1
SPECPRO FIRST BATCH DIGESTS
1. Hagans vs. Wislizenus
GR No. 16680
September 13, 1920
Facts:
Judge Wizlizenus of CFI of Cebu ordered the appointment
of an assessor in a special proceeding, for the purpose of
fixing the amount due to an administrator or executor for
his services and expenses in the care, management, and
settlement of the estate of the deceased person.
Hagans contends that no authority in law exist for the
appointment of assessors in such proceedings.
Issue:
WON the judge in a special proceeding is authorized to
appoint an assessor. NO
Held:
The only provision in law that applies in this case is Section
154 of Act 190 which provides:
“Either party to an action may apply in writing to the
judge for assessors to sit in the trial. Upon the filing of
such application, the judge shall direct that assessors be
provided.”
The present case is a special proceeding, not an action.
There is a distinction between an action and a special
proceeding as provided for in Section 1 of Act 190.
ACTION – means an ordinary suit in court of justice; is a
formal demand of one’s legal right in a court of justice in
the manner prescribed by the court or by the law; it is the
method of applying legal remedies according to definite
established rules.
SPECIAL PROCEEDING – every other remedy furnished
by law; is an application or proceeding to establish the
status or right of a party or a particular fact; no formal
pleadings are required, unless the statute expressly so
provides; is generally acted upon an application or motion.
Proceedings for the appointment of an administrator,
guardians, tutors, contest of wills, to perpetuate testimony,
to change the name of persons, applications for admission
to the bar are all examples of special proceedings.
Therefore, the appointment of assessor by the judge is
annulled and set aside.
2. G.R. No. 109373 March 20, 1995
PACIFIC BANKING CORPORATION
EMPLOYEES ORGANIZATION, PAULA S. PAUG,
vs. CA
FACTS
Pacific Banking Corporation (PaBC) was placed under
receivership by the Central Bank of the Philippines. A few
months later, it was placed under liquidation1 and a
Liquidator was appointed.2
The Central Bank filed with the RTC a "Petition for
Assistance in the Liquidation of Pacific Banking
Corporation." 3 The petition was approved, after which
creditors filed their claims with the court.
The Pacific Banking Union, filed a complaint-in-intervention
seeking payment of holiday pay, 13th month pay
differential, salary increase differential, Christmas bonus,
and cash equivalent of Sick Leave Benefit due its
members. In its order dated September 13, 1991, the
trial court ordered payment of claims of the Union.5
The Liquidator received a copy of the order on September
16, 1991. On October 16, 1991, he filed a Motion for
Reconsideration. In his order, the judge disallowed the
Liquidator's Notice of Appeal on the ground that it was
late, i.e., more than 15 days after receipt of the decision.
The Liquidator received the order on September 16, 1992.
On September 30, 1992 he moved for reconsideration, but
his motion was denied by the court on October 2, 1992. He
received the order denying his Motion for Reconsideration
on October 5, 1992. On October 14, 1992 he filed a Notice
of Appeal from the orders of September 16, 1992 and
October 2, 1992. The judge ordered the Notice of Appeal
stricken off the record on the ground that it had been filed
without authority of the Central Bank and beyond 15 days.
ISSUE
WON a petition for liquidation under §29 of Rep. Act No.
265 is in the nature of a special proceeding, hence the
period of appeal is 30 days YES
WON the notice of appeal filed by the liquidator was filed
on time YES
HELD
The Interim Rules and Guidelines to implement BP
Blg. 129 provides:
19. Period of Appeals. —
(a) All appeals, except in habeas corpus cases and
in the cases referred to in paragraph (b) hereof,
must be taken within fifteen (15) days from
notice of the judgment, order, resolution or award
appealed from.
(b) In appeals in special proceedings in
accordance with Rule 109 of the Rules of Court and
other cases wherein multiple appeals are allowed,
the period of appeals shall be thirty (30) days, a
record on appeal being required.
Rule 2 of the Rules of Court provide:
§1. Action defined. — Action means an ordinary suit
in a court of justice, by which the party prosecutes
another for the enforcement or protection of a right,
or the prevention or redress of a wrong.
§2. Special Proceeding Distinguished. — Every other
remedy, including one to establish the status or right
of a party or a particular fact, shall be by special
proceeding.
Action is the act by which one sues another in a court of
justice for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the
prevention or redress of a wrong while special proceeding
is the act by which one seeks to establish the status or
right of a party, or a particular fact. Hence, action is
distinguished from special proceeding in that the former is
a formal demand of a right by one against another, while
the latter is but a petition for a declaration of a status,
right or fact. Where a party litigant seeks to recover
property from another, his remedy is to file an action.
Where his purpose is to seek the appointment of a
guardian for an insane, his remedy is a special proceeding
to establish the fact or status of insanity calling for an
appointment of guardianship.
Considering this distinction, a petition for liquidation of an
insolvent corporation should be classified a special

proceeding and not an ordinary action. Such petition does
not seek the enforcement or protection of a right nor the
prevention or redress of a wrong against a party. It does
not pray for affirmative relief for injury arising from a
party's wrongful act or omission nor state a cause of action
that can be enforced against any person.
What it seeks is merely a declaration by the trial court of
the corporation's insolvency so that its creditors may be
able to file their claims in the settlement of the
corporation's debts and obligations. Put in another way,
the petition only seeks a declaration of the corporation's
debts and obligations. Put in another way, the petition only
seeks a declaration of the corporation's state of insolvency
and the concomitant right of creditors and the order of
payment of their claims in the disposition of the
corporation's assets.
Contrary to the rulings of the Fourteenth Division,
liquidation proceedings do not resemble petitions for
interpleader. For one, an action for interpleader involves
claims on a subject matter against a person who has no
interest therein. This is not the case in a liquidation
proceeding where the Liquidator, as representative of the
corporation, takes charge of its assets and liabilities for the
benefit of the creditors. He is thus charged with insuring
that the assets of the corporation are paid only to rightful
claimants and in the order of payment provided by law.
Rather, a liquidation proceeding resembles the proceeding
for the settlement of state of deceased persons under
Rules 73 to 91 of the Rules of Court. The two have a
common purpose: the determination of all the assets and
the payment of all the debts and liabilities of the insolvent
corporation or the estate. The Liquidator and the
administrator or executor are both charged with the assets
for the benefit of the claimants. In both instances, the
liability of the corporation and the estate is not disputed.
The court's concern is with the declaration of creditors and
their rights and the determination of their order of
payment.
3. Matute vs. Court of Appeals
Facts: On August 20, 1965 when Carlos S. Matute, one of
the Matute heirs and a full-blood brother of both the
petitioner and the herein respondent Matias S. Matute,
filed in Special Proceeding (settlement of the Matute
estate) a petition praying for the removal of Matias as co-
administrator and his appointment in such capacity.
Carlos alleged that for a period of more than two
years from the date of his appointment, said Matias S.
Matute has neglected to render a true, just and complete
account of his administration and that he is not only
incompetent but also negligent in his management of the
estate under his charge consisting of five haciendas.
The respondent Matias opposed the allegation that
it is completely without basis and false. Records show that
he made an accounting and the same was submitted to the
court. That his competence to act as administrator has
been established to the satisfaction of the court.
It appears that during the reception of evidence
conducted on December 29, 1965 by the probate court,
Carlos S. Matute and the other heirs submitted their
respective lists of exhibits in supportof their motion to
ousts Matias. On January 8, 1966 Matias filed a written
objection to the admission of the movants’ exhibits on the
ground that the same were hearsay, self-serving,
irrelevant and/or mere photostatic copies of supposed
originals which never properly identified nor shown in
court. four days later, the Counsel for Matias filed with
leave of Court a “Motion to Dismiss and/or Demurrer to
2
Evidence” which avers that there is no sufficient evidence
on record to justify and support the motions for the
removal of the herein co-administrator Matias S. Matute.
The probate court issued an order removing Matias
S. Matute as co-administrator. Hence, the certiorari. The
respondent contends that the disputed order removing him
as co-administrator is a patent nullity. Upon the other
hand, the petitioner advances the reason in support of the
order of removal that the probate judge accorded the
respondent all the opportunity to adduce his evidence but
the latter resorted to dilatory tactics such as filing a motion
to dismiss or demurrer to evidence.
Issue: Whether or not Rule 33 regarding judgment on
demurrer to evidence is applicable to special proceedings
such that its’ disregard by the probate court amounts to
grave abuse of discretion.
Held: Yes. Section 2, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court
provides that in the absence of special provisions, the rules
provided for in ordinary civil actions shall be, as far as
practicable, applicable in special proceedings. The
application of the above cited Rule in special proceedings,
like the case at bar, is authorized by the Rules. Instead of
resolving the foregoing motion, the probate judge issued
the controverted order removing the respondent as co-
administrator without giving him the opportunity to adduce
his own evidence despite his explicit reservation that he be
afforded the chance to introduce evidence in his behalf in
the event of denial of his motion to dismiss and/or
demurrer to evidence. The Court view that the above
actuation of the probate judge constituted grave abuse of
discretion which dooms his improvident order as nullity.
4. G.R. No. L-12053 May 30, 1958
ROBERTA DIAZ Y CRUZ, petitioner,
vs.
PEREZ, presiding Judge, Pasay City, ET
AL.,respondents.
FACTS:
Roberta Diaz y Cruz is an old woman, 83 years of age,
residing in Pasay City possessing real and personal
properties roughly estimated at half a million pesos.
On August 18, 1956, three of her nine legitimate children,
and two of her grandchildren by another daughter, joined
in a Petition addressed to the Rizal Court of First Instance,
to declare her incompetent to take care of herself and
manage her properties and to appoint a guardian of her
person and her properties. The allegations, too long to
relate, set out a prima facie case of incompetency1 (Special
Proceeding 1483-P).
On November 7, 1956 while the above special proceeding
was pending hearing before respondent Judge Perez,
Roberta received from the Register of deeds of Rizal a
letter advising her that by reason of said proceedings, a
notice of lis pendens had been annotated on her Transfer
Certificate of Title to real property No. 32872 of that
Province.
Wherefore, on November 29, 1956, she filed in the above-
mentioned proceedings a petition to cancel the lis pendens;
Judge Perez denied the petition. Respondent judge
disapproved the record on appeal, holding the appealed
orders to be interlocutory, and therefore not appealable.
This petition for mandamus and certiorari was filed in this
Court.

ISSUE:
WON Certiorari will lie to annul the order refusing
cancellation of the notice of lis pendens.
RULING: NO.
As to the certiorari, petitioner may not seriously
urge lack of jurisdiction. In asking the Court to
annul the lis pendens she admitted its jurisdiction
to annul — and also to refuse annulment. Was
there abuse of discretion? The lis pendens had
been obviously annotated for the purpose of
advising any one who might wish to buy the realty,
that there is in court a petition to declare Roberta
Diaz incompetent to dispose of her properties.
The argument is presented that Sec. 79 of Act No.
496 and Sec. 24 of Rule 7 indicate the cases
wherein lis pendens may be annotated, and that
guardianship proceedings is not included therein.
In the first place sec. 79 is not an exclusive
enumeration. In the second place, these
proceedings affect "the use" or possession of the
real estate within the meaning of above sections,
even "the title", in the sense that the proceedings
will curtail or take away the right of the owner to
dispose of the same. In this connection, it is
insisted that both sections only apply to "actions"
which are different from "Special proceedings", like
guardianship. It is enough to point out that the
Rules provided for civil actions are generally
applicable to special proceedings. (Rule 73, section
2.)
5. Guy vs. Court of Appeals
GR No. 163707
September 15, 2006
Facts:
The private respondents-minors Karen and Kamille Wei
represented by their mother filed a petition for letters of
administration before the RTC of Makati., they alleged that
they are the duly acknowledged illegitimate children of
Sima Wei who died intestate.
The heirs of the deceased are his wife Shirley Guy and 5
children all surnamed Guy.
Private respondents prayed for the appointment of regular
administrator for orderly settlement of Sima Wei’s estate.
They prayed that Michael Guy, son of the decedent be
appointed as Special Administrator.
Michael Guy prayed for the dismissal of the petition and
asserted that his father left no debts and his estate can be
settled without securing letters of administration pursuant
to Section 1, Rule 74 of Rules of Court; that respondents
status as illegitimate children should have been established
during the lifetime of Sima Wei pursuant to Article 175 of
the Family Code.
Michael also alleged that private respondents’ claim had
been waived, abandoned or extinguished by reason that
Remedios, the mother of the minors executed a Release
and Waiver of Claim (document) stating that in
exchange for financial and educational assistance received
by the minors, Remedios and the minors discharge the
estate of Sima Wei from any and all liabilities.
RTC denied the motion to dismiss on the ground that it had
not been established that Remedios was the duly
constituted guardian of her minor daughters when she
signed the Release and Waiver of Claim.
CA denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
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Issues:
1. WON the Release and Waiver of Claim precludes
private respondents from claiming their
successional rights. NO
2. WON private respondents are barred by
prescription from proving their filiation. NO
Held:
1.
To be valid and effective, a waiver must be couched in
clear and unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the
intention of a party to give up a right or benefit which
legally pertains to him. The document does not state with
clarity the purpose of its execution, it merely states that
Remedios received P300k and an educational plan for her
minor daughters by way of financial assistance and in full
settlement of any and all claims of whatsoever nature and
kind against the estate of the deceased.
Moreover, Article 1044 of Civil Code provides that:
”Any inheritance left to minors or incapacitated persons
may be accepted by their parents or guardians. Parents or
guardians may repudiate the inheritance left to their wards
only by judicial authorization.”
Thus, there was no waiver of hereditary rights. The minors
could not have possibly waived their successional rights
because they are yet to prove their status as
acknowledged illegitimate children of the deceased.
2.
To prove private respondents’ filiation they have to present
evidence based on the governing law on actions for
recognition of illegitimate children before the Family Code
took effect, was Article 285 of the Civil Code which
provides:
The action for the recognition of natural children may be
brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents,
except in the following cases;
1. If the father or mother died during the minority of
the child, in which case the latter may file the
action before the expiration of 4 years from the
attainment of his majority.
xxxx
Under the Family Code, when filiation of an illegitimate
child is established by a record of birth appearing in the
civil register or a final judgment, or an admission of
filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument signed by the parent concerned, the action for
recognition may be brought by the child during his or her
lifetime. If the action is based on open and continuous
possession of status of an illegitimate child, it may only be
brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
The resolution of prescription depends on the type of
evidence to be adduced by private respondents. Case is
remanded to RTC as SC is not a trier of facts.
While the original action was a petition for letters of
administration, RTC is not precluded from receiving
evidence on private respondents’ filiation. Its jurisdiction
extends to matters incidental and collateral to the exercise
of its recognized powers in handling the settlement of the
estate including the determination of the status of each
heir.
Two causes of action are joined in this case, one to compel
recognition and the other to claim inheritance.

6. G.R. No. L-770 April 27, 1948
ANGEL T. LIMJOCO, vs. INTESTATE ESTATE OF
PEDRO O. FRAGRANTE
FACTS:
Pedro Fragante, a Filipino citizen at the time of his death,
applied for a certificate of public convenience to install and
maintain an ice plant in San Juan Rizal. His intestate estate
is financially capable of maintaining the proposed service.
The Public Service Commission issued a certificate of public
convenience to Intestate Estate of the deceased,
authorizing said Intestate Estate through its special or
Judicial Administrator, appointed by the proper court of
competent jurisdiction, to maintain and operate the said
plant. Petitioner claims that the granting of certificate
applied to the estate is a contravention of law.
Petitioner contends that it was error on the part of the
commission to allow the substitution of the legal
representative of the estate of Pedro O. Fragante for the
latter as party applicant in the case then pending before
the commission, and in subsequently granting to said
estate the certificate applied for, which is said to be in
contravention of law.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the PSC erred in granting the application
for CPC
2. Whether the estate of Fragante is a person.
3. Whether the estate of Fragante may be considered
as a citizen within the meaning of section 16 of the
Public Service Act, as amended, particularly the
proviso thereof expressly and categorically limiting
the power of the commission to issue certificates of
public convenience or certificates of public
convenience and necessity "only to citizens of the
Philippines
HELD:
1. NO. The right of Fragante to prosecute the application to
its final conclusion was one which by its nature did not
lapse through his death. It constitutes a part of the assets
of his estate, for such a right was property despite the
possibility that in the end the PSC might have denied the
application. Rule 88, Sec. 2 provides that the executor or
administrator may bring or defend actions for the
protection of the property or rights of the deceased which
survive. It is true that a proceeding upon an application for
a CPC before the PSC is not an "action”. But the provisions
of the law go to prove that the decedent’s rights which by
their nature are not extinguished by death, go to make up
a part and parcel of the assets of his estate which, being
placed under the control and management of the executor
or administrator, cannot be exercised but by him in
representation of the estate for the benefit of the creditors,
devisees or legatees, if any and the heirs of the decedent.
2. YES. Within the framework and principles of the
constitution itself, under the Bill of Rights, it seems clear
that while the civil rights guaranteed therein in the
majority of cases relate to natural persons, the term
“person” must be deemed to include artificial or juridical
persons. It was the intent of the framers to include
artificial or juridical, no less than natural, persons in these
constitutional immunities and in other of similar nature.
Among these artificial or juridical persons figure estates of
deceased persons.
Hence, the Court held that within the framework of the
Constitution, the estate of Fragante should be considered
an artificial or juridical person for the purposes of the
settlement and distribution of his estate which include the
exercise during the judicial administration thereof of those
rights and the fulfillment of those obligations of his which
survived after his death.
3. YES.
The fiction of such extension of Fragante’s citizenship is
made necessary to avoid the injustice of subjecting his
estate, creditors and heirs, solely by reason of his death, to
the loss of the investment which he had already made in
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the ice plant, not counting the other expenses occasioned
by the instant proceeding.
7. Lim vs. CA
Facts:
In 1994, Pastor Lim died. His wife, Rufina Lim petitioned
with the lower court, acting as a probate court, for the
inclusion of 5 corporations into the inventory of the estate
of Pastor Lim. The 5 corporations were: Auto Truck
Corporation, Alliance Marketing Corporation, Speed
Distributing, Inc., Active Distributing, Inc. and Action
Company. Rufina alleged that the assets of these
corporations were owned wholly by Pastor; that these
corporations themselves are owned by Pastor and they are
mere dummies of Pastor. The corporations filed a motion
for exclusion from the estate. They presented proof
(Torrens Titles) showing that the assets of the corporations
are in their respective names and titles. The probate court
denied their motion. The Court of Appeals reversed the
decision of the probate court.
Issue: Whether or not the corporations and/or their assets
should be included in the inventory of the estate.
Ruling: No. As regards the assets, the corporations were
able to present their respective Torrens Titles over the
disputed assets. It is true that a probate court may pass
upon the question ownership albeit in a provisional manner
but still, a Torrens Title cannot be attacked collaterally in a
probate proceeding, it must be attacked directly in a
separate proceeding.
As regards the corporations, to include them in the
inventory is tantamount to the piercing of the veil of
corporate fiction because the probate court effectively
adopted the theory of Rufina. This cannot be done. Firstly,
the probate court is sitting in a limited capacity. Secondly,
Rufina was not able to present sufficient evidence that
indeed the corporations are mere conduits of Pastor.
Mere ownership by a single stockholder or by another
corporation of all or nearly all of the capital stock of a
corporation is not of itself a sufficient reason for
disregarding the fiction of separate corporate personalities.
The veil can’t be pierced without any showing that indeed
the corporation is being used merely as a dummy. To
disregard the separate juridical personality of a
corporation, the wrong-doing must be clearly and
convincingly established. It cannot be presumed.
8.
EMILIA FIGURACION-GERILLA, Petitioner,
-versus-
CAROLINA VDA. DE FIGURACION, et.al., Respondents
G.R. No. 154322; August 22, 2006
FACTS:
Spouses Leandro and respondent Carolina Figuracion (now
both deceased) had six children: petitioner and
respondents Elena Figuracion-Ancheta (now deceased),
HilariaFiguracion, Felipa Figuracion-Manuel, Quintin
Figuracion and Mary Figuracion-Ginez.
On August 23, 1955, Leandro executed a deed of quitclaim
over his real properties in favor of his six children. When
he died in 1958, he left behind two parcels of land.
What gave rise to the complaint for partition, however, was
a dispute between petitioner and her sister, respondent
Mary, over the eastern half of one lot.
Respondents claim that: (1) the properties constituting
Leandro’s estate cannot be partitioned before his estate is
settled and (2) there should be an accounting before
anything else, considering that they (respondents) had to

spend for the maintenance of the deceased Leandro
Figuracion and his wife in their final years, which support
was supposed to come from the income of the properties.
Among other things, respondents apparently wanted
petitioner to share in the expenses incurred for the care of
their parents during the ten years she stayed in the United
States, before she could get her part of the estate while
petitioner apparently wanted her gross share, without first
contributing to the expenses.
ISSUE: Whether or not there needs to be a prior
settlement of Leandro’s intestate estate (that is, an
accounting of the income of the prperties, the payment of
expenses, liabilities and taxes, plus compliance with other
legal requirements, etc.) before the properties can be
partitioned or distributed?
RULING:
YES. While Section 8 of Rule 69 provides that there shall
be an accounting of the real property’s income (rentals and
profits) in the course of an action for partition, there is no
provision for the accounting of expenses for which property
belonging to the decedent’s estate may be answerable,
such as funeral expenses, inheritance taxes and similar
expenses enumerated under Section 1, Rule 90 of the
Rules of Court.
In a situation where there remains an issue as to the
expenses chargeable to the estate, partition is
inappropriate. While petitioner points out that the estate is
allegedly without any debt and she and respondents are
Leandro Figuracion’s only legal heirs, she does not dispute
the finding of the CA that “certain expenses” including
those related to her father’s final illness and burial have
not been properly settled. Thus, the heirs (petitioner and
respondents) have to submit their father’s estate to
settlement because the determination of these expenses
cannot be done in an action for partition.
In estate settlement proceedings, there is a proper
procedure for the accounting of all expenses for which the
estate must answer. If it is any consolation at all to
petitioner, the heirs or distributees of the properties may
take possession thereof even before the settlement of
accounts, as long as they first file a bond conditioned on
the payment of the estates obligations.
9. Pereira vs. Court of Appeals
GR No. L-81147
June 20, 1984
Facts:
Andres Pereira an employee of PAL died without a will. He
was survived by his legitimate spouse of 10 months, the
herein petitioner Victoria Pereira, and his sister Rita Nagac,
the herein private respondent.
Rita Nagac instituted a Special Proceeding case for the
issuance of letters of administration in her favor pertaining
to the estate of Andres Pereira. Victoria filed an opposition
alleging that here exist no estate of the deceased for
purposes of administration for the reason that the death
benefits from PAL, PALEA, PESALA and SSS belong
exclusively to her, being the sole beneficiary and that the
saving deposits of her deceased husband had been used to
defray the funeral expenses and the only real property of
the deceased has been extrajudicially settled by her and
the private respondent as the only surviving hairs; that if
an estate does exist, the letters of administration relating
to the said estate be issued in her favor as the surviving
spouse.
RTC appointed Rita as the administratrix of the intestate
estate of Andres. CA affirmed the appointment.
5
Issues:
1. WON there exists an estate of the deceased Andres
for purposes of administration.
2. WON a judicial administration proceeding is
necessary where there are no debts left by the
decedent.
Held:
1.
The function of resolving whether or not a certain property
should be included in the inventory of list of properties to
be administered by the administrator is one clearly within
the competence of the probate court. However, the court’s
determination is only provisional in character, not
conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate
action which may be instituted by the parties.
2.
The administration proceeding instituted by Rita is
unnecessary.
The general rule is that when a person dies leaving
property, the same should be judicially administered and
the competent court should appoint a qualified
administrator, in the order established in Section 6, Rule
78, in case the deceased left no will, or in case he had left
one, should he fail to name an executor therein.
An exception to the rule is in Section 1 of Rule 74 which
provides that when all heirs are of lawful age and there are
no debts due from the estate, they may agree in writing to
partition the property without instituting the judicial
administration or applying for the appointment of an
administrator. The rule however, does not preclude the
heirs from instituting administration proceedings even if
the estate has no debts or obligations, if they do not desire
to resort for good reasons to an ordinary action for
partition.
Thus, when a person dies without leaving pending
obligations to be paid, the heirs, whether of age or not are
not bound to submit the property to a judicial
administration which is always long and costly, or to apply
for the appointment of an administrator by the Court. It
has been held that the judicial administration and the
appointment of an administrator are superfluous and
unnecessary proceedings.
The only conceivable reason why Rita seeks appointment
as administratrix is for her to obtain possession of the
alleged properties of the deceased for her own purpose,
since these properties are presently in the hands of Victoria
who supposedly disposed of them fraudulently. This is not
a compelling reason which will necessitate a judicial
administration of the estate of the deceased.
The claims of both parties as to the properties left by the
deceased may be properly ventilated in simple partition
proceedings where the creditors should there be any, are
protected in any event.
10.
HEIRS OF JOAQUIN TEVES vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
HEIRS OF ASUNCION IT-IT
G.R. No. 109963 October 13, 1999
FACTS:
Spouses Marcelina Cimafranca and Joaquin Teves died
intestate and without debts in 1943 and 1953,
respectively. During their lifetime, the spouses own two
parcels of land registered in the name of Marcelina and
another lot registered in the name of Joaquin and his two
sisters.
However, Joaquin’s sisters died without issue, causing the
entire property to pass to him. After Marcelina and Joaquin
died, their children executed extrajudicial settlements

purporting to adjudicate unto themselves the ownership
over the two parcels of land and to alienate their shares
thereto in favor of their sister Asuncion Teves for a
consideration. The validity of these settlements executed
pursuant to section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court is the
primary issue in the present case. The division of the
subject lot was embodied in two deeds. The first Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale was entered into on June
13, 1956 while the second deed was executed on April 21,
1959.
The Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and sale was
executed on December 14, 1971. After the death of
Asuncion Teves, her children, private respondents,
extrajudicially settled her property, adjudicating unto
themselves said lots.
On May 9, 1984, herein petitioners, heirs of Marcelina and
Joaquin, filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of
Negros Occidental against private respondents for the
partition and reconveyance of the aforesaid parcels of land,
alleging that the extrajudicial settlements were spurious.
ISSUE: Should the extrajudicial settlements be upheld?
RULING:
YES. An extrajudicial settlement is a contract and it is a
well-entrenched doctrine that the law does not relieve a
party from the effects of a contract, entered into with all
the required formalities and with full awareness of what he
was doing, simply because the contract turned out to be a
foolish or unwise investment. Therefore, although
plaintiffs-appellants may regret having alienated their
hereditary shares in favor of their sister Asuncion, they
must now be considered bound by their own contractual
acts. The subject extrajudicial settlements were never
registered.
However, in the case of Vda. de Reyes vs. CA, the Court,
interpreting Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court,
upheld the validity of an oral partition of the decedent’s
estate and declared that the non-registration of an
extrajudicial settlement does not affect its intrinsic validity.
It was held in this case that the requirement that a
partition be put in a public document and registered has
for its purpose the protection of creditors and at the same
time the protection of the heirs themselves against tardy
claims.
The object of registration is to serve as constructive notice
to others. Thus, despite its non-registration, the
extrajudicial settlements are legally effective and binding
among the heirs of Marcelina Cimafranca since their
mother had no creditors at the time of her death.
10 (new). Maria Socorro Avelino vs Court of Appeals
Judicial Partition
FACTS:
In 1989, Antonio Avelino, Sr. died intestate. In 1991, his
daughter, Maria Socorro Avelino filed a petition for the
issuance of letters of administration of the estate of his
deceased father. All the other heirs however opposed the
petition and they moved that the petition be converted into
an action for judicial partition of the said estate. The trial
court granted the opposition’s motion and so Socorro’s
petition was converted accordingly. Socorro’s motion for
reconsideration was denied. Socorro then filed a petition
for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus alleging grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the trial court in granting the
other heirs motion. The Court of Appeals found no
reversible error. Socorro elevated the petition to the
Supreme Court. She insists that a partition cannot be had
6
because the extent of the estate is not yet determined
hence an administration proceeding is still needed. She
also insists that the Rules of Court does not provide for a
conversion of a petition for administration to an action for
partition.
ISSUE: Whether or not Socorro’s petition for the issuance
of letters of administration may be converted into an action
for judicial partition.
HELD: Yes. This can be based on Section 1 of Rule 74 of
the Rules of Court. Where the more expeditious remedy of
partition is available to the heirs, then the heirs or the
majority of them may not be compelled to submit to
administration proceedings. In this case, all the heirs, with
the exception of Socorro, agreed to judicial partition as
they see it to be the more convenient method. There is no
merit to the contention of Socorro that a partition cannot
be had because the extent of the estate is not yet
determined. The extent of the estate can actually be
determined during the partition proceedings. Therefore,
the trial court made no error in converting Socorro’s
petition to an action for judicial partition.
11. Hernandez v. Andal
Facts:
Cresencia, Maria, Aquilina, Pedro and Basilia Hernandez are
brother and sisters, who acquired in common a parcel of
land from their deceased father. Maria and Aquilina sold to
the spouses Andal a portion thereof, which they purport to
be their combined shares by virtue of a verbal partition
made among the siblings Hernandez.
After the sale, Cresencia attempted to repurchase the land
sold to Andal but the latter refused to sell the same. Later,
Andal resold the same to Maria and Aquilina. Maria and
Aquilina alleged that there had been an oral partition
among them and their brother and
sisters, and that there are witnesses ready to prove such
partition. However, Cresencia asserted that under the
Rules of Court, parol evidence of partition is inadmissible.
Issue: Whether or not oral evidence is admissible in
proving a contract of partition among heirs?
Ruling: As a general proposition, transactions, so far as
they affect the parties, are required to be reduced to
writing either as a condition of jural validity or as a means
of providing evidence to prove the transactions.
Written form exacted by the statute of frauds, for example,
“is for evidential purposes only.” The Civil Code, too,
requires the accomplishment of acts or contracts in a
public instrument, not in order to validate the act or
contract but only to insure its efficacy so that after the
existence of the acts or contracts has been admitted, the
party bound may be compelled to execute the document.
It must be noted that where the law intends writing or
other formality to be the essential requisite to the validity
of the transactions it says so in clear and unequivocal
terms.
Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court contains no such
express or clear declaration that the required public
instruments is to be constitutive of a contract of partition
or an inherent element of its effectiveness as between the
parties.
The requirement that a partition be put in a public
document and registered has for its purpose the protection
of creditors and at the same time the protection of the
heirs themselves against tardy claims. The object of
registration is to serve as constructive
notice.
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It must follow that the intrinsic validity of partition not

executed with the prescribed formalities does not come
into play when, as in this case, there are no creditors or
the rights of creditors are not affected. No rights of
creditors being involved, it is competent for the heirs of an
estate to enter into an agreement for distribution in a
manner and upon a plan different from those provided by
law. Judgment reversed.