8.

PURA CARREON VS RUFO AGCAOILI

FACTS:
Sps. Bonifacio and Celerina Carreon purchased the land subject of this case. When Bonifacio died, Celerina
adjudicated to herself the land declaring herself as the sole heiress of her husband for which a transfer certificate
was issued in her name on Sept 28, 1946 with an annotation that it was subject to Sec. 4 Rule 74 of the RoC. She
then borrowed money from the PNB secured by a REM on ½ of the land. To pay for the loan, ½ was sold to Rufo
Agcaoili hence a new TCT was issued in his name. In Feb 1955, the children of Celerina sought to have a deed
of sale executed by their mother be declared as one of mortgage and to recover the ½ tract of land. The court ruled
in favor of Agcaoli hence this appeal. It was alleged that Agcaoili was a buyer in bad faith and that a trust
relationship existed.

ISSUE: Whether Agcaoli was a buyer in good faith

HELD: YES!
There is no clear proof the Agcaoli knew of any flaw in the title of Celerina. The mere fact of being a townmate
is not a sufficient basis to conclude that he knew she had children. It was shown that he rarely came home since
he was an enlisted man in the Phil. Constabulary hence he cannot be expected to know the relatives and children
of this vendor. Fraud cannot be presumed. It must be established by clear and sufficient evidence. If fraud was
committed, such was perpetrated by Celerina. Agcaoli is only charged with notice of the burdens which are noted
on the face of the title and nothing more.

The lien, established in Sec.4 of Rule 74 of the Old and Revised Rules of Court, in case of summary settlement
of a decedent’s estate, is effective only for a period of 2 yrs. After the 2 yr period, such becomes “functus oficio”
and it may be cancelled at the instance of the transferee of the land involved.

In this case, more than 2 yrs had elapsed, from Sept. 28, 1946 to Sept. 8, 1949 when the deed of sale in favor of
Agcaoili was issued and registered.

9. ARUEGO VS CA

FACTS:
On March 7, 1983, a complaint for compulsory recognition and enforcement of successional rights was filed
before RTC Manila by the minors Antonia Aruego and alleged the sister Evelyn Aruego represented by their
mother Luz Fabian. The complaint was opposed by the legitimate children of Jose Aruego Jr.
The RTC rendered judgment in favor of Antonia Aruego. A petition for certiorari was then filed alleging that the
Family Code of the Philippines which took effect on August 3, 1988 shall have a retroactive effect thereby the
trial court lost jurisdiction over the complaint on the ground of prescription.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Family Code may be given a retroactive effect so as to deprive private respondent of her right
to institute the case for compulsory recognition

RULING:

No. The action brought by private respondent Antonia Aruego for compulsory recognition and enforcement of
successional rights which was filed prior to the advent of the Family Code, must be governed by Article 285 of
the Civil Code and not by Article 175, paragraph 2 of the Family Code. The present law cannot be given
retroactive effect insofar as the instant case is concerned, as its application will prejudice the vested right of
private respondent to have her case decided under Article 285 of the Civil Code. The right was vested to her by
the fact that she filed her action under the regime of the Civil Code. Prescinding from this, the conclusion then
ought to be that the action was not yet barred, notwithstanding the fact that it was brought when the putative father
was already deceased, since private respondent was then still a minor when it was filed, an exception to the
general rule provided under Article 285 of the Civil Code. Hence, the trial court, which acquired jurisdiction over
the case by the filing of the complaint, never lost jurisdiction over the same despite the passage of E.O. No. 209,
also known as the Family Code of the Philippines.
10. ACAP VS CA, EDY DE LOS REYES

FACTS:

Felixberto Oruma sold his inherited land to Cosme Pido, which land is rented by petitioner Teodoro Acap. When
Cosme died intestate, his heirs executed a “Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights” in favor of private
respondent Edy delos Reyes. Respondent informed petitioner of his claim over the land, and petitioner paid the
rental to him in 1982. However in subsequent years, petitioner refused to pay the rental, which prompted
respondent to file a complaint for the recovery of possession and damages. Petitioner averred that he continues to
recognize Pido as the owner of the land, and that he will pay the accumulated rentals to Pido’s widow upon her
return from abroad. The lower court ruled in favor of private respondent.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether the “Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights” is a recognized mode of acquiring ownership by
private respondent

(2) Whether the said document can be considered a deed of sale in favor of private respondent

HELD:

An asserted right or claim to ownership or a real right over a thing arising from a juridical act, however justified,
is not per sesufficient to give rise to ownership over the res. That right or title must be completed by fulfilling
certain conditions imposed by law. Hence, ownership and real rights are acquired only pursuant to a legal mode
or process. While title is the juridical justification, mode is the actual process of acquisition or transfer of
ownership over a thing in question.

In a Contract of Sale, one of the contracting parties obligates himself to transfer the ownership of and to deliver
a determinate thing, and the other party to pay a price certain in money or its equivalent. Upon the other hand, a
declaration of heirship and waiver of rights operates as a public instrument when filed with the Registry of Deeds
whereby the intestate heirs adjudicate and divide the estate left by the decedent among themselves as they see fit.
It is in effect an extrajudicial settlement between the heirs under Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. Hence, there is a
marked difference between a sale of hereditary rights and a waiver of hereditary rights. The first presumes the
existence of a contract or deed of sale between the parties. The second is, technically speaking, a mode of
extinction of ownership where there is an abdication or intentional relinquishment of a known right with
knowledge of its existence and intention to relinquish it, in favor of other persons who are co-heirs in the
succession. Private respondent, being then a stranger to the succession of Cosme Pido, cannot conclusively claim
ownership over the subject lot on the sole basis of the waiver document which neither recites the elements of
either a sale, or a donation, or any other derivative mode of acquiring ownership.
A notice of adverse claim is nothing but a notice of a claim adverse to the registered owner, the validity of
which is yet to be established in court at some future date, and is no better than a notice of lis pendens which is
a notice of a case already pending in court. It is to be noted that while the existence of said adverse claim was
duly proven, there is no evidence whatsoever that a deed of sale was executed between Cosme Pido's heirs and
private respondent transferring the rights of Pido's heirs to the land in favor of private respondent. Private
respondent's right or interest therefore in the tenanted lot remains an adverse claim which cannot by itself be
sufficient to cancel the OCT to the land and title the same in private respondent's name. Consequently, while the
transaction between Pido's heirs and private respondent may be binding on both parties, the right of petitioner as
a registered tenant to the land cannot be perfunctorily forfeited on a mere allegation of private respondent's
ownership without the corresponding proof thereof.

11. ROXAS VS DE JESUS, JR

FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the order of respondent Hon. Jose C. Colayco, Presiding Judge Court of First Instance of
Manila, Branch XXI disallowing the probate of the holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus. After the death of
spouses Andres G. de Jesus and Bibiana Roxas de Jesus, Special Proceeding No. 81503 case was filed by petitioner
Simeon R. Roxas, the brother of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus.On March 26, 1973, petitioner Simeon R. Roxas was
appointed administrator. He then delivered to the lower court a document purporting to be the holographic Will of the deceased
Bibiana Roxas de Jesus. Judge Jose Colayco set the hearing of the probate of the holographic Win on July 21, 1973.Petitioner
Simeon R. Roxas testified that after his appointment as administrator, he found a notebook belonging to the deceased Bibiana R. de
Jesus and that on pages 21, 22, 23 and24 thereof, a letter-will addressed to her children and entirely written and signed in the
handwriting of the deceased Bibiana R. de Jesus was found. The will is dated "FEB./61 "and states: "This is my will which I want to
be respected although it is not written by a lawyer.
Testimony of Simeon R. Roxas was corroborated by the testimonies of Pedro Roxas de Jesus and Manuel Roxas de Jesus who
likewise testified that the letter dated "FEB./61 " is the holographic Will of their deceased mother They further testified that their
deceased mother understood English, the language in which the holographic Will is written, and that the date "FEB./61 " was the
date when said Will was executed by their mother Respondent Luz R. Henson, another compulsory heir filed an "opposition to
probate" assailing the purported holographic Will of Bibiana R. de Jesus because (a) it was not executed in accordance with law, (b)
it was executed through force, intimidation and/or under duress, undue influence and improper pressure, and (c) the alleged testatrix
acted by mistake and/or did not intend, nor could have intended the said Will to be her last Will and testament at the time of its
execution. August 24, 1973 - Judge Jose C. Colayco issued an order allowing the probate of the holographic w/c he
found to have been duly executed in accordance with law Respondent Luz Roxas de Jesus filed a MR stating that the will was not
dated as required by Article 810 of the Civil Code. She contends that the law requires that the Will should contain the day, month
and year of its execution and that this should be strictly complied with.December 10, 1973 – Judge disallowed the probate of the
holographic Will on the ground that the word "dated" has generally been held to include the month, day, and year

ISSUE: WON the date "FEB./61” on the will is a valid compliance with the Article 810 of the Civil Code

HELD:
We agree with the petitioner.
The petitioners contend that while Article 685 of the Spanish Civil Code and Article 688 of the Old Civil Code require the testator to
state in his holographic Win the "year, month, and day of its execution," the present Civil Code omitted the phrase Año mes y dia
and simply requires that the holographic Will should be dated. The petitioners submit that the liberal construction of the holographic
Will should prevail. Respondent Luz Henson says the will is void for non-compliance with Article 810 of the New Civil Code in
that the date must contain the year, month, and day of its execution. The respondent further contends that the petitioner cannot plead
liberal construction of Article810 of the Civil Code because statutes prescribing the formalities to be observed in the execution of
holographic Wills are strictly construed. RULING OF SC:the prevailing policy is to require satisfaction of the legal requirements in
order to guard against fraud and bad faith but without undue or unnecessary curtailment of testamentary privilege. If a Will has been
executed in substantial compliance with the formalities of the law, and the possibility of bad faith and fraud in the exercise thereof is
obviated, said Win should be admitted to probate Court found no evidence of bad faith and fraud in its execution nor was there any
substitution of Wills and Testaments As a general rule, the "date" in a holographic Will should include the day,
month, and year of its execution. However, when as in the case at bar, there is no appearance of fraud, bad faith, undue influence
and pressure and the authenticity of the Will is established the Will should be allowed under the principle of substantial compliance
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The order appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the order
allowing the probate of the holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus is reinstated.

12. CODOY VS CALUGAY

FACTS:

On 6 April 1990, Evangeline Calugay, Josephine Salcedo and Eufemia Patigas, devisees and legatees of the
holographic will of the deceased Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal, filed a petition for probate of the said will. They
attested to the genuineness and due execution of the will on 30 August 1978.

Eugenio Ramonal Codoy and Manuel Ramonal filed their opposition claiming that the will was a forgery and that
the same is even illegible. They raised doubts as regards the repeated appearing on the will after every disposition,
calling the same out of the ordinary. If the will was in the handwriting of the deceased, it was improperly procured.

Evangeline Calugay, etc. presented 6 witnesses and various documentary evidence.

The first witness was the clerk of court of the probate court who produced and identified the records of the case
bearing the signature of the deceased.
The second witness was election registrar who was made to produce and identify the voter’s affidavit, but failed
to as the same was already destroyed and no longer available.

The third, the deceased’s niece, claimed that she had acquired familiarity with the deceased’s signature and
handwriting as she used to accompany her in collecting rentals from her various tenants of commercial
buildings and the deceased always issued receipts. The niece also testified that the deceased left a holographic
will entirely written, dated and signed by said deceased.
The fourth witness was a former lawyer for the deceased in the intestate proceedings of her late husband, who
said that the signature on the will was similar to that of the deceased but that he can not be sure.

The fifth was an employee of the DENR who testified that she was familiar with the signature of the deceased
which appeared in the latter’s application for pasture permit. The fifth, respondent Evangeline Calugay, claimed
that she had lived with the deceased since birth where she had become familiar with her signature and that the
one appearing on the will was genuine.

Codoy and Ramonal’s demurrer to evidence was granted by the lower court. It was reversed on appeal with the
Court of Appeals which granted the probate.

ISSUE:

1. W/N Article 811 of the Civil Code, providing that at least three witnesses explicitly declare the signature in
a contested will as the genuine signature of the testator, is mandatory or directory.

2. Whether or not the witnesses sufficiently establish the authenticity and due execution of the deceased’s
holographic will.

HELD:

1. YES. The word “shall” connotes a mandatory order, an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with
the idea of discretion and that the presumption is that the word “shall”, when used in a statute, is
mandatory.

In the case at bar, the goal to be achieved by the law, is to give effect to the wishes of the deceased and the evil
to be prevented is the possibility that unscrupulous individuals who for their benefit will employ means to defeat
the wishes of the testator.

The paramount consideration in the present petition is to determine the true intent of the deceased.

2. NO. We cannot be certain that the holographic will was in the handwriting of the deceased.

The clerk of court was not presented to declare explicitly that the signature appearing in the holographic will was
that of the deceased.

The election registrar was not able to produce the voter’s affidavit for verification as it was no longer available.

The deceased’s niece saw pre-prepared receipts and letters of the deceased and did not declare that she saw the
deceased sign a document or write a note.

The will was not found in the personal belongings of the deceased but was in the possession of the said niece,
who kept the fact about the will from the children of the deceased, putting in issue her motive.

Evangeline Calugay never declared that she saw the decreased write a note or sign a document.

The former lawyer of the deceased expressed doubts as to the authenticity of the signature in the holographic will.

(As it appears in the foregoing, the three-witness requirement was not complied with.)

A visual examination of the holographic will convinces that the strokes are different when compared with other
documents written by the testator.

The records are remanded to allow the oppositors to adduce evidence in support of their opposition.

The object of solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to
avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity. Therefore, the laws on this
subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial ends. But, on the other hand, also one
must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise the right to
make a will.
However, we cannot eliminate the possibility of a false document being adjudged as the will of the testator, which
is why if the holographic will is contested, the law requires three witnesses to declare that the will was in the
handwriting of the deceased.

Article 811, paragraph 1. provides: “In the probate of a holographic will, it shall be necessary that at least one
witness who knows the handwriting and signature of the testator explicitly declare that the will and the signature
are in the handwriting of the testator. If the will is contested, at least three of such witnesses shall be required.”

The word “shall” connotes a mandatory order, an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of
discretion and that the presumption is that the word “shall”, when used in a statute, is mandatory.

13. GABUCAN VS MANTA

Facts:
A petition for the probate of a notarial will was dismissed on the ground that it does not bear a 30-centavo
documentary stamp. According to the R Judge, the notarial will was not admissible in evidence. Despite P’s
manifestation that he had already attached the documentary stamp, the R Judge refused to reconsider the
dismissal.

Issue: Whether the lower court erred I holding that because no documentary stamp was affixed to the
will, there was “no will and testament to probate”?

HELD:
We hold that the lower court manifestly erred in declaring that, because no documentary stamp was affixed to the
will, there was “no will and testament to probate” and, consequently, the alleged “action must of necessity be
dismissed”.
What the probate court should have done was to require the petitioner or proponent to affix the requisite thirty-
centavo documentary stamp to the notarial acknowledgment of the will which is the taxable portion of that
document.
That procedure may be implied from the provision of section 238 that the non-admissibility of the document,
which does not bear the requisite documentary stamp, subsists only “until the requisite stamp or stamps shall have
been affixed thereto and cancelled.”
Thus, it was held that the documentary stamp may be affixed at the time the taxable document is presented in
evidence (Del Castillo vs. Madrilena, 49 Phil. 749). If the promissory note does not bear a documentary stamp,
the court should have allowed plaintiff’s tender of a stamp to supply the deficiency. (Rodriguez vs. Martinez, 5
Phil. 67, 71. Note the holding in Azarraga vs. Rodriguez, 9 Phil. 637, that the lack of the documentary stamp on
a document does not invalidate such document. See Cia. General de Tabacos vs. Jeanjaquet, 12 Phil. 195, 201-2
and Delgado and Figueroa vs. Amenabar, 16 Phil. 403, 405-6.)

14. DOROTHEO VS CA

FACTS:

Aniceta Reyes died in 1969 without her estate being settled. Thereafter, her husband Alejandro also died. In 1977,
Lourdes Dorotheo filed a special proceeding for the probate of Alejandro’s last will and testament. The children
of spouses filed their opposition. The RTC ruled that Lourdes being not the wife of Alejandro the will is
intrinsically void; the oppositors are the only heir entitled to the estate. Lourdes filed a Motion for Consideration
arguing that she is entitled to some compensation since she took care of Alejandro prior to his death although they
were not legally married to each other. This was denied by the trial court. The CA dismissed her appeal for
her failure to wile the same within the extended period.

ISSUE:

May a last will and testament admitted to probate but declared intrinsically void in an order that has become final
and executor still be given effect?

RULING:

No. A final and executor decision or order can no longer be disturbed or reopened no matter how erroneous it
may be.
The Supreme Court ruled that the will of Alejandro was extrinsically valid but the intrinsic provisions thereof are
void. Alejandro gave all the property to the concubine. Such is invalid because one cannot dispose what he does
not own. In this case, the whole property is the conjugal property of Alejandro and Aniceta. Such has become
final and executor. The only instance where a party interested in probate proceeding may have a final liquidation
set aside is when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence
not imputable to negligence with circumstances do not concur herein.

15. CAÑIZA VS CA
FACTS:
Being then ninety-four (94) years of age, Carmen Caniza was declared incompetent by judgment in a guardianship
proceeding instituted by her niece, Amparo A. Evangelista. Caniza was the owner of a house and lot. Her guardian
Amparo Evangelista commenced a suit to eject the spouses Pedro and Leonora Estrada from said premises.

The complaint was later amended to identify the incompetent Caniza as plaintiff, suing through her legal guardian,
Amparo Evangelista. The amended Complaint pertinently alleged that plaintiff Caniza was the absolute owner of
the property in question; that out of kindness, she had allowed the Estrada Spouses, their children, grandchildren,
and sons-in-law to temporarily reside in her house, rent-free; that Caniza already had urgent need of the house on
account of her advanced age and failing health, “so funds could be raised to meet her expenses for support,
maintenance and medical treatment;” among others.

The defendants declared that they had been living in Caniza’s house since the 1960’s; that in consideration of
their faithful service they had been considered by Caniza as her own family, and the latter had in fact executed a
holographic will by which she “bequeathed” to the Estradas the house and lot in question. The Estradas insist that
the devise of the house to them by Caiza clearly denotes her intention that they remain in possession thereof, and
legally incapacitated her judicial guardian, Amparo Evangelista, from evicting them therefrom, since their ouster
would be inconsistent with the ward’s will. Such will has not been submitted for probate.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the alleged will may be given effect

HELD:
No. A will is essentially ambulatory; at any time prior to the testator’s death, it may be changed or revoked; and
until admitted to probate, it has no effect whatever and no right can be claimed thereunder, the law being quite
explicit: “No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with
the Rules of Court” An owner’s intention to confer title in the future to persons possessing property by his
tolerance, is not inconsistent with the former’s taking back possession in the meantime for any reason deemed
sufficient. And that, in this case, there was sufficient cause for the owner’s resumption of possession is apparent:
she needed to generate income from the house on account of the physical infirmities afflicting her, arising from
her extreme age.