Property Case Digests On Usufruct, Easement, and Nuisance

Property Case Digests on Usufruct, Easement,
and Nuisance
EDCA Publishing & Distributing Corp. v. Santos,

G.R. No. 80298, April 26, 1990, 134 SCRA 614
Cruz, J.
FACTS: Jose Cruz ordered by telephone 406 books from EDCA Publishing and Distributing Corp. (EDCA),
payable on delivery. EDCA prepared the corresponding invoice and delivered the books as ordered, for
which Cruz issued a check. Subsequently, Cruz sold 120 of the books to Leonor Santos who paid him
after verifying the seller's ownership from the invoice he showed her. Meanwhile, EDCA having become
suspicious over a second order placed by Cruz even before clearing of his first check, made inquiries
with the De la Salle College where he had claimed to be a dean and was informed that there was no
such person in its employ. Further, Cruz had no account with the Philippine Amanah Bank, against which
he had drawn the check. EDCA went to the police, which arrested Cruz whose real name was Tomas de
la Peña. EDCA sought the assistance of the police, and forced their way into the store of the Santos and
threatened her with prosecution for buying stolen property. They seized the 120 books. Santos sued for
recovery of the books after demand for their return was rejected by EDCA.
ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not EDCA was unlawfully deprived of the books because the check issued by the
impostor in payment therefor was dishonored.
2.) Whether or not EDCA had the right to cease the books that were sold to Santos.
HELD: 1.) No. EDCA was not unlawfully deprived of the books. Article 559 of the Civil Code provides
that the possession of movable property acquired in good faith is equivalent to a title. Nevertheless, one
who has lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof, may recover it from the person in
possession of the same. If the possessor of a movable lost or of which the owner has been unlawfully
deprived has acquired it in good faith at a public sale, the owner cannot obtain its return without
reimbursing the price paid therefor. A contract of sale is perfected once agreement is reached between
the parties on the subject matter and the consideration. Ownership in the thing sold shall not pass to
the buyer until full payment of the purchase only if there is a stipulation to that effect. Otherwise, the
rule is that such ownership shall pass from the vendor to the vendee upon the actual or constructive
delivery of the thing sold even if the purchase price has not yet been paid. Non-payment only creates a
right to demand payment or to rescind the contract, or to criminal prosecution in the case of bouncing
checks. But absent the stipulation above noted, delivery of the thing sold will effectively transfer
ownership to the buyer who can in turn transfer it to another.
2.) No. Actual delivery of the books having been made, Cruz acquired ownership over the books which
he could then validly transfer to the private respondents. The fact that he had not yet paid for them to
EDCA was a matter between him and EDCA and did not impair the title to the books acquired by the
Santos spouses. Therefore, EDCA was not unlawfully deprived of the books and Santos had rights over
the books.
Dizon v. Suntay
G.R. No. L-30817, September 29, 1972, 47 SCRA 160
Fernando, J.
FACTS: Lourdes Suntay is the owner of a 3 carat diamond ring. She entered into a transaction with
Clarita Sison, wherein said ring was delivered to the latter for sale on commission. Upon receiving the
ring, the receipt was delivered to Suntay. After a lapse of a considerable amount of time, the ring was
not yet returned and so Suntay demanded for its return from Sison but the latter could not comply as
she had already pledged it with Dizon’s pawnshop for P 2,600.00. After insistent demands, Sison
delivered the pawnshop ticket to Suntay. Suntay through her counsel, wrote to Dizon asking for the
Property Case Digests by KC Canada LLB-2 USC LAW 1

delivery of the ring pledged but, the latter refused. She filed an action for recovery with P 500 as
attorney’s fees and costs. She asked for the remedy of replevin upon filing the requisite bond pending
final determination of the action. The CFI of Manila issued the writ and Suntay was able to regain
possession during the pendency of the action. The lower court rendered a decision in favor of Suntay.
On appeal, Dizon sought the reversal of the lower court’s decision and invoking estoppel. CA affirmed
the lower court’s decision. SC affirmed CA decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the owner of the ring may recover its possession from the pawnshop owner.
HELD: Yes. Owner of a diamond ring may recover the possession of the same from a pawnshop where
another person had pledged it without authority to do so. Art. 559 of the civil code applies and the
defense that the pawnshop acquired possession of the without notice of any defect in the title of the
pledgor is unavailing. Neither the promptings of equity nor the mandates of moral right and natural
justice come to his rescue. Dizon is engaged in a business where presumably ordinary prudence would
manifest itself to ascertain whether or not an individual who is offering a jewelry by way of a pledge is
entitled to do so. If no such care be taken he should be the last to complain if thereafter the right of the
true owner of such jewelry should be recognized.
Ramirez vs. Vda. De Ramirez
The main issue in this appeal is the manner of partitioning the testate estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez
among the principal beneficiaries, namely: his widow Marcelle Demoron de Ramirez; his two
grandnephews Roberto and Jorge Ramirez; and his companion Wanda de Wrobleski.
The task is not trouble-free because the widow Marcelle is a French who lives in Paris, while the
companion Wanda is an Austrian who lives in Spain. Moreover, the testator provided for substitutions.
Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national, died in Spain on December 11, 1964, with only his widow as
compulsory heir. His will was admitted to probate by the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch X, on
July 27, 1965. Maria Luisa Palacios was appointed administratrix of the estate.
The usufruct of Wanda.
The appellants claim that the usufruct over real properties of the estate in favor of Wanda is void
because it violates the constitutional prohibition against the acquisition of lands by aliens.
The 1935 Constitution which is controlling provides as follows:
SEC. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be

transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines. (Art. XIII.)
The court a quo upheld the validity of the usufruct given to Wanda on the ground that the Constitution
covers not only succession by operation of law but also testamentary succession. We are of the opinion
that the Constitutional provision which enables aliens to acquire private lands does not extend to
testamentary succession for otherwise the prohibition will be for naught and meaningless. Any alien
would be able to circumvent the prohibition by paying money to a Philippine landowner in exchange for
a devise of a piece of land.
This opinion notwithstanding, We uphold the usufruct in favor of Wanda because a usufruct, albeit a real
right, does not vest title to the land in the usufructuary and it is the vesting of title to land in favor of
aliens which is proscribed by the Constitution.

Fabie v. Gutierrez David
G.R. No. L-123, December 12, 1945, 75 Phil. 536
Ozaeta, J.
FACTS: The petitioner Josefa Fabie is the usufructuary of the income of certain houses located at 372-
376 Santo Cristo, Binondo, and 950-956 Ongpin, Santa Cruz, Manila, under the ninth clause of the will
of the deceased Rosario Fabie y Grey. The owner of Santo Cristo property abovementioned is the
respondent Juan Grey, while those of the Ongpin property are other person not concern herein. Previous
to September 1944 litigation arose between Josefa Fabie as plaintiff and Juan Grey as defendant and the
owner of the Ongpin property as intervenors, involving the administration of the houses mentioned.
ISSUE: Whether or not the action instituted by the petitioner Josefa Fabie is a purely possessory action
and as such within the jurisdiction of said court, or an action founded on property right and therefore
beyond the jurisdiction of the municipal court.
HELD: Yes. It is admitted by the parties that the petitioner Josefa Fabie is the usufructuary of the
income of the property in question and that the respondent Juan Grey is the owner thereof. It is likewise
admitted that by virtue of a final judgment entered in Civil Case No. 1659 of the Court of First Instance
of Manila between the usufructuary and the owner, the former has the right to collect all the rents of
said property for herself with the obligation on her part to pay all the real estate taxes, special
assessments, and insurance premiums, and make all necessary repairs thereon, and in case default on
her part the owner shall have the right to do all those things, in which event he shall be entitled to
collect all subsequent rents of the property concerned until the amount paid by him and the expenses of
collection are fully satisfied, after which the usufructuary shall again collect the rents. There is therefore
no dispute as to the title to or the respective interests of the parties in the property in question. The
naked title to the property is to admittedly in the respondent Juan Grey, but the right to all the rents
thereof, with the obligation to pay the taxes and insurance premiums and make the necessary repairs,
is, also admittedly, vested in the usufructuary, the petitioner Josefa Fabie, during her lifetime.
Construing said judgment in the light of the ninth clause of the will of the deceased Rosario Fabie y
Grey, which was quoted in the decision and by which Josefa Fabie was made by the usufructuary during
her lifetime of the income of the property in question, we find that the said usufructuary has the right to
administer the property in question. All the acts of administration — to collect the rents for herself, and
to conserve the property by making all necessary repairs and paying all the taxes, special assessments,
and insurance premiums thereon — were by said judgment vested in the usufructuary
Moralidad vs. Sps. Pernes
The Court is inclined to agree with the CA that what was constituted between the parties herein is one of
usufruct over a piece of land, with the petitioner being the owner of the property upon whom the naked
title thereto remained and the respondents being two (2) among other unnamed usufructuaries who
were simply referred to as petitioner’s kin. The Court, however, cannot go along with the CA’s holding
that the action for unlawful detainer must be dismissed on ground of prematurity.
Usufruct is defined under Article 562 of the Civil Code in the following wise:
ART. 562. Usufruct gives a right to enjoy the property of another with the obligation of preserving its
form and substance, unless the title constituting it or the law otherwise provides.
Usufruct, in essence, is nothing else but simply allowing one to enjoy another’s property. 9 It is also
defined as the right to enjoy the property of another temporarily, including both the jus utendi and the
jus fruendi, 10 with the owner retaining the jus disponendi or the power to alienate the same. 11

It is undisputed that petitioner, in a document dated July 21, 1986, supra, made known her intention to
give respondents and her other kins the right to use and to enjoy the fruits of her property. There can
also be no quibbling about the respondents being given the right "to build their own house" on the
property and to stay thereat "as long as they like." Paragraph #5 of the same document earmarks
"proceeds or income derived from the aforementioned properties" for the petitioner’s "nearest kins who
have less in life in greater percentage and lesser percentage to those who are better of (sic) in
standing." The established facts undoubtedly gave respondents not only the right to use the property
but also granted them, among the petitioner’s other kins, the right to enjoy the fruits thereof. We have
no quarrel, therefore, with the CA’s ruling that usufruct was constituted between petitioner and
respondents. It is thus pointless to discuss why there was no lease contract between the parties.
However, determinative of the outcome of the ejectment case is the resolution of the next issue, i.e.,
whether the existing usufruct may be deemed to have been extinguished or terminated. If the question
is resolved in the affirmative, then the respondents’ right to possession, proceeding as it did from their
right of usufruct, likewise ceased. In that case, petitioner’s action for ejectment in the unlawful detainer
case could proceed and should prosper.
The CA disposed of this issue in this wise:
xxx Section 1, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides xxx
xxx xxx xxx
From the foregoing provision, it becomes apparent that for an action for unlawful detainer to prosper,
the plaintiff [petitioner] needs to prove that defendants’ [respondents’] right to possess already expired
and terminated. Now, has respondents’ right to possess the subject portion of petitioner’s property
expired or terminated? Let us therefore examine respondents’ basis for occupying the same.
It is undisputed that petitioner expressly authorized respondents o occupy portion of her property on
which their house may be built. Thus – "it is my desire that Mr. and Mrs. Diosdado M. Pernes may build
their house therein and stay as long as they like." From this statement, it seems that petitioner had
given the respondents the usufructuary rights over the portion that may be occupied by the house that
the latter would build, the duration of which being dependent on how long respondents would like to
occupy the property. While petitioner had already demanded from the respondents the surrender of the
premises, this Court is of the opinion that the usufructuary rights of respondents had not been
terminated by the said demand considering the clear statement of petitioner that she is allowing
respondents to occupy portion of her land as long as the latter want to. Considering that respondents
still want to occupy the premises, petitioner clearly cannot eject respondents. 12
We disagree with the CA’s conclusion of law on the matter. The term or period of the usufruct originally
specified provides only one of the bases for the right of a usufructuary to hold and retain possession of
the thing given in usufruct. There are other modes or instances whereby the usufruct shall be
considered terminated or extinguished. For sure, the Civil Code enumerates such other modes of
extinguishment:
ART. 603. Usufruct is extinguished:
(1) By the death of the usufructuary, unless a contrary intention clearly appears;
(2) By expiration of the period for which it was constituted, or by the fulfillment of any resolutory
condition provided in the title creating the usufruct;
(3) By merger of the usufruct and ownership in the same person;
(4) By renunciation of the usufructuary;

(5) By the total loss of the thing in usufruct;
(6) By the termination of the right of the person constituting the usufruct;
(7) By prescription. (Emphasis supplied.)
The document executed by the petitioner dated July 21, 1986 constitutes the title creating, and sets
forth the conditions of, the usufruct. Paragraph #3 thereof states "[T]hat anyone of my kins may enjoy
the privilege to stay therein and may avail the use thereof. Provided, however, that the same is not
inimical to the purpose thereof" (Emphasis supplied). What may be inimical to the purpose constituting
the usufruct may be gleaned from the preceding paragraph wherein petitioner made it abundantly clear
"that anybody of my kins who wishes to stay on the aforementioned property should maintain an
atmosphere of cooperation, live in harmony and must avoid bickering with one another." That the
maintenance of a peaceful and harmonious relations between and among kin constitutes an
indispensable condition for the continuance of the usufruct is clearly deduced from the succeeding
Paragraph #4 where petitioner stated "[T]hat anyone of my kins who cannot conform with the wishes of
the undersigned may exercise the freedom to look for his own." In fine, the occurrence of any of the
following: the loss of the atmosphere of cooperation, the bickering or the cessation of harmonious
relationship between/among kin constitutes a resolutory condition which, by express wish of the
petitioner, extinguishes the usufruct.
From the pleadings submitted by the parties, it is indubitable that there were indeed facts and
circumstances whereby the subject usufruct may be deemed terminated or extinguished by the
occurrence of the resolutory conditions provided for in the title creating the usufruct, namely, the
document adverted to which the petitioner executed on July 21, 1986.
As aptly pointed out by the petitioner in her Memorandum, respondents’ own evidence before the MTCC
indicated that the relations between the parties "have deteriorated to almost an irretrievable
level." 13 There is no doubt then that what impelled petitioner to file complaints before the local
barangay lupon, the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao, and this instant complaint for unlawful
detainer before the MTCC is that she could not live peacefully and harmoniously with the Pernes family
and vice versa.
Thus, the Court rules that the continuing animosity between the petitioner and the Pernes family and
the violence and humiliation she was made to endure, despite her advanced age and frail condition, are
enough factual bases to consider the usufruct as having been terminated.
To reiterate, the relationship between the petitioner and respondents respecting the property in question
is one of owner and usufructuary. Accordingly, respondents’ claim for reimbursement of the
improvements they introduced on the property during the effectivity of the usufruct should be governed
by applicable statutory provisions and principles on usufruct. In this regard, we cite with approval what
Justice Edgardo Paras wrote on the matter:
If the builder is a usufructuary, his rights will be governed by Arts. 579 and 580. In case like this, the
terms of the contract and the pertinent provisions of law should govern (3 Manresa 215-216; se also
Montinola vs. Bantug, 71 Phil. 449). 14 (Emphasis ours.)
By express provision of law, respondents, as usufructuary, do not have the right to reimbursement for
the improvements they may have introduced on the property. We quote Articles 579 and 580 of the Civil
Code:
Art. 579. The usufructuary may make on the property held in usufruct such useful improvements or
expenses for mere pleasure as he may deem proper, provided he does not alter its form or substance;
but he shall have no right to be indemnified therefor. He may, however, remove such improvements,
should it be possible to do so without damage to the property. (Emphasis supplied.)

Art. 580. The usufructuary may set off the improvements he may have made on the property against
any damage to the same.
Given the foregoing perspective, respondents will have to be ordered to vacate the premises without any
right of reimbursement. If the rule on reimbursement or indemnity were otherwise, then the
usufructuary might, as an author pointed out, improve the owner out of his property. 15 The respondents
may, however, remove or destroy the improvements they may have introduced thereon without
damaging the petitioner’s property.
Out of the generosity of her heart, the petitioner has allowed the respondent spouses to use and enjoy
the fruits of her property for quite a long period of time. They opted, however, to repay a noble gesture
with unkindness. At the end of the day, therefore, they really cannot begrudge their aunt for putting an
end to their right of usufruct. The disposition herein arrived is not only legal and called for by the law
and facts of the case. It is also right
Jabonete vs. Monteverde
Court of First Instance of Davao, in view of its finding in Case No. 824, entitled Jabonete vs.
Monteverde, et al., that Antonio Legaspi acquired the lot in question with the knowledge that a
“gravamen” or easement of right of way existed thereon
The easement awarded or secured by the lower court to the plaintiffs was strictly a personal one. The
right of way granted was expressly limited to the latter and their “family, friends, drivers, servants and
jeep.
The servitude established was clearly for the benefit alone of the plaintiffs and the persons above
enumerated and it is clear that the lower court, as well as the parties addressed by the said order, did
not intend the same to pass on to the plaintiffs’ successors-in-interest. In other words, the right
acquired by the original plaintiffs was a personal servitude under Article 614 of the Civil Code, and not a
predial servitude that inures to the benefit of whoever owns the dominant estate.
In resisting the extension of the aforementioned easement to the latter, the plaintiffs’ successors-in-
interest, the respondent-appellant, therefore, was not defying the decision of March 11, 1954 which was
then no longer subsisting, nor the order of May 24, 1954 since the said successors-in-interest had no
right thereunder.
Another evidence that the servitude in question was personal to the plaintiffs is the fact that the same
was granted to the latter without any compensation to the respondent-appellant.
North Negros Sugar Co. vs. Hidalgo
FACTS:
Plaintiff is the owner of a sugar central (known as “mill site”) and also its adjoining
plantation Hacienda “Begona”. He constructed a road adjoining the “mill site” and the
provincial highway. Plaintiff allows vehicles to pass upon paying toll charge of P0.15
for each one; pedestrians are allowed free passage.
Defendant owns the adjoining “Hacienda Sangay” wherein he has a billiard hall and a
tuba saloon (as in drinking place). The road of the plaintiff is the only means of access
to get to Hacienda Sangay.

At one point, plaintiff stopped defendant from using the said road. Hence, instead of
taking the road to get to his Hacienda Sangay, defendant passed through Hacienda
Begona in a passageway used by the carabaos.
Plaintiff applied for injunction to restrain the defendant from entering/passing through
his properties (road & Hacienda).
ISSUE:
WON injunction should be granted.
HELD: NO.
RATIO:
For injunction to be granted, it must be established that the right sought to be
protected exists, but also that the acts against which the injunction to be directed are
violative of said right.
In the case at bar, plaintiff failed to establish his right and that the defendant has
committed/attempts to commit acts that endanger such right. The complaint does not
state how and why the mere passage of defendant over plaintiff’s estate conveying
“tuba” to his Hacienda has caused damage to plaintiff’s property rights. The real
damage that the plaintiff seeks to avoid is the fact that tuba is disposed of at
defendant’s hacienda in which the plaintiff’s laborers have access (apparently, the
plaintiff hates that his laborers are getting drunk in the tuba saloon of the defendant).
This however, is a nothing more than an exercise of legitimate business on the part of
the defendant. What the law does not authorize to be done directly, cannot be done
indirectly (if plaintiff cannot enjoin defendant from selling tuba, neither can it obtain
injunction to prevent him from passing over its property to transport tuba).
(TOPICAL: on mode of acquiring easements): The road was constructed by the plaintiff
on his own land and it made this road accessible to the public, regardless of
class/group of persons/entities. This is a voluntary easement constituted in favor of
the community. Indeed, the plaintiff may close the road at its pleasure as no period
has been fixed when the easement was constituted, but while the road is still open,
he may not capriciously exclude defendant from its use. Having the road devoted to
the public in general, the road is charged with public interest and while so devoted,
the plaintiff may not establish discriminatory exceptions against any private person.
He may withdraw his grant by discontinuing its use, but so long as he maintains it, he
must submit to the control.
Furthermore there exists a forcible right of way in favor of the defendant (CC 564)
because those living in Hacienda Sangay have no access to the provincial road except
through the road in question.
Valisno v. Adriano
G.R. No. L-37409, May 23, 1988, 161 SCRA 398
FACTS: Plaintiff – appellant Nicolas Valisno alleges that he is the owner of a parcel of land in Nueva
Ecija which he bought from his sister, Honorata Adriano Francisco. Said land is planted with watermelon,
peanuts, corn, tobacco and other vegetables and adjoins the land of Felipe Adriano, on the bank of the

Pampanga River. At the time of the sale of the land to Valisno, the land was irrigated by water from the
Pampanga River through a canal about 70 meters long, traversing Adriano’s land. Later, Adriano levelled
a portion of the irrigation canal so that Valisno was deprived of the irrigation water and prevented from
cultivating his 57 – hectare land. Thus, Valisno filed a complaint for deprivation of waters rights in the
Bureau of Public Works and Communications (Bureau – PWC). Bureau – PWC ruled in favour of Valisno.
Instead of restoring the irrigation canal, Adriano asked for a reinvestigation of the case which was
granted. In the meantime, Valisno rebuilt the irrigation canal at his own expense due to his urgent need
to irrigate his watermelon fields. Valisno then filed a complaint for damages. However, the Secretary of
Bureau – PWC reversed its decision and dismissed Valisno’s complaint. It held that Eladio Adriano’s
water rights which had been granted in1923 ceased to be enjoyed by him in 1936 or 1937, when his
irrigation canal collapsed. His non-use of the water rights since then for a period of more than five years
extinguished the grant by operation of law. Hence, the water rights did not form part of his hereditary
estate which his heirs partitioned among themselves. Likewise, Valisno, as vendee of the land which
Honorata received from her father’s estate did not acquire any water rights with the land purchased. The
trial court held that Valisno had no right to pass through the defendant's land to draw water from the
Pampanga River. It pointed out that under Section 4 of the Irrigation Law, controversies between
persons claiming a right to water from a stream are within the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Bureau-
PWC and his decision on the matter is final, unless an appeal is taken to the proper court within thirty
days. The court may not pass upon the validity of the decision of the Public Works Secretary collaterally.
Furthermore, there was nothing in Valisno’s evidence to show that the resolution was not valid. It
dismissed the complaint and counterclaim. Valisno’s motion for reconsideration was denied, and he
appealed to the Court of the Appeals who certified the case to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether the provisions of the Irrigation Act (Act No. 2152) or those of the Civil Code should
apply to this case.
HELD: The provisions of the Civil Code shall apply. The existence of the irrigation canal on Adriano’s
land for the passage of water from the Pampanga River to Honorata's land prior to and at the time of
the sale of Honorata's land to Valisno was equivalent to a title for the vendee of the land to continue
using it as provided in Article 624 of the Civil Code: The existence of an apparent sign of easement
between two estates, established or maintained by the owner of both shall be considered, should either
of them be alienated, as a title in order that he easement may continue actively and passively, unless at
the time, theownership of the two estates is divided, the contrary should be provided in the title of
conveyance of either of them, or the sign aforesaid should be removed before the execution of the deed.
This provision shall also apply in case of the division of a thing owned in common on by two or more
persons (Civil Code).
This provision was lifted from Article 122 of the Spanish Law of Waters which provided: Whenever a
tract of irrigated land which previously received its waters from a single point is divided through
inheritance, sale or by virtue of some other title, between two or more owners, the owners of the higher
estates are under obligation to give free passage to the water as an easement of conduit for the
irrigation of the lower estates, and without right to any compensation therefore unless otherwise
stipulated in the deed of conveyance.
The deed of sale in favor of Valisno included the "conveyance and transfer of the water rights and
improvements" appurtenant to Honorata Adriano's property. By the terms of the Deed of Absolute Sale,
the vendor Honorata Adriano Francisco sold, ceded, conveyed and transferred to Dr. Nicolas Valisno all
"rights, title, interest and participations over the parcel of land above- described, together with one
Berkely Model 6 YRF Centrifugal Pump G" suction, 6" discharge 500-1500 GPM, with Serial No. 5415812
and one (1) set of suction pipe and discharge of pipe with elbow, nipples, flanges and footvalves," and
the water rights and such other improvements appertaining to the property subject of this sale.
According to Valisno, the water right was the primary consideration for his purchase of Honorata's
property, for without it the property would be unproductive.
Water rights, such as the right to use a drainage ditch for irrigation purposes, which are appurtenant to
a parcel of land, pass with the conveyance of the land, although not specifically mentioned in the
conveyance. The purchaser's easement of necessity in a water ditch running across the grantor's land
cannot be defeated even if the water is supplied by a third person. The fact that an easement by grant
may also have qualified as an easement of necessity does detract from its permanency as property

right, which survives the determination of the necessity. As an easement of waters in favor of Valisno
has been established, he is entitled to enjoy it free from obstruction, disturbance or wrongful
interference (19 CJ 984), such as Adriano’s act of levelling the irrigation canal to deprive him of the use
of water from the Pampanga River.
Ronquillo, et. al. v. Roco, et. al.
G.R. No. L-10619, February 28, 1958, 103 Phil. 84
Montemayor, J.
FACTS: Plaintiff Leogario Ronquillo have been in the continuous and uninterrupted use of a road which
traversed the land of the defendants, Rocos, in going to Igualdad Street and the market place of Naga
City for more than 20 years and that the Rocos have long recognized and respected the private legal
easement of a right of way of said plaintiffs.
On May 12, 1953, the defendants along with a number of men maliciously obstructed plaintiff’s right of
way by constructing a chapel in the middle of the said road and then later, by means of force,
intimidation, and threats, illegally and violently planted wooden posts, fenced with barbed wire and
closed hermitically the road passage way thereby preventing the plaintiff from using it.
The plaintiff claims that he has already acquired the easement of right of way over the land thru
prescription by his continuous and uninterrupted use of the narrow strip of land as passage way.
However, plaintiff’s complaint was dismissed by the CFI.
ISSUE: Whether or not an easement of right of way can be acquired by prescription.
HELD: No. The Court held than an easement of right of way may not be acquired thru prescription
because though it may be apparent, it is nevertheless discontinuous or intermittent, and therefore,
under Article 622 of the New Civil Code, can be acquired only by a virtue of a title. Furthermore, a right
of way cannot be acquired by prescription because prescription requires that the possession be
continuous and uninterrupted.
REYES, J.B.L., J., concurring:
I would like to elaborate my reasons for concurring with the majority in declaring the easement of right
of way not acquirable by prescription.
The essence of this easement ("servidumbre de paso") lies in the power of the dominant owner to cross
or traverse the servient tenement without being prevented or disturbed by its owner. As a servitude, it
is a limitation on the servient owner's rights of ownership, because it restricts his right to exclude others
from his property. But such limitation exists only when the dominant owner actually crosser, or passes
over the servient estate; because when he does not, the servient owner's right of exclusion is perfect
and undisturbed. Since the dominant owner can not be continually and uninterruptedly crossing the
servient estate, but can do so only at intervals, the easement is necessarily of an intermittent or
discontinuous nature.
Because possession of a right consists in the enjoyment of that right (old Civil Code, Art. 430; Art. 423,
new Civil Code) and to enjoy a right is to exercise it, it follows that the possession (enjoyment or
exercise) of a right of way is intermittent and discontinuous. From this premise, it is inevitable to
conclude, with Manresa and Sanchez Roman, that such easement can not be acquired by acquisitive
prescription (adverse possession) because the latter requires that the possession
be continuous or uninterrupted (old Civil Code, Art. 1941; new Civil Code, Art. 1118).
The Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190) did not change the situation. Observe that its section 41, in
conferring prescriptive title upon "ten years adverse possession" qualifies it by the succeeding words
"uninterruptedly continued for ten years which is the same condition of continuity that is exacted by the
Civil Code.

SEC. 41. Title to Land by Prescription. — Ten years actual adverse possession by any person
claiming to be the owner for that time of any land or interest in land, uninterruptedly continued
for ten years by occupancy, descent, grants, or otherwise, in whatever way such occupancy may
have commenced or continued, shall vest in every actual occupant or possessor of such land a
full and complete title, saving to the persons under disabilities the rights secured the next
section. In order to constitute such title by prescription or adverse possession, the possession by
the claimant or by the person under or through whom he claims must have been actual, open,
public, continous, under a claim of title exclusive of any other right and adverse to all other
claimants. But failure to occupy or cultivate land solely by reason of war shall not be deemed to
constitute an interruption of possession of the claimant, and his title by prescription shall he
complete, if in other regrets perfect, notwithstanding such failure to occupy or cultivate the land
during the continuance of war.
The case of Municipality of Dumangas vs. Bishop of Jaro, 34 Phil. 541, does not, if properly analyzed,
constitute authority to hold that the easement of right of way is acquirable by prescription or adverse
possession. The Court there said:
The record shows that the church of the pueblo of Dumangas was constructed in or about the
year 1987; that wall on the southeast side adjoins the building lot in question; and that since
the construction of the church there has been a side door in this wall through which the
worshippers attending divine service enter and leave, they having to pass over and cross the
land in question. It is therefore to be presumed that the use of said side door also carries with it
the use by faithful Catholics of the municipal land over which they have had to pass in order to
gain access to said place of worship, and, as this use of the land has been continuous, it is
evident that the Church has acquired a right to such use by prescription, in view of the time that
has elapsed since the church was built and dedicated to religious worship, during which period
the municipality has not prohibited the passage over the land by the persons who attend
services customarily held in said church.
The record does not disclose the date when the Government ceded to the Church the land on
which the church building was afterwards erected, nor the date of the laying out of the adjacent
square that is claimed by the municipality and on which the side door of the church, which is
used as an entrance by the people who frequent this building, gives. There are good grounds for
presuming that in apportioning lands at the time of the establishment of the pueblo of
Dumangas and in designating the land adjacent to the church as a public square, this latter was
impliedly encumbered with the easement of a right of way to allow the public to enter and leave
the church — a case provided for by article 567 of the Civil Code — for the municipality has
never erected any building or executed any work which would have obstructed the passage and
access to the side door of the church, and the public has been enjoying the right of way over the
land in question for an almost immemorable length of time. Therefore an easement of right of
way over said land has been acquired by prescription, not only by the church, but also by the
public which, without objection or protest, has continually availed itself of the easement in
question. (34 Phil., pp. 545-546).
It will be seen that the ratio decidendi of that case lies in the application of Article 567 of the old Civil
Code that provides as follows:
ART. 567. When an estate acquired by purchase, exchange, or partition is enclosed by other
estates of the vendor, exchanger, or co-owner, the latter shall be obliged to grant a right of way
without indemnity, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary.
Bearing in mind the provisions of the article quoted in relation to the wording of the decision in the
Dumangas case, it can be seen that what the court had in mind is that when the Spanish Crown
apportioned the land occupied by the Church of Dumangas, it impliedly burdened the neighboring public
square (which was also Crown property at the time) with an easement of right of way to allow the public
to enter and leave the church, because without such easement the grant in favor of ecclesiastical
authorities would be irrisory: what would be the use of constructing a church if no one could enter it?

Now, if there was an implied grant of the right of way by the Spanish Crown, it was clearly unnecessary
to justify the existence of the easement through prescriptive acquisition. Why then does the decision
repeatedly speak of prescription? Plainly, the word "prescription" was used in the decision not in the
sense of adverse possession for ten or thirty years, but in the sense of "immemorial usage" that under
the law anterior to the Civil Code of 1889, was one of the ways in which the servitude of right of way
could be acquired.1 This view is confirmed by the fact that throughout the passages hereinabove quoted,
the court's decision stresses that the people of Dumangas have been passing over the public square to
go to church since the town was founded and the church was built, an "almost immemorable length of
time." It would seem that the term "priscription" used in said case was merely a loose expression that is
apt to mislead unless the court's reasoning is carefully analyzed.
Since 1889, however, the Civil Code repealed the prior legislation; and thereafter the right of way could
only be acquired by title and not by adverse possession (usucapio), saving those servitudes already
acquired before the Code came into effect (Decisions, Supreme Court of Spain 27 Oct. 1900, 1st
February 1912; 11 May 1927, and 7 January 1920).
Tañedo v. Bernad
G.R. No. L-66520 August 30, 1988, 165 SCRA 86
Padilla, J.
FACTS: Private respondent Antonio Cardenas owned Lot 7501-A and Lot 7501-B. On the said two lots, a
septic tank was constructed for the common use of the occupants of both lots. Cardenas sold Lot 7501-A
to herein petitioner Tañedo and the other Lot 7501-B was also mortgaged to Tañedo as a security for
the payment of loan with an agreement that Cardenas would only sell Lot 7501-B to him. However, said
Lot 7501-B was sold to herein respondent Spouses Romeo and Pacita Sim. Upon learning of the said
sale, Tañedo offered to redeem the property from Sim but the latter refused. Instead, Sim blocked the
sewage pipe connecting the building of Eduardo Tañedo built on Lot 7501-A, to the septic tank in Lot
7501-B. He also asked Tañedo to remove that portion of his building enroaching on Lot 7501-B. Tañedo
was then constrained to file an action for legal redemption and damages invoking Article 1622 of the
Civil Code. On the other hand, respondent Spouses claimed they are the absolute owners of Lot 7501-B
and that Eduardo Tañedo has no right to redeem the land under Art. 1622 of the Civil Code as the land
sought to be redeemed is much bigger than the land owned by Tañedo.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner’s right to continue to use the septic tank, erected on Lot 7501-B,
ceased upon the subdivision of the land and its subsequent sale to different owners who do not have the
same interest.
HELD: No. Applying Article 631 and 624 of the Civil Code, no statement abolishing or extinguishing the
easement of drainage was mentioned in the deed of sale of Lot 7501-A to Eduardo Tañedo. Nor did
Antonio Cardenas stop the use of the drain pipe and septic tank by the occupants of Lot 7501-A before
he sold said lot to Eduardo Tafiedo. Hence, the use of the septic tank is continued by operation of law.
Accordingly, the spouses Romeo and Pacita Sim the new owners of the servient estate (Lot 7501- B),
cannot impair, in any manner whatsoever, the use of the servitude.
Valderama vs. North Negros Sugar Central
Case regarding the milling contracts and use of the railroad in going to the sugar central
HELD:
1. In a contract establishing an easement of way in favor of a sugar company for the construction of a
railroad for the transportation of sugar cane from the servient estates to the mill, it is contrary to the
nature of the contract to pretend that only sugar cane grown in the servient estates can be transported
on said railroad, because it is a well-settled rule that things serve their owner by reason of ownership

and not by easement. That an easement being established in favor of the sugar company, the owners of
the servient estates cannot limit its use to the transportation of their cane, there being no express
stipulation to that effect.
2. An easement of way is not more burdensome by causing to pass hereon wagons carrying goods
pertaining to persons who aren’t wners of the servient estates and at all time the person entitled o the
easement may please, for in such case the easement ontinues to be the same.
Goldcrest Realty vs. Cypress Gardens Condominium Corp.
Petitioner Goldcrest Realty Corporation (Goldcrest) is the developer of Cypress Gardens, a ten-
storey building located atHerrera Street, Legaspi Village, Makati City. On April 26, 1977, Goldcrest
executed a Master Deed and Declaration of Restrictions which constituted Cypress Gardens into a
condominium project and incorporated respondent Cypress Gardens Condominium Corporation
(Cypress) to manage the condominium project and to hold title to all the common areas. Title to the
land on which the condominium stands was transferred to Cypress under Transfer Certificate of Title No.
S-67513. But Goldcrest retained ownership of the two-level penthouse unit on the ninth and tenth
floors of the condominium registered under Condominium Certificate of Title (CCT) No. S-1079 of the
Register of Deeds of Makati City. Goldcrest and its directors, officers, and assigns likewise controlled the
management and administration of the Condominium until 1995.
Following the turnover of the administration and management of the Condominium to the board of
directors of Cypress in 1995, it was discovered that certain common areas pertaining to Cypress were
being occupied and encroached upon by Goldcrest. Thus, in 1998, Cypress filed a complaint with damages
against Goldcrest before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), seeking to compel the
latter to vacate the common areas it allegedly encroached on and to remove the structures it built
thereon. Cypress sought to remove the door erected by Goldcrest along the stairway between the 8th and
9th floors, as well as the door built in front of the 9th floor elevator lobby, and the removal of the cyclone
wire fence on the roof deck. Cypress likewise prayed that Goldcrest pay damages for its occupation of the
said areas and for its refusal to remove the questioned structures.
For its part, Goldcrest averred that it was granted the exclusive use of the roof deck’s limited
common area by Section 4(c)[4]of the condominium’s Master Deed. It likewise argued that it
constructed the contested doors for privacy and security purposes, and that, nonetheless, the common
areas occupied by it are unusable and inaccessible to other condominium unit owners.

Goldcrest contends that since the areas it allegedly encroached upon were not actually
measured during the previous ocular inspections, the finding of the Court of Appeals that it built an
office structure on the roof deck’s limited common area is erroneous and that its directive “to remove
the permanent structures constructed on the limited common area of the roof deck” is impossible to
implement.
On the other hand, Cypress counters that the Court of Appeals’ finding is correct. It also argues
that the absence of such measurement does not make the assailed directive impossible to implement
because the roof deck’s limited common area is specifically identified by Section 4(c) of the Master
Deed, which reads:
Section. 4. The Limited Common Areas. Certain parts of the common areas are
to be set aside and reserved for the exclusive use of certain units and each unit shall
have appurtenant thereto as exclusive easement for the use of such limited areas:
xxxx
(c) Exclusive use of the portion of the roof deck (not shaded red in sheet 10 of
Annex “B”) by the Penthouse unit on the roof deck.
xxxx
We rule in favor of Cypress. At this stage of the proceedings, the failure to measure the
supposed encroached areas is no longer relevant because the award for actual damages is no longer in
issue. Moreover, a perusal of the records shows that the finding of the Court of Appeals that Goldcrest
built an office structure on the roof deck’s limited common area is supported by substantial evidence and
established facts, to wit: (1) the ocular inspection reports submitted by HLURB Inspector Edwin D.
Aquino; (2) the fact that the second ocular inspection of the roof deck was intended to measure the
actual area encroached upon by Goldcrest;](3) the fact that Goldcrest had been fined for building a
structure on the limited common area; and (4) the fact that Goldcrest neither denied the structure’s
existence nor its encroachment on the roof deck’s limited common area.
Likewise, there is no merit in Goldcrest’s submission that the failure to conduct an actual
measurement on the roof deck’s encroached areas makes the assailed directive of the Court of Appeals
impossible to implement. As aptly pointed out by Cypress, the limited common area of the roof deck is
specifically identified by Section 4(c) of the Master Deed.

Anent the second issue, Goldcrest essentially contends that since the roof deck’s common
limited area is for its exclusive use, building structures thereon and leasing the same to third persons do
not impair the subject easement.
For its part, Cypress insists the said acts impair the subject easement because the same are
already beyond the contemplation of the easement granted to Goldcrest.
The question of whether a certain act impairs an easement is undeniably one of fact, considering
that its resolution requires us to determine the act’s propriety in relation to the character and purpose of
the subject easement. In this case, we find no cogent reason to overturn the similar finding of the HLURB,
the Office of the President and the Court of Appeals that Goldcrest has no right to erect an office structure
on the limited common area despite its exclusive right to use the same. We note that not only did
Goldcrest’s act impair the easement, it also illegally altered the condominium plan, in violation of Section
22 of Presidential Decree No. 957.
The owner of the dominant estate cannot violate any of the following prescribed restrictions on its
rights on the servient estate, to wit: (1) it can only exercise rights necessary for the use of the
easement; (2) it cannot use the easement except for the benefit of the immovable originally
contemplated; (3) it cannot exercise the easement in any other manner than that previously
established; (4) it cannot construct anything on it which is not necessary for the use and preservation of
the easement; (5) it cannot alter or make the easement more burdensome; (6) it must notify the servient
estate owner of its intention to make necessary works on the servient estate; and (7) it should choose the
most convenient time and manner to build said works so as to cause the least convenience to the owner of
the servient estate. Any violation of the above constitutes impairment of the easement.
Here, a careful scrutiny of Goldcrest’s acts shows that it breached a number of the
aforementioned restrictions. First, it is obvious that the construction and the lease of the office
structure were neither necessary for the use or preservation of the roof deck’s limited area. Second, the
weight of the office structure increased the strain on the condominium’s foundation and on the roof
deck’s common limited area, making the easement more burdensome and adding unnecessary safety
risk to all the condominium unit owners. Lastly, the construction of the said office structure clearly went
beyond the intendment of the easement since it illegally altered the approved condominium project plan
and violated Section 4of the condominium’s Declaration of Restrictions.

Costabella Corporation v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 80511 January 25, 1991, 193 SCRA 333
Sarmiento, J.
FACTS: Petitioner owns the real estate properties situated at Sitio Buyong, Maribago, Lapu-Lapu City,
on which it had constructed a resort and hotel. The private respondents, on the other hand, are the
owners of adjoining properties. Before the petitioner began the construction of its beach hotel, the
private respondents, in going to and from their respective properties and the provincial road, passed
through a passageway which traversed the petitioner's property. In 1981, the petitioner closed the
aforementioned passageway when it began the construction of its hotel, but nonetheless opened another
route across its property through which the private respondents, as in the past, were allowed to pass.
Later, or sometime in August, 1982, when it undertook the construction of the second phase of its beach
hotel, the petitioner fenced its property thus closing even the alternative passageway and preventing the
private respondents from traversing any part of it. Therefore, an action for injunction with damages was
filed against the petitioner by the private respondents before the then Court of First Instance of Cebu.
The CFI rendered a decision on March 15, 1984 finding that the private respondents had acquired a
vested right over the passageway in controversy based on its long existence and its continued use and
enjoyment by the private respondents and also by the community at large. On appeal, Appellate Court
held as without basis the trial court's finding that the private respondents had acquired a vested right
over the passageway in question by virtue of prescription. The appellate court pointed out that an
easement of right of way is a discontinuous one which, under Article 622 of the New Civil Code, may
only be acquired by virtue of a title and not by prescription. That notwithstanding, the appellate court
went on to rule that ". . . in the interest of justice and in the exercise by this Court of its equity
jurisdiction, there is no reason for Us in not treating the easement here sought by appellees Katipunan
Lumber Co., Inc. and Perfecta Guangco as one that is not dependent upon the claims of the parties but
a compulsory one that is legally demandable by the owner of the dominant estate from the owner of the
servient estate."
ISSUE: Whether or not the easement may be granted to private respondent over the land of Costabella.
HELD: No. It is already well-established that an easement of right of way, as is involved here, is
discontinuous and as such can not be acquired by prescription. Insofar therefore as the appellate court
adhered to the foregoing precepts, it stood correct. Unfortunately, after making the correct
pronouncement, the respondent Appellate Court did not order the reversal of the trial court's decision
and the dismissal of the complaint after holding that no easement had been validly constituted over the
petitioner's property. Instead, the Appellate Court went on to commit a reversible error by considering
the passageway in issue as a compulsory easement which the private respondents, as owners of the
"dominant" estate, may demand from the petitioner the latter being the owner of the "servient" estate.
Based on Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code, the owner of the dominant estate may validly claim a
compulsory right of way only after he has established the existence of four requisites, to wit: (1) the
(dominant) estate is surrounded by other immovables and is without adequate outlet to a public
highway; (2) after payment of the proper indemnity; (3) the isolation was not due to the proprietor's
own acts; and (4) the right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate. In the
case at bar, there is absent any showing that the private respondents had established the existence of
the four requisites mandated by law.
National Power Corp. vs. Suarez
In issue in the present petition is whether petitioner, the National Power Corporation, in its acquisition of
an easement of right of way (aerial) over a parcel of land, only a fee, not the full value of the land, must
be paid.
Petitioner's plea for the application of Section 3A(b) of RA 6395 which directs the payment of an amount
equivalent to only 10% of the market value of the property as just compensation for an easement of
right of way does not lie.

Granting arguendo that what petitioner acquired over respondent's property was purely an easement of
a right of way, still, we cannot sustain its view that it should pay only an easement fee and not the full
value of the property. The acquisition of such an easement falls within the purview of the power of
eminent domain. This conclusion finds support in similar cases in which the Supreme Court sustained
the award of just compensation for private property condemned for public use. x x x
True, an easement of right of way transmits no rights except the easement itself, and respondent
retains full ownership of the property. The acquisition of such easement is, nevertheless, not gratis. As
correctly observed by the CA, considering the nature and the effect of the installation of power
lines, the limitations on the use of the land for an indefinite period would deprive
respondent of normal use of the property. For this reason, the latter is entitled to payment of a
just compensation, which must be neither more nor less than the monetary equivalent of the land.
[
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied).
Petitioner's assertion that respondents can still make use of the property by planting corn, rice, root
crops and similar plants fails to consider that the property was originally tilled and suited for, as reflected
in the Commissioners' Report, 234 fruit bearing coconut trees, 617 abaca plants, 50 madre de cacao and
23 jackfruit trees. That petitioner prohibited respondents from planting trees higher than three meters
clearly shows that the easement had impaired respondents' beneficial enjoyment of their property to
warrant the imposition of payment of its full value.
The measure is thus not the taker's gain but the owner's loss. The word "just" is used to intensify the
meaning of the word "compensation" and to thereby convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered
for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample
The nature, as well as the character of the land at the time of taking is thus the principal criterion in
determining just compensation. All the facts as to the condition of the property and its surroundings, as
well as its improvements and capabilities, must thus be considered.
Lao vs. Alburo

Hence the question to be decided relates solely to the matter of the said wall of the property designated
as parcel No. 2 – the subject matter of the objection filed by the administrator of the estate of the
deceased Lorenza Alburo, owner of the property adjoining that designated as parcel No. 2 – inasmuch as
the administrator alleges in his objection that the said stone wall forms a part of the property that
belonged to the said deceased while the applicants claim that this wall is theirs, being a part of the
strong-minded material house constructed on the said parcel of land, Lot No. 2 according to the plan,
Exhibit A.
Article 572 of the Civil Code provides that the easement of party walls is presumed, unless there is a
title or exterior mark or proof to the contrary in the dividing walls of adjoining buildings up to the
common point of elevation. As the court held judgment appealed from that the wall which lies between
the properties of the applicant and the objectors was a party wall, and as the applicants appealed from
this ruling, it devolves upon us to decide whether it is in fact a party wall, as counsel for the
administrator of the estate of the deceased Alburo or for her heirs finally admitted that it was in
assenting to that decision, although he averred in his written objection that it was the exclusive property
of the objectors; or whether, on the contrary, this wall is a part of property marked No. 2 on the plan
Exhibit A, as the applicants claims.
Article 573 of the Civil Code also declares that it shall be understood that there are exterior signs which
conflict with the easement of party wall, when, among other circumstances, the entire wall is built on

one of the lots and not on the line dividing the two adjoining parcels; when the dividing wall, being
constructed of stone and cement, has stone projecting at intervals from the surface on one side only and
not on the other; and when it supports joists, beams, floors, and the roof timbers of one of the houses
but not of the adjoining building.
The record shows it to have been duly proven that the enclosing wall of Lot No. 2 of the plan Exhibit A,
belonging to the applicants, is much higher than the adjoining building of the objectors; that along the
top of the said wall there is a gutter which catches the rain water from the eaves of the roof of the
applicants’ building and carries it thence to Calle Juan Luna through an iron pipe fastened to the said
wall; that one-half of the top of the said wall is covered by the roof of the applicants’ building; that the
supports of the said wall project toward the side of the applicants’ land and that none of the buttresses
are on the side of the objectors’ lot; that the stones of the wall in dispute are bound or inset in the rear
enclosing wall of the applicants’ property in such wise that the two walls that inclose the lot form but a
single construction, the exterior signs of which show that the wall in question is not a party wall, but
that it forms a part of the applicant’s building and belongs to them.
Besides the signs just referred to, the evidence also shows that on the objectors’ land and flanking the
disputed wall there is another and lower wall which has no connection with the one in question.
Cayetano Arguelles, a master builder, who climbed to the top of the wall in question and examined it,
testified that the aforesaid drain caught the rain water from the eaves of the applicants’ roof, and that
from the outside the division or space between the applicants’ wall and the wall on the objectors’ land
could be seen; that the lower part of this latter wall had two arch like hollows; that according to the
testimony of the objector, Ireneo Mendoza, the latter wall was that of an old building that had belonged
to the said deceased and was destroyed by an earthquake; and that in the rear of the objectors’ land
were the ruins of a wall which had also flanked the wall in dispute, and these ruins, according to the said
witness Mendoza were what was left of the wall of a latrine formerly existing there.
These exterior signs contrary to the existence of a party-wall easement cannot be offset by the
circumstance that the dispute wall projects into Calle Juan Luna 74 centimeters farther than the
applicants’ building, and neither can the fact that the face of this projecting wall is on the same street
line as the objectors’ building, for the reason that, in view of the said signs contrary to the existence of
the easement of party wall, the projection of the wall does not prove that it was a party wall belonging
in common to the applicants and the objectors and that the latter shared in the ownership thereof.
The objectors have not proved that a part or one-half of the wall in litigation was erected on the land
that belonged to the deceased Lorenza Alburo. The fact that the owners of the objectors’ property may
have surreptitiously inserted some of the timbers or joists of their building in the wall belonging to the
applicants is not enough to convert this latter into a party wall, when there are so many exterior signs to
indicate the exclusive ownership of the wall and to conflict with the existence of the easement that the
objectors endeavor to establish. The wall in litigation is fully proven by the record to belong exclusively
to the applicants.
All of the applicants’ properties, including the wall in question, should therefore be registered.

For the foregoing reasons the judgment appealed from is affirmed, but the decree of registration of the
property designated as Lot No. 2 shall include the disputed wall as belonging exclusively to the
applicants, and that part of said wall is a party wall is hereby reversed.
GARGANTOS V. CA
FACTS: Francisco Sanz was the former owner of a parcel of land containing 888 square
meters, with the buildings and improvements thereon, situated in thepoblacion of Romblon.
He subdivided the lot into three and then sold each portion to different persons. One portion
was purchased by Guillermo Tengtio who subsequently sold it to Vicente Uy Veza. Another
portion, with the house of strong materials thereon, was sold in 1927 to Tan Yanon,
respondent herein. This house has on its northeastern side, doors and windows over-looking
the third portion, which, together with the camarin and small building thereon, after passing
through several hands, was finally acquired by Juan Gargantos, petitioner herein.
On April 23, 1955, Gargantos applied to the Municipal Mayor for a permit to demolish the
roofing of the old camarin. The permit having been granted, Gargantos tore down the roof
of the camarin. On May 11, 1955, Gargantos asked the Municipal Council of Romblon for
another permit, this time in order to construct a combined residential house and warehouse
on his lot. Tan Yanon opposed approval of this application.
Because both the provincial fiscal and district engineer of Romblon recommended granting
of the building permit to Gargantos, Tan Yanon filed against Gargantos an action to restrain
him from constructing a building that would prevent plaintiff from receiving light and
enjoying the view trough the window of his house, unless such building is erected at a
distance of not less than three meters from the boundary line between the lots of plaintiff
and defendant, and to enjoin the members of
The kernel of petitioner's argument is that respondent never acquired any easement either
by title or by prescription. Assuredly, there is no deed establishing an easement. Likewise,
neither petitioner nor his predecessors-in-interest have ever executed any deed whereby
they recognized the existence of the easement, nor has there been final judgment to that
effect. Invoking our decision in Cortes vs. Yu-Tibo (2 Phil., 24), petitioner maintains that
respondent has not acquired an easement by prescription because he has never formally
forbidden petitioner from performing any act which would be lawful without the easement,
hence the prescriptive period never started.
ISSUE/HELD: WON Yanon acquired easement by virtue of the deed of sale. AFFIRMATIVE it
should be noted, however, that while the law declares that the easement is to "continue"
the easement actually arises for the first time only upon alienation of either estate,
inasmuch as before that time there is no easement to speak of, there being but one owner
of both estates
It is obvious, however, that Article 538, O.C.C. (now Article 621, N.C.C.) and the doctrine in
the Yu-Tibo case are not applicable herein because the two estates, that now owned by
petitioner, and that owner by respondent, were formerly owned by just one person,
Francisco Sanz. It was Sanz who introduced improvements on both properties. On that
portion presently belonging to respondent, he constructed a house in such a way that the
northeastern side thereof extends to the wall of the camarin on the portion now belonging
to petitioner. On said northeastern side of the house, there are windows and doors which
serve as passages for light and view. These windows and doors were in existence when
respondent purchased the house and lot from Sanz. The deed sale did not provide that the
easement of light and view would not be established. This then is precisely the case covered
by Article 541, O.C.C (now Article 624, N.C.C) which provides that the existence of an
apparent sign of easement between two estates, established by the proprietor of both, shall
be considered, if one of them is alienated, as a title so that the easement will continue
actively and passively, unless at the time the ownership of the two estate is divided, the
contrary is stated in the deed of alienation of either of them, or the sign is made to
disappear before the instrument is executed. The existence of the doors and windows on the
northeastern side of the aforementioned house, is equivalent to a title, for the visible and
permanent sign of an easement is the title that characterizes its existence (Amor vs.
Florentino, 74 Phil., 403). It should be noted, however, that while the law declares that the
easement is to "continue" the easement actually arises for the first time only upon
alienation of either estate, inasmuch as before that time there is no easement to speak of,
there being but one owner of both estates (Articles 530, O.C.C., now Articles 613, N.C.C).
We find that respondent Tan Yanon's property has an easement of light and view against
petitioner's property. By reason of his easement petitioner cannot construct on his land any
building unless he erects it at a distance of not less than three meters from the boundary
line separating the two estates.
CORTES vs. YU-TIBO
This suit was brought to obtain an injunction, in accordance with the provisions of section 162 to 172 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, for the purpose of restraining the continuation of certain buildings
commenced by the defendant. The court below issued a preliminary injunction during the trial, but,
upon, rendering final judgment, dissolved the injunction, with the costs against the plaintiff. The latter
excepted to this judgment and assigns error:
Facts:
That house No. 65 Calle Rosario, this city, property of the wife of the plaintiff, has certain windows
therein, through which it receives light and air, said windows opening on the adjacent house, No. 63 of
the same street; (2) that these windows have been in the existence since the year 1843 and (3) that
the defendant, the tenant of the said house No. 63, has commenced certain work with the view to
raising the roof of the house in such a manner that one-half of the windows in said house No. 65 has
been covered, thus depriving the building of a large part of the air and light formerly received through
the window.
Held:
The court below in its decision held in the easement of light is negative, and this ruling has been
assigned by the plaintiff as error to be corrected by this court.
A building may receive light in various manners in the enjoyment of an easement of light, because the
openings through which the light penetrates may be made in one's own wall, in the wall of one's
neighbor, or in a party wall. The legal doctrine applicable in either one of these cases is different, owing
to the fact that, although anyone may open windows in his own wall, no one has a right to do so in the
wall of another without the consent of the owner, and it is also necessary, in accordance with article 580
of the Civil Code, to obtain the consent of the other coowner when the opening is to be made in a party
wall.

This suit deals with the first case; that is, windows opened in a wall belonging to the wife of the plaintiff,
and it is this phase of the easement which it is necessary to consider in this opinion.
When a person opens windows in his own building he does nothing more than exercise an act of
ownership inherent in the right of property, which, under article 348 of the Civil Code, empowers him to
deal with his property as he may see fit, with no limitations other than those established by law. By
reason of the fact that such an act is performed wholly on a thing which is wholly the property of the
one opening the window, it does not in itself establish any easement, because the property is used by its
owner in the exercise of dominion, and not as the exercise of an easement: "For a man," says law 13,
title 31, third partida, "should not use that which belongs to him as if it were a service only, but as his
own property." Coexistent with this right is the right of the owner of the adjacent property to cover up
such windows by building on his own land or raising a wall contiguously to the wall in which the windows
are opened (art. 581 of the same Code), by virtue of the reciprocity of rights which should exist between
abutting owners, and which would cease to exist if one could do what he pleased on his property and the
other could not do the same on his. Hence it is that the use of the windows opened in a wall of one's
own property, in the absence of some covenant or express agreement to the contrary, is regarded as an
act of mere tolerance on the part of the owner of the abutting property (judgments of the supreme court
of Spain of the 17th of May, 1876; 10th of May, 1884; 30th of May, 1890), and does not create any
right to maintain the windows to the prejudice of the latter (judgment of the supreme court of Spain of
the 13th of June, 1877). The mere toleration of such an act does not imply on the part of the abutting
owner a waiver of his right to freely build upon his land as high as he may see fit, nor does it avail the
owner of the windows for the effects of possession according to article 1942 of the Civil Code, because it
is a mere possession at will. From all this it follows that the easement of light with respect to the
openings made in one's own edifice does not consist precisely in the fact of opening them or using them,
inasmuch as they may be covered up at any time by the owner of the abutting property, and, as
Manresa says in his commentaries on the Civil Code, "there is no true easement as long as the right to
impede its use exists." The easement really consists of in prohibiting or restraining the adjacent owner
from doing anything which may tend to cut off or interrupt the light; in short, it is limited to the
obligation of not impeding the light (ne luminibus officiatur). The latter coincides in its effects, from this
point of view, with the obligation of refraining from increasing the height of a building (altius non
tollendi), which, although it constitutes a special easement, has for its object, at times, the prevention of
any interruption of the light enjoyed by the adjacent owner.
It will be readily observed that the owner of the servient estate subject to such easement is under no
obligation whatsoever to allow anything to be done on his tenement, nor to do anything there himself,
but is simply restrained from doing anything thereon which may tend to cut off the light from the
dominant estate, which he would undoubtedly be entitled to do were it not for the existence of the
easement. If, then, the first condition is that which is peculiar to positive easements, and the second
condition that which is peculiar to negative easements, according to the definition of article 533 of the
Civil Code, it is our opinion that the easement of lights in the case of windows opened in one's own wall
is of a negative character, and, as such, can not be acquired by prescription under article 538 of the
Civil Code, except by counting the time of possession from the date on which the owner of the dominant
estate may, by a formal act have prohibited the owner of the servient estate from doing something
which it would be lawful from him to do were it not for the easement.
As a result of the opinion above expressed, we hold:
1. That the easement of light which is the object of this litigation is of a negative character, and
therefore pertains to the class which can not be acquired by prescription as provided by article 538 of
the Civil Code, except by counting the time of possession from the date on which the owner of the
dominant estate has, in a formal manner, forbidden the owner of the servient estate to do an act which
would be lawful were it not for the easement.
2. That, in consequence thereof, the plaintiff, not having executed any formal act of opposition to the
right of the owner of the house No. 63 Calle Rosario (of which the defendant is tenant), to make therein
improvements which might obstruct the light of the house No. 65 of the same street, the property of the
wife of the appellant, at any time prior to the complaint, as found by the court below in the judgment

assigned as error, he has not acquired, nor could he acquire by prescription, such easement of light, no
matter how long a time have elapsed since the windows were opened in the wall of the said house No.
65, because the period which the law demands for such prescriptive acquisition could not have
commenced to run, the act with which it must necessarily commence not having been performed.
Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the court below and condemn the appellant to the payment of all
damages caused to the plaintiff/
Encarnacion v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 77628, March 11, 1991, 195 SCRA 74
Fernan, C.J.
FACTS: Petitioner owns the dominant estate bounded on north by the servient estate owned by
respondents and an estate owned by Magsino, all of which are located in Talisay, Batangas. The servient
estate is bound on the north by the national highway. To provide access to the highway, a one meter
road path was paved through in which half of its width was taken from the estate of Magsino and the
other half from the estate of the respondent. Petitioner started a nursery plant type of business in which
pushcarts were used to haul the plants from his estate to and from his nursery and the highway, using
the one meter road path. As his business grew, he bought a jeepney to enable him to transport more
plants and soil catering to the now bigger demand. The problem however was that the jeepney cannot
pass through the road path since its width would not be accommodated by a one meter width. Petitioner
made a request upon the respondent to sell to him 1 ½ meters of their property so that the pathway
may be widened to enable his jeepney to pass through. The respondents refused. Petitioner went to
court praying that he would be granted the additional land to the right of way already constituted but
the trial court rendered a decision adverse to the petitioner because there was no such necessity as it
was shown that there was the presence of dried river bed only 80 meters away from the property of the
petitioner which he may use as an alternative route. The CA affirmed said decision of the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to be granted his prayer to buy the additional land to
increase the existing one meter road path.
HELD: Yes. Even with the presence of the dried river bed, upon thorough investigation, it was found to
be an inadequate right of way because a concrete bridge traverses it thereby the jeep would have to
jump over said bridge which has a height of 5 meters in order to reach the highway. It was also found
that during the rainy season, the same was impassable as it became flooded. This right of way could not
provide adequate access to the highway thereby when an estate has no access to a public road, it may
demand for a right of way. Furthermore, under Article 651 of the Civil Code, it is the needs of the
dominant property which ultimately determine the width of the right of way. In this case, since the
business of the petitioner grew larger and pushcarts became tedious to transport his nursery plants, it
became necessary for him to do so with a jeepney. And in order to efficiently make such transportation
of his plants, the right of way had to be widened to accommodate the width of the jeepney of the
petitioner. The petitioner thus shall be granted the additional land to the existing right of way.
Solid Manila Corporation v. Bio Hong Trading Co., Inc.

G.R. No. 90596, April 8, 1991, 195 SCRA 748
Sarmiento, J.
FACTS: Petitioner Solid Manila Corporation is the owner of the land in Ermita, Manila. The same lies in
the vicinity of another parcel, registered in the name of the private respondent Bio Hong Trading Co.,
Inc. The private respondent’s title came from a prior owner, and in their deed of sale, the parties thereto
reserved as easement of way. As a consequence, there is an annotation which was entered wherein a
construction of private alley has been undertaken. However, the petitioner averred that they and their
neighbors have been using the private alley and maintained and contributed to its upkeep until
sometime in 1983. Due to this, the private respondent constructed steel gates that precluded
unhampered used. The petitioner commenced suit for injunction against the private respondent to have
the gates removed and to allow full access to the easement. The court a quo issued ex parte an order

directing the private respondent to open the gates. However, the Court of Appeals ordered the
restoration of the annotation. They ruled that an easement is a mere limitation on ownership and that it
does not impair the private respondent’s title, and that since the private respondent had acquired title to
the property, “merger” brought about an extinguishment of the easement. The petitioner then averred
that the very deed of sale executed between the private respondent and the previous owner of the
property “excluded” the alley in question, and that in any event, the intent of the parties was to retain
the “alley” as an easement, notwithstanding the sale.
ISSUE: Whether or not an easement had been extinguished by merger.
HELD: No. The Court held that no genuine merger took place as a consequence of the sale in favor of
the private respondent corporation. According to the Civil Code, a merger exists when ownership of the
dominant and servient estates is consolidated in the same person. Merger then, as can be seen, requires
full ownership of both estates. One thing ought to be noted here, however. The servitude in question is
a personal servitude, that is to say, one constituted not in favor of a particular tenement but rather, for
the benefit of the general public as stated in Article 614 of the Civil Code. In personal servitude, there is
therefore no “owner of a dominant tenement” to speak of, and the easement pertains to persons without
a dominant estate, in this case, the public at large. Merger, as we said, presupposes the existence of a
prior servient-dominant owner relationship, and the termination of that relation leaves the easement of
no use. Unless the owner conveys the property in favor of the public, if that is possible, no genuine
merger can take place that would terminate a personal easement.
REMIGIO O. RAMOS, SR. vs. GATCHALIAN REALTY, INC., ET AL.

G.R. No. 75905; October 12, 1987
FACTS: Plaintiff Ramos acquired from Science Rodriguez Lombos Subdivision a house and lot containing
an area of 901 square meters situated at Barrio San Dionisio, Parañaque, Metro Manila. In the
subdivision survey plan, two road lots abut plaintiff's property namely lot 4133-G-12 with an area of
2,160 square meters clearly appearing as a proposed road in the Lombos subdivision plan and Lot 4135
of the Parañaque Cadastre now known as Pambansa Road but more commonly referred to as Gatchalian
Avenue.
Respondents Asprec own Lot 4135. Gatchalian Avenue is alongside Lot 4135. Respondent Gatchalian
Realty was granted the road right of way and drainage along Lot 4135 to service the Gatchalian and
Asprec subdivision, by the respondent Asprecs. On April 30, 1981, Ramos filed a complaint for an
easement of a right of way with preliminary mandatory injunction against the private respondents,
alleging, among others the that he constructed his house at 27 Gatchalian Avenue (also known as
Pambansa Road), Paranaque, and has since resided therein with his family from 1977 up to the present;
that during construction of the house, Gatchalian Realty, Inc. built a 7-8, feet high concrete wall right
infront of his premises, blocking his entrance/exit to Gatchalian Road, the nearest being only about 100
meters, most convenient and adequate entrance/exit to the public road or highway, the Sucat Road
(now known as Dr. A. Santos Avenue, Parañaque); that with the construction of the 7-8 feet concrete
wall has constrained plaintiff and his family to use as temporary ingress/egress and with great
inconvenience and hardship other lots belonging to different owners, and this becomes all the more
pronounced during the rainy season due to flood and mud; and, lastly, that the aforesaid concrete wall
is dangerously leaning towards appellant's premises posing great danger or hazard.
The lower court dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
found that the plaintiff failed to establish the existence of the pre-conditions in order that he could
legally be entitled to an easement of a right of way as it affirmed the lower court's order.
ISSUE: Whether or not the plaintiff has successfully shown that all the requisites necessary for the grant
of an easement of a right of way in his favor are present.
HELD: The Court finds the petition not to be impressed with merit. An easement or servitude in an
encumbrance imposed upon an immovable for the benefit of another immovable belonging to a different
owner as defined in Article 613 of the Civil Code. It is established either by law, in which case it is called
legal or by the will of the parties, in which event it is a voluntary easement. Since there is no agreement

between the contending parties in this case granting a right of way by one in favor of the other, the
establishment of a voluntary easement between the plaintiff and the respondent company and/or the
other private respondents is ruled out. What is left to examine is whether or not the plaintiff is entitled
to a legal or compulsory easement of a right of way.
A compulsory right of way can not be obtained unless the following four requisites are first shown to
exist:
(1) That it is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway (Art. 649,
par. 1);
(2) After payment of proper indemnity (Art. 649, p. 1. end);
(3) That the isolation was not due to the Central's own acts (Art. 649, last par.); and
(4) That the right of way claimed is "at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and insofar as
consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the
shortest." (Art. 650).
On the first requisite, the Court finds no reason to disturb the appellate court's finding of fact that the
plaintiff failed to prove the non-existence of an adequate outlet to the Sucat Road except through the
Gatchalian Avenue. As borne out by the records of the case, there is a road right of way provided by the
Sabrina Rodriguez Lombos Subdivision indicated as Lot 4133-G-12 in its subdivision plan for the buyers
of its lots. The fact that said lot is still undeveloped and causes inconvenience to the plaintiff when he
uses it to reach the public highway does not bring him within the ambit of the legal requisite. The Court
agree with the appellate court's observation that the plaintiff should have, first and foremost, demanded
from the Sabrina Rodriguez Lombos Subdivision the improvement and maintenance of Lot 4133-G-12 as
his road right of way because it was from said subdivision that he acquired his lot and not either from
the Gatchalian Realty or the respondents Asprec. To allow the plaintiff access to Sucat Road through
Gatchalian Avenue in spite of a road right of way provided by the plaintiff's subdivision for its buyers
simply because Gatchalian Avenue allows plaintiff a much greater ease in going to and coming from the
main thoroughfare is to completely ignore what jurisprudence has consistently maintained through the
years regarding an easement of a right of way, that "mere convenience for the dominant estate is not
enough to serve as its basis. To justify the imposition of this servitude, there must be a real, not a
fictitious or artificial, necessity for it."
Considering that the plaintiff has failed to prove the existence of the first requisite as aforestated, the
Court finds it unnecessary to discuss the rest of the preconditions for a legal or compulsory right of way.
Quimen v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 112331 May 29, 1996, 257 SCRA 163
Bellosillo, J.
FACTS: Petitioner Anastacia Quimen together with her brothers Sotero, Sulpicio, Antonio and sister
Rufina inherited a piece of property situated in Pandi, Bulacan. They agreed to subdivide the property
equally among themselves, as they did, with the shares of Anastacia, Sotero, Sulpicio and Rufina
abutting the municipal road. Located directly behind the lots of Anastacia and Sotero is the share of their
brother Antonio designated as Lot No. 1448-B-C which the latter divided into two (2) equal parts, now
Lots Nos. 1448-B-6-A and 1448-B-6-B. The latter Lot is behind the property of Sotero, father of private
respondent Yolanda Oliveros. Yolanda purchased Lot No. 1448-B-6-A from her uncle Antonio through her
aunt Anastacia who was then acting as his administratrix. According to Yolanda, when petitioner offered
her the property for sale she was hesitant to buy as it had no access to a public road. But Anastacia
prevailed upon her to buy the lot with the assurance that she would give her a right of way on her
adjoining property. Thereafter, Yolanda constructed a house on the lot she bought using as her
passageway to the public highway a portion of Anastacia's property. But when Yolanda finally offered to
pay for the use of the pathway Anastacia refused to accept the payment. In fact she was thereafter
barred by Anastacia from passing through her property. Later, Yolanda purchased the other lot of
Antonio Quimen, Lot No. 1448-B-6-B, located directly behind the property of her parents who provided
her a pathway between their house from the lot of Yolanda behind the sari sari store of Sotero, and
Anastacia's perimeter fence. The store is made of strong materials and occupies the entire frontage of

the lot measuring four (4) meters wide and nine meters (9) long. Although the pathway leads to the
municipal road it is not adequate for ingress and egress. The municipal road cannot be reached with
facility because the store itself obstructs the path so that one has to pass through the back entrance and
the facade of the store to reach the road. Finally, Yolanda filed an action with the proper court praying
for a right of way through Anastacia's property. The report was that the proposed right of way was at
the extreme right of Anastacia's property facing the public highway, starting from the back of Sotero's
sari-sari store and extending inward by one (1) meter to her property and turning left for about five (5)
meters to avoid the store. However, the trial court dismissed her complaint. The Court of Appeals
reversed the decision declaring that she was entitled to a right of way on petitioner’s property and that
the way proposed by Yoland would cause the least damage and detriment to the servient estate.
ISSUE: Whether or not passing through the property of Yolanda's parents is more accessible to the
public road than to make a detour to her property and cut down the avocado tree standing thereon.
HELD: Yes. The conditions sine quo non for a valid grant of an easement of right of way are: (a) the
dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables without an adequate outlet to a public highway; (b)
the dominant estate is willing to pay the proper indemnity; (c) the isolation was not due to the acts of
the dominant estate; and, (d) the right of way being claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the
servient estate.
The criterion of least prejudice to the servient estate must prevail over the criterion of shortest distance
although this is a matter of judicial appreciation. While shortest distance may ordinarily imply least
prejudice, it is not always so as when there are permanent structures obstructing the shortest distance;
while on the other hand, the longest distance may be free of obstructions and the easiest or most
convenient to pass through. In other words, where the easement may be established on any of several
tenements surrounding the dominant estate, the one where the way is shortest and will cause the least
damage should be chosen. However, as elsewhere stated, if these two (2) circumstances do not concur
in a single tenement, the way which will cause the least damage should be used, even if it will not be
the shortest.
As between a right of way that would demolish a store of strong materials to provide egress to a public
highway, and another right of way which although longer will only require an avocado tree to be cut
down, the second alternative should be preferred.
Alcantara v. Reta, Jr.

G.R. No. 136996, December 14, 2001, 372 SCRA 364
Pardo, J.
FACTS: Alcantara and the other petitioners claim that they were tenants or lessees of the land owned
by Reta. The land has been converted into a commercial center and Reta is threatening to eject them.
They claim that since they are legitimate tenants or lessees of such land, they have the right of first
refusal to purchase the land in accordance with Section 3(g) of Presidential Decree No. 1517, the Urban
Land Reform Act. They also claimed that the amicable settlement executed between Reta and Ricardo
Roble, one of the petitioners, was void ab initio for being violative of PD No. 1517. On the other hand,
Reta claimed that the land is question is not within the scope of PD No. 1517 since it was not proclaimed
as an Urban Land Reform Zone (ULRZ). Alcantara, among others, then filed complaint for the exercise
of the right of first refusal under PD No. 1517 in the Regional Trial Court. However, such complaint was
dismissed and such dismissal was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Hence, this petition was filed.
ISSUE: Whether the Alcantara and the other petitioners have the right of first refusal.
HELD: No. The land involved has not been proclaimed an Urban Land Reform Zone (ULRZ). In fact,
petitioners filed a petition with the National Housing Authority requesting that said land be declared as
an ULRZ. Clearly, the request to have the land proclaimed as an ULRZ would not be necessary if the
property was an ULRZ. PD No. 1517 pertains to areas proclaimed as ULRZ. Consequently, petitioners
cannot claim any right under the said law since the land involved is not an ULRZ.

To be able to qualify and avail of the rights and privileges granted by the said decree, one must be: (1)
a legitimate tenant of the land for ten (10) years or more; (2) must have built his home on the land by
contract; and, (3) has resided continuously for the last ten (10) years. Those who do not fall within the
said category cannot be considered "legitimate tenants" and, therefore, not entitled to the right of first
refusal to purchase the property should the owner of the land decide to sell the same at a reasonable
price within a reasonable time.
Reta denies that he has lease agreements with Alcantara and Roble. Alcantara, on the other hand,
failed to present evidence of a lease agreement other than his testimony in court. Reta allowed Roble to
use sixty-two (62) coconut trees for P186 from where he gathered tuba. This arrangement would show
that it is a usufruct and not a lease. Roble was also allowed to construct his house on the land because
it would facilitate his gathering of tuba. This would be in the nature of a personal easement under
Article 614 of the Civil Code. Whether the amicable settlement is valid or not, the conclusion would still
be the same since the agreement was one of usufruct and not of lease. Thus, Roble is not a legitimate
tenant as defined by PD No. 1517.
With regard to the other petitioners, Reta admitted that he had verbal agreements with them. This
notwithstanding, they are still not the legitimate tenants who can exercise the right of first refusal under
PD No. 1517. From the moment Reta demanded that the petitioners vacate the premises, the verbal
lease agreements, which were on a monthly basis since rentals were paid monthly, ceased to exist as
there was termination of the lease.
In conclusion, none of the petitioners is qualified to exercise the right of first refusal under PD No. 1517.
There was also no intention on the part of Reta to sell the property. Hence, even if the petitioners had
the right of first refusal, the situation which would allow the exercise of that right, that is, the sale or
intended sale of the land has not happened. PD No. 1517 applies where the owner of the property
intends to sell it to a third party.
Villanueva v. Velasco
G.R. No. 130845, November 27, 2000, 346 SCRA 99
Quisumbing, J.
FACTS: Petitioner Bryan Villanueva is the registered owner of the parcel of land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 127862 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. He bought it from Pacific Banking
Corporation, the mortgagee of said property. When petitioner bought the parcel of land there was a
small house on its southeastern portion. It occupied one meter of the two-meter wide easement of right
of way the Gabriel spouses granted to the Espinolas, predecessors-in-interest of private respondents, in
a Contract of Easement of Right of Way. Unknown to petitioner, even before he bought the land, the
Gabriels had constructed the aforementioned small house that encroached upon the two-meter
easement. Petitioner was also unaware that private respondents, Julio Sebastian and Shirley Lorilla, had
filed on May 8, 1991 for easement. As successors-in-interest, Sebastian and Lorilla wanted to enforce
the contract of easement. On August 13, 1991, a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction was issued,
ordering the Gabriels to provide the right of way and to demolish the small house encroaching on the
easement. On January 5, 1995, Judge Tirso Velasco issued an Alias Writ of Demolition. Meanwhile,
petitioner filed a Third Party Claim with Prayer to Quash Alias Writ of Demolition. He maintains that the
writ of demolition could not apply to his property since he was not a party to the civil case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the easement on the property binds petitioner.
HELD: Yes. Unlike other types of encumbrance of real property, a servitude like a right of way can exist
even if they are not expressly stated or annotated as an encumbrance in a Torrens title because
servitudes are inseparable from the estates to which they actively or passively belong. Moreover,
Villanueva was bound by the contract of easement, not only as a voluntary easement but as a legal
easement. A legal easement is mandated by law, and continues to exist unless its removal is provided

for in a title of conveyance or the sign of the easement is removed before the execution of the
conveyance conformably with Article 649 in accordance with Article 617 of the Civil Code.
HIDALGO ENTERPRISES, INC. vs. GUILLERMO BALANDAN, ET AL.

G.R. No. L-3422; June 13, 1952
FACTS: Petitioner Hidalgo Enterprises, Inc. was the owner of an ice-plant factory in the City of San
Pablo, Laguna, in whose premises were installed two tanks full of water, nine feet deep, for cooling
purposes of its engine. While the factory compound was surrounded with fence, the tanks themselves
were not provided with any kind of fence or top covers. The edges of the tanks were barely a foot high
from the surface of the ground. Through the wide gate entrance, which is continually open, motor
vehicles hauling ice and persons buying said commodity passed, and any one could easily enter the said
factory, as he pleased. There was no guard assigned on the gate.
At about noon of April 16, 1948, plaintiff's son, Mario Balandan, a boy barely 8 years old, while playing
with and in company of other boys of his age entered the factory premises through the gate, to take a
bath in one of said tanks; and while thus bathing, Mario sank to the bottom of the tank, only to be
fished out later, already a cadaver, having been died of "asphyxia secondary to drowning."
The Court of Appeals, and the Court of First Instance of Laguna, took the view that the petitioner
maintained an attractive nuisance (the tanks), and neglected to adopt the necessary precautions to
avoid accidents to persons entering its premises. It applied the doctrine of attractive nuisance, stated as
follows: One who maintains on his premises dangerous instrumentalities or appliances of a character
likely to attract children in play, and who fails to exercise ordinary care to prevent children from playing
therewith or resorting thereto, is liable to a child of tender years who is injured thereby, even if the child
is technically a trespasser in the premises.
The principal reason for the doctrine is that the condition or appliance in question although its danger is
apparent to those of age, is so enticing or alluring to children of tender years as to induce them to
approach, get on or use it, and this attractiveness is an implied invitation to such children.
ISSUE: Is a swimming pool or water tank an instrumentality or appliance likely to attract the little
children in play and considered as an attractive nuisance?
HELD: The Supreme Court held in the negative, basing its decision from the great majority of American
decisions where such doctrine originated. The attractive nuisance doctrine generally is not applicable to
bodies of water, artificial as well as natural, in the absence of some unusual condition or artificial feature
other than the mere water and its location. Further, the Court cited the explanation of the Indiana
Appellate Court which holds that: Nature has created streams, lakes and pools which attract children.
Lurking in their waters is always the danger of drowning. Against this danger children are early
instructed so that they are sufficiently presumed to know the danger; and if the owner of private
property creates an artificial pool on his own property, merely duplicating the work of nature without
adding any new danger, he is not liable because of having created an "attractive nuisance.”
As petitioner's tanks are not classified as attractive nuisance, the question whether the petitioner had
taken reasonable precautions becomes immaterial. And the other issue submitted by petitioner — that
the parents of the boy were guilty of contributory negligence precluding recovery, because they left for
Manila on that unlucky day leaving their son under the care of no responsible individual — needs no
further discussion.
ESTATE OF GREGORIA FRANCISCO v. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 95279, 25 July 1991,
199 SCRA 595
Melencio-Herrera, J.
FACTS: Basilan Municipal Mayor Benjamin Valencia summarily ordered the demolition of an antiquated
and dilapidated quonset warehouse situated in Port Area, Strong Boulevard, Isabela, Basilan, outside the
zone for warehouses. The legal possessor of the quonset sought the prohibition of the Order but was

denied by the RTC. The CA originally overturned the RTC but subsequently reversed itself. In question in
this case is the validity of such order by the Municipal Mayor, which was in effect an abatement of
nuisance, without prior judicial authority.
ISSUE: Whether or not Respondent Mayor could summarily and extra-judicially order the demolition of
petitioner's quonset building.
HELD: NO
Ordinance No. 147 relied upon by Respondents should not be interpreted as authorizing the summary
removal of a non-conforming building by the municipal government. For if it does, it must be struck
down for being in contravention of the requirements of due process, as originally held by the
Court of Appeals.
Moreover, the enforcement and administration of the provisions of the Ordinance resides with the
Zoning Administrator. It is said official who may call upon the City Fiscal to institute the necessary legal
proceedings to enforce the provisions of the Ordinance. And any person aggrieved by the decision of the
Zoning Administrator regarding the enforcement of the Ordinance may appeal to the Board of Zoning
Appeals.
Violation of a municipal ordinance neither empowers the Municipal Mayor to avail of extra-judicial
remedies. On the contrary, the Local Government Code imposes upon him the duty "to cause to be
instituted judicial proceedings in connection with the violation of ordinances" (Local Government Code,
Sec. 141 [2] [t]).
Respondents cannot seek cover under the general welfare clause authorizing the abatement
of nuisances without judicial proceedings, which applies only to a nuisance per se or one which
affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may be summarily abated under the
undefined law of necessity (Monteverde v. Generoso, 52 Phil. 123 [1982]). The storage of copra in the
quonset building is a legitimate business. By its nature, it cannot be said to be injurious to rights of
property, of health or of comfort of the community. If it be a nuisance per accidens it may be so proven
in a hearing conducted for that purpose. It is not per se a nuisance warranting its summary abatement
without judicial intervention.
The provincial governor, district engineer or district health officer is not authorized to destroy private
property consisting of dams and fishponds summarily and without any judicial proceedings whatever
under the pretense that such private property constitutes a nuisance. A dam or a fishery constructed in
navigable rivers is not a nuisance per se. A dam or fishpond may be a nuisance per accidens where it
endangers or impairs the health or depreciates property by causing water to become stagnant.
(Monteverde v. Generoso, supra).
While the Sangguniang Bayan may provide for the abatement of a nuisance (Local Government Code,
Sec. 149 [ee]), it can not declare a particular thing as a nuisance per se and order its condemnation.
The nuisance can only be so adjudged by judicial determination.
[Municipal councils] do not have the power to find as a fact that a particular thing is a
nuisance when such thing is not a nuisance per se nor can they authorize the extra
judicial condemnation and destruction of that as a nuisance which, in its nature,
situation or use is not such. These things must be determined in the ordinary courts of
law. In the present case, . . . the ice factory of the plaintiff is not a nuisance per se. It is
a legitimate industry . . . . If it be in fact a nuisance due to the manner of its operation,
that question cannot be determined by a mere resolution of the board. The petitioner is
entitled to a fair and impartial heating before a judicial tribunal. (Iloilo Cold Storage v.
Municipal Council, 24 Phil. 47 [1913]).
Petitioner was in lawful possession of the lot and quonset building by virtue of a permit from the
Philippine Ports Authority (Port of Zamboanga) when demolition was effected. It was not squatting on
public land. Its property was not of trifling value. It was entitled to an impartial hearing before a tribunal
authorized to decide whether the quonset building did constitute a nuisance in law. There was no

compelling necessity for precipitate action. It follows then that respondent public officials of the
Municipality of Isabela, Basilan, transcended their authority in abating summarily petitioner's quonset
building. They had deprived petitioner of its property without due process of law. The fact that petitioner
filed a suit for prohibition and was subsequently heard thereon will not cure the defect, as opined by the
Court of Appeals, the demolition having been a fait accompli prior to hearing and the authority to
demolish without a judicial order being a prejudicial issue.
NOTES:
“Nuisances are of two classes: Nuisances per se and per accidens. As to the first, since they
affect the immediate safety of persons and property, they may be summarily abated under the
undefined law of necessity. But if the nuisance be of the second class, even the municipal authorities,
under their power to declare and abate nuisances, would not have the right to compel the abatement of
a particular thing or act as a nuisance without reasonable notice to the person alleged to be maintaining
or doing the same of the time and place of hearing before a tribunal authorized to decide whether such a
thing or act does in law constitute a nuisance.” (Monteverde v. Generoso, 52 Phil. 123 (1982), citing
Iloilo Ice and Cold Storage Co. vs. Municipal Council of Iloilo [{1913}, 24 Phil., 471])
“Petitioner's business could not be considered a nuisance which respondent municipality could
summarily abate in the guise of exercising its police powers. The abatement of a nuisance without
judicial proceedings is possible only if it is a nuisance per se. A gas station is not a nuisance per se or
one affecting the immediate safety of persons and property,17 hence, it cannot be closed down or
transferred summarily to another location.” (PARAYNO v. JOVELLANOS, G.R. No. 148408, 14 July 2006
citing Monteverde v. Generoso, 52 Phil. 123 (1982)
Parayno vs Jovellanos
G.R. No. 148408
Facts:
Petitioner was the owner of a gasoline filling station in Calasiao, Pangasinan. In 1989, some residents of
Calasiao petitioned the Sangguniang Bayan (SB) of said municipality for the closure or transfer of the
station to another location. The matter was referred to the Municipal Engineer, Chief of Police, Municipal
Health Officer and the Bureau of Fire Protection for investigation. Upon their advise, the Sangguniang
Bayan recommended to the Mayor the closure or transfer of location of petitioner’s gasoline station. In
Resolution No. 50, it declared that the existing gasoline station is a blatant violation and disregard of
existing law.
According to the Resolution, 1) the gasoline filling station is in violation of The Official Zoning Code of
Calasiao, Art. 6, Section 44, the nearest school building which is San Miguel Elementary School and
church, the distances are less than 100 meters. (No neighbors were called as witnesses when actual
measurements were done by HLURB Staff, Baguio City dated 22 June 1989); 2) it remains in thickly
populated area with commercial/residential buildings, houses closed (sic) to each other which still
endangers the lives and safety of the people in case of fire; 3) residents of our barangay always
complain of the irritating smell of gasoline most of the time especially during gas filling which tend to
expose residents to illness, and 4) It hampers the flow of traffic.
Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the resolution but was denied by the SB. Hence she filed a

case before the RTC claiming that the gasoline filling station was not covered under Sec 44 of the
mentioned law but is under Sec 21. Case was denied by the court and by the CA. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the closure/transfer of her gasoline filling station by respondent municipality
was an invalid exercise of the latter’s police powers
HELD:
The respondent is barred from denying their previous claim that the gasoline filling station is not under
Sec 44. The Counsel in fact admitted that : “That the business of the petitioner [was] one of a gasoline
filling station as defined in Article III, Section 21 of the zoning code and not as a service station as
differently defined under Article 42 of the said official zoning code;”
The foregoing were judicial admissions which were conclusive on the municipality, the party making
them. hence, because of the distinct and definite meanings alluded to the two terms by the zoning
ordinance, respondents could not insist that “gasoline service station” under Section 44 necessarily
included “gasoline filling station” under Section 21. Indeed, the activities undertaken in a “gas service
station” did not automatically embrace those in a “gas filling station.”
As for the main issue, the court held that the respondent municipality invalidly used its police powers in
ordering the closure/transfer of petitioner’s gasoline station. While it had, under RA 7160, the power to
take actions and enact measures to promote the health and general welfare of its constituents, it should
have given due deference to the law and the rights of petitioner.
A local government is considered to have properly exercised its police powers only when the following
requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular
class, require the interference of the State and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for
the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive. The first
requirement refers to the equal protection clause and the second, to the due process clause of the
Constitution.
Respondent municipality failed to comply with the due process clause when it passed Resolution No. 50.
While it maintained that the gasoline filling station of petitioner was less than 100 meters from the
nearest public school and church, the records do not show that it even attempted to measure the
distance, notwithstanding that such distance was crucial in determining whether there was an actual
violation of Section 44. The different local offices that respondent municipality tapped to conduct an
investigation never conducted such measurement either.
Moreover, petitioner’s business could not be considered a nuisance which respondent municipality could
summarily abate in the guise of exercising its police powers. The abatement of a nuisance without
judicial proceedings is possible only if it is a nuisance per se. A gas station is not a nuisance per se or
one affecting the immediate safety of persons and property, hence, it cannot be closed down or
transferred summarily to another location.

On the alleged hazardous effects of the gasoline station to the lives and properties of the people of
Calasiao, we again note: “Hence, the Board is inclined to believe that the project being hazardous to life
and property is more perceived than factual. For, after all, even the Fire Station Commander..
recommended “to build such buildings after conform (sic) all the requirements of PP 1185.” It is further
alleged by the complainants that the proposed location is “in the heart of the thickly populated
residential area of Calasiao.” Again, findings of the [HLURB] staff negate the allegations as the same is
within a designated Business/Commercial Zone per the Zoning Ordinance.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed resolution of the Court of the Appeals is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Municipality of Calasiao is hereby directed to cease and desist
from enforcing Resolution No. 50 against petitioner insofar as it seeks to close down or transfer her
gasoline station to another location.
LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL, INC., petitioner, vs.

JAC LINER, INC., respondent
G.R. No. 148339. February 23, 2005
Respondent JAC Liner, Inc., a common carrier operating buses which ply various routes to and from
Lucena City, assailed City Ordinance Nos. 1631 and 1778 as unconstitutional on the ground that these
constituted an invalid exercise of police power, an undue taking of private property, and a violation of
the constitutional prohibition against monopolies.
Ordinance No. 1631

AN ORDINANCE GRANTING THE LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL, INC., A
FRANCHISE TO CONSTRUCT, FINANCE, ESTABLISH, OPERATE AND MAINTAIN A
COMMON BUS-JEEPNEY TERMINAL FACILITY IN THE CITY OF LUCENA
Ordinance No. 1778

AN ORDINANCE REGULATING THE ENTRANCE TO THE CITY OF LUCENA OF ALL BUSES,
MINI-BUSES AND OUT-OF-TOWN PASSENGER JEEPNEYS AND FOR THIS PURPOSE,
AMENDING ORDINACE NO. 1420, SERIES OF 1993, AND ORDINANCE NO. 1557, SERIES
OF 1995
The above-mentioned ordinances, by granting an exclusive franchise for twenty five years, renewable
for another twenty five years, to Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc., its successors or assigns, for the
construction and operation of one common bus and jeepney terminal facility in Lucena City, to be
located outside the city proper, were professedly aimed towards alleviating the traffic congestion alleged
to have been caused by the existence of various bus and jeepney terminals within the city.
Further, the subject ordinances prohibit the operation of all bus and jeepney terminals within Lucena,
including those already existing, and allow the operation of only one common terminal located outside
the city proper, the franchise for which was granted to petitioner. The common carriers plying routes to
and from Lucena City are thus compelled to close down their existing terminals and use the facilities of
petitioner.
Respondent, who had maintained a terminal within the city, was one of those affected by the
ordinances.

The petitioner via petition for review, sought the wisdom of Supreme Court, assailing the Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Issue:
Whether the City of Lucena properly exercised its police power when it enacted City Ordinance Nos.
1631 and 1778
Ruling:
.
As with the State, the local government may be considered as having properly exercised its police power
only if the following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from
those of a particular class, require the interference of the State, and (2) the means employed are
reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals. Otherwise stated, there must be a concurrence of a lawful subject and
lawful method.
The questioned ordinances having been enacted with the objective of relieving traffic congestion in the
City of Lucena, involve public interest warranting the interference of the State. The first requisite for the
proper exercise of police power is thus present
But the ordinances go beyond what is reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem. Additionally,
since the compulsory use of the terminal operated by petitioner would subject the users thereof to fees,
rentals and charges, such measure is unduly oppressive, as correctly found by the appellate court.
Bus terminals per se do not, however, impede or help impede the flow of traffic. How the outright
proscription against the existence of all terminals, apart from that franchised to petitioner, can be
considered as reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem, this Court has not been enlightened.
The true role of Constitutional Law is to effect an equilibrium between authority and liberty so that rights
are exercised within the framework of the law and the laws are enacted with due deference to rights.
As for petitioner’s claim that the challenged ordinances have actually been proven effective in easing
traffic congestion: Whether an ordinance is effective is an issue different from whether it is reasonably
necessary. It is its reasonableness, not its effectiveness, which bears upon its constitutionality. If the
constitutionality of a law were measured by its effectiveness, then even tyrannical laws may be justified
whenever they happen to be effective.
Hence, Ordinance No. 1631 is valid, having been issued in the exercise of the police power of the City
Government of Lucena insofar as the grant of franchise to the Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc., to
construct, finance, establish, operate and maintain common bus-jeepney terminal facility in the City of
Lucena.
Sec. 4(c) of Ordinance No. 1631 is illegal and ultra vires because it contravenes the provisions of
Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as “The Local Government Code”.
City Ordinance No. 1778 is null and void, the same being also an ultra vires act of the City Government
of Lucena arising from an invalid, oppressive and unreasonable exercise of the police power.

Property Case Digests On Usufruct, Easement, and Nuisance

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Property Case Digests On Usufruct, Easement, and Nuisance

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Property Case Digests on Usufruct, Easement,

EDCA Publishing & Distributing Corp. v. Santos,

Property Case Digests by KC Canada LLB-2 USC LAW 1

Ramirez vs. Vda. De Ramirez

The usufruct of Wanda.

The 1935 Constitution which is controlling provides as follows:

SEC. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be

Property Case Digests by KC Canada LLB-2 USC LAW 2

Moralidad vs. Sps. Pernes

Property Case Digests by KC Canada LLB-2 USC LAW 3

The CA disposed of this issue in this wise:

xxx xxx xxx

ART. 603. Usufruct is extinguished:

(3) By merger of the usufruct and ownership in the same person;

(4) By renunciation of the usufructuary;

Property Case Digests by KC Canada LLB-2 USC LAW 4

(7) By prescription. (Emphasis supplied.)

Property Case Digests by KC Canada LLB-2 USC LAW 5

Jabonete vs. Monteverde

North Negros Sugar Co. vs. Hidalgo

Property Case Digests by KC Canada LLB-2 USC LAW 6

Property Case Digests by KC Canada LLB-2 USC LAW 7

Property Case Digests by KC Canada LLB-2 USC LAW 8

ISSUE: Whether or not an easement of right of way can be acquired by prescription.

REYES, J.B.L., J., concurring:

Property Case Digests by KC Canada LLB-2 USC LAW 9

Property Case Digests by KC Canada LLB-2 USC LAW 10

Valderama vs. North Negros Sugar Central

Property Case Digests by KC Canada LLB-2 USC LAW 11

Goldcrest Realty vs. Cypress Gardens Condominium Corp.

condominium project and incorporated respondent Cypress Gardens Condominium Corporation

management and administration of the Condominium until 1995.

Property Case Digests by KC Canada LLB-2 USC LAW 12

Deed, which reads:

specifically identified by Section 4(c) of the Master Deed.

Property Case Digests by KC Canada LLB-2 USC LAW 13

not impair the subject easement.

already beyond the contemplation of the easement granted to Goldcrest.

22 of Presidential Decree No. 957.

and violated Section 4of the condominium’s Declaration of Restrictions.

Property Case Digests by KC Canada LLB-2 USC LAW 14

National Power Corp. vs. Suarez

Property Case Digests by KC Canada LLB-2 USC LAW 15

Lao vs. Alburo

Property Case Digests by KC Canada LLB-2 USC LAW 16

Property Case Digests by KC Canada LLB-2 USC LAW 17

CORTES vs. YU-TIBO

Property Case Digests by KC Canada LLB-2 USC LAW 19

As a result of the opinion above expressed, we hold:

Property Case Digests by KC Canada LLB-2 USC LAW 20

Encarnacion v. Court of Appeals

Solid Manila Corporation v. Bio Hong Trading Co., Inc.

Property Case Digests by KC Canada LLB-2 USC LAW 21

ISSUE: Whether or not an easement had been extinguished by merger.

REMIGIO O. RAMOS, SR. vs. GATCHALIAN REALTY, INC., ET AL.

Property Case Digests by KC Canada LLB-2 USC LAW 22

Quimen v. Court of Appeals

Property Case Digests by KC Canada LLB-2 USC LAW 23

Alcantara v. Reta, Jr.

Property Case Digests by KC Canada LLB-2 USC LAW 24

ISSUE: Whether or not the easement on the property binds petitioner.

Property Case Digests by KC Canada LLB-2 USC LAW 25

HIDALGO ENTERPRISES, INC. vs. GUILLERMO BALANDAN, ET AL.