot news misappropriation.
152
Associated Press,Facts & Figures, http://www.ap.org/pages/about/about.html (last
visited Sept. 5, 2009).
153
This phrase is often used by the news media themselves to stereotype bloggers.
See, e.g., Carl Carter, Who Will Pay for the News? The Internet has Walloped
Newspapers, BIRMINGHAM NEWS (Ala.), Mar. 8, 2009, at 1F (contending that
“bloggers in pajamas” cannot replace mainstream newspapers because those
bloggers, along with “cell-phone photographers,” merely “piggyback on the real
work done by real reporters”); Marc Fisher, Politics 24/7: No One Can Hear You
Scream, WASH. POST, Oct. 14, 2007, at M1 (using the twin phrases “bloggers in their
pajamas” and “pajamas media”); Logan Jenkins, What’s the Future of the U-T? Read
On, For Now, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Jan. 26, 2009, at B2 (arguing in favor of the
importance of traditional newspapers and contending that there is “no way can a
loose network of bloggers in pajamas – or, for that matter, time-challenged broadcast
outlets – match our concerted effort to inform in detailed depth”).
154
Editorial, Burris Scoops Show How Much Newspapers Matter, CHI. SUN-TIMES,
Feb. 17, 2009, at 16.
155
For instance, the ethics code of the Society of Professional Journalists bluntly
admonishes journalists to “never plagiarize.” Society of Professional Journalists,
Code of Ethics, available at http://www.spj.org/pdf/ethicscode.pdf (last visited Sept.
1, 2009). See Norman P. Lewis, Plagiarism Antecedents & Situational Influences,
85 JOURNALISM & MASS COMM. Q. 353, 353 (2008) (observing that “plagiarism
seems to stick to journalism like a leech, despite universal prohibitions, zero-
tolerance policies, and fallout from the 2003 Jayson Blair episode”). See generally
24 WAKE FOREST INTELL. PROP. L.J. Vol.10

Ultimately, the Associated Press should be entitled to some

form of qualified protection for its time, labor, and efforts in gathering
breaking news, but not against bloggers or citizen journalists. The
question really centers on defining the precise scope and range of the
protection to which it should be entitled, given the competing interests
at stake, against rival news services and news aggregators.
Those interests, in the opinion of the authors of this article,
would seem to be at least threefold:
• the interests of the AP as the gatherer and creator of
the newsstories;
• the interests of the AP’s competitors and, in particular
news aggregators; and
• the interests of the audience, recipients, and users of
the news stories.156
In light of these three interests, one might ask the following
threshold question: Why is it important to protect the Associated Press
in the first place, as it gathers information and writes news stories,
when the public (the third possessor of an interest noted above) can
obtain information from so-called citizen journalists and bloggers so
readily today? Professor Michael Schudson of the University of
California, San Diego, addressed that same issue in 2009, concluding
that “matters of professional training, experience, and judgment are as
or more important than ever”157 in the world of journalism and
reasoning that “one need not idealize the newspaper press to recognize
that to this day television, radio, and online news feed off the basic
reporting that to an overwhelming extent comes from organizations
whose economic survival no one knows how to guarantee.”158 In other
words, there remains a fundamental difference in quality and content
that separates professional journalists from bloggers and citizen
journalists, even if that difference stems from a desire for economic
survival.
According to a 2007 article published in Journalism & Mass
Communication Quarterly:
Aggregators produce little original news content, instead
providing a platform for established news producers and
access for users to multiple news sources. Arguably the
most popular online news portal, Yahoo!News, allows users

Marie Dunne White, Plagiarism and the News Media, 4 J. MASS MEDIA ETHICS 265
(1989) (discussing the concept of plagiarism and the related issue of lack of
attribution in news media ethics).
156
Cf. Pendleton, supra note 114, at 246 (identifying a very similar list of competing
interests that must be taken into account in any dispute over intellectual property
where time and labor are expended to gather and produce information).
157
Michael Schudson, Ten Years Backwards and Forwards, 10 JOURNALISM 368,
370 (2009).
158
Id..
2009 ALL THE NEWS THAT’S FIT TO OWN: 25
HOT NEWS ON THE INTERNET & THE
COMMODIFICATION OF NEWS IN DIGITAL CULTURE

to identify favorite topics—politics, business, science,

entertainment—from various sources including Associated
Press (AP), Agence France-Presse (AFP), Reuters, CNN,
and others. A recent Pew study determined that 23% of
online news consumers chose Yahoo!News, and while
Yahoo!News usage has continued to increase, competitor
aggregators, such as Google News, and online news
providers, such as MSNBC.com and CNN.com, have lost
users.159
When a news aggregator has permission and explicit
authorization from a company or news service to post links to its
feeds, there clearly is no possibility of a hot news misappropriation
claim. Lack of permission, however, raises the distinct possibility.
While Judge Castel did not address the actual merits of such a scenario
involving a news aggregator versus a news service,160 it is clear that,
as David Simon, a writer and former Baltimore Sun reporter, recently
wrote in Columbia Journalism Review, “the relationships between
newspapers and online aggregators—not to mention The Associated
Press and Reuters—will have to be revisited and revised.”161 The
interests of society and the reading public—the third possessor of an
interest identified above by the authors of this article—require the
economic viability of professional news services because while
“amateur journalistsmay have wise and clever things to say,”162 they
are not in the practice of regularly breaking news stories and
subscribing to journalistic principles of neutrality and supposed
objectivity.163
Finally, it is important to note that Judge Castel did not address
what attorney Jeffrey D. Neuburger calls “the more difficult and
complex questions concerning the use of news reports by bloggers and
others who do not merely excerpt and link to online news reports such
as those produced by the AP, but add commentary to them as well.”164
In the opinion of the authors of this article, it would seem that legal
analysis of such blogger-added-commentary situations should
159
Joe Bob Hester & Elizabeth Dougall, The Efficiency of Constructed Week
Sampling for Content Analysis of Online News, 84 JOURNALISM & MASS COMM. Q.
811, 811 (2007).
160
See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text (describing how Judge Castel only
considered the issues of choice of law, preemption and the viability of the hot news
misappropriation theory under New York law).
161
David Simon, Build the Wall, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., July-Aug. 2009, at 36,
36.
162
Michael Shapiro, Open for Business, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., July-Aug. 2009,
at 29, 35.
163
See generally Michael Schudson, The Objectivity Norm in American Journalism,
2 JOURNALISM 149 (2001) (discussing objectivity in journalism).
164
Neuburger, supra note 145.
26 WAKE FOREST INTELL. PROP. L.J. Vol.10

incorporate and borrow fair-use factors from copyright law.165 In

particular, 17 U.S.C. § 107 specifically notes that criticism and
comment of an otherwise copyrighted work may be protected.166 In
fact, such commentary might even be considered a form of “news
reporting”167 protected as a fair use. If the blogger is not making a
commercial profit—per the first fair use factor168—this too would
militate in favor of protecting such a use in a blogger-added-
commentary situation. In addition, the smaller the portion of the
original article that is appropriated for purpose of commentary, the
better for the blogger, as the fair-use statute asks courts to factor in
“the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole.”169 This issue, of course, remains
unresolved, and the article now turns to the Conclusion to offer some
ideas of future research and to summarize some of its own findings.

IV.CONCLUSION

This article has attempted to illustrate the origin, evolution, and

continuing viability of the hot news misappropriation doctrine nearly a
century after it was first developed and at a time when we are, as one
communication scholar recently put it, “in the midst of an epochal
transformation of the news media.”170 While the news media and the
very nature of journalism may be changing today, the principles of
unfair competition and reap/sow equity that gave rise in International
News Service v. Associated Press to the hot news misappropriation
remain vital, despite the scholarly criticism of them reviewed earlier in
this article.171
The AP’s lawsuit against AHN was not the first time in recent
years the venerable news service has sued a business for allegedly
ripping off its content,172 but it was the first time this century that the
AP has coaxed a very favorable judicial ruling to use as precedent in

165
See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006) (setting forth four fair-use factors).
166
Id.
167
Id.
168
See id. § 107(1) (2006) (providing that courts should consider, when making a
fair-use determination, “the purpose and character of the use, including whether such
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes”).
169
Id. § 107(3) (2006).
170
Schudson, supra note 159, at 369.
171
See supra notes 109-23 and accompanying text (providing the commentary of
other legal scholars on the high court’s decision in International News Service).
172
See Ken Robertson, Opinion, More Trouble Ahead for Copyright Scofflaws, TRI-
CITY HERALD (Kennewick, Wash.), July 14, 2009, http://www.tri-
cityherald.com/942/story/646943.html (“In 2007, [the Associated Press] sued
Moreover Technologies Inc. and its parent, VeriSign Inc., for using AP headlines,
photos and stories without permission. That case also was settled for undisclosed
terms.”).
2009 ALL THE NEWS THAT’S FIT TO OWN: 27
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COMMODIFICATION OF NEWS IN DIGITAL CULTURE

other cases in which it invokes the hot news misappropriation doctrine

in New York. The Associated Press thus may also consider itself
fortunate that it is headquartered in New York City,173 within a
jurisdiction that recognizes the hot news misappropriation tort, such
that it can haul defendants into, quite literally, its home court within
the Second Circuit.174 Significantly, another state with a large
concentration of media entities—California—also recognizes the hot
news misappropriation doctrine and recently has applied it to images,
not simply news stories, in a case involving celebrity gossip-monger
Perez Hilton.175 The fact that both New York and California recognize
the hot news misappropriation tort brings increased power to the
media companies headquartered there to fight back against nefarious
competitors.
AHN’s alleged conduct of stripping AP’s stories of attribution
and having them masquerade as AHN’s own work raises perhaps as
many worthy ethical issues—business ethics and journalism ethics—
as legal ones, but they are beyond the scope of this law-focused article.
It is worth noting here, however, that the term plagiarism—a cardinal
sin in journalism ethics176 —is derived from the Latin word for
kidnapper,177 and that moniker perhaps provides an apt way of
viewing AHN’s conduct that, in turn, tees up media ethics issues.
Given that there are even ambiguities about what constitutes
plagiarism in journalism, as University of Florida Professor Norman
Lewis recently pointed out in a detailed study,178 there may even be a
fundamental issue of whether what AHN allegedly did with the AP’s
stories even constitutes plagiarism. Future articles should address the
ethical aspects of AHN’s conduct and that of similar entities and news
aggregators.
The news business, of course, is highly competitive. There
have been lawsuits filed over the alleged stealing of sources,179 much

173
See Associated Press, Contact AP, http://www.ap.org/pages/contact/contact.html
(last visited Sept. 1, 2009) (identifying the AP’s headquarters as being located at 450
W. 33rd St. in New York, NY).
174
A discussion of the jurisdictional issues and choice-of-law issues is beyond the
scope of this article.
175
See X17, Inc. v. Lavandeira, 563 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1107 (C.D. Cal. 2007)
(involving a case about the use of photographs by Mario Lavandeira, who does
business under the name Perez Hilton, and holding that “the hot news tort is
cognizable in California”).
176
See supra note 157 and accompanying text (discussing plagiarism and journalism
ethics).
177
White, supra note 157, at 267.
178
Lewis, supra note 157, at 355.
179
See Kathryn S. Wenner, It’s My Source and I’ll Sue If I Want To, AM.
JOURNALISM REV., Oct 2001, at 16, 16. (describing a lawsuit filed in California
28 WAKE FOREST INTELL. PROP. L.J. Vol.10

less the stealing of news stories. Thus, it is not surprising that the hot
news doctrine would be used today, more than ninety years after it was
created, and that other news entities beyond the AP would invoke it.
For instance, the doctrine was at the heart of a dispute in 2009
between the Scranton Times and the Times Leader, rival newspapers
in Northeastern Pennsylvania, in Scranton Times v. Wilkes-Barre
Publishing Co.180 The dispute did not exactly involve what one might
typically consider to be news; it focused, instead, on the allegation that
the print edition of one newspaper was copying from the various
websites of the other newspaper’s obituaries.181 United States District
Judge A. Richard Caputo did not reject the possible existence of a hot
news misappropriation claim within Pennsylvania and the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit, but he did find that, on the specific
facts of the case, the claim was preempted by federal copyright law
because “the Defendant’s alleged copying and re-use of obituaries
originally found in Plaintiffs’ publications did not pose a threat to the
existence of Plaintiffs’ publications or the ability of those publications
to continue the timely publication of obituaries.”182
But future battles are more likely to occur in scenarios like
those involving the Associated Press and All Headline News
Corporation. When a court finally addresses the actual merits of such
a case on the five specific elements of the hot news misappropriation
doctrine, it will trigger an opinion meriting a further scholarly
analysis. For now, as this article has illustrated, the tort that exists (at
least in New York) is quite narrowly articulated and seems unlikely to
quash the work of bloggers and citizen journalists in situations where
they might be sued by the Associated Press.
Finally, it seems that one important issue that must be resolved
in such a future case, heard on the merits, is determining for exactly
how long news actually remains “hot” or “fresh” in a world of
instantaneous, digital communication. When, in other words, does
news become cold? As our social expectations of faster and quicker
news delivery change due to technology, does this mean that a
concomitantly briefer period of quasi property ownership, per a 91-
year-old case, should be allowed under the hot news misappropriation
tort? Although one attorney recently proposed a very precise formula
for such situations under copyright law (rather than the common law
hot news misappropriation tort at issue in International News

involving competing journals that cover the wood and pulp industries and centering
on the claim that the sources used by one of the journals were its trade secrets and
could not be used by its former employees who went to work for the rival
publication).
180 No. 3:08-cv-2135, 2009 WL 585502 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 6, 2009).
181 Id. at **1-2.
182 Id. at **12-14.
2009 ALL THE NEWS THAT’S FIT TO OWN: 29
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Service),183 it would seem this is indeed an area that requires the

flexibility in equity that gives judges discretion when deciding
whether to enjoin the likes of AHN for its alleged news piracy.

183See Ryan T. Holte, Restricting Fair Use to Save the News: A Proposed Change
in Copyright Law to Bring More Profit to News Reporting, 13 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y
1, 3 (2008) (proposing “a change to current copyright law to bring more
profit to news reporting” that “centers around allowing journalists, and the
companies they work for, to own 98% of the investigated and researched
facts they uncover for twenty-four hours after the story is first published”).
Media Law in the Digital Age: The Rules Have Changed, Have You? 
 

HOT NEWS MISAPPROPRIATION AND BARCLAYS V. THEFLYONTHEWALL.COM
  In 2003, prolific legal scholar and 7th Circuit Judge Richard Posner published a law 
review article entitled "Misappropriation: A Dirge," which discussed—among other things—the 
continued viability of "hot news" misappropriation, a theory of unfair competition that dates 
back to the Supreme Court's 1918 case, International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 
215 (1918), which involved unauthorized re‐publication of wire service reports.1 Contrary to 
what Posner's title might suggest, the article didn't outright announce the death of the hot 
news doctrine, but it did paint a picture of a legal doctrine on the ropes—disdained by noted 
jurists, unwise as a matter of policy, and limited in practical significance. For better or worse, a 
decision issued on March 18, 2010 shows the doctrine to be very much alive and relevant. In 
fact, the case raises some disturbing prospects for news aggregation and sharing of information 
on the Internet more generally.  
  In Barclays Capital Inc. v. TheFlyOnTheWall.com, ‐‐‐ F.Supp.2d ‐‐‐‐, 2010 WL 1005160 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2010), Judge Denise Cote of the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of New York issued a permanent injunction requiring the Internet‐based financial news 
site FlyOnTheWall.com ("Fly") to delay its reporting of the stock recommendations of research 
analysts from three prominent Wall Street firms, Barclays Capital Inc., Merrill Lynch, and 
Morgan Stanley. The injunction requires Fly to wait until 10 a.m. E.S.T. before publishing the 
facts associated with analyst research released before the market opens, and to postpone 
publication for at least two hours for research issued after the opening bell. 
  The injunction is based on Judge Cote's finding, after a bench trial, that Fly engaged in 
hot news misappropriation, "free‐riding activity that is directly competitive with the Firms' 
production of time‐sensitive information, thereby substantially threatening their incentive to 
continue in the business." Barclays, at *32. Morgan Stanley and Barclays also succeeded on 
copyright infringement claims relating to Fly's unauthorized copying and distribution of 
excerpts from their research reports for a few weeks in 2005, but the court awarded relatively 
minor damages on those claims and this doesn't impact Fly's current business practices, which 
no longer involve verbatim reproductions or close paraphrases of analyst research.  
Background 
  Like other Wall Street firms, Barclays, Merrill Lynch, and Morgan Stanley produce 
analyst research reports on stocks. The firms distribute these reports for a fee to their clients, 
usually large institutional investors. The firms often release these reports before the NYSE 
opens for the day, and the reports contain recommendations (buy/sell/hold) that, according to 
the firms, often spur investors into making trades, usually through the firm that issued the 

                                                            
1
 Richard A. Posner, Misappropriation: A Dirge, 40 HOU. L. REV. 621 (2003). 

1 
 
Media Law in the Digital Age: The Rules Have Changed, Have You? 
 

report. As a result, the release of a report often has a significant impact on the market price for 
the stock in question. 
  The firms' paying clients gain access to the reports through several means, including the 
firms' password‐protected websites, licensed third‐party distributors like Bloomberg and 
Thomson Reuters (presumably also using some sort of password protection), and email 
messages. In addition, the firms host private conference calls or webcasts in which their 
analysts discuss their research reports and recommendations with clients. Access to these calls 
and webcasts is restricted to those with the required passcode or login.  
  The firms take various precautions to ensure that the reports go only to paying clients. 
For example, they forbid employees from sharing the reports, their licensing agreements 
purport to forbid the clients from redistributing the research content, and licensed distributors 
like Bloomberg and Thomson Reuters contractually agree to maintain a "firewall" so that their 
media arms can't obtain information from their research arms. 
  Inevitably, though, the research reports and the recommendations contained in them 
leak out, and Fly pioneered the business model of publishing this information for its own clients 
on a newsfeed over the Internet. The model has caught on, and, according to the court, 
presently "there is a crowded marketplace with small internet companies and major news 
organizations reporting the Firms' Recommendations before and after the market opens." 
Barclays, at *13. 
  According to Judge Cote's opinion, it looks like Fly's operations have changed 
significantly over the last few years, largely in response to the firms' lawsuit. Before 2005, Fly 
relied primarily on employees at the firms who emailed research reports to Fly after they were 
released to clients (this was pretty clearly a violation of the employees' duties of loyalty and 
confidentiality to the firms). At that time, Fly staff would type the recommendation as a 
headline, sometimes accompanied by a verbatim reproduction or close paraphrase of a passage 
from the report explaining the basis for the recommendation. Barclays, at *12. Hence the 
copyright claims for Fly's conduct in 2005. 
  As a result of the lawsuit, however, Fly apparently changed its information‐gathering 
process. According to testimony from Ron Etergino, Fly's president and majority owner, he "no 
longer feels free to look at the research reports, even if someone should send them to him," id., 
and he now gathers information about the firms' reports from other sources: 
According to Etergino, he checks first to see what Recommendations have been 
reported on Bloomberg Market News. Then he checks Dow Jones, Thomson Reuters, 
and Fly's competitors such as TTN, StreetAcount.com, and Briefing.com. Next, he visits 
chat rooms to which he has been invited to participate by the moderator. . . . Etergino 
also receives "blast IMs" through the Bloomberg, Thomson Reuters, or IMTrader 
messaging services that may go to dozens or hundreds of individuals. Finally, Etergino 

2 
 
Media Law in the Digital Age: The Rules Have Changed, Have You? 
 

exchanges IMs, emails, and more rarely telephone calls with individual traders at hedge 
funds, money managers, and other contacts on Wall Street. 
Id. In other words, Fly acquires information about the reports through a process that looks a 
whole lot like good‐old fashioned journalism. And it largely relies on information that is publicly 
available through mainstream and Internet media reports, IM blasts, and what appear to be 
open chat rooms. The result is a headline like this: "EQIX: Equinox initiated with a Buy at 
FofA/Merrill. Target $110." Barclays, at *10. 
Hot News and Copyright Law 
  As noted, the main dispute in the Barclays case was not about verbatim copying, but 
about Fly publishing time‐sensitive facts from the firms' research reports—essentially, the 
buy/sell recommendations. Facts are not protected by copyright law. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural 
Telephone Service Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991). While the firms' recommendations aren't 
exactly facts in the same way as "hard news," the firms appeared to concede that they couldn't 
stop Fly's current reporting practices through resort to copyright law. Enter the hot news 
misappropriation doctrine, which is controversial precisely because it provides IP‐like 
protection to facts despite copyright law's bedrock policy that facts are in the public domain. 
  In International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918), the Supreme 
Court created the hot news misappropriation doctrine as a matter of federal common law, and 
some state courts, like those in New York, adopted it as part of state unfair competition law. 
The INS case arose after British and French censors barred INS from sending war dispatches to 
the United States because its owner, Hearst, had offended the British and French by siding with 
Germany at the outset of WWI. See Posner, at 627. INS employees got around this problem by 
paraphrasing AP dispatches published in east coast newspapers and sending them by telegraph 
to the West Coast for publication in Hearst newspapers. See INS, 248 U.S. at 231‐32 (at issue 
was INS's practice of "copying news from bulletin boards and from early editions of 
complainant's newspapers and selling this, either bodily or after rewriting it, to defendant's 
customers"); id. at 259‐60 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("The means by which the International 
News Service obtains news gathered by the Associated Press is also clearly unobjectionable. It is 
taken from papers bought in the open market or from bulletins publicly posted."). 
  The INS Court acknowledged that AP had no copyright claim because it had failed to 
register and/or place copyright notices on its news reports (now no longer a requirement under 
U.S. copyright law), and because copyright law did not extend to the facts contained in the 
reports. But, the Court nonetheless enjoined INS from using AP's news reports in direct 
competition with the news service, finding that the INS's free riding "speaks for itself and a 
court of equity ought not to hesitate long in characterizing it as unfair competition in business." 
Id. at 240. Justices Holmes and Brandeis wrote powerful dissents, decrying the majority's 
opinion as unprecedented, unnecessary, and unwise. 

3 
 
Media Law in the Digital Age: The Rules Have Changed, Have You? 
 

  The main policy justification advanced by the majority, which remains the motivating 
principle behind the hot news doctrine today, is that protecting hot‐news‐type information is 
necessary to preserve the incentives that drive economic actors to make the substantial 
investment required to produce a socially valuable product or service in the first place. Posner 
characterizes this policy impulse as protecting against the danger of "killing the goose that laid 
the golden eggs." Posner, at 628. 
  In the Barclays case, the idea is that Wall Street research reports are a social good—they 
help disseminate information important to the proper functioning of the securities markets that 
otherwise would not be produced. This may be a disputable proposition, but it's one the court 
accepted. And, the theory goes, Wall Street firms like Barclays and Merrill Lynch won't go to the 
expense of producing these socially valuable reports if companies like Fly can free ride off of 
them and undermine the money‐making potential of the practice. Again, it's disputable 
whether Fly's conduct, rather than other economic factors (like international economic 
meltdown), has hurt demand for the firms' reports, but Judge Cote found as a matter of fact 
that Fly's activities did create a substantial disincentive.  
  It’s an open question whether or not all of this is wise economic policy. But from a legal 
perspective, the hot news doctrine creates an obvious tension with copyright law because, as 
noted above, it creates a pseudo‐property right in facts that copyright law says are in the public 
domain. This raises the specter of preemption: that is, a situation where federal law displaces 
inconsistent state law under the Supremacy Clause. Judge Cote's opinion in Barclays does a 
very thorough job on this issue and determines that federal copyright law does not preempt 
hot news misappropriation, or at least a narrow version of it. This result was a foregone 
conclusion for Judge Cote because the Second Circuit Court of Appeals had already said as 
much in National Basketball Association v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997), which is 
controlling precedent in the Southern District of New York. 
  Under NBA, the narrow version of hot news misappropriation that survives copyright 
preemption has the following elements:   
(i) a plaintiff generates or gathers information at a cost; (ii) the information is time‐
sensitive; (iii) a defendant's use of the information constitutes free riding on the 
plaintiff's efforts; (iv) the defendant is in direct competition with a product or service 
offered by the plaintiffs; and (v) the ability of other parties to free‐ride on the efforts of 
the plaintiff or others would so reduce the incentive to produce the product or service 
that its existence or quality would be substantially threatened. 
Barclays, at *20 (quoting NBA, 105 F.3d at 845). Posner says that the "meat" of the test is in 
element (v), with (i) through (iv) describing a situation where (v) is likely to be satisfied. Posner, 
at 632. Therefore, "[t]he criterion appears to mean that states can protect fact gathering 
without running afoul of the preemption provision in the federal copyright statute only when 

4 
 
Media Law in the Digital Age: The Rules Have Changed, Have You? 
 

unauthorized copying of the facts is likely to deter the plaintiff or others similarly situated from 
gathering and disseminating the facts that the defendant has copied." Id. The test is "alarmingly 
fuzzy once the extreme position of creating a legal right against all free riding is rejected, as it 
must be." Id. at 638.  
  In other words, the hot news doctrine presents an inherently subjective and necessarily 
fact‐specific standard, and one would expect courts to be cautious in finding it met, if for no 
other reasons than to avoid the potential conflict with copyright law and to promote the 
public's access to information. In Barclays, the firms convinced Judge Cote at trial that each 
element was satisfied, demonstrating that, while it may take a unique set of facts, it's not an 
impossible task.  
What About the First Amendment?   
  Notably lacking from Judge Cote's very thorough opinion is any discussion of how hot 
news misappropriation interacts with the First Amendment. This could be because Fly didn't 
argue the point in its final papers, at least not directly. (Although Fly did raise the First 
Amendment as an affirmative defense in its answer.) As we'll see below, though, Fly 
undoubtedly raised factual arguments that bear on the question. 
  The First Amendment issue is an important one because the Supreme Court didn't 
address it in INS. Justice Brandeis's dissent gives us a First Amendment tingle in his famous 
statement, "[t]he general rule of law is, that the noblest of human productions—knowledge, 
truths ascertained, conceptions, and ideas—become, after voluntary communication to others, 
free as the air to common use," 248 U.S. at 250 (Brandeis, J., dissenting), but even he didn't 
seem to appreciate the constitutional implications of the case. It's also an important question 
because First Amendment doctrine has developed considerably since 1918, and free speech 
concerns of which the Justices then had only a vague inkling now have become an accepted 
part of the constitutional landscape. 
  A long line of Supreme Court cases hold that the First Amendment protects truthful 
speech on matters of public concern. See, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 527‐28, 533‐35 
(2001) (First Amendment barred imposition of civil damages under wiretapping law for 
publishing contents of conversation relevant to matter of public concern); Florida Star v. B.J.F., 
491 U.S. 524, 534 (1989) (First Amendment barred imposition of civil damages on newspaper 
for publishing rape victim’s name); Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103‐06 (1979) 
(First Amendment barred prosecution under state statute for publishing names of juvenile 
offenders without permission of court); Landmark Comms., Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 841‐42 
(1978) (First Amendment barred criminal prosecution for disclosing information from a 
confidential judicial discipline proceeding). Therefore, “if a newspaper lawfully obtains truthful 
information about a matter of public significance then state officials may not constitutionally 

5 
 
Media Law in the Digital Age: The Rules Have Changed, Have You? 
 

punish publication of the information, absent a need to further a state interest of the highest 
order.”  Smith, 443 U.S. at 103; accord Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 527‐28. 
  In Bartnicki v. Vopper, members of a teachers union sued a radio announcer under state 
and federal wiretapping laws after he played an unlawfully recorded telephone conversation on 
the air. The radio show host had received the recording from a third party who himself had 
received the tape in the mail from an anonymous source. The Supreme Court held that the First 
Amendment prohibited the recovery of damages against the radio show host for publishing the 
tape, explaining that “a stranger’s illegal conduct does not suffice to remove the First 
Amendment shield from speech about a matter of public concern.”  532 U.S. at 535. The 
constitutional principle in Bartnicki and other Supreme Court cases is not limited to traditional 
forms of media like newspapers and radio broadcasters. See Mary T. Jean v. Massachusetts 
State Police, 492 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 2007) (First Amendment barred criminal prosecution for 
posting illegally recorded video online when recording made by third party, even if knowing 
receipt of the recording constituted a crime under Massachusetts law). 
  In Barclays, Judge Cote considered it unimportant that Fly obtained the information it 
published from other news services that were publishing the firms' recommendations on the 
Internet in advance of Fly's own publication. The court said that "the conduct of third parties is 
simply of no moment in finding Fly liable for hot‐news misappropriation," and "it is not a 
defense to misappropriation that a Recommendation is already in the public domain by the 
time Fly reports it." Barclays, at *22. This may be a faithful application of the INS case itself—
recall that INS involved taking facts from publicly available bulletin boards and published 
newspaper accounts—but INS never considered the First Amendment, so it can't resolve the 
issue.  
  Under Bartnicki and the cases mentioned above, if Fly obtained the information in 
question through lawful means, then the First Amendment protects its right to publish that 
information. There is nothing inherently unlawful about Fly reading about a stock 
recommendation on a newsfeed provided by another news service or participating in a public 
chat room where Wall Street "rumors" are discussed (accessing a passcode‐protected 
conference call would be another matter). The court says that Fly has engaged in "illegal 
conduct" by publishing the information it did, Barclays, at *22, but this label begs the 
question—that is, whether the state may constitutionally penalize publication of truthful 
information relating to a matter of public concern that was not obtained in violation of any 
other applicable laws. 
  To be sure, the person who originally leaks a firm research report to a news service or 
chat room participant may violate a legal duty owed to one of the firms, but "a stranger's illegal 
conduct" is not sufficient to remove First Amendment protection under Bartnicki. The question 
is closer for Fly's pre‐lawsuit‐era publication of reports received directly from firm employees 

6 
 
Media Law in the Digital Age: The Rules Have Changed, Have You? 
 

who violated a duty of loyalty and confidentiality. It might be independently "unlawful" in the 
constitutional sense to knowingly induce a breach of these duties, but even in the trade secrets 
sphere this question has not been resolved with any clarity. Furthermore, it would not be 
"unlawful" for Fly to communicate by email or telephone with firm clients who are willing to 
convey the substance of the recommendations, though this probably violates the client's 
license agreement. Regrettably, the court did not differentiate between Fly's different 
information‐gathering tactics, and it enjoined publication of information obtained through at 
least some practices that clearly aren't "unlawful" in any meaningful sense. 
  The court might well respond to all this by arguing that the firms' reports are not facts 
related to a matter of public concern like ordinary news, but rather "subjective judgments 
based on complex and imperfect evidence."  Barclays, at *29. There may well be a 
constitutionally significant distinction between reporting the subjective recommendations 
generated by these Wall Street firms and objective, external facts that are discovered "out 
there" in the world. On the other hand, these subjective judgments have objective, real‐world 
consequences, and the announcement of a recommendation is itself a newsworthy event 
because it may cause a change in a stock's price. It is difficult, and potentially hazardous, to try 
to distinguish between reporting the "subjective" recommendations versus reporting the 
"objective" fact that they were made, especially when the publication in question looks like 
this: "EQIX: Equinox initiated with a Buy at FofA/Merrill. Target $110."  
  The court may have ameliorated some of the First Amendment concerns by clarifying 
that the scope of its injunction, like the scope of hot news misappropriation, is narrow:  
 [T]o the extent Fly alters its business and begins to engage in actual analysis of market 
movements, and refers on occasion after the market opens in New York to one of the 
Firms' Recommendations in the context of independent analytical reporting on a 
significant market movement that has already occurred that same day, such conduct 
will not run afoul of the injunction. 
Id. at *32. But, this description of speech activity (the court doesn't frame it in terms of speech) 
that won't be enjoined displays an obvious preference for original/sweat of the 
brow/"analytical" content‐creation over the free transmission of facts and information, which is 
a lot of what happens on the Internet. 
 

7 
 
 FEDERAL OPEN RECORDS LAW: FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA) 

CITIZEN MEDIA LAW PROJECT 

OVERVIEW 

The Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"), enacted in 1966, provides access to the public 
records of all departments, agencies, and offices of the Executive Branch of the federal 
government, including the Executive Office of the President. FOIA does not cover the 
sitting President, Congress, or the federal judiciary. The statute requires federal 
agencies to: 

1. Provide access to their records and information, barring certain exceptions; 
2. Suffer penalties for refusing to release covered information; 
3. Appoint a FOI officer charged with responding to information requests; and 
4. Publish agency regulations and policy statements, including their rules for 
handling FOIA information requests, in the Federal Register. 

FOIA gives the right to request access to government records to any person for any 
reason, whether the person is a U.S. citizen or a foreign national. Requests can be made 
in the name of an individual or an organization (including a corporation, partnership, or 
public interest group). Individuals have the same access rights as professional 
journalists, though journalists who work for established media organizations sometimes 
receive better treatment from records‐keepers. Individuals probably won’t qualify for 
some of the perks afforded to media professionals, such as fee waivers and expedited 
processing, but they are just as capable of using records requests to reveal information 
that is important to the public. In fact, according to one study, more FOIA requests 
come from ordinary citizens than from professional media organizations. 

FOIA covers records from all federal regulatory agencies, cabinet and military 
departments, offices, commissions, government‐controlled corporations, the Executive 
Office of the President, and other organizations of the Executive Branch of the federal 
government. 5 U.S.C. § 552(f).  

FOIA does NOT apply to the President, Congress (or members of Congress), or the 
federal courts and federal judiciary. Some federally funded organizations may not be 
covered by FOIA if the government does not control or regulate their operation. 
However, any of those organizations’ records that are filed with federal agencies may be 
covered. No private persons or organizations are covered by FOIA. State and local 
governments are not covered by FOIA, including federally‐funded state agencies, but all 
states and some local governments have passed freedom of information laws. Requests 
for information from a state or local governments must be made under that 
jurisdiction's freedom of information legislation.  

All non‐exempt electronic and physical records held by federal agencies must be 
disclosed under FOIA. Federal agencies covered by FOIA are permitted to withhold 
documents, or redact portions of documents, if the records (or information in the 
records) are covered by one of the nine exemptions established by FOIA. One of the 
most common exemptions relied on the exemption for national security. 

There are a number of ways that you can receive government records. The easiest 
method is to access an agency's online “reading room” which provides free access to 
certain government documents.  

AGENCY RECORDS SUBJECT TO FOIA 

Any records created, possessed, or controlled by a federal regulatory agency, cabinet 
and military departments, offices, commissions, government‐controlled corporations, 
the Executive Office of the President, and other organizations of the Executive Branch of 
the federal government must be disclosed unless the information contained in the 
records is covered by a specific FOIA exemption. FOIA only extends to existing records; 
you cannot compel an agency to create or search for information that is not already in 
its records. Nor can you use FOIA to compel agencies to answer your general questions 
under FOIA. However, you sometimes can agree to accept information in an abbreviated 
form rather than the actual documents. 

Agencies are required to make the following records available for public inspection and 
copying without a formal FOIA request via the Federal Register: 

• final opinions made in the adjudication of cases; 
• unpublished policy statements and agency interpretations; 
• staff manuals that affect the public; 
• copies of records released in response to previous FOIA requests have been or 
will likely be the subject of additional requests; and 
• a general index of released records determined to have been or likely to be the 
subject of additional requests. 

Physical records of any description can be requested under FOIA. Traditional typed 
documents, as well as maps, diagrams, charts, index cards, printouts and other kinds of 
paper records can be requested.  

The increasing availability of electronic versions of government records is one of the 
most important developments in public access to government information. “E‐records,” 
as these records are sometimes called, generally are simpler and quicker to obtain, 
easier to analyze, and otherwise better suited to citizen use. With the invention of 
online reading rooms and FOIA sections of agency websites, many records take no more 
effort to access than personal e‐mail. Information from e‐records can be organized into 
databases, searched, and plugged into tables and charts, making it possible to perform 
in‐depth analysis in much less time—which opens up new possibilities for public use of 
government information. 
 

Besides quicker access and (possibly) cheaper reproduction costs, electronic records 
have several advantages over their paper‐based counterparts. E‐records can be 
compiled into databases for easy searching and comparison. They are easier to sort 
through quickly, possibly making it easier to find patterns and discrepancies. This can 
make the information‐gathering process significantly simpler and more efficient, which 
is a great help to those who don’t have the time and resources to mount in‐depth 
investigations. For more information on ways to use electronic records, the Poynter 
Institute has an online bibliography of computer‐assisted reporting (CAR) primers and 
other sources of information. 

Electronic records are becoming more and more prevalent as the government continues 
to expand its use of technology. Because of this, any record you seek could be available 
in electronic format. Whether you’re talking directly to a records‐keeper or filing an 
official FOIA request, you should consider asking for electronic copies of the records you 
are requesting. Depending on the agency, you may be able to specify whether you 
receive e‐records by e‐mail attachment, CD, or other medium. Some states, for instance, 
allow the requester to receive records in the format of their choice. An agency must 
make requested records available in electronic format at the request of a person if the 
record is readily reproducible by the agency in electronic format (§ 552(a)(3)(B)). 

Congress extended the Freedom of Information Act to electronic records by enacting 
the Government Printing Office Electronic Information Enhancement Act of 1993 
("Electronic Information Act") and the Electronic Freedom of Information Act 
Amendments of 1996 ("E‐FOIA"). The Electronic Information Act requires government to 
maintain an online directory of Federal electronic information, including the 
Congressional Record, the official record of Congress’ proceedings and debates, as well 
as the Federal Register, which contains agencies’ regulations and policy statements. E‐
FOIA requires that government agencies: 

• prepare electronic forms of records and record indexes; 
• offer access to those records; 
• have a FOIA section of their websites, on which they must post agency 
regulations, administrative opinions, policy statements, staff manuals, and other 
records; 
• identify common records requests and make those records available online; 
• create online reading rooms that include information available in traditional 
reading rooms; and 
• create reference guides for accessing agency information, which must be 
available online. 

 
While the records you've requested might be covered by FOIA, the information 
contained in the records may relate to certain subject areas that are exempt from 
disclosure under FOIA. FOIA contains nine exemptions that might impact your request: 

1. Classified Documents‐‐information classified in the interests of national security 
or foreign policy can be withheld (§ 552(b)(1)(A)). 
2. Internal Agency Personnel Rules‐‐ information relating to internal agency 
practices is exempt if it is a trivial administrative matter of no genuine public 
interest (e.g., a rule governing lunch hours for agency employees) or if disclosure 
would risk circumvention of law or agency regulations (e.g., an employee's 
computer user id) (§ 552(b)(2)). 
3. Information Exempt Under Other Laws‐‐an agency is prohibited from disclosing 
information that protected from disclosing under other federal laws. For 
example, federal tax laws prohibit the disclosure of personal income tax returns 
(§ 552(b)(3)). 
4. Trade Secrets or Confidential Commercial Information‐‐this exemption applies to 
trade secrets (commercially valuable plans, formulas, processes, or devices) and 
commercial information obtained from a person (other than an agency) that 
would be likely to harm the competitive position of the person if disclosed (such 
as a company's marketing plans, profits, or costs (§ 552(b)(4)). 
5. Internal Agency Memoranda and Policy Discussions‐‐in order to protect the 
deliberative policymaking processes of government, internal agency memoranda 
and letters between agencies discussing potential policy options are exempted 
from disclosure (§ 552(b)(5)). 
6. Personal Privacy‐‐private data held by agencies about individuals is exempt if 
disclosure would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy, but a 
person is not prevented from obtaining private information about themselves (§ 
552(b)(6)). 
7. Law Enforcement Investigations‐‐this exemption allows the withholding of 
information that would, among other things, interfere with enforcement 
proceedings or investigations, deprive a person of a right to a fair trial, breach a 
person's privacy interest in information maintained in law enforcement files, 
reveal law enforcement techniques and procedures, or endanger the life or 
physical safety of any individual (§ 552(b)(7)). 
8. Federally Regulated Banks‐‐information that is contained in or related to reports 
prepared by or for a bank supervisory agency such as the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation, the Federal Reserve, are exempt (§ 552(b)(8)). 
9. Oil and Gas Wells‐‐geological and geophysical data about oil and gas wells are 
exempted from disclosure (§ 552(b)(9)). 

Other than exemption number 3 ‐‐ which relates to information exempt under other 
federal law ‐‐ these exemptions are permissive, not mandatory. This means that FOIA 
allows an agency to refuse to disclose otherwise covered records, or to redact portions 
of documents, but it does not compel the agency to do so.  

An agency must state which exemption it is relying on when it withholds documents or 
redacts information. In addition, agencies are required to disclose all non‐exempt 
information, even if it is contained in a record that contains other information that is 
exempt from disclosure. In other words, if an exemption only applies to a portion of a 
record, the agency must release the remainder of the document after the exempt 
material has been redacted. 

ACCESSING FEDERAL GOVERNMENT RECORDS 

FOIA requires that all federal agencies maintain online reading rooms that provide 
electronic versions of their regulations, policy statements, and records. Reading rooms 
are the easiest method of obtaining certain types of government information, because 
accessing them requires only a few clicks on an agency’s website. Therefore, you should 
always start by checking to see if the records you are seeking are already available in the 
reading room. The type and amount of information available in the reading rooms vary 
greatly by agency, but many include a number of useful records. 

If you can't get what you want through a reading room, you should carefully consider 
how (and in what form) you want the responding agency to provide the documents to 
you. 

If the information is not available online, you can try simply asking for it. Agencies are 
required to make the following records available for public inspection and copying 
without a formal FOIA request: 

• final opinions made in the adjudication of cases 
• unpublished policy statements and agency interpretations 
• staff manuals that affect the public 
• copies of records released in response to previous FOIA requests that are of 
sufficient interest to the public that they will likely be the subject of additional 
requests 
• a general index of released records determined to have been or likely be the 
subject of additional requests 

Explain what records you’re seeking and that you’re prepared to file an official request if 
necessary. A record‐keeper familiar with FOIA might honor a request made in‐person or 
via telephone, saving both you and the agency time and (possibly) money. If that 
doesn’t work, you can try speaking to the agency’s FOIA officer. 

 
If you cannot access the records through these informal means, you then will need to 
file a formal FOIA request. 

The United States Government Manual contains a list of federal agencies and a brief 
description of their functions. The Manual also contains the addresses and telephone 
numbers for each agency. Online Directories to Government Information provide 
information on which agencies have responsibility for various subject areas. The Library 
of Congress provides links to congressional committees, publications, and other 
information. While Congress is not subject to FOIA, the Library of Congress has 
extensive records on many government agencies. The National Archives and Records 
Administration contains extensive records from across the federal government, 
including the historical records of federal agencies, congressional bodies, and courts. 

In your request you can ask to receive either an electronic copy or a physical copy of the 
records. If the records already exist in the form that you request them in, then the 
agency must generally provide the records in your preferred form. However, if you 
request an electronic copy of records that only exist in paper form, then the agency 
must only provide you with an electronic copy if it is reasonably able to do so, meaning 
that the record is "readily reproducible" in the alternate format. If you would prefer a 
certain type of electronic format, the agency need only provide the records in that 
specific format if it is reasonably able to do so. See 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(3)(B). 

Depending on the agency, physical copies of records may usually be mailed or faxed to 
you, while electronic copies of records may either be e‐mailed to you or sent to you on a 
CD‐ROM or other disk drive. Because of the various ways you can receive the records, it 
is very important that you specify your preferred method when you initially file your 
request. 

WRITTEN FOIA REQUESTS 

Written requests are the only way to legally assert your FOIA rights. These should be 
mailed, faxed, e‐mailed, or hand‐delivered to the relevant agency’s offices, depending 
on which methods the agency allows. A quick online search of the agency's name and 
"FOIA" should provide you with specific information about how the particular agency 
accepts FOIA requests. If you can't find the information through an online search, check 
the Federal Register, which should include this information. 

A FOIA request should be addressed to the agency's FOIA officer or the head of the 
agency. It must include: 

• Your name and contact information, including your address if you want the 
records mailed to you or your e‐mail address if you are requesting that electronic 
records be e‐mailed to you. 
• A statement that you are seeking records under the Freedom of Information Act. 
 • A description of the record(s) you are seeking. The only requirement is that you 
“reasonably describe” the records. Basically, this means that you must give 
enough information that a record‐keeper would be able to find the records 
without an undue amount of searching. It is generally advisable to make the 
request as specific as possible, so if you know the title or the date of a particular 
document, or can precisely describe the class of documents you seek, you should 
set out these details. Being specific helps you avoid paying fees for records that 
you actually do not need and helps to expedite your request.  

In addition to the required elements listed above, you might want to include some of 
the following additional information in your request: 

• Your preferred method of contact for any questions about the record(s) you are 
seeking, whether it be mail, e‐mail, or telephone. 
• Your preferred medium for receiving the record(s), such as paper, CD‐ROM, 
microfiche, e‐mail attachment, etc. (note that you are not always guaranteed to 
receive the records in your preferred format, but the agency will attempt to 
honor such requests if possible). See the section on Requesting Electronic 
Records in this guide for more information. 
• You do not need to tell the government organization why you want the 
information; every person has a right to request records regardless of his or her 
profession. That said, you may want to inform the record‐keeper that you plan 
to use the information to publish on a matter of public interest. 
• A request for a fee waiver or expedited review for your request, if applicable. 
• The maximum fee you are willing to pay for your record(s). You should indicate 
that you wish to be contacted if the charges will exceed this amount. 

Your FOIA request should be addressed to the relevant agency's FOIA officer or the head 
of the agency. The U.S. Department of Justice has a fairly comprehensive list of FOIA 
contacts at federal agencies. If the agency you want isn't listed there, you can usually 
find the information easily by conducting a quick web search; just type in "agency's 
name" and "FOIA contact." If you are unsure of which agency to send your request to, 
the US Government Manual may be of assistance. You will likely receive a faster 
response if you make your request in accordance with the agency's own FOIA 
regulations (these can be viewed in the Code of Federal Regulations), but the above 
minimum requirements are sufficient to make a valid FOIA request. 

Technically, government organizations must respond to a FOIA request with a denial or 
grant of access within 20 business days. Note that the agency must only respond within 
20 days; it does not have to deliver the records within the 20‐day time period. The time 
period does not begin until the proper agency or office actually receives your request. 
Furthermore, under the new 2007 FOIA amendments, the agency may exceed the 20‐
day time limit if it needs to request more information from you in order to process your 
request. 
Agencies may extend this time limit by up to 10 additional working days (they must 
inform you they are doing so) if one of the following "exceptional circumstances" exists: 
the record‐keeper must search an extraordinary amount of records; the search involves 
records from multiple offices; or the search involves records from multiple 
organizations. If your request cannot be fulfilled within these time periods, the agency 
may ask you to reasonably modify your request or allow for an alternative time frame. 

Realistically, many agencies do not comply with these time limits. Some agencies may 
have a large backlog of requests, and they are usually permitted to treat requests on a 
"first come, first served" basis as long as they devote a reasonable amount of staff to 
responding to the requests. These agencies generally have a processing system that 
allows simpler requests to be handled quickly so that these requests do not have to 
"wait in line" behind more complex requests. 

Expedited processing 

FOIA provides for requests to receive “expedited review” if the request meets certain 
requirements. Generally speaking, you will be entitled to expedited treatment if health 
and safety are at issue or if there is an urgent public interest in the government activity 
at issue. 

If you think there is a compelling reason why you need the information sooner than the 
normal period under FOIA, you should clearly explain your reasons in your initial FOIA 
request. Agencies must decide whether or not to grant expedited processing within 10 
calendar days of the request. Aside from these specific circumstances listed above, 
agencies may use their discretion in deciding whether or not to grant expedited review. 
So, it doesn’t hurt to ask even if you don’t meet the requirements. 

You should also check the individual agency's requirements to see if they allow other 
types of requests to receive expedited treatment. The Department of Justice, for 
instance, offers expedited review “for requests concerning issues of government 
integrity that have already become the object of widespread national media interest” or 
“if delay might cause the loss of substantial due process rights.” 

  

Checking the Status of Your Request 

Under the 2007 FOIA amendments, the agency must provide you with a tracking 
number if your request will take longer than 10 days to process. Then, if you haven't 
heard back from an agency or are unsure about the status of your request, you can use 
the tracking number to find out more information. Each agency is required to have at 
least one "FOIA Requester Service Center" that can give information about the status of 
pending FOIA requests. The agency must tell you the date that it received your request 
and must give an estimated date that it will complete your request. The centers can 
generally be contacted by mail, e‐mail, or telephone. 

FEES 

Federal agencies are allowed to charge “reasonable” costs for responding to your FOIA 
request. This typically includes fees for the time the record‐keeper spends searching for 
the correct documents as well as the cost of duplicating those documents. See 5 U.S.C. 
552(a)(4)(A). 

FOIA breaks down requesters into three categories for determining fees: 

• Commercial use requesters, who must pay all fees for search, duplication, and 
review 
• Requesters from the professional media, educational institutions, and scientific 
institutions, who do not have to pay search fees and only pay duplication costs 
after the first 100 pages 
• All other requestors, who pay search fees after the first two hours and 
duplication costs after the first 100 pages 

Note that this means that small requests should always be free as long as the 
information is not intended for commercial purposes. Also, you should always be as 
specific as possible when describing the documents in your initial FOIA request. This will 
reduce the amount of time that the record‐keeper must spend searching for the 
documents, which will potentially save you money. 

Non‐traditional journalists generally will fall into the last category ‐‐ and thus may be on 
the hook for search fees ‐‐ even if they intend to publish the information in blogs, 
websites, or other media. If you are not associated with professional media, you can 
always request that you should be considered under the second category because of 
your intent to publish. The New FOIA Reform Act, which goes into effect in December 
2008, seems to broaden the scope of the "professional media" category. Under the new 
amendment, a person can be considered part of the news media if he or she gathers 
information that is of public interest, creates a distinct work, and distributes that work 
to an audience. However, the Reform Act cautions that this is not an all‐inclusive 
category, so it remains to be seen if bloggers and other citizen journalists will be able to 
benefit from fee waivers generally only reserved for "professional" media.  

The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press's FOIA Guide breaks down some of 
the actual fees you can expect to pay: 

• Search fees generally range from $11 to $28 per hour, based on the salary and 
benefits of the employee doing the search. Fees for computer time, which are 
described in each agency’s FOI regulations, vary greatly. They may be as high as 
 $270 per hour. Photocopying costs are normally between 3 and 25 cents per 
page. 
• If you think your request could involve a significant amount of search time or 
copying, make sure your FOIA request includes a limit on the fees you’re willing 
to pay. You may also want to ask in advance for an estimate of what the 
expected fees may be. 

Here are some additional things to keep in mind when dealing with fee issues: 

• Agencies can charge search fees even if they don’t find any documents that 
satisfy your request, since the futile search still took time. 
• As long as you aren’t requesting the information for commercial purposes, 
agencies cannot charge you for time they spend deciding whether documents 
should be exempt or time they spend blacking out restricted information from 
the documents. 
• Organizations can’t require you to pay in advance if the expected fee is less than 
$250 and you don’t have a prior history of failing to make payments with the 
organization. 

Under FOIA, organizations are required to publish fee schedules in the Federal Register. 
An organization’s FOI officer should be able to provide you with the schedule, though 
some are available on organizations’ websites. The fee schedule includes information 
about how much the particular agency charges for searching, copying, etc. 

You can always try asking the organization to waive or reduce fees, even if you haven't 
formally requested a fee waiver. 

Fee waivers and fee reductions 

Under the Freedom of Information Reform Act of 1986, your FOIA requests could be 
eligible for total or partial waiver of fees if you can show that the disclosure of the 
information is in the public interest—even if you aren’t a professional journalist. This 
requires that you specifically request a waiver or reduction of fees and explain why you 
think the public has an interest in understanding the information. You also must explain 
any financial interest you have in the information, though a financial stake in publishing 
the information ‐‐ such as if you are paid to blog ‐‐ should not pose a problem. 

Agencies consider fee waiver requests on a case‐by‐case basis. You can appeal fee or 
waiver decisions in the same way you appeal request denials. 

LEGAL REMEDIES UNDER FOIA IF YOUR REQUEST IS DENIED 
You have several options if your FOIA request is denied in whole or in part. First, you can 
attempt to resolve informally any disputes you have with the responding agency. If 
informal resolution fails, you should appeal the denial within the relevant agency before 
taking any other action. If your appeal is unsuccessful and the agency withheld the 
information because it is classified, you can apply to have the information declassified. If 
these options have failed to resolve the dispute, you can seek mediation through the 
newly authorized FOIA ombudsman or file a lawsuit in court to enforce your rights 
under FOIA. 

Informal Resolution 

The simplest ‐‐ and often most effective ‐‐ remedy is to seek informal resolution of the 
dispute. Delays are frequently due to the overworked nature of most FOIA officers. Your 
offer to "revise" or "narrow" the scope of your request can go a long way toward getting 
faster, and better, treatment of your request. If you revise your request, be sure to 
make clear that you willingness to compromise is not considered a "new" request by the 
agency (a new request will start the FOIA clock running again). If the agency tells you 
that the records don't exist, ask them to describe their search methodology. Perhaps 
they aren't looking for the right things or in the right places. It might also help if you 
offer to resolve fee or fee waiver issues by paying a small amount. 

While you engage in informal resolution be sure and keep records of all of your contacts 
with the agency. Track all time and response deadlines carefully. 

Appealing within the Relevant Agency 

If the agency denies your request or does not respond within the required time period, 
you can appeal to the agency's FOIA Appeals Officer. If the agency sent you a denial 
letter, it should set out the agency's appeal procedures. Take special note of the time 
limitation for appeals, which are usually around thirty days. If you haven't received any 
response from the agency (an excessive delay in complying with a request constitutes a 
denial under FOIA) you should send your appeal to the head of the agency. 

Appeal letters can be used to challenge the agency's failure to respond in a timely 
fashion, a decision not to release records in whole or in part, the adequacy of the search 
used to locate responsive records, and the agency's refusal to grant you a fee waiver. 

In your FOIA appeal letter you should: 

• Cite section 552(a)(6) of FOIA and clearly list your grounds for appeal; 
• Attach copies of the original request letter and the denial letter; 
 • Take some time to explain the reasons why the denial should be reconsidered 
(for example, because the exemption does not properly apply to the document, 
or because the agency should waive the exemption in the current case); and 
• State that you expect a final ruling on your appeal within 20 working days, as 
required by FOIA. 

Sample appeal letters can be found on the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the 
Press' website and at the National Security Archive. 

Make sure you are familiar with the exemptions to FOIA so you can argue that the 
records you are seeking are not or should not be exempted. If the agency denies your 
appeal or does not respond within 20 days, you may file a lawsuit in federal court. 

If the agency denied your request because the information is classified (i.e. the agency 
relied on the national security exemption), you can make a separate request for 
mandatory declassification review of the information. You can learn more about 
declassification review procedure by going to the Reporters Committee for Freedom of 
the Press' FOIA Guide. 

Filing a Lawsuit 

If your request is denied, and your internal appeal does not reverse this decision, you 
may sue the agency in the United State District Court in your state of residence, in the 
state where the records are located, or in the District of Columbia. It is generally 
recommended that you retain an attorney to bring such a suit. If your lawsuit is 
"substantially successful", the agency will be ordered to pay your attorney's fees. 
However, you have the right to appear on your own behalf in court by filing a complaint 
pro se.  

Obtaining records through legal action can be a costly and drawn‐out process. Some 
lawsuits over FOIA denials can last more than a year. If you assert that there is a public 
interest in your timely access to the records, the court could speed up your case through 
“expeditious consideration.” 

Lastly, keep in mind that if you file a lawsuit, you must do so within six years from the 
date of your initial FOIA request, even if you receive no response or an incomplete 
response from the agency. 
  
 
Media Law in the Digital Age
Exercising Your Right to Know: Getting Access to Government Information
Kennesaw State University
September 25, 2010

I.

A.
General
Open Records
 
Georgia has a long and proud tradition of encouraging openness in governmental
meetings and records. Principles of openness in government are found in the
Constitution of Georgia, our state statutes, and the decisions of the appellate
courts of the State of Georgia. The two statutes which apply to most meetings
and records are known as the “Sunshine Acts.” These consist of the open and
public meetings laws (Official Code of Georgia [O.C.G.A.] §§ 50-14-1 through
50-14-6) and the open and public records laws (O.C.G.A. §§ 50-18-70 through
50-18-76).

II. General provisions of openness

A. United States Constitution 6th Amendment

B. Georgia Constitution Article 1 § 1 Paragraph 11

III. Open records act

A. Definition of open records act

1. The Act provides that public records shall be open for a personal
inspection by “any citizen of this state.” See O.C.G.A. § 50-18-70(b). Records
are also to be made available to non-residents of Georgia as well. See 93 Op.
Atty. Gen. 27 (1993).

C. What is a public record? 

 
1. The statute lists the following as public records. See O.C.G.A.
§ 50-18-70(a).

a. Documents;
b. Papers;
c. Letters;
d. Maps;
e. Books;
f. Tapes;
  1
  
 
g. Photographs;
h. Computer based or generated information (see below); or,
i. Similar material prepared and maintained or received in the course
of the operation of a public office or agency.

 
2. Public records subject to disclosure also include these items when they are
received or maintained by a private person, corporation, or other private
entity on behalf of a public office or agency. In other words, placing
public records in private hands does not protect them from disclosure. See
O.C.G.A. § 50-18-70(a).

C. Whose records are public records?

1. The open records act incorporates the definition of agency set forth in the
open meetings act (see below).

2. The open records act also states that private entities that act as “vehicles”
of an “agency” are subject to the open records act. An entity acts as a
“vehicle” when it carries out the functions or responsibilities of an agency
or other governing body covered by law. See O.C.G.A. § 50-18-70(a).

D. What records can be legally withheld? (most commonly referenced)

1. Medical records. See O.C.G.A. § 50-18-72 (a)(2).

2. Confidential personnel evaluations from outside sources (and some other

personnel documents). See O.C.G.A. § 50-18-72 (a)(5).

a. Records relating to the discipline of public employees are

to be released 10 days after the materials are presented to the
agency for action, or 10 days after the investigation terminates.
See O.C.G.A. § 50-18-72 (a)(5).

3. In 1992, the state legislature enacted an optional special procedure for

access to information regarding those who were applying for, or were
being considered for, positions such as a department head or county
manager or county administrator. See O.C.G.A. § 50-18-72 (a)(7). Upon a
request to the agency:

a. At least 14 calendar days prior to the meeting at which the

final action or vote is to be taken for the position, the agency
shall release all documents which came into its possession with
respect to as many as three persons considered finalists for the
job. See O.C.G.A. § 50-18-72 (a)(7).

  2
  
 
b. An applicant at this time can withdraw his/her name from
consideration and thereby avoid disclosure, in which case the
identity and records of the next most qualified candidate are to
be disclosed. O.C.G.A. See § 50-18-72 (a)(7).

 
4. Public disclosure is not required for trade secrets which are submitted to
public agencies under requirement of law. Georgia law has defined a
trade secret as a secret process not patented but known only to certain
individuals using it in trade having commercial value, as opposed to the
mere privacy which an ordinary commercial business is carried on. See
O.C.G.A. § 50-18-72 (b)(1).

5. Public disclosure is not required for real estate records pertaining to

acquisition until after the transaction. Public disclosure is not required for
engineers’ costs estimates and rejected or deferred bid proposals
concerning road projects until such time as the final award is made. See
O.C.G.A. § 50-18-72 (a)(6)(A)(B).

6. Public disclosure is not required for criminal investigation records when

they concern a case still under active investigation. See O.C.G.A. § 50-
18-72 (a)(4).

a. Regardless of the status of an investigation, the initial

police, arrest, and initial incident report is an open record and must
be disclosed. Because the Act also covers audio and video records,
911 calls and videos of traffic stops, etc., must be disclosed as
well. Individual accident reports are available under the open
records act upon the submission of a written statement of need by
the requesting party. See O.C.G.A. §§ 50-18-72 (a)(4)(4.1)(16).

7. An individual’s social security number and insurance or medical

information in personnel records may be redacted from such records. See
O.C.G.A. § 50-18-72 (a)(11.1).

8. Public disclosure is not required for a public employee’s home address,

home telephone number, social security number, and insurance or medical
information. See O.C.G.A. § 50-18-72(a)(13)(13.1).

9. Public disclosure is not required for records acquired by a public agency

related to carpooling and ridesharing. See O.C.G.A. § 50-18-72(a)(14).

10. Public disclosure is not required for records of security plans which would
compromise security against sabotage or criminal or terrorist acts and the
nondisclosure of which is necessary for the protection of public safety.
See O.C.G.A. § 50-18-72 (a)(15).
  3
  
 

E. How much can we charge for copying public records?

1. The public agency has the right to assess a copying charge of up to $.25
cents per page, as well as reasonable search and retrieval fees. See

 
O.C.G.A. § 50-18-71 (c)(d).

2. The first 15 minutes of search and retrieval time is free. See O.C.G.A. §
50-18-71 (d).

3. The charges for finding and segregating the public records that are
requested must be based on the rate of pay of the lowest paid employee
authorized to search for and organize those records. See O.C.G.A. § 50-
18-71 (d).

4. A “fee may not be imposed under O.C.G.A. § 50-18-71 when a citizen

seeks only to inspect records that are routinely subject to public
inspection, such as deeds... “ McFrugal Car Rental v. Garr, 262 Ga. 369,
418 S.E.2d 60 (1992).

5. Before a public agency can collect copying costs, it must give an estimate
of what those costs will be. See O.C.G.A. § 50-18-71.2.

F. When do we release public records?

1. The individual in control of the records has a reasonable time, not to

exceed three business days, to determine whether the requested records
are subject to access and to permit inspection and copying. See O.C.G.A.
§ 50-18-70 (f).

2. Where responsive records exist, but are not available within three business
days of the request, a written description of such records, together with a
timetable for their inspection and copying shall be provided within that
period. See O.C.G.A. § 50-18-70 (f).

3. If access to the requested records is denied in whole or in part, the specific

legal authority exempting such records from disclosure must be specified
by Code section, subsection, and paragraph in writing. See O.C.G.A. §
50-18-72 (h).

a. No addition to or amendment of such designation shall be

permitted thereafter, except that such designation may be amended
or supplemented one time within five days of discovery of an error
or within five days of the institution of an action to enforce the
release of records. See O.C.G.A. § 50-18-72 (h).
  4
  
 

G. Are computer records public records?

1. In 1992, the state legislature made clear that computer-based or computer-

 
generated information is a public record. See O.C.G.A. § 50-18-70 (a).

2. No new fees other than those directly attributable to providing access shall
be assessed where records are made available by electronic means. See
O.C.G.A. § 50-18-71.2.

3. Records maintained by computer shall be made available where

practicable by electronic means, including internet access, subject to
reasonable security restrictions preventing access to non-requested or non-
available records. See O.C.G.A. § 50-18-70 (g).

H. Penalties

1. A person who knowingly and willfully violates the open records act by
failing to provide proper access, or failing to provide access within the
proper time limits, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction
shall be punished by a fine not to exceed $100. See O.C.G.A. § 50-18-74.

2. The superior courts have jurisdiction in law and equity to hear actions
pertaining to violations of the Open Records Act. See O.C.G.A. § 50-18-
73 (a).

3. The attorney general has jurisdiction to enforce open records violations.

See O.C.G.A. § 50-18-73 (a).

4. Any agency or person who provides access to information in good faith

reliance on the requirements of the Open Records Act shall not be liable in
any action on account of having provided access to such information. See
O.C.G.A. § 50-18-73 (c). As recently retired Chief Justice Norman
Fletcher wrote, “if there is the slightest doubt, or any questions
whatsoever... DO NOT CLOSE.” Steele v. Honea, 261 Ga. 644 (1991).

Prepared by:
Georgia First Amendment Foundation
150 E. Ponce de Leon Avenue
Suite 230
Decatur, GA 30030
(404) 525-3646 www.gfaf.org
08/16/10
hmanheimer@gfaf.org
  5
  
 
 

  6
 Accessing Public Records – a Comparison between Florida and Georgia
Public Records and Open Meetings Laws

Georgia Access Laws in General: Florida’s Access Laws in General:

Principles of openness in government are found in the Florida has some of the oldest open records and meetings laws in
Constitution of Georgia, state statutes, and the decisions of the the country. Florida’s open records law was enacted in 1909, and
appellate courts of the State of Georgia. The two statutes which the “Government in the Sunshine” law that opened up access to
apply to most meetings and records are known as the “Sunshine meetings of just about every aspect of State and local government
Acts.” These consist of the open and public meetings laws was enacted in 1967. Fla. Stat. §§119.01, 286.011. Additionally,
(Official Code of Georgia [O.C.G.A.] §§ 50-14-1 through 50-14- Article 1 of Section 24 of the Florida Constitution indicates that
6) and the open and public records laws (O.C.G.A. §§ 50-18-70 there is a right of access to records and meetings involving public
through 50-18-76). business. Even though the terms of the public records and
meetings laws tend to be broad and the exemptions are drafted
narrowly, there is also a privacy right set forth in the state
constitution that courts have used to curb the right to access on
occasion.

Georgia’s Public Records Laws Florida’s Public Records Laws

• The Act provides that public records shall be open for a
personal inspection by “any citizen of [the] state.” See
O.C.G.A. § 50-18-70(b). Records are also to be made
available to non-residents of Georgia as well. See 93 Op.
Att’y. Gen. 27 (1993).
• Public records are those held by agencies or private
entities acting on behalf of agencies. O.C.G.A. § 50-18-
70(a). “Agencies” are defines as most sub-divisions of
state or local government. O.C.G.A. § 50-14-1(a)(1).
• The statute defines public records as documents, papers,
letters, maps, books, tapes, photographs or computer
• The Florida Constitution states that “[e]very person has
the right to inspect or copy any public record made or
received in connection with the official business of any
public body, officer, or employee of the state, or persons
acting on their behalf, except with respect to records
exempted pursuant to this section or specifically made
confidential by this Constitution. This section specifically
includes the legislative, executive, and judicial branches
of government and each agency or department created
thereunder; counties, municipalities, and districts; and
each constitutional officer, board, and commission, or
1 

 
 information. O.C.G.A. § 50-18-70(a).
Commonly Encountered Exemptions:
• Medical records – exempt from the public records law
under O.C.G.A. § 50-18-72 (a)(2)
• Personnel Records - Personnel evaluations from outside
sources are exempt from the public records law under
O.C.G.A. § 50-18-72 (a)(5). Records relating to the
discipline of public employees and applications for
government employment are exempt for a certain period
of time after they come into the hands of an agency.
O.C.G.A. § 50-18-72 (a)(5) & (7). Public disclosure is not
required for a public employee’s home address, home
telephone number, social security number, and insurance
or medical information. O.C.G.A. § 50-18-
72(a)(13)(13.1)
• Trade Secrets – exempted from public disclosure under
O.C.G.A. § 50-18-72 (b)(1)
• Real Estate Records – Records made by or for a state
entity related to real estate purchases are not public until
entity created pursuant to law or this Constitution.”
• Fla. Stat. §119.01: “it is the policy of this state that all
state, county, and municipal records shall at all times be
open for a personal inspection by any person”
• A “public record” is all "documents, papers, letters, maps,
books, tapes, photographs, films, sound recordings, data
processing software, or other material, regardless of
physical form, characteristics or means of transmission,
made or received pursuant to law or ordinance or in
connection with the transaction of official business by any
agency." Fla. Stat. § 119.011(12).
• Non-governmental bodies that are “acting on behalf” of a
public agency are also subject to the public records law,
Fla. Stat. § 119.011(2)
Commonly Encountered Exemptions:
• Medical Records – Health care providers are directed not
to release personally identifiable medical records under a
federal law – the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act. Autopsy records are exempt from
public view under Fla. Stat. § 406.135. Pursuant to an
attorney general’s opinion, public hospital records are
open under Florida Records law. Op. Att'y Gen. Fla. 97-
49.
• Personnel Records – Generally determined by the courts
to be open unless it involves medical records. Law
enforcement and criminal justice personnel records –
including those of judges, state attorneys, and public
defenders -- containing addresses, telephone numbers or
pictures of those personnel or their spouse or children are
exempt under § 119.071(4)(d). Public Universities are
granted permission to promulgate rules exempting records
of faculty and administrators from the public records law.
2 
 after the transaction is completed or abandoned. O.C.G.A.
§ 50-18-72 (a)(6)(A)(B).
• Criminal Investigations – Records of active criminal
investigations are exempt from public disclosure under
O.C.G.A. § 50-18-72 (a)(4), except for the initial police,
arrest, and initial incident, which are public records at all
times.
• Social Security Numbers – An individual’s social
security number and insurance or medical information in
personnel records may be redacted from such records. See
O.C.G.A. § 50-18-72 (a)(11.1)
• Security Plans – Public disclosure is not required for
records of security plans that would compromise security
against sabotage or criminal or terrorist acts and the
nondisclosure of which is necessary for the protection of
public safety. See O.C.G.A. § 50-18-72 (a)(15
Fees:
• Records custodians may charge up to $.25 cents per page
for copies, as well as reasonable search and retrieval fees.
O.C.G.A. § 50-18-71 (c)(d)
• The charges for finding and segregating the public records
that are requested must be based on the rate of pay of the
lowest paid employee authorized to search for and
organize those records, but the first 15 minutes of
searching is free. O.C.G.A. § 50-18-71 (d)
Fla. Stat. § 1012.91. Records of internal investigations of
law enforcement personnel or public university faculty or
administrators are also exempted until the investigation is
complete. Fla. Stat. § 112.533(2).
• Trade Secrets – exempt under Fla. Stat. § 815.045
• Real Estate Records – The following statutes protect
record regarding a property acquisition by a state or local
government entity until after a contract for sale has been
inked: Fla. Stat. §§ 125.355, 166.045, 1013.14
• Criminal Investigations – Records of active criminal
investigations that will lead to intelligence gathering about
ongoing criminal activity are exempt from the public
records law. Fla. Stat. § 119.071(2). To what extent
accident reports, police blotters and incident reports do not
contain records of active criminal investigations, they are
open under the public records law.
• Social Security Numbers – Agencies have to keep social
security numbers confidential under Fla. Stat. §
119.071(5) unless they are open under another statute.
• Security Plans – Security plans that would reveal security
systems, plans or procedures of any state agency or private
entity are exempted from the public records law. Fla. Stat.
§ 119.071(3).
Fees:
• Public bodies can charge the actual cost of duplication for
records, not to exceed 15 cents a page for letter or legal
size copies. Fla. Stat. § 119.07(4)(a)(1).
• A special service charge can be charged if a request
requires extensive use of technology resources or clerical
support to compile but should be a reasonable charge
based on the actual costs to the agency Fla. Stat. §
119.07(1)(b)
3 
 • No fee can be charged for a simple inspection of the
record. O.C.G.A. § 50-18-71
Computer Records:
Computer-based or computer-generated information is a public
record. If an agency maintains a record in electronic form, it must
provide it in that form upon request. O.C.G.A. § 50-18-70 (g)
Penalties:
• A person who knowingly and willfully violates the open
records act by failing to provide proper access, or failing
to provide access within the proper time limits, shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be
punished by a fine not to exceed $100. O.C.G.A. §15-18-
74
• A requestor can bring an action for a violation of the
Open Records Act in superior court. O.C.G.A. § 50-18-
73 (a). Also, the attorney general has jurisdiction to
enforce open records violations. O.C.G.A. § 50-18-73 (a).
• Any agency or person who provides access to information
in good faith reliance on the requirements of the Open
Records Act shall not be liable in any action on account of
having provided access to such information. O.C.G.A. §
50-18-73 (c).
Georgia’s Open Meetings Laws
General terms of the statute:
Meetings of a state or local government entity are open to the
public. OC.G.A. § 50-14-1(a)(2). The term “meeting” is defined
as a quorum of the government body when official action is taken,
discussed or presented. O.C.G.A. § 50-14-1(a)(2).
Computer Records:
The public records act covers electronic records, and if an agency
maintains a record in electronic form, it must provide it in that
form upon request. Fla. Stat. § 119.01(2)(f)
Penalties:
• A records custodian who willfully and knowingly defies
the terms of the public records statute commits a
misdemeanor that is punishable by up to one year of
prison and a fine up to $1000. Fla. Stat. 119.10
• A requestor can sue in circuit court for denial of access to
records and if they win can get attorneys fees. Fla. Stat. §
119.12(1).
Florida’s Open Meetings Laws
General terms of the statute:
"All meetings of any board or commission of any state agency or
authority or of any agency or authority of any county, municipal
corporation, or political subdivision . .” must be open to the
public. Fla. Stat. § 286.011(1). Meeting is further defined by
case law to be a gathering of two or more members of the
governmental board or commission at issue. Deerfield Publishing
Inc. v. Robb, 530 So.2d 510 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988)
4 
Notice:
Every public meeting must be noticed by posting a notice
including the place and date of the meeting in a conspicuous place
where the government body usually meets. O.C.G.A. 50-14-1
Commonly Encountered Exemptions:
• Pending litigation - Meeting where government entities
will consult with legal counsel about pending or potential
litigation are exempt from the public meeting law.
O.C.G.A. § 50-14-2
• Employment decisions- Meetings involving discussions
or deliberations regarding employee appointments, hiring
or disciplinary actions are closed. O.C.G.A. 50-14-3(6).
However, votes on these same issues must be taken in
public.
• Real Estate – Meetings discussing future real estate
purchases are exempt from the open meetings act.
O.C.G.A. 50-14-3(4)
• Trade Secrets – There is no mention of trade secrets in
the open meetings act.
• Student Records – Meetings involving student records
are not exempted from the open meetings law. Red &
Black Publishing C. v. Board of Regents, 427 S.E. 2d 257
(1993).
Email:
Although the open meetings law doesn’t address email, the
Georgia Supreme Court has found that meetings conducted on
email are subject to the open meetings act. Kilgore v. R.W. Page
Corp., 261 Ga. 410, 405 S.E.2d 655 (1991).
Penalties:
An elected official that violates the open meeting act can be
subject to a recall election. O.C.G.A. §21-4-3
Notice:
The board or commission must provide reasonable notice of the
meeting. Fla. Stat. § 286.011(1). Minutes of the meeting must be
recorded and available to the public. Fla. Stat. § 286.011(2).
Commonly Encountered Exemptions:
• Pending litigation - A commission or board may meet in
private to discuss pending litigation with the entity’s
attorney, but a transcript needs to be taken, which should
be released to the public after the litigation is over. Fla.
Stat. § 286.011(8)
• Trade Secrets - Trade secrets shall not be disclosed at a
public meeting. Fla. Stat. §403.111.
• Student Records - Meetings involving a parent or
guardian’s challenge to a student record are exempt from
the public meetings statute. Fla. Stat. § 286.011
Email:
An attorney general opinion indicates that the open meetings law
applies to meetings conducted on email. Op. Att'y Gen. 2001-20
(2001).
Penalties:
• Members of a board or commission who attend a meeting
that is in violation of the open meetings law can be
5 
 convicted of a second degree misdemeanor, punishable by
a term in prison up to 60 days and a fine of up to $500.
Fla. Stat. § 286.011(3)(b). Any other government official
violating the terms of the statute can be fined up to $500.
Fla. Stat. § 286.011(3)(a)

Prepared by:

Catherine J. Cameron
Professor of Legal Skills
Stetson University College of Law
1401 61st St. So.
Gulfport, Fl 33707
(727)562-7884
ccameron@law.stetson.edu

Much of the information regarding Georgia law was taken from the work of :

Hollie Manheimer
Georgia First Amendment Foundation

6 

 
 LIBEL & PRIVACY: MINIMIZING THE RISKS OF PUBLISHING ONLINE 
CITIZEN MEDIA LAW PROJECT 
 
An online publisher is exposed to potential legal liability with every news article, blog post, 
podcast, video, or even a user comment. This shouldn't come as too much of a surprise because 
the Internet, after all, is available to anyone who wishes to connect to the network, and even 
the smallest blog or most obscure discussion forum has the potential to reach hundreds of 
millions of people throughout the world. Often the legal risks are small, but not always. The risk 
can take a number of forms, depending on what and the nature of the publication. The section 
that follows is intended to help online publishers identify potential “red flags” when publishing 
something that might result in liability, and can know to be extra careful to take the necessary 
steps to minimize potential legal risks. 
 
First, if what is published contains information that harms the reputation of another person, 
group, or organization, the online publisher may be liable for "defamation" or "false light." 
Defamation is the term for a legal claim involving injury to reputation caused by false 
statements of fact and includes both libel (typically written or recorded statements) and 
slander (typically spoken statements). False light, which is similar to defamation, generally 
involves untrue factual implications. The crux of both of these claims is falsity; truthful 
statements and implications that harm another's reputation will not create liability, although 
they may open the online publisher up to other forms of liability if the information published is 
of a personal or highly private nature.  
 
Second, if the news website publishes private or personal information about someone without 
their permission, the online publisher is exposed to legal liability even if its portrayal is factually 
accurate. For example, in most states a publisher can be sued for publishing private facts about 
another person, even if those facts are true. The term "private facts" refers to information 
about someone's personal life that has not previously been revealed to the public, that is not of 
legitimate public concern, and the publication of which would be offensive to a reasonable 
person. This would include such things as writing about a person's medical condition, sexual 
activities, or financial troubles. 
 
If the online publisher uses someone else's name, likeness, or other personal attributes without 
their permission for an exploitative purpose it could also face liability for what is called 
misappropriation or right of publicity. Usually, people run into trouble in this area when they 
use someone's name or photograph in a commercial setting, such as in advertising or other 
promotional activities. But, some states also prohibit use of another person's identity for the 
user's own personal benefit, whether or not the purpose is strictly commercial.  

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Third, if the news website has web forums, allow reader comments, host guest bloggers on the 
site, or if the site reposts information received from RSS feeds, section 230 of the 
Communications Decency Act (“CDA 230”) will likely shield online publishers from liability for 
problematic statements made by their users, guests and other third‐parties. This important 
federal law protects website operators from tort liability for statements contained in these 
materials – and any other user‐submitted content – published on the site. Online publishers will 
not lose this immunity even if they edit this content, whether for accuracy or civility, and are 
entitled to immunity so long as the edits do not substantially alter the meaning of the original 
statements. Keep in mind that CDA 230 will only protect online publishers – and not the online 
publisher itself, an employee or someone acting under its direction – posts something on the 
blog or website. It does not shield online publishers from its own statements.  
 
 
PUBLISHING INFORMATION THAT HARMS ANOTHER'S REPUTATION 
 
Defamation is the general term for a legal claim involving injury to one's reputation caused by a 
false statement of fact and includes both libel (defamation in written or fixed form) and slander 
(spoken defamation). The crux of a defamation claim is falsity. Truthful statements that harm 
another's reputation will not create liability for defamation (although they may open an online 
publisher up to other forms of liability if the information published is of a personal or highly 
private nature). 
 
Defamation in the United States is governed by state law. While the U.S. Constitution sets some 
limits on what states can do in the context of free speech, the specific elements of a 
defamation claim can ‐‐ and often do ‐‐ vary from state to state.  
   
Generally speaking, a person who brings a defamation lawsuit must prove the following: 
 
1. The defendant published the statement. In other words, that the defendant uttered or 
distributed it to at least one person other than the plaintiff. There is no requirement 
that the statement be distributed broadly, to a large group, or even to the general 
public. If something is published on the Internet, it can be assumed that this 
requirement has been met. 
 
2. The statement is about the plaintiff. The statement need not name the person explicitly 
if there is enough identifying information that those who know the person will recognize 
the statement as being about him or her.  

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3. The statement harmed the reputation of the plaintiff, as opposed to being merely 
insulting or offensive. Generally speaking, a defamatory statement is a false statement 
of fact that exposes a person to hatred, ridicule or contempt, lowers him in the esteem 
of his peers, causes him to be shunned, or injures him in his business or trade.  
 
4. The statement was published with some level of fault. Fault requires that the defendant 
did something he should not have done or failed to do something he should have. 
Depending on the circumstances, the plaintiff will either need to prove that the 
defendant acted negligently, if the plaintiff is a private figure, or with actual malice, if 
the plaintiff is a public figure or official. 
 
5. The statement was published without any applicable privilege. A number of privileges 
may be available depending on what the defendant published and the source(s) he 
relied on for the information. 
 
In cases involving public officials, public figures or matters of public concern, a plaintiff must 
prove that the statement was false. In cases involving matters of purely private concern, in 
many states the burden of proving truth is on the defendant. This is not to say that every detail 
published must be perfectly accurate to avoid liability. If a few minor details are wrong, this will 
not necessarily negate the truth of what is published so long as the statement at issue is 
substantially true. Statements of pure opinion, which cannot be proven true or false, cannot 
form the basis of a defamation claim (e.g., a statement that Bill is a jerk, is clearly a statement 
of opinion).  
 
Keep in mind that the republication of someone else's defamatory statement can itself be 
defamatory. In other words, an online publisher won't be immune simply because it is quoting 
another person making the defamatory statement, even if it properly attributes the statement 
to its source. For example, if an online publisher quotes a witness to a traffic accident who says 
the driver was drunk when he ran the red light and it turns out the driver wasn't drunk and he 
had a green light, it can't hide behind the fact that it was merely republishing the witness' 
statement (which would likely be defamatory). 
 
On the other hand, if an online publisher repeats what someone else said or wrote in an official 
hearing or official document, there’s an important privilege that may protect online publishers 
provided that it attributes the information and is accurate in its reporting. 
 

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There also is an important provision under section 230 of the Communications Decency Act that 
may protect an online publisher – but not the publisher itself or its employee ‐‐ posts 
something on the blog or website that is defamatory.  
 
Damages for Defamation 
 
In most states, the plaintiff must also prove that the defamatory statement caused him or her 
actual damage. Actual damages include such things as the loss of a job because of the 
defamatory statement, but can also include mental anguish or suffering associated with the 
defamation. Some jurisdictions also recognize "per se" defamation, where damage is presumed 
if the defamatory statement relates to one of the following subjects: 
 
• Impugns a person's professional character or standing; 
• States or implies that an unmarried person is unchaste (e.g., is sexually active); 
• States or implies that a person is infected with a sexually transmitted disease; or 
• States or implies that the person has committed a crime of moral turpitude (e.g., theft or 
fraud). 
 
If a plaintiff succeeds in proving defamation, he or she is entitled to recover what is called 
compensatory damage, which is the payment of money to compensate the plaintiff for the 
wrong that has been done. This includes not only out‐of‐pocket expenses (e.g., doctor's bills), 
but also personal humiliation, mental anguish and suffering, and lost wages and benefits if the 
defamation caused the plaintiff to lose employment. In limited circumstances, a plaintiff may 
also be able to recover punitive damages, which are awarded in addition to compensatory 
damages and are intended to punish the defendant. 
 
Note that some states require that a plaintiff must first ask the defendant to correct or remove 
the defamatory statement in order to be entitled to certain types of damages.  
 
FALSE LIGHT CLAIMS 
 
False light is one of the four categories of "privacy torts" (the others being misappropriation, 
intrusion, and publication of private facts). While the nature of false light claims vary by state, 
they generally protect people from offensive and false facts stated about them to the public. 
 
Not all states recognize claims for false light. In the states that do recognize a cause of action 
for false light, the specific requirements to raise a claim vary.  
 

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Generally speaking, a false light claim requires the following: 
 
1. The defendant published the information widely (i.e., not to just a single person, as in 
defamation); 
 
2. the publication identifies the plaintiff; 
 
3. it places the plaintiff in a "false light" that would be highly offensive to a reasonable 
person; and 
 
4. the defendant was at fault in publishing the information. 
 
See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652E. 
 
Distinguishing Between False Light and Defamation Claims 
 
False light is similar to defamation. Most states that allow false light claims recognize some 
differences between false light and defamation, but there is still a great deal of overlap. In fact, 
a number of states do not recognize false light claims at all because of the overlap with 
defamation and because the vague nature of the tort might chill free speech. 
 
Several states that allow both false light claims and defamation claims differentiate the two by 
saying they protect people against different harms flowing from false statements. These states 
indicate that defamation protects a person's public reputation while false light remedies the 
victim of a false statement for his or her emotional distress. 
 
For example, California holds that unlike defamation, false light concerns untrue implications 
rather than directly false statements. For instance, an article about sex offenders illustrated 
with a stock photograph of an individual who is not, in fact, a sex offender could give rise to a 
false light claim, even if the article and photo caption never make the explicit false statement 
(i.e., identifying the person in the photo as a sex offender) that would support a defamation 
claim. 
 
Several states view false light as more narrow than defamation in certain respects ‐‐ that is, 
someone might be able to sue for defamation but not false light. For instance, false light 
requires broad publication to many people, while a defamatory statement could be made to 
only a few people. Some states note that false light requires the statement in question to be 
highly offensive to a reasonable person, while defamation does not require offensiveness so 

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long as the statement actually harmed the reputation of the plaintiff. Finally, a number of 
states require the plaintiff to make a stronger showing that the defendant is at fault for false 
light than for defamation. 
 
Avoiding False Light Claims 
 
False light lawsuits often arise on the margins of stories, rather then at their core. For example, 
one might use a stock photo of a particular street to illustrate a story on local prostitution, and 
inadvertently create the impression that a person caught at random in the photo was 
frequenting the prostitutes. An online publisher should be careful about what is used to 
illustrate its work 
 
Always be careful to check all facts and document the support for all of the information 
published. Statements that may seem innocuous or harmless may offend a reader and could 
give rise to a lawsuit if they are also false.  
 
When working online, be particularly mindful of the formatting of the site. Be sure that the 
website doesn't get reformatted in such a way as to create an unwitting juxtaposition of images 
and stories that creates a connotation that the online publisher had not intended. 
 
PUBLISHING PERSONAL AND PRIVATE INFORMATION 
 
If a reporter physically enter a private area, photograph or take video of people engaged in 
private activities in places where they reasonably expect to be private, or in some other way 
intrude into a person's privacy (by, for example, opening the person's mail), she could be liable 
for a violation of what is called "intrusion upon seclusion." If the reporter collects certain 
personal data, this can also intrude into a person's private affairs. In the newsgathering context, 
the actual collection of the data could be seen as intrusion if the method used meets the four 
general elements for an intrusion claim. 
 
Generally speaking, however, an online publisher/ reporter would not be liable for intrusion if 
she photographs or captures video of people in public places, even if they have not consented 
to being recorded, because individuals cannot have a reasonable expectation of privacy when in 
public. Nor will she be liable for intrusion if she gathers private information from documents 
that are available to the general public. 
 
Online publishers should note that it is not necessary that the photographs or information are 
published; an intrusion claim rests solely on the way in which information is gathered. If the 

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private information is subsequently published, the online publisher can also face liability for 
what is called “publication of private facts.” 
 
When an online publisher publishes information about someone without permission, it is 
potentially exposed to legal liability even if the portrayal is factually accurate. Most states have 
laws limiting a publisher’s ability to publish private facts about someone and recognizing an 
individual’s right to prevent use of his or her name, likeness, and other personal attributes for 
certain exploitative purposes, such as for advertising goods or services. These laws originally 
sprang from a policy objective of protecting personal privacy; the aim was to safeguard 
individuals from embarrassing disclosures about their private lives and from uses of their 
identities that are hurtful or disruptive of their lives. Over time, the law developed and also 
recognized the importance of protecting the commercial value of a person's identity ‐‐ namely, 
the ability to profit from authorizing others to use one's name, photograph, or other personal 
attributes in a commercial setting. 
 
Specifically, there are two types of legal claims that relate to unauthorized publication of 
personal and private information: 
 
Publication of Private Facts: The legal claim known as "publication of private facts" is a species 
of invasion of privacy. An online publisher commits this kind of invasion of privacy by publishing 
private facts about an individual, the publication of which would be offensive to a reasonable 
person. This legal claim can only be successful, however, if the facts in question are not 
legitimately newsworthy. So, for instance, if the online publisher discloses the fact that a 
person has an embarrassing health condition, it might be liable for publication of private facts. 
If, however, this medical condition is particularly relevant to some topic of public interest ‐‐ say, 
the person’s fitness to serve in public office, a court might find that the publication is lawful. 
Determining what facts are of legitimate public concern is often difficult to determine, so the 
online publisher may want to get permission before disclosing potentially embarrassing 
information about an individual.  
 
Using the Name or Likeness of Another: The legal claim known as "misappropriation of name 
or likeness" is a species of invasion of privacy. Over time the courts also recognized a legal claim 
for violation of the "right of publicity," which is closely related. An online publisher commits 
misappropriation and/or violates the right of publicity when it uses an individual's name, 
likeness, or other personal attributes without permission for an exploitative purpose. These 
legal claims usually apply to the use of a name or image in a commercial setting, such as in 
advertising or other promotional activities, but they may apply anytime an online publisher 
takes advantage of another person's identity for its own benefit. However, individuals cannot 

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stop every mention, discussion, or reporting on their lives or activities, and many states 
explicitly exempt news reporting and other expressive activities from liability. For example, if 
the online publisher advertises its website using the photograph of a famous rival blogger (or 
even an unknown rival blogger) without permission, then it might be liable for misappropriation 
of that person’s likeness. (Another way of saying this is that it might be liable for violating the 
blogger's "right of publicity.") But, if the online publisher writes an article commenting on the 
posts of that same blogger and include his picture, it generally won't be liable for using the 
blogger's name without permission or including the photograph for illustrative purposes.  
 
While these laws can create pitfalls for citizen media creators, the risks are manageable and 
online publishers can take certain steps to protect themselves. Most importantly, if online 
publishers stick to reporting or commenting on matters of legitimate public interest and only 
portray people who have a reasonable relationship to the topic, then it generally can avoid 
liability.  
 
As a general rule, if online publishers follow good journalistic practices and standards ‐‐ being 
thorough, fair, and accurate in what they publish, carefully attributing their sources and quotes, 
and not phrasing statements in such a way as to create implications that they do not intend or 
do not have the evidence to support ‐‐ this will minimize the likelihood that they will be 
successfully sued for defamation (honing these good habits has other benefits as well, as they 
will make their work more accurate and credible). 
 
PRIVILEGES AND DEFENSES 
 
There are times, however, when even the most careful publisher can be sued for defamation. In 
such a situation, a number of defenses may be available depending on what was published and 
the source(s) relied upon for the information. The most important defense is "truth." If the 
statement at issue is substantially true, a defamation claim cannot succeed because an online 
publisher has a right to publish truthful information even if it injures another's reputation. But 
truth is not the only defense that may be available. For example, if an online publisher 
publishes a defamatory allegation made by a party in a lawsuit, even if it turns out that the 
allegation is false, a defamation claim cannot succeed because of the right to report on 
allegations made in court regardless of whether they are true. Similarly, statements by 
legislators on the floor of the legislature, or by judges while sitting on the bench are typically 
privileged and cannot support a cause of action for defamation, even if they turn out to be 
false. 
 

8 
 
Sometimes the reliance on these sources may result in the publication of defamatory 
falsehoods, but in publishing the information an online publisher is performing the vital civic 
function of making information available to the public and of playing a watchdog role with 
regard to the government and other interests in society. To deal with the tension between the 
possibility of defaming individuals and the importance of reporting the news and information in 
a timely manner, courts have developed a number of defenses which often called "privileges" 
by lawyers.  
 
Possible privileges and defenses include: 
 
• Substantial Truth: "Truth" is an absolute defense to an action for defamation.  
 
• Opinion and Fair Comment Privileges: Statements of opinion generally cannot support a 
cause of action for defamation, even if they are outrageous or widely off the mark. A 
defense similar to opinion is "fair comment on a matter of public interest."  
 
• Fair Report Privilege: This very important privilege may apply if an online publisher relied 
on a public document or a statement by a public official for the incorrect information, 
made clear that the public document or statement was the source, and fairly and 
accurately used the source. 
 
• Neutral Reportage Privilege: The neutral reportage privilege covers unverified accusations 
made by one public figure about another on a matter of legitimate public interest, such as 
when a politician who opposes a health care bill says that the bill's sponsor is taking 
money from the pharmaceutical industry. 
 
• Wire Service Defense: If an online publisher republishes information from a reputable 
news source (such as the Associated Press) it may be entitled to the wire service defense 
if it turns out that the information was false. 
 
• Statute of Limitations: If the plaintiff has waited too long to file a lawsuit, the defamation 
claim might be barred by the statute of limitations, which sets the maximum amount of 
time plaintiffs can wait before bringing a lawsuit after the events they are suing over have 
occurred. 
 
SUBSTANTIAL TRUTH 
 

9 
 
"Truth" is an absolute defense against defamation. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 
254 (1964), and Time Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 411 (1967). Consequently, a plaintiff has to provide 
convincing evidence of a defamatory statement's falsity in order to prove defamation. 
 
The law does not require that a statement must be perfectly accurate in every conceivable way 
to be considered "true." Courts have said that some false statements must be protected for the 
wider purpose of allowing the dissemination of truthful speech. The resulting doctrine is known 
as "substantial truth." Under the substantial truth doctrine, minor factual inaccuracies will be 
ignored so long as the inaccuracies do not materially alter the substance or impact of what is 
being communicated. In other words, only the "gist" or "sting" of a statement must be correct. 
 
The substantial truth defense is particularly powerful because a judge will often grant summary 
judgment in favor of a defendant (thus disposing of the case before it goes to trial) if the 
defendant can show that the statement the plaintiff is complaining about is substantially true, 
making the defense a quick and relatively easy way to get out of a long (and potentially 
expensive) defamation case. 
 
Substantial truth can also be a flashpoint for libel cases involving public figures and officials who 
must show actual malice by the defendant in order to recover. In Masson v. New Yorker 
Magazine, 501 U.S. 496 (1991), the plaintiff tried to argue that inaccurate quotations were 
evidence of actual malice. The Supreme Court refused to adopt such a stringent rule, noting the 
difficulty of taking notes and translating from recordings and the need to edit a speaker's 
comments into a coherent statement. The Court stated: 
 
We conclude that a deliberate alteration of the words uttered by a plaintiff does not 
equate with knowledge of falsity for purposes of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and 
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., unless the alteration results in a material change in the 
meaning conveyed by the statement. (citations omitted)  
 
The Court went on to note the use of quotation marks to directly attribute inaccurate 
statements to the speaker "bears in a most important way on [this] inquiry, but it is not 
dispositive in every case." Generally speaking, a publisher is given more leeway for inaccuracies 
when he is interpreting his sources than when he is purporting to be providing a "direct account 
of events that speak for themselves." Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279 (1971). 
 
Some examples of statements that courts have found to be "substantially true": 
 

10 
 
 • A statement that a boxer tested positive for cocaine, when actually he had tested positive 
for marijuana. See Cobb v. Time Inc., 24 Media L. Rep. 585 (M.D. Tenn 1995). 
 
• A statement that an animal trainer beat his animals with steel rods, when actually he had 
beaten them with wooden rods. See People for Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Berosini, 
895 P.2d 1269 (Nev. 1995). 
 
• A statement that a father sexually assaulted his stepdaughter 30‐50 times, when the 
stepdaughter testified he had done so only 8 times. See Koniak v. Heritage Newspapers, 
Inc., 198 Mich. App. 577 (1993). 
 
• A statement that a man was sentenced to death for six murders, when in fact he was only 
sentenced to death for one. See Stevens v. Independent Newspapers, Inc., 15 Media L. 
Rep. 1097 (Del. Super. Ct. 1998). 
 
• A statement that Terry Nichols was arrested after the Oklahoma City Bombing, when 
actually he had only been held as a material witness. See Nichols v. Moore, 396 F. Supp. 
2d 783 (E.D. Mich. 2005). 
 
• A statement that a man was charged with sexual assault, when actually he had only been 
arrested but not arraigned. See Rouch v. Enquirer & News of Battle Creek, 440 Mich. 238 
(1992). 
 
OPINION AND FAIR COMMENT PRIVILEGE 
 
The right to speak guaranteed by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution includes the 
right to voice opinions, criticize others, and comment on matters of public interest. It also 
protects the use of hyperbole and extreme statements when it is clear these are rhetorical 
ploys. Accordingly, an online publisher can safely state its opinion that others are inept, stupid, 
jerks, failures, etc. even though these statements might hurt the subject's feelings or diminish 
their reputations. Such terms represent what is called "pure opinions" because they can't be 
proven true or false. As a result, they cannot form the basis for a defamation claim. 
 
This is not to say that every statement of opinion is protected. If a statement implies some false 
underlying facts, it could be defamatory. For example, stating that "in my opinion, the mayor 
killed her husband" is not likely to be a protected opinion. Couching false statements of fact as 
opinion or within quotes from other sources generally won’t protect online publishers either. 
Nor will trying to cover by saying that a politician “allegedly” is a drug dealer, or that someone 

11 
 
else said the politician “is a drug dealer,” or that in writer’s opinion, the politician is a drug 
dealer. A reader may well assume that the publisher has unstated facts to base the conclusion 
on, and it would be a defamatory statement if the implied facts turn out to be false. 
 
All opinions that rely on underlying facts, however, are not necessarily outside the opinion 
privilege. If the online publisher states the facts on which it is basing its opinion, and the 
opinion stated could be reasonably drawn from those truthful facts, the online publisher will be 
protected even if the conclusion turns out to be incorrect. For example, if an online publisher 
were to say "In my opinion, Danielle is failing out of school" it would likely lead its readers to 
assume that there are some unstated facts it relied on to draw its conclusion. Such a statement 
would not be protected, as the privilege does not protect back door entry of facts as "opinion" 
through innuendo. On the other hand, if an online publisher states "In my opinion, Danielle is 
failing out of school because she is a blond and the only thing I ever see her do at the library is 
check Facebook," this provides the reader with the information it is basing the opinion on, and 
allows the reader to come to his own conclusion. 
 
Keep in mind that even if the online publisher states the facts relied upon for the opinion, but 
those facts turn out to be false, the privilege will not apply. For example, if the online publisher 
says that "In my opinion, Danielle is failing out of school because she failed biology," the 
privilege would not apply if she got a C in biology. 
 
To determine whether a statement is an opinion or a fact, courts will generally look at the 
totality of the circumstances surrounding the statement and its publication to determine how a 
reasonable person would view the statement. Under this test, the difference between an 
opinion and a fact often comes down to a case‐by‐case analysis of the publication's context. 
 
Distinguishing Between Statements of Fact and Opinion 
 
In general, facts are statements that can be proven true or false; by contrast, opinions are 
matters of belief or ideas that cannot be proven one way or the other. For example, "Chris is a 
thief" can be proven false by showing that throughout his entire life Chris never stole anything. 
Compare that statement with "Chris is a complete moron." The latter is an opinion (or, 
technically, "a pure opinion"), as what constitutes a moron is a subjective view that varies with 
the person: one person's moron is not necessarily the next person's moron. Put another way, 
there would be no way to prove that Chris is not a moron. If a statement is a "pure opinion," it 
cannot be the basis for a defamation claim. 
 

12 
 
Of course, it is not always easy to determine whether a statement is a pure opinion. As we 
noted above, opinions that imply false underlying facts will not be protected. For example, 
stating that "Chris is insane" could be both a fact and an opinion. It could mean Chris has been 
diagnosed with psychosis and needs to be hospitalized in a mental institution; this could be 
proven false. It could also mean that Chris has wacky ideas that one doesn't agree with, which is 
an opinion. In determining which meaning the statement should be given, courts often rely on 
context and common‐sense logic (or to phrase it in legalese, the "totality of circumstances" of 
the publication). For example, if one called Chris insane in a forum post as part of a heated 
argument over politics, the statement would likely be interpreted as an opinion. 
 
Some examples of protected opinions include the following: 
 
• Statements in the "Asshole of the Month" column in Hustler magazine that described a 
feminist leader as a "pus bloated walking sphincter," "wacko," and someone who suffers 
from "bizarre paranoia" were protected opinion because the context of the magazine and 
column made it clear that the statements were "understood as ridicule or vituperation" 
and "telegraph to a reader that the article presents opinions, not allegations of fact." 
Leidholdt v. L.F.P. Inc., 860 F.2d 890 (9th Cir. 1988). 
 
• Statement in the New York Post that referred to the plaintiff as a "fat, failed, former 
sheriff's deputy" was protected opinion because it was hyperbole and had an "alliterative 
quality" with a "rhetorical effect indicative of a statement of opinion." Jewell v. NYP 
Holdings, Inc., 23 F. Supp.2d 348 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). 
 
• Statements on a radio talk show that described the plaintiff as a "chicken butt," "local 
loser" and "big skank" were not defamatory because they were "too vague to be capable 
of being proven true or false" and had "no generally accepted meaning." Seelig v. Infinity 
Broadcasting, 97 Cal. App. 4th 798 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002). 
 
• A cartoon of a noted evangelist leader fornicating drunk in an outhouse with his mother 
because the parody was so outrageous it could not "reasonably be understood as 
describing actual facts" about Falwell or events in which he participated. Hustler 
Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 53 (U.S. 1988). 
 
Keep in mind, however, that an online publisher can't make a statement an opinion merely by 
prefacing it with "in my opinion." Saying that "in my opinion, Alex stole ten dollars from the 
church collection basket" would lead most listeners to conclude that the publisher had 
evidence that Alex had indeed stolen the money, and that the publisher intended the 

13 
 
statement as one of fact rather than opinion. The courts do not give protection to false factual 
connotations disguised as opinions. 
 
Context and the Totality of the Circumstances 
 
In general, courts will look at the context and medium in which the alleged defamation 
occurred. For example, a statement is more likely to be regarded as an opinion rather than a 
fact if it occurs in an editorial blog as opposed to a piece of investigative journalism. The wider 
context may also provide a framework for the court: during the McCarthy‐era witch hunts of 
the 1950s, for example, courts routinely held that referring to someone as a "Communist" was 
defamatory; in the present day, "communist" has taken on a more generalized (if still often 
derogatory) political meaning, and courts would almost certainly find use of the word to be a 
protected opinion. 
 
The Internet presents particular issues for the courts, as it is a medium where the lack of face‐
to‐face contact can often make judging the actual meaning and context of a publication 
difficult. Courts are likely to take into account the particular social conventions of the Internet 
forum at issue in evaluating a statement's context. 
 
But much remains to be determined, such as how the courts would handle the nature of many 
discussion forums. A 2001 case that dealt with the opinion privilege is worth quoting at length 
as an indication of the approach courts may well take in determining whether an online posting 
is a statement of opinion or fact. In regards to a post on a financial bulletin board site the court 
noted: 
 
Here, the general tenor, the setting and the format of [the] statements strongly suggest 
that the postings are opinion. The statements were posted anonymously in the general 
cacophony of an Internet chat‐room in which about 1,000 messages a week are posted 
about [the particular company]. The postings at issue were anonymous as are all the 
other postings in the chat‐room. They were part of an on‐going, free‐wheeling and 
highly animated exchange about [the particular company] and its turbulent history. . . . 
Importantly, the postings are full of hyperbole, invective, short‐hand phrases and 
language not generally found in fact‐based documents, such as corporate press releases 
or SEC filings.  
 
Global Telemedia International, Inc. v. Doe 1, 132 F.Supp.2d 1261, 1267 (C.D.Cal., 2001).  
 

14 
 
In short, the court concluded that "the general tone and context of these messages strongly 
suggest that they are the opinions of the posters." Id. at 1267. It is likely that other courts will 
take a similarly broad view regarding Internet forums for purposes of the opinion privilege. 
 
To summarize, the factors courts often use to determine whether a statement is a protected 
opinion are: 
 
• What is the common usage and specific meaning of the language used? 
• Is the statement verifiable? Can it be proven false? 
• What is the full context of the statement? 
• What are the social conventions surrounding the medium the statement occurred in? 
 
 
FAIR REPORT PRIVILEGE 
 
The fair report privilege may protect online publishersfrom liability ‐‐ even if something is 
defamatory ‐‐ if it relied upon a official public document or statement by a public official for the 
false information, made clear that the document or statement was the source, and fairly and 
accurately used the source. This privilege enables online publishers to freely report, for 
example, about what people say during a council meeting or from the witness stand during a 
trial or to quote from public records. 
 
The fair report privilege's historic rationale has been to encourage public scrutiny of 
governmental activities through fair and accurate reporting of governmental proceedings. The 
defense allows online publishers to report on government activity without bearing the 
overwhelming burden of first proving the truth of everything said in government documents 
and proceedings. 
 
Keep in mind that not all states recognize the fair report privilege, so check your state's 
defamation section to confirm that the publisher is covered. In those states that do recognize 
the privilege, it will generally apply where: 
 
   1. the source is an official public document or statement by a public official on a matter of 
public concern; 
   2. there is proper attribution of the information to that source; and 
   3. the publisher fairly and accurately portrays the information from the document or 
statement. 
 

15 
 
 Sources Covered By the Fair Report Privilege 
 
While each state can decide for itself what sources are covered by the fair report privilege, it 
generally applies to publicly available government records, official government reports, and 
statements made by government officials. Interim and unfinished government records and 
reports generally are not covered. 
 
Examples where the fair report privilege would probably apply include: 
 
• Statements made by a judge in a trial 
• A speech made by a city council member during a council meeting 
• Testimony during a trial 
• Facts recorded in a final police report 
• Analysis reported in an Environmental Protection Agency survey 
 
The privilege would probably not apply to: 
 
• Statements made by an arresting officer about the facts of the case, where those facts are 
not recorded in the police report 
• Gossip overheard on the courthouse steps 
• Offhand remarks made by a government official in a private setting 
• Statements made in a draft government report 
 
Many sources may fall into gray areas. In general, the privilege is more likely to apply if the 
statement or fact comes from a public figure acting in his official capacity or a final, public 
report. It is less likely to apply where the figure is more private or is acting outside of his official 
scope of duties, or where the report is more preliminary or is inaccessible to the public. 
 
Further, each state defines the scope of the privilege differently. For example, some states 
extend the privilege to more private settings such as a meeting of a corporation's share holders. 
Please consult your state's defamation section for specifics. 
 
Ensuring That The Use of Sources is "Fair and Accurate" 
 
Whether the statement is true or not does not matter for purposes of the fair report privilege: 
even if the witness whose testimony relied on is later convicted of perjury, the privilege still 
applies if the online publisher accurately reported and attributed the testimony he provided in 
the first place. It would apply even if the online publisher had knowledge that the witness was 

16 
 
lying in his testimony. The purpose of the privilege is to protect statements or facts from public 
sources that are newsworthy in and of themselves, regardless of their veracity. 
 
But what is critical is that the online publisher accurately report (or abridge fairly) the 
information: reporting that the witness said the defendant deliberately burned down the house 
when the witness had only said that the defendant accidentally dropped a match would not be 
protected by the fair report privilege. Be particularly careful when the online publisher is 
"translating" complex legalese. Further, be careful not to use quotations selectively. For 
example, if a witness in her testimony said she saw the defendant rob the store, then corrects 
herself thirty minutes later in the same testimony to indicate that she had really not seen the 
robbery, quoting only the first part would likely fall outside the fair report privilege. 
 
In general, courts will look at whether the online publisher acted in "good faith," looking far 
more favorably at an honest mistake that was made in condensing a long, complex statement 
or document than at selective quotation that may be perceived as maliciously intending to 
portray the subject in the least favorable light possible. Not every fact must be included, but 
many courts will find the privilege lost if the overall reporting is too one‐sided. 
 
NEUTRAL REPORT PRIVILEGE 
 
Although not widely adopted, the neutral reportage privilege is designed to protect the 
interests of the press in reporting on matters of public interest, which can often only be done 
by reporting accusations made by one public figure about another. Without a neutral reportage 
privilege, if online publishers publish what another person has said or written and that 
statement turns out to be defamatory, they may be liable for defamation even if they stated 
that they believed the allegation was untrue.  
 
Keep in mind that not all states recognize the neutral reportage privilege or apply it to non‐
traditional publishers, so check your state's defamation section to confirm that the online 
publisher is covered. In those states that do recognize the privilege, it will generally apply 
where: 
 
   1. A responsible, prominent organization or individual; 
   2. Makes a serious charge on a matter of public interest; 
   3. Against another public figure or organization; and 
   4. The charge is accurately and disinterestedly reported. 
 
Edwards v. National Audubon Soc., 556 F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 1977). 

17 
 
 
The privilege was first recognized in a 1977 case involving the New York Times, which reported 
accusations made by the National Audubon Society that a group of scientists were behaving as 
"paid liars" on the issue of whether DDT was harming bird populations. The story posed a 
dilemma. The reporter had a good sense that the Audubon Society had little or no evidence to 
back up its claims and that due to republisher liability he might well be liable for defamation if 
he published the story. But he also recognized that in his hands was a newsworthy story about 
an accusation made by a prominent organization. The court responded by recognizing a new 
form of First Amendment protection: 
 
What is newsworthy about such accusations is that they were made. We do not believe 
that the press may be required under the First Amendment to suppress newsworthy 
statements merely because it has serious doubts regarding their truth. Nor must the 
press take up cudgels against dubious charges in order to publish them without fear of 
liability for defamation. . . . The public interest in being fully informed about 
controversies that often rage around sensitive issues demands that the press be afforded 
the freedom to report such charges without assuming responsibility for them.  
 
Edwards, 556 F.2d at 120.  The court explicitly stated that the reporter's knowledge of factual 
inaccuracies in the story was immaterial to whether or not the privilege applied. 
 
Examples of the Neutral Reportage Privilege 
 
Examples of instances where courts have applied the neutral reportage privilege include: 
 
• Newspaper report that a state auditor accused a town trustee of faking a snow 
emergency to gain access to emergency funds. Watson v. Leach, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 
2474 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996). 
• A newspaper report that a political campaign brochure accused the county's Italian‐
American judges of having mafia connections. Celebrezze v. Netzley, 1988 Ohio App. LEXIS 
3153 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988). 
• A land developer calling another developer "unscrupulous" during a town meeting. 
McCracken v. Gainesville Tribune, Inc., 146 Ga. App. 274, 275 (Ga. Ct. App. 1978). 
 
Differing State Approaches to the Neutral Reportage Privilege 
 

18 
 
Although the neutral reportage privilege has been adopted in some jurisdictions, few states 
have clear state‐wide rulings on what the privilege entails. Even in those states that recognize 
the privilege, it can vary in important ways: 
 
• Private figure plaintiffs: Edwards v. National Audubon involved an instance where the 
person defamed (the plaintiff) was a nationally known scientist, a prominent public figure. 
In cases where the plaintiff is a private person, courts have split over whether to 
recognize the neutral reportage privilege. See, e.g., Khawar v. Globe International, 19 Cal. 
4th 254, 271 (Cal. 1998) (plaintiff was a youth accused of involvement in the Robert 
Kennedy assassination). The trend, however, seems to be for courts to recognize the 
privilege even when private figure plaintiffs are involved. 
 
• Trustworthy and prominent sources: Few sources are more trustworthy and prominent 
than the National Audubon society talking about an issue related to bird populations. But 
often this is not the case. Major stories can come from sources who are neither 
"trustworthy" nor "prominent." The courts go both ways on the issue of whether the 
privilege applies to cases like these. Many judges have emphasized the trustworthiness of 
the source as a key determining factor in whether the privilege applies; others take a 
broader view on the circumstances of the story. 
 
• Public interest and newsworthiness: A scientist allegedly covering up the fact that DDT 
was killing birds was something the public had a strong interest in being informed of. 
Courts vary, however, as to how legitimate the public interest needs to be. Some require 
that there must be a "raging controversy" involving an issue related to the public good. 
Others are more lenient. Also keep in mind that judges will often look more favorably at 
the applicability of the privilege if there is a strong public interest in the accusation. 
 
 
WIRE SERVICE DEFENSE 
 
If an online publisher republishes a news item from a "reputable news service,” it may be 
covered by a privilege called the "wire service defense." This defense to a defamation claim is 
distinct from the immunity provisions in the section 230 of the Communications Decency Act 
(commonly referred to as CDA 230 immunity), which may also apply to republished content 
from a third‐party.  
 
Generally speaking, in states that recognize the wire service defense, it will apply if: 
 

19 
 
   1. the online publisher republished a news item from a reputable news agency; 
   2. the online publisher did not know the information was false; 
   3. The news item on its face does not indicate any reason to doubt its veracity; and 
   4. the online publisher does not substantially alter the news items when republishing it. 
 
In the Internet context, it is not clear how wide a net is cast by the term "reputable news 
agency." Traditional wire services such as the Associated Press and United Press International 
would likely be covered, but courts have not yet looked at the wire‐service defense in light of 
RSS feeds and similar distribution tools. 
 
Keep in mind that rewriting news items in a blog format will limit an online publisher’s ability to 
invoke the wire service defense.  
 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
 
"Statute of Limitations" is a term used by courts to describe the maximum amount of time 
plaintiffs can wait before bringing a lawsuit after the events they are suing over have occurred. 
This time limit is typically set by state statute and is intended to promote fairness and keep old 
cases from clogging the courts. Generally speaking, the limitations period for intrusion claims 
begins to run on the date when the intrusion occurred. 
 
Each state sets it own time limits for bringing a lawsuit and a court will typically apply the 
appropriate statute of limitations of the state in which the suit is filed. A relatively short 
limitations period is an acknowledgment of the importance of free speech principles, since a 
short time period reduces the potential chilling effects of speech‐challenging lawsuits. 
 
Each state has its own statute of limitations for defamation claims, which vary between one 
and three years. 
 
Determining When the Statute of Limitations Period Begins 
 
Generally speaking, the limitations period begins to run when a defamatory statement is 
"published" (i.e., communicated to someone other than the plaintiff). 
 
This rule is relatively easy to apply when a defamatory statement is spoken to a third person. 
But what about situations where publication is to a mass audience, such as on the Internet? In 
these situations, the statute of limitations could begin anew at the time of each publication. For 
example, the statute of limitations could begin every time someone reads a blog post or finds 

20 
 
an archive copy of a newspaper in a library, even if the original material was published years 
ago. 
 
Single Publication Rule 
 
Most states have adopted the so‐called "single publication rule," which states that the statute 
of limitations period begins to run when a defamatory statement is first published. For 
example, if a magazine is distributed to thousands of news stands, only "one publication" is 
deemed to have occurred for purposes of the statute of limitations. As a result, the limitations 
period begins when the magazine was initially made available, not when an extra copy of it left 
over on the news stand is sold two weeks later. 
 
However, the single publication rule is not absolute. If the purported defamatory content is re‐
published to a substantially different audience or is altered in a substantial way, a new statute 
of limitations period may begin to run. For example, if the material in a magazine is 
incorporated into a book, a new statute of limitations period will likely begin when the book is 
published. 
 
Most states have applied the single publication rule to the Internet. Generally, the statute of 
limitation period begins when a defamatory statement is first made available online. Courts will 
likely find re‐publication has started a new statute of limitations period only when online 
material is altered in a significant way: be careful to consider this if the online publisher is 
thinking of substantially editing or rewriting old material.  
 
While an online publisher can't always eliminate its legal risks when publishing private 
information about individuals or using peoples' names and likenesses, there are a number of 
ways it can minimize the risk of being on the receiving end of a publication of private facts, 
misappropriation, or right of publicity lawsuit. Some suggestions include: 
 
• Report on subjects and facts that are newsworthy: Reporting on topics and facts that are 
legitimately newsworthy typically will not invade the privacy of individuals portrayed in 
the work or unlawfully exploit their names or likenesses. It is not always easy to 
determine whether a particular topic or fact is newsworthy, but common sense can go a 
long way. Avoid obscure and salacious details that don't have direct bearing on the topic, 
and don't use someone's photograph to illustrate the work unless they have some 
reasonable connection to the issue at hand. Following this latter advice can also help 
avoid claims for defamation and false light. 
 

21 
 
 • Gather information from publicly available sources whenever possible: If a publisher 
relies on publicly available information, such as property records and public financial 
information, it is unlikely that publication of that information will invade someone's 
privacy. Getting information from publicly available court records is an especially good 
idea because the First Amendment protects publishers when publishing truthful 
information obtained from court records and doing so may also protect it from 
defamation liability under the neutral report privilege, even if the information turns out 
to be false. Reporters for online publishers should avoid using advanced equipment, such 
as telephoto lenses or highly sensitive microphones, to obtain information or 
photographs that could not have been gotten otherwise. Gathering information in this 
way result in liability for intrusion, and publishing material obtained through these 
methods is more likely to violate someone's privacy. 
 
• Be upfront about the intended use of information and photographs: When reporters 
interview or take photographs of someone, they should be clear with that person about 
how the information gathered or photograph taken will be used. It is better to know 
about these concerns ahead of time, so that the online publisher can make an informed 
decision about whether to go ahead as planned. In addition, being upfront provides 
context to ask for consent, discussed immediately below. 
 
• Where possible, get consent from the people covered: Consent is typically one of the 
strongest defenses to publication of private facts, misappropriation, and right of publicity 
claims. When interviewing someone or taking photographs for later publication, it is good 
practice to seek consent to use the information gathered and/or photographs taken on 
the website or blog. Get consent in writing whenever possible. There are two consent 
forms or "releases" that may be helpful ‐‐ a model release and an interview release. 
Remember that minors cannot give consent on their own behalf, and that a consenting 
party generally may revoke consent any time prior to publication. 
 
 
 

22 
 
 RECENT DEVELOPMENTS:  DEFAMATION AND INVASION OF PRIVACY 
CITIZEN MEDIA LAW PROJECT 
  This year’s crop of defamation and invasion of privacy cases have been a mixed bag, 
running the gamut from the sublime to the absurd. On the one hand, we have judges rejecting 
attempts to find libel in 140 character snippets (Horizon Group Management LLC v. Bonnen) 
and finding that reporters can still be reporters even if they publish their work – gasp! – on the 
Internet (Kaufman v. Islamic Society of Arlington). On the other, we have a three judge panel of 
the First Circuit holding that a defendant can be guilty of libel even when the statements are 
true (Noonan v. Staples).    
Fustolo v. Hollander, 455 Mass. 861, 920 N.E.2d 837 (Mass. 2010). 
  Steven Fustolo, a Boston‐area developer, sued Fredda Hollander for defamation based 
on five articles written by Hollander for a community newspaper reporting on Fustolo’s plans 
for development of three North End properties. Hollander filed a motion to dismiss the case 
under the Massachusetts anti‐SLAPP statute, Mass.Gen. Laws ch. 231, § 59H, which the trial 
court denied. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed on appeal. 
  Hollander was a co‐founder of the North End Waterfront Residents' Association 
(NEWRA) and originally submitted articles to the Regional Review newspaper as a means of 
advocating the organization's positions. In 1997, the newspaper began paying Hollander for her 
stories, after instructing her to cover neighborhood meetings, including NEWRA meetings, 
objectively and factually. In May and June 2006, the Regional Review published five articles 
written by Hollander on the proposed development of three North End properties by Fustolo. 
Two of these articles reported on NEWRA meetings: one to discuss the issue; and a second 
meeting at which NEWRA voted to oppose redevelopment of one of the properties. A third 
article covered the meeting of another community group, North End/Waterfront Neighborhood 
Council, which voted in favor of the project opposed by NEWRA.  
  In denying Hollander’s motion, the trial court judge concluded "that Hollander did not 
engage in petitioning activities 'on her own behalf as a citizen' because she wrote the articles in 
her capacity as a reporter, and also because she received compensation for doing so."  Id. On 
appeal, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial court agreed that her involvement in NEWRA did 
not make her articles an exercise of her "right to petition" on the development issue because 
the articles were objective journalistic accounts that did not advocate a particular position or 
disclose the writer's involvement. The court acknowledged that Hollander had "a personal 
interest in the development issues that she wrote about," and that she "sought to bring issues 
that she considered important to the attention of residents, politicians, and government 
officials," but ultimately concluded that her subjective and sincere personal interest was not 
legally relevant. What the SJC cared about was that "Hollander's articles did not contain 
statements seeking to redress a grievance or to petition for relief of her own." Id. at 842. On 
this point, the court gave weight to an affidavit submitted by Hollander:  
Indeed, she expressly stated in her affidavit that in writing all her articles, she was 
"always careful to present an objective description of the subject matter, including the 
positions of both sides where applicable," and that while she had personal views on the 
issues she covered, "they were not reflected in the articles I wrote."  
Id.  
  The SJC took pains to emphasize that the denial of anti‐SLAPP protection would not 
deprive journalists of the constitutional protections they (and others) enjoy against defamation 
liability:  
To the extent that Hollander fears a chilling effect on reporters and the press if they are 
not entitled to claim the protection of the anti‐SLAPP statute in cases where they write 
about contentious issues of public concern, we note that the common law of 
defamation, with its constitutional overlay, see, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 
U.S. 254 (1964), provides reporters with protection for both opinions and, of probable 
greater relevance to this case, for fair reports of public meetings of both government 
bodies and organizations such as NEWRA. . . . While "the Legislature intended to enact 
very broad protection for petitioning activities," "the scope of the statute has its limits." 
There is no reason to stretch the anti‐SLAPP statute beyond its appropriate boundaries 
in order to create a level of protection for reporters beyond that to which they are 
currently entitled under the existing defamation law.  
Id. at 844 (citations omitted).  
Horizon Group Management LLC v. Bonnen, Civ. No. 2009 L 8675 (Circ. Ct. Cook County, Ill. 
Jan. 27, 2010). 
  Horizon Realty Group, an apartment leasing and management company in Chicago, filed 
a defamation lawsuit against a former tenant, Amanda Bonnen, over a tweet she posted about 
the company on Twitter. According to the complaint, filed in Cook County Circuit Court, Bonnen 
posted the following tweet on May 12, 2009:  
@JessB123 You should just come anyway. Who said sleeping in a moldy apartment was 
bad for you?  Horizon realty thinks it's ok. 
Upon Defendant’s motion to strike, the Court dismissed Horizon’s lawsuit, finding “the tweet 
nonactionable as a matter of law.”  In a ruling issued from the bench, Cook County Circuit Court 
Judge Diane J. Larsen held that Bonnen's tweet wasn't capable of supporting Horizon's claim 
because it was "too vague to meet the legal standards of libel" and that the tweet could be 
construed innocently or as a statement of opinion.  
Hobbs v. Pasdar, Civ. No. 4:09‐cv‐00008‐BSM, 2009 WL 5462584 (E.D. Ark. Dec. 1, 2009).  
  Terry Hobbs sued Dixie Chicks singer Natalie Maines and her band mates in Arkansas 
state court for defamation, false light, and intentional infliction of emotional distress after 
Maines published a open letter on the band's website and MySpace blog that allegedly 
"accused [Hobbs] of committing the murder of Steve Branch, Christopher Byers and Michael 
Moore." Compl. ¶ 15. In the letter, Maines (who was sued under her married name, Natalie 
Pasdar) encouraged readers to support the movement to free the so‐called "West Memphis 
Three" – Damien Echols, Jesse Misskelley, and Jason Baldwin – three teenagers who were 
convicted of murdering three eight‐year‐old boys in 1994. (The underlying story is chronicled in 
the HBO documentaries, Paradise Lost: The Child Murders at Robin Hood Hills and Paradise Lost 
2: Revelations, which cast doubt on the guilt of the three teenagers.) Maines and her co‐
defendants removed the case to Arkansas federal court in January 2009. 
  In the letter, a copy of which is attached as an exhibit to the complaint, Maines claimed 
that DNA evidence from the crime scene and other evidence linked Hobbs to the murders 
rather than Echols, Misskelley, and Baldwin. This information appears to be based on Echols's 
petition for a writ of habeus corpus challenging his conviction. The complaint also alleges that 
Maines made defamatory statements at a "Free the West Memphis Three" rally.   
  In its decision granting summary judgment, the court found that Hobbs was a limited 
purpose public figure because he voluntarily injected himself into the public controversy 
surrounding the guilt or innocence of the three teenagers by appearing in the HBO 
documentaries and giving numerous of interviews to the print media about the DNA evidence 
in question, appeared on talk shows including Anderson Cooper 360, and even selling the movie 
rights to his life story and to the life story of his deceased stepson Stevie Branch, one of the 
murdered children.  
  Having found that Hobbs was a limited public figure, the court found that under New 
York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), Hobbs would have to demonstrate actual malice in 
order to prevail on his claims. The court determined that no reasonable jury could find that 
Maines and her co‐defendants acted with actual malice—that is, that they "made the 
statements at issue with knowledge that the statements were false or with reckless disregard 
for whether they were false or not."  Hobbs, at *22. Although Maines admitted that she didn't 
read Echols' 188‐page brief, which originally outlined the evidence in question, the court 
focused on Maines' word‐for‐word use of the press release that was approved by Echols' 
defense attorneys, implicitly finding that this reliance on the legal experts was justifiable.    
Kaufman v. Islamic Society of Arlington, 291 S.W.3d 130 (Tx. App. 2009). 
  The Islamic Society of Arlington, Texas, and several other Islamic organizations sued Joe 
Kaufman in Texas state court for libel and intentional infliction of emotional distress based on 
an article Kaufman wrote for a website called FrontPage Magazine.  
  Kaufman is the chairman of Americans Against Hate, an organization that describes itself 
as a "civil rights organization and terrorism watchdog group."  In his article published on the 
FrontPage Magazine website, Kaufman called for a protest of "Muslim Family Day" at Six Flags 
Over Texas, an amusement park in Arlington. In the course of the article, Kaufman claimed that 
two organizations sponsoring the event (who were not parties to the lawsuit) had ties to radical 
Islamic groups abroad, including Al‐Qaeda. Plaintiffs, a group of Islamic organizations that co‐
sponsored the event, filed suit asserting a claim of defamation against Kaufman.  
  Kaufman filed a motion for summary judgment, which was denied by the district court. 
Kaufman subsequently sought an interlocutory appeal from the order denying summary 
judgment pursuant to Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014(a)(6), which allows "a member of 
the electronic or print media" to appeal from the denial of a motion for summary judgment 
when the action is one “arising under the free speech or free press clause of the First 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, or Article I, Section 8, of the Texas Constitution.”  
Plaintiffs opposed Kaufman’s motion on the grounds that he is not a media defendant for the 
purposes the statute because “he ‘merely posts to the internet,’ because Front Page Magazine 
is simply Kaufman's own internet blog. . . and because Kaufman has not demonstrated that he 
has the training associated with traditional journalism.”  291 S.W.3d at 138.  
  The appeals court rejected the plaintiffs’ contentions and found that Kaufman was 
entitled to seek an interlocutory appeal pursuant to § 51.014(a)(6), noting that “Kaufman is a 
full time investigative journalist,” and that “Front Page Magazine. . . is a ‘national publication 
which focuses mainly on the issues of politics and terrorism and has a monthly readership of 
approximately 500,000.’”  Id. at 139. The court held that “[w]e cannot agree with appellees that 
Front Page Magazine's internet status alone costs Kaufman his benefit to file an interlocutory 
appeal as a member of the electronic media,” finding that “articles communicated through the 
internet equate in legal effect in some circumstances to words published by more traditional 
electronic or print media.”  Id. at 140. The court further noted that “various courts outside of 
our jurisdiction have recognized the internet (either implicitly or explicitly) as a type of 
nontraditional electronic media.”  Id. at 141.  
  While the court was careful to note that “[w]e do not hold, therefore, that everyone 
who communicates on the internet would qualify as a member of the electronic media under 
section 51.014(a)(6),” the court soundly rejected the contention that the medium of 
communication should determine whether a person qualifies as a journalist. Id. at 142.  
Moreno v. Hanford Sentinel, Inc., 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d 858 (Cal. Ct. App.2009). 
  Cynthia Moreno, a UC Berkeley student who grew up in Coalinga, CA, posted negative 
statements about Coalinga and its inhabitants on her MySpace page, in a posting entitled "An 
ode to Coalinga."  Although Moreno removed the posting six days later, Roger Campbell, the 
principal of the local high school, discovered her post and gave a copy to a friend who worked 
for the Coalinga Record, a local newspaper. The newspaper published the "ode" in its Letters to 
the Editor section, attributing it to Cynthia and giving her full name. Townspeople subsequently 
harassed Cynthia's family, forcing the family to move away and Moreno's father to abandon his 
20‐year‐old family business.   
  Cynthia and her family filed suit against the principal and the publishers of the 
newspaper, seeking to recover for invasion of privacy through publication of private facts and 
intentional infliction of emotional distress. The trial court granted the newspaper's motion to 
strike the complaint under the California anti‐SLAPP statute (Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16), as 
well as the principal's demurrer on both counts. The Morenos originally appealed both rulings, 
but later abandoned their appeal against the newspaper, leaving only the principal.  
  The Court of Appeals, Fifth Appellate District, held that the Morenos could not recover 
for invasion of privacy because the facts published were not private:   
Here, Cynthia publicized her opinions about Coalinga by posting the Ode on 
myspace.com, a hugely popular internet site. Cynthia's affirmative act made her article 
available to any person with a computer and thus opened it to the public eye. Under 
these circumstances, no reasonable person would have had an expectation of privacy 
regarding the published material.  
91 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 862.  The court also found that publishing Cynthia's full name along with the 
article was not actionable, even though she had not included her last name on her MySpace 
page. Because that page included her photograph, the court determined that Cynthia's identity 
as the author of the "ode" was public.  
  In denying Moreno's request for permission to amend the complaint, the court also 
determined that her publication on MySpace precluded any claim for misappropriation of her 
name or likeness. The court noted that misappropriation, as a species of invasion of privacy, 
also requires the plaintiff to have a reasonable expectation of privacy. The court did, however, 
reinstate the Morenos' emotional distress claim, ruling in the non‐published portion of the 
decision that a jury could reasonably find that the principal's conduct in turning over a copy of 
the "ode" to the newspaper was "extreme and outrageous."  
Noonan v. Staples, 561 F.3d 4 (1st Cir. 2009). 
  Alan Noonan, a former Staples employee, was fired for alleged violations of the firm’s 
travel and expense policy. The following day, Staples Executive Vice‐President Jay Baitler sent a 
memorandum to about 1,500 employees which included the following: 
It is with sincere regret that I must inform you of the termination of Alan Noonan’s 
employment with Staples. A thorough investigation determined that Alan was not in 
compliance with our [travel and expenses] policies. As always, our policies are 
consistently applied to everyone and compliance is mandatory on everyone’s part. It is 
incumbent on all managers to understand Staples['s] policies and to consistently 
communicate, educate and monitor compliance every single day. Compliance with 
company policies is not subject to personal discretion and is not optional. In addition to 
ensuring compliance, the approver’s responsibility to monitor and question is a critical 
factor in effective management of this and all policies. 
Noonan v. Staples I, 556 F.3d 20, 23‐24.  Noonan subsequently filed suit in state court against 
Staples, alleging three causes of action:  “(1) libel based on the Baitler e‐mail; (2) breach of the 
two stock‐option agreements; and (3) breach of the severance agreement.”  Id. at 23.  After the 
case was removed to federal court, the parties filed cross motions for summary judgment on 
Noonan’s claims, and the district court entered judgment for Staples on all three claims. 
  On appeal, the First Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the breach of 
contract claims, but remanded Noonan’s libel claim for trial. The court based its decision on a 
1902 Massachusetts statute, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231, § 92, which states that truth is a defense 
to libel unless "actual malice is proved."  The court interpreted “actual malice” to mean 
common law malice of “ill will,” rather than Sullivan’s knowing or reckless disregard for the 
truth.  The court therefore ruled that Noonan could prevail on his libel claim if Baitler’s email 
was sent with malevolent intent or ill will, despite the fact that Noonan admitted to pre‐
populating his reports in violation of company policy.    
  Staples filed a motion for a rehearing en banc, asserting that the statute ran afoul of the 
First Amendment by holding parties liable for making truthful statements. The First Circuit 
denied Staples' petition, holding that Staples had waived the constitutional issue:  
Staples now contends that it raised the issue in its initial brief. But that brief simply 
acknowledged that the statute was not constitutional as applied to a matter of public 
concern. Staples did not timely argue that the present matter was a matter of public 
concern or that the statute was unconstitutional as applied to matters of private 
concern. That Staples did not timely raise the issue is also made clear by the fact that it 
has not, until now, filed the notice required for a challenge to the constitutionality of a 
state statute. See Fed. R. App. P. 44(b). The issue is waived, and the fact that the issue 
raises constitutional concerns does not save the waiver.  
561 F.3d 4, at 6.  The court also indicated that the constitutional issue was not "so clear that the 
panel should have acted sua sponte to strike down a state statute."  Id. at 6.  The First Circuit 
further pointed out that Staples "still does not cite a case for the proposition that the First 
Amendment does not permit liability for true statements concerning matters of private 
concern."  Id.  The court appeared to discount this possibility, relying on language from two 
Supreme Court cases ‐‐ Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps1 and Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss 
Builders2 ‐‐ to suggest that speech on matters of private concern does not enjoy full First 
Amendment protection.   
  After remand, the case proceeded to a jury trial in Boston. After trial, the jury found in 
favor of Staples on Noonan's defamation claim.  
Global Wildlife Foundation v. Brilleaux, No. 2010‐0000866 (La. Dist. Ct. Mar. 15, 2010). 
  Global Wildlife Center, a wildlife preserve in Folsom, Louisiana, sued Nicholas Brilleaux, 
publisher of the Hammond Action News blog, after he published a satirical article about a fake 
giraffe attack at the preserve. Hammond Action News publishes Onion‐style fake news stories 
about regional happenings in the Hammond area northwest of New Orleans.  
  On March 2, 2010, Judge Brenda Bedsole Ricks of the 21st Judicial District Court in 
Amite, Louisiana granted Global Wildlife Center a temporary restraining order requiring 
Brilleaux to remove the story from his blog. After a subsequent hearing on Global Wildlife 
Center’s motion for a preliminary injunction, for which the ACLU filed an amicus curiae brief in 
support of Brilleaux, arguing that the First Amendment protects his satirical work, District Judge 
Beth Wolfe dissolved the temporary restraining order and denied the request for a preliminary 
injunction. The court also ordered Global Wildlife to pay Brilleaux $500 in attorneys' fees and 
court costs. 
Twelve Inches Around Corp. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., No. 08 Civ. 6896, 2009 WL 928077 (S.D.N.Y. 
Mar. 12, 2009). 
  Plaintiff is the operator of a website that seeks to temporarily match (or “rent”) 
information technology specialists with companies in need of their expertise. Defendant Cisco 
Systems operates a program to grant individuals certification (such as “Cisco Certified Network 
Professional”) if they pass a Cisco‐administered test. As part of its marketing policy, Cisco offers 
certain incentives to customers that employ staff holding Cisco certifications, generally offering 
greater incentives for customers that employ larger numbers of Cisco‐certified technicians. 
  Cisco’s attorneys sent a cease‐and‐desist letter to plaintiff, asserting that the website 
infringed Cisco's trademarks, and that the program of “renting” Cisco‐certified technicians in 

                                                             
1
 472 U.S. 749 (1985). 
2
 475 U.S. 767 (1986). 
order for companies to attain Cisco discounts was fraudulent. Cisco’s attorney also sent a letter 
to plaintiff’s internet service provider, alleging that plaintiff was “committing fraud by brokering 
individuals who [have Cisco certifications] to third‐party companies, so the companies can 
attain higher partnership levels and corresponding product discounts, in contravention of Cisco 
certification and partnership agreements” and including eight paragraphs “under penalty of 
perjury” purporting to identify the specific trademark registrations allegedly infringed, 
repeating the trademark infringement and fraud allegations stated earlier in the letter, and 
affirming that “[t]o the best of my knowledge, all of the statements made above are true and 
correct.”  2009 WL 928077, at *1‐2. Plaintiff’s ISP subsequently took down the website. 
     Plaintiff sued Cisco and its attorneys, asserting claims for misrepresentation under 17 
U.S.C. § 512 (the Digital Millennium Copyright Act or DMCA), libel, fraud, unfair business 
practices, and tortious interference. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The court dismissed plaintiff’s DMCA, fraud, unfair business practices, and 
tortious interference claims. The court refused to dismiss plaintiff’s claim for libel, however. 
While defendants had sought dismissal of the libel claims on the grounds that the lawyer’s 
letter was a non‐actionable opinion, the court held that while “[a] letter from a lawyer can be a 
non‐actionable statement of opinion,” a “lawyer's statements are not immune from the libel 
laws” and that “a reasonable reader encountering the full context of the letter, in particular the 
affirmation made ‘under penalty of perjury’ and the format of the letter resembling an affidavit 
could reasonably believe that the statements are fact not opinion.”  Id. at *4. 
Super Future Equities, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank Minnesota, N.A., No. 3‐06‐CV‐0271B (N.D. Tex. 
Feb. 12, 2009).  
  As part of an ongoing lawsuit, Orix Capital Markets, LLC filed a counterclaim against the 
plaintiffs alleging that they set up a website ‐‐ www.predatorix.com ‐‐ that published false and 
defamatory statements about Orix. According to the counterclaim, the website included 
allegations that the company committed tax fraud and was under federal investigation for 
violating racketeering laws. Orix subsequently amended its counterclaim to add a claim for 
copyright infringement arising from the re‐posting of a page from the Orix website.  
  The underlying facts of the case are a bit convoluted. Orix, which operates a real estate, 
finance, and asset management business, foreclosed on a Louisiana apartment building owned 
by the Rafizadeh family of Houston. This foreclosure triggered a series of legal disputes 
between the Rafizadehs and Orix, and the Texas case began in 2006, when the Rafizadehs' 
company, Super Future Equities, Inc., brought a class action complaint against Orix and other 
defendants alleging breach of contract, negligence, breach of fiduciary duties, and violations of 
the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). The federal court in 
Texas ultimately dismissed these claims, but allowed Orix’s counterclaim to proceed.  
  The counterclaim‐defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, which the court 
granted in part and denied in part. The court dismissed Orix's claims for business 
disparagement, tortious interference, and copyright infringement (notably, the court found that 
the use of the Orix’s page was fair use), but found that the defamation claim was sufficient to 
go to the jury.  
  In February 2009, after a two‐week trial, the jury awarded Orix $2.5 million in 
compensatory damages and $10 million in punitive damages. After the verdict, the parties 
settled the case on undisclosed terms and the counterclaim‐defendants published an apology 
on the website, acknowledging that the previous postings were incorrect. 
 
Media Law in the Digital Age: The Rules Have Changed, Have You? 

LEGAL TOPICS IN ADVERTISING LAW FOR ONLINE PUBLISHERS 
CITIZEN MEDIA LAW PROJECT 
 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN FTC‐REQUIRED DISCLOSURES OF ENDORSEMENTS AND 
TESTIMONIALS IN ADVERTISING 
 
In October 2009, the Federal Trade Commission issued "Guides Concerning the Use of 
Endorsements and Testimonials in Advertising" (the "Guidelines") that may impose a disclosure 
requirement on bloggers and social media users who review or otherwise write about products 
and services. The Guidelines, which officially went into effect on December 1, 2009, call for 
online publishers to disclose "material connections" they have with a company whose products 
or services they "endorse." This means that bloggers and social media users must disclose their 
relationship with a company when they are being paid or otherwise compensated by the 
company to comment favorably on its products or services. The Guidelines also say that 
bloggers may be held liable for making misleading or unsubstantiated claims about a product or 
service. 
 
The Guidelines impact a relatively narrow category of online publishing activities that can be 
construed as "endorsements," like writing reviews or otherwise commenting favorably on 
products or services. And, putting aside a few gray areas, the Guidelines require disclosure of 
only relatively established relationships with companies—like getting paid, participating in a 
network marketing program, or receiving a steady stream of freebies. On top of that, the 
Guidelines are easy to comply with, and they require nothing more than upholding good 
journalistic standards and prinicples, namely independence and transparency. Finally, the FTC 
staff have made numerous public statements indicating that they are more interested in 
educating than suing bloggers. 
 
Bloggers and users of social media only need to disclose their relationship with a company 
when they "endorse" a product of service. Accordingly, for the vast majority of online 
publishers, the Guidelines probably won't come into play much. But if you publish reviews or 
otherwise regularly discuss products and services, the Guidelines could impact your work, and 
you should have a sense of what constitutes an "endorsement." 
 
An "endorsement" is "any advertising message . . . that consumers are likely to believe reflects 
the opinions, beliefs, findings, or experiences of a party other than the sponsoring advertiser, 
even if the views expressed by that party are identical to those of the sponsoring advertiser." 
Guides, § 255.0(b). 
 
Not all online discussion of product attributes or consumer experiences will qualify as an 
"endorsement." The FTC explains in its commentary on the Guidelines: "the fundamental 
question is whether, viewed objectively, the relationship between the advertiser and the 
speaker is such that the speaker's statement can be considered 'sponsored' by the advertiser 
and therefore an 'advertising message.'" Federal Register Notice, at 8. 
 

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The FTC will look at the following factors to determine whether a message conveying positive 
statements about a product or service is an "endorsement": 
 
• whether the speaker is compensated by the advertiser or its agent; 
• whether the product or service in question was provided by free by the advertiser; 
• the terms of any agreement; 
• the length of the relationship; 
• the previous receipt of products or services from the same or similar advertisers, or the 
likelihood of future receipt of such products or services; and 
• the value of the items or services received. 
 
Federal Register Notice, at 9. That's a lot of factors, but most of the FTC's examples in the 
Guidelines and its public statements suggest that it is primarily concerned with those getting 
paid in cash, those participating in network marketing programs, and those receiving a steady 
stream of products from a company or group of companies.  
 
FTC Investigation of Ann Taylor LOFT Event for Bloggers 
 
On April 20, 2010, the Federal Trade Commission notified Ann Taylor that it had completed its 
first investigation under the ... In the end, the FTC decided not to take any action against An 
Taylor, whose LOFT division offered gifts to bloggers who attended a January 26 “exclusive 
blogger preview” of the chain’s summer 2010 line. 
 
Invitations to the event promised a “special gift” to bloggers who attend and “those who post 
coverage from the event will be entered in a mystery gift card drawing where you can win up to 
$500 at LOFT!”  
 
The FTC guidelines require bloggers (and those who post on other social media, such as Twitter 
and Facebook) who receive free or discounted product or service in exchange for writing a 
review to disclose the freebie or face the possibility of an FTC enforcement action. Under these 
guidelines, the bloggers who received the gift cards and wrote about the event were obliged to 
disclose the freebies. Some of the bloggers disclosed the gifts while others didn’t comment on 
the issue or stated that they did not receive the gifts. 
 
In a letter to LOFT’s attorney announcing that it was taking no action in the matter, the FTC 
stated that 
 
Upon careful review of this matter, we have determined not to recommend enforcement 
action at this time. We considered a number of factors in reaching this decision. First, 
according to LOFT, the January 26, 2010 preview was the first (and, to date, only) such 
preview event. Second, only a very small number of bloggers posted content about the 
preview, and several of those bloggers disclosed that LOFT had provided them gifts at 
the preview. Third, LOFT adopted a written policy in February 2010 stating that LOFT will 
not issue any gift to any blogger without first telling the blogger that the blogger must 

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disclose the gift in his or her blog.  The FTC staff expects that LOFT will both honor that 
written policy and take reasonable steps to monitor bloggers' compliance with the 
obligation to disclose gifts they receive from LOFT. 
 
The FTC letter also noted that LOFT posted a sign at the preview telling bloggers that they 
should disclose the gifts, but noted that "[i]t is not clear, however, how many bloggers actually 
saw that sign." 
 
While the FTC took no action against LOFT or the bloggers who covered the event, it is clear 
that the Commission is keeping an eye out for blatant offers to bloggers and other social media 
posters in return for coverage.  For those who post on blogs and other social media, this means 
that it is important to be familiar with the rules and to be careful to disclose any product or 
service, including discounts, they receive in return for writing about that product or service.  
 
 
INTERSECTION OF ADVERTISING AND PRIVACY LAW 
 
Introduction to Behavioral Advertising 
 
As a source of revenue, websites including those operated by news organizations have placed 
advertisements on their sites. Since advertisers are willing to pay a premium for greater 
assurance that ad placements will be seen by users that are most likely to be interested in the 
product or service offered, technology enables advertisers to target directly individual users 
based on their web surfing activity. This practice is known as “behavioral” advertising. 
 
This individual behavioral advertising has raised a number of privacy concerns: whether 
personally identifiable information is being collected, how the information collected is being 
protected, and whether current laws are being violated if data are being collected without the 
consent of the parties involved. It is often unclear whether current laws, such as the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act apply to online advertising providers that collect information 
through monitoring clicks, search terms or other methods. It is likely that in many cases these 
laws could be held to apply to such activities and that consent is required from one of the 
parties to the communication. 
 
There are no current federal regulations specific to online behavioral advertising and the 
Federal Trade Commission maintains that industry self‐regulation is preferable to agency 
regulations because the state of the industry is fluid and complex. Industry groups have 
developed more detailed guidance and in 2009, the FTC released a set of self‐regulatory 
principles regarding the information that may be collected online and how companies should 
notify their customers about the collection. 
 
In online advertising’s simplest form, a commercial website rents out “space” on its site to 
another website which places a hot link banner advertisement in that space. When clicked, the 
banner ad sends the user directly to the advertiser’s website. In this simplest scenario, all users 

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Media Law in the Digital Age: The Rules Have Changed, Have You? 

will see the same advertisement, regardless of whether the user may be interested in that 
product or service. Since advertisers will pay a premium for the increased likelihood that users 
viewing their advertisement would be interested in the product or service, offered, advertisers 
use technology to more accurately target online ads to the desired audience. 
 
These techniques to target ads to individual Internet users is known as “behaviorally targeted 
advertising” by tracking web activity of each user and inferring each user’s interests based on 
that activity. In most cases, online advertising providers such as DoubleClick and NebuAd 
monitor Internet use by placing a “persistent cookie” on the user’s computer. These cookies are 
small text files that reside on a hard drive indefinitely and once the cookie is in place, it gathers 
certain information related to that user’s online activity on a continuous basis and relays that 
information to the online advertising provider who can use assemble that data into an 
individual profile used to target advertising.  
 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act 
 
Concerns have been raised that online advertising providers, websites, and Internet service 
providers (ISPs) that agree to collect certain data generated by Internet traffic to behaviorally 
target advertising may be violating the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) 100 Stat. 
1848, 18 U.S.C. 2510‐2521. The ECPA prohibits electronic communications service providers 
from intentionally divulging information while in transit to third parties, unless an exception 
applies.  
 
Online advertising providers are acquiring information such as the fact that a user clicked on a 
particular link (an action which is the equivalent of asking the site providing the link to send the 
user information), and they are acquiring that information while the communication is in 
transit. Advertisers may also acquire information, such as words entered into a search engine or 
answers to online forms, while it is in transit. Under ECPA, it is illegal, with certain enumerated 
exceptions, for any person to “intentionally intercept, endeavor to intercept, or procure any 
other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire, oral or electronic 
communication,” where “intercept” can mean the acquisition of the contents of any electronic 
communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device, “contents” 
includes any information concerning the substance, purport, or meaning of that 
communication, and “electronic communication” includes any transfer of signs, signals, writing, 
images, sounds, data or other intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a 
wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic, or photo optical system that affects interstate or 
foreign commerce. Because the advertisers record that a particular user requested information 
a website by clicking on a particular link or sent information to a website, advertisers appear to 
be “intercepting” the “contents” of those “electronic communications” and such interceptions 
are likely covered by ECPA. 
 
The interception of electronic communications is not prohibited by ECPA if one of the parties to 
the communications has consented to the interception. Consent is not defined by ECPA, nor do 
precise instructions of how and when consent may be obtained under ECPA appear in 

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regulation. There have been few cases dealing with ECPA’s application to online advertising 
providers and non examining ECPA’s application to agreements between ISP providers and 
online advertising providers.  
 
Agreements for online advertising providers to monitor certain web traffic may be between the 
online advertising provider and the website operators seeking to have ads placed on their sites. 
The advertising providers receive information about user activity on participating websites and 
aggregate that data to better target ads. In litigation against the online advertising provider 
DoubleClick for violations of ECPA, the court examined whether websites were “users” of 
electronic communications services under ECPA. 
 
The court reasoned that websites are “users” (and, therefore, “parties to the communications” 
at issue) because they actively respond to requests they receive over electronic 
communications services by deciding whether to send the requested document, breaking the 
document down into TCP/IP protocol, and sending the packets over the Internet. Because 
websites are “users” of electronic communications, the court found that websites are also 
“parties to the communications” in dispute; therefore, website owners have the ability to 
consent to a communication’s interception. 
 
The court also held that the website operators had consented, by virtue of their contract with 
DoubleClick, to allow the company to intercept certain traffic on their websites in order to 
target advertising to website visitors. Consent for private interceptions of electronic 
communications cannot be granted if the purpose of the interception is the commission of 
criminal or tortious conduct. The court noted that the focus of the determination of criminal or 
tortious purpose under ECPA is “not upon whether the interception itself violated another law; 
it is upon whether the purpose for the interception—its intended use—was criminal or 
tortious.” Applying that standard, the court found that the plaintiffs had not alleged that 
DoubleClick’s primary motivation for intercepting communications was to injure plaintiffs 
tortiously. 
 
In a similar suit against online advertising provider Pharmatrak, the court outlined limitations to 
the consent exception regarding these types of agreements. In that case, Pharmatrak had 
contracted with certain drug companies to provide advertising on their websites. Included in 
the agreement was permission for the advertising provider to record certain web traffic that did 
not include personally identifiable information. Perhaps inadvertently, the online advertising 
provider did collect a small amount of personally identifiable information though it had pledged 
not to do so. The advertiser argued that consent had been granted for such interception. The 
court disagreed. According to the court, it is for the party granting consent to define its scope, 
and the parties in this case had not consented to the collection of personally identifiable 
information. In collecting personally identifiable information by intercepting data without the 
consent of one of the parties, the online advertiser potentially had violated ECPA, but may have 
lacked the requisite intent to be found liable under the statute. The appeals court directed the 
trial court to conduct further investigation into the matter. 
 

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Given the conclusions in the above cases, it appears that online advertising providers, like 
DoubleClick, that partner to collect data from individual websites generally are not violating 
ECPA, because the websites are “parties to the communication” with the ability to consent to 
interception. Based on these cases, the advertising providers will not be seen as running afoul 
of ECPA so long as the data the advertising providers collect do not fall outside the scope of the 
data the advertising providers’ clients have agreed to disclose. 
 
On the other hand, when the partnership is between the ISP and the online advertising 
provider, neither of the parties to the agreement to intercept web traffic is a party to the 
communications that are being intercepted. Therefore, it would appear that consent for the 
interceptions must be obtained from individual customers of the ISPs. The questions, in these 
circumstances, are whether consent must be “affirmative,” or if it can be “implied,” and if 
consent must be “affirmative” what process must be used to obtain such consent from 
individual users. 
 
Consent to interceptions has been implied by the surrounding circumstances of 
communications. While consent may be implied, it may not be “casually inferred.” It seems 
unlikely, as a result, that merely by using an ISP’s service, a customer of that service has implied 
her consent to the interception of her electronic communications by online advertising 
providers. If consent likely may not be implied simply from use of an ISP’s service, then a form 
of affirmative consent from the ISP’s customer would be necessary. 
 
In other statutes requiring consent for certain types of disclosure, regulatory regimes have 
developed to define when and how affirmative consent should be obtained. A similar debate is 
occurring now involving how ISPs should obtain consent from their customers to share data 
about their online activities with online advertising providers. The debate centers around 
whether ISPs and advertisers must obtain “opt‐in” consent or if they may continue to obtain 
“opt‐out” consent for these interceptions. “Opt‐in” consent is obtained when a party to the 
communication is notified that his or her ISP has agreed to allow an online advertiser to track 
that person’s online activity in order to better target advertising to that person. The advertiser, 
however, may not begin to track that individual’s web activity until the individual responds to 
the notification granting permission for such activity. If the individual never responds, 
interception can never begin. “Opt‐out” consent, by contrast, is obtained when a party to the 
communication is notified that his or her ISP has agreed to allow an online advertiser to track 
that person’s online activity and the advertising provider will begin such tracking unless the 
individual notifies the ISP or the advertiser that he or she does not grant permission for such 
activity. If the individual never responds, interception will begin. Currently, it appears that 
companies such as NebuAd are obtaining or planning to obtain “opt‐out” consent for the 
information gathering they engage in with ISPs. The present question is whether “opt out” 
consent is sufficient to satisfy the ECPA consent requirement. This question has yet to be 
addressed by a federal court or clarified by legislation or regulation. 
 
Federal Trade Commission Online Advertising Self‐Regulatory Principles 
 

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In February of 2009, the FTC released a new set of Self Regulatory Principles for Online 
Behavioral Advertising. These principles represent the most recent step in the FTC’s ongoing 
examination of behavioral advertising practices, which began with the release of proposed self 
regulatory principles for public comment in December of 2007. Among other things, the 
finalized principles clarified the types of advertising to which they should be applied and 
discussed what notification is sufficient for what types of data the site or advertiser is collecting 
about a consumer. A brief sketch of the principles follows. 
 
• The FTC’s principles cover only online behavioral advertising. Online behavioral 
advertising means “the tracking of a consumer’s online activities over time.” The 
principles make clear that so‐called “first party” advertising (where no information is 
shared with a third party) and contextual advertising (where the ad is based on a single 
page visit or search) are not covered by the principles. 
• According to the principles, websites engaged in online behavioral advertising should 
provide clear notification to consumers regarding the types of data being collected on 
the site and why, as well as the opportunity for consumers to choose whether their data 
may be collected for such purposes. 
• Companies collecting the data should provide reasonable security for the data. The 
security measures should be concomitant with the sensitivity of the data (the more 
sensitive the data, the more protected it should be). The data should be retained only so 
long as necessary to fulfill a legitimate business purpose or as required by law. 
• Companies must keep the promises they make to their customers. If the company 
decides to use previously collected data for purposes that differ materially from the 
uses the company described to the customer at the time data collection began, the 
company should obtain the affirmative express consent of affected customers. 
• Companies should collect sensitive data (e.g., social security number, medical 
information, financial account information, etc.) for behavioral advertising only after 
obtaining affirmative express consent from the consumer. 
 
 
COMPLYING WITH MARKETING RESTRICTIONS AND CAN‐SPAM 
 
In 2003, Congress enacted the Controlling the Assault of Non‐Solicited Pornography and 
Marketing (CAN‐SPAM) Act to curb spam and sets forth rules for commercial email, commercial 
messages and gives recipients the right to have you stop emailing them along with penalties for 
violations. CAN‐SPAM doesn’t apply just to bulk email; it covers all commercial messages which 
the law defines as “any electronic mail message the primary purpose of which is the 
commercial advertisement or promotion of a commercial product or service,” including email 
that promotes content on commercial websites. The law makes no exception for business‐to‐
business email. Each separate email in violation of CAN‐SPAM is subject to penalties of up to 
$16,000, so non‐compliance can be costly. The main requirements for compliance are: 
 
(1) Don’t use false or misleading header information 
(2) Don’t use deceptive subject lines 

7 
 
Media Law in the Digital Age: The Rules Have Changed, Have You? 

(3) Identify the message as an ad 
(4) Tell recipients where you are located 
(5) Tell recipients how to opt out of receiving future email from you 
(6) Honor opt‐out requests promptly 
(7) Monitor what others are doing on your behalf. 
 
CAN‐SPAM covers email where the primary purpose of the message is commercial. Content is 
considered commercial if it advertises or promotes a commercial product or service, including 
content on a website operated for a commercial purpose. In contrast, content is transactional if 
it facilitates an already agreed‐upon transaction or updates a customer about an ongoing 
transaction.  
 
On May 12, 2008, the Federal Trade Commission issued final rules for complying with CAN‐
SPAM’s requirements. The final rule established a presumption that marketers are allowed ten 
business days to process an opt‐out request and within that period may continue to send 
commercial electronic mail to someone who has opted out. 
 
The final rule also narrowed the meaning of the term “sender.” The statutory definition of 
“sender” in 15 U.S.C. § 7702(16)(A) is “a person who initiates [a commercial electronic] mail 
message and whose product, service or Internet website is advertised or promoted by the 
message.” Where a single email message contains advertisements for multiple entities, the rule 
clarifies that there can be a “single sender” for compliance purposes if: 
 
(1) the “single sender” falls within the statutory definition of “sender” set forth above; 
(2) the “single sender” is identified in the “from” line of the email as the sole sender of the 
message; 
(3) if sexually oriented material appears in the message, then the term “sexually explicit” is 
placed in a clear and conspicuous manner in the message; and 
(4) the “single sender” complies with the CAN‐SPAM’s prohibitions against deceptive 
transmission information and deceptive subject lines, required return path and required 
elements to include in a commercial email messages. 
 
This rule makes it easier for one party to be responsible for complying with CAN‐SPAM’s opt‐
out requirements where multiple parties advertise in a single e‐mail message. 

8 
 
Media Law in the Digital Age: The Rules Have Changed, Have You? 

ADVERTISING LAW FOR ONLINE PUBLISHERS 
 
FTC ISSUES FINAL GUIDES ON THE USE OF ENDORSEMENTS AND  
TESTIMONIALS IN ADVERTISING 
SCOTT DAILARD 
DOW LOHNES 
 
The Federal Trade Commission’s revised Guides Concerning the Use of Endorsements 
and Testimonials in Advertising (the “Endorsement Guides”) went into effect on December 1, 
2009.  Like all FTC Guides, the revised Endorsement Guides are advisory in nature and do not 
operate with the force of law.  Nonetheless, they articulate standards that the FTC Staff will use 
to evaluate whether advertising practices are deceptive in violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act.  
To varying degrees, the Endorsement Guides also influence courts and state attorneys general 
when they interpret parallel state consumer protection statutes.  Accordingly, counselors for 
advertisers and endorsers should take note of several important changes to the Endorsement 
Guides, most of which involve testimonials that publicize extraordinary results achieved by 
using an advertiser’s product, endorsers who use blogs, social networking sites or other 
“consumer‐generated media” to publish reviews, and celebrities who endorse products on talk 
shows or other “unconventional” advertising formats.  The following summarizes the key 
provisions of the revised Endorsement Guides. 
 
Elimination of “Results Not Typical” Safe Harbor  
 
The revised Endorsement Guides eliminated a “safe harbor” that previously permitted 
testimonials promoting extraordinary results obtained from using an advertiser’s product as 
long as they were accompanied by a conspicuous “results not typical” disclaimer.  Under the 
new Endorsement Guides, a testimonial describing results that a consumer obtained using an 
advertised product generally will be deemed to convey an “implied typicality” claim.  In other 
words, the FTC will interpret the testimonial as a claim that the endorser’s experience 
represents the results that consumers can generally expect to achieve when using the 
advertised product in the depicted circumstances.  According to the revised Endorsement 
Guides, a disclaimer stating that the endorser’s “results are not typical” is no longer sufficient 
to avoid deception.  Instead, if the endorser’s experience with the advertiser’s product or 
service is non‐typical, the testimonial advertisement must also disclose the results that 
consumers can generally expect to achieve.  For example, if an ad features “before” and “after” 
pictures of a woman who claims to have lost 50 pounds in 6 months using the advertiser’s diet 
plan, the ad must also disclose how much weight most women can expect to lose in the 
depicted circumstances – e.g., “most women who follow our plan for 6 months lost at least 15 
pounds.”  The “generally expected results” disclosure must be substantiated by data obtained 
from valid, well‐controlled clinical studies or other objectively reasonable evidence. 
 
Disclosure of “Material Connections” Between Advertisers and Endorsers in Consumer‐
Generated Media 
 

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Media Law in the Digital Age: The Rules Have Changed, Have You? 

The FTC has long required testimonial advertisements to disclose any “material 
connections” between an advertiser and an endorser – typically the provision of free products 
or monetary compensation in exchange for a product review – if consumers would not 
otherwise expect the connection. The revised Endorsement Guides expressly extend this 
principle to relationships that arise when advertisers use “consumer‐generated media” to 
promote their products, and they discuss various circumstances in which messages conveyed by 
bloggers and users of social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter will be regulated as 
commercial endorsements.   
If an advertiser pays someone to blog about a product or service or tout its attributes on 
a message board or a social media site, the review clearly will be considered an endorsement, 
and the reviewer will be required to disclose his or her relationship with the advertiser.  (The 
same is true if the blogger is paid by a third party – such as the operator of a word‐of‐mouth 
marketing network – acting on behalf of an advertiser).   The reviewer’s obligations are more 
difficult to determine if the only incentive he or she receives is the value of a free product 
sample that accompanies a marketer’s request for a review.  In these situations, the FTC will 
evaluate the need for a disclosure on a case‐by‐case basis using a test that focuses on whether 
the receipt of the merchandise could affect the weight or credibility of the reviewer’s 
statements, and whether the connection between the marketer and the reviewer would be 
reasonably expected by consumers.   
   
According to the FTC, the fundamental question is whether, viewed objectively, the 
relationship between the advertiser and the speaker is such that the speaker’s statement can 
be considered “sponsored” by the advertiser and therefore an “advertising message.”  In this 
context, the FTC distinguishes between critics who work for traditional media outlets and 
consumer endorsers who receive free products as incentives to publish favorable reviews.  The 
revised Endorsement Guides generally do not require disclosures from reviewers working for 
traditional media companies because the FTC reasons that consumers generally expect that 
professional critics may have received, for example, the books they review, or saw the movies 
they critique, for free.  The FTC also stated that in “usual circumstances,” it would not consider 
reviews published by traditional media outlets “with independent editorial responsibility” to be 
sponsored advertisements because the weight that consumers give to statements that appear 
in such reviews would not be affected by knowing whether the media publisher paid for the 
product in question.    
 
By contrast, when reviews appear in social media, the FTC reasons that it is much more 
difficult for consumers to distinguish independent editorial opinion from endorsements that 
have been procured (directly or indirectly) by an advertiser.   Accordingly, under the revised 
Endorsement Guides, reviewers who receive free products from an advertiser and then blog 
about their opinions on a social media site should disclose their relationship to the advertiser if: 
(i) the product or service has substantial value, or (ii) the product or service is provided to the 
consumer as part of a network marketing program, or (iii) the reviewer frequently receives free 
products and services from the advertiser (or similar advertisers) because he or she has an 
established blog readership within a particular field or demographic.  

2 
 
Media Law in the Digital Age: The Rules Have Changed, Have You? 

If a material connection exists, both the advertiser and the endorser (e.g., the blogger or word‐
of‐mouth marketer) can be subject to liability for false or deceptive statements made in the 
testimonial.  The fact that an advertiser may have no knowledge of, or control over, the 
endorser’s statements before they are published will not protect the advertiser from liability.  
The FTC stated, however, that in deciding whether to bring an enforcement action, it will 
consider an advertiser’s efforts to advise endorsers of their responsibilities and to monitor their 
reviews for inaccurate statements.  Accordingly, advertisers that provide free products to 
consumer endorsers should establish procedures to advise endorsers of their disclosure 
obligations, provide them with accurate product information, monitor their reviews and 
document the advertiser’s efforts to promptly identify and correct any exaggerated or 
unsubstantiated representations. 
 
The FTC’s approach to endorsements in consumer‐generated media provoked heated 
commentary in both the blogosphere and the traditional press.  Critics of the revised 
Endorsement Guides accused the FTC of holding new media to a different standard than old 
media, or of holding individuals to a stricter standard than large corporations.  Mary Engle, 
Director of the FTC’s Division of Advertising Practices, responded to these charges by noting 
that more robust disclosure requirements are necessary to avoid deception in contexts that 
blur the line between advertising and editorial content.  Engle also emphasized that the 
Endorsement Guides hold social media marketers to the same standards as marketers who use 
other media: “Social media marketing is here to stay,” she said, “and we have enough respect 
for advertising on the Internet and the important role of the blogosphere as a marketplace for 
public opinion to hold it to the same standard we apply to advertising in any other medium.”  
Engle also made it clear that the FTC does not plan to make individual bloggers an enforcement 
priority.  Instead, she stated that the FTC’s principal “concern is with advertisers who pay 
consumers to talk up their products and make it look like independent consumer opinion.”  
 
 Celebrity Endorsements  
 
The revised Endorsement Guides clarify that celebrities who are paid to endorse an 
advertiser’s products have a duty to disclose their relationship with the advertiser if the 
endorsement is made outside of a conventional advertising context.  As a general rule, a 
celebrity endorser who appears in a “traditional” advertisement, such as a television 
commercial, need not disclose that he is being paid by the advertiser, because consumers 
typically assume that celebrities are compensated for their appearances in ads.  The same is not 
true, however, of talk show appearances, statements made by celebrities in social media, or 
during news interviews.  In such non‐traditional advertising contexts, the celebrity must 
disclose his or her connection to an advertiser, because consumers might not otherwise realize 
that the celebrity is a paid endorser, rather than just a satisfied customer.  
 
The FTC will assign liability in the celebrity endorsement context in the same way it does 
in the consumer‐generated media context.  Both the celebrity endorser and the advertiser can 
be liable for the endorser’s false or unsubstantiated statements about the endorsed product.  
Although the advertiser cannot control what a celebrity endorser actually says on a talk show, 

3 
 
Media Law in the Digital Age: The Rules Have Changed, Have You? 

or how the show is edited, it may nonetheless be held liable if the endorser fails to make the 
required disclosure or makes false statements about the advertiser’s product.   In deciding 
whether to bring an action, however, the FTC says it will give significant weight to whether an 
advertiser advised the celebrity in advance about what he or she can and cannot truthfully say 
about a product, and about the need to disclose the celebrity’s relationship with the advertiser.  
 
 
 
 
 

4 
 
 Some Online Advertising Law Lingo

By Luther T. Munford
Phelps Dunbar LLP
Jackson, Mississippi

Sept. 25, 2010

References:

Ian Ballon, E-Commerce and Internet Law (2010) (“E-Commerce”)

George B. Delta and Jeffrey H. Matsura, Law of the Internet (2010) (“Internet”)

John Hart, Internet Law: A Field Guide (6th ed. 2008) (“Field Guide”)

Jan R. Winn and Benjamin Wright, Law of Electronic Commerce (2010) (“Commerce”)

Lingo:

CAN-SPAM Act, Commerce §2.06[A][2], E-Commerce §§ 29.03 - 29.06, Internet

§14.10[A], Field Guide Ch. 8.

Site traffic metrics, Commerce § 2.05[E]

Click fraud, E-Commerce §28.11, Internet § 14.05

Push distribution, adware, spyware, clickwrap agreements, cookies, Internet §§9.03,

14.05, E-Commerce § 2.07

Behavioral advertising, E-Commerce §28.06, Internet § 14.05

Viral or “Buzz” Marketing, E-Commerce §28.05

Linking or framing, E-Commerce §§ 9.04, 20.04, 28.12, Internet §14.05, Field Guide
Ch. 2

Keyword advertising, metatags, E-Commerce §§ 9.10, 9.11, 28.09, Internet §14.05, Field
Guide Ch. 2

Content co-branding, E-Commerce §20.03, Internet §14.05

Affiliate marketing, E-Commerce §28.13

Contests, sweepstakes and promotions, E-Commerce §28.16

Lanham Act and State law false advertising, E-Commerce §28.08

Sales taxation of electronic marketing, Internet §15.06, Field Guide Ch. 11.

PD.4144902.1
 Online commercial communities, Internet §§14.05, 14.06

Best Practices Guidelines for Legal Information Web Site Providers, Commerce §4.02

-2-
PD.4144902.1
 

NEWSGATHERING LAW: HOW TO STAY OUT OF TROUBLE WHEN YOU’RE GATHERING 
INFORMATION FOR A STORY 
 
CHARLES COBLE 
Brooks, Pierce, McLendon, Humphrey & Leonard LLP 
1600 Wachovia Capitol Center 
150 Fayetteville Street 
Raleigh, North Carolina 27601 
T: (919) 839‐0300 
F: (919) 839‐0304 
E: ccoble@brookspierce.com 
 
When Does an Interview Constitute Intrusion? 
 
Although not all States recognize each of the four claims for invasion of privacy (false 
light, intrusion, public disclosure of private facts, and misappropriation), the great majority of 
States have adopted the claim of invasion of privacy by intrusion.  Unlawful intrusion is: 
An intentional physical or sensory interference with, or prying into, a person’s solitude or 
seclusion or his private affairs, where the intrusion is highly offensive or objectionable to a 
reasonable person. 
 
Examples of conduct that courts have found constituted unlawful intrusion include 
physically invading a person’s home or private place, eavesdropping by wiretapping or 
microphone, peering through windows or doors and persistent telephoning.  Potential liability 
for intrusion may therefore place some limits how far journalists go in reporting a story or 
attempting to interview a source. 
 
A person may not maintain an intrusion claim if he or she consents, at the time of the 
alleged intrusion, to being photographed, recorded or videotaped.  Thus, the failure to obtain 
consent, when combined with surreptitious recording at a private location, may expose 
reporters to liability. 
 
For example, consider a reporter who arrives at the subject’s house with no prior notice, 
and, when an adult answers the front door, the reporter begins asking him questions.  During 
the interview, the reporter wears a hidden microphone in his necktie, while a cameraman and 
sound technician hide in a van across the street.  The subject had not agreed to be interviewed 
in advance and at no time during the interview did he consent to being recorded.  On these 

1 
 
 

facts, a federal appeals court in California concluded that the subject could maintain an 
intrusion claim. 
 
Some States do not expressly require parental consent to interview a minor in a public 
forum or to publish or air a minor’s image in connection with a news story.  However, even if a 
minor consents to being interviewed at their home, a reporter is not necessarily protected from 
liability for intrusion.  For example, in a case out of California a television film crew appeared 
unannounced at the front door of a private residence.  Two young children, ages five and seven, 
answered the door and purportedly consented to being interviewed after the news crew 
informed them that their friends had just been murdered by their friends’ mother.  The court 
ruled that the children, because of their young age, lacked the capacity to consent to the news 
crew’s presence on the private property, and, therefore, did not consent to the subsequent 
interview.  As a result, summary judgment on an intentional infliction of emotional distress 
claim was denied. 
In addition to being mindful of potential intrusion claims and issues of consent, 
journalists and editors should also be aware that courts generally consider public school 
property to be a “non‐public forum.”  This designation means that the U.S. Constitution will 
permit reasonable local or state regulations that restrict media access to school property or 
that otherwise restrict newsgathering activities on school property, so long are those 
regulations are designed to lessen interference with normal school activities.  These permissible 
restrictions may even extend beyond school grounds, so long as they apply to a school‐
sponsored activity such as a sporting event, a field trip or a graduation ceremony. 
  
The Difficulty of Protecting Confidential Sources in a Federal Proceeding: The David 
Ashenfelter Saga 
 
A reporter’s best bet to quash an otherwise valid subpoena to appear in a state‐court 
proceeding is a state shield statute.  If, however, the subpoena was issued under federal law, 
such as from a United States Attorney or a federal grand jury or in a civil case pending in federal 
court, or if the reporter works in a state that lacks a shield statute, the only option is to rely on 
the muddled outcome of a 38‐year‐old United Supreme Court precedent.  Despite its age, the 
value of this case to reporters remains uncertain. 
 
In Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), the Court held 5‐4 that reporters served 
with a grand jury subpoena in a criminal matter do not have a First Amendment privilege 
against testifying.  Branzburg actually decided three different cases, each of which involved a 
similar set of facts.  In one of the cases, a reporter in Kentucky had published an investigative 
piece on the local drug trade in which he had personally observed people producing and using 

2 
 
 

illegal drugs.  The other two cases involved reporters who had been covering the activities of 
the Black Panther Party.  In all three cases, local law enforcement officials who were pursuing 
criminal investigations sought to compel the reporters to reveal their confidential sources to a 
grand jury. 
 
Justice Byron White, writing for the majority, accepted the reporters’ argument that if 
journalists are regularly forced to disclose the identity of their confidential sources, those 
sources will soon dry up and the reporters will be unable to do their job.  The question, Justice 
White said, is whether this potential burden on the rights of the press outweighs the legitimate 
needs of law enforcement officials to investigate and prosecute crimes.  In the end, White said: 
[W]e perceive no basis for holding that the public interest in law enforcement and in ensuring 
effective grand jury proceedings is insufficient to override the consequential, but uncertain, 
burden on news gathering that is said to result from insisting that reporters, like other citizens, 
respond to relevant questions put to them in the course of a valid grand jury investigation or 
criminal trial. 
 
Thus, according to Justice White, reporters remain regular citizens and must comply 
with a legitimate subpoena just as any other citizen. 
 
Justice Powell wrote a concurring opinion that reporters have used in both state and 
federal courts to argue that the Constitution in fact gives qualified protection, even though 
Justice White perhaps did not intend recognize such protection.  Justice Powell made clear in 
his opinion that despite the majority holding, law enforcement officials do not have a carte 
blanche “to annex the news media as an investigative arm of government.”  The critical passage 
of his opinion reads as follows: 
 
If a newsman believes that the grand jury investigation is not being conducted in good 
faith he is not without remedy.  Indeed, if the newsman is called upon to give 
information bearing only a remote and tenuous relationship to the subject of the 
investigation, or if he has some other reason to believe that his testimony implicates 
confidential source relationship without a legitimate need of law enforcement, he will 
have access to the court on a motion to quash and an appropriate protective order may 
be entered.  The asserted claim to privilege should be judged on its facts by the striking 
of a proper balance between freedom of the press and the obligation of all citizens to 
give relevant testimony with respect to criminal conduct.  The balance of these vital 
constitutional and societal interests on a case‐by‐case basis accords with the tried and 
traditional way of adjudicating such questions. 
 

3 
 
 

Branzburg is therefore often described as a “4‐1‐4” case, meaning that there were four votes 
on either side of the issue, with one vote straddling both sides.  Justice Powell’s concurrence is 
the “1” here, and it is his call for a careful balancing by courts that would open the door in later 
years to some courts finding a qualified privilege in Branzburg. 
 
The form of that privilege—adopted by many state legislatures in shield laws—was 
outlined in Justice Stewart’s dissent.  He wrote that, contrary to the majority opinion, the First 
Amendment demanded greater scrutiny of government attempts to compel reporters’ 
testimony.  Justice Stewart outlined a three‐part analysis: Governmental officials must, 
therefore, (1) demonstrate that the information sought is clearly relevant to a precisely defined 
subject of governmental inquiry.  (2) They must demonstrate that it is reasonable to think the 
witness in question has that information.  (3) And they must show that there is not any means 
of obtaining the information less destructive of First Amendment liberties. 
 
In one form or another, this three‐part showing forms the basis of many shield statutes 
that provide a qualified privilege to reporters, thereby giving them some protection from 
compelled disclosure of confidential (and in some cases non‐confidential) sources and source 
material.  In addition, it is the foundation of the long‐standing effort to have a federal shield 
statute passed by Congress, an effort that has yet to achieve success. 
 
In recent years, several federal courts have refused to find a federal constitutional 
privilege in Branzburg, which calls into question just how much protection that case offers.  In 
two high‐profile cases in the District of Columbia, federal district court judges ordered reporters 
to disclose confidential sources relating to the Valerie Plame leak investigation and a civil 
lawsuit brought by Wen Ho Lee.  These decisions were upheld on appeal.  In addition, a federal 
district court in San Francisco ordered reporters to disclose their source in connection with the 
BALCO investigation.  The Reporters Committee has cataloged recent federal subpoenas that 
gave rise to court challenges.  The lesson of these cases is that a reporter cannot count on 
protection—even qualified protection—from a federal subpoena that seeks the identity of a 
confidential source or other source materials.  This makes the passage of a federal shield law all 
the more critical. 
   
This exposure reporters and their news organizations face in federal proceedings has 
been highlighted by a saga involving Detroit Free Press reporter David Ashenfelter.  That 
dispute arose in the context of a civil lawsuit brought by former federal prosecutor Richard 
Convertino in federal court in the District of Columbia.  Convertino led the prosecution of the 
so‐called “Detroit Sleeper Cell” defendants shortly after September 11, 2001; however, the 

4 
 
 

Justice Department subsequently removed Convertino from his post and asked that the 
convictions he obtained in that matter be dismissed. 
 
In the complaint he filed in the pending civil action, Convertino—who was himself 
acquitted of charges that he conspired to conceal exculpatory evidence and lied to a federal 
judge in connection with the prosecution—contends that the Department of Justice disclosed 
information about him to the news media in violation of the federal Privacy Act.  In connection 
with the civil lawsuit, Convertino sought to depose Detroit Free Press reporter David 
Ashenfelter.  In particular, he sought from Ashenfelter the identity of a confidential source who 
told the newspaper that Convertino was being investigated for misconduct in connection with a 
terrorism prosecution.  Information from that source appeared in a January 2004 article that 
Ashenfelter authored. 
 
Ashenfelter and the Detroit Free Press fought the subpoena in federal court in Michigan, 
moving to quash the subpoena and opposing Convertino’s motion to compel Ashenfelter to 
comply with the subpoena.  In these papers Ashenfelter relied on traditional First Amendment 
arguments, discussed above.  The federal district court judge rejected these arguments, and 
ordered the deposition to move forward in this written decision, which was subsequently 
reaffirmed on the newspaper’s request for reconsideration. 
 
However, rather than answer the questions he was asked, Ashenfelter invoked the Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self‐incrimination.  He argued he feared prosecution because 
Convertino’s attorney had made statements suggesting that Ashenfelter himself was criminally 
culpable by withholding the identity of the person Convertino claimed had violated the federal 
Privacy Act by revealing information to Ashenfelter about Convertino.  The former prosecutor 
then moved to hold Ashenfelter in contempt for refusing to answer questions about his 
confidential source. 
 
After some legal maneuvering, the issue finally culminated in another hearing.  The 
presiding judge heard testimony from Ashenfelter ex parte and concluded that Ashenfelter’s 
invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege was warranted.  As a result, he held that 
Ashenfelter did not have to testify, and his source’s identity remained secret and Ashenfelter 
was relieved of his obligation to sit for a deposition.  The judge’s decision was hailed by free 
speech advocacy groups, who used the episode to help build momentum for passage of a 
federal shield law.  If Congress were to pass a federal law akin to most state shield statutes, a 
reporter subpoenaed in a federal matter would not have to prevail on a Fifth Amendment (or 
First Amendment) argument in order to protect his or her source. 
  

5 
 
 

Know Your State’s Shield Law 
 
Thirty‐nine States have what have become known as “shield laws” or “reporter's shield 
statutes,” which offer varying degrees of protection to reporters from attempts by government 
officials and others to compel reporters’ testimony.  For example, North Carolina has a shield 
law that follows the majority approach around the country by offering journalists a qualified 
privilege from disclosure of sources and source materials, a privilege that can be overcome if 
the opposing party makes a sufficient showing. 
 
The key portion of the North Carolina statute reads: 
 
A journalist has a qualified privilege against disclosure in any legal proceeding of any 
confidential or nonconfidential information, document, or item obtained or prepared 
while acting as a journalist. 
 
For an invaluable compilation of shield laws around the country, go to the Reporters 
Committee for Freedom of the Press web site.  A formulation such as North Carolina’s can raise 
a host of questions, of course. 
 
What is a journalist? 
 
North Carolina’s shield law defines a journalist as: 
 
Any person, company, or entity, or the employees, independent contractors, or agents of 
that person, company, or entity, engaged in the business of gathering, compiling, 
writing, editing, photographing, recording, or processing information for dissemination 
via any news medium. 
 
This is a rather broad definition, and courts have tended to read it that way.  We do not, 
however, know the limits of this definition.  Is a blogger who posts in his free time—the modern 
version of the lonely pamphleteer—a journalist under the North Carolina law?  North Carolina’s 
appellate courts have not yet given guidance on this question, although a trial court recently 
refused to apply the shield law to a subpoena directed to a blog. 
 
However, the answer in California, at least, may be otherwise.  In O’Grady v. Superior 
Court, 139 Cal. App. 4th 1423 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006), the well‐publicized case involving allegations 
by Apple Computer that a group of bloggers had misappropriated trade secrets, the court 

6 
 
 

declined to wade into the question of what a journalist is, and held simply that California’s 
shield statute applied. 
 
What is a news medium? 
 
Under North Carolina’s shield law, a “news medium” is: 
 
Any entity regularly engaged in the business of publication or distribution of news via 
print, broadcast, or other electronic means accessible to the general public. 
It is important to note that the law references “any entity,” not “any business.”  This 
would seem at least to open the door to a non‐commercial blogger or some other non‐
mainstream form of journalism. 
 
When does it apply? 
 
The privilege applies in “any legal proceeding”—both civil and criminal—and covers 
“any confidential or nonconfidential information, document, or item obtained or prepared 
while acting as a journalist.”  The phrase “as a journalist” is critical, however, because the law 
also makes clear that there is no privilege against disclosure when the journalist obtained the 
sought‐after information because of his or her own eyewitness observation.  A trial court has 
held that the qualified privilege extended to a copy of a radio broadcast of a news program, as 
aired. 
 
What does “qualified” mean? 
 
Because the privilege afforded by North Carolina’s statute is qualified rather than 
absolute, the privilege can be overcome by the party seeking the information.  The journalist 
may be forced to testify or produce evidence if the party seeking disclosure can show that the 
evidence or testimony sought: 
 
• Is relevant and material to the proper administration of the legal proceeding for which 
the testimony or production is sought;  
• Cannot be obtained from alternate sources; and  
• Is essential to the maintenance of a claim or defense of the person on whose behalf the 
testimony or production is sought. 
 
In North Carolina, when a journalist asserts the reporter’s privilege, this three‐part test 
tends to be the legal battleground.  And, as one state court said, it is a “rare instance” in which 

7 
 
 

a party seeking disclosure can meet the requirements.  See, e.g., State v. Petersen, 2003 WL 
22965551 (N.C. Super. June 30, 2003).  Another North Carolina state court elaborated: 
Both the statutory privilege and the common law privilege are intended to protect the free flow 
of information and avoid the impediment that occurs when reporters are subjected to in‐court 
examination of their newsgathering activities.  This intrusion is especially offensive when the 
same information could be derived from other sources. 
Higgins v. Young, 2001 WL 1692379 (N.C. Super. Aug. 08, 2001). 
 
A state shield statute is therefore a critical line of defense journalists can interpose in 
response to a civil, criminal, or grand jury subpoena in a state‐court proceeding.  As soon as a 
newsroom receives a subpoena, it is imperative that it pass the subpoena along to its counsel 
so that he or she can determine whether there is a shield statute and, if so, whether it applies.  
There may be time limits under the state rules of civil procedure for interposing objections to 
the subpoena and/or for filing a motion to quash. 
 
As the court in Higgins v. Young indicated, however, state shield statutes do not 
represent the only form of protection reporters have—the reporter may argue for protection 
by a constitutional privilege as well.  In state‐court proceedings in states with shield laws, those 
laws will likely provide the most robust protection from disclosure, but in states lacking shield 
laws and in federal proceedings the constitutional privilege may well be the only basis for 
opposing the subpoena. 
 
 
 
 

8 
 
 

TOPICS IN NEWSGATHERING LAW 
CITIZEN MEDIA LAW PROJECT 
 
ENTERING THE PROPERTY OF OTHERS TO REPORT ON A STORY 
 
While the First Amendment protects an online publisher’s right to engage in speech, it does not 
grant it unfettered access to the property of others. Online publishers (and their counsel) 
should always keep in mind that the right of access is no greater than the public's right of 
access. In general: 
 
• There is a right to access property that is open to the general public. 
• Not all property owned by the government is accessible by the public. 
• There is no right to enter private property without the owner's permission. 
 
Even when with the right to access property, however, a reporter may be asked to leave by law 
enforcement or the owner of the property. In these situations, it is important that a reporter 
and the online publisher understand her rights ahead of time.  
 
The U.S. Constitution protects the right to speak and, in some instances, grants the right to 
access public places to gather information. The right to access public property is not absolute, 
however. Generally speaking, reporters have the same right of access to public property as the 
general public. Generally speaking, government officials and persons in possession of private 
property are the only figures who can restrict access to property. If one of these figures asks a 
reporter to leave when she believes she has a right to access, she should explain why she has 
the right to stay. They may say that the current circumstances are an exception, or she may be 
able to convince them to allow her to stay. In any case, she must take care – she can be charged 
with trespass for remaining if she does not have a right to remain there. 
 
This section covers access to public (i.e. government‐owned) property. (Refer to the section on 
Access to Private Property for more information on entering privately owned property.) Not all 
government‐owned property is open to the general public. Depending on the type of property 
reporters wish to enter, their right to access public places may be constrained by reasonable 
time, place, or manner restrictions, or by the government's interest in managing its property. 
 
Here is an overview of the three types of public property most commonly encountered: 
 
Property That Historically Has Been Open to the Public 
 

1 
 
 

The right to access public property is strongest when the area has historically been open to the 
public for the exercise of speech, public debate, and assembly. These areas are known as public 
forums and include spaces such as sidewalks, parks, and town squares. Reporters may freely 
enter and gather information while in these public spaces, but they should do so without 
disturbing the peace or interfering with those around them. Their right of access does not 
confer immunity from all liability if their conduct is disruptive or harassing. 
 
Property That Is Open to the Public for a Limited Purpose 
 
The right to access government‐owned property that is only partially open to the public is a bit 
more limited. If the general public is permitted to access only certain areas or for certain limited 
purposes, the right to access the property for newsgathering purposes is similarly limited. For 
example, some parts of a courthouse are open to the general public, but portions of the 
courtrooms themselves are accessible only by the parties in the litigation and judges' chambers 
are completely off limits to the public. 
 
However, some public property, even though it is open only for limited purposes, can take on 
the attributes of a public forum discussed above. A classic example of this type of property is 
public schools and universities. Although public school and university buildings are not wholly 
open to the public, some parts of a campus may be considered a public forum. If a school's 
large open quad is accessed from public sidewalks and streets and freely used by the general 
public with no apparent objection from the school administration, then the quad may be 
considered "dedicated" to public use, and therefore more like the traditional public forums of 
the public park and sidewalk. Additionally, if the school opens certain of its rooms for non‐
school meetings that are open to the public, those rooms, during those times, will be treated as 
public forums. 
 
Remember that because public schools are not entirely public forums, school administrators 
often have the discretion to restrict the entry of outsiders, particularly while the school is in 
session. Check in with the school administration before entering school grounds or the reporter 
may be liable for trespass. Additionally, some states laws prohibit people from loitering within a 
certain distance while school is in session. These "school loitering laws" are mainly aimed at 
keeping sexual predators and drug dealers away from schoolchildren, but be aware that their 
language may be broad enough to cover lawful or innocent activity as well. 
 
Property That Is Not Open To the Public 
 

2 
 
 

A reporter cannot access or gather information on government‐owned property that is not 
open to the general public. This type of property is known as a nonpublic forum in which the 
government can charge the reporter with trespass for entrance without authorization. The 
following are examples of nonpublic forums: 
 
An airport terminal is a nonpublic forum. See International Society for Krishna Consciousness v. 
Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992). The Supreme Court has noted that airports are "among those publicly 
owned facilities that could be closed to all except those who have legitimate business there." 
United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 178 (1983). 
 
Government‐owned civic centers, stadiums, or theaters used for private commercial purposes 
are not public forums. When the government leases a convention center, the private lessee 
may legally exclude individuals who want to report on newsworthy events. The event 
coordinators may even grant exclusive media coverage rights to a particular media outlet and 
deny access to others who want to cover the event (or at least deny them access in their 
capacities as journalists). 
 
A reporter may wish to access another's private property in order to gather information to 
publish online. However, while there are (rare) circumstances in which the law will condone A 
reporter’s entry onto private property without permission, in general the reporter does not 
have any right to enter the private property of others without their consent.  
 
Types of Private Property 
 
Residences: The term "private property" encompasses a wide variety of places, from 
homes to businesses open to the public. Courts are highly unsympathetic to those who try to 
gather news in private homes without consent, and if the reporter enters a private home 
without permission, she may be liable for invasion of privacy, trespass and, in certain cases, 
intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
 
In the 1940s, the Supreme Court took on the issue of "company towns" with regard to the First 
Amendment. Although the company town was private property owned by the company, the 
fact that it had been opened up to use by the public generally made it subject to the 
constitutional requirements of the First Amendment. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946). 
 
Today, there are fewer company towns; however, private, gated residential communities may 
occupy a similar niche. Visitors seeking access to a private residential community must usually 
announce themselves at the gate or receive permission from the development's security guards 

3 
 
 

in order to enter. It's often a wise idea to seek permission before entering such a community. 
But even if the reporter does not have express permission, the right to access will be strongest 
if the private residential community opens its gates to the public at large.  
 
Businesses: If the reporter tries to access businesses that do not open themselves up to 
the public, a reporter may be liable for trespass. However, as a member of the public the 
reporter will be able to access businesses open to the public without fear of liability. The 
reporter’s right of access does not necessarily translate into a right to gather information while 
she is there. The business has given her consent to use the premises as a patron, and her 
actions need to be within the scope of that use. 
 
For example, a restaurant consents to a person’s presence for her to enjoy eating a lovely meal 
in the company of good friends. In this scenario, taking notes about the food, ambiance, and 
service may be fine, whereas approaching other diners for interviews or for photographs likely 
oversteps the scope of the restaurant's consent, and she could be liable for trespass. Note that 
she may only access the areas of the business that are open to the public. Continuing our 
example, while she can enter a restaurant, she cannot go to the kitchen without additional 
permission. 
 
Shopping malls have come to occupy a place in modern communities akin to the town square 
or main street and thus are arguably public, rather than private, in nature. But unlike the 
traditional public forum of a town square, these establishments are privately owned places of 
business. Since the Supreme Court's decision in PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 
74 (1980), stating that there is no constitutional right to free speech in a private shopping mall, 
the law of access to shopping malls has largely been left to the states. State courts vary on the 
question of whether to allow access to shopping malls. Those that do find them to be public or 
quasi‐public forums still note that owners may impose reasonable time, place and manner 
restrictions on expression, provided the regulations are content‐neutral, narrowly tailored, and 
leave open sufficient alternative channels of communication. 
 
If a reporter wants to go to a shopping mall and gather information, try to avoid disrupting 
business activities. For example, it would be better to approach people walking in the corridors 
of the mall, or in the food court, than to attempt to talk to everyone entering or exiting. 
 
Entering Private Property While Accompanying Government Officials 
 
A reporter may be invited by law enforcement or other government officials to accompany 
them while they perform their duties. These types of situations are called "media ride‐alongs" 

4 
 
 

and can be a great way to gather information about how public officials handle their work. 
However, ride‐alongs may take the reporter to events occurring on private property. The 
Supreme Court has held that accompanying police in their execution of an arrest warrant in a 
private home may make the reporter liable for trespass. See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 
(1999). 
 
The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press has a terrific overview on how courts have 
treated trespass issues in media ride‐alongs. The issue is complex. As a rule of thumb: if the 
reporter is invited on a media ride‐along and enter private property, the reporter should get 
consent for her presence from the person in possession of the property. Additionally, she 
should note that depending upon the circumstances, her presence may jeopardize an 
investigation. Do not be surprised if the local law enforcement agency prohibits media ride‐
alongs altogether. 
 
Some suggestions to minimize the legal risks when entering the property of others include: 
 
• When in doubt, get consent from the person in possession of the property before 
entering. 
• Make sure the use of the property is consistent with the right to be there.  
• Do not make misrepresentations to gain access to public or private property.  
• Obtain a press pass or media credentials when possible. Depending on the forum or 
event, the owner of the property, local police, or other government agency may have a 
procedure for obtaining these passes. Government agencies sometimes require proof 
that a requester is a professional journalist, but in some cases the reporter may be able 
to qualify if she publishes a blog or website or by simply asserting that there is a public 
interest in publishing information from the forum or event.  
• Do not disturb the peace or harass people in order to get information when entering a 
business open to the public. 
• It's generally a good idea to refrain from interfering with subjects or disturbing the 
peace. Even if on public property, a reporter may face charges of harassment, assault, 
and the like. 
• Let the school know ahead of time for access to the campus or to interview students. 
• Don't loiter around a schoolyard. Get permission from school officials to be on the 
premises; most schools will not allow strangers to wander around without credentials. 
• When covering a breaking event, cooperate with authorities, police, and emergency 
personnel to be sure that the reporter is not interfering with rescue or other emergency 
efforts. 
 

5 
 
 

 
RECORDING CONVERSATIONS 
 
Using a recording device, such as a microphone, video recorder, or camera, is often a helpful 
way to capture and preserve information about conversations, interviews, and phone calls. It is 
also a good way to document what takes place in a court hearing or public meeting, whether 
for personal reference or later broadcast over the Internet. 
 
Federal and state wiretapping laws may limit the ability to record telephone calls or in‐person 
conversations (including by recording video that captures sound). These laws not only expose 
the person making the recording to the risk of criminal prosecution, but also potentially give an 
injured party a civil claim for money damages against the person making the recording. 
 
From a legal standpoint, the most important question in the recording context is whether a 
person making the recording must get consent from one or all of the parties to a phone call or 
conversation before recording it. Federal law and many state wiretapping statutes permit 
recording if one party (including the person making the recording) to the phone call or 
conversation consents. Other states require that all parties to the communication consent. 
 
Unfortunately, it is not always easy to tell which law applies to a communication, especially a 
phone call. For example, if the parties are in different states, then it is difficult to say in advance 
whether federal or state law applies, and if state law applies which of the two (or more) 
relevant state laws will control the situation. Therefore, a good rule of thumb is to get the 
consent of all parties. However, when all parties in the recording are both located in the same 
state, then you can rely with greater certainty on the law of that state. In some states, this 
means that only one party to the communication must consent. In others, all parties will need 
to consent.  
 
Who must give permission to record a telephone or in‐person conversation? 
 
Federal law permits recording telephone calls and in‐person conversations with the consent of 
at least one of the parties. See 18 U.S.C. 2511(2)(d). This is called a "one‐party consent" law. 
Under a one‐party consent law, you can record a phone call or conversation so long as you are 
a party to the conversation. Furthermore, if you are not a party to the conversation, a "one‐
party consent" law will allow you to record the conversation or phone call so long as your 
source consents and has full knowledge that the communication will be recorded. 
 

6 
 
 

In addition to federal law, thirty‐eight states and the District of Columbia have adopted "one‐
party consent" laws and permit individuals to record phone calls and conversations to which 
they are a party or when one party to the communication consents.  
 
When must you get permission from everyone involved before recording? 
 
Twelve states require the consent of every party to a phone call or conversation in order to 
make the recording lawful. These "two‐party consent" laws have been adopted in California, 
Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, 
Pennsylvania and Washington. Although they are referred to as "two‐party consent" laws, 
consent must be obtained from every party to a phone call or conversation if it involves more 
than two people.  
 
Can you record a phone call or conversation when YOU do not have consent from one 
of the parties? 
 
Regardless of whether state or federal law governs the situation, it is almost always illegal to 
record a phone call or private conversation to which you are not a party, do not have consent 
from at least one party, and could not naturally overhear. In addition, federal and many state 
laws do not permit you to surreptitiously place a bug or recording device on a person or 
telephone, in a home, office or restaurant to secretly record a conversation between two 
people who have not consented. 
 
Federal law and most state statutes also make disclosing the contents of an illegally intercepted 
telephone call illegal.  
 
Practical Tips for Recording Phone Calls and Conversations 
 
• Check the law of your state before recording a phone call or conversation. Recording 
phone calls and conversations without consent may expose you to criminal and civil 
liability, so you will want to be aware of what is permissible before taking action. Pay 
attention to your state’s consent requirement – i.e., whether one party’s consent is 
sufficient to make recording lawful, or whether all parties need to consent. 
• Play it safe and get consent to record from all the parties. In many states, the consent of 
one party is sufficient to make recording lawful. But the legal situation becomes more 
uncertain when parties to a phone call are located in different states. To avoid legal 
problems, it is best to get consent from all parties to this kind of multi‐state 

7 
 
 

conversation before recording. Even when all parties to a conversation are in the same 
place, it cannot hurt (and it may help) to get consent from everyone. 
• Get consent on tape. This is the best way to document that consent was obtained. As a 
practical matter, this will require: (1) notifying the person of the intent to record; (2) 
getting consent off‐the‐record;  (3) starting the recording and then (4) asking the person 
to confirm on‐the‐record that she consents to the recording. 
• Don't be secretive. In some states, secret recording is a violation of the law even in a 
public place. Whenever possible, make it clear to those around that a recording is being 
made. Being upfront puts people on notice that they are being recorded, affords them 
the opportunity to object. 
 
RECORDING PUBLIC MEETINGS AND COURT HEARINGS 
 
Generally speaking, attendees are free to record a meeting of a government body required to 
be open to the public by law through note‐taking, sound and video recording devices, and 
photography, so long as the method of recording used is reasonable and not disruptive. The 
ability to do so, however, is based largely on state open meetings laws, and the details of these 
laws vary significantly. At least one court has held that there is no federal constitutional right to 
make a video recording of an open meeting, at least not when other methods are available for 
compiling a record of the proceeding, such as written and stenographic notes or audio taping. 
Whiteland Woods, LLP v. Township of W. Whiteland, 193 F.3d 177 (3rd Cir. 1999). Government 
bodies may therefore place reasonable restrictions on the use recording devices, including a 
ban on certain devices, in order to preserve the orderly conduct of its meetings. 
 
Even when no state open meetings law affirmatively gives the the right to record, many state 
statutes permit the recording of speeches and conversations that take place where the parties 
may reasonably expect to be recorded. If a reporter is attending a meeting that is open to the 
public, it is likely that the people running a meeting or giving a speech should reasonably 
assume that they might be recorded. However, it is well‐advised to always take reasonable 
steps to make clear that the reporter is recording. Concealing a camera or recording equipment 
is not a good idea. 
 
The law regarding the use of audio and video recording devices in court hearings varies a great 
deal based on the state. In Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560 (1981), the U.S. Supreme Court 
held that the federal Constitution does not prohibit states from allowing cameras in the 
courtroom and that states may adopt their own rules permitting such recording equipment. 
Note that this ruling does not require states to allow recording in the courtroom, it only says 
that states may choose to do so. Since this ruling, all fifty states have adopted rules on the 

8 
 
 

topic, but the rules vary widely. In some states, cameras and recording equipment are 
permitted in trial and appellate court proceedings, while in others recording is only allowed in 
appellate court proceedings. Most states give the court discretion to impose reasonable 
restrictions on the use of cameras and recording equipment in order to maintain the integrity 
of its proceedings and to otherwise serve the interests of justice. 
 
The federal appellate courts may adopt their own rules regarding cameras and recording 
equipment in the courtroom. At the time of writing, only the Second Circuit and the Ninth 
Circuit Courts of Appeals allow recording equipment. 
 
Practical Tips for Recording Public Meetings and Court Hearings 
 
Using a recording device, such as a microphone, video recorder, or camera, is a helpful way to 
capture and preserve information about conversations, interviews, and phone calls. It is also a 
good way to document what takes place in a court hearing or public meeting, whether for 
personal reference or later broadcast over the Internet. Here are some practical tips to 
minimize legal risks when recording conversations, phone calls, meetings, and hearings. 
   
• Check the law before showing up. State law varies greatly, especially when it comes to 
recording in the courtroom. Looking into the law ahead of time can help the reporter 
understand what's possible and the requirements to meet ahead of time.  
• Notify the clerk of the court or the governmental body holding the meeting well ahead 
of time. Many state laws require that permission be granted in advance in order to 
record in a courtroom. This requirement is less common with respect to public 
meetings, but it may still be useful to advise the governmental body in question of a 
plan to record.  
• Don't be secretive. In some states, recording secretly is a violation of the law, even in a 
public place like a meeting or courtroom.  
 
 
THE INTERNET AND SOCIAL MEDIA IN THE COURTROOM 
 
  Courts are addressing the extent to which Internet and new media resources should be 
available to courtroom observers and jurors.  In two separate cases, state judges in Colorado 
and Ohio recently took action against courtroom observers who used social media technology 
in court.   
   

9 
 
 

On February 16, Dwayne Davenport went on trial for the fatal shooting of Michael 
Grissett in East Cleveland on January 16, 2009.  (Two other defendants in the case pleaded 
guilty, and are awaiting sentencing.) As reported by the Cleveland Plain Dealer, on the second 
day of trial jurors noticed that Andre Block (the defendant's friend) and Dwight Davenport (the 
defendant's cousin), who were seated in the back row of the courtroom observing the trial, 
were pointing the above‐mentioned devices at the jury.  After jurors complained to Common 
Pleas Judge Nancy Margaret Russo, she ordered Block and Dwight Davenport arrested for 
contempt of court and declared a mistrial in the case.  
 
  At a hearing on the contempt citation held on February 25, Judge Russo told Block and 
Dwight Davenport that they were guilty of "intimidating and frightening my jury," and that their 
actions had made the jurors fearful of jury service, forcing the mistrial. Block, who used a Flip 
phone to record about eight minutes of the proceedings, claimed that he was taking video of 
the defendant, his friend Dwayne Davenport, to remember him in case Davenport was sent to 
prison. Judge Russo sentenced Block to 60 days in prison. And Dwight Davenport claimed that 
he used his cell phone to send a text message to his girlfriend; no video or photographs of 
jurors were found on his phone.  But Judge Russo rejected this claim. "You were seen by more 
than one person pointing it at the jury," she said in sentencing Davenport to 30 days in jail. "You 
knew full well what you were doing."  
 
  After the incident, several signs were posted in the Cuyahoga County courthouse 
forbidding the use of recording devices and requiring cell phones to be shut off.  Ohio's court 
rules, which were written before the advent of social media technology, allow for broadcasting 
of court proceedings with the permission of the presiding judge.  Victims and witnesses have 
the right to object to being filmed, videotaped, recorded or photographed, Rule 12(C)(2), but 
there is no such provision for jurors (although Rule 12(C)(4) provides that "Media 
representatives shall not be permitted to transmit or record anything other than the court 
proceedings from the courtroom while the court is in session," which arguably could prohibit 
text messaging, tweeting, and other social media dispatches from courtrooms).  Another Ohio 
court has banned most cell phones and similar devices from the courthouse.  
  This is not the first case in which pointing a cell phone has been held to constitute 
intimidation.  In Commonwealth v. Casiano, 876 N.E.2d 475 (Mass. Ct. App. 2007), a 
Massachusetts appeals court upheld a witness intimidation conviction against a defendant who 
pointed a cell phone at an undercover officer in a courtroom hallway while the officer was 
waiting to testify against the defendant.  "It is irrelevant whether any photographs were taken," 
Associate Justice R. Marc Kantrowitz wrote for the court, "as the police officer was made to 
believe that the defendant was taking pictures of him and could disseminate his likeness, an act 
intended to intimidate."  Casiano, at 479.  

10 
 
 

 
  Another recent incident arose during the Colorado murder case against Willie Clark, 
accused of killing Denver Broncos cornerback Darrent Williams. Judge Christina Habas has 
imposed strict restrictions on trial observers, including a prohibition on all communications 
from the courtroom, whether by blogging, text messaging, or other means, and a ban on 
cameras and cell phones from an entire section of the courthouse.  
 
  Despite these restrictions, numerous signs in the courthouse summarizing the rules, 
security checkpoints at both the courthouse and courtroom doors, and an announcement of 
the cell phone ban at the start of proceedings, Robert Forto—who was covering the case for his 
blog—had his iPhone with him in the courtroom.  His daughter called him, then his wife sent 
him a text message, and then his daughter left a voicemail.  Forto texted his daughter, saying "I 
can't talk right now."  
 
  A sheriff's deputy saw Forto send the text message and removed Forto from the 
courtroom and took his cell phone. After about an hour, during a recess in the trial, Forto was 
called before Judge Habas, who according to KMGH‐TV explained: "What you did was a 
contempt (of court). It was a direct violation of my order, even if it was well intentioned."  
Under the terms of the order, Habas banned Forto from the courtroom, but permitted him to 
watch the trial in the overflow room. 
 
  But it’s not just observers’ use of technology that is coming under scrutiny.  In January, a 
Florida trial court judge banned a Florida Times‐Union reporter from live‐blogging during a 
high‐profile murder trial in the Fourth Judicial Circuit Court of Duval County, Florida. Although 
an appeals court reversed the trial judge's initial ruling, the judge ultimately retained the 
restrictions on the use of media in the courtroom.  
 
  The case in question, dubbed the Dubose Murder Trial, involved three brothers being 
tried for the murder of a 9‐year‐old girl. It had attracted significant public interest in the 
Jacksonville area. During the first day and a half of trial, reporter Bridget Murphy was sending 
periodic updates from her laptop in the courtroom to a dedicated blog page on the Times‐
Union's Jacksonville.com website. According to documents filed with the court, after the first 
day of live online coverage the blog had received over 1,000 hits and was laden with 
commentary from interested readers. Even the State Attorney for the Fourth Judicial Circuit, 
Angela Corey, who had stopped by the trial in a supervisory capacity on the first day, said she 
was a fan of the live coverage and called the blog "awesome," according to the newspaper's 
petition appealing the judge’s initial ruling prohibiting live blogging.  
 

11 
 
 

  On the second day of trial, Circuit Judge L. Page Haddock expelled Murphy and her 
laptop from the courtroom. The ban was raised sua sponte, with Judge Haddock telling a Times‐
Union attorney, "They’re distracting the jurors; they’re distracting me."  He also stated that 
blogging live from the courtroom violated a Florida Supreme Court order about how many 
transmitting devices are allowed in the courtroom. Pursuant to regular court practice in the 
jurisdiction, one television camera and one still photographer were also covering the 
proceedings, and Judge Haddock ruled that only two devices total were permitted.  
 
  Later, it became clear that Judge Haddock was relying on Judicial Administration Rule 
2.450, which says that electronic media and still photography coverage of public judicial 
proceedings "shall be allowed" subject to the court's discretion, and provides that "at least 1 
portable television camera," "[n]ot more than 1 still photographer," and "[n]ot more than 1 
audio system for radio broadcast" shall be permitted in any trial or appellate court proceeding.  
 
  The next day, Judge Haddock amended his order, stating that he would allow laptops, 
but that Rule 2.450 imposed a limitation of two total devices in the courtroom at any one time. 
Therefore, if Murphy wanted to continue her coverage, she could only do so if either the still 
camera or the video camera were not being used.  
 
  The Times‐Union attorneys filed an emergency motion before the District Court of 
Appeal for the First District of Florida, requesting that laptop use be permitted at the trial. The 
appeals court granted the motion in‐part, holding that Rule 2.450 does not apply to laptops, 
even when used to live‐blog:  
The rule does not apply to the use of laptop computers, regardless of whether the 
device is used to transmit information outside the courtroom. The trial court retains the 
authority, however, to prohibit the use of any device which as a factual matter, the 
court finds causes a disruption of proceedings.  
 
Morris Pub. Co. v. Florida, No. 1D10‐226 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Jan. 20, 2010.  While the 
appeals court disagreed with Judge Haddock's legal reasoning, its ruling recognized his 
continuing authority to prohibit the use of laptops if it caused a disruption. The appeals court 
decision thus left open to Judge Haddock the possibility of going back to his very first 
justification for prohibiting live blogging of the trial.   After reading the appellate court's order 
in open court, Judge Haddock stated: "For now, my ruling about devices is going to stay the way 
it is." 
 
  Just as the Internet and digital devices have made it easier for bloggers and other media 
to disseminate information on a trial, these technologies also have made it easier for jurors to 

12 
 
 

conduct independent research related to the trial.  This, in turn, prompted the U.S. Judicial 
Conference—which sets policies for all federal courts except the Supreme Court— to 
disseminate this past January new suggested jury instructions on "juror use of electronic 
communication technologies" during trial.  
 
  The suggested instruction to be used before trial states:  
You, as jurors, must decide this case based solely on the evidence presented here within 
the four walls of this courtroom. This means that during the trial you must not conduct 
any independent research about this case, the matters in the case, and the individuals 
or corporations involved in the case. In other words, you should not consult dictionaries 
or reference materials, search the internet, websites, blogs, or use any other electronic 
tools to obtain information about this case or to help you decide the case. Please do not 
try to find out information from any source outside the confines of this courtroom.   
 
The pre‐trial instruction also admonishes jurors that they must not discuss the case with 
anyone, including fellow jurors.  The suggested instruction also includes a laundry list of 
technologies that jurors should not use:  
You may not communicate with anyone about the case on your cell phone, through e‐
mail, Blackberry, iPhone, text messaging, or on Twitter, through any blog or website, 
through any internet chat room, or by way of any other social networking websites, 
including Facebook, My Space, LinkedIn, and YouTube.    
 
The suggested post‐trial instruction, to be given before the jury begins to deliberate, includes a 
more extensive list:  
During your deliberations, you must not communicate with or provide any information 
to anyone by any means about this case. You may not use any electronic device or 
media, such as a telephone, cell phone, smart phone, iPhone, Blackberry or computer; 
the internet, any internet service, or any text or instant messaging service; or any 
internet chat room, blog, or website such as Facebook, My Space, LinkedIn, YouTube or 
Twitter, to communicate to anyone any information about this case or to conduct any 
research about this case until I accept your verdict.   
 
  The Judicial Conference's Committee on Court Administration and Case Management,  
which approved the suggested instructions in December, notes in a preface to the instructions 
that the committee thought it was important to specifically identify the technologies and 
services that jurors should not use: 

13 
 
 

The Committee believes that more explicit mention in jury instructions of the various 
methods and modes of electronic communication and research would help jurors better 
understand and adhere to the scope of the prohibition against the use of these devices. 
 
  The new guidelines follow a spate of cases where appeals courts have overturned jury 
verdicts because of social media use by jurors during trial.  One of the earliest cases to do so 
was a 2003 Colorado case in which the state's Court of Appeals overturned a defentant’s 
conviction based on a juror’s Internet research. In People v. Wadle, 77 P.3d 764 (Colo. App. 
2003), aff'd, 97 P.3d 932 (Colo. 2004), a juror in a criminal trial had done research online about 
the drug Paxil, which the defendant accused of murdering her step‐grandson had taken, and 
shared that research with other jurors.  The trial court denied a motion for a new trial, but the 
appeals court reversed, holding that  
Although the Internet has made information more accessible for the average person, 
the information obtained thereby may be misleading, taken out of context, outdated, or 
simply inaccurate. . . In view of the problems and dangers associated with the 
unsupervised use of the Internet, trial courts should emphasize that jurors should not 
consult the Internet, or any other extraneous materials, at any time during the trial, 
including during deliberations.  
77 P.3d at 771.  
 
  More recently, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals had declared mistrials in two 
cases based on juror’s Internet research. In Wardlaw v. State, No. 1478/07, 185 Md. App. 440 
(Md. Ct. Special App. May 8, 2009), the trial court had instructed the jurors not to investigate 
the case in any way beyond the evidence presented in court.  Yet, despite this admonition, a 
juror in the trial of Zarzine Wardlaw used the Internet to independently research the definition 
of "oppositional defiant disorder," and whether lying is a part of the illness.  During the trial, a 
therapist testified that she had diagnosed a key witness as having the disorder. The trial judge 
learned of the research in a note from the jury, and Wardlaw's attorney moved for a mistrial.  
Instead, the judge instructed the jury that it could base its verdict only on the evidence 
presented in court.  But 30 minutes after the jury resumed deliberations, both the prosecutor 
and defense counsel moved for a mistrial based on the juror's Internet research.  The trial court 
denied this motion.  
 
  The appellate court, in a unanimous, three‐judge decision, concluded that the trial 
court's failure to question the jurors about the influence of the Internet research required a 
reversal:  
[T]he juror’s internet research of ODD, and her subsequent reporting of her finding, 
rightly or wrongly, that lying is associated with the disorder, constituted egregious 

14 
 
 

misconduct. . . .  Given the fact that his misconduct came to light while the jury was still 
deliberating, and was presumptively prejudicial to either the State or appellant, it was 
incumbent upon the trial court to voir dire the jurors to determine whether they could 
still render an impartial verdict based solely on the evidence presented at trial. . . .  
In this case, the trial court did not voir dire the jury, but instead gave a curative 
instruction admonishing the jury not to conduct outside research and reminding them 
that they were to render a verdict based only on the evidence presented at trial. It was 
error for the court to do so, because a specific inquiry into the thought processes of the 
jury was the only method of ascertaining whether the information about ODD, acquired 
through the juror’s internet research, improperly and irreparably influenced the jury’s 
deliberative process to the prejudice of appellant or the State.  
Wardlaw v. State, slip op. at 10‐11.  
 
  A different three‐judge panel of the same court reached the same conclusion in Allan 
Jake Clark v. State of Maryland, No. No. 0953/08 (Md. Ct. Special App. Dec. 3, 2009). In Clark, a 
bailiff discovered printouts from Wikipedia articles in the jury room.  The printouts, which were 
entries on "livor mortis" and "algor mortis," touched on an issue in the murder case—namely, 
how the time and place of death may be determined by looking at how blood settles in a body.  
The court questioned the jurors and determined that only one juror had done outside research 
and seen the articles. The jury convicted Clark of first‐degree murder, and the trial judge denied 
a defense motion for a mistrial. The appeals court reversed in another unanimous decision, 
holding that an "adverse influence on a single juror compromises the impartiality of the entire 
jury panel" (quoted in The Baltimore Sun).   
 
  A New Jersey appeals court panel reached a similar conclusion in July 2009.  In State of 
New Jersey v. Scott, 2009 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1901 (N.J. App. Div. July 20, 2009), cert 
denied, 2009 N.J. LEXIS 1370 (N.J., Nov. 9, 2009), the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate 
Division, reversed the convictions of three cousins on aggravated manslaughter charges. During 
the trial, one of the jurors was very emotional, leaning forward and apparently crying.  Queried 
in chambers, the juror said that she could continue.  But after the jury began deliberations, 
another juror left a phone message for the trial judge over a weekend break, claiming that the 
emotional juror was acting improperly.   
 
  Questioned the following Monday, the complaining juror said that the emotional juror 
had announced to her fellow jurors that she had researched the defendants, the victims, and 
the possible sentence for conviction on the Internet, but had not revealed the results of her 
research.  The complaining juror added that the emotional juror had also read—and tried to 

15 
 
 

hide—a newspaper in the jury room, and had announced at the start of deliberations that she 
had already made her decision, and held up a piece of paper with her decision.  
 
  When questioned, the emotional juror denied doing research on the Internet and said 
that she had seen only a headline about the case in the newspaper.  And, according to the 
appellate court, "[s]he also admitted to holding up a piece of paper with 'something written on 
it' but claimed that she was 'told to' do that 'specific thing.'"  New Jersey v. Scott, slip op., para. 
34. The trial judge then questioned the other ten jurors. Four jurors confirmed that the 
emotional juror said either that she had done research online or knew where such research 
could be done online. But only one of these jurors recalled the emotional juror mentioning 
anything she found in that research; the juror said that she had mentioned the possible 
sentence for the original murder charges in the case.  One juror remembered that someone had 
mentioned that information about the case was available online, but did not recall who had 
made this statement. And the remaining three jurors did not recall hearing anything about 
Internet research.  Based on the emotional juror's failure to admit her apparent violation of the 
court's instructions, the trial court replaced that juror with an alternate.  But he denied a 
mistrial, holding that the remaining jurors were not tainted.  
 
  The appeals court disagreed with this assessment, concluding that "juror 14's 
misconduct tainted the jury as a whole."  New Jersey v. Scott, slip op., para. 52. Citing New 
Jersey precedent holding that "[a] deliberating juror may not be discharged and replaced with 
an alternate unless the record 'adequately establish[es] that the juror suffers from an inability 
to function that is personal and unrelated to the juror's interaction with the other jury 
members,'" State v. Jenkins, 182 N.J. 112, 124‐25 (2004), the appeals court held that in this case 
"a mistrial should have been declared. Failure to do so constitutes reversible error. The error 
requires a new trial."  New Jersey v. Scott, slip op., para. 52  
 
  In another case, a federal district court judge declared a mistrial in a complex drug 
prosecution after discovering that 10 of the 12 jurors had done independent Internet research 
on the case. U.S. v. Frank Hernandez, Crim. No. 07‐60027 (S.D. Fla. mistrial declared March 10, 
2009).  As in the other cases, the jurors' research came to light through questioning by the 
judge, after one juror sent a note saying that another juror had done research.  
 
 

16 
 
Media Law in the Digital Age: The Rules Have Changed, Have You? 

UPDATE ON THE FREE FLOW OF INFORMATION ACT 
CITIZEN MEDIA LAW PROJECT 
  The United State Congress is currently considering two versions of a federal reporters’ 
shield bill, both dubbed the “Free Flow of Information Act.”  The House passed H.R. 985 in 
March 2009 by a voice vote. In December 2009, the Senate Judiciary Committee voted fourteen 
to five to send S. 448 to the floor of the Senate for a vote. That bill was subsequently placed on 
the Senate calendar, where it awaits a final vote. Assuming it passes, the Senate and House bills 
will need to be reconciled—likely through the conference committee process—to arrive at a 
final piece of legislation.  
  While both the House and Senate versions provide a qualified privilege to reporters in 
federal proceedings, they differ substantially regarding what type of information is covered and 
who can invoke the privilege.  The salient provisions of both bills are summarized below. 
 Senate Version 
  The Senate bill—S. 448—only protects the identity of confidential sources and 
newsgathering material obtained upon a promise of confidentiality. It defines “protected 
information” as “(A) information identifying a source who provided information under a 
promise . . . of confidentiality . . . as part of engaging in journalism; or (B) any records, contents 
of a communication, documents, or information that a covered person obtained or created—(i) 
as part of engaging in journalism; and  (ii) upon a [confidentiality] promise or agreement.” S. 
448, §11(6).  The bill leaves intact any common law protections available for sources or 
newsgathering information obtained in the absence of a confidentiality agreement. Id. §6(c). 
  S. 448 originally limited protection to "salaried employee[s]" and independent 
contractors for established news media organizations, but amendments in late October 
expanded coverage to reach anyone carrying out a reporter’s function.  The bill now defines 
“covered person” as anyone who  
(i) with the primary intent to investigate events and procure material in order to 
disseminate to the public news or information concerning local, national, or 
international events or other matters of public interest, regularly gathers, prepares, 
collects, photographs, records, writes, edits, reports or publishes on such matters . . . [; 
who] (ii) has such intent at the inception of the process of gathering the news or 
information sought; and (iii) obtains the news or information sought in order to 
disseminate the news or information by means of print . . . , broadcasting . . . , 
mechanical, photographic, electronic, or other means . . . .  

1 
 
Media Law in the Digital Age: The Rules Have Changed, Have You? 

Id. §11(2)(A). The omission of language restricting the bill to salaried employees or independent 
contractors strongly suggests that the term “covered entity” reaches bloggers and non‐
traditional and amateur journalists who gather news for dissemination to the public. 
  In a civil matter, the qualified privilege may be overcome if the federal court finds: (1) 
the party seeking disclosure has exhausted all reasonable alternative sources for acquiring the 
protected information; (2) the testimony or document sought is essential to resolution of the 
matter; and (3) the party seeking disclosure has established that the interest in compelling 
disclosure clearly outweighs the public interest in disseminating the news and the free flow of 
information. Id. § 2(a)(2)(B). 
  In a criminal matter, the qualified privilege may be overcome if the federal court finds: 
(1) the party seeking disclosure has exhausted all reasonable alternative sources for acquiring 
the protected information; (2) if the party seeking to compel disclosure is the Federal 
Government, based on public information or information obtained from a source other than 
the covered person, there are reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has occurred; (3) 
based on public information or information obtained from a source other than the covered 
person, there are reasonable grounds to believe that the protected information sought is 
essential to the investigation or prosecution or to the defense against the prosecution; (4) the 
Attorney General certifies that the decision to request compelled disclosure was made in a 
manner consistent with section 50.10 of title 28, Code of Federal Regulations, if compelled 
disclosure is sought by a member of the Department of Justice in circumstances governed by 
section 50.10 of title 28, Code of Federal Regulations; and (5) the covered person has not 
established by clear and convincing evidence that disclosure of the protected information 
would be contrary to the public interest, taking into account both the public interest in 
gathering and disseminating the information or news at issue and maintaining the free flow of 
information and the public interest in compelling disclosure (including the extent of any harm 
to national security). Id. § 2(a)(2)(A). 
S. 448 also contains several exceptions.  For instance, the shield does not protect any 
information, record, document, or item obtained as the result of the eyewitness observations 
of, or obtained during the course of, alleged criminal conduct by the reporter. Id. § 3(a).  This 
exception does not apply when the alleged criminal conduct is the act of communicating the 
documents or information at issue.  Id. § 3(b). The shield also does not apply when the 
information sought is reasonably necessary to prevent or mitigate death, kidnapping, 
substantial bodily harm, or destruction of critical infrastructure. Id. § 4. Further still, there is an 
exception for cases where information is sought to prevent terrorist activity or harm to national 
security. Id. §5.  
House Version 

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Media Law in the Digital Age: The Rules Have Changed, Have You? 

  The House bill—H.R. 985—is similar to the Senate’s version, but there are some 
important differences.  Significantly, H.R. 985 extends the shield’s qualified privilege to  any 
documents or information obtained during the newsgathering process, not just sources or 
material obtained in return for a promise of confidentiality.  The bill states that a federal entity 
may not compel a covered person to “provide testimony or produce any document related to 
information obtained or created by such covered person as part of engaging in journalism.” 
H.R. 985, § 2(a).  
  H.R. 985 is less expansive than the Senate bill in terms of who enjoys the shield’s 
protection. It limits protection to those who gather news "for a substantial portion of the 
person's livelihood or for substantial financial gain." Id. § 4(2).1 This language would probably 
exclude many bloggers and student journalists, and even some freelancers who don't get paid 
well.  The definition of “covered person” also excludes persons and organizations identified as 
foreign powers, agents of foreign powers, terrorists, and terrorist organizations.  Id. § 4(2)(A)‐
(E). 
  In a civil matter, the qualified privilege may be overcome if the federal court finds: (1) 
the party seeking disclosure has exhausted all reasonable alternative sources for acquiring the 
protected information; (2) the testimony or document sought is critical to the successful 
completion of the matter; and (3) the public interest in compelling disclosure of the information 
or document involved outweighs the public interest in gathering or disseminating news or 
information. Id. § 2(a)(1), ‐(a)(2)(B), ‐(a)(4).  With respect to the third element, H.R. 985 gives 
the court authority to consider the extent of any harm to national security in conducting the 
balancing test. Id. §2(b). 
If the testimony or document sought could reveal the identity of a source, the privilege 
is only overcome if a court finds that disclosure is necessary to one of the following ends: (1) 
prevention (or identification of a perpetrator) of terrorism;  (2) prevention of “significant and 
specified” national security harms; (3) prevention of substantial bodily harm or imminent 
death; (4) identification of someone who has disclosed a trade secret; or (5) identification of 
someone who “without authorization disclosed properly classified information and who at the 
time of such disclosure had authorized access to such information . . .” Id. §2(a)(3).  
In a criminal matter, the qualified privilege may be overcome by the same showing as 
above, with the additional requirement that, based on information obtained from a person 
other than the covered person, (1) there are reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has 

                                                             
1
   The House bill defines "covered person" as “a person who regularly gathers, photographs, records, 
writes, edits, reports, or publishes information concerning matters of public interest for dissemination to the 
public for a substantial portion of the person's livelihood or substantial financial gain, including a supervisor, 
employer, parent, subsidiary, or affiliate of such a person.”  H.R. 985, §4(2). 

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Media Law in the Digital Age: The Rules Have Changed, Have You? 

occurred; and (2) the testimony or document sought is critical to the investigation or 
prosecution or to the defense against the prosecution. Id. § 2(a)(2)(A).   
  The House bill excludes from protection any information, record, document, or item 
obtained by the reporter as a result of eyewitness observation of alleged criminal conduct, or as 
a result of the commission of alleged criminal or tortious conduct by the reporter.  The 
exception does not apply when the alleged criminal or tortious conduct is the act of 
transmitting or communicating the information, record, or document in question.  Id. §2(e). 
  H.R. 985 contains a provision stating that the proposed federal shield will not apply to 
“civil defamation, slander, or libel claims or defenses under State law, regardless of whether or 
not such claims or defenses, respectively, are raised in a State or Federal court.” Id. § 2(d). 
 

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Media Law in the Digital Age: The Rules Have Changed, Have You? 

STATE SHIELD LAWS: AN OVERVIEW 
CITIZEN MEDIA LAW PROJECT 

  The United States Supreme Court last addressed the constitutionality of a reporter’s 
privilege in Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). The journalists in the consolidated 
Branzburg cases argued that the free flow of information would be chilled if they could not 
ensure the anonymity of sources.1 If a reporter’s privilege does not exist to protect journalists 
from disclosing unpublished information, they argued, sources will be less likely to speak and 
the First Amendment will be greatly harmed.2 Though sympathetic to their case, the court 
clearly held that (1) there is no privilege to refuse to appear before a grand jury until the 
government demonstrates a compelling need for the testimony; and (2) there is no privilege to 
refuse to answer questions that directly relate to criminal conduct that a journalist has 
observed and written about.3 
  Despite the 5‐4 ruling against a reporter’s privilege, the court did say that there is “merit 
in leaving state legislatures free, within First Amendment limits, to fashion their own 
standards.”4 Nearly 40 years after Branzburg and as of November of last year, 37 states and the 
District of Columbia have some form of a shield law. Thirteen states do not and of those only 8 
recognize a qualified reporter’s privilege based on their state constitutions, common law or the 
First Amendment. Of those states that do have a shield law or recognize a qualified privilege, 
the protection granted to journalists varies. The most contentious issues concern the scope of 
protection:  
• Who is protected? Full‐time employees of larger, traditional media organizations, for 
example, or part‐time online journalists as well? 
• What is protected? The identities of sources or notes and materials too? Are confidential 
and non‐confidential materials protected equally? Is an eye‐witness account of a journalist 
protected? 
• How strong is the protection? What balancing tests do courts use when determining if a 
reporter’s privilege applies? 
  As states continue to enact and refine their shield laws, the answers to these questions 
become more clear. But the inconsistency among shield laws remains. Efforts to pass federal 
shield law legislation, though recently amplified, continue to stall and in the words of one court, 
Branzburg will not be overturned. Said the D.C. Circuit after rejecting a reporter’s privilege 
argument in 2006: “Unquestionably, the Supreme Court decided in Branzburg that there is no 
                                                             
1
   Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 679‐81 (1972). 
2
   Id. 
3
   Id. at 708. 
4
   Id. at 706. 

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Media Law in the Digital Age: The Rules Have Changed, Have You? 

First Amendment privilege protecting journalists from appearing before a grand jury or from 
testifying before a grand jury or otherwise providing evidence to a grand jury regardless of any 
confidence promised by the reporter to any source. The Highest Court has spoken and never 
revisited the question. Without a doubt, that is the end of the matter.”5 When it comes to 
forcing journalists to testify, state law may be the last line of defense. 
Who is Protected? 
  Maryland enacted the first state shield law in 1896, responding to the imprisonment of 
a Baltimore Sun reporter for refusing to reveal a confidential source to a grand jury. Technology 
changed considerably since then, providing new media through which journalists can report. 
While most shield laws protect print and broadcast journalists, states have been slow to include 
new media and bloggers.  
  Current shield laws largely focus on “traditional” forms of journalism. Alabama’s shield 
law, for example, protects only journalists at “any newspaper, radio broadcasting station or 
television station.”6 The same for Kentucky7 and Ohio.8 Florida’s shield law covers only those 
journalists who work as a salaried employee or independent contractor of “a newspaper, news 
journal, news agency, press association, wire service, radio or television station, network, or 
news magazine.”9 The statute explicitly excludes book authors and those who are not 
professional journalists, meaning those who do not gather news for “gain or livelihood.”10 
Georgia also excludes any journalist whose work is not published in a “newspaper, book, 
magazine, or [on] radio or television broadcast.”11 New York provides absolute protection for a 
journalist’s confidential information and sources;12 but a “journalist,” according to the state’s 
shield law, is only one who is paid for his or her reporting.13 In Texas, a journalist is one who 
gathers news “for a substantial portion of the person’s livelihood or for a substantial financial 
gain.”14  
  Legislation that defines a journalist by income or a particular type of media is 
nonsensical, wrote John Eden of the Partnership for a Secure America, a bipartisan foreign 
policy think tank.15 “In an era of instantaneous dissemination of information over the Internet 

                                                             
5
   In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 438 F.3d 1141, 1147 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
6
   Ala. Code § 12‐21‐142 (1986). 
7
   Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. 421.100 (Baldwin 1990). 
8
   Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 2739.04, §§ 2739.12 (Baldwin 1981 & 1990 Supp). 
9
   Fla. Stat. § 90.5015(1)(a) (1998). 
10
   Id. 
11
   Ga. Code Ann. § 24‐9‐30 (1993). 
12
   N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 79‐h(b). 
13
   Id. at § 79‐h(a)(6). 
14
   H.B. 670, 81st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2009). 
15
   John Eden, The Partnership for a Secure America, Fixing the Federal Shield Law, Sept. 24, 2009 
http://blog.psaonline.org/2009/09/24/fixing‐the‐federal‐shield‐law/ (last visited April 6, 2010). 

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Media Law in the Digital Age: The Rules Have Changed, Have You? 

by bloggers and other part‐time pundits, it’s hard to see why the privilege should be limited to 
journalists who are getting paid to collect news,” Eden said.16 “If what we care about is getting 
the most up‐to‐date, accurate information, why should it matter whether a blogger or a CNN 
reporter has delivered the news to us?”17 
  Whether or not an individual should be considered a journalist under shield laws “has to 
do more with the function that person is performing,” said Gregg Leslie, legal director for the 
Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press.18 “If the blogger’s involvement is to report 
information to the public and to gather information for that purpose openly then they should 
be treated like a journalist.”19 
  There are several bills sitting in state legislatures that would extend shield law 
protection to bloggers. Massachusetts, one of the states without a shield law, is currently 
debating a bill that defines a journalist by his or her actions — engagement in “bona fide news 
gathering” — rather than for whom the journalist is employed.20 It also describes the “news 
media” not as a traditional print or broadcast entity, but as any organization that “is in the 
regular business of news gathering and disseminating news or information to the public by any 
means, including but not limited to, print broadcast, photographic, mechanical, internet, or 
electronic distribution (emphasis added).”21 New York considered an extension of its current 
shield law to “journalist bloggers.”22 Its law now covers only print, broadcast and wire 
services.23 Kansas is on the verge of passing perhaps the most progressive shield law, one that 
explicitly provides coverage to “online journal[s]” that are engaged in “the regular business of 
newsgathering and disseminating news or information to the public.”24 The bill offers 
protection based primarily on whether an individual engages in journalism, not whether he or 
she is a professional journalist.25 That means student journalists could be covered as well. 
   
  In Hawaii, it doesn’t matter. That state protects those whom disseminate information to 
the public “by means of tangible or electronic media.”26 Though the wording of California’s 
                                                             
16
   Id. 
17
   Id. 
18
   The First Amendment Center, Blogging Overview, http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/press/ 
topic.aspx?topic=blogging, (last visited April 6, 2010). 
19
   Id. 
20
   Massachusetts House Bill 1650 §2 (2009) 
21
   Id. 
22
   Sewell Chan, The New York Times, Bill Would Extend Shield Law to Cover Bloggers, May 20, 2009 
http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/05/20/bill‐would‐extend‐shield‐law‐to‐cover‐bloggers/ (last visited April 
7, 2010). 
23
   New York Civil Rights Law Article 7 § 79‐h. 
24
   Kansas Senate Substitute for House Bill No. 2585 (2010). 
25
   Id. 
26
   Hi. ALS 210 (2008). 

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Media Law in the Digital Age: The Rules Have Changed, Have You? 

shield law implies coverage for traditional media only, a 2006 ruling extended that coverage to 
online news sites as well.27 Nebraska’s Free Flow of Information Act is one of the more liberal. 
Its shield law doesn’t use the word “journalist” at all but instead protects any “person engaged 
in procuring, gathering, writing, editing, or disseminating  news or other information.”28 The 
types of media covered by the statute include, but are not limited to, “any newspaper, 
magazine, other periodical, book, pamphlet, news service, wire service, news or feature 
syndicate, broadcast station or network, or cable television system.”29  
  This type of statute begs the question: Why define “news media” at all? A broad 
definition of “professional journalist” may be the only thing that’s needed, said Lucy Dalglish, 
executive director of the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press.30 Critiquing New 
York’s recent effort to expand its shield law last year, Dalglish noted that “blogging is a 
technology and a method of delivery.”31 
  “Some people are doing valuable journalism when they blog. Others do not,” she said.32 
“What you are trying to protect is the journalism function, not the technology or the 
platform.”33 
What is Protected? 
  The most narrow shield laws and interpretations of a reporter’s privilege protect 
journalists only against the disclosure of anonymous sources. The most broad also protect them 
from disclosing confidential and non‐confidential materials, published and unpublished 
information, eye witness accounts and details about their news organization’s editorial process. 
  “The sources are not the only things sought in these forays into reporting practices and 
newsroom procedures,” wrote the First Amendment Center’s Paul McMasters in 2004.34 
“Federal officials also have gone after telephone records and reporters’ notes and reportedly 

                                                             
27
   See O'Grady v. Superior Court, 139 Cal. App.4th 1423 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that the shield law 
applies to persons gathering news for dissemination to the public, regardless of whether the publication medium is 
print or online.) 
28
   Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 20‐146 (1992). 
29
   Id. at §§ 20‐145(2). 
30
   Sewell Chan, The New York Times, Bill Would Extend Shield Law to Cover Bloggers, May 20, 2009 
http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/05/20/bill‐would‐extend‐shield‐law‐to‐cover‐bloggers/ (last visited April 
7, 2010). 
31
   Id. 
32
   Id. 
33
   Id. 
34
   Paul K. McMasters and Geoffrey R. Stone, The First Amendment Center, Do Journalists Need a Better 
Shield?, Dec. 14, 2004, http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/commentary.aspx?id=14547 (last visited April 7, 
2010). 

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Media Law in the Digital Age: The Rules Have Changed, Have You? 

have tried to enlist journalists as informants, get certain information from being reported and 
forced reporters off of stories they have covered for months or years.”35 
  Kentucky’s shield law is one of the more narrow, only protecting journalists from 
disclosing the “source of any information procured or obtained.”36 There is no protection from 
disclosing notes or eyewitness accounts unless doing so would identify a confidential source.37 
Louisiana,38 Ohio39 and Pennsylvania40 have similar statutes. Though Colorado’s shield law 
protects journalists from disclosing “any news information received, observed, procured, 
processed, prepared, written, or edited by a newsperson, while acting in the capacity of a 
newsperson,” there are several exceptions.41 The privilege of non‐disclosure doesn’t apply to 
information received at a press conference, previously published or broadcast or based on the 
journalist’s personal observation of a crime.42 
  Many states, however, protect not just materials related to confidential sources, but all 
materials produced while gathering news. Under Montana’s shield law, for example, no 
journalist is required “to disclose any information obtained, or prepared or the source of that 
information.”43 New Mexico,44 Tennessee,45 Rhode Island46 and Washington47 offer similar 
protection. While some state courts distinguished confidential information (more coverage) 
from non‐confidential information (less or no coverage),48 journalists in North Carolina can 
claim protection for both under its shield law.49 North Dakota offers just as broad protection, 
preventing the disclosure of any information or source, unless a district court determines that 
“the failure of disclosure of such evidence will cause a miscarriage of justice.”50 Several states 
believe such a miscarriage of justice would occur if their respective shield laws applied in 
defamation cases. Illinois,51 Oregon,52 Rhode Island53 and Tennessee54 all prevent a journalist 
from using any type of reporter’s privilege as a defense .  

                                                             
35
   Id. 
36
   Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. 421.100 (Baldwin 1990). 
37
   See Maddox v. Williams, 23 Med. L. Rptr. 2118 (Ky. Cir. Ct. 1995). 
38
   La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 45:1451‐1459 (West 1992). 
39
   Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 2739.04, §§ 2739.12 (Baldwin 1981 & 1990 Supp.). 
40
   42 Pa. C.S.A. § 5942 (1993). 
41
   Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13‐90‐119(2). 
42
   Id. 
43
   Mont. Code Ann. §§ 26‐1‐902. 
44
   N.M. Stat. Ann. § 38‐6‐7 (Michie 1987). 
45
   Tenn. Code Ann., Title 24, Ch. 1, Part 2, § 24‐1‐208 (1996). 
46
   R.I. Gen. Laws, Title 9, §§ 9‐19.1‐3(b)(1). 
47
   Wash. Rev. Code § 5.68.010. 
48
   See State v. Turner, 550 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1996); CBS Inc. v. Jackson, 578 So.2d 698, 700 (Fla. 1991); 
Marketos v. American Employers Ins. Co., 185 Mich. App. 179 (1990). 
49
   N.C. Gen. Stat. Ch. 8, Art. 7 § 8‐53.9 (1999). 
50
   N.D. Cent. Code § 31‐01‐06.2 (1991). 
51
   735 ILCS 5/8‐901‐909. 

5 
 
Media Law in the Digital Age: The Rules Have Changed, Have You? 

  Federal courts generally hold that the First Amendment does not excuse reporters from 
testifying about eyewitness observations. This finding of law is often reflected in state shield 
laws. North Carolina, for example, doesn’t offer journalists a privilege against “disclosure of any 
information, document, or item obtained as the result of the journalist’s eyewitness 
observations of criminal or tortious conduct, including any physical evidence or visual or audio 
recording of the observed conduct.”55 New Jersey’s otherwise broad shield law expressly 
prohibits protection to journalists testifying about eyewitness observations of “any act of 
physical violence or property damage.”56 The limitation, however, is narrowly construed and 
doesn’t apply to observations of the aftermath of such crimes.57 
How Strong is the Protection? 
  Very few shield laws are absolute. New York, for example, provides absolute protection 
for confidential information and “related material” gathered by the journalist under an express 
agreement of confidentiality.58 A balancing test is used, however, when determining if non‐
confidential information should be disclosed.  
  The dissent in Branzburg endorsed such a balancing test, or qualifications to a reporter’s 
privilege: When a grand jury asks a reporter to reveal confidences, the government should have 
to: (1) demonstrate probable cause to believe that the reporter has information clearly relevant 
to a specific probable violation of law; (2) demonstrate that the information cannot be obtained 
by alternative means less destructive of First Amendment rights; and (3) demonstrate a 
compelling and overriding interest in the information.59 This opinion reflected an influential 
decision by the Second Circuit 14 years earlier in Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (1958), in which 
the court laid out its own test: To overcome privilege and obtain compelled disclosure, a litigant 
must make a clear and specific showing that the information sought is: (1) highly material and 
relevant to the underlying claim; (2) necessary or critical to maintenance of the claim; and (3) 
unavailable from alternative sources. 
  States have considered these tests — most often the Garland factors — when balancing 
their own shield laws with governmental interests. When dealing with non‐confidential 
information, New York uses a test nearly identical to that in Garland.60 Texas, which passed its 
shield law last year, uses a six‐part test that includes showing that the subpoena is not 

                                                                                                                                                                                                    
52
   Or. Rev. Stat., Title 4, Ch. 44, §§ 44.530(3). 
53
   R.I. Gen. Laws, Title 9,  §§ 9‐19.1‐3(b)(1). 
54
   Tenn. Code Ann., Title 24, Ch. 1, Part 2, § 24‐1‐208 (1996). 
55
   N.C. Gen. Stat. Ch. 8, Art. 7 § 8‐53.9 (1999). 
56
   N.J.S.A. 2A:84A‐21a(h). 
57
   See Matter of Woodhaven Lumber & Mill Work, 123 N.J. 481 (1991). 
58
   N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 79‐h(b). 
59
   Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. at 743 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
60
   N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 79‐h(c). 

6 
 
Media Law in the Digital Age: The Rules Have Changed, Have You? 

overbroad, that timely notice was given to the journalist and that “the interest of the party 
subpoenaing the information outweighs the public interest in gathering and dissemination of 
news, including the concerns of journalists.”61 
  Generally, if the party seeking information fails to fulfill any of the Garland factors, the 
privilege is upheld. Other courts find that if so many as one factor isn’t satisfied, none are. 
There are certain circumstances that tend to favor disclosure: if upholding the privilege would 
infringe the constitutional rights of the defendant, if the information request has already been 
published or if the information is not confidential. The tests are fact‐intensive and can lead to 
unpredictability across jurisdictions. In absence of a federal shield law, this is what makes 
discrepancies among state statutes so concerning.  
  Following Branzburg, “a host of different approaches were adopted at the state and 
federal levels,” wrote First Amendment scholars James Thomas Tucker and Stephen Wermiel in 
their defense of a federal shield law.62 “What has resulted is a lack of uniformity and 
uncertainty that can lead to different results for the same set of facts.”63  
 

                                                             
61
   H.B. 670, 81st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2009). 
62
   James Thomas Tucker and Stephen Wermiel, Enacting a Reasonable Shield Law: A Reply to Professors 
Clymer and Eliason, 57 AM. U.L. REV. 1291, 1298 (2008). 
63
   Id. 

7 
 
 The Georgia Open Records Act
Caselaw Summary
Lesli N. Gaither
Dow Lohnes, PLLC
lgaither@dowlohnes.com

Coupled with the Open and Public Meetings Act (O.C.G.A. § 50-14-1 through § 50-14-
60), the Georgia Open Records Act (O.C.G.A. § 50-18-70 through § 50-18-76) is an invaluable
tool for journalists and citizens seeking to inspect government records in Georgia. In fact, the
Open Records Act starts with the presumption that records are “open for a personal inspection by
any citizen of this state, and those in charge of such records shall not refuse this privilege to any
citizen.” O.C.G.A. § 50-18-70(b).

As summarized below, since its passage in 1959, the Open Records Act has been subject
to numerous opinions addressing its scope and application.

1959 General. Bradford v. Bolton, 215 Ga. 188, 192 (1959) (Head, J.):
* Notes that the Open Records Act had not yet been enacted at the time the
action was filed.

1971 Attorney-client privilege. Crow v. Brown, 332 F. Supp. 382, 389 n.5 (N.D. Ga.
1971) (Edenfield, J.), aff’d, 457 F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1972):
* Rejects county’s contention in housing discrimination suit that memoranda
written by the county attorney are inadmissible as protected by the
attorney-client privilege; the court stated that only confidential attorney-
client communications are so protected whereas these memoranda are
Fulton County records and open to public inspection pursuant to the Open
Records Act.

1974 Election petitions. Rentz v. City of Moultrie, 231 Ga. 579 (1974) (Jordan, J.):
* Citizens have a right pursuant to the Open Records Act to view election
petitions.
* Ingram, J., dissented as to other aspects of the decision.

1976 Law enforcement records. Houston v. Rutledge, 237 Ga. 764 (1976) (Gunter,
J.):
* Suit for access to files maintained by the Columbus, Georgia Sheriff
relating to the deaths of inmates in the jail under his supervision.
* The Court rejected the Sheriff’s argument and the decision of the trial
court (Land, J.) that the Open Records Act make public only papers and
records required to be prepared and maintained by statute. Rather, all
documents, papers, and records prepared and maintained in the course of
the operation of a public office are “public records.”

1
 * The Court held that records made and maintained in the course of a
pending investigation should not in most instances be available for
inspection by the public. However, “once an investigation is concluded
and the file closed, either with or without prosecution by the state, such
public records in most instances should be available for public
inspection.” If a public official nevertheless refuses to do so, “the
judiciary must balance the interest of the public in favor of inspection
against the interest of the public in favor of non-inspection....”
* The Court noted that “in our construction of this [the Open Records Act]
statute we have attempted to apply First Amendment principles which
favor open, unfettered communication and disclosure except where some
limitation thereon is required in the public interest.”
* Justice Ingram concurred, stating “I would make it clear that, since the
files here involved have been determined to be public files, there is a
strong presumption that they should be made available for public
inspection immediately. ... [U]nless the sheriff on remand can show some
persuasive reason why the files should not now be made available for
public inspection, I believe we have a duty under the First Amendment to
the United States Constitution and Code Ann. § 40-2701 to require the
files to be made available for public inspection without further delay.”
* Justice Jordan dissented without opinion.

1978 Civil investigative records. Northside Realty Associates v. Community Relations

Commission, 240 Ga. 432 (1978) (Marshall, J.):
* Suit for access to records compiled by the Community Relations
Commission in the course of conducting a racial discrimination “testing”
campaign.
* The Court made clear, as Justice Ingram had indicated in a concurring
opinion in Houston v. Rutledge, that once a request for identifiable public
records is made, “the burden is cast on the [records’ custodian] to explain
why the records should not be furnished.” The case was remanded to the
trial court (Wofford, J.) to allow it to balance the public interest in
disclosure v. nondisclosure.

1978 Ambulance service records. Griffin-Spalding County Hospital Authority v.

Radio Station WKEU, 240 Ga. 444 (1978) (Nichols, J.):
* Suit by a radio station for access to records relating to a public hospital’s
ambulance service.
* Court affirmed the order of the trial court (Whalen, J.) that the
information, with the exception of patient medical records, be produced;
and ordered that the hospital separate the confidential from the non-
confidential information

1979 Board of medical examiners records. Morton v. Skrine, 242 Ga. 844 (1979)
(Hall, J.):
* Suit by a doctor pursuant to the Open Records Act against the state board
of medical examiners for access to the board’s investigatory file on him.

2
 * The Court affirmed the trial court (Weltner, J.), holding that access was
prohibited by another law making such medical investigation reports
confidential.

1979 Law enforcement records. Brown v. Minter, 243 Ga. 397 (1979) (Undercofler,
J.):
* Suit by newspaper editor for access pursuant to the Open Records Act to
certain records representing completed investigations by the Internal
Investigation Unit of the Atlanta Police Department.
* The Court held that the trial court (Fryer, J.) had properly afforded access
to most of the documents, withholding only limited records on the ground
that they would disclose information regarding on-going investigations,
etc.
* The Court reaffirmed that the burden of justifying non-disclosure is on the
government.

1980 Privacy interests. Athens Observer, Inc. v. Anderson, 245 Ga. 63 (1980)
(Undercofler, J.):
* Suit by an Athens newspaper for access pursuant to the Open Records Act
to a report commissioned by the vice-president of research and the Dean
of the College of Arts and Sciences of the University of Georgia.
* The Court affirmed that portion of the decision of the trial court (Gaines,
J.) holding that the report was a public record and reversed that portion
approving only the release of only an edited version. The Court held that
the entire report was a public record and had to be produced.
* The Court rejected contentions by the State that the report constituted
personnel information and that its disclosure would constitute an invasion
of privacy. It stated that the right of privacy does not protect “legitimate
inquiry into the operation of a government institution and those employed
by it. On the contrary, the public policy of this state has been clearly
expressed by the legislature in adopting the Open Records Act. The
purpose is not only to encourage public access to such information in
order that the public can evaluate the expenditure of public funds and the
efficient and proper functioning of its institutions, but also to foster
confidence in government through openness to the public. That the
information may comment upon certain public officials’ performance of
their official duties does not warrant suppression by the courts.”
* Finally, the Court held that the state’s assertion that “such reports must be
protected in order to assure candid assessments by evaluators does not
overcome the need for the public to obtain the reported information.”
* Justice Jordan, joined by Justices Bowles and Marshall, dissented, arguing
that “[t]he documents here sought are merely written evaluations or
opinions of an outside group of experts. Until acted on officially by
university officials such material does not assume the status of a public
‘record’ or writing.”

1980 Housing Authority records. Doe v. Sears, 245 Ga. 83 (1980) (Nichols, J.):

3
 * Suit by newspaper editor for access pursuant to the Open Records Act to
“certain computer printouts kept by the Atlanta Housing Authority as part
of its business records,” containing the names, addresses, sources of
income and rents owed by tenants.
* The Court held that the Act clearly applied to the Housing Authority. It
further held that the “underlying implication” of the Act is that all records
are open to inspection unless closed by a “specific exception.” The Court
thus held that the printouts were public records.
* The Court rejected the decision of the trial court (Eldridge, J.) to not
reveal, on grounds of privacy, names and addresses of tenants whose rents
were delinquent by less than 6 months. The Court stated: “This court
holds today that the general public properly is concerned with whether or
not public housing tenants are paying their rentals when due.
Accordingly, we hold that each of the tenants impliedly waived whatever
constitutional, statutory or common law rights of privacy he may have had
in the status of his rental account and the amounts and sources of his
income when he allowed his rental account to become unpaid when due.”

1980 Citizenship requirement. Atchison v. Hospital Authority of the City of St.

Mary’s, 245 Ga. 494 (1980) (Clarke, J.):
* Suit by an employee of a Florida newspaper for access pursuant to the
Open Records Act to business telephone records of a public hospital.
* The Court reversed the refusal of the trial court (Scoggin, J.) to afford
access.

1984 Public hospital records. Richmond County Hospital Authority d/b/a University
Hospital v. Southeastern Newspapers Corporation, 252 Ga. 19 (1984) (Smith, J.):
* Suit by two newspapers for access pursuant to the Open Records Act to
information identifying the names, salaries, and job titles of public
hospital employees earning more than $28,000 annually.
* In affirming the order of the trial court (Fleming, J.) compelling access,
the Court stated that “[t]he public has a legitimate interest in the operation
of this institution and the salaries paid to those employed there.” The
Court found speculative the hospital’s predictions that highly qualified
staff would go elsewhere and morale would plummet if salaries were
disclosed. The Court found such speculation clearly insufficient to
overcome “the strong public policy of this state in favor of open
government.”

1984 Tax records. Pensyl v. Peach County, 252 Ga. 450 (1984) (Hill, J.):
* Suit by a taxpayer for access pursuant to the Open Records Act to certain
tax information on residences adjoining his.
* The Court affirmed the order of the trial court (Wilcox, J.) that the records
be disclosed, noting: “The General Assembly has seen fit to exempt
intangible personal property and other tax records from the open records
law but has not seen fit to exempt ad valorem property tax records. We

4
 are unwilling to extend the exemption to tax records which the General
Assembly has not seen fit to exclude.”
* Justice Smith dissented without explanation.

1984 Law enforcement records. Irvin v. Macon Telegraph Publishing Company, 253
Ga. 43 (1984) (Gregory, J.):
* Suit by the Macon Telegraph against the Commissioner of Agriculture and
the Director of GBI for access pursuant to the Open Records Act to
records of GBI investigations concerning the conduct of several
employees of the State Farmers’ Market in Macon.
* The Court affirmed the order of the trial court (Vaughn, J.) that the records
be disclosed. The Court rejected claims that the records were personnel
records and that the public interest in non-disclosure outweighed the
public interest in disclosure. In doing so, the Court agreed with the trial
court’s conclusion that “the public has an overriding interest in learning
the results of the GBI investigation and the administrative law judge’s
review of certain of these results. Specifically, the trial court found the
public has an interest in learning ‘about the operation and functioning of a
public agency, namely the State Farmer’s Market at Macon, and the work-
related conduct of public employees; [in gaining] information [to] evaluate
the expenditure of public funds and the functioning of a public institution
or agency; [in having] information openly available to them so that they
can be confident in the operation of their government; and [in insuring]
that both the activity of public employees suspected of wrongdoing and
the conduct of those public employees who investigate the suspects is
open to public scrutiny.”
* Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Smith, dissented, “for the reasons set
forth in Justice Jordan’s dissent in Athens Observer.”

1986 Law enforcement records — State patrol ticket-fixing. Harris v. Cox

Enterprises, Inc., 256 Ga. 299 (1986) (per curiam):
* Suit by The Atlanta Journal-Constitution for access to the GBI’s report on
its investigation of the Georgia State Patrol.
* The Court affirmed the decision of the trial court (Daniel, J.) that the
records be produced, reiterating the state’s “strong policy of open
government” and the Court’s prior holdings that “information reflecting
upon an individual’s performance of official duties would not be exempt
from open records.”

1986 Athletic association records. Macon Telegraph Publishing Company v. Board

of Regents of the University System of Georgia, 256 Ga. 443 (1986) (Bell, J.):
* Suit by the Macon Telegraph for access pursuant to the Open Records Act
of records showing the assets, liabilities, income and expenses of the
University of Georgia Athletic Association.
* The Court reversed the order of the trial court (Pierce, J.) denying access,
concluding that “regardless of whether the documents are prepared by
employees of a private Athletic Association or by Dr. Barber as Treasurer

5
 of that Association, it is clear that they are ‘documents, papers and records
prepared and maintained in the course of the operation of a public office,’
and are therefore ‘public records’ under the Open Records Act.”

1987 Law enforcement records — Wayne Williams files. Napper v. Georgia

Television Company, 257 Ga. 156 (1987) (Marshall, J.):
* Suit by The Atlanta Journal-Constitution, WSB and ABC News for access
to the City of Atlanta’s investigative files on the Atlanta child murders.
* The Court affirmed the decision of the trial court (Alverson, J.) that the
files were public records and should be produced, but held that “the trial
court should have deleted from the files information identifying
individuals who were investigated but not charged with or prosecuted for a
crime, as well as information which would prove personally embarrassing
to individuals who were not the targets of the investigation, unless the trial
court determines that ‘exceptional interests militate in favor of disclosure.’
* Judge Alverson found such exceptional interests on remand and ordered
production, with few deletions.
* On remand, Judge Alverson also awarded attorney’s fees to The Atlanta
Journal-Constitution, WSB and ABC News.
* F.B.I. records in local police custody. An order entered in a separate,
federal action preventing disclosure of such records in the City’s files that
originated from the FBI was affirmed by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Napper, 887 F.2d
1528 (11th Cir. 1989).

1989 Attorney-client privilege. Atlanta Legal Aid v. City of Atlanta, No. D14722
(Fulton County Superior Court, Apr. 14, 1989) (Sears-Collins, J.):
* Suit by Atlanta Legal Aid for access pursuant to the Open Records Act to
the City’s records of its investigation of corruption in the City’s housing
rehabilitation program. The Atlanta Journal-Constitution filed an amicus
brief on Atlanta Legal Aid’s behalf on April 12, 1989.
* On April 14, 1989, Judge Sears-Collins ordered the City to produce the
records, rejecting the City’s claim that since the records were compiled by
the City Attorney they were exempt from disclosure as attorney-client
privileged.

1989 Public university presidential search records. Board of Regents v. The Atlanta
Journal & The Atlanta Constitution & Glenn McCutchen, 259 Ga. 214 (1989)
(Weltner, J.):
* Suit by The Atlanta Journal-Constitution for access to records as to
candidates being considered by the Regents for the presidency of Georgia
State University.
* On March 24, 1989, Judge Langham ordered that the records be produced,
with the exception of confidential evaluations prepared by the Regents and
letters of recommendation prepared by third parties.
* On April 25, 1989, the Court affirmed Judge Langham’s order, rejecting
the Regents’ contentions (1) that the Board is not subject to the Act, (2)

6
 that all presidential search records are exempt from disclosure as
“confidential evaluations,” and (3) that the public interest in nondisclosure
of such records outweighs the public interest in disclosure. The Court
noted that “it would make for a strange rule, indeed, to hold that a person
who applies for a public position — to serve the public and to be paid by
the public — has the right to keep secret from the public the very
existence of such an application.”
* Justice Clarke concurred, emphasizing the statutory mandate that
exceptions to the Open Records Act must be construed narrowly.
* Justice Gregory concurred, noting that the Open Records Act exception
for confidential evaluations of candidates for public employment and the
Open Meetings Act exception for meetings to consider candidates for
public employment are in harmony: “What both protect from disclosure is
the give and take among decision makers so that they may make candid
and difficult comparisons of the qualifications of candidates for public
office and employment, and their performance once selected. ... This does
not mean however that the identity and other information about
candidates, officials, and employees is exempted.”
* Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Smith, dissented, arguing (1) that the
Open Meetings Act exception for meetings to consider candidates for
public employment should be read to exclude disclosure under the Open
Records Act of any records maintained in connection with a presidential
search and (2) that the public interest favored nondisclosure.
* Justice Bell dissented without opinion.

1989 Law enforcement records. Parker v. Lee, 259 Ga. 195 (1989) (Bell, J.):
* Open Records Act exemption for law enforcement records compiled in a
pending investigation applies only when there is an “imminent
adjudicatory proceeding[] of finite duration.” Fact that death row inmate
could be tried for alleged rape, for which an indictment against him is
outstanding, does not justify non-release of records.
* The fact that the person requesting the records is a death row inmate is
irrelevant. There is “no reason to distinguish [a death row inmate’s] (or
any other individual citizen’s) right of access from news organizations’
right of access.”
* Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Smith, dissented.

1989 Records of quasi-public entities — The Atlanta Convention and Visitors

Bureau. The Atlanta Journal & The Atlanta Constitution & Glenn McCutchen. v.
The Atlanta Convention and Visitors Bureau, Inc., No. D63684 (Fulton County
Superior Court, Mar. 14, 1989) (Eldridge, J.):
* Suit for access pursuant to the Open Records Act to records of The Atlanta
Convention and Visitors Bureau, Inc.
* On March 14, 1989, the trial court held that the Bureau is subject to the
Open Records Act because of its public function (promoting tourism and
convention business for the City) and because it receives over half of its
funds from hotel/motel taxes and ordered the Bureau to disclose records as

7
 to its expenditure of these funds. The trial court also held that the Bureau
is not required to disclose records as to its expenditure of funds received
from other sources.
* The Bureau appealed and The Atlanta Journal-Constitution cross-appealed
and the order was stayed pending their outcome. In the fall of 1989, the
Georgia Supreme Court affirmed without opinion. 259 Ga., XXX.

1989 Coroner’s inquest. Kilgore v. R. W. Page Corp., 259 Ga. 556 (1989) (Weltner,
J.):
* Access to coroner’s records is governed by the Open Records Act.

1989 Insurance information. Evans v. Belth, 193 Ga. App. 757 (1989) (Birdsong, J.):
* O.C.G.A. § 33-2-8.1(c) requires withholding from public inspection of any
and all information acquired by the Insurance Commissioner from the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners, provided the same was
obtained under expectation of privacy by the Association at the time of
information release to the Commissioner.
* The section overrides the Open Records Act and applies retroactively to
documents obtained prior to the section’s effective date, April 10, 1989.

1990 Incident reports. Cook Publishing Company, Inc. v. Charles W. Bryant,

individually and in his capacity as Sheriff of Cook County, Georgia, No. CV89-
162 (Cook County Superior Court, Mar. 19, 1990) (Knight, J.):
* Suit against sheriff for access to incident reports.
* Based upon sheriff’s testimony “that he and his deputies are ready and
willing to provide all future incident reports requested,” newspaper’s
motion for injunctive relief denied.

1990 Child abuse records. The Atlanta Journal and Constitution and Glenn
McCutchen v. Georgia Department of Human Resources, No. D-73733 (Fulton
County Superior Court, Apr. 20, 1990) (Hicks, J.):
* Suit for access to records of reports of child abuse and deprivation
concerning children who died while under the protection of the State in
1988 and 1989.
* On April 20, 1990, the trial court ordered the records produced to The
Journal-Constitution but ordered the newspaper not to disclose certain
identifying information in the records.

1990 Hospital accreditation records. Georgia Hospital Association v. Ledbetter, 260

Ga. 477 (1990) (Clarke, J.) (Fletcher, J., with Smith, J., dissenting):
* Declaratory judgment action brought by the Georgia Department of
Human Resources for an adjudication of the open records status of DHR
records on the accreditation of hospitals, public and private, throughout
the state.
* The Atlanta Journal-Constitution and The Gwinnett Daily News
intervened to seek access and the trial court (Langham, J.) ordered the
records opened to the public.

8
 * The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that “[t]he public has a legitimate
interest in the records which make up the DHR’s hospital licensing
decisions.”

1990-91 Public university coaches income records. Dooley v. Davidson and The Atlanta
Journal and The Atlanta Constitution, 260 Ga. 577 (1990) (Weltner, J.); Cremins
v. The Atlanta Journal and The Atlanta Constitution, 261 Ga. 496 (1991)
(Fletcher, J.):
* Suits involving requests by The Atlanta Journal-Constitution for access
pursuant to the Open Records Act to records of athletically-related income
(shoe contracts, radio and television shows, etc.) of athletic coaches at the
University of Georgia and Georgia Tech.
* In Dooley, the Court concluded that certain records reflecting the
athletically-related “outside” income of University of Georgia athletic
coaches were “public records” although they were neither on file with the
University nor were they ever seen by the University President. The Court
found that the records were prepared and maintained or received in the
course of the operation of the University and Athletic Association because
Board of Regents policies and NCAA rules required the coaches to report
such income to the President and in some cases required the President’s
prior approval of the activity.
* The Court established that the following categories of records are required
to be disclosed under the Act:
(1) Records in the hands of employees that pertain to the receipt of
athletic equipment and apparel;
(2) Records of outside income received in connection with the
operation of the university and the [athletic] association; and
(3) Records in the hands of employees that have been prepared for the
purpose of complying with reporting requirements relating to
specified income.
* The Court also held that records relating to money received for speaking
appearances “unconnected with and not in conflict with the performance
of an official duty” are not public records.
* Chief Justice Clarke and Presiding Justice Smith dissented. Each would
limit the definition of “public record” to those required to be maintained
by law or those actually on file at the public office or agency.
* After Dooley, Fulton Superior Court Judge Frank Hull granted the
Newspapers’ motion for summary judgment in an identical case involving
athletic coaches at Georgia Tech.
* On July 3, 1991, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed.

1991 Police investigatory files. McBride v. Wetherington, 199 Ga. App. 7 (1991)
(Cooper, J.):
* Appeal from trial court order denying appellant’s claims that police
department had improperly refused to grant him access to investigatory
records and seeking copies of those records free of charge based on
appellant’s indigence.

9
 * The appellate court affirmed. The court held that O.C.G.A. § 50-18-
72(a)(4) does not require a police department to turn over investigatory
records when there is an ongoing investigation and, in any event, the
records were later made available.
* The court held that a copying fee of 25 cents per page was allowed by
O.C.G.A. § 50-18-71(c) and that the statute contained no provision for
excusal of payment upon filing of a pauper’s affidavit.

1991 Car telephone records. Dortch v. The Atlanta Journal and The Atlanta
Constitution, 261 Ga. 350 (1991) (Fletcher, J.) (Smith and Benham, JJ.,
dissenting):
* Suit for access to unredacted copies of City of Atlanta car telephone
records.
* On September 19, 1990, the trial court (Sears-Collins, J.) ordered the
records produced.
* Notwithstanding that some of the calls made were personal calls for which
the public official reimbursed the City, the Court held that personal
information that is intermingled or co-mingled with official public
documents or information that is being maintained by a city agency is
subject to disclosure under the Open Records Act.
* In response to the City’s claim that some of the telephone numbers of
persons on city cellular phones might be unlisted, the Court held that
“[e]ven if we were to hold that publication of unlisted telephone numbers
involved disclosure of secret or private facts, we cannot say, in the
circumstances presented here, that such disclosure would be so offensive
or objectionable to a reasonable man as to constitute the tort of invasion of
privacy.”
* The Court further held that records reflecting the numbers of the City-
owned cellular telephones must be disclosed notwithstanding the fact that
“this could result in increased telephone bills” by virtue of calls made to
the cellular phone. “While we understand the potential financial problems
that disclosure of the cellular telephone numbers could create, there is
presently no exemption for such records under the Act. Any such remedy
must come from the General Assembly.”

1991 Psychiatric records. Southeastern Legal Foundation v. Ledbetter, 260 Ga. 803
(1991) (Fletcher, J.):
* Suit by news organizations and the Southeastern Legal Foundation for
access to records prepared and maintained or received by the State
regarding the commitment, diagnosis, treatment and release of James
Calvin Brady. On April 24, 1990, less than 24 hours after Brady’s release
from a State mental facility where he had been diagnosed as having
homicidal tendencies, Brady gunned down five persons at random in a
major Atlanta metropolitan shopping mall.
* On May 1, 1990, the trial court (per Coursey, P.J.) denied motions for
access to the records without prejudice, concluding that “[b]ased on the
limited facts which have been presented, this court finds that Mr. Brady’s

10
 privacy interest in his records outweighs the interest of the public at this
time.”
* On June 13, 1990, the trial court (Castellani, J.) denied renewed motions
for access despite public disclosure by Brady’s attorney of portions of the
records sought and despite public statements by Brady’s attorney that “Mr.
Brady is not interested in privacy. He wants the world to know.”
* On appeal, the Supreme Court, per Justice Fletcher, affirmed. The Court
held that the records sought were “clinical records” which are specifically
made confidential by the Mental Health Code, O.C.G.A. § 37-3-1(2). As a
result, the records are exempt under the Act as “records ... which by law
are prohibited or specifically exempted from being open to inspection by
the general public.”
* The records at issue were subsequently disclosed in the course of the
criminal proceedings against Mr. Brady.

1991 Attorney’s fees. GMS Air Conditioning, Inc. v. Georgia Dep’t of Human
Resources, 201 Ga. App. 136 (1991) (Pope, J.):
* Where a case presented factual issues as whether the defendant agency,
though it produced documents plaintiff requested after a lawsuit was filed,
violated the Open Records Act by not producing them before the suit was
filed and whether the violation, if any, was “completely without merit as
to law or fact,” the trial court (Cummings, J.) erred in granting summary
judgment for the agency on plaintiff’s attorney’s fees claim.

1991 Executive search records. The Atlanta Journal and The Atlanta Constitution v.
Atlanta Convention and Visitors Bureau, Inc. and Spencer Stuart and Associates,
Inc., No. S91A1200 (Ga. 1991):
* Suit for access to records reflecting the names, resumes and vitae of
candidates for President of the Atlanta Convention and Visitor’s Bureau, a
private non-profit corporation which receives over 60% (nearly $6
million) of its annual budget from tax revenues. To conduct the search,
the Bureau retained an executive search firm, Spencer Stuart, at a cost of
$30,000.
* On June 3, 1991, the trial court (Johnson, J.) issued an order holding that
records sent directly to the Bureau were public records, but records which
were prepared and retained by Spencer Stuart, although disclosed to and
utilized by the Bureau members, were not public records.
* Appeal dismissed as premature. The Newspapers subsequently dismissed
the action after enactment of certain revisions to the Act.

1991 Tax appraisals. Douglas v. Pope, No. D-86301 (Fulton County Superior Court,
Apr. 12, 1991) (Alverson, J.):
* Held that O.C.G.A. § 48-5-314 is not a blanket prohibition against the
production pursuant to the Open Records Act of materials held by boards
of tax assessors but rather was intended only to protect from disclosure
materials, except the return, provided by taxpayers to the tax assessors
office, such as taxpayer accounting records, profit and loss statements,

11
 income and expense statements, balance sheets, depreciation schedules,
and like materials.
* “The purpose of the confidentiality provisions of O.C.G.A. § was to
protect the privacy of individual taxpayers, not to protect the board of tax
assessors and its agents from public scrutiny as to their procedures, their
activities, and methods of assessing property.”
* Attorney’s fees awarded to plaintiff.

1991 Charges for agency attorney time spent reviewing Open Records Act
requests. Trammell v. Martin, 200 Ga. App. 435 (1991) (Pope, J.):
* Suit for access to bills for legal services performed for and paid by
Clayton County. Defendant county finance director attempted to charge
plaintiff for the cost of attorney time spent reviewing the bills for exempt
information. The trial court held that such a charge was not permitted
under the Act.
* The Court affirmed on appeal holding that the evidence showed “that
defendant wrongly planned to charge plaintiff for attorney time required to
review the requested documents for information exempt from disclosure.
The trial court corrected this violation by ruling plaintiff could not be
charged for that service since it is not a charge authorized under OCGA §
50-18-71.”
* The Court also held that agencies must use the most “economical means
available for providing copies of public records” and remanded the case
for a determination of whether the county had done so.

1991 Complaints concerning agency employees. The City of St. Mary’s v. Camden
Newspapers, No. 91V0420 (Superior Court of Camden County, July 25, 1991;
Aug. 20, 1991), sum. aff’d, (Ga.):
* Suit for access to complaint filed by City employee complaining of
harassment by City council member. The request was made more than 10
days after the complaint had been filed with the City.
* The trial court (Taylor, J.) held that the complaint was not exempt from
disclosure since the complaint had been presented more than 10 days
previously and the City’s investigation had terminated. Nor was the
complaint protected from disclosure by virtue of privacy interests asserted
either by the council member or the complaining employee.

1992 Criminal enforcement. Jersawitz v. Eldridge, 262 Ga. 19 (1992) (Bell, J.):
* District Administrative Judge of the Fifth Judicial District and Chief Judge
of the Atlanta Judicial Circuit (Eldridge, J.) lacked authority to issue an
order interpreting the Open Records Act as not permitting a private citizen
to swear out an arrest warrant against a public official for violation of the
Act and ordering all judicial officers and judges in the District and Circuit
to refrain from issuing any such arrest warrant to any individual other than
the Attorney General, District Attorney or Solicitor General acting in their
official capacities.

12
1992 Property appraisals. Black v. Georgia Dep’t of Transportation, 262 Ga. 342
(1992) (Hunt, J.):
* Appeal from trial court’s denial of Open Records Act request by plaintiff
to inspect appraisals of his property in connection with DOT’s efforts to
condemn.
* The Court held that O.C.G.A. § 50-18-72(a)(6) does not require such
records to be disclosed until after the condemnation proceedings conclude
and DOT has acquired the property. The Court also held that O.C.G.A. §
32-3-7 should not be read to require DOT to disclose matters in
condemnation proceedings that it would not ordinarily have to disclose in
discovery.
* Justice Weltner, joined by Justice Sears-Collins, dissented, arguing that
the clear wording of O.C.G.A. § 32-3-7(a) provides that DOT “acquires”
property as soon as it files a declaration of taking.

1992 Fees. McFrugal Rental of Riverdale, Inc. v. Garr, 262 Ga. 369 (1992) (Clarke,
J.):
* Open Records Act plaintiff, which sought to inspect city council minutes,
city zoning maps and ordinances, challenged city manager’s imposition of
a fee to cover the cost of a temporary employee to supervise the
inspection. Denial of relief by the trial court reversed.
* Emphasizing the importance of public access to government information,
the Court held that “any fee imposed pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 50-18-71
constitutes a burden on the public’s right of access to public records.
Therefore, the statute must be narrowly construed. As we construe the
statute, the imposition of a fee is allowed only when the citizen seeking
access requests copies of documents or requests action by the custodian
that involves an unusual administrative cost or burden. Thus, a fee may
not be imposed under O.C.G.A. § 50-18-71 when a citizen seeks only to
inspect records that are routinely subject to public inspection, such as
deeds, city ordinances or zoning maps. Further the custodian of the
records must bear the burden of demonstrating the reasonableness of any
fee imposed.”

1992 “Secrets of State” exemption. Hardaway Co. v. Rives, 262 Ga. 631 (1992)
(Bell, J.):
* Appeal from ruling of trial court (Langham, J.) that “Engineer’s Cost
Estimate” documents generated by the Department of Transportation as
part of the process of evaluating bids for work on Savannah’s Talmadge
Memorial Bridge were exempt from disclosure under the Open Records
Act as “secrets of state,” O.C.G.A. § 24-9-21(4), or “state matters of
which the policy of the state and the interest of the community require
concealment,” O.C.G.A. § 24-9-27(d). Reversed.
* The Court emphasized that “any purported statutory exemption from
disclosure under the Open Records Act must be narrowly construed.” The
Court agreed that “the public interest in exempting engineering cost
estimates from disclosure until projects are completed or abandoned

13
 outweighs the public interest in favor of disclosure,” but concluded,
consistent with past precedent, that the Court does not “have the discretion
to judicially craft such an exemption. The balancing test which the special
concurrence urges us to apply was expressly limited by Board of Regents
to instances where individual privacy rights were involved.”
* Justice Fletcher, joined by Justice Hunt, concurred specially, concluding
that a balancing was appropriate but weighed in favor of disclosure as
construction had been completed.

1993 Public university student disciplinary court records. Red & Black Publishing
Company v. Board of Regents, 262 Ga. 848 (1993) (Hunt, J.):
* Appeal from ruling of trial court (Hull, J.) that records of the University of
Georgia Student Organization Court must be disclosed to the public
pursuant to the Open Records Act but that the Court’s disciplinary
hearings are not subject to the Open Meetings Act. Affirmed in part,
reversed in part.
* The Court concluded that both the records and the disciplinary hearings of
the Student Organization Court must be open to the public: “We are
mindful that openness in sensitive proceedings is sometimes unpleasant,
difficult, and occasionally harmful. Nevertheless, the policy of this state is
that the public’s business must be open, not only to protect against
potential abuses, but also to maintain the public’s confidence in its
officials.” 262 Ga. at 854.

1993 Records of private entities acting under agency direction and control.
Clayton County Hospital Authority v. Webb, 206 Ga. App. 693 (1993) (Andrews,
J.):
* Appeal from ruling of trial court (Ison, J.) ordering Clayton County
Hospital Authority (CCHA) and five affiliated corporations to produce
records under the Open Records Act.
* The Court of Appeals held that the Act applies to records of private
entities when such entities function “under the direction and control of [a
hospital authority] to implement the [authority’s] duty to provide for the
public health.”
* The Court held that the disputed records — relating primarily to transfers
of funds from the CCHA to five private affiliated corporations and to
transfers of funds between any of those corporations — are public records.
Citing the fact that assets of the CCHA had been transferred to some of the
corporations and the fact that all of the records were in the possession or
control of the CCHA, the Court found that the “private status” alone of the
corporations did not insulate them from the strictures of the Open Records
Act.

1993 Alleged trade secrets submitted to agency. BellSouth Telecommunications,

Inc., d/b/a Southern Bell v. Georgia Public Service Commission, No. E-7376
(Fulton County Superior Court, Apr. 16, 1993) (Eldridge, J.), aff’d without
opinion (Ga.):

14
 * Appeal from administrative determination by Georgia Public Service
Commission that Southern Bell must provide certain documents pursuant
to a PSC order and that PSC would not agree to maintain documents
confidential.
* Trial court concluded that Southern Bell had demonstrated that documents
constituted “trade secrets” and that PSC was obligated to maintain their
confidentiality. The court determined that the Georgia Trade Secrets Act
and the Georgia Open Records Act together required that the PSC not
disclose the documents to the public. The court also found that Southern
Bell had a property interest in the “trade secrets” and that the PSC was
further prohibited under the requirements of the United States Constitution
from publicly disclosing the documents.

1993 District attorney work product. Hall v. Madison, 263 Ga. 73 (1993) (Hunstein,
J.):
* Appeal from denial of death row inmate’s request for writ of mandamus.
After murder conviction was upheld by Georgia Supreme Court, appellant
sought district attorney’s files relating to his prosecution pursuant to the
Open Records Act. Trial court (McWhorter, J.) denied writ of mandamus
without findings or conclusions. Supreme Court affirmed.
* The Court concluded that petition for writ of mandamus was premature
since appellant still had alternative legal remedy available to him in a
habeas proceeding. The Court expressly distinguished Napper v. Ga.
Television on grounds that party seeking production of files in Napper was
not defendant and so did not have habeas proceeding available.

1993 Mootness. Conklin v. Zant, 263 Ga. 165 (1993) (Carley, J.):
* Appellant brought suit seeking order compelling appellees to allow him to
inspect and copy certain records pursuant to the Open Records Act. Trial
court (Smith, J.) dismissed action as moot based on defendant’s having
turned over requested records.
* Supreme Court reversed because evidence showed only that appellees had
turned over some, but not all, of the records requested by appellant.

1994 Police investigatory notes. Lebis v. State, 212 Ga. App. 481 (1994) (Birdsong,
J.):
* Appeal from denial by trial court (Pannell, J.) of criminal defendant’s
request for the production of investigative notes pertaining to his case.
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, stating without
analysis that investigative notes are “`notes’ not `reports’“ and cannot be
classified as “police arrest reports, accident reports, or incident reports”
subject to the Open Records Act.

1994 Privately held records. Hackworth v. Board of Education for the City of Atlanta,
214 Ga. App. 17 (1994) (Smith, J., with Pope, C.J. and McMurray, P.J.):
* Suit for access to personnel records of certain City of Atlanta school bus
drivers. Trial court (Daniel, J.) held that personnel records held by a

15
 privately-owned transit company that contracts with the city to provide
drivers were not public records.
* The court of appeals reversed the trial court’s decision, concluding that,
because the city’s contract with the transit company allowed the city to
review the records and because the operation of buses is a “legitimate
function of the school board and within the operation of a public agency,”
the records were public records despite the fact that they were not
physically in the possession of the city.
* The court remanded the decision to the trial court to determine whether
any of the records are exempt from disclosure based on concerns of
“personal privacy.” Citing Dortch v. Atlanta Journal, 261 Ga. 350 (1991),
the court instructed the trial court to order disclosure of all records unless
disclosure would constitute the tort of invasion of privacy.

1994 Commercial solicitation. Speer v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1294 (N.D. Ga. 1994)
(Hall, J.):
* Suit for permanent injunction by criminal defense attorney preventing
enforcement of O.C.G.A. § 35-1-9, which prohibits the inspection or
copying of law enforcement agency records for the purpose of commercial
solicitation. Prior to passage of § 35-1-9, the plaintiff had used the records
to solicit clients for his legal practice, and he claimed that refusing to
allow him to continue to peruse those records violated his First
Amendment rights. The trial court had initially denied plaintiff’s
challenge, but the Eleventh Circuit reversed, ruling that “a mere reading of
this statute indicates that it probably impinges upon Speer’s commercial
speech.” Speer v. Miller, 15 F.3d 1007, 1010 (11th Cir. 1994).
* On remand from the Eleventh Circuit, the district court held that O.C.G.A.
§ 35-1-9 violates the First Amendment and is unconstitutional because it
does not directly advance a substantial state interest. The court
specifically rejected the state’s argument that the statute advanced the
substantial interest of “protecting people’s privacy.” According to the
court, that effect is “so riddled with exceptions that the statute’s ability to
advance the asserted purpose is anemic and betrays a true alternative
purpose” (preventing solicitation).

1994 Online computer access. Jersawitz v. Hicks, 264 Ga. 553 (1994) (Hunstein, J.):
* The Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the denial by the trial court
(Langham, J.) of plaintiff’s request for on-line computer access to the
Fulton County real estate deed records: “While we are mindful that the
prevalence of computers in homes, offices and schools may make on-line
access to computerized public records desirable, requiring that means of
access must be addressed by the General Assembly.”

1994 Rape incident reports. Doe v. Board of Regents, 215 Ga. App. 684 (1994) (en
banc) (Beasley, J.):
* Trial court refused to issue injunction sought by university employee
enjoining disclosure of a university police incident report, sought by The

16
 Red & Black, regarding the employee’s claim that she had been abducted
and raped on the university campus by an unknown assailant.
* Court of Appeals held that pursuant to the Open Records Act the
newspaper is entitled to the requested report but, pursuant to O.C.G.A.
§ 16-6-23(a), with the university employee’s name and identifying
information redacted.
* Birdsong, J., Andrews, J., Blackburn, J., and Ruffin, J., dissent from the
Court’s decision to authorize redaction of any part of the report. Andrews,
J., writes that O.C.G.A. § 16-6-23(a) “does not cover an admittedly false
allegation of rape. It is undisputed that the incident investigated by the
campus police did not occur.” Blackburn, J., writes that “I join Judge
Andrews in concluding that appellant has lost any right she would
otherwise have had to keep her identity from being disclosed because of
her admitted fabrications and the superior right of the public to know of
the falsity of her original complaint, and the right to know who falsely
complained.”

1995 Tax information. Bowers v. Shelton, 265 Ga. 247 (1995) (Thompson, J.):
* Affirming order of trial court (Jenrette, J.) entering permanent injunction
pursuant to Open Records Act preventing Attorney General from
disclosing confidential tax information contained in closed criminal
investigation file.

1995 Police incident reports. City of Brunswick v. The Atlanta Journal-Constitution

and The Florida Times-Union, 265 Ga. 413 (1995) (Carley, J.):
* Appeal from order of trial court (Williams, J.) requiring City to disclose
serial rape incident reports despite City’s professed concern that doing so
would hamper investigation and pose risk to victims’ safety. For these
reasons, and based upon an ex parte presentation by the City, the trial
court had initially refused to order production. However, the trial court
reversed itself and ordered production after the Times-Union published an
article disclosing certain facts relating to the incidents.
* Cross-appeal by The Journal-Constitution and The Times-Union
challenging the trial court’s conclusion that incident reports can ever be
protected and that it was proper to hear City’s witnesses ex parte.
* Supreme Court affirmed in all respects, concluding that portions of
incident reports may be exempted from disclosure to the extent they
contain confidential information otherwise exempted from disclosure
under the Act.

1995 Hospital authorities. Northwest Georgia Health System, Inc. v. Times-Journal,

Inc., 218 Ga. App. 336 (1995) (McMurray, J.):
* Appeal from order of trial court (Hines, J.) holding that combinations of
private hospitals and public hospital authorities are subject to the
provisions of the Open Meetings and Open Records Acts.

17
 * Court of Appeals affirmed, stating that “[w]ithout question, these private,
nonprofit corporations became the vehicle through which the public
hospital authorities carried out their official responsibilities.”

1996 Fees. Powell v. Von Canon, 219 Ga. App. 840 (1996) (Johnson, J.):
* Appeal from order of trial court (Wood, J.) holding that defendant
government officials are limited to charging only the actual cost of
computer disk or tape onto which requested information is transferred and,
after the first quarter hour of work, only the hourly wage of the lowest
paid full-time employee capable of overseeing or performing transfer.
* Court of Appeals affirmed as to all defendants except clerk of superior
court on ground that superior court clerks are authorized by O.C.G.A.
§ 15-6-96 to sell computer generated records for a profit.

1996 911 incident cards. The Bainbridge Post Searchlight, Inc. v. Decatur County,
No. 96-V-302 (Decatur County Superior Court, Sept. 10, 1996) (Cato, J.):
* Action to require county to make available for public inspection 911
incident cards completed by 911 dispatchers for the purpose of registering,
dispatching and preserving information from callers that is necessary or
important for an appropriate emergency agency to effectively respond to
the emergency.
* Held that 911 incident cards are equivalent to initial police incident reports
and must be made open for inspection by the public at reasonable times at
the 911 facility where the cards are kept.

1996 Settlement agreements. City of Helen v. White County News, No. 96-CV-409-
DB (White County Superior Court, Oct. 7, 1996) (Barrett, J.):
* Action for access to documents relating to settlement of former police
chief’s civil rights action against city.
* Held that “[c]onsistent with the public policy of the Open Records Act, the
public has a right to know the terms of a settlement agreement in which a
public entity has settled a lawsuit” and that “the nondisclosure provisions
of the Settlement Agreement ... are void as against the public policy of the
State of Georgia.” The court rejected the city’s contention that disclosure
would be improper because “a right of privacy may exist on behalf of
those individuals in the underlying lawsuit.”

1996 District Attorney records. Felker v. Lukemire, 267 Ga. 296 (1996) (Thompson,
J.):
* Action by death row inmate for access to district attorney’s records on
prosecution. After hearing and production of additional records, trial court
found that the district attorney had complied with inmate’s request and
denied relief.
* The Supreme Court affirmed, finding that “the district attorney fully
complied with his obligations under the Act. And he had no reason to
suspect that he did not comply.”

18
1997 Inmate appeals. Hall v. Linahan, 225 Ga. App. 439 (1997) (McMurray, J.):
* Appeal by state prison inmate of trial court order concerning inmate’s
Open Records Act requests.
* Because inmate was currently in the custody of Department of
Corrections, held that appeal was controlled by Prison Litigation Reform
Act of 1996, O.C.G.A. § 42-12-1 et seq., and, because no application for
discretionary review had been filed, had to be dismissed.

1997 Child abuse records. In re Hansen, No. 165958 (Fulton County Juvenile Court,
Nov. 14, 1997) (Hatchett, J.):
* Granting access pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 49-5-41(B) to records of Georgia
Department of Human Resources, Division of Family and Children
Services, of all Georgia children who died between January 1, 1993 and
August 31, 1997 and had been reported previously to state protective
service workers.

1997 Privacy of public employees. Chatham County v. Adventure Radio Group, et

al., Case No. CV97-1406-FR (Eastern Judicial Circuit Superior Court, Dec. 22,
1997) (Freesemann, J.):
* Denying request of county and certain county employees to redact the
names of certain county employees who were the subject of tape-recorded
derogatory remarks by senior police officials. “The Court sympathizes
with the female employees who desire to keep their names secreted.
Unfortunately, however, these women have, albeit unwillingly, become
figures in a public drama. Therefore, dissemination of information
pertaining to this drama is no violation of their right to privacy.”
* Granting request of Savannah Morning News and WSAV-TV for
injunction requiring access.

1998 Motor vehicle accident reports. Statewide Detective Agency v. Zell Miller, 115
F. 3d 904 (11th Cir. 1997) (Barkett, J.):
* A private detective agency filed suit against the Governor and the
Attorney General of Georgia, seeking to enjoin enforcement of statute
criminalizing request for motor vehicle accident reports for commercial
solicitation purposes.
* Affirming the District Court preliminary injunction order, the 11th Circuit
Court held that the statute represented an unconstitutional restraint of
commercial speech.

1998 Investigatory report concerning sexual harassment. Fincher v. State, 231 Ga.
App. 49 (1998) (Ruffin, J.):
* Pursuant to the Open Records Act, the State Board of Pardons and Paroles
of Georgia released to a local television station an investigatory report
concerning claims that one of its employees had sexually harassed a co-
worker. The employee sued claiming invasion of privacy.
* Affirming the dismissal, the Court of Appeals found that the report was a
public record not subject to any exemptions under the Georgia Open

19
 Records Act. The Court further found that the public interest in obtaining
the report outweighs any private interest.

1999 Settlement records. Savannah College of Art and Design v. School of Visual
Arts Inc., 270 Ga. 791 (1999) (Hunstein, J):
* Appeal concerning public access to court records in a civil case. The trial
court ordered that confidential settlement documents filed with a
discovery motion should be open because the plaintiff failed to meet its
burden in limiting access. The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that
the plaintiff’s privacy interest in the documents clearly outweighed the
public’s interest in access.

1999 Discovery procedures considered adequate legal remedy. Millar v. Fayette

County Sheriff's Dept., 241 Ga. App. 659 (1999) (Blackburn, J.):
* Attorney's action against county and county sheriff under Georgia's Open
Records Act, seeking injunction requiring them to turn over certain public
records relating to his client's federal action against them, was premature;
when request for injunction was made, attorney retained adequate legal
remedy, namely right to seek defendants' records through discovery
procedures in his federal action. Eldridge and Barnes, J.J. concurring.

2000 Verbal requests for records. Howard v. Sumter Free Press, Inc., 272 Ga. 521
(2000) (Hines, J.):
* Sheriff’s contention that he was not required to comply with verbal
requests by the press for access to public records, but only to “bona fide”
written requests, was unavailing. Verbal requests do not diminish their
efficacy under the Open Records Act.

2000 Records versus information. Schulten v. Fulton-DeKalb Hospital Authority,

272 Ga. 725 (2000) (Carley, J.):
* Law firm filed writ of mandamus to compel hospital to permit inspection
and copying of records since 1995. Court denied relief, because request
would violate Open Records Act by requiring hospital to compile and
prepare reports that were not yet in existence.
* Failure by hospital to furnish non-existent records does not constitute a
denial of a request for access to public records.

2001 Trade secrets. Georgia Dep’t of Natural Resources et al. v. Theragenics Corp.,
273 Ga. 724 (2001) (Carley, J.):
* Trade secrets exception to disclosure under the Act not expressly limited
to documents specifically identified as confidential at time of submission
to agency.
* Because Act places ultimate responsibility for non-disclosure on agency,
agency cannot construe submitter’s failure to identify all trade secrets at
time of original filing as waiver of confidentiality.

20
2001 Internet access. J.K. Champion, M.D. v. State, Civil Action File No.
2000CV26375 (Fulton Superior, Apr. 9, 2001) (Goger, J.):
* Trial court dismissed complaint for injunction to prevent continued public
Internet access to the fact that plaintiff doctor had entered into a
disciplinary consent order with the State Board of Medical Examiners,
holding, inter alia, that Act mandated access.

2001 Motor vehicle records. Spottsville v. Barnes, 135 F. Supp. 2d 1316 (N.D. Ga.
2001) (Thrash, Jr., J.):
* Challenge to 1999 amendment to the Open Records Act that restricts
disclosure of motor vehicle accident reports to certain designated groups
of persons including the media. The amendment was upheld and found
not to be an unconstitutional prior restraint on commercial speech.

2001 Police reports concerning rape. Dye v. Wallace, 274 Ga. 257 (2001)
* Trial court held that Georgia’s Rape Confidentiality Statute, which made it
unlawful for the media to identify rape victims, was unconstitutional.
* Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the media can publish information
from police reports that are lawfully obtained.

2002 Court records filed under seal. Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr., Inc. v. CBS,
Inc., 184 F. Supp. 2d 1353 (N.D. Ga. 2002) (O’Kelley, J.):
* Holding that records filed under seal in support of the parties’
respective summary judgment motions must be unsealed. There was no
third party request to unseal the records. Rather, the decision was in
response to the Court’s order directed to the parties to show cause why the
records should remain under seal.
* The Court held that documents filed under seal in connection with a
dispositive motion in a civil case may remain sealed only if the party
seeking closure can show good cause that outweighs the public’s interest
in dissemination.
* The Court did allow two depositions to remain under seal finding that the
plaintiff showed that good cause exists because the documents contained
trade secrets.

2004 Income tax records of individual who received government contract. City of
Atlanta v. Corey Entertainment , Inc., 278 Ga. 474 (2004) (Fletcher, J.):
* Holding that Georgia’s Open Records Act requires the disclosure of the
tax returns of an individual who won a government contract for her
business based on that fact that she successfully applied for status as a
“Disadvantaged Business Enterprise.”
* The Court rejected the individual’s claim that her privacy interests
outweighed the public interest in disclosure, finding that there is “a strong
need for open government to prevent the appearance of impropriety and
corruption in the certification process” for “disadvantaged” businesses.

21
 * The Court also found that the income tax return was not a “personal net
worth statement” or “documentation supporting it,” which would have
been exempt from disclosure under federal regulations.

2004 Housing Authority records. Strange v. Housing Auth. of City of Summerville,

268 Ga. App. 403 (2004) (Barnes, J.):
* The Housing Authority filed suit seeking, inter alia, to enjoin Appellants
from making future open records requests on the Authority. Appellants
had made several open records requests in the past.
* Appellants filed a counterclaim alleging that the Authority violated the
Open Records Act. The trial court granted summary judgment for the
Authority on the counterclaim, holding that it was rendered moot when the
Authority amended its complaint to withdraw its injunction request.
* The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the counterclaim was not
moot because the Authority also had failed to provide documents in
response to Appellants’ open records requests and, therefore, could still be
liable under the Open Records Act.

2004 State insurance commissioner records. Hoffman v. Oxendine, 268 Ga. App.
316 (2004) (Phipps, J.):
* The Court held that it was an abuse of discretion by the state Insurance
Commissioner to withhold reports regarding the investigation of an
insurer.
* The Court found that the Insurance Commissioner could not rely on
authority and/or reasons to deny disclosure that were not stated in his
response to the Open Records request.
* Here, the Insurance Commissioner failed to cite the “pending
investigation” exception to the Open Records Act in his response to the
request; therefore, the Court held that the trial court erred in permitting the
Commissioner to use this argument in denying disclosure.

2005 Police records — Private university police force. The Corporation of Mercer
University v. Barrett & Farahany, LLP, 271 Ga. App. 501 (2005) (Johnson, J.)
(Ruffin, C.J. and Barnes, J., concurring), cert. denied, 2005 Ga. LEXIS 392 (Ga.
May 23, 2005):
* Suit by law firm against Mercer University for access to records
maintained and generated by the Mercer University Police Department.
* The Court reversed the decision of the trial court (McConnell, J.) that the
records be produced, holding that a police force hired by a private
university is not a public office or agency just because it performs certain
functions authorized by the State by statute.
* The Court also held that the police force did not receive or maintain
documents in the performance or service of a function on behalf of a
public office or agency, because evidence showed that the police force
worked solely for Mercer University. The fact that the police force was
required to report gang activity to local law enforcement was irrelevant.

22
 * Simply performing some task or function with an indirect public benefit,
or with benefit to the public as a whole, does not transform a private
entity’s records into public records.
* Purpose of Open Records Act would not be furthered by compelling
disclosure of records in this case.

2005 Attorney’s fees and procedure — Petitioner should follow up after receiving
response to ORA request before rushing to sue for attorney’s fees. Everett v.
Rast, 272 Ga. App. 636 (2005) (Miller, J.):
* The Court affirmed the decision of the trial court denying Everett’s motion
for attorney’s fees and expenses, holding that the city had not failed to
produce records without substantial justification. Rather, the city
indicated that it would comply and that documents in addition to those in
its possession “may or may not” be in the possession of various city
departments.
* Everett improperly rushed to litigation instead of contacting the city after
it responded that it would provide documents.

2005 Attorney’s fees and procedure — Custodian of records must affirmatively

respond to ORA request within 3 business days. Wallace v. Greene County,
274 Ga. App. 776 (2005) (Bernes, J.):
* The Court reversed and remanded the decision of the trial court denying
Wallace’s motion for summary judgment on attorney’s fees, holding that
the county violated the Open Records Act by not affirmatively responding
to Wallace’s request within 3 business days. Thus, Wallace met first
prong of test for attorney’s fees.
* Court remanded on unresolved issue of whether Wallace had shown that
county lacked substantial justification for the violation, the second prong
of test for attorney’s fees.

2005 Private entities as vehicles for public agencies due to involvement of public
officials. Baker v. Metropolitan Atlanta Chamber of Commerce et al., 2005-cv-
105088, Nov. 17, 2005 Order (Johnson, J.), currently on appeal:
* Suit by Attorney General and newspaper for access to NASCAR Hall of
Fame and Super Bowl bids submitted and maintained by private entities.
* The Court held that records maintained by private entities related to the
bids were subject to Open Records Act because public officials and their
pledges of political and financial support were “absolutely necessary” to
the possible success of the bids.
* The bids were received in the course of the operation of a public office
because the private entities needed the public officials and acted with their
full knowledge and acquiescence.
* Certain exceptions under the statute protecting bids from disclosure did
not apply here.

2006 Records of bids for Atlanta to host NASCAR Hall of Fame and Super Bowl.
Central Atlanta Progress, Inc. v. Baker, 278 Ga. App. 733 (2006) (Johnson, J.):

23
 * Two private corporations, composed of Atlanta-area businesses, submitted
bids for Atlanta to host the NASCAR Hall of Fame and the 2009 Super
Bowl, and newspaper requested copies of the bids under the Georgia Open
Records Act, but corporations refused, arguing that the bids were not
subject to the Act because they were not prepared by or on behalf of
public agencies.
* The Attorney General issued an opinion that “in light of the significant
involvement of public officials, public employees, public resources and
public funds in the matters, the bids were subject to the [Act] and should
be disclosed,” but the corporations still refused. The superior court agreed
and ruled for the newspaper.
* Court affirms trial court’s decision, explaining that the bids involved the
use of public funds; they called for the future use of substantial public
resources; and, public officials and employees participated in preparing
them. The Act “must be broadly construed to effect its purposes.”

2006 Attorney’s fees and procedure — Summary Judgment improper when

evidence shows that records custodian failed to respond to ORA request
within 3 business days, and no substantial justification exists for not doing so.
Benefit Support, Inc. v. Hall County, 281 Ga. App. 825 (2006) (Blackburn, J.):
* County failed to respond to a records request within three days of
receiving it, and requester sued for attorney’s fees for failing to comply
with the Georgia Open Records Act. Trial court denied the county’s
request for summary judgment on this claim, finding that both prongs of
the test set forth in Wallace were satisfied: the county missed the three-
day deadline, and it did not have a substantial justification for its
omission.
* Court affirms trial court’s denial of summary judgment, explaining that
because the county did not produce the documents until after the civil
litigation commenced, “and because the county has further failed to
explain this dilatory conduct in any evidence submitted with its
summary judgment motion, some evidence shows that the county’s
violation lacked substantial justification.”

2006 Trade-secrets exception to ORA. Douglas Asphalt Company v. E.R. Snell

Contractor, Inc., 282 Ga. App. 546 (2006) (Barnes, J.):
* Trial court enjoined DOT from giving unredacted copies of certain
records to asphalt company because the records contained contractors’
trade secrets, which could give asphalt company a competitive advantage.
* Court affirms trial court, finding that the exception to the Act for trade
secrets, O.C.G.A. § 50-18-72(b)(1), applies, and explaining that the “trial
court did not err in concluding that the contractors presented evidence that
the information derived economic value from not being generally known
or readily ascertainable to others.” Court also holds that although the
product was sold in public places, this did not transform the confidential,
technical specifications of the product’s design into public property.

24
 * Court rejects asphalt company’s contention that trade-secret exception
was not satisfied because the contractors were not required by law to
submit the information to the DOT. “While it is true that the contractors
were not required by law to enter into contracts with the state, several
witnesses testified that once they entered those contracts, they were
required by law to submit the information to the DOT before starting or
continuing work.” Court explains that information that must be submitted
in conjunction with government contracts is “required by law” as that
phrase is used in O.C.G.A. § 50-18-72(b)(1).

2007 Access to Election Materials. Smith v. DeKalb County, 288 Ga. App. 574
(2007) (Ellington, J.):
* Injunction proper to Georgia Secretary of State to prevent public from
obtaining election data.
* Individual submitted Georgia Open Records Act request to director of
elections seeking CD containing “all ballot images and ballot styles as
well as vote totals and a copy of the consolidated returns from the election
management system.” Director notified Secretary of State of request and
that she intended to release the records. Secretary of State sought TRO to
prevent this.
* Lower court granted TRO and permanent injunction preventing
unauthorized individuals from accessing election CDs because it found
Georgia law required CD’s to remain under seal for at least 24 months
following election unless otherwise directed by superior court, but
superior court had not ordered the seal be lifted. Because the CD is
statutorily designated to be kept under seal, it is exempt from records open
to public inspection.
* Injunction is also proper because CD contains security information that
could compromise election security, so it falls within exemption for
“material which if made public could compromise security against
sabotage, criminal, or terroristic acts.” Though copy of CD could be
provided without this security information, government need not create
this since it was not in existence at the time of the request.

2007 Notice where State (or its agency) is a party. Georgia Department of
Agriculture v. Griffin Industries, 284 Ga. App. 259 (2007) (Adams, J.):
* Department did not receive adequate notice in accordance with O.C.G.A.
§ 9-10-2(1) that merits of Open Records Act request were going to be
considered by court, thus court’s decision granting full requested relief
was improper.
* Only notice in record was of case management conference, and only
pending motion was for temporary relief, thus Department did not have
adequate notice of hearing on merits of ultimate issue.

2007 Open Records Act requests regarding government wrongdoing. Moore v.

Gabriel, No. 3:05-CV-31(CDL), 2007 WL 917291 (M.D. Ga. Mar. 22, 2007):
* Open Records Act requests relating to potential abuse and

25
 mismanagement by government are protected First Amendment speech
because this is of core public interest.

2008 Open Records Act does not excuse improper service. Melton v. Wiley, 262
Fed. Appx. 921 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam):
* Plaintiff claimed Open Records Act, which protects from disclosing
records revealing home address of law enforcement officers, validated
substitute service crafted by process server who served someone other
than defendant at defendant’s place of business.
* Court rejects this argument explaining that Open Records Act does not
excuse failure to perfect service in accordance with Georgia law.

2008 Pending investigations and three-day response requirement. Unified Gov’t of

Athens-Clarke County v. Athens Newspapers, LLC, 284 Ga. 192 (2008) (Carley,
J.):
* Newspaper filed suit against county claiming it violated Open Records Act
by refusing access to police records of unsolved rape and murder case
from 1992. Although investigation was inactive, the investigatory file had
not been closed.
* Trial court granted summary judgment for county finding the records
exempt because they fell within exemption for “pending investigations,”
set forth in O.C.G.A. § 50-18-72(a)(4).
* Appellate court reversed, finding the exception unsatisfied because
evidence showed there had been no progress in solving the case for several
years and because there was no ongoing, active investigation. Court of
Appeals noted that statutory exemptions to the Open Records Act must be
narrowly construed.
* Georgia Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals holding and held
that the investigation remained “pending” and thus subject to the Open
Records Act exemption.
* Georgia Supreme Court held that for purposes of the Open Records Act
exemption, a seemingly inactive investigation, which has not yet resulted
in a prosecution, remains undecided and therefore remains “pending” until
it is concluded and the file is closed. Similarly, a prosecution is pending
until a conviction has been reviewed on direct appeal and no further direct
litigation of an imminent nature and finite duration remains.
* Georgia Supreme Court approved of Court of Appeals’ interpretation of
three-day response requirement in O.C.G.A. § 50-18-70(f) as requiring
response within three business days of agency receiving request
irrespective of when specific person at agency in charge of records
receives request.
* Hunstein, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part) disagreed with
majority’s analysis of “pending investigation” exemption and stated that
exemption should only apply to those investigations and prosecutions
being “actively, definitely and imminently pursued.”

2008 Open Records Act Does Not Permit Recovery of Damages. Chisolm v.

26
 Tippens, 289 Ga. App. 757, 762 (2008) (Mikell, J.):
* Noting in dicta that Open Records Act does not permit recovery of
compensatory or punitive damages.

2008 Records Generated During Internal Investigation of Sexual Misconduct

Were Subject to Disclosure and Were Not Work Product. Fulton DeKalb
Hospital Auth. v. Miller & Billips, 293 Ga. App. 601 (2008) (Johnson, J.):
* Law firm filed suit against Fulton DeKalb Hospital Authority pursuant to
Open Records Act seeking disclosure of records generated during internal
investigation into allegations of sexual misconduct. Authority had refused
to produce certain records, including tape-recorded interviews, interview
notes, and investigator’s final report to the General Counsel on the basis of
the work product doctrine.
* Following in camera review, trial court rejected work product claim and
ordered disclosure of records despite involvement of legal department in
investigation, finding that investigation was a routine inquiry in response
to complaints and was not conducted in anticipation of litigation.
* Appellate court affirmed, finding that Authority had commenced
investigation not in response to any claim or threat of litigation, but only
because it received anonymous complaints.

2008 Public Agency Must Raise Specific Exemption in Initial Response to

Requesting Party. Jaraysi v. City of Marietta, 294 Ga. App. 6 (2008) (Mikell,
J.):
* Property owners filed suit against City for refusing to disclose records
regarding unfinished construction on their property for which building
permit had been revoked and which was subject to Municipal Court
demolition action.
* Court rejected City’s attempt to rely on “pending investigation or
prosecution of criminal or unlawful activity” exemption under O.C.G.A. §
50-18-72(a)(4) because City failed to specify this reason in its initial
response to Open Records Act request, and instead did not reference
specific Act provision until summary judgment. Court also noted that
City’s citation to O.C.G.A. § 50-18-72, without more, was insufficient in
that City did not cite subsection and paragraph relied upon.
* Appellate court vacated trial court’s grant of summary judgment for City
where record showed that City violated Open Records Act by failing to
respond to request within three business days and rejected argument that
property owners’ action was moot because City had eventually provided
requested records. Court remanded case to trial court to determine
whether attorney’s fees were warranted under O.C.G.A. § 50-18-73(b).

2008 Documents Held By Private Entity Performing Public Function; Trade

Secrets Exemption. United Healthcare of Georgia, Inc. v. Georgia Dep’t of
Cmty. Health, 293 Ga. App. 84 (2008) (Bernes, J.):
* Private party contracted with Georgia Department of Community Health
(“DCH”) to serve as third-party administrator for administration of State

27
 Health Benefit Plan. Following Open Records Act request to DCH,
private party filed suit seeking to enjoin disclosure of certain documents
relating to its contract with DCH.
* Court held that documents were “public records” because, even though in
possession of private party, Open Records Act requires disclosure of
documents possessed by a private entity performing a service or function
for or on behalf of a public agency. O.C.G.A. § 50-18-70(a).
* Court held that documents were “required by law to be submitted to a
government agency” in satisfaction of trade secrets exemption to the Open
Records Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-18-72(b)(1) (rejecting the trial court’s
holding on this point) because private entity had submitted documents to
DCH pursuant to contractual obligation.
* Rejecting public policy argument in favor of disclosure and finding that
plain language of O.C.G.A. § 50-18-72(b)(1) constitutes General
Assembly’s determination that trade secret protection outweighs any
greater public benefit in disclosure.
* Remanding to trial court for determination of whether certain documents
meet two-part test for trade secrets under O.C.G.A. § 10-1-761(4)(A).

2008 Lack of Federal Jurisdiction. Flemming v. Morris, No. 4:08-CV-51 -CDL,

2008 WL 2442184, at *5 (M.D. Ga. Apr. 30, 2008) (Faircloth, M.J.):
* Prisoner filed suit bringing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Open Records Act claim.
* After determining that § 1983 claim should be dismissed, Magistrate
Judge recommended dismissal of Open Records Act claim as outside the
subject matter jurisdiction of federal court.
* Although documents at issue may have been relevant to plaintiff’s federal
claims, the determinations which must be made regarding the documents’
status and accessibility under Georgia law are not related to the issues
underlying plaintiff’s federal claims and are therefore not part of the same
case or controversy.

2009 Personnel Records of Municipal Employee. Goddard v. City of Albany, 285

Ga. 882, 684 S.E.2d 635 (2009) (Benham, J.):
* Court held that appellant’s right to privacy was not violated when her
personnel documents were released by her manager pursuant to the Open
Records Act.
* Personnel records of municipal employees are not entitled to any blanket
exemption from the Open Records Act. Appellant’s privacy claim,
therefore failed.

2009 Lack of Federal Jurisdiction. GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc., v. MARTA, No. 1:09-

CV-594-TWT, 2009 WL 5033444 (N.D.Ga. Dec. 14, 2009) (Thrash, Jr., J.):
* Court declined jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ Open Records Act claims.
* Court did not have federal question jurisdiction because the plaintiffs’
claims were based on state law. Court did not have supplemental
jurisdiction because the plaintiffs’ Open Records Act claims did not arise

28
 out of a common nucleus of operative fact with any federal claim in the
case.
* Plaintiffs’ claims were narrow in that they only involved questions as to
whether the records requested were subject to the Open Records Act, whether the
defendants responded to the requests, and if the defendants responded, when they
responded.

2009 Recoverable Damages. Shabazz v. Marchand, No. 1:09-CV-1741-WSD, 2009

WL 3148676 (N.D.Ga. Sept. 29, 2009) (Duffey, Jr., J.):
* Court dismissed plaintiff’s claim for compensatory and punitive damages
based on defendant’s failure to respond to plaintiff’s Open Records Act
request. Court held that the Open Records Act does not authorize
compensatory or punitive damages, only an award of attorney fees and
litigation expenses in actions brought to enforce the statute.
* Court also dismissed plaintiff’s claim for compensatory and punitive
damages based on claim that defendant disseminated to an “unauthorized
recipient” information that included plaintiff’s social security number, in
violation of O.C.G.A. § 50-18-72. Court held that defendant was not an
“authorized recipient” whose conduct is governed by § 50-18-72(a) (11.3)
(C). Defendant was a custodian of records and, therefore, did not obtain
records pursuant to the Open Records Act. Court again noted in relation
to this claim that the Open Records Act does not authorize compensatory
or punitive damages.
* Court noted that plaintiff could file action against county requesting
equitable relief in the form of access to the requested records if he
believed that he was improperly denied access to a public record. His
claim should not have been against defendant in her individual capacity.

2009 Access to Personnel File. Soloski v. Adams, 600 F. Supp. 2d 1276 (N.D.Ga.
2009) (Shoob, S.J.):
* Court noted that personnel file of a dean of a university is available to the
public under the Open Records Act.
* Court held that reprimand letter placed in plaintiff’s personnel file, which
stated that former dean of college at state university violated university’s
nondiscrimination and anti-harassment policy, was not an adverse
employment action, even though file was accessible to public under
Georgia Open Records Act.

29
Media Law in the Digital Age: The Rules Have Changed, Have You? 
 

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: SECTION 230, COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT 
  For online publishers and the attorneys advising them, Section 230 of the 
Communications Decency Act (47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006)) is perhaps the most important piece of 
legislation to come out of Congress in the last 15 years. It provides broad protection against 
liability for many types of legal claims arising from the actions of users and commenters. While 
some recent cases have carved out narrow exceptions to Section 230 immunity, it continues to 
serve as a powerful tool for minimizing the risks inherent in allowing third parties to publish 
online. 
Background on Publisher and Distributor Liability  
  Under standard common‐law principles, a person who publishes a defamatory 
statement by another bears the same liability for the statement as if he or she had initially 
created it. Thus, a book publisher or a newspaper publisher can be held liable for anything that 
appears within its pages. The theory behind this "publisher" liability is that a publisher has the 
knowledge, opportunity, and ability to exercise editorial control over the content of its 
publications.1 
  Distributor liability is much more limited. Newsstands, bookstores, and libraries are 
generally not held liable for the content of the material that they distribute unless they have 
knowledge that the material is tortious or illegal in nature.2  The concern is that it would be 
impossible for distributors to read every publication before they sell or distribute it, and that as 
a result, distributors would engage in excessive self‐censorship. In addition, it would be very 
hard for distributors to know whether something is actionable defamation; after all, speech 
must be false to be defamatory.  
  Not surprisingly, the first websites to be sued for defamation based on the statements 
of others argued that they were merely distributors, and not publishers, of the content on their 
sites. One of the first such cases was Cubby v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 
1991). CompuServe provided subscribers with access to over 150 specialty electronic "forums" 
that were run by third parties. When CompuServe was sued over allegedly defamatory 
statements that appeared in the "Rumorville" forum, it argued that it should be treated like a 
distributor because it did not review the contents of the bulletin board before it appeared on 
CompuServe’s site. The court agreed and dismissed the case against CompuServe.  
  Four years later, a New York state court came to the opposite conclusion when faced 
with a website that held itself out as a "family friendly" computer network. In Stratton Oakmont 
v. Prodigy, 23 Media L. Rep. 1794 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995), the court held that because Prodigy was 
                                                            
1
  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 578 (1977); Harris v. Minvielle, 19 So. 925, 928 (La. 1896). 
2
 See Tacket v. General Motors Corp., 836 F.2d 1042, 1046‐47 (7th Cir. 1987); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 581(1) (1977). 

1 
 
Media Law in the Digital Age: The Rules Have Changed, Have You? 
 

exercising editorial control over the messages that appeared on its bulletin boards through its 
content guidelines and software screening program, Prodigy was more like a "publisher" than a 
"distributor" and therefore fully liable for all of the content on its site.  
  The perverse upshot of the CompuServe and Stratton decisions was that any effort by an 
online information provider to restrict or edit user‐submitted content on its site would result in 
the provider facing a much higher risk of liability if it failed to eliminate all defamatory material 
than if it simply didn’t try to control or edit the content of third parties at all.  
The Communications Decency Act   
  This prompted Congress to pass the Communications Decency Act in 1996. The Act 
contains deceptively simple language under the heading "Protection for Good Samaritan 
blocking and screening of offensive material":  
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher 
or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.  
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). Section 230 further provides that "[n]o cause of action may be brought 
and no liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this 
section." 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3). 
  Courts have generally relied upon a three‐pronged test to determine whether a party is 
entitled to protection under Section 230. The three conditions that must be satisfied in order to 
successfully invoke Section 230 protections are: 
1. The defendant is “a provider or user of an interactive computer service..” 
2. The defendant is being “treated as the publisher or speaker” of information for the 
purposes of liability. 
3. The challenged information is “information provided by another information content 
provider.” 
Websites Covered by Section 230   
  Is an "interactive computer service" some special type of website? No. For purposes of 
Section 230, an  
"interactive computer service" means any information service, system, or access 
software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a 
computer server.  
47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2). Most courts have held that through these provisions, Congress granted 
interactive services of all types, including blogs, forums, and listservs, immunity from tort 

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Media Law in the Digital Age: The Rules Have Changed, Have You? 
 

liability so long as the information is provided by a third party.3  As a result of Section 230, 
Internet publishers are treated differently from publishers in print, television, and radio.  
Claims Covered by Section 230   
  Section 230 has most frequently been applied to bar defamation‐based claims.4  In the 
typical case, a plaintiff who believes she has been defamed sues both the author of the 
statement and the website that provided a forum or otherwise hosted the material. Courts 
have held with virtual unanimity that such claims against a website are barred by Section 230.  
  But immunity under Section 230 is not limited to defamation or speech‐based torts. 
Courts have applied Section 230 immunity to bar claims such as invasion of privacy,5 
misappropriation,6 and in a case brought against MySpace, a claim asserting that MySpace was 
negligent for failing to implement age verification procedures and to protect a fourteen‐year 
old from sexual predators.7  
  However, Section 230 explicitly exempts from its coverage criminal law, 
communications privacy law, and "intellectual property claims."  47 U.S.C. § 230(f). In 
interpreting these exclusions, courts agree that Congress meant to exclude federal intellectual 
property claims, such as copyright and trademark, but they disagree whether state‐law 
intellectual property claims (or claims that arguably could be classified as intellectual property 
claims, such as the right of publicity) are also exempted from the broad immunity protection 
Section 230 provides.8  
  Finally, Section 230 does not immunize the actual creator of content.9  The author of a 
defamatory statement, whether he is a blogger, commenter, or anything else, remains just as 
responsible for his online statements as he would be for his offline statements.  
Online Activities Covered by Section 230   
  Courts have consistently held that exercising traditional editorial functions over user‐
submitted content, such as deciding whether to publish, remove, or edit material, is immunized 

                                                            
3
 See, e.g., Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1030 n.15 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that the term “includes a wide 
range of cyberspace services, not only internet service providers”). 
4
 See, e.g., Whitney Info. Network, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., No. 04‐cv‐462, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1424, at *7 (M.D. 
Fla. Jan. 11, 2006); Patentwizard, Inc. v. Kinko’s Inc., 163 F. Supp.2d 1069, 1071 (D.S.D. 2001). 
5
  Parker v. Google, Inc., 242 Fed. Appx. 833, 833 (3d Cir. 2007). 
6
 Gregerson v. Vilana Fin., Inc., No. 06‐1164 AMD/AJB, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11727, at *28‐29 (D. Minn. 
Feb. 15, 2008). 
7
  Doe v. MySpace, 474 F. Supp.2d 843 (W.D. Tex. 2007). 
8
 Compare Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1118 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding plaintiff’s right of 
publicity/misappropriation claim preempted under Section 230) and Atl. Recording Corp. v. Project Playlist, Inc., 
603 F. Supp.2d 690, 703‐04 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).  
9
 See, e.g., FTC v. Accusearch Inc., 570 F.3d 1187 (10th Cir. 2009). 

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under Section 230.10  As one moves farther away from these basic functions, immunity may still 
exist, but the analysis becomes more fact‐specific.  
Exceptions to Section 230 Immunity:  Roommates.com and Barnes v. Yahoo! 
  In an en banc decision, the Ninth Circuit found that defendant Roommates.com, an 
apartment matching service, was not entitled to protection under Section 230 against claims 
under the Fair Housing Act (FHA) and related laws.11  The decision, written by Judge Kozinski, 
exploded forever the longstanding assumption (among Internet lawyers, at least) that website 
operators would always be immune under Section 230 for publishing and organizing content 
provided by their users, so long as the underlying claim didn't involve intellectual property, 
federal criminal law, or the Electronic Communications Privacy Act.  
  Roommates.com is a website that helps match people looking for a place to live with 
people who've got space to rent. Before users can search or post listings, they must create a 
profile by answering a number of questions. Users must specify, using drop‐down menus, 
information about their gender, sexual orientation, and whether they will bring children to a 
household. They also must provide information about their preferences in roommates with 
regard to the same three criteria. In addition, the registration interface encourages users to 
provide "Additional Comments" about themselves and their desired roommate in an open‐
ended fill‐in‐the‐blank form. The website then publishes all this information on the user's 
profile page and uses it to channel subscribers toward listings with compatible preferences, 
including through a search function. Two advocacy groups sued Roommates.com, arguing that 
these practices violate the Fair Housing Act and California housing discrimination law. 
Roommates.com invoked Section 230 as a defense.  
  The decision has three holdings: (1) Section 230 does not bar the claim that 
Roommates.com violated the FHA by asking questions about gender, sexual orientation, and 
children during the registration process; (2) Section 230 does not bar the claim that 
Roommates.com violated the FHA by publishing answers created using its pull‐down menus and 
by providing search functionality and email notices based on this information; and (3) Section 
230 bars a FHA claim based on the "Additional Comments" provided by users.  As to the first 
holding, if we assume for the sake of argument that asking certain questions violates the law, it 
follows that asking them is the website's own act, not the user's. The third holding is consistent 
with the Seventh Circuit's decision in Chicago Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights v. Craigslist, 
Inc., 2008 WL 681168 (7th Cir. Mar. 14, 2008), which held that Section 230 barred FHA claims 
against Craigslist for posting the discriminatory notices of its users. A Craigslist user, much like a 
                                                            
10
 See, e.g., Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1031 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he exclusion of ‘publisher’ liability 
necessarily precludes liability for exercising the usual prerogative of publishers to choose among proffered 
material and to edit the material published while retaining its basic form and message.”) 
11
 Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008). 

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Roommates.com user filling out the "Additional Comments" section, has complete discretion 
about what to place in his or her notice; there are no pull down menus or specific questions 
prompting or encouraging the user to indicate a discriminatory preference.  
  The importance of the Roommates.com decision rests with the second holding. The 
court found that Roommates.com was responsible for user‐created content that violated the 
FHA because it (a) required subscribers to provide allegedly unlawful information as a condition 
of accessing its service; and (b) provided a limited set of pre‐populated answers. 
Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1165‐66. With respect to its search and email functions, the court 
held that Roommates lost Section 230 immunity by designing its system to use allegedly 
unlawful criteria to channel information to particular users and forcing users to participate in 
the discriminatory process. Id. at 1167.  
  On the one hand, Roommates.com is one of the first cases to hold a website operator 
liable for content chosen by a user from a pull‐down menu, and this result is at least facially 
inconsistent with the Ninth's Circuit's own Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, 339 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 
2003), which Judge Kozinski re‐interpreted, and some district court cases, like Whitney 
Information Network, Inc. v. Xcentric Ventures, LLC, 2008 WL 450095, at *9‐12 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 
15, 2008). But, if you narrow this case to its facts, it is relatively unremarkable and easy to 
distinguish from other cases. Here, the court found that Roommates.com forced its users to 
answer allegedly illegal questions, provided only allegedly unlawful answer choices, and then 
imposed the allegedly unlawful criteria on its users through searches and email notifications.  
  The Court tried to limit the impact of its ruling, noting that “[t]he message to website 
operators is clear: If you don’t encourage illegal content, or design your website to require 
users to input illegal content, you will be immune.”  The opinion emphasized that this wasn’t a 
seismic shift away from Section 230 immunity, stating: 
Websites are complicated enterprises, and there will always be close cases where a 
clever lawyer could argue that something the website operator did encouraged the 
illegality. Such close cases, we believe, must be resolved in favor of immunity, lest we cut 
the heart out of section 230 by forcing websites to face death by ten thousand duck‐
bites, fighting off claims that they promoted or encouraged—or at least tacitly assented 
to—the illegality of third parties. 
521 F.3d at 1175. Despite this limiting language, more recent cases have shown that plaintiffs’ 
lawyers have grabbed on to Roommates.com and another recent Ninth Circuit decision, Barnes 
v. Yahoo!, Inc. to chip away at the broad protections afforded by Section 230. 
  Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d (9th Cir. 2009) clarifies one of the many possible lines 
between enjoying Section 230 protection and losing it, namely what kinds of legal claims treat 

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an interactive computer services as a "publisher or speaker" within the meaning of the statute 
and what kinds do not.  
  At issue in Barnes was the fact that plaintiff’s ex‐boyfriend created a fake personals ad 
for her on Yahoo! and impersonated her on various online forums:  
Barnes did not authorize her now former boyfriend to post the profiles, which is hardly 
surprising considering their content. The profiles contained nude photographs of Barnes 
and her boyfriend, taken without her knowledge, and some kind of open solicitation, 
whether express or implied is unclear, to engage in sexual intercourse. The ex‐boyfriend 
then conducted discussions in Yahoo’s online “chat rooms,” posing as Barnes and 
directing male correspondents to the fraudulent profiles he had created. The profiles 
also included the addresses, real and electronic, and telephone number at Barnes’ place 
of employment. Before long, men whom Barnes did not know were peppering her office 
with emails, phone calls, and personal visits, all in the expectation of sex.  
570 F.3d at 1098. Barnes demanded that Yahoo! take the information down, but Yahoo! was 
not very responsive ‐‐ even though it had a policy providing for the removal of fake profiles if 
the complaining party provided a copy of her drivers' license. The opinion notes what happened 
next: 
During the same period, a local news program was preparing to broadcast a report on 
the incident. A day before the initial air date of the broadcast, Yahoo! broke its silence; 
its Director of Communications, Ms. Osako, told Barnes that she would “personally walk 
the statements over to the division responsible for stopping unauthorized profiles and 
they would take care of it.”  Barnes claims to have relied on this statement and took no 
further action regarding the profiles and the trouble they had caused. Approximately 
two months passed without word from Yahoo!, at which point Barnes filed suit against 
Yahoo! in Oregon state court. Shortly thereafter, the profiles disappeared from Yahoo!’s 
website, apparently never to return.  
Id. at 1099. 
  Barnes attempted to plead around Section 230 in a number of creative ways. She 
claimed that since Section 230 only relieved online service providers of being held to be the 
publisher of defamatory material, that did not relieve Yahoo! of the obligation to take down 
allegedly defamatory material once it had notice of its tortious nature. Barnes then tried to 
argue that Section 230 only applies to websites that try and remove some objectionable 
material. Barnes argued that the statutory purpose of the Amendment was to encourage 
websites affirmatively to police themselves, not to provide an excuse for doing nothing, noting 
that section 230(c) is captioned “Protection for ‘good samaritan’ blocking and screening of 
offensive material.”  Cf. Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1163‐64.  
   While the court rejected these attempts to plead around Section 230, it nevertheless 
found one of Barnes’ claims not preempted: promissory estoppel. As noted above, Yahoo! 

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engaged in discussions with Barnes and promised to remove the material. However, Yahoo! 
failed to do so.  
  Subsection 230(c)(1) creates a baseline rule: no liability for publishing the content of 
other information service providers. However, the court concluded, insofar as Barnes alleged a 
breach of contract claim under the theory of promissory estoppel, subsection 230(c)(1) of the 
Act would not preclude her cause of action. 570 F.3d at 1109.  
RECENT CASES 
Dart v. Craigslist, Inc., 665 F. Supp.2d 961 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 20, 2009). 
  Thomas Dart, the Sheriff of Cook County, Illinois, sued personal ad site Craigslist in 
March 2009, alleging that the site is a "public nuisance" under Chicago Municipal Code §8‐8‐
020, because its users have posted ads in the "erotic services" category that facilitate 
prostitution. The civil complaint, filed by the Sheriff in his official capacity, sought an injunction, 
compensatory and punitive damages, and attorneys' fees. The complaint alleged that Craigslist 
creates a "public nuisance" because its "conduct in creating erotic services, developing twenty‐
one categories, and providing a word search function causes a significant interference with the 
public's health, safety, peace, and welfare." Compl. ¶ 92. 
  Ruling on Craigslists’ motion to dismiss, Judge John Grady found Dart’s claims to be 
preempted by Section 230, noting that the objectionable content was created by Craigslist 
users, not Craigslist itself. Dart attempted to argue that Craigslist, like Roommates.com, should 
be viewed as co‐authoring or inducing the objectionable content through its creation of an 
"erotic" or "adult" services category and the inclusion of subcategories like "w4m."  Judge 
Grady rejected this argument, noting that the elements cited by the Sheriff could also be used 
to facilitate the placement of lawful ads:  
While we accept as true for purposes of this motion plaintiff's allegation that users 
routinely flout Craigslist's guidelines, it is not because Craigslist has caused them to do 
so. Or if it has, it is only "in the sense that no one could post [unlawful content] if 
craigslist did not provide a forum." . . . Section 230(c)(1) would serve little if any purpose 
if companies like Craigslist were found liable for "causing" or "inducing" users to post 
unlawful content in this fashion.  
665 F. Supp.2d at 969. 
Finkel v. Facebook, No. 102578/09, 2009 N.Y. Slip Op. 32248 (N.Y. Sup. Sep 15, 2009).  
  Denise Finkel, a 2008 graduate of Oceanside High School on Long Island, sued four of 
her former high school classmates and their parents after the students created a private 
Facebook group called "90 Cents Short of a Dollar," which allegedly contained false and 
defamatory statements about her. Finkel also sued Facebook, claiming that the social 
networking should be held liable for publishing the defamatory statements because it "should 

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have known that such statements were false and/or have taken steps to verify the 
genuineness" of the statements. Complaint ¶ 28.   
  In response to Facebook's motion to dismiss the Complaint under Section 230, Finkel 
argued that because Facebook's Terms of Service granted it an "ownership" interest in the 
content on its site, it was not entitled to protection under Section 230. In a 5‐page decision, 
New York Supreme Court Justice Debra James rejected Fikel’s ownership theory, holding:  
"Ownership" of content plays no role in the Act's statutory scheme. The only issue is 
whether the party sought to be held liable is an "interactive computer service" and if 
that hurdle is surmounted the immunity granted by 42 USC 230(c)(1) is triggered if the 
content was provided by another party.  
2009 N.Y. Slip Op. 32248, at 3‐4. 
Goddard v. Google, Inc., 640 F. Supp.2d 1193 (N.D. Cal. 2009). 
  Goddard sued Google after clicking on an allegedly fraudulent AdWords advertisement 
for “free” mobile subscription service providers (“MSSP”), which resulted in unauthorized 
charges to her cell phone bill. Goddard asserted claims against Google for state unfair 
competition and money laundering, breach of contract, and negligence, alleging that Google 
was complicit in the alleged fraud because its AdWords program helped generate the keywords 
used in the offending advertisements.  
  On Google’s first motion to dismiss, the court found Goddard’s claims preempted by 
Section 230. The court rejected Goddard’s assertion that Section 230 was inapplicable claim 
because her unfair competition claims were anchored in the federal anti‐money laundering 
criminal statute and excluded under §230(e)(1). The court likewise rejected Goddard’s breach 
of contract claims, finding that Google never made affirmative representations regarding the 
services advertised through AdWords, finding that the behavioral restrictions on advertisers 
contained in the AdWords contract didn’t create affirmative marketing representations 
enforceable by third parties. While dismissing Goddard’s complaint, the court granted her leave 
to amend her complaint to take into account the intervening decision in Roommates.com, 
explaining that:  
[T]here may be instances in which an internet content provider will be considered 
"'responsible' at least 'in part' for [posted third‐party content] because every [posting] is 
a collaborative effort" between the internet provider and the third‐party content 
provider. Fair Housing Council, 521 F.3d at 1167. If Plaintiff could establish Google's 
involvement in "creating or developing" the AdWords, either "in whole or in part," she 
might avoid the statutory immunity created by § 230. 
2008 WL 5245490 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2008).  

8 
 
Media Law in the Digital Age: The Rules Have Changed, Have You? 
 

  In an amended complaint, Goddard alleged "that Google's mathematical algorithm 
'suggests' the use of the word 'free' in relation to 'ringtone' as a means of attracting more 
visitors to [the MSSPs'] sites, and that MSSPs whose offerings are not actually free are literally 
powerless to resist," and as a result Google “contribute[ed] materially” to the alleged unlawful 
activities. 640 F. Supp.2d at 1199. 
  The court subsequently granted Google's second motion to dismiss, holding that 
Google's AdWords program was merely a "framework that could be utilized for proper or 
improper purposes" and that Google did not "elicit[] the allegedly illegal content and make[] 
aggressive use of it in conducting its business."  Id. at 1198. In denying Goddard a chance to 
amend her complaint once more, the court found that "Google must be extricated from this 
lawsuit now lest [Section 230's] 'robust' protections be eroded by further litigation."   
Doe II v. MySpace, Inc., 175 Cal. App. 4th 561 (2009). 
  The appeal included four consolidated cases filed by the families of teenaged girls that 
were sexually assaulted by men they met on the social networking site MySpace. The 
complaints asserted claims against MySpace for negligence and strict product liability based on 
MySpace’s alleged failure to implement age verification software and more stringent privacy 
settings. In finding plaintiffs’ claims barred by Section 230, the Court found that Congress did 
not intend to limit the protections of Section 230 to defamation claims. The court rejected 
plaintiffs’ allegations that their claims arose out of MySpace’s own tortious conduct and thus 
fell outside of Section 230. In so holding, the court found that the claims were predicated on 
holding MySpace liable as a publisher for third party content because they sought to hold the 
website responsible for the communications between users.   
NPS LLC v. StubHub Inc., No. 06‐4874‐BLSI, 2009 WL 995483 (Mass. Super. Jan. 26, 2009). 
  The New England Patriots filed a lawsuit against StubHub Inc., one of the largest online 
ticket resellers, claiming that the company encourages fans to violate Massachusetts' anti‐
scalping laws and the team's prohibition against reselling tickets. The lawsuit, filed in Suffolk 
Superior Court, also named as defendants two local residents and 50 "John Does," who 
allegedly resold their season tickets on StubHub.com.  
  Through its website, StubHub allows people to buy and sell tickets to sporting, concert, 
theater, and other events. Sellers can choose whether to sell their tickets at a fixed price, via a 
minimum price auction, or via a declining price auction, in which the seller sets a price that 
decreases each day. Under its user agreement, StubHub receives a 25% commission for each 
sale: 15% of the selling price from the seller, and 10% added to the total sales price due from 
the buyer. StubHub also provides reduced fees and special privileges to certain "Large Sellers," 
who "take a large interest in tickets spanning over multiple events and genres."  

9 
 
Media Law in the Digital Age: The Rules Have Changed, Have You? 
 

  After discovery, StubHub moved for partial summary judgment on the Patriot’s claim of 
intentional interference with advantageous relations, arguing, among other things, that Section 
230 exempted it from liability for the actions of its users. The Patriots claimed that StubHub 
tortiously interfered with the team's relationship with its fans by intentionally inducing or 
encouraging ticket holders to transfer their tickets in violation of their season ticket licenses 
and Massachusetts' anti‐scalping laws, which prohibit, inter alia, selling tickets for more than $2 
over the face value plus service charges. In response, StubHub argued in its motion that it isn't 
responsible for what its users do because it does not sell tickets itself, but simply provides an 
online forum for others to sell tickets.  
  StubHub also argued that it should be treated no differently from the newspaper "want‐
ads," an analogy that the court was quick to reject:  
There are, however, at least two fundamental differences between StubHub's website 
and the "want‐ads" in the classified pages of a newspaper or comparable website. First, 
the newspaper generally charges a fixed price for the advertisement; its price is not 
dependent on the amount of the sale. See Chicago Lawyers' Comm. for Civil Rights 
Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, 519 F.3d 666, 671‐672 (7th Cir. 2008). Second, newspapers 
do not affirmatively seek to increase the price charged in the classified ad, especially 
when doing so may constitute a violation of law. In Craigslist, the Seventh Circuit, 
rejecting a claim that craigslist helped to violate the anti‐discrimination laws in the Fair 
Housing Act, noted that nothing in the service provided by craigslist encouraged those 
posting listings for rental or sale properties to add discriminatory preferences in 
violation of the Act. Id. at 671.  
NPS, at *12.  
  Justice Gants concluded that "StubHub is an interactive computer service, that sellers 
who post their tickets on StubHub are information content providers within the meaning of § 
230, and that StubHub does not lose the immunity provided by the CDA if it simply knew that 
its sellers were potentially in violation of G.L. c. 140, § 185A or § 185D." NPS, at *12.  Citing the 
Ninth Circuit's decision in Roommates.com, however, Justice Gants found that Section 230 
immunity does not apply to interactive computer service providers who are found to have 
"contribute[d] materially to the alleged illegality of the conduct." NPS, at *13 (quoting 
Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1167‐68). The court held that the Patriots sufficiently alleged that 
StubHub “contribute[d] materially” to the alleged illegal conduct, noting:  
[A]s discussed earlier, there is evidence in the record that StubHub materially 
contributed to the illegal “ticket scalping” of its sellers. In effect, the same evidence of 
knowing participation in illegal “ticket scalping” that is sufficient, if proven, to establish 
improper means is also sufficient to place StubHub outside the immunity provided by 
the CDA. 
NPS, at *13. This finding was based on the following allegations:   

10 
 
Media Law in the Digital Age: The Rules Have Changed, Have You? 
 

 StubHub's pricing structure "meant that it profited from any violation of the anti‐
scalping laws, since its revenue increased in direct proportion to the price of the ticket 
sold."  
 StubHub did "not require the seller (or even ask the seller) the face value of the ticket . . 
. . The absence of such information permits illegal ticket scalping to occur through the 
StubHub website and prevents any policing of the website to prohibit such scalping."  
 StubHub "affirmatively encouraged LargeSellers in the LargeSeller's Handbook to 'check 
the website from time to time for underpriced tickets or exclusive listings that may not 
be seen elsewhere,' and still encourages LargeSellers to buy these underpriced tickets 
by waiving for them the fee due from all other ticket buyers‐10 percent of the sales 
price." "[B]y encouraging LargeSellers to buy these tickets, is essentially encouraging 
LargeSellers to resell these tickets at higher prices, from which StubHub will enjoy a 
higher commission."  
Accordingly, the court denied StubHub’s partial motion to dismiss. 
GW Equity LLC v. Xcentric Ventures LLC, 2009 WL 62173 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 9, 2009). 
  GW Equity, LLC, a mergers and acquisition firm that acts as a consultant to middle‐
market business owners who seek to sell or merge their businesses, sued Xcentric Ventures, LLC 
and Edward Magedson in Texas federal court for defamation and other torts over reports 
published on the Ripoff Report website, which provides a forum in which consumers may 
accuse companies and individuals of various "rip‐off" and "bad business" practices.  
  In its complaint, GW Equity alleged that Ripoff Report published false and defamatory 
reports submitted by users without verifying their accuracy. In an effort to circumvent the 
immunity for website operators provided by Section 230, GW Equity further alleged that 
Xcentric and Magedson created, developed, and published defamatory titles, headings, and 
metatags for these reports concerning GW Equity. It also claimed that Ripoff Report generated 
defamatory content by providing users with drop‐down boxes containing defamatory tags, such 
as "corrupt companies," which were applied by users to reports about GW Equity.  
  After completing discovery, Xcentric and Magedson moved for summary judgment. In 
October 2008, a federal magistrate judge issued his report on the motion, which was later 
adopted by the court, recommending that the district court grant Xcentric and Magedson's 
motion for summary judgment. The magistrate judge found that Xcentric and Magedson were 
entitled to the protection of Section 230 because GW Equity had failed to raise a genuine issue 
of fact concerning Xcentric’s development or creation of defamatory content. The court 
indicated that providing drop‐down boxes with "a broad choice of categories from which a user 
must make a selection in order to submit a report [was] not sufficient" to deprive the 
defendants of immunity, especially because they "did not solely provide users with a selection 
of categories that were negative and/or defamatory in nature." GW Equity, at *6, *18.  

11 
 
Media Law in the Digital Age: The Rules Have Changed, Have You? 
 

  The court also found that there was no competent evidence that any Ripoff Report 
employee ever wrote or significantly edited report titles and headings, or changed the category 
tag on a user report. See id. at *17‐18. The court relied in part on a report produced by Xcentric 
showing IP addresses and locations connected with the reports and rebuttals about GW Equity. 
This report showed the IP addresses of Ripoff Report servers and machines used by Ripoff 
Report staff, and none of those IP addresses matched up with the IPs of a report or a rebuttal 
about GW Equity. See id. at *17.  
  Finally, the court rejected GW Equity's argument that Ripoff Report's "Corporate 
Advocacy Business Remediation & Satisfaction Program" took the website outside of the 
protections of Section 230. According to GW Equity, under this program Ripoff Report will, for a 
fee, investigate "rip‐off" reports targeting member companies and post prominent rebuttals to 
those reports. The court indicated that "it is not a bar to immunity for an Internet provider to 
refuse to remove defamatory material created by a third party, or to otherwise use it to their 
advantage, even though the Internet provider’s conduct may be considered reprehensible and 
offensive." Id. at *19. 

12 
 
Media Law in the Digital Age: The Rules Have Changed, Have You? 

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: ONLINE ANONYMITY 
  Several cases in 2009 and 2010 have addressed the legal process for uncovering the 
identities of anonymous or pseudonymous Internet speakers. State high courts in the District of 
Columbia, Maryland and New Hampshire decided cases in which parties sought to compel 
website operators to disclose the identity of anonymous posters, and lower courts in Illinois, 
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina and Tennessee also addressed the 
issue.  Federal district courts also weighed in, with decisions in the District of Columbia, 
Pennsylvania, Missouri, and New York.  
  Nearly all of the decisions this past year recognized a qualified First Amendment right to 
speak anonymously that must be balanced against a would‐be plaintiff’s right to seek proper 
redress for legally actionable harm. In effectuating this balance, most courts required a party 
seeking identifying information to provide notice and make a substantial legal and factual 
showing of the merits of the underlying claim before unmasking an anonymous or 
pseudonymous speaker intended to be named as a defendant.1 Most2 of these courts adopted 
either the Dendrite3 or the Cahill4 standard, or some variation, with a few courts recognizing 
that the distinction is largely semantic.5 
  Anonymous speech also broke into the popular press with model Liskula Cohen’s 
successful effort to uncover the identity of the “Skanks in NYC” blogger.6 While a slight oddball 
in terms of its legal analysis, the Cohen case does not represent a significant departure from the 
other anonymous speech cases discussed in this section.  
  In other developments, two decisions elaborated on the standard for unmasking of an 
anonymous poster who would serve as a witness, rather than as a defendant.7  These courts 
adopted a four‐part test, previously applied in Doe v. 2TheMart.com8 and Enterline v. Pocono 
Medical Center,9 which looks a good deal like the test applied in qualified reporter’s privilege 

                                                            
1
 See Sinclair v. TubeSockTedD, 596 F. Supp. 2d 128 (D.D.C 2009); Zherka v. Bogdanos, 08 Civ. 2062 
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2009); Solers v. Doe, 977 A.2d 941 (D.C. 2009); Brodie v. Independent Newspapers, 966 A.2d 432 
(Md. 2009); The Mortgage Specialists, Inc. v. Implode‐Explode Heavy Indus., Inc., ‐‐‐ A.2d ‐‐‐‐, 2010 WL 1791274 
(N.H. 2010); A.Z. v. Doe, 2010 WL 816647 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Mar. 8, 2010); Swartz v. Doe, No. 08C‐431 
(Tenn. Cir. Ct. Oct. 8, 2009). 
2
 The two exceptions were the court in Hester v. Doe, No. 10‐CVS‐361 (N.C. Super. Ct. June 28, 2010) and 
Maxon v. Ottawa Publ’g Co., 3‐08‐0805 (Ill. App. Ct. June 1, 2010). 
3
 Dendrite Int’l v. Doe, 775 A.2d 756 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001). 
4
 Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005). 
5
 See, e.g., Sinclair v. TubesocktedD, 596 F. Supp. 2d 128, 132 (D.D.C. 2009); Swartz v. Doe, No. 08C‐431, 
slip op. at 8 (Tenn. Cir. Ct. Oct. 8, 2009).  
6
 Cohen v. Google, Inc., 887 N.Y.S.2d 424 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009). 
7
 McVicker v. King, 2010 WL 786275 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 3, 2010); Sedersten v. Taylor, 2009 WL 4802567 (W.D. 
Mo. Dec. 9, 2009).  
8
 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (W.D. Wash. 2001). 
9
 2008 WL 5192386 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 11, 2008). 

1 
 
Media Law in the Digital Age: The Rules Have Changed, Have You? 

cases. Additionally, in comparison to 2008,10 courts in 2009 and 2010 were less receptive to 
claims that state shield laws protect the identities of anonymous commenters. 
  Finally, two incidents involving newspapers voluntarily outing website commenters 
received considerable attention, a good deal of it negative. One involved a St. Louis Post‐
Dispatch reporter who turned over the IP address of a vulgar commenter to a local school that 
traced the comment back to an employee, who resigned.11 The second involved the Cleveland 
Plain Dealer’s decision to disclose publicly that several comments posted on its site were linked 
to the email account of a local judge.12 The public relations backlash from these incidents 
suggests that a website privacy policy should spell out clearly when a website operator may 
disclose identifying information other than in response to legal process, and that employees 
should be trained to comply with that policy.  
THE CASES 
Hester v. Doe, No. 10‐CVS‐361 (N.C. Super. Ct. June 28, 2010). 
  Former Vance County commissioner Thomas S. Hester, Jr. sought the identities of six 
pseudonymous commenters who allegedly posted defamatory comments to a local community  
blog.  The court, while citing the standard set forth in Dendrite Int’l v. Doe, 775 A.2d 756 (N.J. 
App. Div. 2001), adopted only "some" of the Dendrite test.  In testing the sufficiency of the 
plaintiff’s claims, the court applied the motion to dismiss standard set forth in Fed. R. Civ. P. 
12(b)(6), finding that the higher standard under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 adopted by many courts was 
"way too stringent and premature."  Slip op. at 3.  After conducting the motion to dismiss 
analysis, the court ultimately quashed the subpoena as applied to certain of the blog posts the 
court found to be non‐defamatory, but allowed the subpoena as to other commenters.  
Maxon v. Ottawa Publishing Co., 3‐08‐0805 (Ill. App. Ct. June 1, 2010). 
  Plaintiffs had sought the identities of a pseudonymous commenter that had posted 
allegedly defamatory statements in comments on articles posted on the website of a local 
newspaper.  The lower court applied a modified version of the Dendrite and Cahill test and 
dismissed plaintiffs’ petition for discovery of the commenter’s identity.  The appeals court 
rejected the proposition that “anonymous speech, in and of itself, warrants constitutional 
protection,” and accordingly found that there was “no need for the additional procedural 

                                                            
10
 In 2008, courts in Montana and Oregon ruled that their state shield laws protected the identities of 
anonymous commenters, viewing such information as material obtained during the newsgathering process. See 
Doe v. TS, CV08030693 (Or. Cir. Ct. Sept. 30, 2008); Doty v. Molnar, No. DV 07‐022 (Mont. Cir. Ct. Sept. 3, 2008).  
11
 See Ars Technica, Paper outs “anonymous” commenter, job loss ensues (Nov. 18, 2009), at 
http://arstechnica.com/web/news/2009/11/paper‐outs‐anonymous‐commenter‐job‐loss‐ensues.ars. 
12
 First Amendment Coalition, Cleveland newspaper causes stir by unmasking anonymous poster—a judge 
(March 29, 2010), at http://www.firstamendmentcoalition.org/2010/03/cleveland‐newspaper‐causes‐stir‐by‐
unmasking‐anonymous‐poster‐%E2%80%93‐a‐judge/. 

2 
 
Media Law in the Digital Age: The Rules Have Changed, Have You? 

requirements articulated in the Dendrite‐Cahill test.”  Slip op. at 11‐12.  Instead, the court 
determined that the only test a lower court should apply to a petition seeking the identity of an 
anonymous commenter was that set forth in Supreme Court Rule 224, which requires the 
plaintiff to establish all elements of a claim for defamation.  Id. at 13‐14.  The court specifically 
rejected any additional requirement to balance the commenter’s First Amendment rights, and 
further rejected the application of a summary judgment standard, rather than a motion to 
dismiss standard, to test the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s claims.  Id. 
The Mortgage Specialists, Inc. v. Implode‐Explode Heavy Indus., Inc., ‐‐‐ A.2d ‐‐‐‐, 2010 WL 
1791274 (N.H. 2010). 
  In Mortgage Specialists, the New Hampshire Supreme Court vacated the trial court’s 
order that the publishers of the mortgage industry watchdog site, The Mortgage Lender 
Implode‐O‐Meter ("ML‐Implode"), turn over the identity of an anonymous source who provided 
ML‐Implode with a copy of a financial document prepared by The Mortgage Specialists, Inc. for 
submission to the New Hampshire Banking Department, finding that the website qualified as a 
“reporter” and was thus entitled to invoke the qualified newsgathering privilege under Part I, 
Article 22 of the New Hampshire Constitution. The court also vacated the trial court’s order that 
ML‐Implode reveal the identity of a pseudonymous commenter who allegedly posted 
defamatory statements about the company, adopting the Dendrite balancing test. 
  In ruling that ML‐Implode was entitled to invoke the qualified newsgathering privilege 
under the New Hampshire Constitution, the court flatly rejected The Mortgage Specialists' 
argument that "the newsgathering privilege is inapplicable here because Implode is neither an 
established media entity nor engaged in investigative reporting."  2010 WL 1791274, at *2‐3.  It 
explained that "[t]he fact that Implode operates a website makes it no less a member of the 
press," and that "Implode's website serves an informative function and contributes to the flow 
of information to the public."  Id.  Therefore, the court concluded, "Implode is a reporter for 
purposes of the newsgathering privilege."  Id.  The court remanded the issue to the trial court 
with instructions to apply the balancing test set forth by the First Circuit in  Bruno & Stillman, 
Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583, 595‐98 (1st Cir. 1980), which requires the court to 
“balance the potential harm to the free flow of information that might result against the 
asserted need for the requested information.” Id. at 596.  The test sets our several factors for 
trial courts to consider, including whether the claim is merely “a pretense for using discovery 
powers in a fishing expedition,” whether there is a need for confidentiality between the 
journalist and the source, the exhaustion of other non‐confidential sources, and the importance 
of confidentiality to preserve the journalist's continued newsgathering effectiveness.  Id. at 597‐
98. 
  In vacating the trial court’s order to reveal the identity of the pseudonymous 
commenter, the court recognized a First Amendment right to speak anonymously.  2010 WL 

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1791274, at *5.  To guide the lower court in weighing the speaker’s First Amendment rights 
against Mortgage Specialist’s interest in uncovering the author of the allegedly defamatory 
statements, the court adopted the balancing test first set forth in Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe 
Number 3, 342 N.J. Super. 134, 775 A.2d 756 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).  2010 WL 
1791274, at *6.  Under the Dendrite test, the plaintiff must notify the commenter of the 
subpoena and give him or her a chance to respond.  The court must then review the plaintiff’s 
complaint and the proffered evidence in order to determine whether the plaintiff has made a 
prima facie case on each element of its causes of action.  If the plaintiff meets this burden, the 
court must then “balance the defendant’s First Amendment right of anonymous free speech 
against the strength of the prima facie case presented and the necessity for the disclosure of 
the anonymous defendant's identity to allow the plaintiff to properly proceed.”  775 A.2d at 
760‐61. 

In re Lerner, No. HUD‐L‐0672‐10 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Mar. 19, 2010). 
  In In re Lerner, A New Jersey trial court ruled that the president of the Galaxy Towers 
Condominium Association was not entitled to pre‐suit discovery of the identities of anonymous 
critics who posted comments on “Galaxy Facts,” a website forum used by Galaxy Towers condo 
owners to discuss a variety of issues, including the Association’s governance and leadership. In 
an oral ruling, the court held that Rule 4:11‐1, the New Jersey rule of civil procedure governing 
pre‐suit discovery, does not authorize pre‐suit discovery in order to learn the identities of 
potential defendants. Citing Dendrite, the court explained that “[New Jersey] courts have set 
forth a procedure whereby a party seeking to file a complaint for defamation can sue 
anonymous speakers even before he or she knows who they are,” adding that “in those 
circumstances, pre‐complaint discovery would not be appropriate.” Tr. at 22. Because the 
condominium association president had not filed a John Doe complaint before seeking 
discovery, the court denied the requested discovery. 

A.Z. v. Doe, 2010 WL 816647 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Mar. 8, 2010). 
  In A.Z. v. Doe, a mid‐level appeals court in New Jersey affirmed an order quashing a 
subpoena seeking subscriber information for a Gmail account. The plaintiff was a member of 
her high school’s “Cool Kids & Heroes” program, comprised of students of high academic 
achievement who pledged to maintain standards of “exemplary personal conduct.” An 
anonymous individual set up a Gmail account and sent an email to the faculty advisor for the 
Cool Kids & Heroes program stating that seven students, including the plaintiff, were “breaking 
their contracts, and breaking the law.” The email attached several photographs taken off 
Facebook showing students drinking and smoking pot. Only one of the photographs included 
the plaintiff, and it showed her standing at a ping pong table about to throw a ping pong ball, 
but it did not show her drinking or smoking.  

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  The plaintiff filed a John Doe lawsuit against the sender of the email and subpoenaed 
Google, and the Doe defendant filed a motion to quash. The trial court granted the motion, 
reasoning that the plaintiff failed to show that the strength of her prima facie case and the 
necessity for disclosure outweighed Doe’s First Amendment right to anonymous speech. 
  On appeal, the court adhered to the Dendrite standard and affirmed the trial court, 
though on different grounds. The appeals court ruled that the plaintiff was not entitled to 
unmask the defendant because she could not make out a prima facie case of defamation. 
Specifically, the court found that the plaintiff presented no evidence that the statement she 
was “breaking [her] contract[], and breaking the law” was false. The court noted that the 
plaintiff “never provided a sworn statement that she was not consuming alcohol while 
underage, that the photograph was a forgery, that the photograph had been altered, or that 
she was not the person who was depicted in the photograph.”  2010 WL 816647, at *5. The 
court also found compelling additional photographs taken off Facebook that Doe submitted in 
support of the motion to quash. These photographs showed plaintiff holding and drinking 
alcoholic beverages along with the other students. Id. at *6. The court concluded: “We are 
satisfied that regardless of whether the balancing test embodied in Dendrite’s fourth prong is 
applied or not, no plaintiff is entitled to an order unmasking an anonymous author when the 
statements in question cannot support a cause of action for defamation.” Id. at *7. 
McVicker v. King, 2010 WL 786275 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 3, 2010). 
  In McVicker, a federal district court in the Western District of Pennsylvania denied 
William McVicker’s motion to compel Trib Total Media, the publisher of the South Hills Record 
and YourSouthHills.com, to disclose identifying information for seven identified screen names. 
McVicker, the plaintiff in an employment discrimination case, sought the posters’ identities in 
order to impeach the testimony of city council members who made the decision to fire him.  
  In ruling on the motion to compel, the district court reviewed the various standards 
applied by other courts in anonymous speech cases and determined that “a party seeking 
disclosure must clear a higher hurdle where the anonymous poster is a non‐party.” McVicker, 
2010 WL 786275, at *3 (citing Doe v. 2TheMart.com, 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1095 (W.D. Wash. 
2001)). The court adopted the four‐part test applied in 2TheMart.com and Enterline v. Pocono 
Medical Center, 2008 WL 5192386 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 11, 2008), which requires the court to 
consider whether (1) the subpoena was issued in good faith; (2) the information sought relates 
to a core claim or defense; (3) the identifying information is directly and materially relevant to 
that claim or defense; and (4) information sufficient to establish or to disprove the claim or 
defense is unavailable from any other source. McVicker, 2010 WL 786275, at *5.  
  The court determined that McVicker failed to show that the identifying information was 
directly and materially relevant to his employment claim because it was primarily useful for 

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impeachment purposes. Id. The court also found that the identities of the commenters and 
information in their possession were not strictly necessary for McVicker to impeach the city 
council members effectively, and that the same or similar information might be obtained 
through "normal, anticipated forms of discovery." Id. at *6.  
  In the course of its analysis, the court also “summarily rejected” McVicker’s argument 
that the YourSouthHills.com's privacy policy created no expectation of privacy, finding that the 
policy “clearly reflects that [the website publisher] will disclose its users’ personally identifiable 
information only in very limited situations.” Id. at *5.  
  The district court also ruled that Trib Total Media had standing to assert the First 
Amendment rights of individuals posting to its website. See id. at *4. 
Sedersten v. Taylor, 2009 WL 4802567 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 9, 2009). 
  In Sedersten, a federal district court in the Western District of Missouri denied John 
Sedersten’s motion to compel The Springfield News‐Leader to divulge the identity of 
"bornandraisedhere," a pseudonymous commenter who commented on an article on the 
News‐Leader's website. The subpoena issued in conjunction with Sedersten's civil lawsuit 
against the City of Springfield, Missouri, Springfield's police chief, and a former Springfield 
police officer. The News‐Leader article discussed county prosecutors' decision to drop charges 
against the police officer, a decision that "bornandraisedhere" sharply criticized. Gannett 
Missouri Publishing, the publisher of the News‐Leader, objected to the subpoena, and 
Sedersten moved to compel the newspaper to turn over information.  
  As in McVicker, the district court briefly reviewed the various standards applied by other 
courts in anonymous speech cases and determined that “a party seeking disclosure must clear a 
higher hurdle where the anonymous poster is a non‐party.” 2009 Wl 4802567, at *2 (citing Doe 
v. 2TheMart.com, 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1095 (W.D. Wash. 2001)). The court adopted the four‐
part test applied in 2TheMart.com, which requires the court to consider whether (1) the 
subpoena was issued in good faith; (2) the information sought relates to a core claim or 
defense; (3) the identifying information is directly and materially relevant to that claim or 
defense; and (4) information sufficient to establish or to disprove the claim or defense is 
unavailable from any other source. Id. The court also explained that it would “keep in mind 
other First Amendment principles, such as the strict scrutiny applied to restrictions on political 
speech.” Id. 
  Applying this test, the court determined that “this is not the exceptional case that 
warrants disclosure of an anonymous speaker’s identity.” Id. The court found that the evidence 
Sedersten sought to elicit from bornandraisedhere was cumulative, and that Sedersten could 
rely on the comments in making out his negligent hiring/retention case against the City without 
knowing the identity of the speaker. In addition, the court commented that, if 

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bornandraisedhere was in fact the chief of police (a named defendant), then Sedersten could 
simply question the chief on the comments during a deposition. Id. at *2 n.5. 
  The court also rejected Sedersten’s argument that bornandraisedhere had waived First 
Amendment protection by agreeing to the News‐Leader’s privacy policy, which reserved to the 
newspaper "the right to use, and to disclose to third parties, all of the information collected 
from and about [users] while [using] the Site in any way and for any purpose." Id. at *1, 3. The 
court was unconvinced by Sedersten’s reliance on “two sentences in a two‐page document in 
which the overarching theme is that information provided by a user of the site may be used for 
various commercial purposes.” The court further explained that “[n]othing on the face of the 
privacy policy even hints a user may be waiving his or her constitutional right to anonymous 
free speech by posting comments or materials on the News‐Leader’s website.”  Id. at *3. 
Swartz v. Doe, No. 08C‐431 (Tenn. Cir. Ct. Oct. 8, 2009). 
  In Swartz, a Tennessee trial court ruled that plaintiffs Donald and Terry Keller Swartz 
were entitled to discover the identity of the anonymous blogger behind the “Stop Swartz” blog 
who published critical statements about them and encouraged readers to post information on 
their whereabouts and activities. In ruling on the defendant’s motion to quash, the court 
adopted the Dendrite standard, which requires the following five‐part test: (1) the plaintiff must 
notify the poster that he or she is the subject of a subpoena or discovery request; (2) the 
plaintiff must give the poster reasonable time to file opposition to the application; (3) the 
plaintiff must identify the exact statements purportedly made by each anonymous poster that 
give rise to each claim; (4) the plaintiff must make a prima facie or substantial showing of proof 
for each element of each cause of action; and (5) the court must balance the First Amendment 
interests of the anonymous poster against the strength of the plaintiff’s prima facie case and 
the need for disclosure to allow the claims to proceed. Slip op. at 7. With respect to prong four 
of this test, the court indicated that the factual showing “must be made by affidavit, deposition, 
or sworn statement, and that mere allegations of fact are insufficient.”  Id. at 8.  
  In characterizing the test, the court cut through the semantic differences between the 
various standards available to courts in anonymous speech cases: 
As the Solers and Krinsky courts have noted, the labels of "summary judgment" or even 
"prima facie" are potentially confusing. By adopting the Dendrite analysis, the Court 
does not focus on the terminology, but rather the requirement that a plaintiff make a 
substantial legal and factual showing that the claims have merit before permitting 
discovery of an anonymous defendant's identity. 
Id. The court determined that the Swartzes succeeded in making this substantial legal and 
factual showing, pointing out that they submitted copies of the offending blog posts and 
testified regarding the falsity of the statements and damages. Id. at 9‐10. 

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Solers v. Doe, 977 A.2d 941 (D.C. 2009).   
  In Solers, a software developer sued a John Doe defendant for defamation and tortious 
interference over an anonymous tip submitted to an industry watchdog group claiming that the 
software developer had engaged in software privacy. Solers subpoenaed the watchdog group, 
seeking information about the anonymous defendant’s identity. On appeal, the D.C. Court of 
Appeals adopted a protective standard for its lower courts to follow and emphasized that a 
plaintiff "must do more than simply plead his case" to unmask an anonymous speaker claimed 
to have violated the law. 977 A.2d at 958.  
  The D.C. Court of Appeals’ test most closely resembles those set out in Doe v. Cahill, 884 
A.2d 451 (Del. 2005), and Krinsky v. Doe 6, 159 Cal.App. 4th 1154 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008). It 
requires a court to follow five steps before ordering the disclosure of an anonymous or 
pseudonymous speaker's identity: (1) ensure that the plaintiff has adequately pleaded the 
elements of a defamation (or other) claim; (2) require reasonable efforts to notify the 
anonymous defendant that the complaint has been filed and the subpoena has been served; (3) 
delay further action for a reasonable time to allow the defendant an opportunity to file a 
motion to quash; (4) require the plaintiff to proffer evidence creating a genuine issue of 
material fact on each element of the claim that is within its control; and (5) determine that the 
information sought is important to enable the plaintiff to proceed with his/her lawsuit. Id. at 
954‐56. With respect to the fifth prong, the court indicated that it would not require a showing 
that the plaintiff had exhausted alternative sources for the information, so long as the other 
elements of the test had been satisfied. The D.C. Court of Appeals remanded the case to the 
trial court for application of this test. 
Cohen v. Google, Inc., 887 N.Y.S.2d 424 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009). 
  In Cohen, a New York trial court granted model Liskula Cohen pre‐suit discovery from 
Google to reveal the identity of the anonymous publisher of the “Skanks in NYC” blog. Cohen 
alleged that the blog author defamed her by calling her a “skank” and a “ho” and posting 
photographs of her in provocative positions with sexually suggestive captions, all creating the 
false impression that she is sexually promiscuous. 
  The court analyzed the discovery request under New York CPLR § 3102(c), which 
provides for discovery “to aid in bringing an action.” The court ruled that, under CPLR § 3102(c), 
a party seeking pre‐action discovery must make a prima facie showing of a meritorious cause of 
action before obtaining the identity of an anonymous defendant. See 887 N.Y.S.2d at 426‐27 & 
n.5. While acknowledging the First Amendment issues at stake and citing Dendrite, the court 
opined that New York law’s requirement of a prima facie showing “appear[s] to address the 
constitutional concerns raised in this context.” Id. at 427 n.5. 

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  The court held that Cohen adequately made this prima facie showing of defamation, 
finding that the “skank” and “ho” statements, along with the sexually suggestive photographs 
and captions, conveyed a factual assertion that Cohen was sexually promiscuous, rather than 
an expression of protected opinion. Id. at 428‐29. Somewhat confusingly, in rejecting the 
blogger’s argument that her statements should be viewed as opinion because “as a matter of 
law . . . Internet blogs serve as a modern day forum for conveying personal opinions, including 
invective and ranting,” the court cited an old case from Virginia, In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to 
America Online, Inc., 2000 WL 1210372 (Va. Cir. Ct.), rev’d on other grounds, 542 S.E.2d 377 (Va. 
2001), which applied a lenient “good faith” standard to a discovery request seeking the identity 
of an anonymous commenter. This reference is best understood as dicta, however, because the 
court invoked the case in dealing with a peripheral point. Furthermore, the AOL test is 
inconsistent with CPLR § 3102’s requirement of a “prima facie showing of a meritorious cause 
of action,” which the court invoked to sidestep First Amendment analysis. Id. at 427 n.5. 
Alton Telegraph v. Illinois, 08‐MR‐548 (Ill. Cir. Ct. May 15, 2009). 
  In Alton Telegraph v. Illinois, an Illinois trial court denied in part the Alton Telegraph’s 
motion to quash a subpoena issued by state prosecutors seeking the identity of five 
pseudonymous posters who commented on a Telegraph story about an ongoing murder 
investigation. The court rejected the Alton Telegraph’s argument that the pseudonymous 
commenters were “sources” protected by the Illinois shield law.  
  While acknowledging in the abstract that commenters could serve as sources, the court 
ruled that these commenters were not sources because the Telegraph reporter did not use any 
information supplied by them “in researching, investigating, or writing the article,” and “none 
of the comments were written until after the article was published.” Slip op. at 5. In the 
alternative, the court ruled that, even if the shield law did apply to the case, the state had 
“satisfied its burden to divest the Telegraph of its privilege” because it had exhausted all other 
sources of information and the sources were relevant. Id. at 6. Nevertheless, the court granted 
the motion to quash with respect to three of the commenters because their comments did not 
contain the same highly relevant information and “appear[ed] to be nothing more than 
conversation/discussion.” Id. at 7. Neither the court nor the parties raised the issue of the 
commenters’ First Amendment rights to speak anonymously.  
Zherka v. Bogdanos, 08 Civ. 2062 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2009). 
  In Zherka, a federal district court in the Southern District of New York granted The 
Journal News’ motion to quash subpoenas seeking the identities of three pseudonymous 
posters to a forum on the LoHud.com website. In ruling on the motion to quash, the court 
applied a multi‐part test derived from Dendrite, Sony Music Entertainment v. Does, 326 
F.Supp.2d 556 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), and Doe I v. Individuals, 561 F. Supp. 2d 249 (D. Conn. 2008), 

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which has the following elements: (1) the plaintiff must make a reasonable attempt to provide 
notice to the anonymous poster; (2) the plaintiff has to provide the court with the full 
statements which are at issue; (3) the plaintiff must make a concrete showing of a prima facie 
case; (4) the court should consider whether the information is available through alternate 
means; and (5) if all the other elements are satisfied, the court must balance the First 
Amendment interests of the anonymous posters against the need for disclosure in order to 
allow the plaintiff to proceed.13 See Zherka, Tr. at 28‐31. 
  In applying this standard, the court gave considerable weight to prong four, finding that 
the plaintiff had failed to pursue alternative means of identifying the posters and suggesting 
that the named defendants likely knew the posters’ identities. Id. at 30‐31. The court gave the 
plaintiff permission to re‐serve the subpoena after discovery between the named parties and 
stated that “it should be done with appropriate notice as outlined above, and with concurrent 
filing to me showing the full statements, laying out the prima facie case, and describing why 
there are no effective alternative means to get the information.” Id. at 32.  
Brodie v. Independent Newspapers, 966 A.2d 432 (Md. 2009). 
  In Brodie, the Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed the trial court’s order denying 
Independent Newspapers’ motion to quash a subpoena seeking the identity of five 
pseudonymous commenters. The plaintiff, Zebulon Brodie, sought the identities of the 
commenters to pursue a defamation action against them over statements on a website forum 
criticizing Brodie for selling his historic home to another developer who allegedly burned it 
down and accusing Brodie of maintaining a dirty Dunkin' Donuts franchise. The Court of Appeals 
ruled that Brodie’s subpoena should have been quashed. In the process, it clarified the 
appropriate standard for the lower courts, indicating that “a test requiring notice and 
opportunity to be heard, coupled with a showing of a prima facie case and the application of a 
balancing test,” such as the Dendrite standard, “most appropriately balances a speaker's 
constitutional right to anonymous Internet speech with a plaintiff's right to seek judicial redress 
from defamatory remarks.” 966 A.2d at 456.  
  The Court of Appeals spelled out a five‐part test, under which a court should take the 
following steps before ordering disclosure of the identity of an anonymous or pseudonymous 
speaker: (1) require the plaintiff to undertake efforts to notify the anonymous posters that they 
are the subject of a subpoena or application for an order of disclosure, including posting a 
message of notification of the discovery request on the message board; (2) withhold action to 
afford the anonymous posters a reasonable opportunity to file and serve opposition to the 
                                                            
13
 Interestingly, the court indicated that the First Amendment interests of the posters under prong five 
would be diminished if the website privacy policy warned that identifying information would be disclosed in 
response to court order or other legal process. Zherka, Tr. at 28. The court did not provide detailed reasoning on 
this point.  

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application; (3) require the plaintiff to identify and set forth the exact statements purportedly 
made by each anonymous poster, alleged to constitute actionable speech; (4) determine 
whether the complaint has set forth a prima facie defamation per se or per quod action against 
the anonymous posters; and (5) if all else is satisfied, balance the anonymous poster’s First 
Amendment right of free speech against the strength of the prima facie case of defamation 
presented by the plaintiff and the necessity for disclosure of the anonymous defendant’s 
identity. Id. at 457.  
  The Court of Appeals ruled that Brodie did not have a valid cause of action against the 
posters because statements made by certain posters were not actionable and the statute of 
limitations had run against other posters not named in Brodie’s complaint. See id. at 449.  
Sinclair v. TubeSockTedD, 596 F. Supp. 2d 128 (D.D.C. 2009). 
  In Sinclair, a federal district court in the District of Columbia quashed a subpoena 
seeking the identities of three pseudonymous Internet users. In early 2008, plaintiff Lawrence 
Sinclair published a YouTube video and blog claiming that he had engaged in sexual activities 
and done drugs with then‐presidential candidate Barack Obama. In response, “TubeSockTedD” 
uploaded a video to YouTube stating that Sinclair was “spreading lies about Obama.” Another 
Internet user, “mzmolly,” posted a comment on Democratic Underground.com stating that 
Sinclair was a mental patient who was institutionalized on the date in 1999 when he claimed to 
have encountered Obama. A third, “OWNINGLIARS,” posted a comment on Digg.com stating 
that Sinclair was a liar and was in a mental hospital when he claimed he met Obama. Sinclair 
filed a John Doe lawsuit for defamation against all three and sought identifying information 
from the relevant Internet service providers, and the pseudonymous posters moved to quash. 
  The court granted the motion to quash and dismissed the complaint in its entirety. It 
surveyed the case law on the First Amendment right to speak anonymously and held that, 
under either the Cahill or the Dendrite standard, Sinclair was not entitled to the requested 
discovery because his complaint was facially invalid. Specifically, the court determined that 
Sinclair's complaint did not plead facts necessary to establish the court's subject‐matter 
jurisdiction over the case or personal jurisdiction over the pseudonymous defendants. In 
addition, the court ruled that Sinclair's defamation claims failed as a matter of law because he 
did not plead either actual malice or special damages, and because section 230 of the 
Communications Decency Act protected mzmolly and OWNINGLIARS for "simply summarizing 
and reporting information obtained from" a third party. In conclusion, the court stated: “Where 
the viability of a plaintiff’s case is so seriously deficient, there is simply no basis to overcome 
the considerable First Amendment interest in anonymous speech on the Internet. Sinclair has 
provided no ground to do so here.” 596 F. Supp. 2d at 134.  

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  Although the court quashed the subpoena and dismissed the complaint, it refused to 
award mzmolly and Democratic Underground sanctions against Sinclair because of the novel 
areas of law involved. Id. at 134 n.4. 
 

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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: SECTION 512, DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT 
CITIZEN MEDIA LAW PROJECT 
 
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
 
In 1998, Congress passed the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). Although the 
DMCA as a whole extended the reach of copyright law and is generally regarded as favoring the 
interests of copyright owners, it also created provisions limiting the liability of certain online 
actors. Section 512 of the DMCA, 17 U.S.C. § 512, contains the DMCA's "safe‐harbor" provisions 
for online service providers. These provisions shield online service providers, like website 
operators, ISPs, hosting providers, and search engines, from copyright infringement claims 
made against them based on the conduct of their customers or users. To take advantage of the 
safe‐harbor provisions, online service providers need to implement "notice‐and‐takedown" 
procedures that call for expeditious removal of content upon receipt of a valid takedown notice 
from a copyright owner.  
 
Safe‐harbor for Internet Service Providers Under DMCA Section 512 
 
Online publishers that publish or use the creative work of others, their trademarks, or 
certain confidential business information without the permission of the owner may be exposing 
themselves to legal liability for violations of intellectual property law. Fortunately, online 
publishers that allow their users to post this type of content can protect themselves from 
copyright infringement claims under the DMCA by establishing effective “notice‐and‐takedown” 
procedures, promptly removing content when a copyright owner sends notification that 
material is infringing in cases where the online publisher did not have knowledge that the 
material in question is infringing. 
 
The DMCA gives online service providers, like the hosting service and other website 
operators, an incentive to take down infringing material when someone sends a notice 
complaining about it, but also enables the user to send a “counter‐notice” to get the material 
put back up. Such situations may arise when a user of an internet service provider finds its 
content to be the target of a DMCA takedown notice sent to, for example, a hosting provider 
complaining that the user is posting copyright infringing material and asking the hosting 
provider to remove or disable access to it. Less commonly, a user might post something in user 
comments on another blog or website that elicits a takedown notice.  
 

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Media Law in the Digital Age: The Rules Have Changed, Have You? 
 

Online publishers should consider implementing these procedures and taking the 
administrative steps required to enjoy safe‐harbor protection. They are not legally required to 
do so, but it may help them avoid copyright infringement liability. The three main things an 
online publisher needs to do to take advantage of the safe‐harbor provisions are (1) designate a 
copyright agent to receive takedown notices; (2) adopt and communicate to users an effective 
"copyright infringement policy"; and (3) properly comply with takedown notices when received.  
 
There are two safe‐harbor provisions that potentially apply to online publishing 
activities: 
 
The first safe‐harbor provision, under section 512(c), relates to materials posted to a blog or 
website at the direction of a user. This could include a file (e.g., a photograph, a film clip, an 
audio file) that a user posts to a comment section on the site or to a forum thread. Under this 
safe‐harbor, the administrator of a website or other service will not be held liable for money 
damages for infringing content posted "at the direction of a user," so long as the administrator: 
 
(1) does not have actual knowledge that there is infringing content on the servers, or know 
any surrounding facts that would make the infringing use apparent; 
(2) does not receive any financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity if it 
has the ability to control such activity; and 
(3) acts expeditiously to remove or disable access to the infringing material upon obtaining 
knowledge or awareness that the material is infringing or upon receiving a properly 
drafted notice of infringement. 
 
The second safe‐harbor provision, under section 512(d), relates to links to other online 
material located elsewhere. This safe‐harbor provision states that an online service provider 
will not be held liability for money damages “for infringement of copyright by reason of the 
provider referring or linking users to an online location containing infringing material or 
infringing activity, by using information location tools, including a directory, index, reference, 
pointer, or hypertext link.” If a website links to material without knowing that it infringed 
copyright, the language of this section appears to relieve the online publisher of liability so long 
as the online publisher: 
 
(1) does not have actual knowledge that the material is infringing, or know any surrounding 
facts that would make the infringement apparent 
(2) does not receive any financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity if it 
has the ability to control such activity; and 

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Media Law in the Digital Age: The Rules Have Changed, Have You? 
 

(3) acts expeditiously to remove or disable access to the infringing material (such as by 
taking away the link) upon obtaining knowledge or awareness that the material is 
infringing or upon receiving a properly drafted notice of infringement. 
 
These safe‐harbor provisions could be valuable protections for online publishers, but in 
order to take advantage of them, website operators and administrators must meet the 
administrative requirements. Note however, the existence of the safe‐harbor provisions does 
not imply that an online publisher will be held liable for copyright infringement if it opts not to 
use the safe‐harbors. Rather, liability will depend on the independent principles of direct and 
secondary infringement. 
 
Administrative Requirements for Section 512 Safe‐Harbor Protection 
 
There are a few additional administrative steps that an online publisher must take to enjoy the 
benefits of the safe‐harbor provisions.  
   
    1. Designate a Copyright Agent to Receive DMCA Takedown Notices  
 
The U.S. Copyright Office maintains a list of designated agents to receive notices of 
claimed copyright infringement. This list enables copyright owners who believe that their work 
is being infringed to send complaints or "takedown notices" to internet service providers 
hosting or linking to the disputed material. An online publisher will need to designate an agent, 
which can be the website administrator or someone else who agrees to do it, in order to take 
advantage of the DMCA safe‐harbor provisions. To do this, the publisher files an Interim 
Designation with the United States Copyright Office, along with an $105 filing fee. 
 
    2. Adopt and Communicate to Users a Copyright Infringement Policy.  
 
In order to qualify for the safe‐harbor protections, the online publisher must also 
publish a statement on the website giving notice to users of the DMCA agent's contact 
information and policies regarding copyright infringement and the consequences of repeated 
infringing activity. The notice can be a part of the website's terms of use or some other notice 
displayed prominently on the site. The statement should explain that the online publisher will 
respond expeditiously to notices of claimed copyright infringement and terminate users or 
account holders who are "repeat infringers."  
 
Websites may also want to include a statement detailing the proper form for a notice of 
claimed infringement, which must include: 

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Media Law in the Digital Age: The Rules Have Changed, Have You? 
 

 
(1) a physical or electronic signature of a person authorized to act on behalf of the owner of 
the infringed copyright; 
(2) identification of the copyrighted work or works claimed to have been infringed; 
(3) identification of the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of 
infringing activity and that is to be removed; 
(4) information reasonably sufficient to permit the service provider to contact the 
complaining party (e.g., the address, telephone number, or email address); 
(5) a statement that the complaining party has a good faith belief that use of the material is 
not authorized by the copyright owner; and 
(6) a statement that information in the complaint is accurate and that the complaining 
party is authorized to act on behalf of the copyright owner. 
 
17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(B) states that if a complaining party does not substantially comply with 
these requirements, its notice will not serve as "actual notice" for the purpose of Section 512. 
The website’s policy statement should also include a statement explaining the procedure for 
users of the site to make a counter‐notification. 
 
    3. Properly Comply with A Notice of Claimed Infringement When Received  
 
Online publishers may from time to time receive a notice of claimed infringement from 
a copyright owner, alleging that content on the site infringes the holder's copyright. Such a 
notice must comply with the form outlined above. If the copyright notification substantially 
meets these formal requirements, in order to qualify for the safe‐harbor, the online publisher is 
required to: 
 
(1) expeditiously remove or disable access to the material that is claimed to be infringing 
(there is little guidance on what counts as "expeditious"); 
(2) notify its user or subscriber that the material has been removed so that they may file a 
counter‐notice should they wish (the online publisher is not required to notify the user 
before removing the material); 
(3) if proper counter‐notice is provided, notify the copyright holder and provide a copy of 
that counter‐notice; and 
(4) if proper counter‐notice is provided and if the copyright holder does not file suit within 
10 business days, restore the removed material. 
 
Additional Legal Considerations 
 

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Media Law in the Digital Age: The Rules Have Changed, Have You? 
 

The DMCA gets a great deal of attention in discussions of online speech, especially in 
technical circles. But it is important to remember that other legal issues may also affect online 
publishing activities. The DMCA safe‐harbor provisions apply only to claims of copyright 
infringement. They do not apply to trademark infringement claims, defamation claims, or 
claims alleging misappropriation of trade secrets, to name just a few of the possibilities. This 
means that an online publisher cannot insulate itself from liability on one of these other claims 
simply by "expeditiously removing" the disputed content. In many situations, online publishers 
may be protected by section 230 of the Communications Decency Act for publishing the 
statements of its users.  
 
Not Every Threatening Letter is a DMCA Takedown Notice 
 
Website and blog operators get cease‐and‐desist letters based on non‐copyright claims 
with some frequency. Not every threatening letter is a DMCA takedown notice. A website 
administrator should look at the precise allegations and legal claims made in the letter and 
evaluate what next steps need to be taken. It is not sufficient, for example, to conclude that a 
cease‐and‐desist letter relating to defamation or trade secrets law is somehow "defective" and 
should be ignored because it has not met the formal requirements for a notice of claimed 
copyright infringement under section 512. This could potentially exacerbate a delicate 
situation.  
 
The confusion may also work in reverse. There may be times when an online publisher 
receives a DMCA takedown notice for material that is technically not eligible for safe‐harbor 
treatment, such as material posted by the online publisher itself. If it satisfies the complaining 
person that the material is taken down, and there is no serious objection, the online publisher 
should consider doing so. 
 
Procedure For Filing a Counter‐Notice 
 
The DMCA notice‐and‐takedown procedures also provide protection from a wrongful 
claim of copyright infringement. The DMCA requires a service provider to notify its user 
promptly when it removes any content because of a takedown notice, and the user has the 
right to submit a counter‐notice asking that the material be put back up. There is no specific 
time limit for submitting a counter‐notice, but the user should not delay unreasonably in doing 
so. If it receives a counter‐notice, the online service provider is required to replace the disputed 
content unless the complaining party sues the user within fourteen business days of the 
counter‐notice. (A service provider may replace the disputed material after ten business days if 

5 
 
Media Law in the Digital Age: The Rules Have Changed, Have You? 
 

the complaining party has not filed a lawsuit, but it is required to replace it within fourteen 
business days.) 
 
Before the user sends a counter‐notice, she should consider carefully whether she is in 
fact infringing the complaining party's copyright. There are two reasons to consider this 
carefully. First, the counter‐notice requires that the user state, under penalty of perjury, that 
you have a good faith belief that her material was wrongly removed. Second, if the complaining 
party has a good infringement claim, sending a counter‐notice may trigger a lawsuit. If the user 
is not prepared to stand up in a lawsuit, she should think twice about firing back a counter‐
notice. That said, copyright owners sometimes send bogus takedown notices that have no basis 
in law or fact, which are meant solely to intimidate the target. A prompt counter‐notice can 
make these empty threats go away for good. 
 
Some common bases for sending a counter‐notice are that the complaining party does 
not own copyright in the work in question ‐‐ either because it is not covered by copyright or 
because someone else owns the copyright to it ‐‐ and that the use of the copyrighted work is a 
fair use. Users should be extra careful when relying on a claim of fair use to justify sending a 
counter‐notice. Determining whether something is a fair use often requires a complex, fact‐
specific analysis, and even expensive copyright lawyers have difficulty predicting what a court 
will say about fair use ahead of time. If you believe fair use might protect your client, you 
should examine the four fair use factors carefully and consider contacting an intellectual 
property attorney. 
 
To work effectively, a counter‐notice must contain the following items: 
 
(1) the user’s physical or electronic signature; 
(2) the user’s name, address, and phone number; 
(3) identification of the material and its location before it was removed; 
(4) a statement under penalty of perjury that the material was removed by mistake or 
misidentification; 
(5) the user’s consent to the jurisdiction of a federal court in the district where you live (if 
you are in the U.S.), or your consent to the jurisdiction of a federal court in the district 
where your service provider is located (if you are not in the U.S.); and 
(6) the user’s consent to accept service of process from the party who submitted the 
takedown notice. 
 
17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(3).  
 

6 
 
Media Law in the Digital Age: The Rules Have Changed, Have You? 
 

If the user is not a U.S. resident, she must consent to the jurisdiction of a U.S. court in 
her counter‐notice. If the user will never come to the United States and has no assets here, 
then this may not be a significant concession because a plaintiff would not be able to enforce a 
judgment against her in the U.S. Nevertheless, a plaintiff might be able to convince a court in 
the user’s country to enforce a foreign (U.S.) judgment. In any event, sending a counter‐notice 
makes non‐U.S. residents give up a powerful argument they would otherwise have ‐‐ namely, 
that a U.S. court does not have the authority to render a judgment against them. For these 
reasons, non‐U.S. residents may not want to send a counter‐notice unless they are willing to 
fight a copyright infringement claim in the U.S. 
 
Section 512(f) of the DMCA creates liability for knowingly making false claims in a DMCA 
takedown notice or counter‐notice. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(f). If the user claims in a counter‐notice 
that the content does not infringe the complaining party's copyrighted work while knowing this 
to be false, then the copyright owner can win damages from the user, including court costs and 
attorneys' fees stemming from the wrongful counter‐notice. Note, however, that this provision 
also works against a person or company sending a wrongful takedown notice. In recent years, 
the targets of wrongful takedowns have fought back and won damages and favorable 
settlements from individuals and companies sending bogus takedown notices. For instance, in 
Online Policy Group v. Diebold, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195 (N.D. Cal. 2004), two students and 
their ISP sued voting machine manufacturer Diebold after it tried to use DMCA takedown 
notices to disable access to Internet postings of the company's leaked internal email archive. 
The court granted summary judgment to the students and ISP on their claim, finding that 
portions of the email archive were so clearly subject to the fair use defense that "[n]o 
reasonable copyright holder could have believed that [they] were protected by copyright." 
According to the EFF, Diebold subsequently agreed to pay $125,000 in damages and fees to 
settle the lawsuit. Someone who has sent a baseless takedown notice may be more inclined to 
back off if they are reminded about section 512(f) of the DMCA, in addition to receiving a 
counter‐notice.  
 
Recent Cases 
 
Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., No. 07 Civ. 2103, (S.D.N.Y. June 23, 2010). 
 
This case affirmed the safe‐harbor provisions for online service providers who provide 
“storage at the direction of a user” under DMCA § 512(c), so long as the online service provider 
complies with the administrative requirements. The defendant YouTube operates a website 
that allows users to upload video files free of charge. These video files are copied and 
formatted by YouTube’s computer systems and made available for viewing on the website.  

7 
 
Media Law in the Digital Age: The Rules Have Changed, Have You? 
 

Viacom claimed that thousands of videos on YouTube contained Viacom’s copyrighted works 
without authorization and that YouTube had knowledge of infringing activity.  
 
  The court held that YouTube had designated an agent to receive copyright infringement 
notices. It was also “uncontroverted that when YouTube was given the notices, it removed the 
material. It is thus protected ‘from liability for all monetary relief for direct, vicarious and 
contributory infringement’ subject to the specific provisions of the DMCA.” Viacom at *23. 
 
 
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Google, Inc., No. 09 Civ. 9484, (C.D. Cal. July 26, 2010). 
 
  This recent case underscored the requirement that a copyright holder must submit an 
adequate takedown notice to constitute notice of copyright infringement. Google provides 
Blogger, a service that allows account holders to create their own blogs hosted on Google’s 
servers. Account holders may display images on their blogs either by using hyperlinks to 
content hosted on other servers, or by uploading images onto Google’s servers. Google has a 
DMCA notification policy for the service and requires complaints to be sent to Google’s 
designated agent. Blogger accounts are terminated if Google determines that three DMCA 
notices of infringement were valid 
 
Among the takedown notices sent by Perfect 10 to Google were those that generally 
consisted of a cover letter, a spreadsheet, and a hard drive or DVD containing electronic files. 
The spreadsheets did not identify the infringing URLs, but merely the top‐level URL for the 
entire website, “evidently expecting Google to comb through hundreds of nested electronic 
folders containing over 70,000 distinct files, including raw image files . . . and screen shots of 
Google search results, in order to find which link was allegedly infringing.” Google at *15. The 
spreadsheets also did not identify the copyrighted work that was allegedly infringed, instead 
requiring Google to search through a separate electronic folder containing more than 15,000 
images in order to identify the copyrighted work that was infringed.  
 
The court ruled that these notices were defective because “they do not contain all of 
the required information in a single written communication.” Citing Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 
488 F.3d 1102, 1113 (9th Cir. 2007), the court stressed that “[t]he DMCA notification procedures 
place the burden of policing copyright infringement –identifying the potentially infringing 
material and adequately documenting infringement—squarely on the owners of the copyright.” 
These notices that Perfect 10 submitted to Google would impermissibly “shift a substantial 
burden from the copyright owner to the provider.” Google at *17.  

8 
 
 

STARTING AN INDEPENDENT NEWS ORGANIZATION 
BUSINESS LAW AND OTHER CONSIDERATIONS 
PAUL KRITZER 
 
You’re starting a new media company.  What comes first, strategy or structure? 
 
Logic would argue:  first agree to the strategy – and then build the organization to enable 
delivery.  Not so fast. 
 
What if the structure turns out to be incapable or feeble in supporting and accommodating the 
business plan?  Then your strategy might fail and the business slips and fails to gain traction. 
 
Let me say a few introductory words about the different business structures available.  You 
need to choose a form of business, and you need outside financing.  Your choices are: (1) a 
Public‐Owned Corporation, (2) a Limited Liability Corporation of “LLC”, (3) a Low‐Profit Limited 
Liability Company or “L3C,” (4) a Non‐Profit Business, (5) a partnership or (6) a sole 
proprietorship.   
 
Publicly‐Owned Company 
 
At the outset let’s dismiss the idea of forming a publicly‐owned corporation.  Under state and 
federal law, an entrepreneur will find a corporation to be a strait‐jacket.  You are required to 
maximize profits for the shareholders, pay out profits in exact proportion to percentage of 
ownership, and subjugate the interests and needs of employees, communities and societal 
concerns.  Corporate governance and taxation policies are rigid and inflexible.  I was general 
counsel for 24 years with a media company that went public in 2003, and for the next 5 years I 
spent 2 hours on Sarbanes‐Oxley federal compliance issues for each 1 hour of newsroom legal 
work.  For an industry that is fading and changing, I strongly doubt that you want to be saddled 
with a public‐owned corporation from start‐up.  Corporations are already the source of many 
problems in the economy. 
 
Limited Liability Company  
 
Next we have a Limited Liability Company, or “LLC”?  The idea of a LLC took hold 20 years ago 
and swept across the nation.  An LLC is a hybrid.  It combines the best features of a partnership 
with the best features of a corporation.  It is a flexible business tool.  Taxation is flexible, 
because you can choose between being taxed like a partnership (with flow‐through directly to 
the owners) or like a corporation.  Operations can be flexible too: you can write an Operating 
Agreement that overrides many rules of corporate governance.  For instance, your Operating 
Agreement can say that a 5% ownership would receive 50% of the profits.  You can’t do that 
with a corporation. 
 
Low‐Profit Limited Liability Company 
 

1 
 
 

Your next alternative is something new, and it’s called a “Low‐Profit Limited Liability Company,” 
or “L3C”.  This is the next step of business hybrid.  Vermont was the first state to adopt a law 
authorizing L3C, and it did so only 2 years ago.  A handful states, including Michigan, Illinois, 
and Montana have followed.  About a dozen other states are considering L3C legislation.  And 
some states, including my home state of Wisconsin, have rejected the concept.  
 
The L3C combines best features of a Limited Liability Company and the best features of a Non‐
Profit Business.  To be a L3C, your business’ primary purpose must be a societal goal – and not a 
profit goal.  With a L3C, you are allowed to make a profit, and you are allowed to pay dividends 
to your investors.  Plus a L3C has a unique feature:  your investors can include private 
foundations ‐ which make contributions through grants, loans or debt. 
 
Under the federal tax code, private foundations must give away 5% of their assets every year.  
Under normal circumstances, private foundations get no money back from their gifts.  They 
invest for societal reasons.  They are aiming for a different type of bottom line, a societal 
bottom line.  But what if a private foundation can make an investment in a hybrid L3C and get 
some money back, through dividends or redemption?  This pay‐back would stretch their 
charitable dollars, they would have more to give, and their influence on societal causes would 
be enhanced. 
 
So a L3C business is designed to receive funds from a new source ‐‐ grants or loans from private 
foundations.  Keep in mind that a L3C’s primary mission is not to maximize profits; it is to 
pursue a societal interest, and the production of a profit is incidental and secondary.  A private 
foundation can invest in a L3C, get some money back, enhance its societal mission and stay 
within the non‐profit rules of the IRS.   
 
When it invests in a L3C, a private foundation expects it may be an investment with high risk 
and lower‐than‐normal pay‐out.  This benefits the L3C, which is also allowed to seek 
investments from the open market which would demand a lower risk and higher pay‐out.  The 
Wall Street people call these “traunches.”  A L3C can have several layers or traunches or 
investors. Each traunche can have a lesser degree of risk and higher pay‐out.  
 
So the L3C has the special feature that it can receive investments from private foundations, and 
it can re‐pay the foundation with dividends.  But to accept the L3C model, the business owner 
must announce that the primary purpose of his company is a societal goal and profits are a 
secondary after‐thought.   
 
Because of the IRS rules concerning non‐profits, private foundation funds rarely seek to support 
corporations or LLCs.  But they can be used to initiate and support L3Cs – to the mutual benefit 
of the private foundation and the L3C. 
 
Non‐Profit Business 
 

2 
 
 

Our fourth option is a tax‐free, non‐profit entity.  That would be like PBS, Window to the World 
(owner of public television and radio stations in Chicago) or stateline.org.   
 
Support for non‐profits – in the absence of significant advertising ‐ comes from grants (from 
corporations, private foundations, government agencies), membership dues, subscriptions and 
retail sales of merchandise.  Your non‐profit business will be fine … so long as you keep the fund 
grantors happy and they decide to keep the funding tap open.  But, as we know, funds from 
corporations, private foundations and government agencies get cut or deleted in tight times, 
upon administration changes or sometimes for no good reason at all.   
 
For example, the one of best newsgathering organizations on activities in state capitols in the 
past decade was stateline.org, which was incubated and generously supported by the Pew 
Charitable Trusts.  But recently Pew said ten years of support was enough, its key managers 
were shuffled elsewhere and stateline.org’s umbilical cord to funding was cut. Membership 
dues and merchandise sales aren’t enough to float the boat.   
 
  I’m not going to say much about partnerships and sole proprietorships except this:  they 
leave you naked.  Unless you are incorporated, you don’t have protection for your personal 
assets from legal liability.  If you are in a business where you are throwing inflammatory words 
around and people are threatening to sue you for libel, invasion of privacy or copyright 
infringement on a frequent basis, you definitely need legal protection for your personal assets. 
 
  Let me say just a few more words about the L3C structure.  
 
  First, it’s just 2 years since Vermont authorized L3Cs, and only a few states have 
followed suit.  But you can form a L3C company in Vermont for just $100 and then operate it in 
your home state. 
 
  Second, the IRS and Treasury Department haven’t formally blessed the arrangement.  
That makes the private foundation people nervous.  But the L3C legislation in each state was 
carefully drafted to comply with the IRS rules.   
 
  So far I haven’t heard of a new media company being formed as a L3C.  We are looking 
for a pioneer.  There’s  a lot of private foundation money just waiting for you. 
 
  With that thought, let’s draw on the collective wisdom of our panel members. 
 

3 
 
 

 
 
 
MEDIA LIABILITY INSURANCE 
CITIZEN MEDIA LAW PROJECT 
 
Even frivolous lawsuits dismissed at a relatively early stage of the litigation can be expensive to 
defend, and the cost skyrockets the longer the litigation continues, particularly if judgment is 
rendered against you. While most lawsuits never get to trial, if you lack the money to carry out 
a vigorous defense, the only option available to you may be to settle (perhaps even to take 
down the allegedly offending content or even your entire site) regardless of the merits of your 
defense. 
 
For these reasons, it is important to assess whether your online activities are covered by your 
existing homeowners or renters insurance. If your activities are not covered, it might be worth 
getting media liability insurance, even if such policies initially appear to be prohibitively 
expensive. Alternatively, if your online activities are part of an existing business, you may be 
able to add coverage to your business insurance policy through an add‐on rider. Consult your 
insurance agent for costs and details. 
 
Here are a list of steps to take when evaluating your insurance coverage needs: 
 
   1. Carefully review your existing insurance policies to see if claims related to your online 
activities are covered (e.g., claims for libel, invasion of privacy, copyright infringement). Review 
the section on Homeowners and Renters Insurance Coverage in this guide for help in making 
this determination. 
 
   2. If your current insurance policies don't cover you, consider switching to another carrier that 
will provide coverage. See the section on Evaluating Homeowners and Renters Insurance 
Policies for guidance. 
 
   3. Consider whether your state's law excludes coverage for your specific activities.  This is 
especially important if you make any money from your online activities. See the section on 
Insurance Exclusions for Business Pursuits for information. 
 
   4. If your state excludes coverage for business pursuits and you make sufficient money from 
your site to be excluded, carefully weigh whether the income you receive is worth the loss in 
coverage. 
 
   5. Consider whether media liability insurance might be a better option (for many, it may be 
prohibitively expensive, but the coverage can be quite comprehensive). See the section on 
Media Liability Insurance for help. 
 
 

4 
 
 

 
LAUNCHING A WEBSITE FOR NEWS ORGANIZATIONS 
CITIZEN MEDIA LAW PROJECT 
 
There are two key documents or statements that all websites should post before (or at least 
soon after) going "live" on the Internet. First, your site's terms of use govern your relationship 
with users, allowing you to set boundaries of acceptable behavior by your users and potentially 
limiting your liability. Second, you should create a privacy policy, which informs your users of 
your practices relating to private information and helps you avoid liability under a complex 
array of federal and state privacy laws. The following sections address these two important 
documents in greater detail and provide examples that you can follow in creating your own 
terms of use and privacy policy.  
 
As a website or blog operator, there are some basic steps to consider that will reduce your legal 
risks. One is creating terms of use/service and a privacy policy for your site or blog, which will 
help you structure your relationship with your users and let them know what your practices are 
regarding personal information. 
 
The second is taking steps to bring your site within the "safe‐harbor" provisions of the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act, which can help you avoid liability for linking to other sites containing 
copyright infringing material and for hosting copyright infringing material posted by your users.  
 
Terms of use (or "terms of service" or "terms and conditions") generally are a statement placed 
on an easily visible place on a website that governs the relationship between the site and its 
users or visitors. Users explicitly agree to the terms when they sign up for an account and, 
depending on how you write the terms, visitors may implicitly agree to them when they use the 
site. 
 
Why Is It a Good Idea to Have Terms of Use? 
 
Terms of use help you put your users on notice of what you consider to be an acceptable use of 
your site and what you do not. They enable you to reserve the right to deny access to users 
who engage in objectionable conduct and to remove content that you find offensive or that 
may subject you to liability from third parties. It also gives you an opportunity to put language 
up on your website that may help protect you in the event of a lawsuit. 
 
Terms of use are especially important if your website gives out accounts because they help 
specify the mechanics of how the account system will work. But keep in mind that terms of use 
can also apply to visitors merely browsing the website or posting comments (assuming you 
allow comments without an account, which many do not). 
 
Terms of use are also useful in dealing with user‐generated content. When a user creates a 
comment (or any other original expression) and posts it to your website, the user owns the 
copyright to that comment. Absent an agreement or license (see the Allowing Others to Use 

5 
 
 

Your Work section for details), you could be held liable for copyright infringement for editing or 
changing the comment. By posting terms of use on your website, however, you can specify (and 
make clear to users) that you will have a license to edit, change, and remove all content posted 
to the website. These provisions in the terms of use give you effective control of user‐
generated content on your site, even if users own the copyright to that content. 
What Should You Include in Terms of Use? 
 
As discussed above, terms of use should set out the ground rules for your site. Here are some 
key items you should consider including in your terms: 
 
• terms about creating and accessing accounts; 
 
• a disclaimer of affiliation and/or responsibility for material posted or linked to the 
website; 
 
• guidelines for acceptable user‐generated content, such as: 
 
Content may not be illegal, obscene, defamatory, threatening, infringing of intellectual 
property rights, invasive of privacy or otherwise injurious or objectionable.  
 
• a reservation of your copyright and trademark rights or information about a Creative 
Commons or other collaborative licensing arrangement under which the content on the 
site is licensed; 
 
• a provision conditioning the posting of user‐generated content on the grant of a license to 
the website to use and alter the content of the posting, such as: 
 
• By posting or contributing content using these Services, you are granting [name of your 
website] a non‐exclusive, royalty‐free, perpetual, and worldwide license to use your 
content in connection with the operation of the Services, including, without limitation, 
the license rights to copy, distribute, transmit, publicly display, publicly perform, 
reproduce, edit, translate and reformat your content, and/or to incorporate it into a 
collective work.  
 
• a provision or provisions reserving your right to terminate or restrict access to a user's 
account, and to delete any content posted through it; 
 
• a provision prohibiting the impersonation of another person (the point here is to stop a 
user from misleading others about their identity, not necessarily to prohibit anonymous 
or pseudonymous speech); 
 
• provisions relating to inter‐user relations, such as clauses prohibiting on‐site and offline 
harassment; and 
 

6 
 
 

• a provision linking users and visitors to your copyright infringement policy ‐‐ for an 
example of this kind of policy, see the CMLP's Digital Millennium Copyright Act Policy, and 
for details see the Protecting Yourself Against Copyright Claims Based on User Content 
page. 
 
A privacy policy is a statement placed in an easily visible place on a website informing users 
about how the website deals with users' personal information. Privacy policies generally explain 
whether and how users' information will be shared with third parties, including parent 
companies or subsidiaries. It frequently explains whether and how the website uses cookies. 
 
Why Is It a Good Idea to Have a Privacy Policy? 
 
Privacy policies let people know what you will do with information that they provide when 
registering with your website, as well as information that gets logged while they browse. A 
privacy policy allows users to find out what you do with their private information and enables 
them to adapt their conduct accordingly. Beyond that, a privacy policy will help you avoid 
liability under a complex array of state and federal laws dealing with users' private information. 
What Should You Include in a Privacy Policy? 
 
A well‐crafted privacy policy should include the following items (although the particular items 
included may depend upon the nature of your website): 
 
• a statement explaining what kind of information you collect about your users, how you 
use it, and with whom (if anyone) you intend to share it; 
 
• a statement disclosing whether and how you use cookies and/or other tracking software; 
 
• a statement reminding users that data is collected through a server access log when a 
user browses, reads, or downloads information from the site; 
 
• a statement reminding users that the website operators may have to disclose user 
information in response to warrants, subpoenas, or other valid legal process; 
 
• a description of the process through which users can request changes to any of the 
personally identifying information collected and/or stored (you can provide an email 
address for notifying the website operator of changes); 
 
• an opt‐out procedure for users to request that their information not be shared with third 
parties, or that their contact information not be used to send unsolicited correspondence 
(again, this can be done with an email address); 
 
• a description of the process through which the website operator will notify users of 
changes to the privacy policy; 
 

7 
 
 

• a statement identifying the effective date of the policy. 
 
Another important aspect of a privacy policy is what it says about minors. If your site targets or 
knowingly collects information from children under age thirteen, it must comply with the 
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act. For more information about how to comply with the 
Children's Online Privacy Protection Act, please see COPPA.org's compliance page. If you do not 
plan to collect information from minors, you should consider adding a statement to your 
privacy policy saying: 
 
This website's content is intended for adults and we will not knowingly collect personal 
information from children under 13 years of age. If you are a parent or legal guardian of 
a child under age 13 who you believe has submitted personal information to this site, 
please contact us immediately.  
 
There are also rules about collecting medical information and information about criminal 
records. Unless it is important to the purpose of your website, you should not gather this type 
of information. If you plan to gather this type of information, you should consult a lawyer about 
your data collection strategy. 
 
What Should You Avoid? 
 
It is common to see the following statement in website privacy policies: "[Name of website] will 
not collect any personal information about you except when you specifically and knowingly 
provide such information." While this kind of statement may sound reassuring for your users, it 
is not true in most cases. When a user visits a website, he or she provides personal information 
to the website operator simply by virtue of browsing, reading, and downloading material. This 
information includes IP address, user configuration settings, and what website referred the user 
to the site, among other things. It is better to tell users that this type of information is being 
collected automatically on standard web server access logs.  
 
 

8 
 
 

 
A START‐UP INDEPENDENT NEWS ORGANIZATION’S GUIDE TO CONTRIBUTION AGREEMENTS  
 
F. RICHARD RIMER 
Troutman Sanders LLP 
Atlanta 
T: 404.885.3380 
F: 404.962.6831 
E: richard.rimer@troutmansanders.com  
 
Contribution Agreements are a centuries‐old idea.  From the time that the printing press 
made distribution of the written word viable, there has been a need to solidify the relationship 
between publisher and author‐‐ those that have the means to distribute materials and those 
that create the material to be distributed.  Contributor Agreements rose to fill this need. 
 
  Contributor Agreements typically address issues such as what the publisher can do with 
a given work, how the author will be compensated, how the materials will be delivered, what 
quality of work is acceptable, what warranties the author will provide, and so forth.  Publishers 
often have a standard form agreement containing the terms acceptable to it.  The terms chosen 
should highlight the issues the publisher finds most important and represent the policies the 
publisher has chosen to adopt.  Whether a publisher will consent to negotiating the standard 
terms depends upon the quality of the author and/or material submitted. 
 
Of course technology did not stop at the printing press.  Every new technology or 
medium creates a different set of issues for publishers and authors to consider.  Perhaps no 
technology has altered the landscape more than the advent of the Internet.  This technology 
has decreased the price of publishing while increasing the speed, breadth and depth of 
distribution.  Further, this technology has allowed various types of media to be intertwined as 
never before.  As a result, many jurisdictions have passed laws targeted specifically at materials 
distributed via the Internet. 
 
  Just as the Internet has altered the distribution of works, the legal relationship between 
those who create and those who control the distribution of material has likewise been 
impacted.  This is a reality that most independent news organizations experience on a daily 
basis.  Additionally, the Internet’s reliance on speed and relaxed relationships has influenced 
the environment.  This article examines Contribution Agreements as used by independent 
online news organizations, including a review of common provisions.  
 
Pre‐publication conduct 
 
Just as important as any provision contained in a Contribution Agreement are the 
policies and procedures news organizations establish with respect to both submissions and 
potential claims.  Regarding submissions, does the organization require a written agreement, 

9 
 
 

and if so, is it a lengthy, one‐sided document or something concise containing only necessary 
provisions?  These issues are the focus of the remaining sections of this paper. 
  Publishers need to also decide how they will handle any potential legal disputes.  
Policies concerning the timing of notice to insurance carriers, retaining counsel and 
communicating with the contributor could provide protection to the publisher.  Further, 
policies regarding when and how submitted work is reviewed for any potential legal issues may 
provide additional protection. 
 
Grant of Rights/ Reserved Rights 
 
Perhaps the most important legal provision to consider is what rights the author is 
granting to the publisher versus those rights being reserved by the author.  Historically these 
rights featured the language(s) covered, the territory of publication, the forms of publication 
allowed and subsidiary rights.  While these provisions are still important to print publishers, 
online publications often have different objectives. 
   
The rights granted to publishers in older technologies are often limited in terms of 
language and territory.  This limitation was available to authors in these formats as distribution 
via paper allowed authors to more easily govern what territories and in what languages a 
publisher distributed an article or book.  The same is not true with digital distributions.  
Accordingly, these terms are commonly removed or minimized. 
 
  On the other hand, the forms of publication and subsidiary rights have taken on a 
greater importance.  While agreements regarding paper‐based technology often stress the type 
of print media (e.g., newspaper or magazine, hardcover or paperback, etc.) and occasionally 
discussed various non‐print media (e.g., audio books), agreements covering digital media focus 
heavily on availability in different types of media.  These provisions may cover distribution via 
Internet, CDs, interactive software, archival systems and multimedia projects.  Similarly, the 
focus on subsidiary rights has expanded.  While rights to create compilations have always been 
common, digital agreements need to be much more complete.  First, the publisher would want 
rights granted in both paper and electronic compilations.  The publisher would also want rights 
in not only the current technology, but also via technology “hereafter developed” (i.e., future 
technology).  It is important to be careful when describing future technology as courts will 
typically read these rights narrowly.  Accordingly, it is recommended that you carefully review 
the placement of this right in the contract and avoid terms used to describe specific technology 
now in existence (e.g., “World Wide Web”). 
 
  While the need for speed and the preference for informal relationships has created an 
environment in which shorter agreements are preferred, these terms are critical.  A news 
organization should carefully decide what media it plans to use to distribute information and 
tailor its Contributor Agreement to meet these needs. 
Author’s Representations and Warranties 
 

10 
 
 

  Publishers can be found liable for copyright infringement even if they were not aware of 
the infringement and took corrective measures once notified.  Accordingly, many publishers 
seek some comfort that materials submitted by an author do not infringe another’s work.  This 
is especially true in an electronic environment in which copying requires only a few key strokes 
and the authors may be relatively unknown to the publisher.  While a superior form of 
protection for a publisher is to seek indemnity from the author, this is often either worthless or 
unreasonable in these arrangements.  One of the better remaining options is to seek a 
representation from authors that the works are not infringing, thus lowering the likely 
judgment if the publisher is found liable.   
 
Publishers should not blindly accept these representations from authors.  It is 
recommended that Publishers perform at least some due diligence to make sure the submission 
does not obviously infringe a work.  In the context of a news organization, there should be a 
cross‐check against the publisher’s own memory of similar stories and possibly use of a search 
engine to see if the submission is substantially similar to any existing articles.   
 
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act  (DMCA) offers an advantage to online publishers 
that may not be available to publishers using other media.  Title II of the DMCA  creates a safe 
harbor for online service providers (OSP) against copyright liability.  This Title, commonly 
referred to as the Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act, or OCILLA, requires 
that the OSP not have actual knowledge that it has published infringing material or be aware of 
facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent and that it act expeditiously to 
remove the purported infringing material upon receiving notice from copyright owners or their 
agents.  There are other requirements, such as the naming of a designated agent to receive 
complaints from copyright owners, but these additional obligations are likely well worth the 
liability protection afforded. 
 
Publishing decisions 
 
  Speed obviously plays an important role in online news.  It is common for submissions to 
contain errors, both grammatical and factual.  Accordingly, it is important that publishers gain 
the right to edit the submission as necessary.  This could include amending the title and moving 
the placement of the story on the web page as it becomes more or less relevant. 
Financial Terms 
 
  News organizations vary widely as to whether authors are paid, and if so, how much.  
Typical methods of payment include a one‐time fee negotiated prior to submission, share of 
advertising revenues or a payment per use.  While there is no specific right answer as to 
whether or how a publisher should compensate authors, these terms should be carefully set 
forth in the agreement. 
 
Future Works  
 

11 
 
 

  Publishers should consider whether it wants rights with respect to future works by the 
author.  These rights can either be in the form of options on future articles written or even in 
the form of a non‐compete agreement.   
 
 
This provision was much more common in older media.  While these rights are not quite as 
valued in the online community, they may occasionally be important and should not be 
forgotten. 
 
Jurisdiction 
 
  In most agreements the choice of law or choice of forum provisions primarily serve 
either as an assurance that a well‐regarded jurist will hear any issues or as an aid to one party in 
that any actions will be brought in a nearby venue.  While these factors may be present in 
Contribution Agreements, the parties need to also be mindful of the differences in the basic 
elements of copyright law from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.  For example, many foreign countries 
recognize an author’s “moral rights” in a work, and also do not recognize grants of rights which 
do not exist at the time that the agreement was entered into.  It is recommended that the 
author consent to jurisdiction in the United States and consent to application of US law. 
Summary 
 
  Independent news organizations that frequently use materials from outside providers 
need to prepare a standard form Contribution Agreement.  This form should be concise, and 
only contain the provisions necessary to allow the organization to use the materials submitted 
as reasonably anticipated.  While each organization will have different needs, a basic grant of 
rights to the publisher, a simple warranty from the author and a choice of law provision should 
be included. 
 
 

12 
 
 

 
PROTECTING YOUR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT BASICS 
 
DOUG KENYON 
HUNTON & WILLIAMS LLP 
RALEIGH 
T: (919) 899‐3076 
F: (919) 833‐6352 
E: dkenyon@hunton.com 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

13 
 
Legal Entity / Liability Considerations
for a New Media Company

Brett Lockwood
Smith, Gambrell & Russell, LLP
404-815-3674
blockwood@sgrlaw.com
Potential Sources of
Liability for Publishing Business
  Defamation
  Infringements
  Contractual breaches
  Negligence
  Non-compliance with applicable statutes
Having an Entity Helps to Manage
Liability, But . . .
  Does not eliminate liability

  Still need to minimize exposure in publishing and business

activities

  Use contractual liability limitations when possible

  Make sure to use third party content or intellectual property with

permission or under fair use

  Be aware of compliance tripwires – such as taxes, licenses,

sweepstakes, CAN-SPAM, Telephone Consumer Protection Act,
and privacy / data issues, among others
Entities Covered

  Sole Proprietorships
  Corporations
  Limited Liability Companies

  Some other entity forms to consider:

  Non-profitcorporations
  Partnerships,
Requirements for Legal Existence

Sole Proprietorship: No filing required and

is usually very informal.

Corporation: Must file Articles of

Incorporation and be formally “organized”.

LLC: Must file Articles of Organization and

have an Operating Agreement.
Principal Statutory Sources

  Various state business entity statutes

  In
Georgia: Official Code of Georgia
Annotated, Title 14, Corporations,
Partnerships and Associations
Basic Documents –
Sole Proprietorships
  No filing required for entity because a sole
proprietorship is not a distinct legal entity

  Is more akin to an alter ago of its owners

  Because of this, it also has most liability exposure

  Many proprietorships will file a trade name

registration sometimes called a d/b/a or DBA)
Basic Documents -- Corporations

  Articles of Incorporation
  Bylaws
  Organizational Minutes
  Subscription Agreement/Investment Letter
  Stock Certificates
  Shareholders Agreement (optional but
typical)
Typical Provisions of Basic
Corporation Documents

Articles of Incorporation
  Name of Corporation
  Principal place of business
  Registered agent and address
  Number, classes and rights of
shares
  Limits on director liability
  Consideration of other interests
Typical Provisions of Basic
Corporation Documents (cont’d)

Bylaws
  Meeting and Notice Requirements
  Directors and Officers
  Limits on Authority of Officers and
  Directors
Typical Provisions of Basic
Corporation Documents (cont’d)

Organizational Minutes
  Approve initial directors, officers,
approve incorporator’s actions,
accept share subscriptions,
authorize bank accounts, approve
form of share certificate and
Bylaws
Typical Provisions of Basic
Corporation Documents (cont’d)

Subscription Agreement/Investment Letter

• Specifies share consideration

• Confirmation that subscriber is able to
bear risk of investment
• Legend requirement
• General transfer restrictions
Typical Provisions of Basic
Corporation Documents (cont’d)

Shareholders Agreement*
• Restrictions on transferability
• Rights of first refusal
• Options to buy or sell other
shareholders’ shares
• Agreements about management

* Optional
Basic Documents
-- Limited Liability Companies

  Articles of Organization
  Operating Agreement
  Minutes*
  Certificates*

* Optional
Typical Provisions of Basic
LLC Documents

Articles of Organization

• Must specify name

• Usually specify whether member or

manager managed
Typical Provisions of Basic
LLC Documents (cont’d)

Operating Agreement

• Hybrid between Bylaws and

Shareholders Agreement

• Designates limits on authority

• Designates managers
Ancillary Entity Related Documents

  Federal Tax ID number

  State Sales Tax ID number
  Business licenses
  “S” corporation election
  Check the box election – For LLCs
If Any Questions
Brett Lockwood
blockwood@sgrlaw.com
404-815-3674
www.sgrlaw.com

Blogs:
www.techrazorblog.com
www.ocanadablog.com
 

A START‐UP INDEPENDENT NEWS ORGANIZATION’S GUIDE TO CONTRIBUTION AGREEMENTS  
 
F. RICHARD RIMER 
Troutman Sanders LLP 
Atlanta 
T: 404.885.3380 
F: 404.962.6831 
E: richard.rimer@troutmansanders.com  
 
Contribution Agreements are a centuries‐old idea.  From the time that the printing press 
made distribution of the written word viable, there has been a need to solidify the relationship 
between publisher and author‐‐ those that have the means to distribute materials and those 
that create the material to be distributed.  Contributor Agreements rose to fill this need. 
 
  Contributor Agreements typically address issues such as what the publisher can do with 
a given work, how the author will be compensated, how the materials will be delivered, what 
quality of work is acceptable, what warranties the author will provide, and so forth.  Publishers 
often have a standard form agreement containing the terms acceptable to it.  The terms chosen 
should highlight the issues the publisher finds most important and represent the policies the 
publisher has chosen to adopt.  Whether a publisher will consent to negotiating the standard 
terms depends upon the quality of the author and/or material submitted. 
 
Of course technology did not stop at the printing press.  Every new technology or 
medium creates a different set of issues for publishers and authors to consider.  Perhaps no 
technology has altered the landscape more than the advent of the Internet.  This technology 
has decreased the price of publishing while increasing the speed, breadth and depth of 
distribution.  Further, this technology has allowed various types of media to be intertwined as 
never before.  As a result, many jurisdictions have passed laws targeted specifically at materials 
distributed via the Internet. 
 
  Just as the Internet has altered the distribution of works, the legal relationship between 
those who create and those who control the distribution of material has likewise been 
impacted.  This is a reality that most independent news organizations experience on a daily 
basis.  Additionally, the Internet’s reliance on speed and relaxed relationships has influenced 
the environment.  This article examines Contribution Agreements as used by independent 
online news organizations, including a review of common provisions.  
 
Pre‐publication conduct 
 
Just as important as any provision contained in a Contribution Agreement are the 
policies and procedures news organizations establish with respect to both submissions and 
potential claims.  Regarding submissions, does the organization require a written agreement, 
and if so, is it a lengthy, one‐sided document or something concise containing only necessary 
provisions?  These issues are the focus of the remaining sections of this paper. 

1 
 
 

  Publishers need to also decide how they will handle any potential legal disputes.  
Policies concerning the timing of notice to insurance carriers, retaining counsel and 
communicating with the contributor could provide protection to the publisher.  Further, 
policies regarding when and how submitted work is reviewed for any potential legal issues may 
provide additional protection. 
 
Grant of Rights/ Reserved Rights 
 
Perhaps the most important legal provision to consider is what rights the author is 
granting to the publisher versus those rights being reserved by the author.  Historically these 
rights featured the language(s) covered, the territory of publication, the forms of publication 
allowed and subsidiary rights.  While these provisions are still important to print publishers, 
online publications often have different objectives. 
   
The rights granted to publishers in older technologies are often limited in terms of 
language and territory.  This limitation was available to authors in these formats as distribution 
via paper allowed authors to more easily govern what territories and in what languages a 
publisher distributed an article or book.  The same is not true with digital distributions.  
Accordingly, these terms are commonly removed or minimized. 
 
  On the other hand, the forms of publication and subsidiary rights have taken on a 
greater importance.  While agreements regarding paper‐based technology often stress the type 
of print media (e.g., newspaper or magazine, hardcover or paperback, etc.) and occasionally 
discussed various non‐print media (e.g., audio books), agreements covering digital media focus 
heavily on availability in different types of media.  These provisions may cover distribution via 
Internet, CDs, interactive software, archival systems and multimedia projects.  Similarly, the 
focus on subsidiary rights has expanded.  While rights to create compilations have always been 
common, digital agreements need to be much more complete.  First, the publisher would want 
rights granted in both paper and electronic compilations.  The publisher would also want rights 
in not only the current technology, but also via technology “hereafter developed” (i.e., future 
technology).  It is important to be careful when describing future technology as courts will 
typically read these rights narrowly.  Accordingly, it is recommended that you carefully review 
the placement of this right in the contract and avoid terms used to describe specific technology 
now in existence (e.g., “World Wide Web”). 
 
  While the need for speed and the preference for informal relationships has created an 
environment in which shorter agreements are preferred, these terms are critical.  A news 
organization should carefully decide what media it plans to use to distribute information and 
tailor its Contributor Agreement to meet these needs. 
Author’s Representations and Warranties 
 
  Publishers can be found liable for copyright infringement even if they were not aware of 
the infringement and took corrective measures once notified.  Accordingly, many publishers 
seek some comfort that materials submitted by an author do not infringe another’s work.  This 

2 
 
 

is especially true in an electronic environment in which copying requires only a few key strokes 
and the authors may be relatively unknown to the publisher.  While a superior form of 
protection for a publisher is to seek indemnity from the author, this is often either worthless or 
unreasonable in these arrangements.  One of the better remaining options is to seek a 
representation from authors that the works are not infringing, thus lowering the likely 
judgment if the publisher is found liable.   
 
Publishers should not blindly accept these representations from authors.  It is 
recommended that Publishers perform at least some due diligence to make sure the submission 
does not obviously infringe a work.  In the context of a news organization, there should be a 
cross‐check against the publisher’s own memory of similar stories and possibly use of a search 
engine to see if the submission is substantially similar to any existing articles.   
 
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act  (DMCA) offers an advantage to online publishers 
that may not be available to publishers using other media.  Title II of the DMCA  creates a safe 
harbor for online service providers (OSP) against copyright liability.  This Title, commonly 
referred to as the Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act, or OCILLA, requires 
that the OSP not have actual knowledge that it has published infringing material or be aware of 
facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent and that it act expeditiously to 
remove the purported infringing material upon receiving notice from copyright owners or their 
agents.  There are other requirements, such as the naming of a designated agent to receive 
complaints from copyright owners, but these additional obligations are likely well worth the 
liability protection afforded. 
 
Publishing decisions 
 
  Speed obviously plays an important role in online news.  It is common for submissions to 
contain errors, both grammatical and factual.  Accordingly, it is important that publishers gain 
the right to edit the submission as necessary.  This could include amending the title and moving 
the placement of the story on the web page as it becomes more or less relevant. 
Financial Terms 
 
  News organizations vary widely as to whether authors are paid, and if so, how much.  
Typical methods of payment include a one‐time fee negotiated prior to submission, share of 
advertising revenues or a payment per use.  While there is no specific right answer as to 
whether or how a publisher should compensate authors, these terms should be carefully set 
forth in the agreement. 
 
Future Works  
 
  Publishers should consider whether it wants rights with respect to future works by the 
author.  These rights can either be in the form of options on future articles written or even in 
the form of a non‐compete agreement.   
 

3 
 
 

 
This provision was much more common in older media.  While these rights are not quite as 
valued in the online community, they may occasionally be important and should not be 
forgotten. 
 
Jurisdiction 
 
  In most agreements the choice of law or choice of forum provisions primarily serve 
either as an assurance that a well‐regarded jurist will hear any issues or as an aid to one party in 
that any actions will be brought in a nearby venue.  While these factors may be present in 
Contribution Agreements, the parties need to also be mindful of the differences in the basic 
elements of copyright law from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.  For example, many foreign countries 
recognize an author’s “moral rights” in a work, and also do not recognize grants of rights which 
do not exist at the time that the agreement was entered into.  It is recommended that the 
author consent to jurisdiction in the United States and consent to application of US law. 
Summary 
 
  Independent news organizations that frequently use materials from outside providers 
need to prepare a standard form Contribution Agreement.  This form should be concise, and 
only contain the provisions necessary to allow the organization to use the materials submitted 
as reasonably anticipated.  While each organization will have different needs, a basic grant of 
rights to the publisher, a simple warranty from the author and a choice of law provision should 
be included. 
 
 
 

4 
 
 

OTHER CONSIDERATIONS WHEN LAUNCHING AN ONLINE PUBLISHING VENTURE 
CITIZEN MEDIA LAW PROJECT 
 
MEDIA LIABILITY INSURANCE 
 
Even frivolous lawsuits dismissed at a relatively early stage of the litigation can be expensive to 
defend, and the cost skyrockets the longer the litigation continues, particularly if judgment is 
rendered against you. While most lawsuits never get to trial, if you lack the money to carry out 
a vigorous defense, the only option available to you may be to settle (perhaps even to take 
down the allegedly offending content or even your entire site) regardless of the merits of your 
defense. 
 
For these reasons, it is important to assess whether your online activities are covered by your 
existing homeowners or renters insurance. If your activities are not covered, it might be worth 
getting media liability insurance, even if such policies initially appear to be prohibitively 
expensive. Alternatively, if your online activities are part of an existing business, you may be 
able to add coverage to your business insurance policy through an add‐on rider. Consult your 
insurance agent for costs and details. 
 
Here are a list of steps to take when evaluating your insurance coverage needs: 
 
   1. Carefully review your existing insurance policies to see if claims related to your online 
activities are covered (e.g., claims for libel, invasion of privacy, copyright infringement). Review 
the section on Homeowners and Renters Insurance Coverage in this guide for help in making 
this determination. 
 
   2. If your current insurance policies don't cover you, consider switching to another carrier that 
will provide coverage. See the section on Evaluating Homeowners and Renters Insurance 
Policies for guidance. 
 
   3. Consider whether your state's law excludes coverage for your specific activities.  This is 
especially important if you make any money from your online activities. See the section on 
Insurance Exclusions for Business Pursuits for information. 
 
   4. If your state excludes coverage for business pursuits and you make sufficient money from 
your site to be excluded, carefully weigh whether the income you receive is worth the loss in 
coverage. 
 
   5. Consider whether media liability insurance might be a better option (for many, it may be 
prohibitively expensive, but the coverage can be quite comprehensive). See the section on 
Media Liability Insurance for help. 
 
 
 

1 
 
 

TERMS OF USE AND PRIVACY POLICY 
 
There are two key documents or statements that all websites should post before (or at least 
soon after) going "live" on the Internet. First, your site's terms of use govern your relationship 
with users, allowing you to set boundaries of acceptable behavior by your users and potentially 
limiting your liability. Second, you should create a privacy policy, which informs your users of 
your practices relating to private information and helps you avoid liability under a complex 
array of federal and state privacy laws. The following sections address these two important 
documents in greater detail and provide examples that you can follow in creating your own 
terms of use and privacy policy.  
 
As a website or blog operator, there are some basic steps to consider that will reduce your legal 
risks. One is creating terms of use/service and a privacy policy for your site or blog, which will 
help you structure your relationship with your users and let them know what your practices are 
regarding personal information. 
 
The second is taking steps to bring your site within the "safe‐harbor" provisions of the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act, which can help you avoid liability for linking to other sites containing 
copyright infringing material and for hosting copyright infringing material posted by your users.  
 
Terms of use (or "terms of service" or "terms and conditions") generally are a statement placed 
on an easily visible place on a website that governs the relationship between the site and its 
users or visitors. Users explicitly agree to the terms when they sign up for an account and, 
depending on how you write the terms, visitors may implicitly agree to them when they use the 
site. 
 
Why Is It a Good Idea to Have Terms of Use? 
 
Terms of use help you put your users on notice of what you consider to be an acceptable use of 
your site and what you do not. They enable you to reserve the right to deny access to users 
who engage in objectionable conduct and to remove content that you find offensive or that 
may subject you to liability from third parties. It also gives you an opportunity to put language 
up on your website that may help protect you in the event of a lawsuit. 
 
Terms of use are especially important if your website gives out accounts because they help 
specify the mechanics of how the account system will work. But keep in mind that terms of use 
can also apply to visitors merely browsing the website or posting comments (assuming you 
allow comments without an account, which many do not). 
 
Terms of use are also useful in dealing with user‐generated content. When a user creates a 
comment (or any other original expression) and posts it to your website, the user owns the 
copyright to that comment. Absent an agreement or license (see the Allowing Others to Use 
Your Work section for details), you could be held liable for copyright infringement for editing or 
changing the comment. By posting terms of use on your website, however, you can specify (and 

2 
 
 

make clear to users) that you will have a license to edit, change, and remove all content posted 
to the website. These provisions in the terms of use give you effective control of user‐
generated content on your site, even if users own the copyright to that content. 
What Should You Include in Terms of Use? 
 
As discussed above, terms of use should set out the ground rules for your site. Here are some 
key items you should consider including in your terms: 
 
• terms about creating and accessing accounts; 
 
• a disclaimer of affiliation and/or responsibility for material posted or linked to the 
website; 
 
• guidelines for acceptable user‐generated content, such as: 
 
Content may not be illegal, obscene, defamatory, threatening, infringing of intellectual 
property rights, invasive of privacy or otherwise injurious or objectionable.  
 
• a reservation of your copyright and trademark rights or information about a Creative 
Commons or other collaborative licensing arrangement under which the content on the 
site is licensed; 
 
• a provision conditioning the posting of user‐generated content on the grant of a license to 
the website to use and alter the content of the posting, such as: 
 
• By posting or contributing content using these Services, you are granting [name of your 
website] a non‐exclusive, royalty‐free, perpetual, and worldwide license to use your 
content in connection with the operation of the Services, including, without limitation, 
the license rights to copy, distribute, transmit, publicly display, publicly perform, 
reproduce, edit, translate and reformat your content, and/or to incorporate it into a 
collective work.  
 
• a provision or provisions reserving your right to terminate or restrict access to a user's 
account, and to delete any content posted through it; 
 
• a provision prohibiting the impersonation of another person (the point here is to stop a 
user from misleading others about their identity, not necessarily to prohibit anonymous 
or pseudonymous speech); 
 
• provisions relating to inter‐user relations, such as clauses prohibiting on‐site and offline 
harassment; and 
 
• a provision linking users and visitors to your copyright infringement policy ‐‐ for an 
example of this kind of policy, see the CMLP's Digital Millennium Copyright Act Policy, and 

3 
 
 

for details see the Protecting Yourself Against Copyright Claims Based on User Content 
page. 
 
A privacy policy is a statement placed in an easily visible place on a website informing users 
about how the website deals with users' personal information. Privacy policies generally explain 
whether and how users' information will be shared with third parties, including parent 
companies or subsidiaries. It frequently explains whether and how the website uses cookies. 
 
Why Is It a Good Idea to Have a Privacy Policy? 
 
Privacy policies let people know what you will do with information that they provide when 
registering with your website, as well as information that gets logged while they browse. A 
privacy policy allows users to find out what you do with their private information and enables 
them to adapt their conduct accordingly. Beyond that, a privacy policy will help you avoid 
liability under a complex array of state and federal laws dealing with users' private information. 
What Should You Include in a Privacy Policy? 
 
A well‐crafted privacy policy should include the following items (although the particular items 
included may depend upon the nature of your website): 
 
• a statement explaining what kind of information you collect about your users, how you 
use it, and with whom (if anyone) you intend to share it; 
 
• a statement disclosing whether and how you use cookies and/or other tracking software; 
 
• a statement reminding users that data is collected through a server access log when a 
user browses, reads, or downloads information from the site; 
 
• a statement reminding users that the website operators may have to disclose user 
information in response to warrants, subpoenas, or other valid legal process; 
 
• a description of the process through which users can request changes to any of the 
personally identifying information collected and/or stored (you can provide an email 
address for notifying the website operator of changes); 
 
• an opt‐out procedure for users to request that their information not be shared with third 
parties, or that their contact information not be used to send unsolicited correspondence 
(again, this can be done with an email address); 
 
• a description of the process through which the website operator will notify users of 
changes to the privacy policy; 
 
• a statement identifying the effective date of the policy. 
 

4 
 
 

Another important aspect of a privacy policy is what it says about minors. If your site targets or 
knowingly collects information from children under age thirteen, it must comply with the 
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act. For more information about how to comply with the 
Children's Online Privacy Protection Act, please see COPPA.org's compliance page. If you do not 
plan to collect information from minors, you should consider adding a statement to your 
privacy policy saying: 
 
This website's content is intended for adults and we will not knowingly collect personal 
information from children under 13 years of age. If you are a parent or legal guardian of 
a child under age 13 who you believe has submitted personal information to this site, 
please contact us immediately.  
 
There are also rules about collecting medical information and information about criminal 
records. Unless it is important to the purpose of your website, you should not gather this type 
of information. If you plan to gather this type of information, you should consult a lawyer about 
your data collection strategy. 
 
What Should You Avoid? 
 
It is common to see the following statement in website privacy policies: "[Name of website] will 
not collect any personal information about you except when you specifically and knowingly 
provide such information." While this kind of statement may sound reassuring for your users, it 
is not true in most cases. When a user visits a website, he or she provides personal information 
to the website operator simply by virtue of browsing, reading, and downloading material. This 
information includes IP address, user configuration settings, and what website referred the user 
to the site, among other things. It is better to tell users that this type of information is being 
collected automatically on standard web server access logs.  
 
 
 

5 
 
 THE NEWSPAPER REVITALIZATION ACT 
  In March 2009, United States Senator Benjamin Cardin (D‐MD) introduced legislation 
that would allow newspapers to become nonprofit organizations in what he described as "an 
effort to help the faltering [newspaper] industry survive." 
  The proposed “Newspaper Revitalization Act of 2009,” S. 673, would allow "newspapers 
for general circulation" to operate as nonprofits under section 501(c)(3) of the U.S. Internal 
Revenue Code, similar to public broadcasting.  Under the bill, newspaper nonprofits would not 
be allowed to make political endorsements, but would be allowed to report on all issues, 
including political campaigns. Advertising and subscription revenue would be tax exempt and 
contributions to support coverage or operations could be tax deductible.  
  According to Cardin's press release:  
The measure is targeted to preserve local newspapers serving communities and not 
large newspaper conglomerates. Because newspaper profits have been falling in recent 
years, no substantial loss of federal revenue is expected.  
"We are losing our newspaper industry," said Senator Cardin. "The economy has caused 
an immediate problem, but the business model for newspapers, based on circulation 
and advertising revenue, is broken, and that is a real tragedy for communities across the 
nation and for our democracy. 
"While we have lots of news sources, we rely on newspapers for in‐depth reporting that 
follows important issues, records events and exposes misdeeds. In fact, most if not all 
sources of journalistic information ‐ from radio to television to the Internet ‐ gathers 
their news from newspaper reporters who cover the news on a daily basis and know 
their communities. It is in the interest of our nation and good governance that we 
ensure they survive." 
  The bill has been referred to the Senate Committee on Finance. A companion bill 
introduced by Rep. Carolyn Maloney (D‐NY), H.R. 3602, is pending in the House Committee on 
Ways and Means. 
 
Protecting Your Intellectual Property:
Trademark and Copyright Basics

Harvard University’s Berkman Center for Internet & Society &

Kennesaw State University’s Center for Sustainable Journalism

Kennesaw State University

September 25, 2010
Douglas W. Kenyon
John Gary Maynard, III
 Agenda

  Trademarks Overview
  What is a trademark?
  What does a trademark do?
  Are trademarks different from other Intellectual Property?
  What are the different types of marks?
  How are Trademark rights established in the U.S.?
  When can one file a U.S. Trademark Application?
  Why file with the PTO?
  What makes a “good” mark?
  What do we (your attorneys) need to file a trademark
application with the PTO?
  What does the PTO do with the application?
  Once I have a mark, what do I do to protect it?
  How do I maintain a trademark registration?

2
 Agenda

  Copyrights Overview
  What is a Copyright?
  What can qualify for copyright protection?
  What rights does a copyright owner have?
  Are facts protectible as a copyright?
  Who owns the copyright?
  Must one register a copyright?

3
 What is a Trademark?

What is a Trademark?
Any word, phrase, symbol, design or combination thereof that
distinguishes goods and/or services of one source from those
of other sources

4
 What Does a Trademark Do?

What Does a Trademark Do?

Legally, a trademark serves two purposes:

(i) identifies goods or services as coming from a single, albeit

anonymous, source

(ii) identifies goods or services as having a known quality

5
 Trademarks are different than other
Intellectual Property

Trademarks are different than other

Intellectual Property
  A patent confers on the owner the right to exclude others from making,
using, offering for sale or selling the patented invention for the life of the
patent.
  Copyrights provide certain exclusive rights (reproduction, distribution,
etc.) to the author or owner of an original work of authorship that has
been fixed in a tangible medium of expression.
  Trade Secrets are any formula, pattern, device or compilation of
information which is used in a business and, because it is unknown to
others, gives the business a competitive advantage.

6
 Types of Marks

Types of Marks:
  Trademark - A mark used by a seller to identify its goods and distinguish them from
others.
  Service Mark - A mark used by a seller to identify its services and distinguish them
from others.
  Certification Mark - A mark used in connection with goods and services to certify
various facts about them, for example quality or ingredients or approval by a
certifying organization.
  Collective Mark - A mark used to identify a cooperative, association, club, union or
other group.
  Trade Dress - The packaging, labeling and overall appearance of a product.
  Trade Name - The name of a business, as opposed to the name of a specific
product or service.
  Slogan or Tagline - A phrase used in connection with a product or service.
  Domain Name - The Uniform Resource Locator (“URL”) for a Website on the
Internet that must be registered with organizations authorized to register and
maintain domain names.

7
 Establishing Trademark Rights in the U.S.

How are Trademark Rights established

in the United States?
  The U.S. is a “use based” as opposed to a “file based” country.
  Using a mark in interstate commerce to identify goods or
services will create common law rights.
  Registration provides great benefits to the owner of a
registered mark, but registration is not mandatory.
  Marks may be registered by the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office (“USPTO”) or with a particular State.

8
 Basis for Filing an Application to Register a Mark

When can one file a U.S. trademark

application?

(i) Use in commerce in the U.S. or between the U.S. and a

foreign country (“use” application).
(ii) Bona-fide intent to use the mark in the future (“intent-to-
use” or “ITU” application).

9
 Benefits of U.S. Trademark Registration

Why file with the PTO?

  May prevent others from registering or using a confusingly

similar mark.
  Nationwide constructive notice of registrant’s claim to the mark.
  Legal presumption that the registered mark is valid.
  Right to use federal registration notice ®.
  Right to sue for infringement in Federal District Court and
obtain injunctive relief (which can include destruction of
infringing articles and corrective advertising) and damages, as
well as treble damages and attorneys’ fees in exceptional
cases.
  For “famous” marks, the right to sue others for dilution of the
distinctive nature of the mark (“tarnishment” or “blurring”).

10
 Choosing a Trademark

“The Hierarchy Of Marks”

Generic Descriptive Suggestive Arbitrary/Fanciful

POTATO CHIPS YELLOW PAGES COPPERTONE APPLE / CLOROX

11
 Trademark Selection - Distinctiveness of Marks
“The Hierarchy Of Marks”
Generic Descriptive Suggestive Arbitrary/Fanciful

POTATO CHIPS YELLOW PAGES COPPERTONE APPLE / CLOROX

  Generic: The generic name of a product or service has no

trademark significance and cannot be protected or registered.

Example: The mark POTATO CHIPS used to identify potato

chips.

12
 Trademark Selection - Distinctiveness of Marks

Generic Descriptive Suggestive Arbitrary/Fanciful

POTATO CHIPS YELLOW PAGES COPPERTONE APPLE / CLOROX

  Descriptive: Marks describing the purpose, function, or a characteristic of a

product or service cannot be protected without having acquired an association
with the owner’s goods in the mind of the public (“secondary meaning”), which
is typically established by long continuous use of the mark and/or significant
advertising.
Example: The mark YELLOW PAGES used to identify the yellow pages.
13
 Trademark Selection - Distinctiveness of Marks

Generic Descriptive Suggestive Arbitrary/Fanciful

POTATO CHIPS YELLOW PAGES COPPERTONE APPLE / CLOROX

  Suggestive: Marks merely suggesting some quality or characteristic of

a product or service are generally inherently distinctive and therefore
registrable (most of the time).
Example: The mark COPPERTONE used to identify sun tan lotion.

14
 Trademark Selection - Distinctiveness of Marks

Generic Descriptive Suggestive Arbitrary/Fanciful

POTATO CHIPS YELLOW PAGES COPPERTONE APPLE / CLOROX

  Arbitrary: Marks that comprise words or symbols used in
common language but when used with the products or
services at issue neither suggest nor describe a quality or
characteristic of the product or service are protectable and
registrable as inherently distinctive marks.
Example: The mark APPLE used to identify computers.

15
 Trademark Selection - Distinctiveness of Marks

Generic Descriptive Suggestive Arbitrary/Fanciful

POTATO CHIPS YELLOW PAGES COPPERTONE APPLE / CLOROX

  Fanciful: Marks that consist of words that have been

invented (“coined”) or are out of common usage are inherently
distinctive and therefore protectable and registrable.

Example: The mark CLOROX used to identify bleach.

16
 Trademark Selection - Recommendations

What makes a “good” mark?

  Make every effort to develop fanciful and arbitrary marks.
  Suggestive marks are better than descriptive marks.
  Avoid descriptive or generic marks.
  Avoid use of terms in or as marks that have specific meanings in the relevant
industry that would render the mark descriptive or suggestive.
  Avoid marks which may create a negative impression in the relevant market
(NOVA, used by General Motors as a trademark for automobiles, means “won’t go”
in Spanish!)
  Avoid using terms commonly used in the relevant market (in the U.S., for example,
AMERICAN, NATIONAL, GENERAL, ETC.).
  Terms with no connection to the goods or services to be identified make good
marks (for example, SAUSAGE Brand Shampoo).
  Unique or “coined” marks consisting of new words and/or symbols are best.

17
 Trademark Application Preparation
What do we (your attorneys) need to file a trademark
application with the PTO?
  Use-Based Application
  Identification of the owner
  Identification of goods or services
  Date of first use
  Drawing
  Specimen
  For goods: tags, labels, packages or containers that prominently
display the mark or digital photographs of the mark on the items.
  For services: advertising, marketing materials, promotional
materials, or brochures which prominently display the mark in
connection with the services.
  Intent-to-Use Application
  Identification of the owner
  Identification of goods or services
  Drawing

18
 Trademark Application -
Processing by the USPTO
What does the PTO do with the application?
  Upon filing, the application is reviewed for completeness and assigned
to an Examining Attorney.
  Within 3 to 6 months, the Examining Attorney reviews the application
and if issues or questions arise, the Examining Attorney will issue an
Office Action.
  Applicant has 6 months to respond to an Office Action.
  Once the Examining Attorney is satisfied that the mark in the
application may function as a trademark, and is available for
registration, the mark is published for opposition in the USPTO’s
Official Gazette.
  Upon publication, third parties with an interest have 30 days to oppose
registration of the mark.
  If there is no opposition to a use-based application, then the USPTO
will issue a Certificate of Registration for the mark.
  If there is no opposition to an ITU application, then the USPTO will
issue a Notice of Allowance. Applicant then has 6 months (with
extensions up to 3 years) to use the mark in commerce and file a
Statement of Use. Provided the Statement of Use is accepted by the
USPTO, the mark is registered and a Certificate of Registration issues.
19
 Rules of Trademark Usage

Once I have a mark, what do I do to protect it?

  Use and encourage others to use the mark as an adjective,
never as a noun or verb.
  Always use a generic noun or the word “brand” with the mark.
  Never pluralize the mark.
  Use words or symbols as marks to identify the source of a
product or service - not what a product or service is or does.
  Use the mark in the same manner throughout your company:
same color, same type style and font, same or similar location
on corporate literature.
  Continually examine the quality and nature of any licensees’ or
affiliates’ product or service associated with the mark.

20
 Rules of Trademark Usage

Once I have a mark, what do I do to protect it?

  Continually search competitor’s marks for similarity to yours.
  Educate all company employees, contractors, consultants and
vendors to report all inconsistencies of use or suspicions of
similar uses by competitors.
  Educate customers regarding the uniqueness of the mark and
its symbolic status in regard to your company’s products or
services.
  Federally registered marks should be identified by the
registration symbol “®”; unregistered trademarks and service
marks should be identified by “TM” and “SM”.
  When the mark consists of text, use bold, all capital letters or a
special typeface or any combination to set the mark apart,
particularly when used in headings or titles.

21
 Protecting Your Trademarks

How do I maintain a trademark registration?

  Maintain Registrations
  Affidavit of Use and Incontestibility
  Filed between the fifth and sixth year of registration
  Combined Declaration of Use and Application for Renewal
  10 years after Registration
  Every 10 years thereafter
  Monitor the trademark for infringement
  Where applicable, use watching services
  Employ in-house programs and standards to identify potential
infringement
  Avoid genericide
  Use licenses where appropriate

22
 Copyrights

©
23
 Copyright Law

What is a Copyright?

A U.S. copyright protects original works of authorship which have

been fixed in a tangible medium of expression.

What does this mean?

For example, a song has multiple copyrights: (i) the lyrics; (ii) the
score or sheet music; (iii) the sound recording.

24
 A Copyright Protects

What can qualify for copyright protection?

  literary works   sculptural works

  musical works
  dramatic works
  pantomime and
choreographic works
  pictorial and graphic works
  computer programs
  motion pictures
  sound recordings
  architectural works

25
 Copyright Owner May Control

What rights does a copyright owner have?

The exclusive right to control:

  reproduction
  distribution
  adaptation
  public display
  public performance

26
 Idea v. Expression Dichotomy

Are facts protectible as a copyright?

No – facts and ideas are not protected.

  The format for a television series v. the series itself

  Idea for a World War II novel v. the novel itself
  Facts v. arrangement of those facts

27
 Copyright Ownership

Who owns the copyright?

The author.

Who is the Author?

The person who actually created the work.

  Employee/scope of employment
  Independent contractor
  Works for hire

28
 Copyright Points to Remember

Must one register a copyright?

  Not mandatory, but failure to do so may limit

your rights.
  Affords certain benefits
  Prerequisite to filing suit
  Statutory damages and attorney’s fees
  Simple and inexpensive

29