Psychol Stud
DOI 10.1007/s12646-010-0032-3
REFLECTIONS
Karl Popper, Psychology and Philosophy
Neelam Kumar
Received: 16 March 2010 / Accepted: 30 August 2010
# National Academy of Psychology (NAOP) India 2010
Abstract This paper intends to re-emphasize the relationship
among Psychology, Popper and his Philosophy. Popper, who
is often considered as one of the most important philosophers
of science, had associations with the discipline of psychology
in his early years. Popper was associated with Würzburg
school of psychology, especially the psychologies of Külpe,
Selz and Bühler. However, there was a change in Popper’s
interest from the psychology of discovery to an objectivist
epistemology—that is, to the logic of discovery, which he
himself acknowledged (1976, p. 55). Popper, not only turned
away from psychology, as early as 1930 or thereabouts, he
later became one of the most outspoken opponents of a
psychological approach to science. This antipathy has worked
both ways! Very few psychologists study and discuss Popper.
His place in the history of psychology, certainly remains
inadequate. But why should psychologists ignore Popper?
Instead of turning away from Popper, Psychologists’ efforts
should be directed towards bringing into focus Popper, his
works and association with psychology. This paper argues and
tries to discuss the relationships among Popper, his training in
psychology and his philosophy.
Keywords Psychology of Science . Popper . Philosophy of
Science . Kuhn . Boring . Külpe . Selz and Bühler
Introduction
It is still not widely appreciated that Sir Karl Popper’s
initial interest was psychology, not philosophy.
Jacobs (1989, p, 173)
N. Kumar (*)
NISTADS,
New Delhi, India
e-mail: kumarneelam28@gmail.com
Karl Popper can be described as one of the most
important and widely known philosophers of science of
the twentieth century. Interestingly, the root of Popper’s
philosophy of science has been traced to the psychology
of the Wurzburg school, especially the psychologies of
Selz and Bühler. Popper’s psychological arguments and
data enabled him to develop his characteristic deductive
stance in epistemology and philosophy of science.
Popper, around 1929 or thereabouts, shifted his inquiry
from psychology to the logic of science. Popper himself
acknowledges a change in his interest from the psychol-
ogy of discovery (and thinking) to an objective episte-
mology—that is, to the logic of discovery (p. 55, 75).
This paper emphasizes that psychologists should not
ignore Popper. The paper also intends to discuss why
and how Popperian thinking shows marks of dismissal
for psychology in the science studies. The role of
psychology within science studies is especially impor-
tant: a) as science constitutes one of the most important
domain related to human beings; and b) it has been
argued that behaviourism, as a revolution against
dualistic mentalism in psychology, was one of the three
forces whose convergence into a common effort resulted
in the emergence of Science of Science1 (Stevens 1939,
251).
Popper and Psychology
Karl Popper started his career as a psychologist—wrote his
Ph.D thesis on psychology of thinking. Shortly before
submitting his dissertation for his Ph.D., the focus of
1
Operationalism as a revolution against absolute and undefinable
concepts in physics, and Logical Positivism as a revolution against
rational metaphysics in philosophy were the other two forces.

Popper’s interest switched from the psychology, to the
methodology, of thought and problem-solving, and in
particular to the methodology of science. Popper had
studied both psychology and pedagogy. His intellectual
interests led him to psychology while the professional
ambitions led him to teaching and pedagogy. Popper
completed his doctorate under the supervision of psychol-
ogist Karl Buhler (Kurz 1996). His problem grew out of his
work in psychology conducted within Bühler’s framework.
To begin with he conducted investigations in both, thinking
psychology and methodology. Popper achieved a major
breakthrough by radically separating logic from psycholo-
gy. Popper’s philosophy of science, with its emphasis on
the method of trial and error, is largely found to be based on
the psychology of Otto Selz. It has been well established
that Otto Selz laid the foundations for the psychology of
problem solving and the psychology of scientific discov-
ery.2 Popper gradually transformed Selz’s anti-inductive
theory of problem solving into a deductive psychology of
knowledge. Popper (1962) asserted in his famous essay that
induction is a myth, it is not in fact a psychological or
scientific reality. According to him science, in contrast to
our normal cognitions, progresses because it alone actively
looks for and accepts negative evidence and will reject
previously held beliefs. Popper eventually developed his
theory by abandoning the psychology of discovery and
psychology of thinking—by giving priority to the study of
logic over the study of subjective thought processes.
Popper held a view that psychology cannot explain the
growth of knowledge. For almost two decades he thus left
psychology aside but in the post-war years he brought back
logic and psychology together.
Popper’s Philosophy of Science
The origin of Popper’s philosophy of science lies in the
rejection of three fields: the Marxist theory of history,
psycho-analysis, and individual psychology. After a brief
involvement with Marxism and Individual Psychology,
Popper found the theories of Marx, Freud and Adler
deficient in comparison to Einstein’s work. As a result of
this dissatisfaction, Popper moved from psychology of
thought and discovery after years of work, and finally
developed a characteristic deductive stance in epistemology
and philosophy of science. Popper rejected induction as a
2
Selz had already led the way by describing scientific research as
problem solving. Probably, Popper’s shift from psychology to
philosophy did not break the connection of his thought with that of
Selz.
Psychol Stud
method of science and chose falsifiability as a criterion for
demarcating science from non-science. He made a distinction
between the context of discovery and context of justification.
He agreed with the consensus that the “context of discovery,”
which concerns with the origin of hypotheses, is properly a
matter for psychology. He regarded only the “context of
justification” of concern to the epistemology of science.
Popper charged psychologists with psychologism—attempt-
ing to answer a philosophical question by empirical
(psychological) means. In contrast, psychologists (such as
Piaget) charged philosophers with the fallacy of logicism—
attempting to answer empirical question by philosophical
means.
Kuhn’s work brought a major change to the status of
psychology. Kuhn, who had formal training as a
physicist, asserted that he attempts a “social psychology
of science”(Kuhn 1970, p.21). Kuhn’s formulations thus
could open up a dialogue between epistemology and
psychology, making the latter not only the recipient of
epistemological postulates, but also a science able to
participate in the production of theories of science and
scientific activities. The recognition of the role of social
psychological concepts in explaining science was facili-
tated by historians’ turn away from the internalist account
of science. Philosophers in the analytic tradition viewed
incursions of psychology into epistemology as assaults on
rationality.3 They discredited psychological account of
theory change and psychology was relegated to the task of
explaining only irrational. Sociologists were also antago-
nistic toward psychological and computational explana-
tions. Sociological approaches denied the need for
psychological, and particularly cognitive, explanations of
scientific discourse.
Psychology of Science: The Unsung Contributions
The contributions of several pioneering and eminent
psychologists, who are famous for their mainstream
research, to the sub-discipline of Psychology of Science
remain largely unknown. A prime example is E.G.
Boring, who is best known among the psychologists as
a great historian of psychology. Boring has written
3
Popper did not accept Kuhn’s proposal of turning to psychology and
sociology. He rejected all psychologistic and sociologistic tendencies,
and furthermore said that in comparison to physics, psychology and
sociology were riddled with fashions and uncontrolled dogmas. He
answered Kuhn’s question, “Logic of Discovery or Psychology of
Research?” with the reply that while Logic of Discovery has little to
learn from the Psychology of Research, the latter has much to learn
from the former.
Psychol Stud
numerous articles in the philosophy of science, the
psychology of scientific discovery, and the sociology of
scientific production. Boring had interests in the psy-
chology of the history of scientific discovery, the role of
great men in science, and the problems of originality in
science and scientific creativity. Some of his papers on
psychology of science, have been reprinted in the History,
Psychology and Science (1963). Similarly, as much as
Piaget can be labeled a child psychologist or cognitive
developmental theorist, he can also be viewed as a
philosopher of science. Another stellar example is Mas-
low. Maslow even published a book entitled The Psychol-
ogy of Science (1966) but remains relatively unknown
among mainstream psychologist for this contribution. On
the contrary, scholar like Karl Popper, basically a
psychologist by training, is famous for his works on
philosophy of science. His emergence as one of the main
opponents of psychology of science, probably gained
additional unpopularity among psychologists. Many stan-
dard history of psychology texts either do not mention him
or do it sketchingly (for example, Popper is referred only
three-four times in Marx and Hillix book Systems and
Theories of Psychology). In contrast one can come across
recent reconstructions of (young) Popper’s roots in Selz’s
psychology of thinking by philosophers and historians (ter
Hark 1993; 2000; 2003a, b, 2004). But ter Hark’s (2004)
impressive and important work has shown us how rich the
intellectual tradition of Denkpsychologie (cognitive psy-
chology) proved to be for Popper and philosophy, and it is
desirable that psychologists go back to the same material
to get a better self-understanding of some fundamental
assumptions that have guided their disciplines during the
last hundred years (Erneling 2010).
Kuhn, one the most famous historians of science, in
contrast, endorsed psychology in a big way. Kuhn
emphasised on the social psychology of research in
contrast to Popper who believed in the logic of research.
For Popper, the introduction of psychological concepts
into explanation of scientific theory change was synon-
ymous with claiming that science is not rational. Popper
himself acknowledges a change in his interest from the
psychology of discovery to an objectivist epistemology—
that is, to the logic of discovery. According to Popper,
science advances by discarding false hypotheses and
replacing them with ones that are better approximations
to the truth, a kind of asymptotic progression where
science never arrives at a final, absolute truth but does
come gradually closer and closer (Popper 1959; 1992).
This distinction between discovery and justification
allowed Popper to bracket psychological processes and
ignore them. Popper charged psychologists with psychol-
ogism—attempting to answer a philosophical question by
empirical (psychological) means. He became one of the
most outspoken opponents of a psychological approach in
science studies.4
Is his shift to Philosophy responsible for his unpopularity
among psychologists? Popper’s work ‘The Logic of Scientific
Discovery’ starts with the distinction between Psychology of
Knowledge and the logic of knowledge (p, 30). Popper
(1962), using psychological arguments and data asserted in
his famous essay that science, in contrast to our normal
cognitions, progresses because it alone actively looks for and
accepts negative evidence and will reject previously held
beliefs. It has been argued that Popper this way characterizes
science as a unique psychological phenomenon. Popper
regarded his 1920s work on psychology (and pedagogy) as
immature, made few references to it until his ‘autogbiog-
raphy’ published in 1974. However it has also been argued
that in the late 1940s, Popper began using his psychol-
ogy again to support his epistemological positions
(Hacohen 2000). According to a philosopher of science
(Hark 2003a, p 487) Popper’s epistemology is rooted in
German psychology,notably the work of Otto Selz and is
much more intertwined with psychology than is allowed
by his own anti-psychologism. He argues that Popper’s
Selzian stance in psychology finally enabled him to
develop his characteristic deductive stance in epistemolo-
gy and philosophy of science.
Thomas Kuhn, the historian of science, with a formal
training in physics, not only relied, to a great extent, on
psychology (both systematic use as well as informal) for the
development of his thesis, his work and interpretation of
scientific development, could make possible the recognition
of psychology’s role in the production of a theory of
scientific activity. In his famous book Structure of Scientific
Revolutions (SSR), Kuhn clearly acknowledged that he
attempts a “social psychology of science”: … “it should be
clear that the explanation must, in the final analysis, be
psychological or sociological” (Kuhn 1970, p.21). Kuhn
used research in Gestalt psychology to explain what
happens when a paradigm shift occurs. Kuhn’s writing
give evidence of the following influences from psychology:
4
Science Studies include philosophical, historical, sociological,
psychological, educational or politico-economic study of science and
technology. Science studies have been claimed to emerge as the
reasonable outcome of revolutions in the three major fields: physics,
psychology, and philosophy. Operationalism as a revolution against
absolute and undefinable concepts in physics, behaviourism as a
revolution against dualistic mentalism in psychology, and Logical
Positivism as a revolution against rational metaphysics in philosophy
were the three forces whose convergence into a common effort is
effected by the Science of Science (Stevens, 1939, 251). These
revolutions occurred almost independently, but a general community
of spirit among them led directly to extensive cross-fertilization

a) the work of Piaget5,6; b) work concerning the psychology
of perception, especially the gestalt psychologists (Kuhn
often relies on gestalt switch; c) work in experimental
cognitive psychology, especially that of Bruner and
postman (1949) and d) work in social psychology (see
page 240; Musgrave 1971). According to Kuhn much of
scientific behaviour derives from the psychology of
scientists rather the than logic of discovery. Kuhn’s
interpretation of scientific development, in way, opened
up a dialogue between epistemology and psychology. In
Kuhn’s view, to fully understand the scientific revolutions,
we will have to understand the psychological processes of
attitude change effective within the scientific community.
This in turn could bring out psychology’s role in the
production of a theory of scientific activity. Kuhn also
explained the crisis situation in science in psychological
terms and particularly acknowledged the importance of
Piaget’s investigation (preface, vi). Kuhn, stated that he
attempts a “social psychology of science”(Kuhn 1970,
p.21). He argued that much of the scientific behaviour
derives from the psychology of the scientist rather than the
logic of discovery. Thus, Kuhn’s idea of developing a social
psychology of science is potentially important for Psychol-
ogy’s integration into science studies.
Conclusion
I would like to conclude this paper by arguing that
psychologists of science need to look into the works of Karl
Popper to trace the heritage of their nascent sub-discipline
(which is said to have a long past but a short history). Popper
noted in his doctorate that it might be possible to construct a
new philosophy of science by translating Selz’ s psychological
theory into a theory of science. Psychologists should explore
the mutual influence—the role of psychology in the develop-
ment of Popper’s philosophy of science and Popper’s
influence on the psychology of science. Philosophers in the
analytic tradition viewed incursions of psychology into
epistemology as assaults on rationality. For decades, philos-
ophers of science considered psychological studies of the
nature of scientific thinking to be outside the proper scope of
philosophical analyses of science. Reinforced by a demarca-
tion rule that distinguished between the context of discovery
and the context of justification, philosophers of science argued
5
A footnote encountered by chance led me to the experiments by
which Jean Piaget has illuminated both the various worlds of the
growing child and the process of transition from one to the next.—T.S.
Kuhn, Preface, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962)
6
A footnote encountered by chance led me to the experiments by
which Jean Piaget has illuminated both the various worlds of the
growing child and the process of transition from one to the next.—T.S.
Kuhn, Preface, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962).
Psychol Stud
that the former was the domain of psychology, the latter the
domain of philosophy, and urged a formal separation of the
two.
However, the neat dichotomy has now apparently
collapsed under the pressure of arguments showing that
the justification of scientific results cannot be separated
from the social and psychological processes that produced
those results. The contemporary scholars within epistemol-
ogy and philosophy of science have come to take
psychology more seriously. For example, Giere (1988),
Goldman (1986), Harman (1986), and Thagard (1988,
1993) all use psychology to challenge traditional logic-
based conceptions of rationality. But recent Popperian
thinking continues to dismiss psychology of science and
its integration in science studies. Some sociologists are
intensely antagonistic toward psychological and computa-
tional explanations, even going so far as to propose a ten-
year moratorium on cognitive explanations of science
(Latour and Woolgar 1986, p. 280). In contrast (and quite
naturally!), contemporary psychologists are becoming
optimistic and opine that psychology of science can study
not only the problems connected with the personality of the
creative scientists or creative workers in science; but also
the problems connected with the activities leading to
formation of science; and above all, the problems related
to science as a completed human product (See Gholson et
al. 1989; Feist and Gorman 1998). This paper argues that
psychologists should explore the mutual influence—the
role of psychology in the development of Popper’s
philosophy of science and Popper’s influence on the
psychology of science. Probably it may also explain the
integration and relative status of psychology in science
studies in general and philosophy of science in particular.
Why Psychology itself has not been important sub-
discipline in science studies remains an interesting question
and need to be discussed in the light of philosophical
perspectives. Recent philosophers like Steve Fuller and Ron
Giere, for example, put psychology at the centre of science
studies (though in very different ways!). The former linked
more to Skinner’s behaviorism and the latter to cognitive
psychology (Fuller 1989; Giere 1988). The way to study
scientists is to look at their interactions with each other and
the inscriptions that they produce (Latour 2000).
Philosophy answers the questions related to science in
epistemological terms. History of science deals with the
scientific progress. Sociologist of science explains science
in terms of social norms. Psychologist can make distinct
contributions to the study of science through their tendency
to focus on individual level behaviours and interactions in
contrast as well as in support to sociologists’ institutional
and culture level variables. Psychology moreover can also
handle issues, which may be different from those of history,
philosophy and sociology of science. The question of the
Psychol Stud
integration of psychological accounts of science is thus live
and important. Historians, philosophers, psychologists, and
sociologists study Science in very different ways, focus on
apparently disparate aspects of science (in relative autono-
my from other fields) and apply markedly different
methods. Science studies can thus be both exemplified
and expanded through the dialogues between the disci-
plines. All inputs are necessary for an integrated under-
standing. Disciplinary detachment may result in myopic
vision. Psychology as an independent branch of science is
well suited to study the social processes of science the
issues and assumptions related to science. Popper’s initial
interest was psychology, not philosophy (Jacobs 1989). His
shift from psychology to philosophy occurred around 1928,
which was manifested in his doctoral dissertation, ‘On the
Problem of Method in the Psychology of Thinking’.
Popper’s own writings have mostly ignored this phase.
Studies of Popper on psychology have only begun to
appear in recent years. Moreover, historians and philoso-
phers have their own version of Popper’s early develop-
ment (which is related to psychology). We, psychologists,
philosophers and historians of psychology should highlight
Popper’s psychological phase and can make use of the
claims that Popper’s philosophical breakthrough originates
from his sharply separating logic and psychology. Careful
examinations of Popper’s views are thus important for
Psychology of science, deserves thorough reconsideration
as psychology can be taken as the trajectory of his
subsequent philosophical thought.
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