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SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS

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1. CASE TITLE - I AM CAPS LOCK, BOLD, UNDERLINE


Doctrine (I am Italicized)

FACTS
Paragraph form. Please include only the relevant facts to our subject

ISSUE/S: Whether or not..


Please include only the relevant issues to our subject

HELD:
YES/NO. The Court held…

● Ratio decidendi.

Prepared by: (Your full name)

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SAMPLE #1:

1. GARCIA FULE VS. CA (G.R. No. L-40502 November 29, 1976)

In the application of venue statutes and rules — Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such
nature — residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word "domicile"
still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. "Resides" should be viewed or
understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual
residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat.

FACTS:

Fule filed with the CFI of Laguna, at Calamba a petition for letters of administration alleging that Amado
G. Garcia, a property owner of Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in the City of Manila, leaving real estate and
personal properties in Calamba, Laguna, and in other places, within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court." At
the same time, she moved ex parte for her appointment as special administratrix over the estate. On even date,
her motion was granted. Preciosa B. Garcia, surviving spouse of Amado, opposed the appointment. She
contends that the order appointing Fule as special administratrix was issued without jurisdiction and that she
should be preferred in the appointment of a special administratrix. The CFI judge ruled in favor of Fule.

Preciosa B. Garcia commenced a special action for certiorari and/or prohibition and preliminary
injunction before the Court of Appeals primarily to annul the proceedings before Judge Malvar in Sp. Proc. No.
27-C of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, or, in the alternative, to vacate the questioned four orders of that
court, denying their motion for reconsideration of the order denying their motion to dismiss the criminal and
supplemental petitions on the issue, among others, of jurisdiction, and the three others, all dated July 19, 1974,
directing the delivery of certain properties to the special administratrix, Virginia G. Fule, and to the court.

The Court of Appeals rendered judgment annulling the proceedings before Judge Severo A. Malvar in
Sp. Proc. 27-C of the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, for lack of jurisdiction. Preciosa B. Garcia had
already filed on February 1, 1975 a petition for letters of administration before the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Quezon City Branch, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738, over the same intestate estate of Amado G. Garcia. In
response, Fule instituted a petition for certiorari with temporary restraining order, to annul the proceedings in CFI
Quezon.

ISSUE: Whether or not the proceeding was properly filed in CFI Quezon.

HELD:
YES. The Court held that venue in the instant case was properly assumed by and transferred to Quezon
City. It is in the interest of justice and avoidance of needless delay that the Quezon City court's exercise of
jurisdiction over the settlement of the estate of the deceased Amado Garcia and the appointment of special
administratrix over the latter's estate be approved and authorized and the Court of First Instance of Laguna be
disauthorized from continuing with the case and instead be required to transfer all the records thereof to the
Court of First Instance of Quezon City for the continuation of the proceedings.
● Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: "If the decedent is an inhabitant of the
Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of
administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he
resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance
of any province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate
of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by
a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate,
shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case,
or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record."
● With particular regard to letters of administration, Section 2, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court
demands that the petition therefor should affirmatively show the existence of jurisdiction to make the
appointment sought, and should allege all the necessary facts, such as death, the name and last
residence of the decedent, the existence, and situs if need be, of assets, intestacy, where this is relied
upon, and the right of the person who seeks administration, as next of kin, creditor, or otherwise, to be
appointed. The fact of death of the intestate and his last residence within the country are foundation
facts upon which all subsequent proceedings in the administration of the estate rest, and that if the
intestate was not an inhabitant of the state at the time of his death, and left no assets in the state, no
jurisdiction is conferred on the court to grant letters of administration.
● The aforequoted Section 1, Rule 73 (formerly Rule 75, Section 1), specifically the clause "so far
as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of the estate," is in
reality a matter of venueT, as the caption of the Rule indicates: "Settlement of Estate of Deceased
Persons. Venue and Processes. It could not have been intended to define the jurisdiction over the
subject matter, because such legal provision is contained in a law of procedure dealing merely with
procedural matters. Procedure is one thing; jurisdiction over the subject matter is another. The power or
authority of the court over the subject matter "existed and was fixed before procedure in a given cause
began." That power or authority is not altered or changed by procedure, which simply directs the
manner in which the power or authority shall be fully and justly exercised. There are cases though that if
the power is not exercised conformably with the provisions of the procedural law, purely, the court
attempting to exercise it loses the power to exercise it legally. However, this does not amount to a loss
of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Rather, it means that the court may thereby lose jurisdiction over
the person or that the judgment may thereby be rendered defective for lack of something essential to
sustain it. The appearance of this provision in the procedural law at once raises a strong presumption
that it has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter. In plain words, it is just
a matter of method, of convenience to the parties.
● The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, confers upon Courts of First Instance jurisdiction over
all probate cases independently of the place of residence of the deceased. Because of the
existence of numerous Courts of First Instance in the country, the Rules of Court, however, purposedly
fixes the venue or the place where each case shall be brought. A fortiori, the place of residence of the
deceased in settlement of estates, probate of will, and issuance of letters of administration does not
constitute an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter. It is merely constitutive of venue. And it is
upon this reason that the Revised Rules of Court properly considers the province where the estate of a
deceased person shall be settled as "venue."
● But, the far-ranging question is this: What does the term "resides" mean? Does it refer to the actual
residence or domicile of the decedent at the time of his death? We lay down the doctrinal rule that the
term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or
domicile." This term "resides," like, the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be
interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the
application of venue statutes and rules — Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such
nature — residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the
word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some
cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes
fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In
other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal,
actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical
presence in a place and actual stay thereat.

Prepared by: Juan Dela Cruz

SAMPLE #2:

2. Victoria Pereira vs CA and Rita Pereira Nagac ( G.R. No. L-81147 June 20, 1989)

The determination of what properties should be included in the inventory is within the competence of the probate
court, but such determination is merely provisional, subject to a final decision in a separate action which may be
brought by the parties.

Judicial administration and appointment of an administrator are superfluous when a deceased died without debts.

Where the claims of the heirs of the deceased may be properly ventilated in simple partition proceedings, judicial
administration of estate is unnecessary.

FACTS:
Andres de Guzman Pereira, an employee of the Philippine Air Lines, passed without a will. He was
survived by his legitimate spouse of ten months, the herein petitioner Victoria Bringas Pereira, and his sister
Rita Pereira Nagac, the herein private respondent.

Private respondent instituted a Special Proceeding for the issuance of letters of administration in her
favor pertaining to the estate of the deceased Andres de Guzman Pereira. In her verified petition, private
respondent alleged the following: that she and Victoria Bringas Pereira are the only surviving heirs of the
deceased; that the deceased left no will; that there are no creditors of the deceased; that the deceased left
several properties, namely: death benefits from the Philippine Air Lines (PAL), the PAL Employees Association
(PALEA), the PAL Employees Savings and Loan Association, Inc. (PESALA) and the Social Security System
(SSS), as well as savings deposits with the Philippine National Bank (PNB) and the Philippine Commercial and
Industrial Bank (PCIB), and a 300 square meter lot located at Barangay Pamplona, Las Pinas, Rizal and finally,
that the spouse of the deceased (herein petitioner) had been working in London as an auxiliary nurse and as
such one-half of her salary forms part of the estate of the deceased.

Petitioner spouse filed her opposition and motion to dismiss the petition of private respondent alleging
that there exists no estate of the deceased for purposes of administration and praying in the alternative, that if an
estate does exist, the letters of administration relating to the said estate be issued in her favor as the surviving
spouse. In its resolution, the RTC, appointed private respondent sister Rita Pereira Nagac as administratrix of the
intestate estate of Andres de Guzman Pereira upon a bond posted by her in the amount of Pl,000.00.The trial
court ordered her to take custody of all the real and personal properties of the deceased and to file an inventory
thereof within three months after receipt of the order. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not there exists an estate of the deceased for purposes of administration.
2.) Whether or not a judicial administrative proceeding is necessary where there are no debts left by the
decedent.

HELD:
1.) SC did not answer. The SC is not a trier of facts, It cannot order an unqualified and final exclusion or
non-exclusion of the property involved from the estate of the deceased. The resolution of this issue is
better left to the probate court before which the administration proceedings are pending. The trial court
is in the best position to receive evidence on the discordant contentions of the parties as to the assets of
the decedent's estate, the valuations thereof and the rights of the transferees of some of the assets, if
any. The function of resolving whether or not a certain property should be included in the inventory or
list of properties to be administered by the administrator is one clearly within the competence of the
probate court. However, the court's determination is only provisional in character, not conclusive,
and is subject to the final decision in a separate action which may be instituted by the parties.

2.) NO. The general rule is that when a person dies leaving property, the same should be judicially
administered and the competent court should appoint a qualified administrator, in the order established
in Section 6, Rule 78, in case the deceased left no will, or in case he had left one, should he fail to name
an executor therein.
● An exception to this rule is established in Section 1 of Rule 74. Under this exception, when all
the heirs are of lawful age and there are no debts due from the estate, they may agree in writing
to partition the property without instituting the judicial administration or applying for the
appointment of an administrator.
● Section 1, Rule 74 of the Revised Rules of Court, however, does not preclude the heirs from instituting
administration proceedings, even if the estate has no debts or obligations, if they do not desire to resort
for GOOD REASONS to an ordinary action for partition. While Section 1 allows the heirs to divide the
estate among themselves as they may see fit, or to resort to an ordinary action for partition, the said
provision does not compel them to do so if they have good reasons to take a different course of action.
● Where partition is possible, either in or out of court, the estate should not be burdened with an
administration proceeding without good and compelling reasons.
● Thus, it has been repeatedly held that when a person dies without leaving pending obligations to be
paid, his heirs, whether of age or not, are not bound to submit the property to a judicial administration,
which is always long and costly, or to apply for the appointment of an administrator by the Court. It has
been uniformly held that in such case the judicial administration and the appointment of an administrator
are superfluous and unnecessary proceedings.
● The court below before which the administration proceedings are pending was not justified in issuing
letters of administration, there being no good reason for burdening the estate of the deceased Andres
de Guzman Pereira with the costs and expenses of an administration proceeding.

Prepared by: Juan Dela Cruz

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1. SILVERIO SR. VS. SILVERIO, JR. (AUGUST 13, 2014)

2. SAN LUIS VS. SAN LUIS (514 SCRA, FEBRUARY 2007)

3. AGTARAP VS. AGTARAP (651 SCRA, JUNE 2011)

4. Continue the rest of the cases according to our syllabus

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