Hezi Montalan
insurance policy of a legally married man can claim the proceeds in case of
15. The Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. vs. Carpiona T. Ebrado and
Pascuala Vda. De Ebrado, G.R. No. L-44059 October 28, 1977, MARTIN, J.
DOCTRINE
Any person who is forbidden from receiving any donation under Article 739
cannot be named beneficiary of a life insurance policy by the person who
cannot donate to him. Common-law spouses are barred from receiving
donations from each other.
FALLO
ACCORDINGLY, the appealed judgment of the lower court is hereby affirmed.
Carponia T. Ebrado is hereby declared disqualified to be the beneficiary of the
late Buenaventura C. Ebrado in his life insurance policy. As a consequence, the
proceeds of the policy are hereby held payable to the estate of the deceased
insured. Costs against Carponia T. Ebrado.
FACTS:
[Nature of the Case: Petition for Review (Rule 45) ]
Cristor Ebrado was issued by The Life Assurance Co., Ltd., a policy for
P5,882.00 with a rider for Accidental Death. He designated Carponia T. Ebrado
as the revocable beneficiary in his policy. He referred to her as his wife.
Cristor was killed when he was hit by a failing branch of a tree. Insular Life
was made liable to pay the coverage in the total amount of P11,745.73,
representing the face value of the policy in the amount of P5,882.00 plus
the additional benefits for accidental death.
Carponia T. Ebrado filed with the insurer a claim for the proceeds as
the designated beneficiary therein, although she admited that she and the
insured were merely living as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage.
Pascuala Vda. de Ebrado also filed her claim as the widow of the deceased
insured. She asserts that she is the one entitled to the insurance proceeds.
Insular commenced an action for Interpleader before the trial court as to who
should be given the proceeds. The court declared Carponia as disqualified.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a common-law wife named as beneficiary in the life
death of the latter? – No.
RATIO:
Section 50 of the Insurance Act which provides that "the insurance shall be
applied exclusively to the proper interest of the person in whose name it is
made".
The word "interest" highly suggests that the provision refers only to the
"insured" and not to the beneficiary, since a contract of insurance is personal in
character. Otherwise, the prohibitory laws against illicit relationships
especially on property and descent will be rendered nugatory, as the same
could easily be circumvented by modes of insurance.
When not otherwise specifically provided for by the Insurance Law, the
contract of life insurance is governed by the general rules of the civil law
regulating contracts. And under Article 2012 of the same Code, any person
who is forbidden from receiving any donation under Article 739 cannot be
named beneficiary of a life insurance policy by the person who cannot make a
donation to him. Common-law spouses are barred from receiving donations
from each other.
Article 739 provides that void donations are those made between persons who
were guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of donation.
There is every reason to hold that the bar in donations between legitimate
spouses and those between illegitimate ones should be enforced in life
insurance policies since the same are based on similar consideration. So long as
marriage remains the threshold of family laws, reason and morality dictate that
the impediments imposed upon married couple should likewise be imposed
upon extra-marital relationship.
A conviction for adultery or concubinage isn’t required exacted before
the disabilities mentioned in Article 739 may effectuate. The article says that in
the case referred to in No. 1, the action for declaration of nullity may be
brought by the spouse of the donor or donee; and the guilty of the donee may
be proved by preponderance of evidence in the same action.
The underscored clause neatly conveys that no criminal conviction for the
offense is a condition precedent. The law plainly states that the guilt of the
party may be proved “in the same acting for declaration of nullity of
donation.” And, it would be sufficient if evidence preponderates.

The insured was married to Pascuala Ebrado with whom she has six legitimate
children. He was also living in with his common-law wife with whom he has
two children.