Advanced Legal Writing

Arellano University School of Law
Pasay City
JUDICIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE FORMS
Advanced Legal Writing Class
Mondays 4:30 – 7:30 PM
Atty. Porfirio DG Panganiban, Jr.
Professor
Submitted by:
Angelica Castillo
Earl Goico
Filadrian Canlas
Jayson Sari
Justiniano G. Quiza, Jr.
Victor Cayco
JUDICIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE FORMS
CRIMINAL CASES
For Violation of BP 22
For Estafa
For Concubinage
For Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Damage to Property
For Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Serious Physical Injuries
Complaint Affidavit
Counter Affidavit
Reply
Rejoinder
Sub-Rejoinder
Motion for Clarificatory Questions
Resolution
Information
 Affidavit of Desistance
Mis-accounting
Mistakes Identity
Misapprehension of Facts
 Motion For the Allowance to Post Bail

 Motion For the Reduction of Bail
 Motion to Release Accused on Recognizance
 Motion to Quash Criminal Information
 Motion for Determination of Probable Cause and Hold in Abeyance
Arraignment of the Accused
 Motion For Reconsideration (Prosecutor’s Resolution)

 Appeal to the Office of the President (DOJ Resolution)
 Motion for the Issuance of an Alias Warrant of Arrest
 Motion for the Issuance of a Hold Departure Order
 Motion for Leave of Court with Motion for Demurrer to Evidence
TRIAL BRIEF
Pre Trial Brief
Offer of Evidence
Proffer of Evidence
CIVIL CASES
 For Specific Performance With Damages

 For Annulment of Marriage
 For Legal Separation
 For Rescission of Contract with Damages
 For Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
Complaint
 Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer and/or Responsive Pleading

 Motion for Bill of Particulars
 Motion for Judgment on the Pleading
Answer
 Answer with Affirmative Defenses

 Answer with Counterclaim and Crossclaim
 Answer with Specific Denial of Document Under oath
 Answer with Specific and Affirmative Defense and Counterclaim
 Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim
Reply
TRIAL BRIEF
Pre Trial Brief
Arbitration – Compromise Agreement
Position Paper
Motion for Written Interrogatories
Motion for Deposition of Witness

Question and Answer for Principal Deponent
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS AND PROVISIONAL REMEDIES
1. Complaint for Interpleader

2. Petition for Prohibition
3. Petition for Quo Warranto
4. Petition for Quieting of Title
5. Petition for Declatory Relief
6. Petition for Madamus
7. Complaint for Ejectment
8. Complaint for Unlawful Detention
9. Complaint for Expropriation
10. Complain for Foreclosure of Mortgage
11. Complaint with Preliminary Attachment
12. Complaint with Preliminary Injunction
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
Jurisdictional Requirements
1. Petition for Habeas Corpus

2. Petition for Guardianship
3. Petition for Probate of a Notarial Will
4. Petition for Adoption
5. Petition for Change of Name
6. Petition for Correction of Entry
ADMINISTRATIVE CASES
LABOR PROCEEDINGS
NLRC Rules and Procedures
1. Complaint
2. Answer
3. Position Paper
4. Reply Position Paper
5. Rejoinder
6. Sur Rejoinder
7. Memorandum for the Complainant
8. Memorandum for the Defendant / Respondent
9. Memorandum of Appeal
10. Motion for Execution with a Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Execution
PROFESSIONAL REGULATORY COMMISSIONN PROCEEDINGS
PRC Rules of Procedure
1. Complaint
2. Answer
3. Reply
4. Position Paper
5. Pre Trial Brief
HOUSING LAND USE REGULATORY BOARD PROCEEDINGS
HLURB Rules of Procedure
1. Complaint
2. Answer
3. Reply
4. Position Paper
5. Memorandum
6. Notice of Appeal (Office of the President)
7. Appeal Memorandum
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES )
CITY OF MANILA )S.S.
COMPLAINT AFFIDAVIT
I, KRISTEN REYES, of legal age and a resident of 1300-A Batangas St., Brgy. San
Isidro, Makati City under oath declare that:
1. Last June 10, 2009, KAREN CRUZ borrowed Php 500,000.00 from me, obliging
herself to pay that loan by September 30, 2009. A copy of the promissory note which
she made and issued for that loan is hereto attached as Annex “A”.
2. Last September 30, 2009, in the City of Manila, the respondent purportedly in
payment for that loan, drew and issued to me a check drawn on the Banco De Oro,
Taft Avenue, Manila particularly check no. 05100610 dated October 5, 2009. A copy
of that check is hereto attached as Annex “B”.
3. Upon presentment for clearing or collection, that check was dishonored by the drawee
bank for the reason “Drawn Against Insufficient Funds and Account closed.” The
Bank debit advice to that effect is hereto attached as Annex “C”.
4. Notice of dishonor and demand for payment were made upon the respondent
However, the latter simply ignored them.
5. I am executing this sworn statement for the purpose of charging the respondent with
having violated B.P. No. 22.
Manila, October 26, 2009.
KRISTEN REYES
Complainant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me on October 27, 2009 affiant exhibiting to

me his Community Tax Certificate No. 101010 issued in Manila on January 5, 2009.
Witness my hand and seal.
ATTY. ADORA MENDOZA

Notary Public
My Commission expires on Dec. 31, 2009
IBP No. 06101979, Manila on May 10, 2005
PTR No. 01231958, manila on Jan. 5, 2007
Doc. No. 10
Page No. 16
Book No. 10
Series of 2009.
COUNTER-AFFIDAVIT
I, KAREN CRUZ, of legal age and a resident of 1300-B Batangas St., Brgy. San
1. I am the respondent in the above-captioned case;

2. I was not aware of the presentment for clearing/collection with Banco De Oro by the
plaintiff; much more, I was not aware that the check issued was dishonored by the
said bank upon such presentment;
3. It is not enough that the issued check was subsequently dishonored for insufficiency
of funds. It must be shown that I knew of the insufficiency of funds at the time the
check was issued. Hence, the law provides that the issuer must be notified of the
dishonor;
4. While it is true that I was asked by herein plaintiff to pay the amount I borrowed,
such kind of notice is not the one required by B.P. 22, which must be in writing as
held by the Supreme court in several of its cases;
5. Considering that I did not receive a written notice of dishonor of the checks, clearly,
there is no way of determining when the 5-day period prescribed in Section 2 of B.P.
22 would start and end. Thus, the required knowledge of the insufficiency of funds or
credit at the time I issued the checks did not arise;
6. Finally, therefore, it cannot be said that I violated B.P. 22.
30 October 2009, Manila.
KAREN CRUZ
Affiant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 30th day of October, 2009 at Manila. I
further certify that I have examined the affiant and I am satisfied that he understood and
voluntarily executed the foregoing counter-affidait.
ATTY. ROSE ANGEL

Notary Public for the City of Makati
197 Salcedo St., Legaspi Vill., Makati City
Appointment No. 54225 until Dec. 31, 2009
Roll of Attorney No. 51486
PTR No. 0987256, Jan. 4, 2009, Makati
Series No. of Commission 0854481
IBP No. 729988
MCLE Compliance No. 1-000500
Doc. No. 20
Page No. 25
Book No. 10
Series of 2009.
REPLY – AFFIDAVIT
I, KRISTEN REYES, of legal age and a resident of 1300-A Batangas St., Brgy. San
1. That I am reiterating my allegation in my affidavit that last June 10, 2009, KAREN
CRUZ borrowed Php 500,000.00 from me, obliging herself to pay that loan by
September 30, 2009. A copy of the promissory noted which she made and issued for
that loan is hereto attached as Annex “A”.
2. Last September 30, 2009, in the City of Manila, the respondent purportedly in
payment for that loan, drew and issued to me a check drawn on the Banco De oro,
Taft Avenue, Manila particularly check No. 05100610 dated October 5, 2009. A copy
of that check is hereto attached as annex “B”.
3. Upon presentment for clearing or collection, that check was dishonored by the drawee
bank for the reason “Drawn Against Insufficient Funds and Account closed.” The
Bank debit advice to that effect is hereto attached as Annex”C”.
4. That contrary to her claim, he was informed by the bank teller of the said bank and
was asked to deposit the amount needed for the clearing of the check. Not only that,
Notice of Dishonor was sent to her.
5. Notice of Dishonor and demand for payment were made upon the respondent.
However, the latter simply ignored them. Moreover, she ignored such verbal and
written notices.
6. That I am willing and ready to present Notice of Dishonor and proof of receipt from
bank records;
7. That is without doubt, the best evidence to prove the veracity of my allegation that the
respondent violated B.P. 22 and that I have no other motives initiating this action but
to make her liable for her action.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto affixed my signature this 10th day of

November 2009, in Makati City.
KRISTEN REYES
AFFIANT
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 10 th day of November, 2009. I hereby

certify that I have personally examined the Affiant and I am satisfied that she voluntarily
executed and understood her Reply Affidavit.
MARK ANTHONY D. SANTOS

Assistant City Prosecutor
Republic of the Philippines
OFFICE OF THE CITY PROSECUTOR
Makati City
KRISTEN REYES,
Complainant,
- Versus - I.S. NO. 09-54225

For: Violation of B.P. Blg. 22
KAREN CRUZ,
Respondent.
x------------------------------------------------x
REJOINDER
I, KAREN CRUZ, of legal age and a resident of 1300-B Batangas St., Brgy. San Isidro,
Makati City, after being duly sworn to in accordance with law submit this Rejoinder-Affidavit, as
follows:
1. I respectfully aver that I was not informed or was made aware of the presentment,
much more the dishonor by the bank as alleged in the complaint and Reply of herein
complainant;
2. I vehemently deny the allegation of the Complainant that she sent a written Notice of
Dishonor supporting her claim and the consequent act of ignoring the said notice.
How can someone ignore something she was not made aware of, in the first place.
3. Indeed, the Complainant approached me reminding me of the payment to the loan

obtained from her wherein she likewise mentioned the dishonor by the bank, there
was no written notice sent in that regard.
4. I would like to emphasize that under B.P. 22, the Complainant must prove not only
that the adverse party issued a check that was subsequently dishonored. It must also
establish that he was actually notified that the check was dishonored, and that he or
she failed, within five banking days from receipt of the notice, to pay the holder of the
check the amount due thereon or to make arrangement for its payment. This is in line
with the Philippine Jurisprudence, that while, indeed, Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 does
not state that the notice of dishonor be in writing, taken in conjunction, however, with
Section 3 of the law. i.e., “that where there are no sufficient funds in or credit with
such drawee bank, such fact shall always be explicitly stated in the notice of dishonor
or refusal,” a mere oral notice or demand to pay would appear to be insufficient
for conviction under the law. The Court in several of its cases has consistently held
that it is convinced that both the spirit and letter of the Bouncing Checks law would
require for the act to be punished there under not only that the accused issued a check
that is dishonored, but that likewise the accused has actually been notified in writing
of the fact of dishonor.
5. It is not enough that the issued check was subsequently dishonored for insufficiency
of funds. It must be shown that I knew of the insufficiency of funds at the time the
check was issued. Hence, the law provides that the issuer must be notified of the
dishonor;
6. While it is true that I was asked by herein plaintiff to pay the amount I borrowed,
such kind of notice is not the one required by B.P. 2, which must be in writing as held
by the Supreme Court in several of its cases;
7. To reiterate, considering that I did not receive a written notice of dishonor of the
checks, clearly, there is no way of determining when the 5-day period prescribed in
Section 2 of B.P. 22 would start and end. Thus, the required knowledge of the
insufficiency of funds or credit at the time I issued the checks did not arise.
8. Lastly, applying the foregoing arguments, therefore, it cannot be said that I violated
B.P. 22.
20 November 2009, Manila.
KAREN CRUZ
Affiant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 20th day of November, 2009 at Manila.
I further certify that I have examined the affiant and I am satisfied that he understood and
voluntarily executed the foregoing counter-affidavit.

Makati City
KRISTEN REYES
Complainant,
- Versus - I.S. No. 09-54225

KAREN CRUZ,
Respondent.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
SUR-REJOINDER
Comes Now, COMPLAINANT KRISTEN REYES, unto this honourable office,

respectfully state that:
1. I am the complainant in the above-captioned case;

2. That contrary to her denial, she was informed of the presentment of the check when it
was deposited for encashment;
3. That contrary to her claim, I sent her a written Notice of Dishonor and even the bank
teller of the bank called her and informed her to deposit for the amount on the same
date of the check so that the account will have sufficient fund and thereafter sent
Notice of Dishonor signed by the officer of the bank, as herein attached as evidence.
4. The foregoing facts and the affidavits already sworn to by the complainant narrate all
the elements necessary to hold the respondent liable for the violation of BP 22.
5. I attest to the truth of the foregoing statements.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto affix my signature this 25 th day of November,

2009 in Makati City.
KRISTEN REYES
Complainant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 25 th day of November, 2009 in Makati

City. I hereby certify that I have personally examined the affiant and I am convinced that she
personally and voluntarily verified the foregoing Rejoinder and she understood the contents
thereof.

NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION
METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT
Makati City
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Plaintiff,
- Versus - CRIM. CASE NO. 12345

I.S. No. 09-54225
KAREN CRUZ,
Accused.
x------------------------x
INFORMATION
The undersigned 3rd Assistant City Prosecutor accuses KAREN CRUZ of the crime of
Violation of BP 22, committed as follows:
That sometime in the month of June 2009, in the City of Makati, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue to KRISTEN REYES,
to apply on account or for value the check describe below:
CHECK NO. : 05100610

Drawn Against : Banco De Oro
In The Amount of : P500,000.00
Dated/Postdated : October 5, 2009
Said accused well knowing that at the time of issue, she did not have sufficient
funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment in full of the face amount of said
check upon its presentment, which check, when presented for payment within ninety (90)
days from its date, was dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason “Drawn Against
Insufficient Funds and Account closed”, and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor,
she failed to pay said payee the face amount thereof or to make arrangement for its full
payment within five (5) banking days after receiving notice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Makati City, December 18, 2009

APPROVED:
LITO D. MAGTALAS
City Prosecutor
I hereby certify that I have conducted a preliminary investigation on this case; that the
accused was informed of the complaint and of the evidence submitted against her; that she was
given an opportunity to submit controverting evidence; and, that based on the evidence
presented, there exists a reasonable ground to believe that the crime has been committed and the
accused is probably guilty thereof.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 18th day of December 2009 in Makati
City.
Witnesses:
1. KAREN CRUZ – 1300-B Batangas St., Brgy. San Isidro, Makati City
2. The cashier (or his/her duly authorized representative) of Dela Rosa-Salcedo branch,
Legaspi Village, Makati City re: Account Number: 00551-103667-6
3. And others
BAIL NOT REQUIRED

PROVINCE OF QUEZON )Sc.
MUNICIPALITY OF LOPEZ )
COMPLAINT-AFFIDAVIT
I, ALVIN C. ENGUILLO, of legal age, married, Filipino, with residence and postal
address at Brgy. Magsaysay, Lopez, Quezon, subscribing under oath, state that:
1. On September 15, 2009 at Calamba, Laguna, Mr. Jose de Jesus, with residence at
Island Subdivision, Palo Acto, Canlubanmg, Laguna, delivered and endorsed to me a
post-dated check drawn against his account at the Equitable PCI Bank, Waltermart-
Calamba branch, Calamba, Laguna, with Check No. 0000091959, dated September
20, 2009, in the amount of Nine Thousand Pesos (P9,000.00);
2. Mr. de Jesus assured me that the said check will have sufficient fund upon its
presentment on its maturity date, so I gave and delivered to him wood products
valued at P9,000.00 in exchange of said check;
3. On September 20, 2009, I deposited the said check in the Philippine National Bank,
Lopez Branch, Lopez, Quezon, but the same was dishonoured by the bank due to
stopped payment without any valid reasons and due to account insufficient funds
(SPO-DAIF), a machine copy of the said check with the reason of its dishonor is
hereto attached as Annex “A” and made an integral part hereof;
4. I made several demands to Mr. de Jesus to make good his Equitable PCI Check or to
pay the face value thereof, the last of which was on November 4, 2009, a copy of the
notice of dishonor and the demand to pay is hereto attached as Annex “B”, however,
Mr. de Jesus, until to date, failed, refused and continue to fail and refuse to fund the
check or pay the amount of the check to my damage and prejudice in the amount of
P9,000.00;
5. I would have not parted with my wood products in the amount of P9,000.00, if not the
assurance and misrepresentation made to me by Mr. Jose de Jesus, that the said
Equitable PCI Check will be sufficiently funded and honoured by his bank upon its
presentment on its maturity date;
6. I am executing this Complaint-affidavit for the purpose of filing a criminal case

against Mr. Jose de Jesus for Estafa, defined and penalized under Article 315,
paragraph 2 (d) of the Revised Penal Code.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this 18 th day of November, 2009
at Lopez, Quezon, Philippines.
ALVIN C. ENGUILLO
Complainant-Affiant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 18th day of November 2009 at the City
of Manila, Philippines.
MARIE ANTOINETTE CARPIO

Public Prosecutor
Doc. No. ___________

Page No. ___________
Book No. ___________
Series of ___________
PROVINCE OF QUEZON )Sc.
COUNTER-AFFIDAVIT
I, JOSE DE JESUS, of legal age, married, Filipino, with residence and postal address at
Island Subdivision, Palo Acto, Canlubang, Laguna, subscribing under oath, state that:
1. That I am the respondent in the complaint for Estafa filed by ALVIN ENGUILLO
before the Municipal Prosecutor of Lopez, Quezon;
2. That I admit that portion of paragraph 1 of the complaint regarding the names,
residences and status of the parties, as well as the fact of having issued the post-dated
check mentioned therein;
3. That I likewise admit the allegation in paragraph 3 as to the assurance I gave the
complainant regarding the sufficiency of the funds represented by the check on the
date stated therein, and for which reason I received from him wood products valued at
P9,000.00;
4. That I deny the rest of the allegations in the complaint, the truth being that a certain
Laurence Aquino promised to deposit the amount of P11,000 to my account on
September 18, 2009 and that the assurance I made to the complainant was based on
such expectancy; that I informed the complainant of such fact, yet he agreed to
proceed with the transaction; that such fact was the reason why we agreed that the
due date be on September 20; that on September 19, I learned that Laurence Aquino
did not make good his promise and on the same day, I asked the complainant not to
deposit the check and I will instead tender payment to him in cash the following day;
that when I personally delivered the cash to his address, it was accepted by ERIN
ENGUILLO, personally known to me to be complainant’s wife;
5. That despite of my advice and payment, complainant still deposited the check, hence
it was dishonoured;
6. That on September 22, 2009, I asked Erin Enguillo if she had given the money to the
complainant, but she told me that she used the money to purchase a television set for
their bedroom, and that she thereafter informed her husband;
7. That despite repeated explanation to the effect that I already paid what was due to his
wife, he still sent me several demand letters which I naturally refused to heed for the
reason already stated in the preceding paragraph;
8. That I am executing this counter-affidavit to deny the allegations pointing to my

liability for Estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 in the complaint-affidavit
filed by the complainant.
JOSE DE JESUS
Complainant-Affiant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 28th day of November 2009 at the City of
Manila, Philippines.

Public Prosecutor
Doc. No. ________;

Page No. ________;
Book No. ________;
Series of ________.
PROVINCE OF QUEZON )S.c.
REPLY
I, ALVIN C. ENGUILLO, of legal age, married, Filipino, with residence and postal
address at Brgy. Magsaysay, Lopez, Quezon, subscribing under oath, state that:
1. That I am reiterating my allegation in my affidavit that JOSE DE JESUS deceived

me into selling him my wood products by presenting a check for P9,000.00 which
was later on dishonoured by the bank for being drawn against insufficient funds;
2. That contrary to his claim, he never informed me of any such fact as he narrated in
paragraph 4 of his counter-affidavit;
3. That because I did not receive any advice, I deposited the check in good faith and
with full confidence that the same was fully funded.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this 18th day of November, 2009
ALVIN C. ENGUILLO
Complainant-Affiant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 7th day of December 2009 at the City of

Public Prosecutor
Doc. No._________;
Page No._________;
Book No. ________;
Series of ________;
Department of Justice
OFFICE OF THE MUNICIPAL PROSECUTOR
Lopez, Quezon
ALVIN C. ENGUILLO,
Complainant,
- Versus - I.S. NO. 09-56789-43

For: Estafa
JOSE DE JESUS,
Respondent.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
REJOINDER
Comes Now, RESPONDENT JOSE DE JESUS, unto this honourable office, respectfully
state that:
1. Respondent specifically, vehemently and consistently deny the material allegations in

the reply affidavit of the complainant, dated December 7, 2009, for being unfounded,
baseless and malicious and must be dismissed outrightly for failing to establish the
requisite elements of the crime ascribed.
2. Respondent reiterates his defense that on the day the sale was consummated, he
informed the complainant that the check had to be post-dated in view of the deposit
which was yet to be made by Laurence Aquino, and that immediately after learning
that no such deposit was made, he advised the complainant not to deposit the check,
and tendered payment in cash to his wife Erin Enguillo, which was accepted and
acknowledged by the latter, the acknowledgement receipt is attached herein and made
an integral part thereof.
3. Erin Enguillo told respondent that she had used the money to buy a television set for
their bedroom, which means that the payment, though not made personally to the
complainant, redounded to his benefit. Though Erin may have failed or purposely
never intended to tell her husband that she had received cash from respondent, it is
unlikely that defendant would not even ask his wife how the latter was able to
purchase a television set. Erin Enguillo is a plain housewife and is not engaged in
any business or gainful employment. Respondent is hereby requesting that Erin
Enguillo be called upon to testify.
4. The efforts made by the respondent and the actual payment of cash to replace the
check clearly show lack of intent to deceive the complainant. The complainant is
stopped from denying receipt of payment because even though the money did not
physically pass through his hands, it nevertheless redounded to his benefit since it
was used to buy an item which is now being used in their household. In the case of
Piraza vs. People (G.R. NO. 154721, March 22, 2007), the elements of estafa under
paragraph 2(D) Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code are the following(1) Postdating
or issurance of a check in payment of an obligation contracted at the time the check
was issued;(2) lack of sufficiency of funds to cover the check; and (3) damage to
the payee. By his acquiescence to his wife’s acts, the complainant is deemed to have
appropriated the money by himself, thus, he could not have suffered damage.
5. The allegations in the complaint are clearly malicious and manifestly intended to
collect a sum of money for a debt which had already been fully settled.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto affix my signature this 14 th day of December,

2009 in Lopez, Quezon, Philippines.
JOSE DE JESUS
Respondent
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 14 th day of December, 2009 in

Manila.
I hereby certify that I have personally examined the affiant and I am convinced
that he personally and voluntarily verified the foregoing Rejoinder and he understood the
contents thereof.

Public Prosecutor
Lopez, Quezon
ALVIN ENGUILLO,
Complainant,
- Versus - I.S. No. 09-56789-43

For: ESTAFA
JOSE DE JESUS,
Respondent.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
SUR-REJOINDER
Comes Now, COMPLAINANT ALVIN ENGUILLO, unto this honourable office,

respectfully state that:
1. I am the complainant in the above-captioned case.
2. Complainant denies having been duly informed by the respondent that the availability
of funds for the check would depend upon the collection of money from a third
person. The sale of wood products would not have been consummated had the
complainant known that the sufficiency of funds is conditional. But even assuming
that the sale would have taken place at any rate, it is not true that respondent properly
communicated the eventual non-payment of the said third person. No conversation
had taken place between the date of sale and the date of deposit.
3. Complainant did not receive any payment from respondent, either personally or
through his wife. If any amount was indeed received Erin Enguillo, such did not
redound to the benefit of the complainant because the latter has been separated in bed
and board with his wife since 2006. Defendant was grossly negligent in not taking
steps to determine such fact, which is not very hard to known since it is of public
knowledge.
4. While the defendant refuses to settle his obligation, Erin also insists in not turning
over the money to the complainant, if any has been received by her. It is therefore
clear that complainant did not, in any way, benefit from any payment made by
respondent. Payment, if any, was not made to the proper person. Hence, it does not
result in the settlement of the obligation.
5. The foregoing facts and the affidavits already sworn to by the complainant narrate all
the elements necessary to hold the respondent liable for the crime of Estafa under
Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto affix my signature this 22nd day of December,
2009 in Lopez, Quezon, Philippines.
ALVIN ENGUILLO
Complainant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 22nd day of December, 2009 in Manila.
I hereby certify that I have personally examined the affiant and I am convinced that he
personally and voluntarily verified the foregoing Rejoinder and he understood the contents
thereof.

Public Prosecutor
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
Fourth Judicial Region
MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT
Lopez, Quezon

Plaintiff,
- Versus - Criminal Case. No. 09-56789-43

For: ESTAFA
JOSE DE JESUS,
Accused.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
INFORMATION
THE UNDERSIGNED PROSECUTOR accuses JOSE DE JESUS of Island Subdivision,

Palo Acto, Canlubang, Laguna, of the crime of ESTAFA as defined and punished under par.
(d),Art 315, of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by P.D. No. 818, committed as follows:
“That sometime on September 2009, the above-named accused, by means of

deceit, false pretenses and with intent to defraud, did then and there willfully, and
unlawfully and feloniously draw and issue Equitable PCI Bank, Waltermart-Calamba
Branch Check No. 0000091959, postdated to September 20, 2009, in the amount of Nine
thousand Pesos (p9,000) in payment of wood products owned by the undersigned
complainant and delivered to the accused, knowing fully well at the time of issue, he did
not have sufficient funds in the bank or he lacks fund or credit sufficient to cover the full
payment of the check, and upon its presentation for encashment/collection to the
Philippine National bank, Lopez Branch, Lopez, Quezon, which bank (PNB) is within the
preliminary jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said check was dishonoured due to
“STOP PAYMENT WITHOUT ANY VALID REASONS and DUE TO ACCOUNT
INSUFFICIENT FUNDS (DAIF)”, and despite notice of dishonor, accused failed and
refused to make arrangement for its payment within three (3) working/banking days after
receipt of said notice of dishonor, and until the present, despite repeated demands,
accused has failed to pay the amount of the check to the payee/holder’s damage and
prejudice in the amount of P9,000.00 Philippine Currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Lopez, Quezon, November 23, 2009.

Public Prosecutor
VERIFICATION
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have conducted a preliminary investigation in this case, that I
have personally examined the complainant and his witness, that there is reasonable ground to
believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof; that the
accused was informed of the complaint and of the evidence submitted against him; and that he
was given an opportunity to submit controverting evidence.

Public Prosecutor
RECEIVED, FILED AND DOCKETED this 24 th day of November, 2009 at Lopez,

Quezon.
MARK DELA CRUZ

Clerk of Court
Bail Bond Recommended: P40,000.00.

Muntinlupa City )Sc.
COMPLAINT AFFIDAVIT
I, LAARNI ESTEBAN, of legal age, married and a resident of No. 14 Quirikada St.,
Alabang, Muntinlupa City after having been sworn to law hereby depose and state:
1. That I am the legal wife of Abner A. Esteban. We were married at St. Anne Church
at Bayanan, Muntinlupa City on July 14, 2004;
2. That we are living as husband and wife at Block 4, Lot 5 Richpoint village, Brgy.
Poblacion, Muntinlupa City;
3. That in or about the month of July 2007 and on dates subsequent thereto, in the City
of Muntinlupa, ABNER ESTEBAN and AILEEN D. CO willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously cohabited as husband an wife at No. 123 National Road, Putatan,
Muntinlupa City, AILEEN D. CO has full and actual knowledge of the fact that
ABNER A. ESTEBAN is legally a married man.
4. That as the result of the cohabitation of ABNER A. ESTEBAN and AILEEN D. CO, a
child named PETER JOHN C. ESTEBAN was born on October 9, 2008.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto affixed my signature this 26th day of

November 2008 in Muntinlupa City.
LAARNI L. ESTEBAN
Affiant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 26 th day of November, 2008. I hereby

certify that I have personally examined the Affiant and I am satisfied that he voluntarily executed
and understood her Complaint affidavit.
ATTY. LETTY JACOB

Notary Public
2nd Flr., MC Bldg., Rotonda,
Muntinlupa City,
IBP#11111111
Roll No. 222222
PTR#333333
Muntinlupa City
Doc. No. _________;

Page No. _________;
Book No. ________;
Series of _________.
COUNTER AFFIDAVIT
I, AILEEN D. CO, of legal age, single and a resident of Block 9, Lot 27, Rodriguez
Village, Barangay Makiling, Muntinlupa City after having been sworn to law hereby depose and
state:
1. That I met ABNER A. ESTEBAN sometime in January, 2007 in Sta. Cruz, Manila
while working as a sales clerk in a department store.
2. That ABNER A. ESTEBAN represented himself as a single and unmarried man.
3. That we fell in love and decided to live as husband and wife at No. 123 National
Road, Putatan, Muntinlupa City.
4. That our son PETER JOHN C. ESTEBAN was born on October 9, 2008.
5. That I have no knowledge that ABNER A. ESTEBAN was lawfully married to a
certain LAARNI L. ESTEBAN.
6. That I gained knowledge of the marriage between ABNER A. ESTEBAN and
LAARNI L. ESTEBAN only upon the confrontation that occurred at No. 123
National Road, Putatan, Muntinlupa City when LAARNI L. ESTEBAN confronted
ABNER A. ESTEBAN.
7. That after the said confrontation I left ABNER A. ESTEBAN and lived with my
parents at Block 9 Lot 27 Rodriguez Village, Barangay Makiling, Muntinlupa City.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto affixed my signature this 8 th day of December

2008 in Muntinlupa City.
AILEEN D. CO
Affiant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 8th day of December 2008. I hereby
certify that I have personally examined the affiant and I am satisfied that he voluntarily executed
and understood her complaint affidavit.
ATTY. RIZA MANALAC

Notary Public
Muntinlupa City
IBP#11111111
ROLL No. 222222
PTR#333333
Muntinlupa City
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES)
REPLY AFFIDAVIT
I, LAARNI L. ESTEBAN, of legal age, married and a resident of No. 14 Quirikada St.,
Alabang, Muntinlupa City after having been duly sworn to law hereby depose and state:
1. That I am reiterating the allegation in my affidavit that my husband, ABNER A.

ESTEBAN and AILEEN D. CO willfully, unlawfully and feloniously cohabiting as
husband and wife at No. 123 National Road, Putatan, Muntinlupa city;
2. That AILEEN D. CO has full and actual knowledge of the fact that ABNER A.
ESTEBAN is legally a married man;
3. That contrary to her claim, I and my husband were actually introduced to her
sometime on march 2008 at the Annual Convention of Filipino Entrepreneurs held at
the Cultural Center of the Philippines;
4. That in support of my allegation, I am willing and ready to present photographic

evidence/pictures taken during the convention.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto affixed my signature this 23rd day of

December 2008 in Muntinlupa City.
LAARNI L. ESTEBAN
Affiant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 23rd day of December 2008. I hereby
certify that I have personally examined the Affiant and I am satisfied that he voluntarily executed
and understood her Reply-Affidavit.
ATTY. LETTY JACOB

Notary Public
Muntinlupa City
IBP#11111111
Roll No. 222222
PTR No. 333333
Muntinlupa City
Doc. No. _________;

Page No. _________;
Book No. ________;
Series of _________.
Muntinlupa City
LAARNI L. ESTEBAN
Complainant,
- Versus - I.S. No .
For: Complaint for Concubinage
ABNER A. ESTEBAN and AILEEN D. CO

Respondent.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
REJOINDER
Comes Now, RESPONDENT AILEEN D. CO unto this Honourable Office, respectfully

state that:
1) Respondent specifically, vehemently and consistently denies the material allegations

in the reply affidavit of the complainant, dated December 23, 2008, for being
unfounded, baseless and malicious and must be dismissed outrightly for failing to
establish the requisite elements of the crime ascribed;
2) Respondent reiterates her defense that while it is true that she cohabited with ABNER
A. ESTEBAN as husband and wife which resulted to the birth of PETER JOHN C.
ESTEBAN on October 9, 2008, there is no truth to the averment that it is done so
unlawfully, willfully, feloniously and with knowledge that ABNER A. ESTEBAN is a
legally married man since the latter represented himself as a single and unmarried
man;
3) That contrary to the allegations of the complainant, respondent, although present at

the Annual Convention of Filipino Entrepreneurs, was never introduced to both
ABNER A. ESTEBAN and LAARNI L. ESTEBAN and that she gained knowledge
of the marriage between ABNER A. ESTEBAN and LAARNI L. ESTEBAN when
the latter confronted the former and that therefore, the allegations are clearly
unfounded and malicious and should therefore be dismissed.
4) I attest to the truth of the foregoing statements.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto affixed my signature this _____day of

January 2009 in Muntinlupa City, Philippines.
AILEEN D. CO
Respondent
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this _______day of January 2009 in
Muntinlupa City.
I hereby certify that I have personally examined the affiant and I am convinced that she
thereof.
MYRNA S. FLORITA
Assistant City prosecutor
Muntinlupa City
LAARNI L. ESTEBAN
Complainant,
- Versus - I.S. No.

For: Complaint for Concubinage
ABNER A. ESTEBAN and AILEEN D. CO

Respondents.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
SUR-REJOINDER
Comes Now, LAARNI L. ESTEBAN, unto this honourable office, respectfully state that:
1. __________________________;
2. Complainant is reiterating the allegation that respondent was actually introduced to

her and her husband ABNER A. ESTEBAN during the annual Convention of Filipino
entrepreneurs as supported by photographic evidence taken during said occasion
which complainants is willing and ready to present;
3. That contrary to the respondent’s previous statement that she lived with her parents at
Block 9 Lot 27 Rodriguez Village, Barangay Makiling, Muntinlupa City after the
confrontation that took place at No. 123 National Road, Putatan, Muntinlupa,
respondents AILEEN D. CO and ABNER A. ESTEBAN are still seen living together
at No. 123 National road, Putatan, Muntinlupa;
4. That respondents are continuously, willfully, feloniously, and unlawfully cohabiting

as husband and wife despite actual and full knowledge that ABNER A. ESTEBAN is
a legally married man.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto affixed my signature this _____day of

_______, 2009 in Muntinlupa City, Philippines.
LAARNI L. ESTEBAN
Complainant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this _____day of January, 2009 in Muntinlupa City.
I hereby certify that I have personally examined the affiant and I am convinced that sh
thereof.
MYRNA S. FLORITA
NATIONAL CAPITOL REGION
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
BRANCH ______
MUNTINLUPA CITY
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Plaintiff,
- Versus - CRIM. CASE NO. 09-333

FOR: CONCUBINAGE
ABNER ESTEBAN Y ABAD and
AILEEN CO Y DAGOHOY
Accused.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - x
INFORMATION
The undersigned 4th Assistant City Prosecutor based on the Sworn Statement executed by
Private Complainant, LAARNI ESTEBAN Y LIM of the crime of CONCUBINAGE, committed
as follows:
That in or about the month of July, 2008 and on dates subsequent thereto, in the City of
Muntinlupa, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, ABNER ESTEBAN being the lawful husband of private complainant LAARNI
ESTEBAN and without their marriage having been legally dissolved, did, then and there
willfully, ;unlawfully and feloniously cohabit with a woman not his wife, herein co-accused
AILEEN CO despite knowing him to be married in the conjugal house of complainant LAARNI
ESTEBAN and co-accused ABNER ESTEBAN.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
City of Muntinlupa, December 20, 2009
MYRNA S. FLORITA
I hereby certify that a preliminary investigation has been conducted in this case, and that I
have personally examined the complainant and her witnesses; that there is reasonable ground to
believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused probably guilty thereof, that the
accused was informed of the complaint and of the evidence submitted against him; that he was
given the opportunity to submit controverting evidence and that this Information is being filed
with the approval of the City Prosecutor having been first obtained.
MYRNA S. FLORITA
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 20th day of December 209 at City of
Muntinlupa.
DANNY D. LIM
2ND Assistant City Prosecutor
Witnesses:
1. LAARNI ESTEBAN - #878 National road, Putatan, Muntinlupa City and/or #15
Police, Provincial Mobile Group, Bukal Sur, Taguan, Candelaria, Quezon Province
and/or #133 Silver Street, Bernabe Subd., Parañaque City
2. JESUS LADIERO - -do-
3. And other
BAIL RECOMMENDED: TEN THOUSAND PESOS (Php10,000.00)

For accused ABNER ESTEBAN
BAIL NOT REQUIRED for accused AILEEN CO
APPROVED:
FERNANDO R. NEPOMUCENO
City Prosecutor
Republic of the Philippines )

Makati City )Sc
COMPLAINT
PLAINTIFF, through counsel alleges:
1. That Plaintiff, RONALD O. GALVAN, is a Filipino, of legal age, and a resident of 112
Dita St., San Antonio Village, Makati City, and defendant, NOEL C. MAGPANTAY., is a
Filipino, of legal age, with residence and postal address at 344 Kamagong St., San
Antonio Village, Makati City;
2. That on or about November 3, 2009, at about 3 p.m. in the City of Makati, the said
defendant did then and there, while driving his Sarao jeepney with Plate No. ZLX 623
under the influence of liquor and in a reckless and imprudent manner, bumped the said
jeepney into the residential house of RONALD O. GALVAN situated at 112 Dita St., San
Antonio village, Makati City; and
3. That the said accident caused damage to the front wall of the said residential house to the
damage and prejudice of its owner, RONALD O. GALVAN, in the amount of Php
120,000.00.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that judgment issue:
1. Ordering the payment of the damages sustained the residential house, and
considering said payment as defendant is entitled to the same; and
2. Ordering costs and other fees to the defendants.
MABEL V. ILUMBA
Counsel for the Plaintiff
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me on 26 November 2009, affiant having

exhibited to me his community tax certificate No. 482235678 issued on 5 November 2009 at
Makati City, day of 5 November 2006.
CARYL G. SICAY
Notary Public
Doc. No. 231;

Page No. 54;
Book No. IX;
Series of 2009.

Makati City )Sc
COUNTER-AFFIDAVIT
DEFENDANT, through counsel alleges:
1. That Defendant, NOEL C. MAGPANTAY, is a Filipino, of legal age, with residence and
postal address at 344 Kamagong St., San Antonio Village, Makati City;
2. That Defendant denies the allegations in paragraph two (2) of the complaint and
specifically alleges that on November 3, 2009, he had his dental check up and stayed in
his dentist’s clinic located in Quezon City from 12 p.m. to 5 p.m.;
3. That in support of these allegations, defendant hereby present a receipt and a dental
certificate issued and dated 3 November 2009;
4. That it is physically impossible for the defendant to have participated in the incident as
during that time he was still in the dental clinic.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the case be dismissed for lack of cause of
action and that judgement be issued ordering the payment of the costs and attorney’s fees.
LINDA V. FABUNAN
Counsel for the Defendant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me on 29 November 2009, affiant having

Makati City, day of 5 November 2006.
LOIDA A. GAMILLA
Notary public
Doc. No. 231;

Page No. 54;
Book No. IX;
Series of 2009.
Makati City )Sc
REPLY
COMES NOW, the plaintiff, by the undersigned counsel, and in reply to the defendants
answer, respectfully alleges:
1. That defendant DENIES specifically each and every material allegations made
paragraphs two, three and four ;in the counter-affidavit submitted by the defendant
and alleges that he personally witnessed the incident and saw the plaintiff come out of
the jeepney after it bumped the front portion of his house;
2. That the plaintiff managed to run away from the place of the incident and that his
identity was confirmed by the plaintiff after having found his driver’s license in the
jeepney;
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that judgment issue:
1. Ordering the payment of the damages sustained the residential house, and
considering said payment as defendant is entitled to the same; and
2. Ordering costs and other fees to the defendants.
MABEL V. ILUMBA
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me on 1 December 2009, affiant having

Makati City, day of 5 November 2006,.
CARYL G. SICAY
Notary Public
Doc. No. 231;

Page No. 54;
Book No. IX;
Series of 2009.

MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF TARANGAN
PROVINCE OF SAMAR
The People of the Philippines Criminal Case No. 10266-08

FOR: DAMAGE TO PROPERTY
- Versus -
NOEL C. MAGPANTAY,
Accused.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
REJOINDER
COMES NOW, respondent, RONALD O. GALVAN, is a Filipino, of legal age, and a

resident of 112 Dita St., San Antonio Village, Makati City, and defendant, NOEL C.
MAGPANTAY, is a Filipino, of legal age, with residence and postal address at 344 kamagong
St., San Antonio Village, Makati City, do hereby deposes and says:
That the accident was caused by a supposed truck that was about to hit the jeepney I was
driving, that by reason, if I was not to hit plaintiff’s residential house it could have had killed me;
That contrary to the allegations of the complaint I exercised due diligence;
That I contrary to the allegations of the complaint, I was not under the influence of
alcohol, thus it cannot be aggravated by this circumstance.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I affixed my signature this 13th day of February 2008.
RONALD O. GALVAN
(Affiant)
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 13th day of February 2008 affiant
exhibiting to me his Community Tax Certificate (CTC) No. 1467890 issued in Tarangan, Samar
on January 3, 2008.
ATTY. PAUL CALMA

Counsel for the Accused
Roll No. 12345 Mp/ 178598 dated 1-2-09
CITY OF MANILA )Sc
AFFIDAVIT
I, JOEL L. MARINAS, Filipino, of legal age and a resident of 69 Atis St., Farmtown
Subdivision, Quezon City, after having been duly sworn to in accordance with law, hereby
depose and state that:
1. On July 16, 2009 at around 7:00 PM, I was walking along southbound lane of Taft
Avenue in Vito Cruz, Manila. Upon reaching the pedestrian lane in front of De La
Salle University, I decided to cross the street;
2. While crossing the street, I noticed a red Honda Civic with plate number CBA 222
fast approaching my direction. Within a few seconds, I was hit and was knocked
unconscious;
3. I sustained severe wounds and a fractured knee which resulted to my confinement in

the hospital for 2 weeks. I was also unable to go to work for 3 months;
4. The Honda Civic mentioned earlier is owned and being driven by the respondent,
Rommel Renojo;
5. This affidavit is being executed for the purpose of attesting to the truth of the
foregoing facts and in support of my accusation against respondent, Rommel Renojo
for causing serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence.
IN WITNESS WHEEOF, i have hereunto set my hand this 17 th day of November 2009
at the City of Manila, Philippines.
JOEL L. MARINAS
Affiant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 17th day of November, 2009 at the City
DARWIN NOTO
Notary Public
Doc. No. _______;

Page No. _______;
Book No. ________;
Series of 2009.
CITY OF MANILA )Sc
COUNTER-AFFIDAVIT
I, ROMMEL RENOJO, Filipino, of legal age and a resident of 32 Puno St., Hacienda
Village, Pasay City, after having been duly sworn to in accordance with law, hereby depose and
state that:
1. I was driving my car, a Honda Civic with plate number CBA 222 on the night of July
16, 2009. I passed along Taft Avenue at around 8:00 PM;
2. As I passed along Vito Cruz, Manila, I saw the complainant crossing the street. Since
he was crossing at the pedestrian lane, I slowed down my car.
3. I never hit, much more knocked the Complainant unconscious;
4. The complainant has not produced any witness considering that the supposed incident
happened in a busy public place;
5. The accusation made by the complainant has no basis and therefore should be
dismissed.
at City of Manila, Philippines.
ROMMEL RENOJO
Affiant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 20 th day of November, 2009 at the City
DENNIS BUGAYONG
Notary Public
Doc. No. _______;

Page No. _______;
Book No. ________;
Series of 2009.
MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA
BRANCH 10
The People of the Philippines Criminal Case No. 10266-08
- Versus - FOR: PHYSICAL INJURIES
ROMMEL R. RENOJO
Accused
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
REJOINDER
Comes now, ROMMEL R. RENOJO, Filipino, of legal age and a resident of 69 Atis St.,
Farmtown Subdivision, Quezon City, do hereby deposes and says:
That I vehemently and consistently deny the allegations set forth in the complain for
Physical Injuries filed against me;
That contrary to the allegations of the complaint the complainant was walking on the
wrong side of the road, and since the accident happened in the evening, and the street was not
much lighted, I failed to have seen the complainant;
That I accidentally pinned my wheel to the right as there was a passing truck, which
might cause greater damage to the accused,
And that I exercised due diligence, and that the action have prevented greater damage to
property and self;
That I attest to the truth of the forgoing statement.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I affixed my signature this 13th day of February 2008.
ROMMEL R. RENOJO
(Affiant)
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 13th day of February 2008 affiant
exhibiting to me his Community Tax Certificate (CTC) No. 1467890 issued in Tarangan, Samar
on January 3, 2008.
ATTY. PAUL LIM

Roll No. 12345 Mp/ 178598 dated 1-2-09
METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT OF MANILA
Branch No. 10

Plaintiff
Versus Crim. Case No. 35

For Reckless imprudence
Resulting to serious physical
Injuries
ROMMEL RENOJO
Accused
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
INFORMATION
The undersigned, Prosecutor accuses Rommel Bondoc of the crime of RECKLESS

IMPRUDENCE RESULTING TO SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES, committed as follows, to
wit:
That on July 16, 2009 at about 7:00 p.m., in the City of Manila and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused did there and then unlawfully, hastily and feloniously, and
without justifiable cause hit and ran over one Joel Marinas, with his car, resulting to injuries to
the latter rendering him incapacitated for labor for a period of more than thirty 90 days.
Contrary to law
City of Manila, Philippines, November 23, 2009
EDMUND JOSEPH ABIJAY

CITY PROSECUTOR
CERTIFICATION OF PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
I hereby certify that a preliminary investigation in this case has been conducted by me in
accordance with law; that I have examined the complainant and her witnesses; that there is a
reasonable ground to believe that the offense charged had been committed; that the accused is
probably guilty thereof; that the accused was informed of the offense charged and was given the
opportunity to submit controverting evidence; and that the filing of this information is with the
prior authority and approval of the city fiscal.
DANIEL BERNABE
Assistant Fiscal
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me on this 1 December 2009 in the City of Muntinlupa,
Philippines.
CHRISTOPHER RAGUINDIN
City Fiscal
List of Witnesses:
VILMA SANTOS
LUIS MANZANO
Bail Recommended: Php 100,000

Makati City )Sc
AFFIDAVIT OF DESISTANCE
I, MARIA MAHUBOG, of legal age, married and with residence address at 154-E Vito
Cruz Extension, San Antonio Village, Makati City, after having been duly sworn to according to
law, hereby depose and state:
1. That I am the private complainant in the Criminal Case No. 01 entitled: “People of
the Philippines vs. Juan Dela Cruz”; for Violation of Batas Pamjbansa (BP) Bilang 22
pending before the Municipal Trial Court, Branch 5, Makati City, Philippines.
2. In this regard, the accused Juan Dela Cruz has already paid in full the amount
represented by the checks subject of the above-mentioned case, to wit: Criminal Case
No. 01, Check No. 0054225, amount Php100,000.00.
3. That in view of the payment in full by the accused, which was mis-accounted on my
part, and therefore, I would like to manifest that I am no longer interested in the
prosecution of the aforementioned criminal case and I am respectfully requesting the
Honorable Public Prosecutor to move for the dismissal of the aforementioned cases
against the accused.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this 6 th day of October, 2009 at
the City of Manila, Philippines.
ATTY. JACKIELYN N. SANTOS

Public Prosecutor
CITY OF MANILA )Sc.
I, Juan de la Cruz, of legal age, single, and a resident of 222 F. Jhocson St., Sampaloc,
Manila, after having duly sworn to in accordance with law hereby depose and state:
1. I am the complaining witness for Serious Physical Injuries against Jose Santos in the
case entitled “People of the Philippines versus Jose Santos”, Criminal Case No.
333333, metropolitan Trial Court, Branch No. 02, City of Manila;
2. After I have re-examined the facts, events and occurrences surrounding the
commission of the offense and after soul-searching and self-re-examination, I heeby
confirm that the one who inflicted harm on me on June 10, 2009 as alleged in the said
complaint is not Jose Santos, and the filing of the said complaint against him was a
case of mistaken identity.
3. I hereby inform the City Prosecutor of Manila that I am withdrawing my complaint

for Serious Physical Injuries in Criminal Case No. 333333 entitled “People of the
Philippines versus Jose Santos”, metropolitan Trial Court, Branch No. 02, City of
Manila.
4. I likewise request the Metropolitan Trial Court, branch No. 02, City of Manila to
dismiss with prejudice the said criminal case.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I hereby set my hand this 18 th day of November 2009 at the
City of Manila.
Juan de la Cruz
Complaining Witness
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 18th day of November 2009 at the City
Richmond Ruiz
Public Prosecutor
CITY OF MANILA )Sc
I, WALTER FALSARIO, of legal age, single, and a resident of # 123 Main St., Malate,
Manila, after having duly sworn to in accordance with law hereby depose and state:
1. I am the complaining witness for Serious Physical Injuuries against Lando Simon in
the case entitled “People of the Philippines versus Lando Simon”, Criminal Case No.
12345, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch No. 11, City of Manila.
2. After my sober and soul searching assessment and analysis of the incident, I have
realized that because I was not wearing my eyeglasses and it was dark, I can not point
out, without a doubt the accused or any other person/s who inflicted harm against me.
3. Since I could not state with certainty and without doubt the liability of Lando Simon,
in fairness to him, I am permanently withdrawing my complaint against him. I clear
him for whatever responsibility or liability to me.
4. I hereby inform the City Prosecutor of Manila that I am withdrawing my complaint

for Serious Physical Injuries in Criminal Case No. 12345 entitled “People of the
Philippines versus Lando Simon”, Metropolitan Trial Court, branch No. 11, City of
Manila.
5. I likewise request the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch No. 11, City of Manila to
dismiss with prejudice the said criminal case.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I hereby set my hand this 22 nd day of September 2007 at the
City of Manila.
WALTER FALSARIO
Complaining Witness
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 22nd day of January 2008 at the City of
ATTY. VALERIE MAY CARPIO

Notary Public
11234 Sampaloc
Manila City
IBP No. 4798273188, Manila
PTR No. 8012358 Jan. 5, 2009, Manila
MCLE Compliance No. 10-0610, Jan. 5, 2009
Doc. No.________;
Page No._______;
Book No. _______;
Series of 2009.
BRANCH _____
MUNTINLUPA CITY

Plaintiff,
- Versus - CRIM. CASE NO. 09-222

FOR: QUALIFIED THEFT
AMABEL G. IGNACIO,
Accused.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
MOTION TO ALLOW ACCUSED TO POST BAIL
Accused, by counsel, respectfully states that:
1. Accused is charged of qualified Theft involving an amount of P230,000.00 and no

bail is recommended for her provisional liberty;
2. Accused is entitled to bail as a matter of right under Section 13, Article III of the
Constitution, Section 4, rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, relevant
laws and jurisprudence;
3. Section 13, Article III of the Constitution states that, “All persons, except those
charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is
strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law.”
4. Section 4, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that:
“SEC. 4. Bail, a matter of right exception.- All persons in custody shall be

admitted to bail as a matter of right with sufficient sureties, or released on
recognizance as prescribed by law of this Rule (a)before or after conviction by the
Metropolitan Trial Court in Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court, and (b) before
conviction by the Regional Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment.”
5. In People vs. Hernando, 317 SCRA 617 (1999), WHICH WASREITERATED IN

People vs. Panganiban, 335 SCRA 354 and the most recent case of Vicente S. Cenzon
vs. Hon. Abad Santos, G.R. No. 164337, June 27, 2006, it was held that as used PD
No. 818, reclusion pepetua is not the prescribed penalty for the offense, but merely
describes the penalty actually imposed on account of the amount involved. As held in
the case of Corazon:
“Thus, it must be asked, is private respondent Sia charged with an offense

punishable by reclusion perpetua?
The issue that confronts us is not novel. Perforce, in Panganiban, we settled that
the term, reclusion perpetua, as utilized in Presidential Decree No. 818, merely describes
the penalty imposed on account of the amount of the fraud involved. The unequivocal
import in Presidential Decree No. 818 is that, if the amount of the fraud exceeds twenty
two thousand pesos(P22,000.00), the penalty of reclusion temporal is imposed in its
maximum period, adding one year for each additional ten thousand (P10,000.00) pesos,
but the total penalty shall not exceed thirty (30) years, which shall be termed reclusion
perpetua. Taking out legal bearing from the Panganiban case, we stress that the use of the
term reclusion perpetua in Presidential Decree No. 818 is merely to describe the penalty
imposed, but not the prescribed penalty thereof.
XXX XXX XXX
The Court, in Hernando was just as succinct in pronouncing that the term
reclusion perpetua as used in Presidential Decree No. 818, merely describes the penalty
actually imposed on account of the amount of the fraud involved, which exceeds twenty
two thousand (P22,000.00) pesos. As used in Presidential Decree No. 818, reclusion
perpetua is not the prescribed penalty for the offense.”
6. Pursuant to the above interpretation what is considered non-bailable is an offense

punishable by reclusion perpetua. However, bail is allowed in the instance when the
penalty of reclusion perpetua is imposed merely on account of the amount involved,
such as in the cases of estafa an qualified theft.
7. Based on the ruling in Hernando, the Department of Justice issued Circular No. 74 on
November 6, 2001 which provided amendment to the 2000 Bail Bond guide
involving the crimes of Estafa under Article 315, 2 (d) as amended by PD 818, AND
Qualified Theft, by recommending bail in these cases even if the amount of fraud or
the value of the property involved is P32,000.00 or over. Notably, in both estafa and
qualified theft, the penalty imposed depends on the amount involved.
8. Nevertheless, on July 1, 2005, the Department of Justice issued circdular No. 29

which amended Circular No. 74, stating among others, that no bail shall be
recommended for the offense of qualified theft where the value of property stolen is
P222,000.00 or more. The rationale given is to prevent the policy of leniency
accorded the accused under Circular No. 74 from shielding those charged with large
scale thievery. The new circular apparently departs from the Hernando ruling by
making no distinction between reclusion perpetua as the prescribed penalty and
reclusion perpetua as the description of the penalty imposed.
9. Accused believes that Circular No. 29 is merely directory and cannot prevail over the
ruling in Hernando, Panganiban and Cenzon which is favorable to the accused. The
ruling recognizes the principle of statutory construction that penal laws are liberally
construed in favor of the accused and strictly against the State.
WHEREFORE, in accordance with law and jurisprudence which recognize the accused’s
rights to bail, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that accused AMABEL
IGNACIO Y GUTIERREZ BE ALLOWED TO POST BAIL AND THE BAIL BE FIXED FOR
HER PROVISIONAL LIBERTY.
Muntinlupa City, July 20, 2009
ATTY. LIZA G. MACUJA

Notary Public
Muntinlupa City,
IBP#11111111
Roll No. 222222
PTR#333333
Muntinlupa City
NOTICE OF HEARING
The Branch Clerk of Court

RTC, Branch ____
Muntinlupa City
Greetings:
Please include the foregoing Motion in the calendar of matters scheduled to be heard on
December 15, 2009 at 1:30 o’clock in the afternoon for the consideration and approval of the
Honorable Court.
Copy furnished:
Public Prosecutor
Regional Trial Court, Branch ____
Muntinlupa City
EXPLANATION
Copy of the Motion was served to the above addressee by personal service.

Quezon City
People of the Philippines,

Plaintiff,
- Versus - Criminal Case No. 00176

For Slight Physical Injury
Patrick C. Dungao
Accused.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
MOTION TO REDUCE BAIL
Accused, through counsel, by way of a special appearance solely for this purpose,
respectfully alleges:
1. That the accused has been charged with Slight Physical Injury and that the bail for
his provisional release has been set at P20,000.00;
2. That the accused is a poor fellow of very limited means such that it is imposible for
him to pay the full amount of his bond and is therefore constrained to request for a
reduction of the amount of bail;
3. That it would be advantageous to everyone if he be given temporary liberty thereby

allowing him to continue with his gainful employment and as head of the family with
seven (7) dependents;
4. As such, accused appeals to the mercy and compassion of this Honorable Court and
respectfully requests that his bail be reduced to P10,000.00.
5. That this motion for reduction of bail is being filed without prejudice to any other
remedy which may be available to the accused and that the accused expressly
reserves the right to question the legality of the issuance of the search warrant or his
warrantless arrest if the circumstances would so warrant.
WHEREFORE, accused respectfully prays that his bail be reduced to P10,000.00
Other relief just and equitable are likewise prayed for.
Manila, Philippines, 20 November 2009.
JOSE M. PARDO
Quezon City
People of the Philippines,

Plaintiff,
- Versus - Criminal Case No. 00176

For Slight Physical Injury
Patrick C. Dungao
Accused.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
MOTION TO REDUCE BAIL
Accused, through counsel, by way of a special appearance solely for this purpose,
respectfully alleges:
1. That the accused has been charged with Slight Physical Injury and that the bail for
his provisional release has been set at P20,000.00;
2. That the accused is a poor fellow of very limited means such that it is imposible for
him to pay the full amount of his bond and is therefore constrained to request for a
reduction of the amount of bail;
3. That it would be advantageous to everyone if he be given temporary liberty thereby

allowing him to continue with his gainful employment and as head of the family with
seven (7) dependents;
4. As such, accused appeals to the mercy and compassion of this Honorable Court and
respectfully requests that his bail be reduced to P10,000.00.
5. That this motion for reduction of bail is being filed without prejudice to any other
remedy which may be available to the accused and that the accused expressly
reserves the right to question the legality of the issuance of the search warrant or his
warrantless arrest if the circumstances would so warrant.
WHEREFORE, accused respectfully prays that his bail be reduced to P10,000.00
Manila, Philippines, 20 November 2009.
JOSE M. PARDO
NOTICE OF HEARING
Atty. Roman S. Fabunan

715 V. Mapa St.,
Sta. Mesa, Manila
Greetings:
Please take notice that the foregoing Motion for reduction of Bail shall be submitted for
the consideration and approval of the Honorable Court on Friday, 4 December 2009 at 2:00 p.m.
or as soon as counsel and matter may be heard.
JOSE M. PARDO
COPY FURNISHED:
Atty. Roman S. Fabunan
MANILA (BRANCH I)
MOTION TO QUASH CRIMINAL COMPLAINT
Comes now the accused Jose Pabor through undersigned counsel and to his Honorable
Court in the above entitled case respectfully moves to quash the information for the crime of
theft on the grounds that:
1. IT CONTAINS AVERMENTS WHICH IF TRUE WOULD CONSTITUTE LEGAL

EXCUSE OR JUSTIFICATION.
2. THAT THIS COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION OF THE CASE.
ARGUMENT
The information alleges that the accused Jose Pabor is eleven years old with no known
address. Under Article 12, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code, a person over nine years of
age and under fifteen unless he acted with discernment is exempt from criminal liability.
Moreover, there is no allegation that the accused acted with discernment. Even granting
that he had acted with discernment, such minor shall be proceeded against in accordance with
Article 80 of the Revised Penal Code.
Article 80 of the Revised Penal Code provides among others that a minor unless sixteen
years of age at the time of the commission of a grave or less grave felony. The court shall
suspend the proceedings and shall commit such minor or to the custody or case of public or
private, benevolent or charitable institution established under the law for the care or education of
orphaned, homeless, defective and delinquent children, or to the case and custody of any other
responsible person in any other place subject to the visitation of the Director of Social Welfare.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the instant information be dismissed and that
the accused be immediately be released for detention.
Manila, September 2, 1988
DANILO DELA CRUZ

Counsel for Defendant
#Unit 303 Elizalde Condo., Donada St.,
Pasay City
Roll of Attorneys No. 47660
IBP NO. 691464 – 12/07/06 – Makati City
PTR No. 0267508-01/02/07 – Makati City
MCLE Compliance No. 10-0610, Jan. 5, 2009
NOTICE OF HEARING
Fiscal Jose Bartolome

Office of the City Fiscal
Manila
Please be informed that the foregoing motion to quash is set on Friday, September 9,
1988 at 9:00 am or as soon thereof as counsel may be heard.
ATTY. DANILO DELA CRUZ
Copy furnished:
Fiscal Jose Bartolome

Office of the City Fiscal
Branch ______
Lipa City
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, CRIMINAL CASE NOS. 0102-2010
Plaintiff,
FOR: Violation of Section 11,
Art. 2, RA 9165 and Art 151
Paragraph 1 of the
Revised Penal Code
-versus-
ALEJANDRO GUEVARRY CALINGASAN,
Alias “ Allan Mata”
Accused.
X -------------------------------------------------------x
MOTION FOR DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE AND HOLD IN ABEYANCE THE ARRAIGNMENT OF
THE ACCUSED
Undersigned accused, in the above-entitled case, unto this Honorable Regional Trial Court,
respectfully moves to set aside and abandon the resolution dated November 6, 2009 of the Honorable
Investigating Prosecutor reinstating the assailed resolution finding probable cause in the aforesaid criminal
cases.
Accused received the assailed resolution of the distinguished Assistant City Prosecutor of Lipa on
February 2, 2010 denying his motion for reconsideration on the grounds that accused failed to submit
additional evidence for the reversal of same.
Accused believed that there is no need to submit additional evidence for the reversal of the first
assailed resolution on the ground that probable cause in the pleading asserting a claim in highly
improbable as the accusatory statements state no cause action and deserve no merit. Moreover, the
arrest is also illegal. The assertion of the good assistant city prosecutor that full blown trial is necessary is
untenable in the case at bar.
Above complainants police officers alleged in the accusatory statement on or about 11:00 o’clock
in the evening of July 6, 2009 while they were at the headquarters, they were sent by their Chief of Police
to conduct surveillance or monitoring on persons using illegal drugs (shabu). On board their civilian jeep
with plate number NPC 188 traversing the highway of Brgy. Marauoy when a woman flagged them and
reported that was a selling of an illegal drugs (shabu). The woman pointed to a man in white t-shirt and
maong pants (herein accused) the one selling shabu and talking to two women along the road.
Immediately they approached the man (accused ) and upon seeing them and recognizing to be policemen,
the man ran away but on chase they were able to capture the man who scolded them and resisted arrest
and upon search, PO1 Gonzales, confiscated from the hand of the man (accused herein) one small plastic
sachet containing white crystalline substance believed to shabu. He was later charged.
On the other hand, responded filed his counter affidavit to the complaint supported by his
witnesses. He alleged that the allegations of the police officers were all fabricated and without legal and
factual bases. It was not true that he was conversing with two women along the road, he was alone at the
side of the road waiting for a ride when the police officers complainants herein arrived and at gunpoint
arrested him. His witness Shirley Perez recounted that SPO1 Renato Laygo was drunk at the time and
mauled Alejandro Calingasan, her fiancé. All the allegations in the complaint were denied by respondent.
After the investigation, the investigating prosecutor rendered a resolution finding probable cause,
denying likewise his motion for reconsideration, hence this motion for judicial determination of probable
cause.
At the outset, the complaint must be treated in violation of the existing rules in operations against
illegal drugs. As alleged in the complaint, the Chief of Police directed the herein complainants police
officers to conduct surveillance or monitoring of illegal drugs and NOT to apprehend drug users that time
because through monitoring and surveillance, the police officers prior to their operations must have the
pre-operation report as one of the requirements. In this case, there is none. Moreover, SPO1 Renato
Laygo was under the influence of liquor during the operation against herein accused. This negates the
presumption of regularity in the performance of their duty. People of the Philippines versus Alfredo
Concepcion is inapplicable in this case as cited in the resolution.
Scrutinizing the allegations contained in the complaint of the police officers, the Honorable Court
should appreciate it as HIGHLY IMPROBABLE CAUSE. Firstly, alleging among other that they were in
civilian vehicle with plate number NPC 188 at 11:00 o’clock in the evening, woman flagged them down and
reported that selling of illegal drugs (shabu) is in progress. How could the woman know that they were
police officers that time in the night. She was neither identified nor required to execute an affidavit to
substantiate and corroborate the complaint. She was not an informant and therefore may be required to
execute her affidavit. Secondly, respondent was talking o two women and NOT SELLING SHABU to two
women,, third paragraph contained “AGAD NAMANG ITINURO SA AMIN NG NASABING BABAE KUNG SINO
ANG NAGBEBENTA NG SHABU AT NAPANSIN NAMIN AND KANYAANG ITINUTURO AY ISANG LALAKI NA
NAKA PUTTING T-SHIRTY AT MAONG NA PANTALON NA MAY KAUSAP DING DALAWANG BABAE SA TABI NG
KALSADA. He woman does NOT SAY respondent tha time was selling shabu to the two women. The
complaint says “MAY KAUSAP DING DALAWANG BABAE SA TABI NG KALSADA” and did not say selling shabu
to the two women. Hence NO crime is being committed or is attempting to be to be committed or has just
been committed in their presence. The alleged two women were neither invited for identification
purposes no apaprehended for the purpose. Thirdly, the complaint alleged that “AT AGAD ITONG
TUMAKBONG PALAYO AT AMIN ITONG HINABOL . . . . . . . . AT NG AMING RIKISAHIN SIYA AY AKING (PO1
GONZALES) NAKUHA SA KANYANG KAMAY ANG ISANG MALIIT NA PLASTIC SACHET. It was very obvious
that the complaint affidavit of the police officers is highly improbable and does not deserve merit. One
knew that once he was chased by a policeman and yet he was holding illegal drugs, his tendency of course
is to thro it away. The contention that the shabu subject of the complaint was taken from the hands of
respondent is untenable. Very remarkable likewise, is the confrontation that took place in the presence of
the investigating prosecutor when the complainant told the prosecutor on how they could help the
accused in order not to be charged in court. It has been the prior agreement of the accused in order not to
be charged in court. It has been the prior agreement of the accused the complainants police officers that
he (accused) would not file his counter charge both criminal for planting evidence before the Office of the
Ombudsman and administrative case before the Napolcom for mauling him provided that the offense
charged shall not prosper in court.
Legally, the above complaint should be dismissed outrightly on the ground that the arrest has no
legal basis, therefore, unlawful. There is no warrant of arrest against respondent and there are only three
exceptions to the rule; first, the in flagrante delicto rule, second the hot pursuit rule and lastly, the
escaped prisoner rule. The first exception cannot be applied on basis that the offense is not being
committed, or is attempting to be committed or has just been committed in the presence of the
complainants. No actual selling of shabu in the presence of the police officers, nor an attempt or
consummated act of selling under the third paragraph of the complaint. The evidence warranting the
arrest is hearsay. The complainant police officers have no personal knowledge of the offense charged. The
alleged report of the woman that selling of illegal drugs (shabu) is hearsay in evidence and shall not be
admitted by the investigating prosecutor. This contention is discussed already in the preceding paragraph.
Second exception is hot pursuit rule which means that the offense has in fact been committed and the
arresting officers has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of the facts and
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it. No crime has in fact been committed as
discussed also in the preceding paragraph. The third exception is moreover, inapplicable.
Since the arrest is unlawful, the search is likewise illegal on the ground that it does not fall into the
exception of incidental to lawful arrest.
` Furthermore, violation of article 151 of the revised penal is subsequent to unlawful arrest it must
also be denied credence..
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that the abovementioned cases of
violation of Section 11 Article 2 of RA 9165 and Article 151 paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code be
DISMISSED for lack of probable cause and therefore hold in abeyance the arraignment of the accused.
Other reliefs just and equitable are likewise prayed for under the premises.
Lip[a City, February 2010.
Alejandro G. Calingasan
Accused
Greetings:
Please submit the foregoing motion to the Honorable Court or its kind
Consideration and approvable immediately upon receipt hereof.
Alejandro G. Calingasan
Copy furnished:
Prosecutor Guia Montealto
Lipa City
Prosecutor’s Office
Lipa City
Renato Virrey Laygo, I.S. No. IV-15-INV-096-0189

PO3 Enrico Pilapil Tapalla and for violations of Sec 11, Art 2,
PO1 Dan R. Gonzales RA 9165 and Article 151 par
1 of the Revised Penal Code
Complainants,
-versus-
Alejandro Guevarra,
Respondent.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
RESOLUTION
Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Respondent on November 3, 2009, the
Investigating Prosecutor denies the same. There is no new evidence submitted by the respondent
which will justify the reversal of the finding of probable cause. The Motion for Reconsideration
contains mere discussions of the contents of the affidavits already submitted. The allegations in
the counter-affidavit of respondent and that of his witness can well be ventilated in a full blown
trial.
The evidence submitted by the complainants particularly Sworn Statement executed by Renato
Virrey Laygo, PO3 Enrico Pilapil Tapalla and PO1 Dan R. Gonzales; Request for Forensic
Examination; Chemistry Report No. BD-063-09; and inventory of Confiscated/Seized Item
cannot be set aside by the alleged agreement of the parties.
The finding of probable cause for violations of Sec 11, Article 2, Republic Act 9165 and Article
151, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code against Alejandro Guevarra.
Lipa City, November 6, 2009.
ALI JASMIN BADIOLA-MANALANG

Investigating Prosecutor
Approved:
GIL PUYAT LACANARIA

City Prosecutor
Copy furnished:
Alejandro Guevarra
Renato Virrey Laygo
PO3 Enrico Pilapil Tapalla
PO1 Dan R. Gonzales

National Capital Judicial Region
Branch 85, Lipa City
ARTURO F. GATCHALIAN,
Plaintiff,
-versus- CRIM CASE NO. 0029-2009
ABDRES GUERRA Y ABROGAR,
Defendant.
x---------------------------------------x
MTOTION FOR ISSUANCE OF HOLD DEPARTURE ORDER
Complainant, unto this Honorable Court, respectfully moves for the issuance of a hold departure order
against accused ANDRES GUERRA Y ABROGAR and in support thereof states:
1. That she is the complainant in Criminal Case No. 0029-2009 against ANDRES GUERRA Y
ABROGAR;
2. That on March 11, 2009 Honorable Judge Florencio S. Arellano issued a warrat of arrest against
accused;
3. That accused has been hiding since then January 2009 and his non-apprehension has somehow
frustrated the ends of justice;
4. That there is a distinct poswsibility that he will go outside the country to evade the long arm of
the law as per information and affidavit executed by the private complainant;
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that this motion be granted.
Lipa City, June 25, 2010.
NERISSA IDA BADANA
Second Assistant City Prosecutor
MCLE Compliance II –No 00019833
Dated May 6, 2010
RTC – Branch 85, Lipa City
Greetings:
Please submit the foregoing Motion to the HOnorable Court immediately upon receipt hereof for its
consideration and approval.
NERISSA IDA BADANA
Second Assistant City Prosecutor
MCLE Compliance II –No 00019833
Dated May 6, 2010

Branch 85
Lipa City
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, CIVIL CASE NO. 09-0281

Plaintiff, For: Qualified Theft
-versus-
MARISSA A. ADVINCULA
Accused.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
MOTION FOR LEAVE OF COURT WITH MOTION FOR

DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE
ACCUSED, by counsel, to this Honourable Court, most respectfully states, THAT –

1. The prosecution has terminated the presentation of its evidence. It formally offered its
evidence with a manifestation that upon admission by this Honorable Court, it rests its
case.
2. It is solemn mandate of the Constitution that an accused is presumed innocent until the
contrary is proven. In order to overcome the said presumption nothing but proof beyond
reasonable doubt must be established by the prosecution. The burden is never shifted to
the accused or diminished by the weakness of the defense. For indeed, unless the
prosecution discharges that burden, the accused need not even offer evidence in his
behalf. He would be entitled to an acquittal. (people v Garcia, 215 SCRA 349)
3. In the instant case, the prosecution absolutely failed to overcome the constitutional
presumption of innocence of the accused. The evidence it presented is insufficient to
establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
3.1 The highly improbable theory of the prosecution was not substantiated.
3.2 The prosecution relied primarily on hearsay, self-serving and inadmissible evidence
to prove its case.
3.3 None of the testimonies of the prosecution’s witnesses, as well as the documents
offered as evidence, directly, or even logically, point to the accused as the perpetrator
of the crime charged.
3.4 The testimonies of the prosecution’s key witnesses are inconsistent and contradictory
on material points so as to make their testimonies worthless as evidence.
3.5 In sum, the bottom line is that there is gross insufficiency of evidence to sustain the
indictment or to support a verdict of the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
4 All the foregoing discussions, coupled by the fact of failure of the prosecution to properly
offer its exhibits formally, clearly show that the prosecution has miserably failed to prove its
case and to overcome the presumption of innocence of the accused.
The presumption can be overcome only by competent and credible proof beyond reasonable
doubt. The reasonable doubt should necessarily pertain to the facts constitutive of the crime
charged. Discrepancies that touch on significant factors, such as those pointed out above, are
crucial on the guilt or innocence of an accused. In criminal prosecution, a reasonable doubt
can be created by many things; it is sufficient to prevent a conviction if the doubt arises from
the evidence adduced or from the lack of evidence. While no test definitely determines which
is and which is not considered reasonable under the law, it must necessarily involve genuine
and irreconcilable contradictions based, not on suppositional thinking, but on the hard facts
constituting the elements of the crime. And these are what the doubt created in this case is
based on. It is not mere possible doubt but intelligent, reasonable and impartial doubt based
on a careful examination and conscious consideration of all the evidence in the case. It is
that state of the case which, after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence
leaves the mind of the judge in that condition that he cannot say that he feels an abiding
conviction to a moral certainty of the truth of the crime charged. Absolute certainty is not
demanded by the law to convict of any criminal charge but moral certainty is required, and
this certainty must be every proposition of proof requisite to constitute the offense. 33
5 The constitutional presumption of innocence is not an empty platitude meant only to

embellish the Bill of Rights. Its purpose is to balance the scales in what would otherwise be
an uneven contest between the lone individual (the accused) pitted against the People of the
Philippines and all the resources at their command. Its inexorable mandate is that, for all the
authority and influence of the prosecution, the accused must be acquitted and set free if
his/her guilt cannot be proved beyond the whisper of a doubt. The presumption of innocence
can only be rebutted by proof beyond reasonable doubt. In order to convict an accused, the
circumstances of the case must exclude all and each and every hypothesis consistent with his
innocence. For the slightest possibility of an innocent man being convicted for an offense he
has not committed would be far more dreadful than letting a guilty person go unpunished for
a crime he may have perpetrated
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed that leave of court be granted
to the accused for him to file a demurrer to evidence.
Other reliefs just and equitable under the premises are being prayed for.
Lipa City, March 16, 2009
JAYSON BARRETO CAGTAHAN

Camia Street, City Park Subdivision
Sabang 4217 Lipa City
Roll of Attorneys 67167
PTR No. 9828287/LIpa City/1-5-2009
IBP No. 25633/1-05-2009
MCLE Compliance No. II-0008371
The Clerk of Court

This Court
Greetings:
Please submit the foregoing Motion to the HOnorable Court immediately upon receipt hereof for
its consideration and approval.
JASON BARRETO CAGTAHAN

Branch ___________
Pasig City
- versus -
MARISSA A. ADVINCULA,
Accused.
x ----------------------------------------x
DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE
ACCUSED, through counsel, unto this Honorable Court respectfully moves for the
dismissal of the charge against her of Qualified Theft on the following grounds:
1. The highly improbable theory of the prosecution was not substantiated.
2. The prosecution relied primarily on hearsay, self-serving and inadmissible

evidence to prove its case.
3. None of the testimonies of the prosecution’s witnesses, as well as the documents

offered as evidence, directly, or even logically, point to the accused as the
perpetrator of the crime charged.
4. The testimonies of the prosecution’s key witnesses are inconsistent and

contradictory on material points so as to make their testimonies worthless as
evidence.
5. In sum, the bottom line is that there is gross insufficiency of evidence to sustain
the indictment or to support a verdict of the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt.
I. PREFATORY STATEMEMENT
1. This is a case of Qualified Theft filed against the herein accused, Marissa Advincula,
former Customer Relations Assistant (CRA) of the Greenhills Branch of AB Banking
Corporation, filed by Carmela Collantes, then Senior Manager of the Audit
Examination Department of said bank, in behalf of the bank as private complainant.
2. Curiously and worthy of note is the fact that the charge was filed shortly following
charges of incriminatory machination and intriguing against honor filed by the accused
herself against the officers of the bank branch of private complainant where the
accused used to work. 1
3. Criminal prosecution is a process whereby the accused is proceeded against for an

alleged commission of an offense as indicted in the information. In this wise, an
accused is a lone person defending himself/herself against the full machinery of the
State and the People of the Philippines. Consequently, all the necessary defenses and
principles allowed under the law which may exculpate him/her from criminal
liability should be applied in his/her favor. The time-honored doctrine is that an
accused should be convicted, not on the basis of the weakness of his defense, but on
the strength of the prosecution’s evidence itself.
4. Accordingly, an accused is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved beyond

reasonable doubt. This presumption prevails unless overturned by competent and
credible proof which the State is required to establish on all the essential elements of
the crime with which the defendant is charged in the indictment, and to establish
beyond reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty of said crime. It is necessary that
unless the preponderance of evidence points beyond the shadow of a doubt to his guilt,
the accused is entitled to an acquittal. 2 For the evidence to be considered sufficient, it
must prove (a) the commission of the crime, and (b) the precise degree of
participation by the accused. 3
5. It must be noted at the very outset that the charge of qualified theft of which the
accused is charged hinges entirely and exclusively on the fantastic tale the private
complainant persists to parlay that the accused succeeded in completely deceiving
her superiors at the Greenhills branch of the complainant bank into believing that
the cash collection covered by each of the bank’s official receipts covering the
transactions that are the subject of this case was pocketed by the accused, and that
she (the accused) did this on 644 separate occasions during her stint as Customer
Relations Assistant at said bank for a period of about one year and a half—a gothic
story that defies human reason and insults one’s intelligence.
6. Worse, the prosecution attempted to prove its impossible theory, not by adducing
evidence establishing “the precise degree of participation by the accused” as
required by the Supreme Court in each and every act of the crime of which she
stands charged but by wild presumptions and illogical inferences to show an alleged
criminal pattern based on circumstantial or indirect evidence that does not even
pass the test of admissibility.
II. THE CHARGE AGAINST THE ACCUSED
The Amended Information filed with this Honorable Court on April 27, 2000, charging
Marissa Advincula with the crime of Qualified Theft, reads as follows:
“On or about or sometime between January 1995 to May 1996, in San Juan, Metro
Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with
intent to gain and without the knowledge and consent of the owner, being then an
employee of AB Banking Corporation’s Greenhills Branch, who was assigned to
handle the collection and remittance of Safety Deposit box (SDB) rental accounts of
the Bank’s customer and with grave abuse of confidence reposed on her by her
employer, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry
away cash money amounting to P314,760.00, belonging to AB Corporation,
represented by Carmela Collantes to the damage and prejudice of the latter in the said
amount of P314,760.00.
“Contrary to law.”
III. DISCUSSION AND ARGUMENTS
1. On March 2, 2004, the prosecution rested its case, at least preliminarily (the complete
resting of the prosecution’s case being upon the court’s resolution of the Formal Offer
and Objections thereto 4 ) through a Formal Offer of Exhibits. In the
Comments/Objections to Prosecution’s Formal Offer filed by the accused on April 6,
2004, it emphasized the non-inclusion of several alleged exhibits in the Prosecution’s
Formal Offer, which deprives her of the right to object thereto, as follows:
a. “The prosecution alleges in page 116 of the Formal Offer that the first set of
documents offered for a common purpose starts from Exhibit ‘A’ up to Exhibit ‘P25-
3,’ while the first set actually attached in the formal offer of Exhibits is only from
Exhibit ‘A’ to Exhibit ‘P17-3.’
b. “Contrary to the prosecution’s allegations, there are no portions of Exhibits ‘A’ to

‘D22-3’ which are marked as Exhibits ‘A-1’ to ‘D22-1.’
c. “There are also no portions therein marked as Exhibits ‘A-2’ to ‘D22-2’ contrary to the
prosecution’s allegations.
d. “There are no initials of Carolyn Lim (the accused) in any portion of each of the
documents comprising Exhibits ‘A’ to ‘P25-3’ contrary to the prosecution’s
allegations.”
2. Arguing further on the matter, the accused went on by discussing that these exhibits
are misleading as they are not what the prosecution alleges them to be and that the
above-identified documents, alleged but not found in the formal offer of the
prosecution, may not be considered as having been formally offered. Under the Rules,
the court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered (Rule 132,
sec. 35). A formal offer is necessary, since judges are required to base their findings of
fact and their judgment solely and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties at
the trial. Opposing parties would be deprived of their chance to examine the document
and to object to its admissibility if this procedure were not followed.
3. In an order dated April 20, 2004, the Honorable Court, confirming the abovecited
objections, returned to the prosecution its Formal Offer of Evidence due to the finding
that some exhibits listed in the Covering Pleading of said Formal Offer were missing
as attachments.
4. Hence, in a hearing of this case dated April 27, 2004, the prosecution withdrew its
Formal Offer for the same reasons stated above. Thus, the accused was constrained to
also withdraw its Comments and Objections in order to adjust its allegations according
to the additional exhibits that were supposed to be attached in the Formal Offer. The
Court, therefore, issued an order giving the prosecution a period of thirty (30) days
within which to file its Formal Offer, and the accused with the same period from
receipt of a copy of the Formal Offer to file its Objections and Comments thereto, after
which the matter shall be deemed submitted for resolution.
5. Subsequently, the prosecution asked, and the court granted, in an order dated July 16,
2004, another fifteen (15) day period from receipt of said order to file its Formal Offer,
giving the prosecution more than ample time to complete its offer.
6. Counsel for the accused received a copy of the prosecution’s NEW Formal Offer of
Evidence on August 3, 2004. Amazingly, this new Formal Offer, consisting of 123
pages, comprises the Cover Pleading only. It failed not only to complete the
attachments as required by this Court, but altogether omitted every and all exhibits
described therein.
7. Despite the fact that the previous Formal Offer (filed by the prosecution on March 3,
2004) has been withdrawn and, thus, considered stricken off the records of the case,
the NEW Formal Offer did not contain any attachment of any documentary evidence,
which effectively deprives the accused of any opportunity to object to any of the
alleged exhibits submitted by the prosecution.
8. Additionally, after a circumspect and painstaking scrutiny, it was found out that the
changes in the cover pleading (as discussed in the accused’s Objections/Comments to
Prosecution’s Formal Offer) constitute only insertions of some exhibits with similar
purposes as the first Formal Offer. The fact that no documentary evidence, originally
attached in the previous formal Formal Offer or otherwise, has been attached in this
new Formal Offer renders the foregoing changes immaterial and inconsequential.
It has not cured, even in the slightest degree, the defects of the previous Formal
Offer of the prosecution which has been excluded by this Honorable Court.
9. Moreover, the introduction of the foregoing changes did not affect the purposes for the
offer of the documentary evidence as there has been no changes whatsoever in the
discussion of the purposes for said offer.
10. It should be stressed that the new Formal Offer did not even incorporate by reference
the incomplete attachments of the previous Formal Offer of Exhibits.
11. On these scores, as this Court has expressed in its July 16, 2004 Order “Failure to
comply within the reglementary period will be considered as a waiver of the
prosecution’s right.” The submission of the Formal Offer by the prosecution, although
made in time, is, in fact, not a compliance at all.
12. The failure of the prosecution to offer a complete exhibit in the previous Formal Offer
and its failure to submit any exhibit on the new Formal Offer should be deemed a
waiver of its right to do so. The delay of the proceedings in this case due to the
unjustified lapses in the prosecution’s offer of evidence has been clearly vexatious
and oppressive, constitutive of a violation of the right to a speedy trial of the
accused.
13. Nevertheless, maintaining the above arguments, if only to obviate any further possible
delay, and in the event that the Honorable Court, for whatever judicious and just
reason there may be, would find no merit in the above discussion, or if the Court
would consider the attachments in the previous Formal Offer as deemed incorporated
in the second Formal Offer, the accused, without admitting the propriety of the new
Formal Offer, interposed its comments and objections both to the withdrawn and the
new Formal Offer of Exhibits of the prosecution. Thus, the following arguments and
discussion in support of the demurrer:
1. The highly improbable theory of the

prosecution was not substantiated.
The prosecution, during the presentation of its evidence, adduced 643 separate official
receipts issued by the complainant bank for safety deposit box (SDB) payments
purportedly aggregating P314,760.00, which was allegedly misappropriated/taken by
the accused, on 644 separate occasions, continuously, surreptitiously, unnoticed and
undetected during a long span of approximately eighteen months. These documents
were, however, not offered in the new Formal Offer of Evidence. At most, they were
offered incompletely in the prosecution’s first Formal Offer.
The prosecution attempts to convince the Court, without properly offering these
exhibits, that these documents, on their face, prove that the accused actually stole the
money covered by the receipts—patently a reductio ad absurdum.
Even assuming for argument’s sake that these documents were formally offered,
nowhere in these official receipts is there any sign or indication that the monies
covered by the receipts were stolen or pocketed by the accused. On the contrary, the
official receipts, each signed by a senior official of the bank, prove conclusively that
the complainant bank actually received the money and not an iota of evidence was
independently adduced to suggest, much less to directly prove, that the accused
removed any part of the money from the complainant bank’s possession.
The Supreme Court, in evaluating the value of official receipts, has this to say:
“These documents are not mere scraps of paper bereft of probative value but vital
pieces of evidence of commercial transactions. They are written memorials of the
details of the consummation of contracts.” 5
In addition to said receipts, the prosecution presented, at least in the first Formal Offer,
subsidiary ledgers 6 allegedly to prove that payments for SDB rentals and deposits for
keys were not remitted nor reported by the accused as income in the general ledger and
that the accused did not prepare income tickets on SDB rentals and deposits for keys,
much less had them validated by the tellers, which allegedly would have shown that
such collections were received by the private complainant. 7 The said subsidiary
ledgers, however, are nothing more but “index cards,” 8 not accountable official
records required by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and therefore subject easily
to fabrication or manipulation—and, furthermore, self-serving and inadmissible as
evidence.
Also, the prosecution, contrary to its allegations, did not attach “A-1” to “D22-1 and
“A-2” to “D-2” to D22-2 in its previous Formal Offer of Evidence. Worse, it did not
attach even one exhibit in its new Formal Offer.
Nevertheless, the sum of these documents merely shows, at best, that the accused is
guilty of violating standard banking procedures, never to be taken as a crime. It does
not prove, in any way, that the accused pocketed or carted away sums of money owned
by the complainant bank.
Ironically, the prosecution, while maintaining that the accused should have observed
standard banking procedures, admits emphatically, and relies on it as an argument, to
establish the guilt of the accused, that the complainant bank itself is deficient in
enforcing such procedures, an express admission of guilt of mismanagement.
In aid of its flimsy demonstration of the guilt of the accused through the official
receipts and subsidiary ledgers, the prosecution took refuge in the allegation that it was
due to the defects in the implementation of banking procedures by the private
complainant itself that facilitated the accused’s commission of the alleged offense.
This is, to use a figure of speech, turning the gun around and pointing it to the accused.
This argumentation of the prosecution should not be allowed to operate to the
prejudice of the accused. In fact, such allegation militates against the private
complainant as it merely bolsters the fact that the procedures followed in the bank is
vulnerable to abuse by anyone among its employees, including the witnesses
themselves or even the higher officials within the complainant bank having access to
the subject monies. It is enigmatic why the private complainant limited its imputation
to just the accused when the monies allegedly lost were also accessible to the other
employees. And this is all because of the self-declared “deficiency in the procedures”
of complainant bank. It behooves a rational mind to think that the case was filed only
against the accused as a vengeful afterthought against the latter’s earlier filing of a
case against her superiors in the bank—or that her accusers did so as a
conspirational coverup for their own misdeeds.
2. The prosecution relied primarily
on hearsay, self-serving and inadmissible
evidence to prove its case.
A person should testify only as to the facts which he/she knows of his/her personal
knowledge . 9 Any other testimonial evidence outside the witness’ personal knowledge
is hearsay and downright inadmissible. 10
The prosecution’s principal witness and accuser, Carmela Collantes, did not have
personal knowledge of what had really transpired during the time of the alleged
commission of each and every act of qualified theft. She only based her statements and
factual assessments on the records and stories presented and conveyed to her by the
employees in complainant bank’s employ, which cannot avoid the obvious taint of bias
and partiality. Consequently, her testimony as a whole has no probative value at all.
The general rule is that hearsay evidence is not admissible. Admissibility of evidence
should not be equated with weight of evidence. Hearsay evidence whether objected to
or not cannot be given credence for it has no probative value. 11
Aside from supervising the audit examination of the bank records allegedly covered by
the questioned transactions, witness Collantes interviewed Elsa Garcia, the Branch
Cashier, and the tellers and employees of the complainant bank, 12 the results of which
were submitted in her audit report, 13 in addition to the figures presented in relation to
the audited transactions. The report also contains baseless conclusions, among which
is that 562 official receipts, presented as prosecution evidence, were allegedly
prepared by the accused 14 without stating the basis of such conclusion as required
by the rules of evidence on signature authentication.
The audit report further contains such odd statements as the following:
“Some of the above officers, namely, Elsa Garcia, Branch Cashier, Carlos Peña,
Branch Operations Head and Ernie Santos, Acting Branch Manager claimed that
when the official receipts were presented to them for signature, there were times when
cash were inserted in the official receipt booklet and on occasions when there was no
cash, they thought the money was already given to the tellers.” 15 (underscoring
supplied)
Any reasonable-thinking person who happens to read this particular passage would
have guffawed at this laughable story were it not for the fact that it involves a serious
matter—which should be dismissed outright.
Paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 under the title “B.” Subsequent Events/Actions Taken” on
page 2 of the report, and paragraphs 2, 3 a), b), c) and d) under the title “II. Findings”
on page 3 and 4 of the same Audit Report (attached in the first Prosecution’s Formal
Offer but not in the second one) are all hearsay and inadmissible as evidence to prove
the truth of the allegations thereof. Assuming arguendo that the said findings are
admissible, they are simply incapable of constituting direct proof of the guilt of the
accused as they only lead to general conclusions inconclusive of the fact that the
accused took monies from the bank. Moreover, the proceedings employed to arrive
at such findings are internal and administrative in the bank, very susceptible to bias
and partiality and with very limited rights provided for the accused.
The only material point on which witness Collantes reported on her own personal
knowledge is found in paragraph 7 on page 3, and this is favorable to the accused. The
paragraph is quoted below:
“7. On June 6, 1996, Marissa Advincula, accompanied by her father, Mr. Antonio Lim,
came to the Head Office for a meeting with representatives of HRMDD, Legal Group,
BRAD and Audit where she denied any knowledge or participation in the non-
remittance of SDB collections. She even accused the Branch officers and staff of
staging a conspiracy against her. When Carolyn was asked for what reason, she cited
that maybe because she was requesting to be transferred to other branches since last
year but her request was denied.” (emphasis supplied)
When witness Collantes conducted the audit examination of the transactions in
question, she was a Senior Auditor holding office at the complainant bank’s head
office, not an operation officer at the bank branch where the accused was working.
How could she personally have known what happened in the handling of safety
deposit box accounts of the bank branch when she was not there personally? How
could she suggest that the accused, tricked, deceived or manipulated her superiors at
the bank? How could she say or suggest that the accused succeeded in
misappropriating the safety deposit box collections subject of the alleged crime?
3. None of the testimonies of the
prosecution’s witnesses, as well
as the documents allegedly offered as
evidence, directly, or even logically, point
to the accused as the perpetrator of
the crime charged.
The bulk of the documents offered in the first Formal Offer of the prosecution consists
of safety deposit box official receipts evidencing, as earlier mentioned, the fact that the
complainant bank actually received, through its authorized officers, the amounts
covered by the documents. Instead of implicating the accused, the receipts totally
exculpate her of the crime attributed to her.
Receipts, to repeat what we previously said, are not mere scraps bereft of probative
value but vital pieces of evidence of commercial transactions. They are written
memorials of the details of the consummation of the contracts. 16
Also included in the documents offered in the previous Formal Offer as prosecution
evidence are charts, copies of bank procedures allegedly violated by the accused, and
the computer printouts allegedly reflecting the questioned transactions. Assuming that
they were formally offered, all of them are self-serving and inadmissible evidence.
They are non-accountable and sequentially unnumbered documents which by
themselves will not prove the commission of the crime and therefore inadmissible as
such in evidence. None of them will induce a reasonable mind to conclude that the
accused is guilty of the crime charged against her.
“Self-serving declarations are not admissible in evidence as proof of the facts asserted,
whether they arose by implications from acts and conduct or were made orally or
hearsay character. Furthermore, such declarations are untrustworthy, and to permit
their introduction in evidence would open the door to frauds and perjuries.” 17
Nor do these documents prove the facts they seek to establish the purpose of the
offer. At best, what they demonstrate is the tolerance of the officers of private
complainant in the defects of its own procedures. It is rather an utter admission of
the bank’s negligence that forecloses its right to protest against its unfavorable
effects.
Conversely, said documents only bolster the fact that the system within the bank is
readily vulnerable to abuse and exploitation by anyone, including the officers and
employees of the private complainant and the prosecution witnesses themselves.
It may not serve the same purposes sought even if considered as part of the testimonies
of witnesses Edna Garcia, Branch Cashier, and Ernie Santos, Acting Branch Manager.
Witnesses Garcia and Santos are biased witnesses as they have been charged by the
accused of another offense prior to the execution of their respective affidavits. Not to
mention that they are employees of the complainant bank. Necessarily, the contents of
their affidavits would be defensive and exculpatory at the expense of the accused. The
possibility exists that their accusation and testimonies are mere cover-ups for the
crimes for which the accused is charged—which may have been committed by others
within the bank, not excluding the witnesses themselves.
The same is true with the Teller’s Entry allegedly prepared by witness Rose Gadia,
teller, marked in exhibit as “W’ to “W’-5A” in the previous Formal Offer, purportedly
to prove that Gadia did not receive the cash or process the transaction of client Peter
LI, as SDB lessee, for Php700.00 as rental for SDB 1064. This clearly does not prove
what it purports to prove. It is, moreover, incompetent and irrelevant evidence. The
veracity and authenticity of the entries and other contents thereof were never
established in accordance with the rules. Not being accountable forms, they can
easily be selectively manipulated or even fabricated to serve the complainant bank’s
or the witnesses’ own personal purposes.
In the case of the testimonies and depositions in the affidavits of Gadia and the tellers
of the branch concerned of the complainant bank at the time the questioned
transactions took place, it should be noted that not any one of them directly pointed to
the accused as having actually misappropriated the funds supposed to have been stolen
by her. In other words, there was no “smoking gun.” All they did was to deny that the
funds covered by the official receipts and income tickets ID-stamped by them were
actually received by them as allegedly evidenced by lack of their initials. This again is
at best specious logic and at worst a ridiculous and futile argument. Why would they
ID-stamp the income tickets covering safety deposit box collections when they did not
actually receive the money? What was the purpose of, and the point in, going through
this exercise? No right-thinking and impartial observer would have ever conceived of
the reason for such act other than to indicate receipt of the monies covered by the
income tickets. It should furthermore be noted that the witnesses were and still are
employees of the complainant bank and therefore biased and under moral pressure to
testify in favor of their employer.
One final point on the matter that should be brought out is the hesitant manner or
demeanor of the witnesses, which the court may have observed.
4. The testimonies of the prosecution’s
key witnesses are inconsistent and
contradictory on material points so as to
make their testimonies worthless as
evidence.
a. The contradictions in the testimony of prosecution and key witness Edna Garcia, the
bank cashier.
On the witness stand, prosecution witness Garcia testified:
1. In explaining the procedure observed in the handling of Safety Deposit Box rental
payments, that: “First, the Custom(er) Relations Assistant would ask the client to give
the money to the teller… The client goes to the teller where the client makes the
payment…” 18
This directly contradicts the line peddled under oath by the other prosecution
witnesses 19 that the accused, as CRA, invariably received or took delivery of SDB
clients’ rental payments. This testimony even bolsters the fact that, in fact and in
truth, the accused received no money from the bank’s customers.
2. That after the CRA had prepared the income ticket, “the teller presents it to the bank
official for validation.” 20
This again directly contradicts the testimonies of other prosecution witnesses 21

regarding the procedure in the handling of SDB rental payments to the effect that
the CRA, not the teller, presents the income ticket to the bank official for validation.
b. Drafting of the Notice of Investigation
Carlos Peña, Branch Operations Head of the Greenhills Branch of complainant bank,
at first testified on the witness stand that, on instructions of Ernie Santos, the Acting
Branch Manager, he “requested one of my [his] staff to type the Notice of
Investigation [to the accused]” and then “directly handed it to Mr. Santos.” 22
Fourteen days later, on February 5, 2001, the witness changed his testimony by saying
that he referred the matter first to “our Legal,” and then “drafted it first” 23 before
giving it to a staff member for typing.
When asked under cross-examination on February 5, 2001 why he still thought it

proper to conduct an investigation of the alleged anomaly in the handling of the Peter
Li account when he, together with Edna Garcia, believed that the accused practically
confessed to him and to Garcia her guilt, Peña made this out-of-this-world response;
“xxx we were just trying to get information from her [fishing expedition?] xxx usap-
usapan lang.” 24 [translation: “It is just mere talk.”]
At any rate, it is essential to note that the effect of this investigation is irrelevant
and baseless evidence, containing mere unfounded self-serving surmises on the
guilt of the accused. The findings in said investigation are immaterial and not
binding in these proceedings. The investigation held by the bank representatives
is expected to be biased in favor of the bank. Although there purports to be
opportunity for the accused to be heard, the partiality of the jury (composed of
officers of the bank itself) rendered such opportunity futile and nugatory.
c. Time of meeting of senior branch staff with the accused on May 29, 1996.
Branch Operations Head Peña testified on February 5, 2001 that he, along with the
other senior branch staff and the accused, had a meeting in the office of Acting Branch
Manager Santos on the alleged anomaly concerning the SDB rental payment of bank
client Peter Li ”at around 11:00 A.M.” and that the Notice of Investigation was
presented to the accused at 11:30 A.M. or 12:00 noon during said meeting. 25
On the other hand, Acting Branch Manager Santos, under direct examination, declared
that the meeting actually took place at 10:00 A.M., not 11:00 A.M. 26 — a full one
hour difference from the meeting time testified to by Carlos Peña.
The contradictory statements of the prosecution’s key witnesses touch on a very

material point, suggesting that either or both of them were lying through their teeth.
d. Content of the Notice of Investigation.
Prosecution witness Peña said on the witness stand on February 5, 2001 that the Notice
of Investigation issued to the accused was in connection with the case of Mr. Peter Li.
When cross-examined, however, he admitted that there was nothing such contained in
the said Notice, 27 a fact verified by an examination of the document. For his part,
Acting Branch Manager, Santos never mentioned a thing about it.
This particular matter is likewise very material, since it is customary, nay required
standard operating procedure, that a notice of investigation must indicate the purpose
of the investigation, the absence of which exposes the person to be investigated to an
ambush in gross violation of his/her right to due process.
e. Bank Procedures.
In his testimony on February 5, 2001, Branch Operations Head Carlos Peña declared
that he was ignorant of changes in procedures instituted by Branch Cashier Edna
Garcia because he was not informed about such changes, implying that Ms Garcia
could change the procedures without the necessity of informing him. 28
It is completely unbelievable that an Operations Head is not informed of changes of

procedures in his own turf.
f. The Crying Incident.
Acting Branch Manager Santos testified that the accused cried inside his office while
the meeting was being conducted. 29
On the other hand, Edna Garcia declared on the witness stand that the crying incident
took place before the meeting and not in the office of Acting Branch Manager
Santos. Operations Head Peña was silent about the matter.
Again, contradictory statements on a very material matter, which usually happen when
a story is concocted in conspiracy.
Ms Garcia also supposedly had the following exchange of words with the accused as
follows:
“Ms Marissa Advincula [accused] cried and told me, among others, that “NOON PA
DURING THE DAYS WHEN KA CLOSE KO SI GINA. SABI NGA NG KA CLOSE KO
PAG KAILANGAN KO NG PERA, GANITO AND GAWIN KO.”[Translation: “Even
then when I was close to Gina. She said that whenever I need money, this is what I
should do.”] She further told me that one of the reasons why she requested for transfer
to another branch is because she could not control herself from doing it anymore. She
even told me “FEELING KO ANG GALING-GALING KO NA. HINDI NILA AKO
NAHUHULI.” 30 [Translation: “I felt I was very good. They cannot catch me.”]
This is an unnatural and preposterous exchange, if such exchange ever took place,
which even caught the unusual attention of the court when the alleged exchange of
words was narrated by the witness.
All the foregoing inconsistencies and contradictions on material points in the
testimonies of the key witnesses negate their value as evidence.
“Inconsistencies such as these in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses have been

known to happen, and indeed acquittals have been the result where the
inconsistencies and self-contradictions dealt with material points as to altogether
erode the credibility of the witness.” 31
“Moreover, when the alleged eyewitnesses contradict themselves, then the element
of reasonable doubt is injected and cannot be lightly disregarded.” 32
5. In sum, the bottom line is that there is
gross insufficiency of evidence to
sustain the indictment or to support a
verdict of the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt.
All the foregoing discussions, coupled by the fact of failure of the prosecution to
properly offer its exhibits formally, clearly show that the prosecution has miserably
failed to prove its case and to overcome the presumption of innocence of the accused.
The presumption can be overcome only by competent and credible proof beyond
reasonable doubt. The reasonable doubt should necessarily pertain to the facts
constitutive of the crime charged. Discrepancies that touch on significant factors, such
as those pointed out above, are crucial on the guilt or innocence of an accused. In
criminal prosecution, a reasonable doubt can be created by many things; it is sufficient
to prevent a conviction if the doubt arises from the evidence adduced or from the lack
of evidence. While no test definitely determines which is and which is not considered
reasonable under the law, it must necessarily involve genuine and irreconcilable
contradictions based, not on suppositional thinking, but on the hard facts constituting
the elements of the crime. And these are what the doubt created in this case is based
on. It is not mere possible doubt but intelligent, reasonable and impartial doubt
based on a careful examination and conscious consideration of all the evidence in
the case. It is that state of the case which, after the entire comparison and
consideration of all the evidence leaves the mind of the judge in that condition that he
cannot say that he feels an abiding conviction to a moral certainty of the truth of the
crime charged. Absolute certainty is not demanded by the law to convict of any
criminal charge but moral certainty is required, and this certainty must be every
proposition of proof requisite to constitute the offense. 33
The constitutional presumption of innocence is not an empty platitude meant only to
embellish the Bill of Rights. Its purpose is to balance the scales in what would
otherwise be an uneven contest between the lone individual (the accused) pitted
against the People of the Philippines and all the resources at their command. Its
inexorable mandate is that, for all the authority and influence of the prosecution, the
accused must be acquitted and set free if his/her guilt cannot be proved beyond the
whisper of a doubt. The presumption of innocence can only be rebutted by proof
beyond reasonable doubt. In order to convict an accused, the circumstances of the case
must exclude all and each and every hypothesis consistent with his innocence. For the
slightest possibility of an innocent man being convicted for an offense he has not
committed would be far more dreadful than letting a guilty person go unpunished for a
crime he may have perpetrated.
At this point, it is well worth repeating what we said at the outset: The prosecution
attempted to prove its impossible theory, not by adducing evidence establishing “the
precise degree of participation by the accused” as required by the Supreme Court in
the case of Gutib vs. Court of Appeals 34 in each and every act of the crime of which
she stands charged but by wild presumptions and illogical inferences to show an
alleged criminal pattern based on circumstantial or indirect evidence that does not
even pass the test of admissibility.
We beg to end this exposition by asking the crucial question: Why is it that, out of
643 separate SDB transactions subject of this case, the complainant bank did not
produce a single witness who participated in any of these transactions, such as, for
example, Peter Li, the handling of whose SDB payment was allegedly thoroughly
investigated by the complainant, to testify definitively to whom among the bank
employees concerned his/her SDB cash payment was actually given or delivered?
Why? Why?
In light of the foregoing discussions, the accused stands on firm ground that the weight
of evidence of the prosecution against her lacks sufficient strength to convict her and
thus should fall by itself.
IV. PRAYER
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that this Honorable Court issue an order
DISMISSING the case against the accused for failure of the prosecution to establish
proof beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.
August 31, 2004, San Juan, M. M. for Lipa City City.

PTR No. 9828287/LIpa City/1-5-2009
IBP No. 25633/1-05-2009
1
Exhibits “W25 PT” for the prosecution (counter affidavits of Ernie Santos) and Exh.
“T-25 PT” (counter affidavit of Elsa Garcia)
2
People vs. Berroya, 89 SCAD 674.
3
Gutib vs. Court of Appeals G. R. No. 131209, August 13, 1999
4
Cornelio Godoy Vs. Hon. Court Of Appeals [G.R. No. 80814. August 30, 1988.]
5
G.R. No. 135657 January 17, 2001 Jose V. Lagon vs. Hooven Comalco Industries,
Inc.
6
Contrary to prosecution’s allegations, there are no portions of Exhibits “A” to “D22-3
which are marked as Exhibits “A-1” to “D22-1 and “A-2” to “D-2” to D22-2;
7
Prosecution’s Formal Offer of Evidence, page 116
8
TSN, February 5, 2001, p.18
9
Rule 130 Section 36 of the Rules of Court.
10
(People vs. Bautista, G. R. No. 111149, September 5, 1997).
11
People vs. Parungao, G. R. No. 125812, November 28, 1996.
12
TSN August 8, 2001, page 9
13
Exhibits “V” to “V-18” of the prosecution
14
3rd paragraph of page 5 of the report
15
3rd paragraph of page 6 of the report)
16
Legon vs. Hooven Comalco Industries, Inc. (Jan. 17, 2001).
17
Restaurante Las Conchas vs. Llego; [G.R. No. 119085. September 9, 1999.]
18
TSN, December 18, 2000, p. 3, 2nd par.
19
Collantes, TSN Feb. 20. 2002, pp. 12-13
20
TSN, Dec. 18, 2000, p. 3, 8th par.
21
Gadia, October 7, 2003 TSN, p. 8
22
TSN, Jan. 22, 2001, p. 8, pars. 4 and 6
23
TSN, Feb. 5, 2001, p. 7, last par., and p. 9, 2nd par.
24
TSN, Feb. 5, 2001, p. 23, last par.
25
TSN, February 5, 2001, p. 8, pars. 2 & 6
26
TSN, June 6, 2001, p. 4, par. 5
27
TSN , February 5, 2001, p. 9, par. 5 and last par.
28
TSN, February 5, 2001, p. 14, pars. 2 & 3.
29
TSN,June 6, 2001, p. 5., 15th par.
30
Exh. “T-25 (PT)” – (Counter-Affidavit of Nellie Alar, p. 9, par. 2.21 and 2.22).
31
People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Joel Tañeza y Dacal, accused-
appelllant. [G.R. No. 121668. June 20, 2000].
32
People of the Philippines vs. Melchor dela Iglesia, [G.R. Nos. 110991-92. February
24, 1995.]
33
People vs. Lagmay, 105 SCAD 785.
34
G. R. No. 131209, August 13, 1999.

METROPOLITAN COURT OF MANILA
Branch 1

Plaintiff,
-versus- Crime Case No. 54965
For: Article 315- Estafa
RACHEL ANN DEJARME
Accused.
INFORMATION
The undersigned Prosecutor hereby accuses Rachel Ann Dejarme with having violated
Article 315, which she committed as follows: that on or about August 2009 in Taft Avenue,
Manila within jurisdiction of this Court, the accused did then and there, because of her position
as a manager of the Bank of the Philippine Islands, Taft Avenue, Manila committed the crime of
estafa, under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code.
Contrary to law.
Jose Santos
Assistant Fiscal
CERTIFICATION OF THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION

I hereby certify that a preliminary investigation in this case has been conducted by me in
accordance with law; that I have examined the complainant and her witnesses; that there is a
reasonable ground to believe that the offense charged has been committed; that the accused is
probably guilty thereof; that the accused was informed of the offense charged and was given the
opportunity to submit controverting evidence; and that the filing of this information is with the
prior authority and approval of the city fiscal.
DANILO BERNABE
Assistant Fiscal
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me on this 1 December 2009 in the City of Muntinlupa,
Philippines.
CHRISTOPHER RAGUINDIN
City Fiscal
List of Witnesses:
VILMA SANTOS
LUIS MANZANO

METROPOLITAN COURT OF MANILA
Branch 1

Plaintiff,
-versus- Crime Case No. 54965
For: Abduction with consent
RAYMUNDO S. IGNACIO
Accused.
x----------------------------------------------------x
INFORMATION
The undersigned Prosecutor hereby accuses Raymundo S. Ignacio of the Abduction with
Consent, under Article 343 of the Revised Penal Code, after having abducted Abigail Pizarro, 12
years of age, carried out with her consent and with lewd designs.
Contrary to Law.
Manila, August 13, 2009.
LADY DIANNE MANALOTO

Assistant Prosecutor
Roll No. 30967
IBP No. 55608 dated 1-2-09
APPROVED:
AMELIA DELA LLANA

Provincial Prosecutor
IBP No. 742475 dated 2-5-09
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have conducted a preliminary investigation in this case in

accordance with law, that I have examined the Complaint and the Sworn statements attached in
support thereof, that there is reasonable ground to believe that the offense charged has been
committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof; the subpoena with enclosures was sent
to the respondent; and that the filing of this information is with the prior authority and approval
of the Provincial Prosecutor.
ROMMEL GONONG
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 20th day of February 2008 at

Municipality of Tarangan, Province of Samar.
WITNESSES:
EDNA BAYOT, Barangay Sogod, Municipality of Tarangan

others

Branch _____________
Quezon City
HEIRS OF THE LATE ANDRES

LADIERO, namely EUNICE LADIERO,
EVELYN LADIERO
And EKATHLYN LADIERO,
Plaintiffs,
Civil Case No. 33546

-versus- For: Specific Performance
LOANSHARK BANKING CORP. And
MARIA SANTOS,
Defendants.
x----------------------------------------------------------x
COMPLAINT
PLAINTIFFS, by counsel, respectfully state:
1. Plaintiff Eunice Ladiero is of legal age, Filipino, and resident of No. 843 F Samat
Street, Mandaluyong City.
1.1. Plaintiff Evelyn Ladiero is of legal age, single, Filipino and a resident of the
same address
1.2. Plaintiff Ekathlyn Ladiero is of legal age, married, Filipino and a resident of the
same address.
1.3. Plaintiffs are the surviving spouse and children respectively as well as sole heirs
of the late Retired PNP General Andres Ladiero who died on 20 November 2007
at Quezon City.
Copies of the corresponding Death Certificate, Marriage Contract and Birth Certificates are
attached as Annexes A, B, C, and D, respectively.
2. Defendant Loanshark Banking Corporation (“Loanshark”) is a banking corporation
organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines with principal office at the
G/F Oceanworld Building, Quezon City where it may be served with summons and
other court processes.
2.1. Defendant Maria Santos is of legal age, married, Filipino and the incumbent
President of the defendant corporation and is of the same address as that of that
of the defendant corporation where they may be served with summons and other
court processes.
3. During his lifetime, the said deceased Andres Ladiero received from the defendant
corporation the attached Letter dated 20 August 2007 (Annex E hereof) showing that
the said decedent had a deposit account with the said bank.
4. For this reason, upon the death of the decedent, plaintiffs repeatedly requested
defendants for a Statement of Account on the said deposit for the purpose of
preparing an inventory of the estate of the late Andres Ladiero, paying the estate
taxes, and then demanding the release to them of the balance of the said deposit.
4.1. Plaintiffs submitted to defendants the Death Certificate of the decedent,
Marriage Contract, and Birth Certificates to prove not only that they are the sole
heirs of the late Andres Ladiero but also that the said deposit forms part of the
conjugal property of plaintiff Eunice Ladiero and the decedent.
5. Defendants, however, without any just and lawful cause to give the said Statement of
Accounting stating that they will only confirm such placements.
And produce documents related thereto upon receipt of a subpoena or court order.
Copy of the letter to this effect is attached as Annex F hereof.
6. The reason given by the defendants is manifestly unlawful and unjust considering that
plaintiff owned one half share thereof as her conjugal share while she and her co-
plaintiffs inherited the other half. The Secrecy of the Bank Deposit Laws provides
that a banking institution may even without court intervention give the information
regarding deposits if unauthorized by the owners of the deposits which are in the
present case, the plaintiffs.

7. By reason of the unlawful and unjust conduct of the defendants, plaintiffs are exposed
to the possibility of paying late payment interest and penalties on estate taxes and are
also constrained to needlessly engage counsel to file and prosecute this case for a fee
of PhP30,000.00 plus PhP5,000.00 per appearance.
8. Defendants should be assessed exemplary damages of at least Php50,000.00 to deter
other financial institutions from forcing surviving spouses and children and heirs to
undergo unnecessary expenses and difficulties before providing them information on
deposit/placements in the name of their deceased relatives.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that after due proceedings judgment be rendered
directing the defendants jointly and severally:
a.) To confirm to plaintiffs past and present deposits/placements in the name of the late
Andres Ladiero singly or jointly with other person or persons;
b.) To provide plaintiffs Statements of Accounts and all other documents pertinent to
such deposits/placements;
c.) To pay plaintiffs the late payment interests and penalties for estate taxes which
plaintiffs may be compelled pay the government;
d.) To pay plaintiffs attorney’s fees of PhP30,000.00 plus PhP5,000.00 per appearance
and other expenses of litigation;
e.) To pay plaintiffs exemplary damages of at least PhP50,000.00.

Other equitable relief are likewise prayed for.
Quezon City, 19 November 2007.
RONALDO VALDEZ
Counsel for the Plaintiffs
PTR # 1234567; 1/9/2001, QC
IBP # 654321; Quezon City
Lot 15, Block 7, Quezon Blvd.
Quezon City
VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION

OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING
We, EUNICE LADIERO, EVELYN LADIERO AND EKATHLYN LADIERO,

subscribing under oath, depose and state:
1. We are the plaintiffs in the foregoing complaint.

2. We have caused the preparation and filing of the foregoing complaint. We have read
and understood the foregoing pleading and all its allegations of fact are true and
correct of our own personal knowledge and based on authentic records.
3. We have not commenced nor caused the commencement of any other action or
proceedings involving the same issues raised herein before the Supreme Court, Court
of Appeals or any division thereof or any tribunal or agency; to the best of my
knowledge no such action is pending before the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals or
any tribunal or agency; and
4. That in the event that any action involving the same should be made known, we
hereby bind ourselves to report the same within five (5) days from knowledge thereof
to this Honorable Court.
WITNESS WHEREOF, we hereby affix our signature this 19th day of November 2007 at
Quezon City, Metro Manila, Philippines.
EUNICE LADIERO EVELYN LADIERO

CTC No. 53495568 CTC No. 5385593
Issued on April 6, 2007 Issued on August 5, 2007
Issued at Mandaluyong City Issued at Mandaluyong City
SSS I.D. No. 8305550334 SSS I.D. No. 33582559
Issued by SSS Issued by SSS
EKATHLYN LADIERO
CTC No. 54100043
Issued on August 1, 2007
Issued at Mandaluyong City
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 19th day of November, 2007 at Quezon
City affiants exhibited to me their Community Tax Certificate Nos. as well as their proof of
identity as indicated above.
Doc No. 445;

Page No. 89;
Book No. 16;
Series of 2007.

Quezon City
_________________________,
Plaintiff,
Civil Case No. __________For:
Rescission of Contract with
Damages
-versus-
_________________________,
Defendant.
x--------------------------------------------x
COMPLAINT
PLAINTIFF, through counsel, most frequently states:
1. That plaintiff is a Filipino, of legal age, single and residing at _____________,

whereas defendant is likewise Filipino, of legal age, single and residing at _______________,
at which addresses the parties herein may be served with summons and other court processes;
2. Plaintiff is engaged in the trading of rice, sugar and other merchandise while
defendant is the owner of the rice mill and is also engaged in the whole sale of different
varieties of rice;
3. On _________________, plaintiff entered into an agreement with the defendant

for the purchase of one thousand (1,000) cavans of Dinorado at the rate of One thousand two
hundred pesos (Php1,200.00) each;
4. Under the agreement, plaintiff shall pay a down payment equivalent to forty
percent (40%) of the total purchase price and the balance to Be paid when he picks up the
merchandise from defendant’s rice mill on June 30, 2005.
A copy of the agreement dated June 15, 2005 is hereunto attached as Annex “A” and
made an integral part hereof.
5. Pursuant to their agreement, plaintiff paid to defendant the amount of Four

Hundred Eighty Thousand Pesos (P480,000.00) representing the forty percent (40%)
downpayment.
A copy of the receipt issued by the defendant is hereto attached as Annex “B” and made
an integral part hereof.
6. On June 30, 2005, plaintiff went to the defendant’s rice mill to pick-up the one
thousand (1,000) cavans of Dinorado rice and to pay the balance of P960,000.00.
7. Defendant, however, informed the plaintiff that he cannot deliver to the plaintiff
the entire one thousand (1,000) cavans of Dinorado rice and that all he has in his rice mill was
only fifty (50) cavans. Defendant instead offered a different variety of rice but of lower quality.
Plaintiff refused and insisted on the refund of P240,000.00 down payment he paid to the
defendant.
8. Defendant, however, refused to return the amount paid by the plaintiff.
9. Plaintiff demanded for the return of the amount he paid to the defendant and for
the rescission of their earlier agreement but his demand fell on deaf ears. A copy of plaintiff’s
demand letter is hereunto attached as Annex “C” and made an integral part hereof.
10. Defendant is evidently guilty of bad guilty of bad faith in refusing to return the
amount paid by the plaintiff without even giving any valid or justifiable reason, which caused
the latter mental anguish, serious anxiety, moral shock and other similar injury, for which the
defendant should be held liable to pay P100,000 as moral damages.
11. By way of example or correction for the public good, and to deter other like-
minded individuals from trampling upon the rights of the others, defendant should likewise be
held liable to pay P100,000.00 as nominal damages.
12. As a result defendant’s wanton refusal to return the amount paid by the plaintiff
and to rescind their earlier agreement, plaintiff was compelled to litigate and for the purpose,
have to engage the services of the undersigned law firm for a fee of P50,000.00.
13. Defendant should likewise be held liable for interest of legal rare, litigation
expenses and cost of suit.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed the judgment be rendered in favour of
plaintiff and against the defendant ordering the latter:
1. Ordering the rescission of the agreement dated __________________________;

2. Ordering the return of the amount of P480,000.00 to the plaintiff, plus interest thereon
at the legal date from the date until the full payment thereof;
3. Ordering the defendant to pay he plaintiff the following sums:
a. P100,000.00 as and for moral damages;
b. P100,000.00 as and for exemplary damages;
c. P50,000.00 as and for attorney’s fess;
d. Litigation Expenses; and
e. Costs of suit.
Plaintiff prays for such relief as may be just and equitable in the premises.
Done in Biñan, Laguna this _____ day of July 2009.
Plaintiff/Affiant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this ___ day of July 2009 at Biñan,
Laguna.
Verification/Certification
I, _________________________________, Filipino, of legal age and address at

________________________________, after having been duly sworn to law, depose and say:
1. That I am defendant, counter claimant in above entitled case.

2. That i have caused the preparation of the foregoing complaint; I have read the
allegations therein and certify that the same are true and correct of my own personal
knowledge.
3. That I further certify that plaintiff have not commenced any other action involving the
same issues, before the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals or any division thereof or
any division thereof any tribunal or agency; to the best of my knowledge no such
action is pending before Supreme Court, Court of Appeals or tribunal or agency and,
4. That in the event that any action involving the same should be made known, I hereby
bind myself to report the same within five days from knowledge thereof to this
Honorable Court.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I hereunto set my hand this 28 th day of January 1999 Pasig
City, Philippines.
Plaintiff/Affiant
This is to certify that I have personally examined the Complainant/Affiant and I am

satisfied that he has truly and voluntarily executed his statement and that he understood the same.
________________________
ASSISTANT PROSECUTOR

Eighteenth Judicial Region
Branch 92, Timbukto
CALVIN MARWOOD
and ERIC DAMPIER,
Plaintiffs,
CIVIL CASE NO. B-14344
NATALIE IMBRUGLIA and

RYAN FISCHER,
Defendants,
SEBASTIAN CAINE,
Plaintiff-Intervenor.
x------------------------------------------------------------------------x
MOTION FOR INTERVETION

With Attached COMPLAINT-IN-INTERVENTION
SEBASTIAN CAINE, by counsel, most respectfully states thus:
1. He has legal interest in the parcel of lot subject of the instant litigation between
CALVIN MARWOOD and ERIC DAMPIER, as Plaintiffs vs. NATALIE IMBTUGLIA and
RYAN FISCHER as Defendants.
2. The parcel of UNREGISTERED land (hereinafter, the “LOT”) subject of the
instant case embraces an area of Four Thousand Thee Hundred Two (4,302) square meters
and is situated in Las Vegas, Nevada, USA. It is more particularly described as LOT NO.
2210 and was previously covered by Tax Declaration No. 1026 issue in the name of TIM
MARWOOD.
3. Sometime in 1952, the late TIM MARWOOD obtained possession and ownership
of the LOT via succession from his late parents.
4. For almost three (3) years, clearing and planting works on the LOT were made for
and on behalf of the late TIM MARWOOD by a certain Carl Cardova.
5. Sometime in 1968, herein movant SEBASTIAN CAINE personally took
possession of the LOT and performed planting and clearing works thereon for and on behalf
of TIM MARWOOD. Specifically, he plant palay thereon.
6. Herein movant continuously and unabatedly performed such cultivation works on
the LOT from 1968 to 1979 when he had to leave for work in Russia.
7. During the lifetime of the late TIM MARWOOD, specifically on 29 August 1976,
he executed an Affidavit of Waiver whereby he renounced and waived all his rights and
interests over the LOT, together with another parcel of lot covered by Tax Declaration No.
001, in favour of his nephew, SEBASTIAN CAINE.
8. Thus, the late TIM MARWOOD formally handed over full possession of the LOT
to herein movant in recognition of the continuous clearing and cultivation works he
personally performed thereon.
9. Sometime in 1980, upon his return from Russia, the movant found the LOT idle
and unused during his absence so he had coconut trees planted thereon. To date, the same
coconut trees remain on the LOT.
10. To date, the movant has actual and constructive possession of the LOT and is the
holder of a valid and legal TITLE thereto.
11. Sometime, in early 2000, herein movant learned that the Plaintiff herein, CALVIN
MARWOOD, is seeking the issuance of Free Patent Title over the LOT before the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
12. He also found, at about the same time, that the Defendant RYAN FISCHER is
likewise seeking title over the LOT, in his capacity as transferee thereof, before the DENR.
13. In light of the foregoing, herein movant filed a Protest-opposition to the all the
aforesaid application for Free patent Title before the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) at Province of Laguna.

14. Presently, there are two (2) Free Patent Application (FPA) cases involving the
LOT before the CENRO at Biñan, Laguna, to wit
a. FPA No. 000004-187A entitled “SEBASTIAN CAINE, Claimant-

Applicant vs. CALVIN MARWOOD, Applicant-Respondent and NATALIE
IMBRUGLIA, Claimant-Transferee.”
b. FPA No. 000005-187A entitled John Cruise, Claimant-Protestant vs.

Calvin Marwood, Applicant-Respondent.
15. On 26 October 200, a recommendation was made by Land Investigator Frank
Linndonn, the investigator-on-case, on the aforesaid cases, the dispositive portion of which
reads thus:
“Undersigned hereby recommends that viewed from the foregoing circumstance of

the case, F.P.A. No. 000004-187-A of Calvin Marwood covering Lot No. 2210, Cad. 455-
D, Las Vegas, Nevada Cadastre, be REJECTED; that the claim thereon by NATALIE
IMBRUGLIA be dismissed and dropped from the records and that considering the
legality and propriety of the transfer thereof via waiver of the rights of TIM marwood, in
favour of Sebastian Caine, the latter be allowed to file appropriate public land application
therefore. Lastly, the claim of protestant Cruise thereon be dismissed for want of merit
(emphasis and underscoring supplied).’
16. To date, the aforesaid Free-Patent Application Cases are still pending resolution
by the Office of the Secretary, Department of the Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) at its main office in Manila. This is by virtue of the fact that the recommendations
made by then Land Investigator Frank Linndonn have been forwarded thereto for review.
17. In light of the foregoing, it is manifest that herein movant, SEBASTIAN CAINE,
has a very significant legal interest over the LOT subject of the instant litigation and is so
situated as to be adversely affected by any judgment regarding the ownership and/or
possession thereof that this Honorable Court may render.
18. On the other hand, the late MARIAN and TIM MARWOOD died without issue.
19. During their lifetime, they never legally adopted a child, including CALVIN
MARWOOD—a fact expressly admitted by the latter in a sworn statement that she freely
executed.
20. Such being the case, the Defendant CALVIN MARWOOD could never legally
convey ownership over the LOT, in whatever manner, to her co-Plaintiff ERIC DAMPIER
and the defendants NATALIE IMBRUGLIA and RYAN FISCHER.
21. Thus, it is most respectfully prayed that movant SEBASTIAN CAINE be allowed
to intervene in the instant case in accordance with Rule 19 of the Rules of Court so that he
would not be prejudiced by the surreptitious filing of the instant case and so that he could
assert his claim against the parties herein as set forth in the attached COMPLAINT.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, it is most respectfully prayed that:
1. SEBASTIAN CAINE be allowed to intervene in the instant case in accordance with
Rule 19 of the Rules of Court so that he could assert his claim against the parties
herein; and
2. The attached COMPLAINT-IN-INTERVENTION be DULY ADMITTED.
Other just and equitable reliefs are likewise prayed for.
24 November 2004 _________________________________

TAYLOR FLACK MESSER
Law Offices
Counsel for the PLAINTIFF-IN-INTERVENTION
90210 Beverly Hills
CA, USA
By:
MACK TAYLOR
Roll No. 010102
IBP NO. NY32432; 02/02/04; CA
PTR No. NY1234567; 0/02/04 CA
NOTICE OF HEARING

FTC Branch 92, Timbukto
ATTY. RICK STETLER

No. 1082 Miami, Florida
ATTY. ALEX WOOD

Counsel for the Defendants
No. 1234 Seattle, Washington
CALVIN MARWOOD
Plaintiff
New York, New York
ERIC DAMPIER
Plaintiff
Salt Lake City, Utah
NATALIE IMBRUGLIA
RYAN FISCHER
Chicago, Illinois
Please take notice that the undersigned will submit the foregoing motion for the
consideration of the Honorable Court on Friday, 16 December 2004 at 10:00 am.
MACK TAYLOR
Copy furnished by Registered Mail:
ATTY. RICK STETLER

No. 1082 Miami, Florida
ATTY. ALEX WOOD

Counsel for the Defendants
No. 1234 Seattle, Washington
CALVIN MARWOOD
Plaintiff
New York, New York
ERIC DAMPIER
Plaintiff
Salt Lake City, Utah
NATALIE IMBRUGLIA
RYAN FISCHER
Chicago, Illinois
EXPLANATION FOR SERVICE BY POST
Copies of this motion could not be served upon the counsels for the original to the instant
case as the Firm momentarily lacks available personnel to do so and due to the distance involved.
MACK TAYLOR

Quezon City
___________________________,
Plaintiff,
Civil Case No. ___________
-versus-
___________________________,
Defendant,
___________________________,
Intervenor.
x---------------------------------------------x
MOTION FOR INTERVENTION
PLAINTIFF, through counsel alleges:

1. That he is the contractor of Peter Bato’s Building located at _______________,
and until now, the latter has till outstanding overdue account to him in the amount of Two
Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00), a substantial amount of which shall be used to pay laborer’s
wages;
2. That Peter Bato has filed a case for collection against the herein defendant and
they have executed a compromise agreement to settle the said obligations in this manner; (1)
P10,000 which will be due and payable on or before December 25, 2006; (2) P5,000 due and
payable on or before January 30, 2007; (3) P5,000 which will be due and payable on or
before March 17, 2007;
3. That he has a legal and demandable claim against the herein plaintiff which is
seriously overdue;
4. That in order to ensure that the herein he will be able to collect the same and able
to pay his laborer’s, it seeks leave of this Honorable Court to intervene in this case, and have
its claim to be registered and treated as a lien to whatever amount of money to be paid by
herein defendant to the plaintiff, to the extent of P2,000.00 plus corresponding interest
equivalent to 5% interest per annum until it is fully paid.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that he be allowed to intervene in this case, and

that and order be issued ordering the plaintiff to pay him the said amount of P2000 plus interest
at the rate of 5% per annum until it is fully paid.
Cost and other reliefs.
Done in Biñan, Laguna this ___ day of July 2009.
Plaintiff/Affiant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this ___day of July 2009 at Biñan,

Laguna.

Quezon City
__________________________,
Plaintiff,
Civil Case No. _____________
-versus-
__________________________,
Defendant,
__________________________,
Intervenor.
x--------------------------------------------x
COMPLAINT IN INTERVENTION
COMES NOW INTERVENOR, through counsel, and with prior leave of this Honorable
Court in this case, most respectfully states:
1. That plaintiff is a Filipino, of legal age, single, and residing at _______________,

whereas defendant is likewise Filipino, of legal age, single and residing at
________________, at which addresses the parties herein may be served with
summons and other court processes;
2. That the herein intervenor is the contractor of Peter Bato’s Building located at
_______________, and until now, the latter has till outstanding overdue account to
him in the amount of Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00), a substantial amount of
which shall be used to pay laborer’s wages;
3. That Peter Bato has filed a case for collection against the herein defendant and they
have executed a compromise agreement to settle the said obligations in this manner;
(1) P10,000 which will be due and payable on or before December 25, 2006; (2)
P5,000 due and payable on or before January 30, 2007; (3) P5,000 which will be due
and payable on or before March 17, 2007;
4. That he has a legal and demandable claim against the herein plaintiff which is
seriously overdue;
5. That in order to ensure that the herein he will be able to collect the same and able to
pay his laborer’s, it seeks leave of this Honorable Court to intervene in this case, and
have its claim to be registered and treated as a lien to whatever amount of money to
be paid by herein defendant to the plaintiff, to the extent of P2,000.00 plus
corresponding interest equivalent to 5% interest per annum until it is fully paid.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that he be allowed to intervene in this case, and

that and order be issued ordering the plaintiff to pay him the said amount of P2000 plus interest
at the rate of 5% per annum until it is fully paid.
Cost and other reliefs.
Done in Biñan, Laguna this ___ day of July 2009.
Plaintiff/Affiant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this ____ day of July 2009 at Biñan,
Laguna.
BRANCH 64, MAKATI CITY
AVILLA LAND CORPORATION

Plaintiff,
-versus- Civil Case No. 01-1234
AMADO IGNACIO, ET. AL.,

Defendants.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
MOTION FOR LEAVE
TO FILE THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT
COME NOW< the defendants, AMADO IGNACIO and PEDRO IGNACIO, through the
counsel, most respectfully allege:
1. Plaintiff AVILLA LAND CORPORATION in the above-entitled case seeks to collect

from the defendants in the amount of P1,500,000.00, plus 38% interest per annum on
the said amount and 1% penalty charges on the alleged sale of 2,000 bags of yellow
corn seeds by the plaintiff to defendants;
2. Plaintiff acted through its employee/agent ROBERT ORTEGA who delivered the
aforesaid stocks and who also collected some of the considerations of the sale but did
not remit the proceeds thereof to defendant AMADO IGNACIO and to the plaintiff;
3. ROBERT ORTEGA has not been made a party to this action. Although defendants are
entitled to indemnity and/or subrogation against him, in respect to plaintiff’s claim.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, defendants move for leave, as 3rd party plaintiff, to file complaint against
ROBERT ORTEGA as 3rd party defendant. Other reliefs deemed just and equitable under the
circumstances are also prayed for.
Quezon City for Makati City.

February 6, 2003.
RAMIREZ AND ASSOCIATES

# 825 13th Avenue, Cubao,
Quezon City
By:
OLIVER C. RAMIREZ
Counsel
NOTIFICATION

RTC, NCJR, Branch 64
Makati City
Greetings:
Please submit the foregoing MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE 3rd PARTY COMPLAINT
for the consideration and approval of the Honorable Presiding Judge, RTC, NCJR, Branch 64,
Makati City preferably on February 26, 2003 at 2:00 o’clock in the p.m. or immediately upon
receipt without further oral arguments.
OLIVER C. RAMIREZ
Counsel
Copy Furnished:
Tolentino Gonzales & Villanueva Law Offices

Suite 705 Don Santiago Building
2345 Taft Avenue, Ermita, Manila
EXPLANATION
(Pursuant to Section 11, rule 13, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure)
Copy of the foregoing Motion was furnished adverse counsel by registered mail due to
lack of manpower to effect personal service.
OLIVER C. RAMIREZ
Counsel

BRANCH 10, PASAY CITY
ATHENA P. HERNANDEZ
Plaintiff,
-versus-
LLOYD M. ZARAGOSA and

PHILIPPINE TRANSPORTATION CO.
Defendants.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x Civil Case No. 06-0123
For: Damages
LLOYD M. ZARAGOSA and

PHILIPPINE TRANSPORTATION CO.
Third Party Plaintiffs,
-versus-
JOHN GODINEZ and

GREYHOUND BUS COMPANY
Third Party Defendants.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT
COME NOW, the Third Party Plaintiffs, by the undersigned counsel and unto this
Honorable Court, respectfully alleges that:
1. Athena P. Hernandez has filed against herein third party plaintiffs a

complaint, copy of which is hereto attached as “Annex A” and is made
an integral part thereof;
2. Third party plaintiff Philippine Transportation Corporation (herein
referred to as PHILTRANCO for brevity) is a corporation duly
organized under Philippine Leas, herein represented by the undersigned
counsel by virtue of the resolution of the Board of Directors as
evidenced by a Secretary’s Certificate herein attached as “Annex B”
engaged in the business of carriage with principal office at Stardust
Building, Pasay City, while co-third party plaintiff Lloyd M. Zaragosa
is the driver of the company’s bus and both may be served with
summons at the principal office of the said corporation;
3. Third party defendant Greyhound bus Co. (herein referred as
GREYHOUND for brevity) is a corporation duly organized under
Philippine Laws with office address at 2745 Airport Drive, Pasay City
where it may be served with summons by this Honorable Court.
4. In the traffic Investigate report, copy of which is hereto attached as

‘Annex C” and made an integral part hereof, it was clearly stated that
the accident did not only involve the vehicles of the parties in the
Hernandez vs. Zaragosa filled before this Honorable Court and
docketed as Civil Case No. 05-01 but also made mention of a third
party, specifically Greyhound bus bound for Bicol which sideswiped
the Philtranco Bus driven by herein third party plaintiff Zaragosa;
5. In the Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim filed by the defendants
in the aforementioned case (herein Third Party Plaintiffs), it wad
averred that the collision between plaintiff’s evasive and lawful
maneuver to avoid being hit by herein defendants Greyhound bus
which was overtaking a Mitsubishi gallant Super Saloon with plate
number TPS 345 driven by John Godinez at top speed;
6. Due to reckless driving and failure to exercise reasonable care and
diligence by the still unidentified driver of the defendants Greyhound,
herein third party plaintiff, Zaragosa was forced to evade the impending
head-on collision with the Greyhound bus but was nonetheless
sideswiped by the latter forcing Philtranco bus to swerve to the lane of
the Mitsubishi Gallant Super Saloon. As a result of the accident, the
driver of the Gallant died;
7. When he made that evasive action, he was not able to see the Gallant
Super Saloon because of the condition of the road at the time,
notwithstanding the fact that there was stalled dump truck at that
particular lane going to Bicol which was directly in front of the Gallant
Super Saloon;
8. The proximate cause of the accident was due to the collision initiated
by the Greyhound bus with Philtranco bus driven by herein third party
plaintiff Zaragosa which caused the latter to collide with the Gallant;
9. Considering that the plaintiff of Civil Case No. 05-02 ailed to implead
the driver and the owner of the Greyhound bus as co-defendants in this
said case, herein plaintiff as constrained to institute this present action
against herein defendants.
10. Under Section 11, Rule 6 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, a
defending party may, with leave of court, file against a person not a
party to the action for the purpose of contribution, indemnity,
subrogation of any relief in the respect of his opponent’s claim.
WHEREFORE, Lloyd M. Zaragosa and Philtranco demand judgment against third party
defendants Greyhound Bus Co. and a certain John Godinez, driver of said bus that figure
in the accident for all sums that may be adjudged against defendants Zaragosa and
Philtranco in favour of plaintiff, Athena Hernandez.
Quezon City for Pasay City.
March 3, 2005.
FERNANDEZ TANTOCO SILVERIO AND ASSOCIATES

#48 Masambong Street, Project 3, Quezon City
By:
ATTY. KATHERINE S. LIM
Counsel
VERIFICATION

PASAY CITY
We, LLOYD M. Zaragosa, of legal age, Filipino, married and with residence address at
34 Rose Street, Uptown Village, Cainta, Rizal and JESSICA SANCHEZ, Director and Board
Secretary of the Third Party plaintiff corporation with principal office at Stardust Building, Pasay
City, after having been duly sworn to in accordance with law hereby depose and say that:
We are the Third Party Plaintiff in the above-captioned case;
We caused the preparation of the foregoing Third Party Complaint;

We read and understood the allegations contained herein are true and correct based on our
personal knowledge.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we have hereunto set our hands and affixed our signatures on
March 3, 2005 at Pasay City.
LLOYD M. ZARAGOSA JESSICA SANCHEZ

Affiant Affiant
CERTIFICATION OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING

PASAY CITY
WE, LLOYD M. ZARAGOSA and JESSICA SANCHEZ, under oath, hereby certify that:
1. I have not commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same issues in
any court, tribunal or agency;
2. No such action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before any court, tribunal
or agency. I hereby undertake notify his Honorable Court within 5 days from such
knowledge.
LLOYD M. ZARAGOSA JESSICA SANCHEZ

Affiant Affiant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 4th day of March, 2005 at Quezon City,
affiants exhibiting to me their CTC Nos. 123456 and 678910 both issued on January 5, 2005 at
Cainta, Rizal.
GEORGE B. ESTREGAN
NOTARY PUBLIC
Until December 31, 2005
PTR 123456
IBP 678910
Doc No. 11
Page No. 55
Book No. 6
Series of 2005.
Quezon City
_______________________________,
Plaintiff,
Civil Case No. ___________
-versus-
_______________________________,
Defendant
x------------------------------------------------------------x
_______________________________,
Third Party Plaintiff,
-versus-
_______________________________,
Third Party Defendant,
x------------------------------------------------------------x
THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT
THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFF, through counsel, and with prior leave of this Honorable
Court to file this Third Party Complaint, most respectfully states:
1. That plaintiff is a Filipino, of legal age, single, and residing at __________________,

whereas defendant is likewise Filipino, of legal age, single and residing at
___________________, at which addresses the parties herein may be served with
summons and other court processes;
2. That Ray Langit, plaintiff in Civil Case No. __________________ pending before
this Honorable Court, file complaint against the third party plaintiff, and copy of said
complaint is herewith attached and marked as Annex “A” made integral part hereof.
3. That the 1,000 bags of cement referred to in plaintiff’s complaint was actually
purchased by Rosanna Roces, the owner of the house in 18 Timoteo Cruz, Bf Homes,
Parañaque City, and to whom the same were intended to be delivered and who
actually used the said cement, not the herein third party plaintiff who is merely the
engineer who is managing the construction of the said house and who was requested
to sign the receipt.
4. That the letter of Rosanna Roces (who is on prolonged stay in California due to
lingering illness) acknowledging her liability to pay the said 1,000 of cement is
herewith attached as Annex ‘A” and made an integral part hereof.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that in case the third party is adjudged

liable to pay the same, an order be issued ordering the third party defendant to
indemnity whatever is paid the third party plaintiff to herein plaintiff.
Done in Biñan, Laguna this _____ day of July 2009.
Plaintiff/Affiant
Branch 85
Lipa City
CLAIRE REPADAS CUNANAN, CIVIL CASE NO. 09-0281

Petitioner,
-versus-
ROSEMARIE A. DORANGO,
Respondent.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE RESPONSIVE PLEADING
Defendants, by undersigned counsel, unto the Honorable Court, most respectfully avers that;
1. Defendants earlier filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer seeking an
extension of fifteen (15) days from July 30, 2006 within which to file their Answer to the
above entitled case.
2. The services of the undersigned counsel has just been hired today by the defendants and
it is quite impossible for him, given the limited time of three days from today, to draft and
finalize the Answer for the defendants.
3. Due to time constraints, defendants need an extension, at least, of thirty (30) days from
August 14, 2006 to September 14, 2006 in order for them to file an intelligent Answer or
responsive pleading.
WHEREFORE, for reasons above indicated and in interest of justice and due process,
defendants respectfully prayed the Honorable Court for an extension of thirty (30) days
from August 14, 2006 within which to file their Answer or responsive pleading to the
complaint of the plaintiff.
Other reliefs just and equitable in the premises are likewise prayed for.
Paranaque City for Lipa City, August 12, 2006.
VICTORIA QUIRANTE
PRT # 0577210 / 01-02-08 / Lipa City
IBO # 65347 / 01-03-08 / Batangas City
ROLL No. 43990
Copy furnished:
Atty. Francisco Balderra
Coubsel for the Plaintiff
2/F JR Business Complex
Ayala Highway, Mataas na Lupa
Lipa City
NOTICE / REQUEST / EXPLANATION
The Honorable Branch Clerk of Court

RTC Branch 85 – Lipa City
Greetings:
Please submit the foregoing non-litigated motion to the Honorable Court for its consideration
and approval on August 18, 2006 at 8:30 AM or immediately upon receipt hereof sans further
argument and undersigned counsel is waiving his appearance on such date. The foregoing motion
was served by registered mail due to distance and lack of messengerial staff.
Victoria Quirante

Branch 85
Lipa City
MARIE CANN F. TOMMUTO, CIVIL CASE NO. 09-0281

Plaintiff,
-versus-
ALDEN FRANCIS DACULA,

Defendant.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
MOTION FOR BILL OF PARTICULARS
DEFENDANT states:
1. That the present action is for the recovery of Twenty-five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00)
as compensation for alleged professional services rendered by the plaintiff, as surgeon, to
the children of the herein defendant.
2. That the nature and extent of said professional services are not averred with sufficient
definiteness or particularity to enable said defendant to properly prepare his answer, since
he has three children, who have availed of his services.
WHEREFORE, the defendant prays that the plaintiff be ordered to set out the names of the
children of the defendant treated by said plaintiff, the nature and dates of such treatment, and the
charges corresponding to each.
Alden Francis Dacula

Defendant
Greetings:
Please submit the foregoing motion to the Honorable Court or its kind
Consideration and approvable immediately upon receipt hereof.
Alden Francis Dacula
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF BATANGAS
FOURTH JUDICIAL REGION
BRANCH 85, LIPA CITY
ARTURO T. MORADA,
Plaintiff,
- versus –
-
REYNALDO T. MORADA, ET AL.,
Defendants,
x---------------------------------------------x
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
PLAINTIFF, by counsel, to this Honorable Court respectfully states:
1. Based on the Complaint, Answer with Counterclaim, and result of the pre-trial, the main issue
apparently involved here is: Whether the Deed of Sale allegedly executed on April 29, 1992 by the late
Maria Templo-Morada (3/4 owner of the 328-square-meter land involved, who died on December 26,
1989) is void, for being a falsified document and thus, for lack of consent to the deed of sale.
2. Plaintiff claims that the subject deed of sale is void, because his mother, Maria T. Morada,
could not have possibly executed it on April 29, 1992 as she already died on December 26, 1989.
3. Defendants argue that all the essential requisites of a contract (consent and capacity of the
contracting parties, and object and cause of the contract) are present, and the deed of sale was executed
in accordance with the formalities and solemnities required by law. (Paragraphs 23 and 24, Answer with
Counterclaim)
4. Defendants admit that Maria T. Morada died on December 26, 1989.they however, claim as
their defense, that it was sometime in 1989 when she and her co-owners (her children Luz T. Morada,
Celso T. Morada and Imelda Morada-Recinto) decided to sell the subject property to raise money for her
hospitalization expenses, and they executed the deed of sale involved. (Paragraph 11, Answer with
Counterclaim)
5. Plaintiff respectfully submits that the above defense is a sham one, and there is no genuine
factual issue on the falsification of the subject deed of sale, because defendants admit that Maria T.
Morada already died on December 26, 1989—2 years, 4 months and 3 days before the execution of the
deed of sale.
6. In Paragraph 19 of their Answer with Counterclaim, defendants assert that the falsification
case (I.S. No. 05-0197) filed by plaintiff against defendants Cynthia Biaquis-de Dios and Gloria Morada-
Biaquis in the Office of the City of Prosecutor of Lipa City, was dismissed for “lack of probable cause”.
7. But the resolution on the falsification case, as contained in a Report and Recommendation
dated May 16, 2005 (copy hereto attached as Annex “A”), shows that what the City Prosecutor’s Office
found as lacking probable cause is the crime of Estafa. The charge of Falsification of Public Document
was dismissed, not for lack of probable cause but, for having prescribed already.
8. More importantly, and contrary to defendants’ claim or defense, the City Prosecutor’s Office
found that falsification of document was indeed committed. The Report and Recommendation dated
May 16, 2005 (on page 3, 1st and 2nd paragraphs) pertinently read as follows:
The fact of falsification is very glaring
because at the time of the execution of the
questioned deed of sale one of the vendors,

Maria Morada, was already dead. Respondent Gloria Morada’s
assertion’s that it was signed
by their mother when she was still alive but was
notarized later cannot be sustained being contrary
to the rules on evidence which explicitly provides that the

document speaks for itself. The deed state that it was executed on
April 29, 1992.
Falsification of a public document by a private individual

entails a penalty of prison correccional hence it prescribes in 10
years. The reckoning period is counted from the date of registration
of the instrument with the Register of Deeds. Under prevailing
jurisprudence such registration is notice to the whole world. In the
case at hand the deed of sale was registered in 1992 so the crime of
falsification has aleady prescribed in 2002. This complaint was
belatedly filed in the year 2005 so it is very obvious the case of
falsification cannot be prosecuted anymore. (Emphasis Supplied)
9. Truly, the deed of sale is a falsified document. The authors of the falsification caused it to
appear that Maria T. Morada had participated in the execution of the deed on April 29, 1992, when she
did not in fact so participate, as she is dead already. This form of falsification falls under Article 171, No.
2, in relation to Article 172, Revised Penal Code.
10. The deed of sale also contains untruthful statements in the narration of facts,
namely” That Maria T. Morada sold the property on April 29, 1992; that she signed the deed of
sale on that date; and that she appeared before a Notary Public and acknowledged the
execution of the deed. This kind of falsification is covered by Article 171, No. 4, in relation to
Article 172, Revised Penal Code.
11. Because the deed of sale is a falsified document, it is void for lack of consent to the deed of
sale. As held in Tan vs. Mandap (429 SCRA 711 G.R. No. 50925, May 27, 2004):
Xxx Mandap, Sr. did not personally appear before a notary
public. Yet the documents stated the contrary. Such falsity raises
doubt regarding the genuineness of the vendor’s alleged consent to
the deeds of sale.
12. Even assuming, for argument’s sake only, that Maria T. Morada signed the deed of sale in
1989, the sale and the transfer of ownership (including the title to the property) to the buyers are still
void, because the deed of sale which was used as basis for the sale and transfer of ownership s a void
document, it being a falsified one.
13. Further, defendants are already estopped in either asserting that the deed of sale is valid, or
in claiming that the deed of sale was actually signed by Maria T. Morada in 1989 (when she was still
alive).
14. By claiming that the deed of sale was signed by Maria T. Morada in 19809, defendants are
barred by estoppel from claiming that the deed of sale is valid, because the deed was purportedly
executed on Apr9l 29, 1992 – when she is dead already. And by claiming that the deed was executed in
accordance with the formalities required by law, they are also estopped from asserting that it was signed
in 1989, as the deed cannot be considered valid if it was signed in 1989, but falsely made it appear to
have been executed and notarized on April 29, 1992.
15. In other words, defendants’ inconsistent or contradictory positions or claims is another
proof that their defenses are sham. And rule on estoppel bars them from making these claims.
16. Article 1431 of the Civil Code provides that:
Art. 1431. Through estoppel an admission or representation is

rendered conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied
or disproved as against the person relying thereon.
17. And in Depositario V. Hervias (121 SCRA 756, 758), it was held that:
Xxx A party will not be allowed to make a mockery of justice

by taking inconsistent positions which, if allowed, would result in
brazen deception. The doctrine of estoppel bars a party from trifling
with the courts and flaunting the elementary rules of right dealing and
good faith.
18. There is also no genuine factual issue on the subsequent donation of the subject property
made by the buyers (defendants-spouses Jesus De Dios and Cynthia Biaquis-De Dios) in favor of
defendants-spouses Gerardo Biaquis, Jr. and Glora Morada-Biaquis.
19. Since the purported sale and transfer of ownership of the subject property to defendants-
spouses Jesus and Cynthia De Dios are void for having been made through a falsified deed of sale, the
donation they made to spouses Gerardo and Glora Biaguis and the transfer of ownership and title to the
latter, are likewise void.
20. The reason is: As spouses Jesus and Cynthia De Dios had no valid title or ownership over the
subject property, spouses Gerardo and Gloria Biaquis (as donees) did not acquire any valid title or
ownership over it, for the latter merely stepped into the shoes of the former.
21. As held in Tan V. Mandap (429 SCRA 711):
On the third issue, petitioners argue that since the sale of subject
properties by ‘Mandap, Sr. to the Basquez spouses is valid, it follows’ that the
subsequent sale of the property by the latter to petitioners is also valid. But
this contention cannot be sustained, since we find that based on the evidence
on record, the sale in favor of the Vasquez spouses is void. Hence, it follows
that the sale to petitioners is also void, because petitioners merely stepped
into the shoes of the Vasquez spouses. Since the Vasquezes as sellers had no
valid title over the parcel of land they sold, petitioners as buyers thereof could
not claim that the contact of sale is valid.
22. Further, defendants’ defenses of latches and prescription are also not genuine. Plaintiff’s
action for declaration of nullity of the sale and donation involved is based on a falsified deed of sale that
is void. Hence, such action is imprescriptible. Article 1410 of the Civil Code provides that:
Article 1410. The action or defense for the inexistence of a

contract does not prescribe.
23. Defendants’ claim that the action prescribes in four (4) years, is clearly baseless. The 4-year
prescriptive period refers to or is applicable to a contract that is voidable on the ground of incapacity of a
party to give consent to a contract, or where the consent is vitiated by mistake, violence, intimidation,
undue influence or fraud. (Articles 1390 and 1391, Civil Code). Here, the deed of sale is void for lack of
consent (Article 1409, Civil Code).
24. Defendants also cite the law on torrens title, claiming that the action to assail the validity of
the title issued to spouses Gerardo and Gloria Biaquis (donees) prescribed in one (1) year, as a petition
for review of the decree of registration can be availed of within 1 year from the entry of the decree and
must be based on actual fraud.
25. Defendants are referring to Section 32 of P.D. No. 1529. But this provision or law is
inapplicable here, because it refers to original registration of property wherein a decree of registration
would be issued. This case does not involve titling of property, but the nullity of transfer of ownership
and transfer of a certificate of title.
26. Considering that the defenses raised are sham and clearly baseless, and that there is no
need for trial on the alleged factual issues involved, the Honorable Court may validly render a summary
judgment in this case.

27. As explained in Wood Technology Corp. v. Equitable Banking Corp. (451 SCRA
724, Feb 17, 2005) :
Summary judgment is a procedure aimed at weeding out sham claims or

defenses at an early stage of the litigation. The proper inquiry in this regard
would be whether the affirmative defenses offered by petitioners constitute
genuine issues of fact requiring a full-blown trial. In a summary judgment, the
crucial question is: are the issues raised by petitioners not genuine so as to
justify a summary judgment? A “genuine issue” means an issue of fact which
calls for the presentation of evidence, as distinguished from an issue that does
not constitute a genuine issue for trial.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, plaintiff respectfully prays that a partial summary judgment be
rendered as follows:
(a) Holding that defendants’ defenses – that the deed of sale dated April 29, 1992 and deed
of donation dated January 28, 1997 are valid, and that the action is barred by prescription
and laches – are sham and clearly baseless.

(b) Holding that there are no triable genuine issues of fact, except as to the cause of action for
accounting of rentals and recovery of attorney’s fees.
(c) Declaring the subject deed of sale, deed of donation, and spouses Gerardo and Gloria
Biaquis’ Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-111068
void.
Plaintiff also prays for other or further measures of relief that the Honorable Court may find just,
proper or equitable in the premises, consistent with the summary judgment that may be rendered in this
case.
Lipa City, May 9, 2008.
FRANCISCO BALDERAMA & Associates
2nd Flr. JR Business Complex, Ayala Highway
Mataas na Lupa, Lipa City, Batangas 4217
By :
FRANCISCO Q. BALDERAMA, JR.
PRT # 0577210 / 01-02-08 / Lipa City
ROLL No. 43990

NITA V. CRUZ
Plaintiff,
Civil Case No. 01-2345

-versus- For: Collection of Sum of Money
VICENTE S. ROSARIO
Defendants.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
ANSWER
COMES NOW, the defendant, through the undersigned counsel and in answer plaintiff’s
complaint, in the above-entitled case, respectfully prays:
1. That he admits paragraph 1 of the complaint;

2. The he is without knowledge or information to form belief as to truth of the
averments made in paragraph 2 and 3 thereof;
3. The he denies specifically each and every material allegations made in paragraph 4 of
the complaints;
4. And as AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES, the defendant alleges:
a. That the cause of action of the plaintiff is non-existent, the written contract
upon which the complainant is based have already been paid as evidenced by
the written acknowledgement issued by the duly authorized agent of the
plaintiff;
b. Hat assuming that the same was not paid, still the cause of action has
prescribed, the contract executed 15 years ago cannot be used as basis for the
plaintiff’s cause of action.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. The Complaint be dismissed with costs against the plaintiff;

2. For such other relief which the court deems and equitable under the circumstances.
Pasay City, 25th day of March, 2002.
OLIVER C. LOZANO, JR.

13 Leveriza St., Pasay City
IBP No. 37468598
PTR No. 8373613
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 30th day of March, 2002 at Pasay City,
affiant exhibiting to me his Community Tax Certificate No. 7761373 issued on January 12, 2002
at Pasay City.
GEORGE B. ESTREGAN
NOTARY PUBLIC
PTR 123456
IBP 678910
Doc No. 534

Page No. 662
Book No. 78
Series of 2002.
Metropolitan Trial Court
Branch X, Manila
Juan Matibay
Plaintiff,
-versus-
Kitz Lozada
Defendant.
x-------------------------------x
ANSWER
COMES NOW, the defendant Kitz Lozada, by and through the undersigned counsel, answering
plaintiff’s complaint alleges that:
1. Defendant admits paragraph 1 and 2 of the complaint;
2. Defendant specifically denies allegations contained in paragraphs 3, 4, and 5 of the

complaint for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
truth and correctness of the same;
3. Defendant admits the allegation in paragraph 6 of the complaint to the effect that he is
the true owner of Toyota Revo with the Plate No. ABC 123 but denies the rests of the
allegations under the influence of liquor.
Pasig City, Philippines, 28 January, 1999.
KITZ LOZADA
Defendant/Affiant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 28th day of January, 1999 at Pasig City,
affiant exhibiting to me he CTC No. 123456 issued on January 2, 1999 at Makati City.
George Balbar
Notary Public
Until Dec. 31, 20010
PTR:
IBP:
Doc No. ___;

Page No. ___;
Book No. ___;
Series of 2010.

Branch X, Manila
Juan Matibay
Plaintiff,
-versus-

Kitz Lozada
Defendant.
x------------------------------x
ANSWER WITH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
Comes now, the defendant Kitz Lozada, by and through the undersigned counsel,
answering plaintiff’s complaint alleges that:
2. Defendant admits paragraph 3, to the effect that he denies responsibility over the
purchased goods, and as
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
1. Based on the foregoing affirmative allegations, the Promissory Note signed by the
defendants, unaccompanied by the requisite Disclosure statement, is no force and
effect
2. Moreover, since the sighing thereof was attended with fraud, duress, intimidation,
threat and undue influence, the same is void from its inception.
3. Furthermore, since the terms and conditions contained therein, particularly with
respect to the rates of interest, attorney’s fees, liquidated damages and penalties are
all shocking to the conscience and are wantonly against public policy.
4. That since the penalties and liquidated damages are iniquitous and unconscionable,
the courts, under the circumstances, can reduce the penalties and liquidated damages,
pursuant to Articles 1229 and 2227 of the Civil Code, which provision state:
“Art. 1229. The judge shall equitably reduce

the penalty when the principal obligation has been
partly or irregularly complied with by the debtor.
Even if there has been no performance, the penalty
may also be reduced by the courts if it is iniquitous or
unconscionable.”
“Art. 2227. Liquidated damages, whether

intended as an indemnity or penalty, shall be
equitably reduced reduced if they are iniquitous and
inconscionable.”
5. Base on all foregoing, the plaintiff clearly has no cause of action against the
defendants.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, defendant prays for judgment:
1. Dismissing the complaint with costs against the plaintiff;
2. On the Counter, ordering plaintiff to pay defendant the sum of P70,000.00 as

attorney’s fees and the sum of P80,000.00 for the loss of income; and
3. Any other reliefs through Honorable Court may deem just and equitable under the
foregoing premises.
Pasig City, Philippines, 28 January, 1999.
Manuel Morato
Counsel for defendant
21 Meralco Ave.
Pasig City
PTR:
IBP:
Verification/Certification
1. Kitz Lozada, Filipino, of legal age and address at 71 Shaw Blvd. Pasig City, After
having been duly sworn to law, depose and say
1. That I am the defendant, counter claimant in above entitled case.

2. That I have caused the preparation of the foregoing complaint; I have read the
allegations therein and certify that the same are true and correct of my own
personal knowledge.
3. That I further certify that plaintiff have not commenced any other action involving
the same issues, before the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals or any division
thereof or any division thereof any tribunal or agency; to the best of my
knowledge no such action is pending before Supreme Court, Court of Appeals or
tribunal or agency and,
4. That in the event that any action involving the same should be made known, I
hereby bind myself to report the same within five days from knowledge thereof to
this Honorable Court.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I hereunto set my hand this 28 th day of January 1999 Pasig
City, Philippines.
Kitz Lozada
Defendant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 28 th day of January 1999, Pasig City,
defendant having exhibited to me he CTC 123456 issued on January 2, 1999 at Makati City.
Notary Public
Until Dec. 31, 2010
Doc No.:
Page No.:
Book No.:
Series of 2010:
Copy furnished:
San Juan, Africa, Gonzales & San Agustin

8/F Antonio Bldg.
T.M. Kalaw Street, Ermita, Manila
Counsel for Plaintiff
Branch X, Manila
Juan Matibay
Plaintiff,
-versus- Civil Case
No. 09301
Kitz Lozada and / or Mar de Leon
Defendants.
x________________________________x
ANSWER WITH SPECIAL / AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

AND COUNTERCLAIM
Comes now, the defendant Kitz Lozada by and through the undersigned counsel
answering plaintiff complaint alleges that:
2. Defendants admits paragraph 3 to the effect that he denies responsibility over the
purchased goods and as
SPECIAL AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

3. At the time of the Contract of sales was entered on September 6, 1998,defendant made it
clear to the plaintiff that he was acting as agent of the other defendant, Mar de Leon;
4. Defendants Mar de Leon was indeed the principal of therein defendant Kitz Lozada
because he was the foreman of the engaged in the construction of the house of the said
principal;
5. As the foreman whatever purchases he made needed for the construction of the house
were to be charged to his principal, Mar de Leon.
COUNTERCLAIM
6. Because of the suit filed against herein defendant, he was constrained to hire the services
of the undersigned of the counsel in the amount of P 70,000 as attorney’s fees;
7. As a result of this suit, he has spent many sleepless nights which rendered him to be ill
and from his work losing an aggregate amount P 80,000 as income for the past 2 months.
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 28 th day of January 1999, Pasig City
defendant having exhibited to me he CTC 123456 issued on January 2, 2009 at Makati City.
George Balbar
Notary Public
Until Dec. 31, 1970
PTR:
IBP:
Doc. No:
Page No.:
Book No.:
Series of 1970.:
Copy furnished:

8 / F Antonio Bldg.
T.M. Kalaw Street, Ermita, Manila
Branch X, Manila
The Traders Commercial Bank

Plaintiff,
-versus-
Civil Case No.
19300
Alfredo de Guzman Et al
Defendant.
x___________________x
ANSWER WITH COUNTERCLAIM AND CROSS-CLAIM
COMES NOW, Defendants Rex Angel, by and through his undersigned counsel and to this
Honorable Court respectfully states:
1. That he admits paragraph 1 of the complaints;
2. That he denies paragraph 2 of the complaint, the truth being that it was defendant de
Guzman who applied for and exclusively benefited from the loan with the plaintiff,
answering defendant acting as mere consignor in the promissory note to accommodate
defendant de Guzman and to guarantee the loan;
3. That he lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the
allegations contained in paragraph 3,4,5 and 6 of the complaint and therefore, specially
denies the same;
For his special affirmative defenses further avers
4. That the answering defendant agreed to co-sign ad / or guarantee and accommodate

defendant de Guzman’s loan because both were then employed of the Philippine National
Cooperative Bank, and answering defendant, the principal condition of loan was in a
position to enforce or influence payment defendant de Guzman of his said account with
the plaintiff;
5. That without the knowledge and consent of answering defendant, the principal condition
of the loan was changed and the term of payment thereof was unreasonably extended by
the plaintiff; to the prejudice of the answering defendant.
By way of compulsory counterclaim, answering defendant alleges:
6. That the allegations in paragraph 1 to 6 of the answer are hereby reproduced and
reiterated;
7. That the filing of the malicious and ground less action by the plaintiff against defendant
has caused the latter mental anguish, serious anxiety and embarrassment and has
besmirched reputation for which, serious anxiety and embarrassment and has besmirched
reputation for which he should be compensated by way of moral damages the amount of
which he should be compensated by way of moral damages the amount of which, though
not capable of pecuniary estimation would not be less than P 5,000.00.
And for his crossclaim against his co-defendant answering defendant further alleges;
8. That he hereby repleads reiterates and reproduces all the material allegations in the
foregoing answer with special / affirmative defenses and in the counterclaim;
9. That defendant de Guzman should reimburse answering defendant on may amount the
matter maybe held answerable or which he may be ordered or suffered to pay under and
by virtue of the present action in favor of plaintiff, answering defendant not having
benefited whatsoever from the loan which defendant de Guzman obtained from plaintiff.
WHEREFORE, premises considered answering defendant respectfully prays to the

Honorable Court render judgment as follows:
1. By dismissing the complaint against answering defendant;
By ordering plaintiff to pay answering defendant moral damages amounting to not less than P
5000 plus exemplary as the Honorable Court may find reasonable plus attorney’s fees of P
500 and the costs of suit;
Answering defendant prays for such other and further relief as may be just and equitable
in the premises.
Makati for Manila, Philippines August 20, 1970.
Manuel Morato
21 Epifanio Delos Santos Ave.
Makati
PTR:
IBP:
Verification / Certifications
I Rex Angel, Filipino of legal age and address at B 71, Lot 86, Lagro, Quezon City, after
having been duly sworn to law depose and say

2. That I have caused the preparations of the foregoing complaint; I have read the
knowledge.
same issues, before the supreme Court, Court of Appeals or any division thereof or
action is pending before Supreme Court of Appeals or Tribunal or agency and,
4. That in the event that any action involving the same should be made known; I hereby
Honorable Court.
Witness whereof, I hereunto set my hand this 20 th day of August 1970 at Makati,
Philippines.
Rex Angel
Defendant-Counter
Claimant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 10th day of August at Makati City
defendant Counter-Claimaint having exhibited to me he CTC 123456 issued on July 25, 1970 at
Makati City.
George Balbar
Notary Public
Until Dec. 31, 1970
PTR:
IBP:
Doc. No.:
Page No.:
Book No.:
Series of 1970:
Copy furnished

8/F Antonio Bldg.
T.M. Kalaw Street, Ermita Manila

Branch X, Manila
The Traders Commercial Bank

Plaintiff,
-versus-
Alfredo de Guzman, Et Al
Defendant.
x____________________x
ANSWER WITH COMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIM
COMES NOW, Defendant Rex Angel, by and through his undersigned counsel, and to
this Honorable Court respectfully states:
1. That he admits paragraph 1 of the complaint;
2. That he denies paragraph 2 of the complaint, the truth being that it was defendant de
Guzman who applied for and exclusively benefited from the loan with the plaintiff,
answering defendant acting as mere consignor in the promissory note to accommodate
defendant de Guzman and to guarantee the loan;
3. That he lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of
the truth of the allegations contained in paragraph 3,4,5 and 6 of the complaint and
therefore, specifically denies the same;
By way of compulsory, answering defendant alleges:
4. That the allegations in paragraph 1 to 6 of the answer are hereby reproduced and
reiterated;
5. That the filing of the malicious and ground less action by the plaintiff answering
defendant has caused the latter mental anguish serious anxiety and embarrassment and
has besmirched he should be compensated by way of moral damages the amount of
which, though not capable of pecuniary estimation would not less than P5,000.00.
WHEREFORE, premises considered answering defendant respectfully prays to the

Honorable Court render judgment as follows:
1. By dismissing the complaint against answering defendant;
2. By ordering plaintiff to pay answering defendant moral damages amounting to not

less than P5,000.00 plus exemplary damages as the Honorable Court may find
reasonable plus attorney’s fees of P500 and the cost of suit;
Answering defendant prays for such other and further relief as may be just and equitable
in the premises.
Makati for Manila, Philippines, August 20, 1970.
Manuel Morato
21 Epifanio Delos Santos Ave.
Makati
PTR:
IBP:
Verification / Certification
I Rex Angel, Filipino of legal age and address at B 71, Lot 86, Lagro Quezon City, after
having been duly sworn to law, depose and say.

2. That I have caused the preparation of the foregoing complaint; I have read the
knowledge.
same issues, before the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals or any division thereof or
action is pending before Supreme Court, Court of Appeals or tribunal or agency and,
Honorable Court.
Witness whereof, I hereto set my hand this 20 th day of August 1970 at Makati,
Philippines.
Rex Angel
Defendant-Counter
Claimant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 10 th day of August at Makati City,

defendant Counter-Claimant having exhibited to me he CTC 123456 issued on July 25, 1970 at
Makati City.
George Balbar
Notary Public
Until Dec. 31, 1970
PTR:
IBP:
Doc.No.:
Page No.:
Book No.:
Series of 1970:
Copy furnished:
San Juan Africa,Gonzales and San Agustin

8/f Antonio Bldg.
T.M. Kalaw Street, Ermita,Manila
Cousel for plaintiff

Regional Trial Court
City of Paranaque
Branch 260
ARIES S. DE LEON
Petitioner,
-versus- Civil Case No. 04-004

For: Annulment of Marriage
LORENE V. BUNDANG
Respondent.
x_____________________________x
PETITIONER’S PRE-TRIAL BRIEF
PETITIONER, through counsel, unto this Honorable Court, Most respectfully
submits the following Pre-Trial Brief in compliance with the order of the
Honorable Court dated April 17, 2006.
A. Possibility of Amicable Settlement

Petitioner hereby manifests that he is open to amicable settlement on matters other
than validity of marriage.
B. Brief Statement of Petitioner
Respondent’s life has no direction and has no ambition for better future for
them. Even when after respondent gave birth to a baby boy and has become strong
enough to do and perform some household chores, as well as the usual duties of a
mother, respondent has become too much dependent on petitioner. Petitioner even
had to wash their used clothes and change the baby’s diaper at dawn despite the
fact that respondent knows very well that he (petitioner) still had to go to work for
their financial needs, and if only to make both ends meet.
As time goes by, Petitioner’s marriage with Respondent started to wane. The
expected sweetness and gentleness of a happy marriage has faded.
Aggravated by the fact that Respondent even refused to come along with Petitioner
in attending the activities of the Medical Society even as she was herself invited to
attend. This was the beginning of their frequent arguments and consequently serious
quarrels. They quarreled a lot, so to speak, and petitioner had surmised that no
amount of mediation or conciliation process could pacify the tension of animosity
prevailing between them at that time;
Sometime in June 2000, Respondent left their home and stayed with her
parents, leaving their only child (a son) with the Petitioner, and up to the present she
has not returned home. The child who is now more than three (3) years old has
remained under the care and custody of the Petitioner. And under the foregoing
circumstances and predicament, Petitioner is engulfed with, he often wondered what
kind of life would he have with a wife so irresponsible, without foresight or thoughtful
regard for the future.

During their marriage, petitioner and respondent did not acquire any real or
personal properties considering the perplexing situations of their marriage and to the
best of petitioner’s knowledge, petitioner and respondent do not have any
community obligations or debts.
C. Facts for Stipulation
1. Jurisdiction of the Honorable Court on the person of the parties.
2. Sometime parents, leaving their only child with the Petitioner, and up
to the present she has not returned home. The child who is now more than three (3)
years old has remained under the care and custody of Petitioner.
D. Statement of Issue
Whether or not the marriage between the parties is null and void by reason of
psychological incapacity of the respondent to comply with the essential
marital obligations of marriage.
E. Documents for Markings
1. Certificate of Marriage of the parties.
2. Certificate of Live Birth of the parties’ only son.
3. The right to present evidence on the psychological impression on the
parties is being reserved by Petitioner.
F. Witness
1. The Petitioner himself who will testify on his material allegations.
2. A doctor who will testify on the psychological impression or incapacity
of the respondent.
G. Trial Dates
Subject to the available dates in the calendar of the Honorable Court.
Respectfully submitted
Paranaque City, 5 June 2006.

MALATE LIRIO, MADRIGAL, ENRIQUEZ
LAW FIRM
Counsel for the Petitioner
Suite 205, Sta.Lucia Bldg.
Sta.Lucia St., SAV-1,Paranaque City
By:
FRANCISCO J. MALATE, JR.

PTR No.
IBP No.
Atty’s Roll No.
Branch 100, Manila City
ALVIN G. MARASIGAN,
Plaintiff,
-versus- CIVIL CASE NO. 556987
ROSEMARIE B. SANTOS,
Defendant.
x---------------------------------------x
POSITION PAPER
Defendant Rosemarie Santos through the undersigned counsel respectfully submits the
following position paper and states that:
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This action for annulment filed by plaintiff Alvin Marasigan for his marriage with defendant
Rosemarie B. Reyes on April 19, 2005 was filed in the Regional Trial Court of Manila Branch 100 on the
following grounds:
1. Fraud on account of the defendant’s pregnancy with a child not of the plaintiff’s.
2. The plaintiff’s consent having been obtained by force and intimidation
3. Failure in obtaining consent of the plaintiff’s parents.
The plaintiff also prays for support and moral damages on account of the foregoing allegations.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Defendant Rosemarie B. Santos, daughter of Lawyer-Businessman Felipe Valdez Santos, was
eighteen (18) years old when she married herein plaintiff Alvin Marasigan who was then twenty (20)
years old and was about to enter the law school. The ceremony was held on April 19, 2005 at the Manila
City Hall officiated by Manila Mayor Lito Atienza.

Prior to the said marriage, Santos and Marasigan were not even acquaintances. They first met in
a class party where everyone was having the most of the night. After a few exchange of conversations
while getting drunk amidst a loud environment, they drove to a motel and spent the night together. That
night has since started the malady of their lives.
Defendant Santos found out her pregnancy a month before her graduation at the St. Paul’s
University – Manila as a Broadcast Journalism student. EXHIBIT A is the original copy of the pregnancy
test done by Dr. Erlinda Colayco, an OB-Gyne of Delos Santos Hospital, on the defendant stating that as
of March 20, 2005, the defendant is carrying a four-week old baby in her womb. The plaintiff however
questions his paternity over the child.
In a cross examination with the plaintiff, (TSN, July 20, 2007, p. 16), he alleged that on February
22, 2005, he was approached by two bodyguards of the defendant’s father, Atty. Felipe Santos,
accordingly informing him of the ‘misfortune’ that he would be in should he not marry the defendant. A
revolver was accordingly shown to him when the bodyguards sensed his hesitation. Two days after the
incident, the plaintiff allegedly approached personally the defendant’s father invoking his incapability to
enter into marriage. However, Atty. Santos accordingly told him to ‘expect to die’. The defendant denies
the accusations stating that her father, who is a church pastor, could not do such a ‘horrible’ act. Further,
Santos maintains that neither did her father intervene in her personal choices including her personal life.
The defendant added that her father only knew of Marasigan when both of them already decided to get
married, abandoning the contention that Atty. Santos forced Marasigan to marry her.
Moreover, the plaintiff contends that he failed to obtain his parent’s consent when he married
defendant Santos as they were in the United States. Due to the fraud referred to in the preceding
paragraph, the plaintiff was forced to seek help from an elderly couple by the name of Claudio Gunda
and Rosita Ramirez-Gunda who operate a gotohan near his residence to pretend to be his parents thus
making it appear that their marriage was valid. The court has established the correctness of the
accusation through the examination conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation on the thumb
mark made by the couple on the subject marriage contract compared to that of thumb marks of the real
parents of plaintiff Marasigan (EXHIBIT D). The court no longer required the couple to testify in court as
the evidence was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
ISSUES
The court defined the following issues which the defendant prays to result in the annulment of
his marriage with defendant Santos:
2. The plaintiff’s consent having been obtained by force, intimidation and undue influence.
ARGUMENTS
The court has established the fact that defendant Santos was known in the same university for
her playfulness with her male buddies. The university’s Guidance Counselor has testified the numerous
instances when the defendant’s attention was called due to her alleged obvious misconduct of
consistently going out with various male acquaintances as complained by the latter’s respective
girlfriends (TSN, July 13, 2007, p.4). Said accusation was not denied by defendant Santos.
Defendant Santos also admitted in court that in her past experiences, some has already
confronted her affront regarding her playful deeds. In fact, defendant Santos also admits the truthfulness
of the plaintiff’s allegation that they were not even lovers when they first had sex. However, it has to be
pointed out that during the cross examination with the plaintiff by the undersigned, the former admitted
that he already knew Santos by name and he has already heard so much about her playful reputation.
Alvin Marasigan on direct-examination (TSN, July 20, 2007, p. 10 to 12).
ATTY. QUIRANTE:
Q Do you know Rosemarie Santos even before you met in the class party?
A No.
Q Can you tell this court how you approached her?
A She looked beautiful that night. When I got the chance of getting near her, I immediately
did.
Q So you were attracted to her. Did you have the hint that she would not decline your
conversation with her?
A Yes. My friends assured me I wouldn’t get rejected.
Q So your friends knew her.
A Yes.
Q Did you not have any boy talk with your friends regarding Rosemarie?
A Yes we did but I did not know her personally.
It had long been held in Carris v. Carris, 24 N.J. Eq. 516 that where a man has had sexual
intercourse with his wife before the marriage, and she is pregnant at the time of marriage, although he
may not be the author of the pregnancy, the marriage will not be annulled. It is only but proper to
abandon the defense of fraud on the regard both the husband and the wife were parties to premarital
immortality. Clearly, the issue of paternity over the couple’s child is not up to resolve the allegation of
fraud as cited in Art. 46, Family Code. Whether or not the child is that of Alvin Marsigan could not be a
valid ground to annul his marriage with herein defendant. The defendant however insists the paternity
of Marasigan. Nonetheless, the petitioner failed to satisfactorily prove his denial on his paternity over
the child for not presenting a more technical, accurate and reliable evidence despite the wide array of
scientific avenues of proving or disproving paternity.
II
Plaintiff Marasigan alleged that if it were not for the force and intimidation applied to him
compelling him to marry Rosemarie Santos, the marriage would not have occurred. This issue is clearly
of no moment because the petitioner dismally proved with sufficient bases that indeed he was forced or
intimidated prejudicing his consent over the marriage.
Marasigan brought to the court Allan Colandog, his friend who was accordingly with him when
the guards approached him and as witness Colandog put it, “forced” him to marry Rosemarie. Further,
Colandog testified that the guards showed Marasigan their respective revolvers when the latter
manifested his refusal to the marriage. Marasigan was too affected, avers Colandog, that he shivered in
fear when the guards disappeared. He further recapped that Marasigan got affected to the point that he
missed one of his series of interviews at the University of Santo Tomas as an applicant for admission at
the University of Santo Tomas Faculty of Civil Law (TSN, July 13, 2007, p. 17).
The defendant, despite his denial to the aforementioned facts, first chose not to present any
further evidence to contradict the allegations that have affected her family to the point of separating
herself voluntarily under the guardianship of her parents by living alone in a condominium unit in
Quezon City. Santos was evidently too emotional in her cross examination.
Rosemarie Santos on cross-examination (id, at p. 24).
ATTY AFABLE
Q Did your father force or intimidate Alvin to marry you?
A No
Q Then what can you say about the petitioner’s allegation that he was forced and
intimidated prior to the marriage ceremony?
A I’m so tired of his allegations. These things destroyed my family that I no longer know
how to restore our broken ties. Go on, tell this court every single lie and I will not negate
them. You can even incarcerate me right now.
Q Calm down Ms. Santos. So you are not presenting any evidence to contradict the
allegations?
A No.
Vitiated consent by force and intimidation is a valid ground for annulment as stated in Art. 45,
Family Code. The present family code limits the cases which would constitute fraud sufficient for
annulment of marriage to those enumerated in Article 46 (Anaya v. Palaroan, 36 SCRA 97).
However, the petitioner failed to prove in this court the existence of such force and intimidation
when he failed to negate the single evidence that herein defendant later presented. EXHIBIT G and E
submitting Atty. Santos’ passport and Certificate of Appearance respectively, indicating that he was in a
business conference at Istanbul, Turkey on February 19 to 25, 2005, making it impossible for him to meet
the petitioner on February 22, 2005. Marasigan also failed to establish the viability of his allegation that
the guards showed him their guns when the said guards were on leave due to their employer’s absence
(see copy of employees’ logbook EXHIBIT F).
Given that these allegations are true, the most that the court can discern over the actions of the
plaintiff prior to the marriage is his reluctance to the marriage. In which case, as interestingly held in
Vales v. Villa, 35 Phil 789 that there must, then, be a distinction to be made between a case where a
person gives his consent reluctantly and even against his good sense and judgment, and where he, in
reality, gives no consent at all, as where he executes a contract or performs an act against his will under
a pressure which he cannot resist. It is clear that one acts as voluntarily and independently in the eye of
the law when he acts reluctantly and with hesitation as when he acts spontaneously and joyously. Legally
speaking he acts as voluntarily and freely when he acts wholly against his better sense and judgment as
when he acts in conformity with them. Between the two acts there is no difference in law.
Very clearly, the petitioner is just shopping for grounds to annul his marriage with the plaintiff.
III
It is also stated in Art. 45, Family Code
Article 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the
time of the marriage:
(1) That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was
eighteen years of age or over but below twenty-one, and the marriage was solemnized
without the consent of the parents, guardian or person having substitute parental
authority over the party, in that order, unless after attaining the age of twenty-one,
such party freely cohabited with the other and both lived together as husband and
wife; (emphasis supplied).
xxx xxx xxx
True enough, the petitioner was above 18 but below 21 during the marriage. The court very well
established that the petitioner seek help from the Gunda couple for the consummation of the marriage
ceremony. The defendant herself knew that the Gunda couple was not Marasigan’s parents because she
knew that the former’s parents have been in the United States for so long and that they cared so much
for Alvin that they would not miss their son’s marriage without first knowing her would-be wife. The
defendant is definitely of the same stand that they were both not in legal age when they contracted the
marriage and that only her father consented.
The issue now turns out to be whether they were still cohabiting at the time when Alvin turned
21, in squaring off with the qualification in paragraph 1 of Art. 45, Family Code.
As the defense easily established, the couple were still cohabiting as the plaintiff told the court.
Alvin Marasigan on direct-examination (TSN, July 20, 2007, p. 21).
ATTY QUIRANTE
Q By the way Alvin, when did Rosemarie live your home to live alone in a condominium?
A A month ago or so?
Q Are you sure?
A Well we lived in the same house but we were not at peace with each other.
Marasigan turned 22 on January 1, 2007. At the time of the interrogation he was already 22 and
seven months. Clearly, if Rosemarie left their home a month before said interrogation, they were still
cohabiting when petitioner Marasigan turned 21. Therefore, Art. 45 of the Family Code could not be
invoked by the petitioner in annulling their marriage.
This malady has gone through a weary race. Contrary to what the law provides that the husband
and the wife are obliged to live to observe mutual love, respect and fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code). The
sanction therefore is the “spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal
mandate or court order” to enforce consortium (Tsoi v. Lao-Tsoi, 334 Phil 294, citing Cuaderno v.
Cuaderno, 120 Phil. 1298)
At any rate, it is being implored that this journey of diametrically opposed marriage be settled in
its most peaceful way. That what damage this has caused to the emotions of the parties be repaired and
their affection restored.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE premises considered, Defendant respectfully prays that plaintiff’s action for
annulment de denied for the grounds he presented are bereft of merit.
Other relief just and equitable under the premises is also prayed for.
Manila City, March 10, 2008.

GLEN ARROYO QUIRANTE
P. Burgos St., Manila
PTR No. 6347124, 2/24/2008, Manila City
IBP No. 812332, 4/13/2008, Pasig City
Copy Furnished:
Atty. Florie Gama Afable
Garcia Macalintal and Associates
3rd Floor, Orcel Bldg.,
Quezon Avenue, Quezon City

Branch 100, Manila City
ALVIN G. MARASIGAN,
Plaintiff,
ROSEMARIE B. SANTOS,
Defendant.
x---------------------------------------x
POSITION PAPER
Defendant Rosemarie Santos through the undersigned counsel respectfully submits the
following position paper and states that:
This action for annulment filed by plaintiff Alvin Marasigan for his marriage with defendant
Rosemarie B. Reyes on April 19, 2005 was filed in the Regional Trial Court of Manila Branch 100 on the
following grounds:
5. The plaintiff’s consent having been obtained by force and intimidation
The plaintiff also prays for support and moral damages on account of the foregoing allegations.
Defendant Rosemarie B. Santos, daughter of Lawyer-Businessman Felipe Valdez Santos, was
eighteen (18) years old when she married herein plaintiff Alvin Marasigan who was then twenty (20)
years old and was about to enter the law school. The ceremony was held on April 19, 2005 at the Manila
City Hall officiated by Manila Mayor Lito Atienza.
Prior to the said marriage, Santos and Marasigan were not even acquaintances. They first met in
a class party where everyone was having the most of the night. After a few exchange of conversations
while getting drunk amidst a loud environment, they drove to a motel and spent the night together. That
night has since started the malady of their lives.

Defendant Santos found out her pregnancy a month before her graduation at the St. Paul’s
University – Manila as a Broadcast Journalism student. EXHIBIT A is the original copy of the pregnancy
test done by Dr. Erlinda Colayco, an OB-Gyne of Delos Santos Hospital, on the defendant stating that as
of March 20, 2005, the defendant is carrying a four-week old baby in her womb. The plaintiff however
questions his paternity over the child.
In a cross examination with the plaintiff, (TSN, July 20, 2007, p. 16), he alleged that on February
22, 2005, he was approached by two bodyguards of the defendant’s father, Atty. Felipe Santos,
accordingly informing him of the ‘misfortune’ that he would be in should he not marry the defendant. A
revolver was accordingly shown to him when the bodyguards sensed his hesitation. Two days after the
incident, the plaintiff allegedly approached personally the defendant’s father invoking his incapability to
enter into marriage. However, Atty. Santos accordingly told him to ‘expect to die’. The defendant denies
the accusations stating that her father, who is a church pastor, could not do such a ‘horrible’ act. Further,
Santos maintains that neither did her father intervene in her personal choices including her personal life.
The defendant added that her father only knew of Marasigan when both of them already decided to get
married, abandoning the contention that Atty. Santos forced Marasigan to marry her.
Moreover, the plaintiff contends that he failed to obtain his parent’s consent when he married
defendant Santos as they were in the United States. Due to the fraud referred to in the preceding
paragraph, the plaintiff was forced to seek help from an elderly couple by the name of Claudio Gunda
and Rosita Ramirez-Gunda who operate a gotohan near his residence to pretend to be his parents thus
making it appear that their marriage was valid. The court has established the correctness of the
accusation through the examination conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation on the thumb
mark made by the couple on the subject marriage contract compared to that of thumb marks of the real
parents of plaintiff Marasigan (EXHIBIT D). The court no longer required the couple to testify in court as
the evidence was proven beyond reasonable doubt.

ISSUES
The court defined the following issues which the defendant prays to result in the annulment of
his marriage with defendant Santos:
5. The plaintiff’s consent having been obtained by force, intimidation and undue influence.
ARGUMENTS
The court has established the fact that defendant Santos was known in the same university for
her playfulness with her male buddies. The university’s Guidance Counselor has testified the numerous
instances when the defendant’s attention was called due to her alleged obvious misconduct of
consistently going out with various male acquaintances as complained by the latter’s respective
girlfriends (TSN, July 13, 2007, p.4). Said accusation was not denied by defendant Santos.
Defendant Santos also admitted in court that in her past experiences, some has already
confronted her affront regarding her playful deeds. In fact, defendant Santos also admits the truthfulness
of the plaintiff’s allegation that they were not even lovers when they first had sex. However, it has to be
pointed out that during the cross examination with the plaintiff by the undersigned, the former admitted
that he already knew Santos by name and he has already heard so much about her playful reputation.
Alvin Marasigan on direct-examination (TSN, July 20, 2007, p. 10 to 12).
ATTY. QUIRANTE:
Q Do you know Rosemarie Santos even before you met in the class party?
A No.
Q Can you tell this court how you approached her?
A She looked beautiful that night. When I got the chance of getting near her, I immediately
did.
Q So you were attracted to her. Did you have the hint that she would not decline your
conversation with her?
A Yes. My friends assured me I wouldn’t get rejected.
Q So your friends knew her.
A Yes.
Q Did you not have any boy talk with your friends regarding Rosemarie?
A Yes we did but I did not know her personally.
It had long been held in Carris v. Carris, 24 N.J. Eq. 516 that where a man has had sexual
intercourse with his wife before the marriage, and she is pregnant at the time of marriage, although he
may not be the author of the pregnancy, the marriage will not be annulled. It is only but proper to
abandon the defense of fraud on the regard both the husband and the wife were parties to premarital
immortality. Clearly, the issue of paternity over the couple’s child is not up to resolve the allegation of
fraud as cited in Art. 46, Family Code. Whether or not the child is that of Alvin Marsigan could not be a
valid ground to annul his marriage with herein defendant. The defendant however insists the paternity
of Marasigan. Nonetheless, the petitioner failed to satisfactorily prove his denial on his paternity over
the child for not presenting a more technical, accurate and reliable evidence despite the wide array of
scientific avenues of proving or disproving paternity.
II
Plaintiff Marasigan alleged that if it were not for the force and intimidation applied to him
compelling him to marry Rosemarie Santos, the marriage would not have occurred. This issue is clearly
of no moment because the petitioner dismally proved with sufficient bases that indeed he was forced or
intimidated prejudicing his consent over the marriage.
Marasigan brought to the court Allan Colandog, his friend who was accordingly with him when
the guards approached him and as witness Colandog put it, “forced” him to marry Rosemarie. Further,
Colandog testified that the guards showed Marasigan their respective revolvers when the latter
manifested his refusal to the marriage. Marasigan was too affected, avers Colandog, that he shivered in
fear when the guards disappeared. He further recapped that Marasigan got affected to the point that he
missed one of his series of interviews at the University of Santo Tomas as an applicant for admission at
the University of Santo Tomas Faculty of Civil Law (TSN, July 13, 2007, p. 17).
The defendant, despite his denial to the aforementioned facts, first chose not to present any
further evidence to contradict the allegations that have affected her family to the point of separating
herself voluntarily under the guardianship of her parents by living alone in a condominium unit in
Quezon City. Santos was evidently too emotional in her cross examination.
Rosemarie Santos on cross-examination (id, at p. 24).

ATTY AFABLE
Q Did your father force or intimidate Alvin to marry you?
A No
Q Then what can you say about the petitioner’s allegation that he was forced and
intimidated prior to the marriage ceremony?
A I’m so tired of his allegations. These things destroyed my family that I no longer know
how to restore our broken ties. Go on, tell this court every single lie and I will not negate
them. You can even incarcerate me right now.
Q Calm down Ms. Santos. So you are not presenting any evidence to contradict the
allegations?
A No.
Vitiated consent by force and intimidation is a valid ground for annulment as stated in Art. 45,
Family Code. The present family code limits the cases which would constitute fraud sufficient for
annulment of marriage to those enumerated in Article 46 (Anaya v. Palaroan, 36 SCRA 97).
However, the petitioner failed to prove in this court the existence of such force and intimidation
when he failed to negate the single evidence that herein defendant later presented. EXHIBIT G and E
submitting Atty. Santos’ passport and Certificate of Appearance respectively, indicating that he was in a
business conference at Istanbul, Turkey on February 19 to 25, 2005, making it impossible for him to meet
the petitioner on February 22, 2005. Marasigan also failed to establish the viability of his allegation that
the guards showed him their guns when the said guards were on leave due to their employer’s absence
(see copy of employees’ logbook EXHIBIT F).

Given that these allegations are true, the most that the court can discern over the actions of the
plaintiff prior to the marriage is his reluctance to the marriage. In which case, as interestingly held in
Vales v. Villa, 35 Phil 789 that there must, then, be a distinction to be made between a case where a
person gives his consent reluctantly and even against his good sense and judgment, and where he, in
reality, gives no consent at all, as where he executes a contract or performs an act against his will under
a pressure which he cannot resist. It is clear that one acts as voluntarily and independently in the eye of
the law when he acts reluctantly and with hesitation as when he acts spontaneously and joyously. Legally
speaking he acts as voluntarily and freely when he acts wholly against his better sense and judgment as
when he acts in conformity with them. Between the two acts there is no difference in law.
Very clearly, the petitioner is just shopping for grounds to annul his marriage with the plaintiff.
III
It is also stated in Art. 45, Family Code
Article 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the
time of the marriage:
(1) That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was
eighteen years of age or over but below twenty-one, and the marriage was solemnized
without the consent of the parents, guardian or person having substitute parental
authority over the party, in that order, unless after attaining the age of twenty-one,
such party freely cohabited with the other and both lived together as husband and
wife; (emphasis supplied).
xxx xxx xxx

True enough, the petitioner was above 18 but below 21 during the marriage. The court very well
established that the petitioner seek help from the Gunda couple for the consummation of the marriage
ceremony. The defendant herself knew that the Gunda couple was not Marasigan’s parents because she
knew that the former’s parents have been in the United States for so long and that they cared so much
for Alvin that they would not miss their son’s marriage without first knowing her would-be wife. The
defendant is definitely of the same stand that they were both not in legal age when they contracted the
marriage and that only her father consented.
The issue now turns out to be whether they were still cohabiting at the time when Alvin turned
21, in squaring off with the qualification in paragraph 1 of Art. 45, Family Code.
As the defense easily established, the couple were still cohabiting as the plaintiff told the court.
Alvin Marasigan on direct-examination (TSN, July 20, 2007, p. 21).
ATTY QUIRANTE
Q By the way Alvin, when did Rosemarie live your home to live alone in a condominium?
A A month ago or so?
Q Are you sure?
A Well we lived in the same house but we were not at peace with each other.
Marasigan turned 22 on January 1, 2007. At the time of the interrogation he was already 22 and
seven months. Clearly, if Rosemarie left their home a month before said interrogation, they were still
cohabiting when petitioner Marasigan turned 21. Therefore, Art. 45 of the Family Code could not be
invoked by the petitioner in annulling their marriage.
This malady has gone through a weary race. Contrary to what the law provides that the husband
and the wife are obliged to live to observe mutual love, respect and fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code). The
sanction therefore is the “spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal
mandate or court order” to enforce consortium (Tsoi v. Lao-Tsoi, 334 Phil 294, citing Cuaderno v.
Cuaderno, 120 Phil. 1298)
At any rate, it is being implored that this journey of diametrically opposed marriage be settled in
its most peaceful way. That what damage this has caused to the emotions of the parties be repaired and
their affection restored.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE premises considered, Defendant respectfully prays that plaintiff’s action for
annulment de denied for the grounds he presented are bereft of merit.
Other relief just and equitable under the premises is also prayed for.
Manila City, March 10, 2008.

GLEN ARROYO QUIRANTE
P. Burgos St., Manila
PTR No. 6347124, 2/24/2008, Manila City
IBP No. 812332, 4/13/2008, Pasig City
Copy Furnished:
Atty. Florie Gama Afable
Garcia Macalintal and Associates
3rd Floor, Orcel Bldg.,
Quezon Avenue, Quezon City

Branch 85
Lipa City
CLAIRE REPADAS CUNANAN, CIVIL CASE NO. 09-0281

Petitioner,
-versus-
324 CONTRACTORS, INC.,

Respondent.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
MOTION FOR WRITTEN INTERROGATORIES
NOW COMES the plaintiff in the above entitled case, moves for a rule on the defendant, 324
Contractors, Inc., to answer under oath the following interrogatories:
1. Did 324 Corporation prior to 1st day of October, 2008, enter into a contract with Habaji
Coporation for the servicing, repairing, or inspecting of all or any of the bar fixtures sold
to its customers, any or all parts of which were purchased from the defendant, 324
Contractors, Inc?
2. Was such contract, if any, in writing?
3. Was the said contract in force on the 1st day of October, 2008?
4. Did Habaji Corporation at any time prior to the 1st day of October, 2008 purchase from
324 Contractors, Inc any of the bar fixtures with which the restaurant and tavern operated
by Lito Garcia at 336 Camo Street, was equipped prior to the day aforesaid, including a
cooler for the purpose of keeping beef cold and fresh for consumption?
5. Did Habaji Corporation operate its inspection, service and repair department under the
name of the Corporation?
6. What was the relationship, if any, between the aforesaid Habaji Corporation and Huson
Corporation?
7. Did Habaji Corporation by any of its employees, inspect, service, and made repairs on a
certain cooler machine in the tavern aforesaid on the 1st day of October 2008, and at any
other time between that date and the 2nd day of November, 2008?
8. Were Habaji Corporation and Huson Corporation both located at 224 Street on the 2nd day
of November, 2008?
AFFIDAVIT
WILBUR IAN Q. BABULA, being first duly sworn, on oath, deposes and says that he is one of
the attorneys for the plaintiff in the above-entitled cause; that said cause of action arises out of
the escape of certain dangers gases from certain bar fixtures sold to the plaintiff by the defendant,
324 Contractors, Inc.
Affiant is informed and believes that the said bar fictures were inspected, altered, and repairs
attempted to be made by one of the servants and agents of the defendant, Habaji Corporation,
and that said work was done by said Habaji Corporation, by virtue of a certain contract with 324
Corporation; that the said defendant in its answer has denied that it had any such contract with
the defendant, the Habaji Corporation, and that the said fixtures were inspected, altered, or
repaired by its servant or agent, that a same denial has also been made in the answer of the
defendant, Habaji Corporation.
Affiant further says that the evidence required by the answers of the interrogatories herewith
presented, and the list of wsorn documents, are necessary and material in the trial of said cause.
WILBUR IAN BABULA & Associates

2nd Flr. JR Business Complex, Ayala Highway
Mataas na Lupa, Lipa City, Batangas 4217
By :
WILBUR IAN BABULA

PRT # 0577210 / 01-02-08 / Lipa City
ROLL No. 43990

Prosecutor’s Office
Lipa City
ROSARIO B. CHAVER, SP. PROC CASE NO.2007-009

FOR: Declaration of Nullity
of Marriage
Petitioner,
-versus-
Alejandro Guevarra,
Respondent.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
MOTION FOR THE TAKING OF DEPOSITION OF WITNESS
PETITIONER ROSARIO B. CHAVER, by and through the undersigned counsel, unto this
Honorable Court, most respectfully manifests:
1. That last November 11, 2009, MARIETA GLOBO ECACA, witness for the herein
plaintiff, arrived for a one-month vacation from Qatar where she is currently working;
2. That, her testimony is of utmost importance for the judicial determination of the instant
case.
3. That however, herein witness is constrained, by reason of her work, to go back to Qatar
on December 13, 2007, and, is uncertain as to when departure on December 13, 2009.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honourable Court that
an Order be taken before the Branch Clerk of Court of this Court preferably on December 12,
2009 at 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon.
Other relief and remedies, just and equitable in the premises, are likewise prayed for.
City of Tanauan for Lipa City, December 7, 2009.

PTR No. 9828287/LIpa City/1-5-
2009
IBP No. 25633/1-05-2009
The Clerk of Court

This Court
Greetings:
Please submit the foregoing Motion to the HOnorable Court immediately upon receipt hereof for
its consideration and approval.
JASON BARRETO CAGTAHAN

MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA
BRANCH 10
JOAN S. GUIAYA
Plaintiff, CIVIL CASE NO. 984353
-versus-
FRANCIS RYAN CASTRO

Defendant.
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADING
PLAINTIFF, by counsel and to this Honorable Court respectfully moves that judgment on the
pleadings must be directed, on the following grounds;
(1) In his answer to the complaint for a sum of money, the defendant merely alleged that he
had no knowledge and information as to the allegations of the complaint. This kind of
denial, while allowed on certain instances, does not apply when the facts as to which
want of knowledge is asserted are to the knowledge of the court are so plainly and
essentially within the defendant’s knowledge. It amounts to a general denial that would
entitle the plaintiff to judgment on the pleadings.
(2) Moreover, attached to the complaint, as actionable documents is a promissory note
executed by the defendant, to evidence the loan of P1,000,000.00. He did not question its
authenticity under oath. He merely said that he has no knowledge thereof, which is not
sufficient to tender a factual issue and the same impliedly admits the due execution and
authenticity. As to entitle plaintiff on judgment on the pleadings.
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays that judgment on the pleading be rendered in favour of the
plaintiff, ordering defendant to pay plaintiff as prayed for in the complaint.
Manila, November 24, 2009.
ATTY. REGINA D. CORDERO

Atty. Athena G. Villanueva
Unit 903 South City Star Tower,
Madrigal Avenue, Muntilupa
Mam:
Please be informed that the undersigned counsel has set the foregoing motion for hearing
on December 5, 2009 at 10am.
Atty. Regina D. Cordero

MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF MUNTINLUPA
BRANCH 98
DONABEL P. RAMA
Plaintiff,
FOR: SPECIFIC
PERFORMANCE
PILAR B. PILAPIL
Defendant.
x--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
MOTION FOR EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT
PLAINTIFF, by counsel and to this Honorable Court, respectfully alleges:
1. The decision in favour of the plaintiff has become final and executor since more than
fifteen (15) days from defendant’s receipt thereof on September 15, 2009 had already
lapsed without a defendant’s appealing therefrom.
2. After a decision has become final, execution is a matter of right on the part of the
prevailing party and ministerial duty of the court to issue writ of execution.
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays that a writ of execution be issued for the satisfaction of the
judgment date September 30, 2009.
Muntinlupa, September 30, 2009.
ATTY. RAQUEL DEJARME

The Clerk of Court

Municipal Trial Court
Muntinlupa
Sir:
Please submit the foregoing for the approval of the Court upon receipt thereof, notice and
hearing not being required.
ATTY. RAQUEL DEJARME
Service of motion.
Proof of service.

NITA V. CRUZ
Plaintiff,
Civil Case No. 01-2345

-versus- For: Damages
VINCENT S. CASTRO
Defendants.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
MOTION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF

ALIAS WRIT OF EXECUTION
COMES NOW, the petitioner in the above captioned case by and through counsel, and to
this Honorable Court most respectfully states that:
1. On October 21, 2003, this Honorable Court rendered its decision granting the
petitioner’s petition for the issuance of writ of execution;
2. To implement the Decision, this Honorable Court cause the issuance of the writ of
execution dated October 28, 2003;
3. As the date however, the said writ of execution/possession has not been implemented
yet making the same functus officio. Thus necessitating the issuance of an alias writ
of possession for the sheriff to implement the Decision dated October 21, 2003;
4. This motion is filed due to the foregoing reasons only and for the purpose of delaying
the early disposition of this case,
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable

Court an alias writ of execution be issued.

Pasay City, Philippines, March 5, 2005
OLIVER C. LOZANO, JR.

13 Leveriza St., Pasay City
IBP No. 37468598
PTR No. 8373613
NOTICE OF HEARING
THE Branch Clerk of Court

RTC, NCJR, Branch 10
Pasay City
Greetings:
Please submit the foregoing motion to the Honorable Court immediately upon receipt
hereof, for its consideration and approval without further oral arguments.
OLIVER C. LOZANO
Counsel
Copy Furnished:
Tolentino Gonzales & Villanueva Law Offices

Suite 705 Don Santiago Building
2345 Taft Avenue, Ermita, Manila
EXPLANATION
The foregoing Motion is being served to the counsel of the defendant by registered mail
instead of personal delivery due to unavailability of personnel to effect personal delivery.
OLIVER C. LOZANO
Counsel
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
Regional Office No. 3
Capitol Compound, City of San Fernando 2000, Pampanga
ABAD, EDUARDO P.
Guagua Water District
San Nicolas, Guagua, Pampanga
RE: Administrative Complaint

x---------------------------------x
ENTRY OF APPEARANCE AND

URGENT EX-PARTE MOTION FOR TIME
UNDERSIGNED COUNSEL, respectfully states that:
1. He is entering his appearance for the cause of the General Manager, Eduardo P. Abad of
the Guagua Water District;
2. The order dated November 11, 2009 was received on November 19, 2009 by the office of
the said General Manager directing him to comment within five (5) days from receipt
thereof ending November 24, 2009 why he should not be administratively charged;
3. Due to the preoccupation of the undersigned counsel with other prior commitments of
equal import, he would earnestly seek for time within which to prepare and submit said
comment;
4. The needed time is not intended to delay the soonest administration of justice;
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that the undersigned counsel be

granted time of another five (5) days from November 24, 2009 up to November 28, 2009 within
which to prepare and submit subject comment.
Guagua for City of San Fernando, Pampanga, November 23, 2009.
Respectfully submitted
With my conformity: Ex parte:
RIC M. CRUZ
Assisting Counsel
EDUARDO P. ABAD Guagua, Pampanga
General Manager PTR O/R No. 2167795 01-28-2009
IBP O/R No. 75776 01-28-2009
Pampanga Chapter
MCLE Compliance No. III-000529
Manila
GINA PARENO
Plaintiff,
-versus- CIVIL Case No.1
For Sum of Money

TITO SOTTO
Defendant.
x-------------------------------------------------x
SECOND MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME
DEFENDANT, by the undersigned counsel, and unto this Honorable Court, most respectfully
states that:
1. Defendant engaged the services of undersigned counsel only on November 17, 2009;
2. Defendant was served with Summons and copy of Complaint on November 3, 2009 and
thus has until November 18, 2009 within which to submit an Answer or Responsive
Pleading;
3. However, due to the pressures of equally urgent professional work and prior
commitments, the undersigned counsel would not be able to meet the said decline;
4. As such, undersigned counsel, through an urgent motion for extension of time was
constrained to request for an additional period of five days from November 19, 2009 to
November 24, 2009 within which to submit Defendant’s Answer or Responsive Pleading.
Such motion was granted though a resolution by the court;
5. However, defendant failed to submit the said motion on time for honestly failing to
foresee their inability to prepare and file the intended petition within the reglamentary
period due to prepare due to voluminous and pressing work load on equally important
cases of the undersigned counsel, not to mention his daily court appearances;
6. Moreover, this additional time will also allow the undersigned to interview the available
witness and study this case further;
7. This Second Motion is not intended for delay but solely due to the foregoing reasons.
WHEREFORE, Defendant most respectfully prays of this Honorable Court that he be given an
additional period of five days from today within which to submit an answer or other Responsive
Pleading.
Other relief just and equitable is likewise prayed for.
Manila, November 24, 2009

Atty. Jun Yee
ABC Bldg., Rizal Avenue, Manila
PTR No. 3395523
IBP No.: 34482
Roll No. 3495430
Copy furnished:
Atty. Wenceslao Gonzales
Counsel for Complainant
XYZ Bldg. Juan Luna St.
Manila
Manila
GINA PARENO
Plaintiff,
-versus- CIVIL Case No. 1
For Sum of money
TITO SOTTO
Defendant.
x--------------------------------------------x
FINAL MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME
Undersigned counsel, and unto this Honorable Court, mostly respectfully states that:
1. He is the counsel for the Defendant in the above captioned case for sum of money;
2. Defendant engaged the services of undersigned counsel only on November 17, 2009;
3. Defendant was served with Summons and copy of the Complaint on November 3, 2009
and thus has until November 18, 2009 within which to submit an Answer or Responsive
Pleading;
4. Defendant was twice given extension of time to prepare and answer the complaint. The
first time extension of five days was given on November 19, 2009 to end on November
24, 2009.
5. However, defendant failed to submit the said motion on time for honestly failing to
foresee their inability to prepare and file the intended petition within the reglamentary
period due to voluminous and pressing work load on equally important cases of the
undersigned counsel, additional time of five days was also allowed by the Court with no
opposition form the opposing party. Said extension was from November 25, 2009 to
November 30, 2009;
6. Good cause exist to justify the additional requested extension of three more days as
counsel for the defendant had to undergo a minor dental surgery during the previously
requested extension;
WHEREFORE, with indulgence form the Court, counsel for the defendant most humbly request
that a final extension of three days to prepare the answer be granted.
Atty. Jun Yee

ABC Bldg., Rizal Avenue, Manila
PTR No. 3395223
IBP No. 34482
Roll No. 3495430
Copy Furnished:
Atty. Wenceslao Gonzales
Counsel for Complainant
XYZ Bldg. Juan Luna St.
Manila
Branch 01, Manila
Francis Magalona,
Plaintiff,
-versus- Civil Case No. 00001
Doris Begornia,
Defendant
x---------------------------x
MOTION TO DECLARE DEFENDANT DEFAULT
Plaintiff, by counsel and unto this Honorable Court, respectfully states
1. The records of the Honorable Court show that Defendant was served with copy of the
summons and of the complaint, together with annexes thereto on March 20, 2009;
2. Upon verification however, the records show that Defendant Doris Begornia has failed to
file her Answer within the reglamentary period specified by the Rules of Court despite
the service of summons and the complaint;
3. As such. It is respectfully prayed that Defendant Doris Begornia be declared in default
pursuant to the Rules of Court and that the Honorable Court proceed to render judgment
as the complaint may warrant.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that Defendant Doris Begornia be declared in

default pursuant to the Rules of Court and that the Honorable Court proceed to render judgment
as the complaint may warrant.
City of Manila, Phlippines, April 15, 2009.

Al C. Batonghinog
Roll No. 123
IBP No. 4567, issued on
October 31, 2008
PTR No. 00001, issued at
Makati City
Notice of Hearing:
The Clerk of Count

Branch 01, Manila
Greetings: Please set the foregoing Motion to Declare Defendant in Default on April 30, 2009 at
9:00 o’clock in the morning or at any time convenient to the calendar of the Honorable Court.
Thank You.
Copy Furnished:
Atty. Rolando Balasabas

No. 13, UN Avenue
Manila City
Branch 01, Manila
Francis Magalona,
Plaintiff,
Doris Begornia,
Defendant
x---------------------------x
MOTION TO LIFT ORDER OF DEFAULT
Defendant, by the undersigned counsel, respectfully alleges that:
1. Ten (10) days after the summons of the complaint was received by this defendant, she
filed a motion to dismiss;
2. Plaintiff has not filed any opposition to said motion and no hearing was held on said
motion to dismiss;
3. While the said motion to dismiss was still pending, this Honorable Court declared
defendant in default;
4. Said order declaring defendant in default is premature and without legal basis since there
is still a pending motion to dismiss.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the order declaring the defendant in default
be lifted and that this Honorable Court rule on the aforesaid pending motion to dismiss.
City of Manila; March 20, 2009

Rolando Balasabas
Roll No. 321
IBP No. 7654 issued on
October 31, 2005
Manila City
Notice of Hearing:
The Clerk of Court

Branch 01, Manila
Greetings: Please set the foregoing Motion to Declare Defendant in Default on April 30, 2009 at
9:00 o’clock in the morning or at any time convenient to the calendar of the Honorable Court.
Thank you.
Copy Furnished:
Atty. Al C. Batonghinog
Cubao, Quezon City
SPECIAL CIVIC ACTIONS
49. Complaint for Interpleader

50. Petition for Prohibition
51. Petition for Quo Warranto
52. Petition for Quieting of Title
53. Petition for Declaratory Relief
54. Petition for Mandamus
55. Complaint for Ejectment
56. Complaint for Unlawful Detainer
57. Complaint for Expropriation
58. Complaint for Foreclosure of Mortgage
BRANCH _____
QUEZON CITY
METALINE CORP.
Plaintiff,
-versus- SP. CIVIL CASE NO. 09-444
JOSELITO M. FIGUERES AND

BALTAZAR R. DONAIRE,
Defendants.
x______________________x
COMPLAINT
PLAINTIFF, METALINE CORP., by counsel and to this Honorable Court, respectfully

alleges
1. Plaintiff is a corporation duly organized and existing under the law of the Philippines,
with principal offices at # 654 Tinio St., Kala, Quezon City.
Defendants Joselito M. Figueres and Baltazar R. Donaire are both of legal age and
with residences at # 555 Aguas St., Polar, Quezon City and #543 Manta St., Bagoo,
Quezon City, respectively, where they may be served with summons and other legal
processes.
2. On March 30, 2009, Joselito M. Figueres subscribed to 5,000 shares of stock of plaintiff,
with par value of 100.00 per share, and accordingly , he was issued a certificate of stock
No. 0957, which upon his request, was in blank, he explaining that a blank certificate
would be easy to negotiate and transfer.
3. On or about April 2, 2009 a certain Baltazar R. Donaire called on plaintiffs corporate

secretary, presenting and leaving to the corporate secretary Stock Certificate No. 0957 in
which his name was already therein and which he claimed was endorsed to him by
Joselito M. Figueres and asking that said certificate of stock be cancelled and a new
certificate issued him. But before the corporate secretary could effect the transfer,
submitted an affidavit claiming that his Stock Certificate No. 0957 was lost and asking
that the same be cancelled and a new replacement be issued to him.
4. Confronted with the conflicting claims of ownership of said shares of stock, plaintiff held
in abeyance action of their respective claims and demanded of defendants Joselito M.
Figueres and Baltazar R. Donaire to interplead and litigate their respective claims but
they refused and continue to so refuse.
5. Plaintiff was thus constrained to file the instant complaint in interpleader and to incur
expenses of litigation, including attorney’s fees in the amount of 500.00, which should be
assessed equally between the defendants.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment, requiring defendants to interplead and litigate their
respectively claims between themselves.
Plaintiff further prays that defendants be ordered to pay expenses of ligation and attorney’s fees
in the amount of 500,000.00 plus costs and other expense to be assessed against them equally.
Muntinlupa City, November 8, 2009

Counsel for the plaintiff
2nd Flr, MC Bldg., Rotonda,
Quezon City
IBP # 11111111
Roll NO. 222222
PTR # 333333
Quezon City
COURT OF APPEALS
MANILA
PEDRO OCAMPO,
Petitioner,
-versus- CA- G.R. SP. No.___________
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,

BRANCH 27 MANILA,
MARIO MAGSAYSAY,
Respondents.
X_______________________________________________x
PETITION FOR PROHIBITION
Petitioner, by counsel and to this Honorable Court, respectfully alleges:
1. Petitioner is of legal age and with residence at Singalong Barangay 695 Zone 75,Malate
Manila. Respondent Regional Trial, Branch 41, Manila, is a court created by law, which
issued the questioned orders ( Annexes A and B ), in Civil Case No. 09-054321, Manila,
where it may be served with summons and other legal processes. Respondent Mario
Magsaysay is of legal age and with residence at General Malvar St., Barangay 695, Zone
75 Malate, Malate where he may be served with summons and other legal processes. He
is the plaintiff in said Civil Case No. 09-054321.
2. On January 12, 2009 private respondent filed a complaint for reconveyance and
cancellation of certificate of title of a parcel of land located in Forbes Parks, Makati City,
alleging as ground therefore that said parcel of land has been registered in the name of
petitioner merely on behalf and in trust for his benefit. Copy of said complaint is attached
hereto as Annex C.
3. On or about January 25, 2009, the respondent trial court issued the summons and required
petitioner to file his answer thereto. instead of answering the complaint, petitioner as
defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the trial court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case on the ground that the parcel of land is
located in Makati city and the Register of Deeds of Makati, which issued the certificate
covering said land, was not impleaded as party defendant.
4. On February 18, 2009, the trial court issued an order denying the motion to dismiss the
requiring petitioner to file his answer. Certified true copy of said order, which was
received on February 23, 2009 is attached hereto as Annex A.
5. On March 3, 2009 or within the 15 day period from receipt of said order Annex A,
petitioner filed his motion for reconsideration, copy of which is attached herewith as
Annex D.
6. On April 1, 2009 the trial court issued an order, copy of which was received on April 7,
2009 denying the motion for reconsideration, Certified true copy of said order is attached
hereto as Annex B.
7. The said Civil Case No. 09-054321 (Annex C) for reconveyance and cancellation of TCT
is outside the jurisdiction of the respondent trial court for the reason that the parcel of
land subject matter thereof is located in Makati City and the Register of Deeds of Makati
City has not been impleaded as party respondent, and the questioned orders Annexes A
and B are null and void for having been issued by the trial court without jurisdiction.
8. Since respondents are proceeding with Civil Case NO. 09-054321 notwithstanding its
lack of jurisdiction, there is need for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, in
connection with which petitioner avers that he is entitled to the relief demand, part of
which consist of restraining the respondents from continuing with the proceeding in Civil
Case NO.09-054321: that the commission or continuance of which during the pendency
of the litigation would work injustice to petitioner, and the petitioner is willing and ready
to post a bond to respondents to the effect that petitioner will pay all damages which
respondents will suffer by reason of the preliminary injunction if the Honorable Court
should finally decide that petitioner was not entitled thereto.
WHEREFORE, the petitioner prays for judgment:
1. Upon the filing of this petition and after due hearing, a writ of preliminary injunction be
issued restraining the trial court from further proceeding in Civil Case No. 09-054321,
upon such bond as this Honorable Court may fix, to the effect that petitioner will pay all
damages which respondents will suffer by reason of the preliminary injunction if the
Honorable Court should finally decide that petitioner was not entitled thereto.
2. The petition be given due course.
3. After proceedings, nullifying the trial courts questioned orders Annexes A and B and
commanding respondent trial court to desist from further proceeding in Civil Case No.
09-054321.
City of Manila, November 25, 2009.
JOSE MANUEL
Attorney for Defendant
CRUZ & ASSOCIATES
2nd Floor, RCBC Plaza,
Ayala Avenue, Makati City
Roll NO. 123456
P.T.R. No. 1234567/
Manila / January 10, 2008
IBP NO. 123456 / Manila /
January 20, 2008
MCLE Compliance No. 123456

MUNTINLUPA CITY
MARIA DIANA G. ABELON

Petitioner,
-versus-
EMERITUS FLORES
Respondent.
X_________________________________________________x
PETITION FOR QUO WARRANTO
PETITIONER, by counsel and to this Honorable Court, respectfully alleges:
1. Petitioner is of legal age and with residence at 78 Batangas St., Ayala Alabang Village,
Muntinlupa, while respondent is also of legal age and with residence at 8 Tagbilaran st.,
Alabang Hills Muntinlupa where he may be served summons and other legal processes.
2. Petitioner has been permanently appointed as chief of the collection department of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue, at the head office in Quezon City as shown by his
appointment paper, copy of which is attached as Annex A.
3. Petitioner is covered by the Civil Service and enjoys security of tenure, pursuant to the
constitution and Civil Service Laws, and he cannot be removed without valid cause and
only after due process of law.
4. On May 29, 2009, petitioner went on official leave as he had be sent to the United States
for study of period of three months. When petitioner returned from his official leave, he
found out that his position as chief of the collection department was occupied by the
respondent, who claimed that he had been appointed therein by the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, and he refused to vacate said position to give way to petitioners
assumption of the duties thereof.
5. Petitioner demanded of respondent to vacate the position, as he has been legally
occupying the same and has not been removed there from for cause. And after due
process of law, but the respondent refused and continues to refuse to do so, constraining
the petitioner to file the instant petition for quo warranto.
6. Respondent is a usurper of the office, as petitioner has not been legally removed there
from for cause and after due process as provided by law, the position has not been vacant
to which respondent can be validly appointed, and thus respondent refusal to vacate the
position is unlawful.
7. When confronted about the matter, the commissioner of internal revenue advised the
petitioner to file a quo warranto case which he is filling within one year from the date
respondent was illegally appointed to the position.
8. As a consequence of respondents unlawful usurpation of the position and unlawful
holding and exercising the position, receiving the salaries and monetary benefits arising
there from, petitioner suffered from damages in the monthly of Php 25,000 from
attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation in the amount of Php 500,000 which should be
assessed against the respondent.
WHEREFORE, petitioner prays for judgment:
1. Outstanding respondent from the position of chiefs of the collection department of the
BIR and altogether exclude him therefrom;
2. Adjudging respondent liable for damages in the amount of Php 25,000 a month from
the time he returned from official leave, starting ,May 29, 2009 as well as attorney’s
fees and expenses of litigation in the amount of Php 500,000 which should all be
assessed against respondent.
Muntinlupa, November 24, 2009.
ATTY. LADY DIANNE MANALOTO

AGAINST FORUM SHOPPING
I, MARIA DIANA T. ABELON, of legal age and with residence at 78 Batangas St., Ayala
Alabang Village, Muntinlupa after having been duly sworn depose and say:
1. That I am plaintiff in this petition;
2. That I have caused the preparation of the said complaint.
3. That I have read the allegations therein contained and that the same are true and correct
of my personal knowledge or based on authentic records,
4. That I have not theretofore commended any action or filed any claim involving the same
issues in court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and to, the best of my knowledge, no
such other claim pending therein, and if I should therefore learn that the same action or
similar action or claim has been filed pending, I shall report the fact within five (5) days
therefrom to the court wherein the aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been
filed.
MARIA DIANA T. ABELON

Affiant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me on November 30, 2009 affiant exhibiting me

Community Tax Certificate Number 9834685 issued in Muntinlupa on January 7, 2009.
ANNA GAIL P. PERALTA

Notary Public
Doc No.
Page No.
Book No.
Series of 2009.
MUNICIPAL COURT OF NAGA CITY
CAMARINES SUR
Pilar B. Pilapil
Plaintiff,
-versus-
Lito Atienza
Defendant.
x_____________________________________________________x
COMPLAINT
PLAINTIFF, by undersigned counsel and to this Honorable Court alleges;
Plaintiff is of legal age, Filipino with residence of Zone 5, Maleniza Compound, San Felipe,
Naga City, while defendant is also legal age, Filipino and with residence at 67 Santa
Monica Village, Magsaysay Avenue, Naga City, where he may be served with summons
and other legal processes.
Plaintiff is the owner of a parcel of land situated in 90 Penafrancia Avenue, Naga City,
covered by TCT No.4539377 of the register of Deeds for Naga City, which is more
particularly described as follows: (technical description of the land)
While plaintiff was in the office of the city assessor of Naga City, checking the tax
declaration of his property covered by TCT No.4539377, he discovered that another
person. Then defendant in the instant case, has another title, namely TCT No. 9745434
covering the same parcel of land described above, which was subsequently issued by the
plaintiff.
Unless defendant’s second TCT No. 9745434 is cancelled and declared null and void, a cloud
of doubt will continue to exist over plaintiff’s title, thereby warranting an action for
quieting of title.
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays that defendant’s TCT No. 9745434 over the same parcel of
land as that of plaintiff be cancelled and declared null and void, and for such other reliefs
as may be just and equitable in the premises.
Naga City, Camarines Sur. November 24, 2009.
JOAN GRACE S. GUIDO


I, Pia B. Pilapil of legal age and with residence Zone 5, Maleniza Compound, San Felipe,
Naga City after having been duly sworn depose and say;
That I am the Plaintiff for the above titled case;
That I have caused the preparation by my counsel of said complaint,
That I have read the allegations therein contained and that the same are true and correct of
my personal knowledge or based on authentic records.
Witness my hand and seal on this 29th day of November 2009.
PIA B. PILAPIL
Affiant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me on 29 th day of November 2009 affiant

exhibiting me Community Tax Certificate Number 8548577 issued in Naga City, Camarines Sur
on January 28,2009.
ANNA MARGARITA PERALTA

Notary Public
Doc. No.
Page No.
Book No.
Series of 2009.
GUAGUA PAMPANGA
In the matter of petition for the

Declaratory relief regarding
The Validity of Municipal
Ordinance of Guagua
MR. JOSE SUMAULOG

Petitioner,

For Declaratory Relief
HON. RICARD SINGSON IN HIS

CAPACITY AS MAYOR,
HON. TON GUTIERREZ AND THE
SANGUNIANG PAMBAYAN NG
GUAGUA,
Defendant
x_______________________________________x
PETITION
Plaintiff, by counsel to this Honorable Court most respectfully state:
That Petitioner is a Filipino of legal age, a resident of No. 420 San Bartolome Street, San
Miguel, Guagua, Pampanga, Plaintiff may be served orders, notices and processes through
undersigned counsel;
That Defendants are the officials of the Municipality of Guagua with office at the second floor,
Municipal Hall, Plaza Burgos, Guagua, Pampanga, where they may be served with summons
and other processes by this Honorable Court;
That on November 17, 2009, the respondents Municipal Council of Guagua passed and
promulgated the Ordinance No. 24 series of 2009 which in part reads:
SECTION 1 that the following speed limits for vehicular traffic along the National Highway
and the Provincial Roads within the territorial limits of Urdaneta shall be as follows:
Thru crowded streets approaching intersections at blind corners, passing school zones or
thickly populated areas, duly marked with sign post the maximum speed limit allowable shall
be 20 kph.
SECTION 2 that any person or persons caught driving any motor vehicle violating the
provision of this ordinance shall be fined P10.00 for the first offense; P20.00 for the second
offense; andP30.00 for the third and succeeding offenses, the Municipal Judge shall
recommended the cancellation of the license of the offender to the Motor Vehicle Office
(MVO); or failure to pay the fine imposed, he shall suffer a subsidiary imprisonment in
accordance with law.
That the said ordinance was approved by the defendant municipal mayor of the Municipality of
Guagua;
That on November 30, 2009 petitioner was driving his car within Guagua when a member of
Guagua Municipal Police asked him to stop. He was told upon stopping that he had violated
Municipal Ordinance 24 2009 for overtaking a truck. The policeman then asked for plaintiff’s
license which he surrendered, and a temporary operators permit was issued to him. This
incident took place about 200 meters away from a school building, San Miguel, Guagua;
That criminal complaint was filed in the Municipal Court of Guagua against petitioner for
violation of Ordinance 24 (S.2009).
That due to the institution of the criminal case, petitioner hereby initiates an action for the
annulment of said ordinance with prayer for the issuance of preliminary injunction for the
purpose of restraining defendants Municipality of Guagua from enforcing the ordinance for
the following reasons:
Ordinance is not clear and definite in its terms
When the Municipal Council of Guagua used the phrase “vehicular traffic” (Section 1,
ordinance ) it did not distinguish between passenger cars and motor vehicles and motor
trucks and buses. Considering that this is a regulatory ordinance, its clearness,
definiteness and certainty are all the more important so that an average man should be
able with due care, after reading it, to understand and ascertain whether he will incur a
penalty for particular acts or courses of conduct.
Express repeal; test of validity
The general rule is that a later law prevails over an earlier law. Contention that a later
enactment of the law relating to the same subject matter as that of an earlier statue is not
sufficient to cause an implied repeal of the original law is erroneous. In thecase at bar,
ordinance validity should be determined vis-à-vis RA 4136 the mother statute (not Act
3992) which was in force at the time criminal case was brought against the petitioner.
Requisite of a valid ordinance
An essential requisite for a valid ordinance is among others, that it must not contravene
the statute, for it is fundamental principle that municipal ordinances are inferior in status
and subordinate to the laws of the state. Following this general rule, whenever there is a
conflict between an ordinance and a statute, the ordinance must give way.
Ordinance contrary to mother statute ( RA 4136)
The Municipal Council of Guagua did not make any classification of its thoroughfares ,
contrary to the explicit requirement laid down by Section 38 RA 4136. The ordinance
refers to only one of the four classifications mentioned in paragraph (b), Section 35. The
classification which must be based on Section 35 are necessary in view of section 36
which states that no provincial, city or municipal authority shall enact or enforce any
ordinance or resolution specifying maximum allowable speeds other than those provided
in this act.
Delegation of power
A local legislative body intending to control traffic in public highways is supposed to

classify, first and then mark them with proper signs, all to be approved by the Land
Transportation Commissioner. Statutes which confer upon a public body or officer power
to perform acts which concern the public interest or rights of individuals are generally
regarded as mandatory although the language is permissive only since they are
constructed as imposing duties rather than conferring privileges. Ordinance is invalid as
there is no showing that the marking of the streets and areas falling under section 1,par.
(a), ordinance No. 24 Series of 2009, was done with the approval of the Land
Transportation Commissioner.
WHEREFORE, petitioner prays for judgment declaring that the above mentioned ordinance as
violated of the constitution and is therefore invalid.
Such other relief and remedies as may be deemed just and equitable under the premises are
likewise prayed for.
Guagua Pampanga, November 27, 2009.
GONZALES LAW FIRM

Counsel for the petitioner
City of San Fernando, Pampanga
By
DEXTER GONZALES
IBP No. 97750-33
PTR No. 338653
Roll No. 59384
CERTIFICATION AGAINST FORUM SHOPPING
I Jose Sumaulog, do hereby certify that I am the petitioner of the above entitled case; that I have
not filed any other case in any other court or administrative tribunal involving the same cause of
action; that I am not aware of any pending case involving the same cause; and that should I
hereafter acquire knowledge of such other action, I will notify this Honorable Court thereof
within five (5) days from acquiring such knowledge.
Guagua Pampanga November 27, 2009
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 27th of November 2009, by the affiant who is
personally known to me ( or whom I have identified through competent evidence of identity) and
who exhibited his / her Community Tax Certificate No. 44206583 issued at Guagua Pampanga
on January 16, 2009.
GONZALES LAW FIRM

City of San Fernando, Pampanga
By
DEXTER GONZALES
IBP No. 97750-33
PTR No. 338653
Roll No. 59384
MANILA
In the matter of petitioner for the

Issuance of the writ of mandamus
MR. JOSE FULGERAS

Petitioner,

For Mandamus
MR. ROMY CORPUS,

Election Officer
Defendant
X______________________________________x
PETITION
Petitioner, by the undersigned counsel and unto this Honorable Court, hereby respectfully avers
that:
The petitioner is of legal age, Filipino citizen, with postal address at 123 San Juan, Manila;
The defendant is the Election Officer of the City of Manila with office at second floor,
Commission on Election, Intramuros, Manila where he may be served with summons and
other processes by the Honorable Court;
That the plaintiff, on November 25, 2009 filed his certificate of candidacy to run as city
councilor before the office of the said election officer;
That the defendant refused to accept the said certificate of candidacy on mere ground that he
alleged that the petitioner is a citizen of the United States of America, hence not qualified
to seek public office through election;
That said allegation is baseless in as much as the petitioner is a natural born citizen and has
never acquired foreign citizenship and that the defendant election officer is misinformed
by the other candidate who also at that time filed his certificate of candidacy;
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully averred that a writ of mandamus be
issued, compelling the defendant election officer to perform his ministerial duty of accepting the
certificate of candidacy filed by the plaintiff.
Other reliefs as may be just and equitable are likewise prayed.
AMBAY LAW FIRM

City of Manila
By
FRITZIE JANE COBARDO

IBP No. 9330750-33
PTR No. 368653
Roll No. 79653
CERTIFICATION AGAINST FORUM SHOPPING
I Jose Fulgeras, do hereby certify that I am the petitioner of the above entitled case; that I have
not filed any other case in any other court or administrative tribunal involving the same cause of
action; that I am not aware of any pending case involving the same cause; and that should I
hereafter acquire knowledge of such other action, I will notify this Honorable Court thereof
within five (5) days from acquiring such knowledge.
Guagua Pampanga November 27, 2009
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 28th day of November,2009 by the affiant who is
personally known to me (or whom I have identified through competent evidence of identity) and
who is exhibited his/her Community tax Certificate No. 3352677 issued at City of Manila on
June 6, 2009.
SAMBAY LAW FIRM

City of Manila
By
FRITZIE JANE COBARDO

IBP No. 9330750-33
PTR No. 368653
Roll No. 79653
Branch 8 41, Quezon City
JANE V. ABATA
Herein represented by
MARIA M. REYES
Plaintiff,
CIVIL CASE NO.19022
FOR EJECTMENT
---versus---
DINA RAVELO,
Defendant
x-----------------------------------------------x
COMPLAINT
PLAINTIFF, through undersigned counsel, unto this Honorable Court most respectfly alleges:
That plaintiff, herein represented by her attorney-in-fact, MARIA M. REYES, of legal age,
Filipino, married and a resident of Bl 71, Lot 86, Lagro, Quezon City, where he may be
served as summons and other court processes, copy of his special power of Attorney is
also hereto attached as Annex “A”;
That the defendant is of legal age, Filipino, married and a resident of Evening Star Drive
Extension, Sitio Mabilog, Barangay Culiat, Tandang Sora, Quezon City, where he may be
served with judicial processes;
That he is the true, lawful and registered absolute owner of that parcel of land ( Lot 658-B of
the Subd. Plans Fls-3101-D of Quezon City, copy of which is hereto attached as Annex
“B”;
That the plaintiff has declared that the said property under Tax Dec No.B-074-06431, copy of
which is hereto attached as Annex “C”;
That the plaintiff has been religiously paying the real estate tax due thereon the latest Tax
Receipt for 1997 is hereto attached as Annex “D”;
That after the relocation survey of the property conducted by Geodetic Engr .Augusto D. Tan
sometime in September 1997,or thereabout it was found out by the defendant and his
family have put up a dwelling unit on the portion of the aforesaid property without the
knowledge and consent of the plaintiff and it seems that the defendant has been occupying
the premises as shown by the improvements introduced therein, for quite a long, long time
already;
That demand to vacate and pay a monthly rental have been made upon the defendant to pay a
minimum of P 100.00 sq. m., but defendant failed and refuse to vacate and to pay rentals,
for which reasons, plaintiffs is constraints to bring this action against the defendant and to
retain the services of counsel therefore and incurred a considerable amount of money for
attorney’s fees and other litigation expenses, as maybe proved in the course of the
proceedings in this case, copy of which is hereto attached as Annexes “E” & “E1”,
respectively.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court to render judgment in favor of

the plaintiff and against the defendant and anyone claiming right under him, to vacate the
premises and to remove and demolish his dwelling structure from said parcel of land as
hereinabove described and embraced in TCT RT 11141(371877) of the Registry of Deeds of
Quezon City free from any lien and encumbrance whatsoever, and;
To pay a monthly rental of minimum of P 100.00 per sq.m. of the area being occupied by him
beginning September 7, 1997 and thereafter, until he and all those claiming rights under
him and actually vacate the premises and peacefully surrender possession thereof to the
plaintiff or to her authorized representatives;
To remove and demolish the dwelling unit or structure he erected therein at his own expense,
otherwise the removal and demolition thereof shall be charged against the defendant; and
To pay attorney’s fees and other litigation expenses incurred in connection therewith.
Plaintiff likewise prays for such other relief as this Honorable Court may deem just and equitable
under the premises.
Quezon City, Metro Manila, November 20, 1997.
MENDOZA & ASSOCIATES

81 Road 1, Pag-asa Quezon City
By:
JOSELITO M. MENDOZA
IBP OR No. 553736. 11-13-97 for CY 1998
PTRC-QC 8446210, 1-8-97
I, Maria M. Reyes of legal age, Filipino and with address at Blk 71, Lot 86 Lagro, Quezon City,
Philippines after being sworn in accordance with law, hereby depose and say:
1. That I am the attorney-in-fact of plaintiff Jane V. Abata and duly authorized to bring action
in the above-entitled case;
2. That I have caused the preparation of the foregoing complaint; I have read the allegations
therein and certify that the same are true and correct of my own personal knowledge;
3. That I certify that plaintiff have not commenced any action involving the same issues,
before the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, the different divisions thereof, or in any
other court, tribunal or agency. To the best of my knowledge, no such other actions or
proceedings are pending before the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, the different
divisions thereof, or in any other court, tribunal or agency ; and
bind myself to report the same within five (5) days there from to this Honorable Court.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hands this November 15, 1997 at Quezon
City, Metro Manila, Philippines.
MARIA M. REYES
AFFIANT
SUBCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 25th day of November 1997, by the affiant who
exhibited me to his Community Tax Certificate No. 16418658E issued at Quezon City,
Philippines on November 25, 1997.
JOSELITO M. MENDOZA
Notary Public
PTRC-QC8446210, 1-8-97
Doc. No. 454;

Page No.: 24;
Book No. VII
Series of 1997
CITY OF MANILA
BRANCH NO. 01
Francis Magalona,
Plaintiff Civil Case No. 02
For: Unlawful Detainer
-versus-
Doris Begornia,
Defendant
x___________________________x
COMPLAINT
Plaintiff avers that:
He is of legal age and a resident of Paranaque City while the defendant is of legal age and a
resident of the City of Manila.
Last October 1, 2008, he leased to the defendant the house at 911 Taft Ave., Manila City for a
term of one (1) year expiring on September 30, 2009.
The stipulated monthly rental is P 5,000 payable by the end of every month.
The defendant failed to pay the rental due last May to August 2009.
Last September 1, 2009, he demanded that the defendant vacate the said house; however, the
latter has refused.
He had to engage the service of counsel for which he agreed to pay P 5,000 for attorney’s
fees.
PRAYER
Wherefore it is prayed that after due notice and hearing, a judgment be rendered ordering:
The defendant and all persons claiming right under him to vacate the house at 911 Taft Ave.,
Manila City;
The defendant to pay the plaintiff the rentals due since May 1, 2009 until the former shall
have actually vacated said house;
The defendant to indemnify the plaintiff for P 15,ooo as attorney’s fees, and for cost of suit
and expenses of litigation.
Plaintiff further prays for such reliefs as may be just and equitable in the premises.
City of Makati for Manila City, October 1, 2009.
Al C. Batonghinog
Roll No. 123
October 31, 2008
Makati City
VERIFICATION
I under oath aver that : (a) I am the plaintiff in the afore-titled case (b) I caused the preparation
of the complaint; (c) I read it and its contents are true of my own knowledge.
(Sgd.) Francis Magalona
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 1st day of October, 2009 in Makati City, affiant
having exhibited to me his Driver’s License No. 12345 issued at Paranaque City on January 10,
2007.
Al C. Batonghinog
Roll No. 123
October 31, 2008
Makati City
Doc. No. 13
Page No. 3
Book No. 7
Series of 2009
CERTIFICATE OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING
Under oath, the undersigned hereby certifies that he has not earlier commenced a similar
action against the defendant for the same cause with any other court, tribunal or quasi-judicial
agency.
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 1st day of October, 2009 in Makati City, affiant
having exhibited to me his Driver’s License No. 12345 issued at Paranaque City on January 10,
2007.
Al C. Batonghinog
Roll No. 123
October 31, 2008
Makati City
Doc. No. 14
Page No. 4
Book No. 7
Series of 2009
BRANCH No. 05
Quirino Province

Department of Public Works and
Highways,
Plaintiff,
-versus-
Joanna Marinas and Liberty Cunanan,

Defendants
x_____________________________________x
COMPLAINT
PLAINTIFF, by the Solicitor General, and to this Honorable Court, respectfully alleges:
1. Plaintiff is a sovereign entity organized under the Constitution, with the power to sue and
expropriate lands for public use, thru the Department of Public Works and Highways.
2. Defendants Joanna Marinas and Liberty Cunanan are all of legal age and with residence at
Brgy. Zone 1 Gumaca, Quezon Province.
3. For the purpose of widening the national highways, which is a public use, and which starts
from Quirino Province and goes to the Province of Isabela, and in order to ease traffic, there is
need to widen said national highway by six (6) meters, and running parallel thereto needed for
the purpose are the properties of defendants, located in the Province of Quirino and described as
follows:
Bounded by the national road in the east, a private property in the west, north and south
portions, covered by TCT No. 000786 and 000877.
4. The land areas of defendants affected by the widening of the road consist of 100 sq. m of
defendant Joanna Marinas and 300 sq. m of defendant Liberty Cunanan.
5. The affected land areas are not occupied by persons other than the defendants.
6. Plaintiff, prior to filing the complaint, offered to defendants to acquire their lands by
negotiation, but they rejected the offer
7. Plaintiff through the Assistant Secretary of the Department of Public Works and Highways
have asked defendants to sell their respective properties that would be affected by the widening
of the road, but they refused, constraining plaintiff to file the complaint for expropriation.
8. The assessed value of defendants lands which are affected by the widening of the road, are
P 150,000 for defendants Joanna Marinas and P 450,000 for defendants Liberty Cunanan.
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays as follows:

1. Provisionary adjudging the value of the properties in the following amounts P 150,000 for
defendants Joanna Marinas and P 450,000 foe defendants Liberty Cunanan, which are equal to
their assessed value.
2. After the deposit of the provisional amounts by plaintiff with the National Treasury or any
authorized bank, awarding forthwith the possession of the lands to plaintiff
After payment by plaintiff of the just compensation of the lands in question to defendants,
ordering the segregation of the land areas affected by a government surveyor and the transfer to
plaintiff of the titles of said land areas, and for such other reliefs as may be just and equitable in
the premises.
Gumaca, Quezon on August 30, 2009.
Al C. Batonghinog
Counsel for plaintiff
Roll No. 123
October 31, 2008
GUmaca, Quezon
VERIFICATION
I under oath, aver that: (a) I am the duly authorized representatives of the plaintiff in the afore-
titled case; (b) I caused the preparation of the Complaint; (c) I read it and its contents are true of
my own knowledge.
(Sgd.) Francis Bunye
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 1 st day of October, 2009 in Gumaca, Quezon
affiant having exhibited to me his Drivers License No. 12345 issued at Paranaque City on
January 10, 2007.
Al C. Batonghinog
Roll No. 123
October 31, 2008
GUmaca, Quezon
Doc. No. 15
Page No. 4
Book No. 7
Series of 2009
Under oath, the undersigned hereby certifies that he has not earlier commenced a similar
action against the defendant for the same cause with any other court, tribunal or quasi-judicial
agency.
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 1st day of October, 2009 in Gumaca Quezon,
affiant having exhibited to me his Driver’s License No. 12345 issued at Paranaque City on
January 10, 2007.
Al C. Batonghinog
Roll No. 123
October 31, 2008
Gumaca, Quezon
Doc. No. 16
Page No. 4
Book No. 7
Series of 2009
BRANCH NO. 06
BATANGAS CITY
Joana del Mindo,

Plaintiff,
-versus-
Juan Flores,
Defendant
x____________________________________x
COMPLAINT
PLAINTIFF, by counsel and to this Honorable court, respectively alleges:
1. Plaintiff is of legal age and a resident of Brgy. Polomolok Mabini, Batangas Defendant is
of legal age and residing at Brgy. Zone 2 Batangas City.
2. On March 1 , 2008 defendant, borrowed P 1,000,000 from plaintiff, payable within one
year from said date, with 12 % interest per annum, and to secure payment of such loans, he
executed on the same date a real estate mortgage on his residential lot with an area of 1,000 sq.
m located at Brgy. Zone 2, Batangas City, and covered by TCT No. 8909 of the Registry of deeds
of Batangas City, and which is particularly described as follows:
a. A vacant lot in the east

b. The national highway in the west
c. City road in the south and
d. Residential houses in the north
Copy of said real estate mortgage is attached hereto and made an integral part hereof as Annex
“A”.
3. It is the condition of such mortgage that upon failure of defendant to pay his obligations
within the stipulated period and suit is filed to effect payment, defendant agreed to pay liquidated
damages of P 50,000 and attorney’s fees of P 120,000.
4. The one year period has expired without defendant paying the principal amount and
interests thereon. Accordingly, plaintiff demanded of defendant to pay his overdue obligations,
but notwithstanding such demands, both verbal and, written, defendants refused and continue to
refuse to pay the same.
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays for judgment as follows:

a. Ordering defendants to pay plaintiff his principal obligation of P 1,000,000, with 12 %
interest thereon per annum from March 1, 2008 as well as the liquidated damages of P
500,000 and attorney’s fees P 120,000 plus costs.
b. Issuing a decree of foreclosure for the sale at public auction of the above described parcel
of land, and for disposition of the proceeds thereof in accordance with law, upon failure
of defendant to pay in full his obligations within the period set by law.
October 7, 2009 in the City of Batangas
Al C. Solis
Counsel for plaintiff
Roll No. 123
October 31, 2008
Batangas City
VERIFICATION
I under oath aver that : (a) I am the plaintiff in the afore-titled case (b) I caused the preparation
of the complaint; (c) I read it and its contents are true of my own knowledge.
(Sgd.) Joana del Mindo
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 7th day of October, 2009 in Batangas City,
affiant having exhibited to me her Driver’s License No. 12345 issued at Mabini, Batangas on
January 10, 2007.
Al C. Solis
Roll No. 123
October 31, 2008
Batangas City
Doc. No. 13
Page No. 3
Book No. 7
Series of 2009
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
Jurisdictional Requirements
59. Petition for Habeas Corpus

60. Petition for Guardianship
61. Petition for Probate of a National Will
62. Petition for Adoption
63. Petition for Change of Name
64. Petition for Correction of Entry
PROVISIONAL REMEDIES
65. Complaint with Preliminary Attachment

66. Complaint with Preliminary Injuction
SUPREME COURT
In the Matter of the Petition

For Habeas Corpus of
Maria Y. Reyes
Sp.Proc.No. 09-1163
HABEAS CORPUS
Jose S. Reyes,
Petitioner,
-versus-
Chief of Police Gardo U. Versoza

Police Superintendent Edgar T. Katoliko
x________________________________x
PETITION
COMES NOW petitioner, in the above-titled case, through his undersigned attorney, and to this
Honorable Court respectfully represent:
1. Petitioner Jose S. Reyes is of legal age and a resident of 68 Santol St., Sampaloc, Manila.
Petitioner is the husband of Maria Y. Reyes.
2. That on August 13, 2009, petitioner was taken from her residence by ten (10) police officers
headed by police Superintendent Edgar T. Katoliko, and since then confined, restrained and
deprived of her liberty in the Correctional Institute for Women in Mandaluyong City;
3. That in spite of the fact that petitioner has been confined for nearly four months, no formal
complaint or accusation for specific offense has been filed against her nor any judicial writ or
order for her commitment has at any time been issued so far;
4. That petitioner did not commit any offense for which she may be arrested or deprived of her
liberty by Police superintendent Edgar T. Katoliko by order and the behest of one, Chief of Police
Gardo U. Versoza, whose office is in Camp Crame in Quezon City;
5. That there being no Martial Law or State of Emergency, the confinement of the petitioner under
the circumstances above narrated is utterly illegal.
WHEREFORE, petitioner prays that said officers, Police Superintendent Edgar T. Katoliko and
Chief of Police Gardo U. Versoza, or who ever acts in their place and stead, be directed to appear before
this Honorable Court and produce the body of petitioner; and explain forthwith why petitioner should not
be set at liberty without delay.
Manila. November 20, 2009.

ALBERTO S. ROMULO
Counsel for Petitioner
6th Flr. USV Tower
Mabini St., Ermita, Manila
Roll No. 001765
IBP NO. 01223, issued On Jan.
5,2009 at Manila
PTR No. 00769, issued on Jan.
7,2009 at Manila
VERIFICATION
I, Jose S. Reyes of legal age and with residence at 68 Santol St., Sampaloc, Manila, after having
been duly sworn, depose and say:
1. That I am the petitioner in the above entitled petition.
2. That I have caused the preparation by my counsel of said petition.
3. That I have read the allegations therein contained, and that the same are true and correct of
my personal knowledge or based on authentic records.
Witness my hand this 20th of November 2009 at Manila, Philippines
JOSE S. REYES
Affiant
SUBCRIBED AND SWORN TO before this 27 th day of October, 2009 in Makati City,
Philippines, affiant exhibiting to me his Postal ID No. 000123 issued in Manila on January 5, 2009. I
hereby certify that I have examined the Affiant and that I am fully satisfied that he has voluntarily
executed and understood the contents of his Petition.
ATTY. ROD N. NAVARRO
Notary Public
Until Dec. 31, 2009
IBP No. 03271973, Manila on
Jan. 5, 2009
PTR No. 01231958, Manila on
Jan. 2, 2009
Doc. No._____
Page No._____
Book No._____
Series of 2009.

Branch 7, Quezon City
In the Matter of the Petition for

Guardianship of minor children, CHAR C. CONTRERAS,
CHRIS C. CONTRERAS and COR C. CONTRERAS,
Luis and Maria Aquino SP PRC No. 52359275

Petitioner.
x_______________________________________________x
PETITION
Petitioner, by the undersigned counsel, respectfully state:
1. Petitioner LUIS A. AQUINO is of legal age, Filipino, married to petitioner Maria C.
Aquino, also of legal age and Filipino, with residence address at No. 4 Tamban corner Biya
Streets, Silvina Village, Quezon City, Metro Manila.
2. Petitioner MARIA C. AQUINO is the aunt (being the sister of the deceased mother of
the minor children) of the minor children, CHAR C. CONTRERAS, CHRIS C. CONTRERAS,
and COR C. CONTRERAS.
3. At the times of filing of the instant petition, said minor children are 15, 13 and 7
years of age and all are residing at no. 26 Hyancinth Street, Roxas District, Quezon City,
Metro Manila. Copies of Certificates of Live Birth of Char C. Contreras, Chris C. Contreras
and Cor C. Contreras are attached hereto as Annexes “A”, “B” and “C”, respectively.
4. Irmalyn C. Contreras, the late mother of the said minors, who was then Senior
Programme Manager of the United Nations Development Programme Regional Office in
Manila, died on 11 September 1993. A copy of the Certificate of Death of Irma C.
Contreras is attached hereto as Annex “ D “.

5. At present, Gilberto L. Contreras, the father of the minor children, is out of the
country for an indefinite period of time and has not returned to the Philippines since
1986.
6. As designated beneficiaries and heirs of their deceased mother, said minor
children inherited:
Personal Properties consisting of:
DESCRIPTION / PARTICULARS TOTAL SHARE OF
MINOR CHILDREN
A. Dollar Time Deposit with

Citytrust Bank P 9,583.42
Face Value of Certificate Nos.
169642 (US$ 2,226.17) and
169725 (US$ 1,543.68):
US$ 3,769.85 (Probably
P105,555.80, at P28.00/US$1).
[Total proportionate interest of

Minor children, 37.5%, computed
As follows:
50% to surviving spouse;

50% to remaining heirs; father
And 3 children;
Thus, 12.5% for each heir.
For the 3 minor children – 3x
12.5%=37.5%]
B. Life Insurance proceeds due

Under Policy Number 2037099
Issued in July 1982 by the Insular
Life Assurance Company, Ltd.,
Naming Gilberto L. Contreras, Char
Contreras and Chris C. Contreras
as beneficiaries. P 200,000.00
Face value of policy:

P300,000.00 [ 2 children out of 3
Beneficiaries]
C. Insurance proceeds due under

The United Nations Group Life
Insurance with Aetna Life
Insurance Company of U.S.A.,
Naming the three (3) minor
Children as beneficiaries P 1,064,000.00
D. Indemnity benefits, which consist
Of salary, allowance and commutation
Of leave standing to the credit of the late
Irmalyn C. Corales at the time of her
Death
On 11 September 1993 due from
The United Nations Development
Programme, with the three (3)
Minor children as beneficiaries. P 80,000.00
Probable Amount: P80,000.00 [3

Children out of 3 beneficiaries]
E. Pension fund due under the

United Nations Joint Staff
Pension Fund benefits probably,
With Gilerto L. Corales and
Char C. Corales as beneficiaries. P 50,000.00
Probable amount: P 100,000.00

[ 1 child out of 2 beneficiaries]
F. Volkswagen car model 1976
Probable market value:

P 10,000.00 [ Total Proportionate
Interest of
Minor Children, 37.5%) P 3,750.00
G. Mitsubishi Lancer EL car model

1992, P 65,000.00 (acquisition
Cost of P 330,000.00, net of loan
Of P 265,000.00 as of 15
September 1993) P 24,375.00
[Total Proportionate Interest of

Minor Children, 37.5%)
Total amount of personal

Properties ( gross amount, estate
Taxes and other charges
Not yet deducted) ____________
P 1,461,708.42
============
Real Properties consisting of:
DESCRIPTION/ PARTICULARS TOTAL SHARE OF

MINOR CHILDREN
A. A parcel of land denominated as

Lot 25, Block 37, with an area of
One hundred eighty (180)
Square meters, situated in the
Barrio Pamplona, Municipality of
Las Piñas, Metro Manila, Province
Of Rizal and covered by Transfer
Certificate of title No. (S-95595) %
2316-A issued by the Registrar of
Deeds for Metro Manila District IV. 37.5%
Probable value based on the latest

Zonal valuation of the Bureau of
Internal revenue: 180 x
P 1,100.00=
P 198,000.00 P 74,250.00
B. A parcel of land denominated as

One Hundred Eighty (180) square
Meters, situated in the Barrio
Pamplona, Municipality of Las
Piñas, Metro Manila, Province of
Rizal and covered by Transfer
Certificate of title No. ( S-95596)
T-2317-A issued by the Register
Of deeds for metro Manila
District IV. 37.5%
Probable value based on the latest

Zonal valuation of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue: 180 x
P 1,100.00 =
P 198,000.00 P 74,250.00
C. A parcel of land denominated as

One Hundred (100) square
Ampid, San Mateo, Metro
Manila, Province of Rizal and
Covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 234788 issued by the
Register of deeds for Marikina,
Metro Manila 37.5%
Actual Purchase Value in January

1993- P 36,000.00
(no zonal valuation available) P 13,500.00
D. A parcel of land denominated as

One Hundred Three (103) square
Ampid, San Mateo, Metro Manila,
Province of Rizal and covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 234789
Issued by the Register of Deeds for
Marikina, Metro Manila 37.5%
Actual Purchase Value in January

1993- P 37,080.00
(no zonal valuation available) P 13,905.00
Total amount of real

Properties (Gross amount,
Estate taxes and other
Charges not yet deducted) ____________
P 175,902.00
Grand Total (Gross amount
Of Personal and Real
Properties, taxes and other
Charges not yet deducted) _____________
P 1,637,610.42
7. In View of the minority of said children as well as the indefinite absence of their
father, it is necessary and convenient that a guardian over their persons and properties be
appointed to give proper care and attention to them, to protect their rights, interest, and
title over the above-described properties and to represent them in all matters affecting
their interests.
8. The Following are the relatives of the minor children, with their ages, addresses,
relationship set opposite their respective names, to wit:
Name Relationship Age Address
Belen Lin C. Contreras Grandmother 69 26 Hyacinth Street,

Roxas District, Quezon City,
Metro Manila
Berna L. Contreras Aunt 22 -same-
Nell C. Abella Aunt 45 4-a South AA Street

Quezon City, Metro Manila
Dosca P. Cadaing Uncle 47 5910 Southview Drive,

San Jose, California
95138 U.S.A
Lenda C. Encarnado Aunt 40 16 Jalan D. Tamar

Grandview 6800 Ampang
Jaya, Selangor, Malaysia
Roland M. Cadaing Uncle 27 c/o Russo, Via Dante

Alighieri 21, Porto
Potenza Picena, Maserata
Italy 62016
Riam Cadaing Lim Aunt 38 2 Tamban corner Biya
Streets, Silvina Village
Quezon City, Metro Manila
9. On the other hand, the following are the persons who have the custody and care
over the minor children, with their ages, addresses and relationship with the minor
children set opposite their respective names, to wit :
Name Relationship Age Address
Belen Lin C Contreras Grandmother 69 26 Hyacinth Street,

Roxas District, Quezon
City, Metro Manila
Berna L. Contreras Aunt 22 -same-
10. Petitioners are childless and both gainfully employed. Petitioner Luis A. Aquino is a
Senior Associate Attorney with the Villaraza & Cruz Law Offices while petitioner Maria C.
Aquino is an employee of the World Health Organization Regional Office in Manila. The
petitioners possess all the qualifications to whom letters of guardianship should be
issued.
11. Gilberto L. Contreras, the father of the minor children, has requested the
petitioners to act as guardians over the persons and properties of the minor children in
his absence. A copy of the affidavit dated 24 September 1993 executed by Gilberto L.
Contreras in san Francisco, California, U.S.A is attached hereto as Annex “E:.
12. The petitioners are willing to post a bond for the issuance of letters of
guardianship in an amount to be fixed by the Honorable Court and Subject to the
conditions as stated in Rule 94 of the Revised Rules of Court.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that, after notice and hearing, and upon
posting of such bond as this Honorable Court may direct, the petitioners be appointed
guardians of the persons and all properties of the minor children CHAR C. CONTRERAS,
CHRIS C. CONTRERAS and COR C. CONTRERAS.

Makati for Quezon City Metro Manila, ____________________________2002.
LIM OCAMPO & CANDELARIA

Counsel for the Petitioners
LUIS A. AQUINO and MARIA C. AQUINO
Suites 304-306 Coronel Condominium II
2727 Kalayaan Avenue, Santiago Village
1208 Makati City Metro Manila
By:
FRITZ JIHANN J. COBARDO

# Unit 305 Elizalde Condo. Donada St., Pasay City
PTR No. 6742249-01/08/2000-Makati City
IBP No. 549677-01/08/2000-Cebu City
MCLE Compliance No. 110-09810, Jan. 25,2009
VERIFICATION
MAKATI CITY) S.S.
I, MARIA C. AQUINO of legal age, Filipino and with residence address at No. 4 Tamban corner
BIya Streets, Silvina Village, Quezon City, Metro Manila after having been duly sworn in accordance
with law hereby depose and state:
1. I am one of the petitioner in the above-entitled petition.
2. I caused the preparation of the instant petition.
3. I have read the instant petition and that the allegations therein are true of my own knowledge.
MARIA C. AQUINO
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this ___ day of November 2002, affiant personally
appeared and exhibited to me her Employee No. 009-542 and TIN ID No. 925-291-405-000 issued on
October 13, 2000.
Doc. No.
Page No.
Book No.
Series of 2002.
COPY FURNISHED:
Branch 7, Paranaque
In the Matter of the Petition for
Approval of Will of EDMUNDO GALANG DAVID
Deceased.
PAULINO T. GALANG SP PRC No. 9574353
Petitioner.
x_______________________________________________x
PETITION FOR PROBATE OF WILL
PETITIONER, by counsel and to this Honorable Court, alleges:
1. On February 13, 2009 deceased Edmundo Galang David died in the City of Paranaque, then residing
at 7852 Segudo Mendoza St., Villa Mendoza Subd. Sucat, Paranaque, which was his residence at the
time of his death, leaving a will, a true copy of which is attached thereto as Annex “A” and made an
integral part hereof.
2. Petitioner is of legal age and with residence at 8594 Kabesang Segundo St., Fortunata Village,
Paranaque and is the executor in said will and he hereby consents to act as such executor.
3. The names, ages, and residences of the heirs, legatees and devisees of said decedent are as follows:
NAMES AGE RESIDENCE
EDGE ASUNCION P. 22 7852 Segundo Mendoza
DAVID St., Pque.
EDMOND JOSEPHUS P. 18 7852 Segundo Mendoza
DAVID St., Pque.
4. The deceased left properties, real and personal with a total approximate value of Php 20,000.00
5. Petitioner as named executor, moves and prays that letters testamentary, be issued to him; that he is
competent to serve as executor and is ready to give a hand as required by the Rules of Court.
6. The will has been delivered to the court on July 8, 2009.
WHEREFORE, petitioner prays that after due notice, publication and hearing the aforementioned will of
deceased EDMUNDO GALANG DAVID be approved, allowed and that letters testamentary be issued to
herein petitioner.
Paranaque August 15, 2009.
LADY DIANNE MANALOTO

Counsel
VERIFICATION
I PAULINO T. GALANG, of legal age and with residence at Kabesang Segundo St., Fortunata Village,
Paranaque after having been duly sworn depose and say;
1. That I am the petitioner in the above entitled petition;

2. That I have caused the preparation by my counsel of said petition,
3. That I have read the allegations herein contained and that the same are true and correct of my
personal knowledge or based on authentic records.
Witness my hand and seal on this 15th day of august 2009.
PAULINO T. GALANG
Affliant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me on the 15th day of August 2009, affiant exhibiting to
me Community Tax Certificate No. 985923 issued in Paranaque on January 9, 2009.
ALEXANDRA C. ALIPIO
Notary Public
Doc. No.
Page No.
Book No.
Series of 2009.
Branch 43, Manila
In the Matter of Adoption of

Sophia Gabrielle Romano
The Spouses Mark Angelo Uy SP PROC. No. 154645417

And Marian Reena Uy,
Petitioners
x_________________________________________________x
PETITION FOR ADOPTION
PETITIONERS, by counsel and to this Honorable Court, respectfully alleges:
1. Petitioners are husband wife, of legal age, the husband being 27 years of age, while the wife is 26 of
age, Filipino citizens and with residence at Unit 9A EGI Residences, Taft Avenue, Manila.
2. Petitioners are childless and they are in possession of full civil capacity and legal rights; they are of
good moral character; they have not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude; they are
emotionally and psychologically capable of caring for children; they are at least 16 years older that
the person to be adopted; and are in position to support and care for the adoptee and of themselves, in
keeping with the means of the family; and they have undergone pre-adoption services as required by
section 4 of Republic Act No. 8552 as shown by a certification to that effect, true copy of which is
attached hereto as Annex “A”.
3. The name of the adoptee is Sophia Gabrielle Romano the name given her when the adoptee was given
to the petitioners for adoption since the child’s birth and has been taken care of by the petitioners
from age one (1) day until the present, who is now 5 years of age, giving her all health attention by
doctors. The petitioners have loved the adoptee since then and they have developed a kind of parental
love for the child; and the adoptee has known petitioners as her parents, calling the husband as
“Daddy” and the wife as “Mommy”. The birth certificate, which the mother informed the hospital
staff, shows her to be a baby girl without first name and with surname Beltran without any named
father as the child was born out of wedlock on December 25, 2004.
4. The Adoptee is not disqualified by law to be adopted. The adoptee has no estate.
5. The first name, surname or names by which the adoptee is to be known and registered in the Civil
registry is Sophia which is what the adoptee is known by petitioners and by the petitioners’ relatives
and playmates. Attached hereto and made integral parts hereof are the followings:
Birth certificate of the adoptee as Annex “A”; his baptismal certificate, which is attached as Annex “B”;
6. Written consent of the mother of the adoptee, which she had it prepared and she executed or signed it
after the adoptee’s birth; after which she never showed up, nor even glanced at her child; hence the
written consent could not be notarized as she was in a hurry to leave the hospital telling the petitioner
to take good care of the child.
7. The petitioners are childless; they have no legitimate children.
8. child study report on the adopted is attached hereto as Annex “B”.
9. No child study on the biological parents of the adoptee as his mother could no longer be located since
birth of the child, and the child has no known father.
10. Home study report on the petitioners as adopters is made by the court as Annex “C”.
WHEREFORE, petitioners pray that after due notice, publication and hearing a decree of adoption be
issued in favor of petitioners to the effect that henceforth the child Sophia be freed from all legal
obligations of obedience and maintenance with respect to his natural parents, and be to all legal intents
and purposes, the child of petitioners and that the surname be changed to cacatian which is the surname of
petitioners spouses.
Manila, November 24, 2009.
PAOLO ANTONIO ISMAEL
Counsel
We, Mark Angelo Uy and Marian Reena Uy, of legal age and with residence at Unit 9A EGI Residences
Taft Avenue, Manila after having been duly sworn depose and say:
1. That we are the plaintiffs / petitioners in the above titled complaint / petition.
2. That we have caused the preparation of said complaint / petition.
3. That we have read the allegations therein contained and that the same are true and correct of my
personal knowledge or based on authentic records.
4. That we have not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issue in
court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency, and so to the best of my knowledge, no such other action or
claim is pending therein and if we should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has
been filed or is pending, we shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein
the aforesaid complaint has been filed.
MARK ANGELO UY MARIAN REENA UY

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me on November 24, 2009 affiant exhibiting to me his
Community Tax Certificate No. 849342112 issued in Manila on January 15, 2009
ATTY. PATRICK JUNE SOLIS
Notary Public
My Commission expires Dec. 31, 2009.
IBP No. 4232578 on Manila, Sept.2000
PTR No. 3470745 on Manila, Sept. 2000
Doc. No.
Page No.
Book No.
Series of 2009.
Makati, Branch 88
In Matter of the change of name

Of Corazon Putingtae
Special Proceeding No. 12345
Corazon Putingtae
Petitioner
x________________________________x
PETITION
Petitioner through the undersigned counsel and unto this Honorable Court, respectfully alleges that;
1. She has been a bonafide resident of the City of Makati, Philippines for more than
three years prior to the date of the filing of this petition.
2. That the family name which she carries, namely Putingtae is a derivative of the
Chinese name of her ancestry and said name carries in Tagalog language meaning and
connotation which immediately evoke laughter and abusive comments from those who hear the
same, thereby causing embarrassment to her.
3. Said name has always been a handicap in her social and business dealings.
4. She intends to get married and judging from her bitter experience as a child, she does not want
that her future children shall suffer the same humiliation and inferiority complex which she has
suffered on account of that name.
5. It is her desire to change her family name to Reyes, this being the family name of her best fiend.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, premises considered, petitioner respectfully prays that the Honorable Court issue
judgment after due notice, publication and hearing an order issuing to change her name to Corazon Reyes.
Other reliefs just and equitable under the premises are likewise prayed for. Signed January 8, 2009,
Makati City Philippines.
ERIC ARNAIZ
Counsel for the Petitioner
Unit 4519 Laureana Mansion Yabut St.,
Makati City
PTR No. 1569878 / 01-06-2009 / Makati City
IBP Lifetime No. 03936
Roll No. 30665
MCLE Compliance No. II 04910 / 07-20-07
City of Makati ) S.S.
I, Corazon Reyes of legal age, Filipino and residing at 9043 Guadalupe Makati City, Philippines after
being sworn in accordance with law, hereby depose and say:
1. That I am the petitioner in the above-entitled case;

2. That I have caused the preparation of the above petition and have read the same and knows the
contents thereof;
3. That the allegations contained therein are true and correct of my own personal knowledge.
4. That I further certify that:
a. I have not commenced any other action or proceeding or filed any claim involving the
same issues or matter in any court, terminal or quasi-judicial agency and to the best of my
knowledge, no such action or proceeding is pending therein;
b. If I should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or proceeding has been filed or
is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of appeals, or any other tribunal or quasi-
judicial agency, I undertake to report such fact within five (5) days there from to the court
or agency wherein the original pleading and sworn certification contemplated herein have
been filed.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hands this November 11, 2009 at Makati City
Philippines.
CORAZON REYES
Affiant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this November 11, 2009 by the affiant who
exhibited me to his Community Tax Certificate No. 0221155448 issued at Manila, Philippines on January
10, 2009.
Atty. Orly Mercado
My Commission expires on Dec. 31,2009
Roll No. 2356
IBP NO. 1245 Makati
PTR No. 04515 January 10,2009, Makati
MCLE No. 654987
Doc. No: 3;
Page No. 2;
Book No. 1
Series of 2009
NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDITIAL REGION
PARANAQUE CITY
BRANCH________
CANCELLATION OF DATE AND

PLACE OF MARRIAGE IN THE LIVE
BIRTH CERTIFICATE OF MINOR
KATE PARDO DACUMOS IN THE
LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF
PARANAQUE CITY represented by
Her mother NELIA J. PARDO.
SP. PROC. NO. 09-0039

FOR: cancellation of entry
LOVIE KATE PARDO DACUMOS,

Registry
Petitioner,
-versus-
THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF

PARANAQUE CITY and NATIONAL
STATISTICS OFFICE,
Respondents.
PETITION
COMES NOW, Petitioner KATE PARDO DACUMOS represented by her mother NELIA J. PARDO
through the undersigned Public Attorney and unto this Honorable Court, most respectfully alleges:
1.0 That Petitioner is a minor, Filipino duly represented by her mother NELIA J. PARDO and both
presently residing at Barangay Ubos, Valderama, Antique, where they may be served with
summons and processes of the Court;
2.0 That Respondent Local Civil registrar of Paranaque and National Statistic Office are
government agencies who are impleaded hereto as repositories of all public records relating to
the birth of children born in the Philippines particularly in Paranaque City with office address at
the Ground floor of Paranaque City Hall and East Avenue, Quezon City, respectively;
3.0 That petitioner KATE PARDO DACUMOS was born in Baclaran, Paranaque City on February
4, 1992 of which her Certificate of Live of birth is sought to be corrected in this Petition,
attached hereto as Annex A and made integral part hereof;
4.0 That a perusal of Certificate of Live Birth KATE PARDO DACUMOS would show that the
entry regarding the Date and Place of Marriage of parents is March 10, 1991 Antique, a clearly
erroneous entry since the fact of the matter is that the parents of the petitioner particularly Peter
Bargayo Dacumos and Nenita Jauod are NOT MARRIED.
5.0 In support to herein Petition, Dacumos likewise attached his affidavit of Paternity which was
notarized by Consul General Benito B. Valeriano of the Philippine Consulate General Dubai,
United Arab Emirates and marked as “ ANNEX B”. moreover Nenita Jauod Pardo attached a
Certification from the National Statistics Office dated February 14, 2009 certifying that she
does not appear in the Notarial Indices for Marriages based on the records of 1945-2009
Marriages enrolled in the database as of January 31, 2009 and hereto attached as “ ANNEX C”.
6.0 The necessity of cancellation of said entry with the records of the office of the Civil Registrar
cannot be understated considering that correction would bar future complications, confusion,
misinterpretation, embarrassment and inconvenience on part of minor KATE PARDO
DACUMOS.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is most respectfully prayed that after due notice
and hearing, judgment to forthwith rendered ordering the cancellation of the date and place of marriage in
the Certification of Live Birth of KATE PARDO DACUMOS and to order the Local Civil Registrar of
Paranaque City and directing the National Statistics Office to CANCEL the said error indicated.
It is likewise prayed for such other relief consistent with law and equity.
City of Paranaque, March 26, 2009
ROMULO C. TOLENTINO
Public Attorney II
VERIFICATION / CERTIFICATION
I Nelia J. Pardo, of legal age, Filipino and with address at Barangay Ubos, Valderama, Antique
having been sworn in accordance with law, hereby depose and state, that:
1. I am the Mother of the petitioner in the instant Petition;
2. I have caused the preparation and filing of the instant Petition the content of which are true
and correct based on personal knowledge and authentic records in my possession;
3. I hereby certify that I have not commenced any other action or proceeding involving the
same issues in the Supreme Court, Court of appeals, the different divisions thereof, or in
any other court, tribunal or agency. To the best of my knowledge, no such other actions or
proceeding are pending before the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, the different divisions
thereof, or in any other court, tribunal or agency for that matter:
4. I hereby undertake to notify this Honorable Office within five (5) days from notice, should
I learn of similar action or proceeding filed or is pending before any body, court tribunal
above-mentioned.
NENITA J. PARDO
Affiant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me in City of Manila this 11 th day of November 2009
affiant exhibiting to me her Community Tax Certificate No. 445545 issued at the City of Manila on May
8, 2009.
Doc. No. 55
Page No. 17
Book No. 6
Series of 2009
Branch 01 Manila
Gerald Anderson,
Plaintiff,
For: Sum of Money
Kim Chiu,
Defendants
x__________________________x
COMPLAINT
( With Prayer for Attachment)
Plaintiff, by the undersigned counsel, respectively states that:
1. Plaintiff Gerald Anderson is of legal age, single and a resident of Paranaque City ; while
defendant Kim Chui is of legal age, single and a resident of Taft Ave. Manila.
2. Defendant borrowed P 1,000,000 from plaintiff and executed, to residence the loan, a promissory
note on October 1, 2008, which reads as follows:
“ For value received, I hereby promise to pay Gerald Anderson the amount of P 1,000,000,
payable on September 30, 2009, with interest hereon at 12 % per annum without any further
demand. Should I fail to pay the same on due date, and suit is filed to enforce this promissory
note, I further promise to pay 25% of the principal amount as attorney’s fees and expenses of
litigation.
Executed on October 1, 2008 at City of Manila.
( Sgd.) Kim Chui
3. The aforesaid obligation of defendant in the total amount of P 1,000,000 is now overdue but
notwithstanding repeated demands, both oral and written, defendant failed and refused and continues to
refuse to pay said obligation, constructing plaintiff to file the suit and to incur attorney’s fees and
expenses of litigation in the amount of 25% of the principal obligation or P 250,000 which should be
assessed by defendant as stipulated in the promissory note.
4. Defendant’s obligation is valid and genuine and accordingly a sufficient cause of action exist
against her.
5. Defendant is about to depart from Philippines with intent to defraud her creditors, as shown by
her securing a passport, her application for immigrant visa to China and selling her properties.
6. There is no sufficient security for the claim sought to be recovered from defendant in the instant
action and the amount due to plaintiff is as much as the sum for which the order of attachment may be
granted above all legal counterclaims.
7. Plaintiff is willing and ready to post a bond executed in favor to the adverse in the amount which
the Honorable Court may fix in the order granting the writ of attachment, conditioned that the latter will
pay all the costs which may be adjudged to the adverse party and all damages which he may sustain by
reason of the attachment, if the court shall finally adjudge that the applicant was not entitled thereto.
WHEREFORE, plaintiff respectfully prays as follows.
a. Defendant be ordered to pay plaintiff the amount of P 1,000,000 with legal interest
thereon form the date the complaint is filed, plus P 250,000 as attorney’s fees and
expenses of litigation, until the whole obligation is paid, plus costs; and
b. a writ of attachment immediately be issued against the property of defendant, as security

for the satisfaction of the judgment that may be recovered.
Plaintiff further prays for such other relief’s as may be just and equitable in the premises.
October 30, 2009 at the City of Manila.
Al C. Solis
Roll No. 123
IBP No. 4567, Issued on
October 31,2008
PTR No. 00001 issued at

Makati City
VERIFICATION
I under oath, aver that: (a) I am the plaintiff in the afore-titled case; (b) I caused the preparation of
the Complaint; (c) I read it and its content are true of my own knowledge.
(Sgd.) Gerald Anderson
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 30 th day of October,2009 in Batangas City,

affiant having exhibited to me her Driver’s License No. 12345 issued at Paranaque City on January 10,
2007.
Al C. Solis
Roll No. 123
October 31,2008
Makati City
Doc. No. 13
Page No. 3
Book No. 7
Series of 2009

Under oath the undersigned hereby certifies that he has not earlier commenced a similar against
the defendant for the same cause with any other court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency.
(Sgd.) Gerald Anderson
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 30 th day of October, 2009 in Makati City, affiant
having exhibited to me his Driver’s License No. 12345 issued at Paranaque City on January 10, 2007.
Al C. Batonghinog
Roll No. 123
October 31,2008
Makati City
Doc. No. 14
Page No. 4
Book No. 7
Series of 2009
Branch 01, Manila
XYZ CORPORATION,
Plaintiff,
-versus- Civil case No. 000019
Romulo Mandocdoc,
Defendant
x____________________x
COMPLAINT
(With Prayer of Preliminary Injunction)
PLAINTIFF, by counsel and to this Honorable Court respectfully alleges:
1. Plaintiff is a corporation duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the
Philippines, with principal office at Escolta, Manila, while defendant is of legal age and with residence at
Trabajo, Manila, where he may be served with summons and other legal processes.
2. Plaintiff, engaged in sale of general merchandise, entered into an exclusive dealership and
distribution agreement with Mayfair Manufacturing of New York, U.S.A., whereby plaintiff as
independent distributor, would exclusively sell Mayfair’s bearing the trademark, “NIKE, in the
Philippines and to protect said trademark from unauthorized use by other”. Copy of said agreement is
attached hereto as Annex “A”.
3. Defendant also engaged in general merchandising, imported wearing apparel from ABC
Company based in New Delhi, India, which carried the trademark NIKE, and began selling the same in
Manila, on or about January 2, 2009, without the consent of plaintiff, nor that of Mayfair Manufacturing
Company of New York, USA, and passing them off as either coming from plaintiff or from the former.
4. As a consequence of defendant’s acts, plaintiff suffered damages and his sale of wearing materials
bearing the mark NIKE has been diminishing, to such an extent that plaintiff has been losing profits of no
less than P 1,000,000 a month starting March 2009.
5. Defendants continues to commit the acts of unfair competition and of illegally interfering with
the agreement executed between plaintiff and Mayfair Manufacturing Company, in violation of plaintiff’s
rights.
6. Unless restrained during the pendency of the instant action, plaintiff will suffer more damages
and defendant will continue violating plaintiff’s rights, as exclusive dealer of said wearing apparel with
the mark, NIKE, and of its rights against unfair competition, and in this connection, plaintiff avers as
follows:
a) Plaintiff has a good and valid cause of action
b) He is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consist in restraining the
commission or continuance of the act or acts of perpetually;
c) The commission or continuance of the act complained of during the litigation would probably
work injustice to plaintiff or cause plaintiff irreparable injury not only to its business but also to its
goodwill.
d) Defendants is doing or is procuring or suffering to be done, the acts complained of in violation of

the rights of the plaintiff respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the
judgment ineffectual.
e) Plaintiff is ready and willing to file a bond executed to the defendant enjoined, in an amount to be
fixed by the court, to the effect that the plaintiff will pay to such party all damages which he may sustain
by reason of the injunction or temporary restraining order if the court should finally decide that the
applicant was not entitled thereto.
WHEREFORE, plaintiff respectfully prays as follows:
1. Upon the filing of this action, a temporary restraining order be issued expert and thereafter a writ
of preliminary injunction issue, restraining defendant or any of his agents and representatives from selling
wearing materials bearing the trademark NIKE, during the pendency of the action, upon such bond which
will be posted by plaintiff in the amount as may be fixed by this Honorable Court.
2. After hearing, judgment be rendered in favor of plaintiff and against defendant:
a) Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the amount of P 8,000,000 as damages and loss of
profit;
b) Requiring the defendant to account for all his sales of wearing materials with the
trademark NIKE, and to pay all profits realized by him to plaintiff.
c) Making the writ of preliminary injunction that may have been issued permanent.
Plaintiff further prays for such other reliefs as may be just and equitable in the premises.
October 30, 2009 at the City of Manila
Al C. Batonghinog
Roll No. 123
October 31,2008
Makati City
VERIFICATION
I under oath, aver that: (a) I am the duly authorized representative of the plaintiff in the afore-
titled case; (b) I caused the preparation of the Complaint; (c) I read it and its contents are true of my own
knowledge.
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 30th day of October, 2009 in Batangas City, affiant
having exhibited to me her Driver’s License No. 12345 issued at Paranaque City on January 10, 2007.
Al C. Batonghinog
Roll No. 123
October 31,2008
Makati City
Doc. No. 13
Page No. 3
Book No. 7
Series of 2009
Under oath, the undersigned hereby certifies that he has not earlier commenced a similar action
against the defendant for the same cause with any other court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency.
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 30th day of October, 2009 in Makati City, affiant having
exhibited to me his Driver’s License No. 12345 issued at Paranaque City on January 10, 2007.
Al C. Bonghanoy
Roll No. 123
October 31,2008
Makati City
Doc. No. 14
Page No. 4
Book No. 7
Republic of the Philippines Pro-form No.
Department of Labor and Employment (NOT FOR SALE)
NATIONAL LABOR AND RELATIONS COMMISSION
Quezon City OFW – LAND BASED
National Capital Region
NETH MERCADO
Complainant /s
-versus- NLRC RAB No. NCR Case No. (L) NCR – 06 05610
DMMM MEDICAL PLACEMENT & SERVICES INC and /or

Respondent/s (Local Agency)
Arbiter: LOPEZ, Adonis L. Jr
CYRUS CLING/ BRUCE SHURE and / or 5 /F LYNAR BLDG.
Respondent/s (Principal Abroad)
ARMANDO LAPID
Other Respondent/s
X----------------------------------------------X
COMPLAINT
COMPLAINANT/s, RESPECTFULLY STATE/S THAT:
NAME OF COMPLAINANT/S: SEX: AGE:

CIVIL STATUS
NETH MERCADO Female 26
SINGLE
Address ZIP CODE No. Complainant/s (if more than one)
610 Sampaguita St. Moonwalk II

Quezon City NCR 1421 Male NONE Female
1
NAME OF RESPONDENT AGENCY (LOCAL AGENCY) NAME OF RESPONDENT PRINCIPAL

DMMD MEDICAL PACEMENT & SERVICES INC CYRUS CLING/BRUCE SHURE
ADDRESS ADDRESS
0105 San Gabriel St, Paranaque, Mla.
NCR 1007
OWNER/MANAGER/PRESIDENT NAME OF ACTUAL EMPLOYER

ARMANDO LAPID ________________________
Nature of Work / Position Salary for Contract: (800.00 USD FLIGHT DATE
(PHILS)
HOUSEKEEPER
Place of Work / Flag / Vessel Salary Received 800.00 USD Dep:12-2-07 Arrival: 06-16-08
TURKS & CAICOS ISLAND

Name of Worker’s Union / Federation (If Any)
UNION MEMBERSHIP: Non – Member
This portion is to be filled vby the complainant officer, unless complainant/ is/are with legal counsel.:
CAUSES OF ACTION
Underpayment – SalarRy/Wages (6 ½ months) , Attorney’s Fees

OFW – Transportation Expenses
TRAFIICKING, REFUND OF PLACEMENT FEE, REMAINING CONTRACT, REFUND OF
PROCESSING FEE, DAMAGES, REFUND OF EXPENSES, BREACH OF CONTRACT.
________________________
Signature
MORE ON BACK: Complete all applicable spaces. DO NOT WRITE HERE

Page 1 of 2 pages
R E L I E F
COMPLAINANT/S PRAY FOR THE FOLLOWING:
A. PAYMENT OF SALARIES/WAGES FOR THE UNEXPIRED PORTION OF THE CONTRACT

THREE (3) MONTHS PER YEAR (PER RA# 8042) { }
B. OTHER SPECIFY:
SALARIES/WAGES FOR THE UNEXPIRED PORTION OF THE CONTRACT 3 MONTHS

PER YEAR (Per ra#8042); UNEXPIRED PORTION OF THE CONTRACT; MONEY CLAIMS;
MORAL & EXEMPLARY DAMAGES PLUS ATTORNEY’S FEES;
C. OTHER RELIEF, JUST AND EQUITABLE UNDER THE PREMISES, ARE LIKEWISE
PRAYED FOR.
DONE IN QUEZON CITY THIS 23RD DAY OF JUNE, 2008 .
NETH MERCADO _________________________

Complainant Complainant (2)
ADDRESS:
610 Sampaguita St. Moonwalk II ____________________________
Quezon City NCR 1421 Counsel for Complainant /s
___________________ZIP CODE 1421
EMPLOYMENT PERIOD:
DATE EMPLOYED: ______ DATE DISMISSED: 6-15-2006 PTR NO:
HOUSEKEEPER ________________________
Salary Rate: IBP NO.
800.00 USD ________________________
VERIFICATION
I/We, NETH MERCADO, having been duly sworn to, (if several, shall subscribe and
sworn to in accordance with law hereby depose and state that:
I/We am/are the complainant in the above-entitled case;
I/We have read the contents hereof and declare the same to b true to the best of my/our
knowledge and belief.
CERTIFCATION AND NON-FORUM SHOPPING
This is to certify that I/We have not filed any similar case with any other court, Quasi-Judicial body on government
agency have I/We filed any other similar complaint involving ther same parties and the same cause of action before
any other Regional Branch (RAB) of the National Labor Relations Commission.
NETH MERCADO ________________
COMPLAINANT COMPLAINANT
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 23rd day of June, 2008 in Quezon City, affiant exhibiting to
me his/her their Community Tax Certificate NO./s 5044610 issued on January 5, 2008 at Paranaque City.
Interview by: ________________________ Encoded by: EVALYN CORTEZ

Complaint Officer
Date: June 23, 2008 __________________________

Administering Officer
DO NOT WRITE HERE

Page 2 of 2 pages

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT
Regional Office No. IV-A
Batangas Field Office
3rd Fl., MAJ Centre, Pallocan West, Batangas City
Telefax (043) 723 – 0734; (043) 300 – 3940
CAITHLIN MAY M. JIMENEZ

Complainant,
LB-BFO-RO 402-09151988
AUTOMATIC LENDING INVESTOR,

INC. AND MARICRIS M. NAVAL
Respondent,
X----------------------------------------------X
COMPLAINT
COMES NOW complaint and to this Batangas Field Office respectfully alleges:
Name: CAITHLYN M. JIMENEZ

Civil Status: Single
Age: 25 years old
Address: No. 34 Kap. Simeon Luz St., Lipa City
Telephone No: 756 – 4357
Position: Accounting Clerk
Period of Employment started on April 10, 2004 until September 10, 2009
Address of workplace: No. 15 Santol St., Balintawak, Lipa City
Daily Working Hours: 8:00 – 7:00pm
Latest Salary: Php 18, 500.
Name of Union, if member: N/A
Name of Respondent: AUTOMATIC LENDING INVESTOR
Name of President/Manager/ Owner: MARICRIS M. NAVAL
Address: No. 34 Kap. Simeon Luz St., Lipa City
Nature of Business: Lending Investor
Number of Employees: 55 Regular: 40
Temporary: 15
COMPLAINANT is hereby charged with:
o Labor only contracting Illegal Suspension

o Illegal Deductions No SSS Coverage
o Illegal Dismissal Non-Payment of Separation Pay
o Non-Remittance of SSS Premiums Violation of Contract
o Constructive Dismissal
Non-Payment of :
o Wages Wages
 Legal / Special Holiday Pay Legal/Special Holiday Pay
 Premium Pay for Rest Day Premium Pay for Rest Day
o 13th month Pay / 13th month pay
 Overtime Pay Overtime Pay
 5 days Service Incentive Pay 5 days Service Incentive Pay
 Night Shift Differential Pay Night Shift Differential Pay
Details of these charges:
Complainant was illegally dismissed last August 10, 2009 and was given 30 days
to effectively her dismissal. The respondent failed to pay the complainant legal and
special holiday pays, premium pay for the rest day, overtime pay, 5 days incentive pay,
night shift differential pay and underpayment of 13th month pay as mandates in the Labor
Code of the Philippines, PD 442, as amended..
Done in Batangas City this 10th day of October 2009.

Complainant
VERIFICATION
I, Caithlin May M. Jimenez being duly sworn to in accordance with law, and state
that:
I am the complainant in the above-entitled case and I have caused the separation
and filing of the complaint and I read the contents hereof and declare the same to be true
to the best of knowledge.
This is to certify that I have not filed similar case without any court, Quasi-Judicial body
or government agency.

Complainant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to me before this 10 th day of October 2009 at

Batangas City, affiant exhibiting her Residence Certificate Number 01050610 issued at
Lipa City on January 5, 2009.
MARIO SAN ISIDRO

Regional Office No. IV-A
Batangas Field Office
3rd Fl., MAJ Centre, Pallocan West, Batangas City
Telefax (043) 723 – 0734; (043) 300 – 3940

Complainant,
LB-BFO-RO 402-09151988
AUTOMATIC LENDING INVESTOR,

INC. AND MARICRIS M. NAVAL
Respondent,
X----------------------------------------------X
ANSWER
I, MARICRIS M. NAVAL, for and in behalf of AUTOMATIC LENDING INVESTOR,

of legal age and a resident of 1300-B Batangas St., Brgy San Isidro, avers that:
1. I am one of the respondents in the above-captioned case;
2. The income generated from lending and other non-bank financial services and
because of the Asian currency crisis. Consequently, AUTOMATIC LENDING
INVESTOR, temporarily suspended its operations. It advised its employees, including
complainant, not to report for work starting on the first week of March 2009.
AUTOMATIC LENDING INVESTOR indefinitely closed shop effective May 2009;
3. The closure of business operation by AUTOMATIC LENDING INVESTOR is not

tainted with bad faith or other circumstance that arouses undue suspicion of malicious
intent. The decision to permanently close business operations was arrived at after a
suspension of operation for several months precipitated by a slowdown in income
without any prospects of improving. These were no indications that an impending strike
or any labor-related union activities precipitated the sudden closure of business. , Further,
we were able to notify complainant and all other workers through written letters dated
November 25, 2008 of the Company’s decision to permanently close its business and had
submitted a termination report to the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE);
4. It is worth noting that the closure of business operation is allowed under the Labor
Code, provided separation pay be paid to the terminated employee. Further, it is settled
that the giving of separation benefits is required only in cases not due to serious business
losses or financial reverses.
5. Considering that the complainant was not illegally dismissed, there should be no back
wages needed to be awarded.
DONE in Batangas City this 20th day of October 2009.

MARK KEVIN W. REYES
Respondent
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 20 th day of October 2009 at Batangas

City, affiant exhibiting her Residence Certificate Number 01050615 issued at Lipa City
on January 3, 2009.
MARIO SAN ISIDRO

Administrative Officer
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
National Capital Region – North Sector
Quezon City
HAMLET GARMENTS
INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION
Plantiff,
-vs-
PAUL CHRISTIAN C. LOZANO

Defendant
x--------------------------------x
DEFENDANT’S POSITION PAPER
Defendants by counsel and unto this Honorable Court, most respectfully submits
this Position Paper and in support thereof, avers as follows:
THE PARTIES
Plaintiff is a domestic corporation organized and existing under the laws of the
Philippines with principal place of business located at Golden Haven Village, Carmona,
Laguna.
Defendant, Paul Christian C. Lozano is a Filipino, of legal age and a resident of

57-A Lapu-Lapu St. Rogaville Homes, Pacita Complex, San Pedro, Laguna.
The parties maybe served with processes and orders of the court in their above-
given respective addresses.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant Paul Christian C. Lozano, purchased a motorcycle on an installment

basis from Motortrade Nationwide Corporation. Defendant Raymond John H. Santos is
the guarantor.
Plaintiff alleged that defendant defaulted in his payment of the installments due
and that of the contract price of Eighty Thousand Three Hundred Seventy Six Pesos (P80,
376.00) only the total amount of Thirteen Thousand Three Hundred Pesos Ninety Six
Pesos (P13, 396.00) was paid by the defendant leaving a balance of P66, 980.00 plus 5%
interest per month on the unpaid installment amounts due. Hence, this instant petition.
Defendant allege that he could not recall having signed a promissory note with
chattel mortgage in favor of the plaintiff, and that it was his earnest belief that he
transacted only with Motortrade Nationwide Corporation and not with the plaintiff.
The defendants further allege that per their records and contrary to the claim of
the plaintiff, the remaining unpaid balance of their obligation is only Ten Thousand Pesos
(P10, 000.00). Because of the manifest discrepancy in their respective records,
reconciliation is necessary.
Moreover, defendants claim that the plaintiff already took possession of the
motorcycle subject of the chattel mortgage, a manifest act of foreclosure on the part of
the latter.
PRAYER
REINSTATEMENT AND PAYMENT OF BACK WAGES
Complainant reiterates its entitlement to back wages and reinstatement or

separation pay in lieu of the latter, for respondent’s illegally dismissing him without just
cause.
SALARY FOR WORK RENDERED ON SEPTEMBER 26, 2007 UP TO

OCTOBER 2, 2007
Not having been controverted by the respondent, complainant likewise reiterates

his claim for unpaid salaries for the work he performed on the stated dates. He is
rightfully entitled thereto having had performed his duties to the company faithfully and
diligently during these said period and to forfeit the same is without legal basis and
would cause grave injustice to him.
13TH MONTH SALARY DIFFERENTIAL AND OTHER BENEFITS
Likewise, complainant reiterates his entitlement to benefits mandated by law such

as the payment of 13th month pay, holiday pay, the difference in his salary actually paid
by the respondent from that of the minimum wage set by law, and all other benefits
mandated by law.
WHEREFORE, in view of the above premises, the complainant still maintains

that respondent illegally dismissed his employment without just cause and reiterates the
Prayer in her Position paper to this Honorable Office.
Other reliefs, just and equitable under the circumstances are likewise prayed for.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
PUBLIC ATTORNEY’S OFFICE
16TH Floor, Makati City Hall
Makati City
By:
JOHN BENEDICT ATIENZA

Public Attorney
I, PAUL CHRISTIAN LOZANO, subscribing under oath, depose and state that:
1. I am the complainant in the above-entitled case;

2. I have read the foregoing Reply and declare that the contents thereof are true and
correct to my own knowledge; and
3. I have caused the preparation and filing of the same.

Affiant
Quezon City
PAUL CHRISTIAN LOZANO

Complainant,
-versus- NLRC-NCR Case No. 10-11018-07

(Hon. L.A. VENERANDA C. GUERERO)
HAMILET INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION

Respondents,
x-------------------------------------------------------x
REPLY TO RESPONDENT’S POSITION PAPER
COMPLAINANT, assisted by the undersigned counsel and unto this Honorable

office, most respectfully submits his Reply and states THAT:
STATEMENT OF COMMENTS
1. Complainant vehemently denies respondent’s allegation that he was

involved in the stealing of the items from the company. In fact, contrary to
the allegation of the respondent, complainant is not the person responsible
for the safekeeping of the said items.
2. Complainant likewise denies that he failed to submit his explanation letter as

required of him by the respondent, as in fact he did (Annex”C” of the
Complainant’s Position Paper). Moreover, respondent also denies that he
refuse to answer any of the inquiries addressed to him during the said
investigation. Contrary to the claim of the respondent, the Minutes of the
Investigation (Annex “C” of Respondent’s Answer to the Position Paper)
does not state whether questions have been asked at all of the complainant
and whether complainant refused to answer such questions. The minutes

simply stated the names of the attendees to the investigation and a general
statement that the complainant was investigated on the date of the office of
the respondent.
3. Respondent failed to particularly account as how it was able to establish the

guilt of the complainant. There was no showing that testimonies were in fact
given by witness, and if this is indeed true, there was no indication as to who
these witness were, how and when were their testimonies extracted by the
respondent, nor any showing that complainant was able to confront these
witnesses or that he was given a chance to controvert their testimonies.
4. Assuming for the sake of argument that there was indeed a proper
investigation conducted, if the complainant was found to have been guilty of
the act ascribed to him, it is beyond comprehension why then did respondent
not include him in the case it filed against the employees found responsible
for the theft. One could only surmise that the respondent did not find him in
the alleged theft, and therefore no just cause for his termination.
REINSTATEMENT AND PAYMENT OF BACK WAGES
Complainant reiterates its entitlement to back wages and reinstatement or

separation pay in lieu of the latter, for respondent’s illegally dismissing him without just
cause.
SALARY FOR WORK RENDERED ON SEPTEMBER 26, 2007 UP TO
OCTOBER 2, 2007
Not having been controverted by the respondent, complainant likewise reiterates

his claim for unpaid salaries for the work he performed on the stated dates. He is
rightfully entitled thereto having had performed his duties to the company faithfully and
diligently during these said period and to forfeit the same is without legal basis and
would cause grave injustice to him
13TH MONTH SALARY DIFFERENTIAL AND OTHER BENEFITS
Likewise, complainant reiterates his entitlement to benefits mandates by law such

as the payment of 13th moth pay, holiday pay, the difference in his salary actually paid by
the respondent from that of the minimum wage set by law, and all other benefits
mandated by law.
WHEREFORE, in view of the above premises, the complainant still maintains

that respondent illegally dismissed his employment without just cause and he reiterates
the Prayer in her Position Paper to this Honorable Office.
Respectfully submitted this ___ of December 2007, Makati City for Quezon City.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
PUBLIC ATTORNEY’S OFFICE
16TH Floor, Makati City Hall
Makati City
By:
PAUL CHRISTIAN C. ANAUD

Public Attorney
I, PAUL CHRISTIAN C. LOZANO, subscribing under oath, depose and state

that:
1. I am the complainant in the above-entitled case;

2. I have read the foregoing Reply and declare that the contents thereof are true
and correct to my own knowledge; and
3. I have caused the preparation and filing of the same.

Affiant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this ____________ of December

2007 at Makati City.

Quezon City
Christopher Allan V. Pascua,

Complainant,
- versus - NLRC NCR CASE No. 00 – 03 – 02798 – 06
INNOVE COMMUNCATIONS, INC.,

et, al.,
Respondents
REJOINDER
[To Respondents’ Reply]
COMES NOW complainant Christopher Allan V. Pascua, assisted by counsel and unto
this Honorable Office herein submits his Rejoinder and respectfully avers as follows:
The real issue in this case is “WHETHER OR NOT PUTTING

COMPLAINT PASCUA IN A FLOATING STATUS
EFFECTIVE JANUARY 1, 2006 IS TANTAMOUNT TO HIS
CONSTRUCTIVE DISMISSAL” which issue the respondents
Is trying to evade by maliciously asserting that complaint
Manaog was “actually” dismissed through a memo dated March
29, 2006 which was issued almost three (3) months after they have
already placed complainant Pascua in a “floating status”.
The fact is disputed that on January 1, 2006 complainant Pascua was left by the
respondents without any position in the respondent company. This bold claim is supported by no
less than the categorical admission of facts by the respondents in paragraph 2 of their Reply
which for emphasis, clarity and ready reference we hereby quote herein as follows:
“2. it is true that effective January 1, 2006, the respondent company effected a
reorganization of the Small Medium Enterprises Group. It is also true that complaint Pascua was
not given any position under the reorganized structure.xxx”
With the foregoing statement, respondents have clearly admitted the fact the effective
January 1, 2006, complaint Pascua was indisputable placed by the respondents in a
floating status because they themselves categorically declared that complainant Pascua
“was not given any position in the reorganized structure” maliciously leaving
complainant Pascua in an embarrassing situation where he remains to be employed with,
but without occupying any position in, the respondent company. Having this clear
admission on hand, we respectfully believe that the only issue left to be resolved in this
case is whether such act of putting complaint Pascua in a “floating status” is tantamount to
his dismissal. This issue, as we have sufficiently explained in our previous papers
submitted to the decisions of the Supreme Court on the same subject matter. To further
give emphasis on an otherwise clearly settled matter, the Supreme Court in the case of
Blue Dairy Corporation and / or Edison T. Aviquetero and Pedro G. Miguel vs. NLRC and
Elvira R. Recalde4 aptly said its piece on the issue of constructive dismissal in this wise:
“Constructive dismissal has been defined as a quitting because continued

employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely; as an offer
involving a demolition in a rank and diminution in pay. Likewise,
constructive dismissal exists when an act of clear discrimination, insensibility
or disdain by an employer has become so unbearable to the employee leaving
him with no potion but to forego with his continued employment.”
From the foregoing, it is glaringly evident that fate suffered by complainant Pascua in the
hands of the herein respondents amounts to constructive dismissal tantamount to illegally
dismissing him.
While the issue of constructive dismissal as espoused by complainant Pascua is

clear and simple, we are seriously wondering why respondents keep on sidelining the
real issue rather than facing the same head-on. Are respondents afraid to face the issue
head-on because they have now come to realized that what they have done amounts to a
clear violation of the law? Nevertheless, if they do not want to go to the issue, we will be
the ones who will bring the issue to their doorsteps just so that we could already have a
clear resolution of the same.
In their attempt to evade the issue, they are hiding under their hopeless claim that
“complainant Pascua was dismissed in actuality” allegedly evidenced by the memo dated
March 29, 2006. With all due respect, allow us to at least set the records straight once
and for all. While we do not deny the fact that there was indeed a memo dated March 29,
2006, the same however does not negate the fact that the “floating status” of complainant
Pascua was effected as early as January 1, 2006. Hence, the illegality of the respondents
act of putting complainant Pascua in a “floating status” at an early date cannot anymore
be cured by a termination memo issued on a later date. To allow the same would be to
create an absurdity of the highest order, for it will amount to allowing the cart to be put
in front of the horse which by any stretch of the imagination cannot be justified as
logically possible. Furthermore, what becomes more evident, with the issuance by the
respondents of the termination memo on a later date is the fact that such issuance of the
termination memo was only an afterthought on their part designed to give a semblance of
legality to an otherwise illegal act effected as early as January 1, 2006.
Interestingly, in the respondents’ effort to justify their act of putting complainant

Pascua in a ‘floating status” on January 1, 2006, they have managed to put an amusingly
lame excuse that complainant Pascua’s floating status “is not constructive dismissal
because his continued employment was dependent upon the outcome of the disciplinary
proceedings”. Since when were employers given the prerogative to put employees in a
floating status pending the outcome of disciplinary proceeding? In this jurisdiction, what
is only allowed is to put an employee under preventive suspension pending an
investigation in relation to an administrative or disciplinary proceedings which even
then, is not complainant in a floating status for almost three (3) months. What makes
things even more amusing is the fact that respondents even had the guts to declare that
“[C]omplainant ought to be grateful that he was not placed under preventive suspension
during the pendency of the of the disciplinary preceedings” 5 as if they have the right to
be wrong and even be proud for committing such wrong.
To make things worse, respondents even went to the extent of maliciously

misleading this Honorable Office by stating that “ [G]ranting for the sake of argument
that complainant PASCUA was placed on floating status, still that does not per se
constitute constructive dismissal”6 and in support thereof cited the case of OSS Security
and Allied Services v. NLRC 325SCRA157. However, perusal of the full text of the
decision laid down by the Supreme Court on the cited case revealed that nowhere in said
decision was it ever pronounced by the constitute constructive dismissal. This is evident
from the fact that the pivotal issue resolved therein by the Court was whether or not the
transfer of the involved security personnel was illegal and tantamount to unjust
dismissal.
All the foregoing would only lead a reasonable man to conclude that respondents
are already desperately seeking ways and means to redeem themselves, from their
irreversible error of constructively dismissing complainant Pascua, even to the extent of
coming up with amusing and misleading statements and arguments.
While we consider respondents’ assertion,that the dismissal of complainant Pascua

was by reason of his alleged dismal performance, is again an attempt to sideline the
real issue since the issue of performance is totally irrelevant to the issue of constructive
dismissal which is the real issue ought to be resolved in the instant case. We, however
take it upon ourselves to refute such argument herein.
At the onset, we would like to reiterate our clear position that the real issue ought
to be resolved in this particular case is whether or not complainant Manaog was
constructively dismissed on January 1, 2006. However, since the respondents herein are
trying to muddle the issue by desperately clinging their self-professed issue of “actual
dismissal based on poor performance”, we deemed it necessary to refute such allegation
on the merits to finally put a rest on an irrelevant issue which respondents are trying to
inject in this case.
As we have already clearly discussed in our Reply to Respondents’ Position

Paper, the alleged poor performance of complainant Pascua in 2004 and 2005 is nothing
more than a pigment of their imagination or worst, by their deliberate effort to
maliciously oust complainant Pascua from his employment with the respondent
company, not supported by, or even contrary to, the Year-To-Date report of the
performance for such years which they themselves generated in the first place [please
refer to Annex “A” of Complainant’s Reply]. Such document clearly shows that it was
not only complainant Pascua who failed to meet the quota for such year and complainant
Pascua was not even the poorest performer back then. We will not anymore dwell
lengthily on such matter since we believe the discussion on such matter in our Reply
sufficiently explained the same.
In this paper we will be dwelling more on the issue of the alleged “remiss
performance” of complainant Pascua on the projects assigned to him. The projects being
referred to by the respondents were [1] Own The Fort; [2] Greenhills Christian
Fellowship; [3] Batman Kiosk. We shall be explaining the events and circumstances
surrounding these projects in seriatim for an orderly explanation and understanding of
the same.
OWN THE FORT PROJECT
Respondents alleged that complainant Pascua committed gross negligence in the

handling of this particular project. This allegation, we believe, is an outright
irresponsible conclusion as the same was contrary to the actual series of acts and events
which complainant undertook just so that the project would materialize. However, due to
circumstances beyond the control of complainant Pascua, the Project failed not because
of his inaction but by the reason of the following:
[a] No Right of Way Agreement has yet been entered into between Innove and
BCDA [Administrator of The Fort]; and
[b] Innove, at the time, has not yet secured a permit for underground installation
in The Fort;
This project was in fact regularly handled by complainant Pascua as shown by the
fact that he made a “sales call” to two (2) locators of The Fort namely MGC and Every
Nation. As per the regular course of things, complainant gathered requirements from the
prospective clients to show that they are qualified to become clients of the respondent
company. After gathering those requirements complainant Pascua immediately submitted
a Network Facility Request (NFR) to determine whether Innove has an existing and
available facility in the area sufficient to cover the requirements of the clients. However,
the same yielded a negative result and as a consequence of which the NFR for the clients
became pending as an installation to these prospective clients would be dependent on
whether Innove would be allowed to use existing ducts. Attached herein as Annex “A” is
an email dated August 23, 2005 from Arnold Pasa to Maria Glenda Castro showing that
there was a demand for lines by the clients MGC and Every Nation but which
requirements were not able to materialize due to the absence of facility in the area since
at that time Innove has yet to secure a permit for underground installation in The Fort.
With respect to the market place, which is also a target site in The Fort,
complainant Pascua likewise did what is required of him by initiating talks with possible
clients. In fact he was almost able to close a deal with Station Square East Commercial
Corporation (SSECC) through Engr. Jeffrey P. Uy where it not for the absence of a
Memorandum of Agreement for Right of Way between Innove and BCDA. Attached
herein as Annexes “B” to “B-2” is an email trail the latest of which was dated July 13,
2005 from Virgilio Moreno to Complainant Pascua that the proposed MOA was not yet
signed at the same time the negotiations were being undertaken by complainant Manaog.
With the foregoing, it can be clearly deducted that complainant Pascua did his
part in the implementation of the above Project but the same did not materialize not
through his fault but through the absence of facility in the area as well as the absence of
the MOA for right of way between respondent company and BCDA.
GREENHILLS CHRISTIAN FELLOWSHIP
In the particular Project, respondents again allege that complainant was remiss in
the discharge of his duties. We assert otherwise.
This Project was initially handled Mr. Roselino Barbosa who came from the
group of complainant Pascua. During such time the Outside Plant already informed the
group of complainant Pascua of the difficulty of serving the client Greenhills Christian
Fellowship (GCF) in addition to the fact that the location of the client (which is in Daan
Hari Las Pinas) is still a non-service area back then. In this regard, Mr. Allan Soco, the
Immediate Supervisor of the herein complainant Pascua, instructed Mr. Barbosa through
an email dated March 31, 2005 to inform the client of (GCF) that the Project will not be
pursued “due to line take up vs. amount needed investment”. Attached herein as Annex
“C” is a copy of the email of Mr. Allan Soco to Mr. Barbosa dated March 31, 2005 which
forms an integral part of this Rejoinder.
Thereafter, is the effort of complainant Pascua to find other solutions to close the
amount of GCF and complainant Pascua personally attended to the client. However,
since the client prefers a Makati number (which respondent Company cannot provide
then since the available facility is only for Cavite number) the only solution is the
installation of a wireless Radio Link which according to the group of Mr. Dennis Monzon
will cost about P1.008 Million. In this regard, complainant sent an email dated April 20,
2005 to Mr. Allan Soco recommending to defer the project which recommendation was
approved by Mr. Soco in an email dated April 20, 2005. Attached herein as Annex “D’ is
email of complainant dated April 20, 2005 as well as the email of Mr. Allan Soco dated
April 21, 2005 both forming an integral part of this Rejoinder.
In summary, the Greenhills Christian Fellowship Project failed, or was not

pursued, not because of the remiss performance of complainant Pascua, as maliciously
asserted by respondents, but by reason of the unavailability of facility and right product
by the respondent company as well as the financial constraints accompanying the project.
BATMAN KIOSK PROJECT
The Batman Kiosk Project is not the sole responsibility of complainant Pascua,
but instead, of the whole Sales Team. The ten (10) supposed Batman Kiosk to be put up is
divided among Residential Group with two (2), Strat Group with three (3) Business
Group with five (5) commitments. Henceforth, complainant Pascua, being merely a part
of the Business group is only supposed to contribute for the materialization of the five (5)
Batman Partners committed. This claim is supported by the email dated July 7, 2005 sent
to Allan Soco to the entire group asking for at least one (1) kiosk per Account Manger
(AM). Attached herein as Annex “E” is a copy of the email of Mr. Soco dated July 7, 2005
which forms an integral part of this Rejoinder.
Notwithstanding the above commitment of only at least one (1) kiosk per AM,
complainant was actually able to initially recruit ten (10) Batman partners as evidenced
by the email dated August 29, 2005 to Maria Glenda Castro et.al. Attached herein as
Annex “F” is a copy of such email which forms an integral part of this Rejoinder.
However, due to problems beyond the control of complainant such as wrong facility,
expired reservation and absence of required documents among others, these initial
recruits failed to ultimately become partners for the Batman Project. This only goes to
show that complainant did his part in the Project and the alleged failure should not be
solely imputed upon him.
Having this glaring reality, we cannot understand why respondents are

maliciously imputing the alleged failure of the Projects to complainant. This only goes to
show that the respondents allegation of “remiss performance” against the herein
complainant was just but a part of their malicious grand plan to justify their act of
dismissing, albeit illegally, complainant Pascua from his employment with the respondent
company.
Assuming without necessarily admitting that complainant indeed displayed dismal

performance as the respondent desperately try to assert, still respondents did not follow
the proper procedure for effecting his termination as provided in the Discipinary process
which the respondent Company itself, through its responsible Officers, formulated.
Following the clearly baseless assertion of the respondents that complainant

Pascua displayed dismal performance of his duties, we still believe that the respondents
did follow the proper procedure for addressing the same as provided no less than the
respondent company’s Disciplinary Process which they themselves formulated.
According to their “own” disciplinary process, if an employee fails to meet the

quota set, he or se should be immediately subjected to the disciplinary process and the
penalty in accordance with which progresses from VERBAL COUNSELLING for the
first infraction to TERMINATION for a sixth infraction within a given 12-month period.
Attached herein as Annex “G” is a copy of the company disciplinary process and forms
of an integral part of this Rejoinder.
In the case of complainant Pascua, respondents failed to show that they subjected
him to this process, which perforce, becomes part and parcel of the administrative due
process. What respondents did with complainant was that they allowed complainant to
continue to perform with his duties and responsibilities without calling his attention on
his alleged poor performance and immediately subjected him to the penalty of
termination for a supposed first offense without going through the “Timing and Sequence
of Disciplinary Process” where a first infraction should only be treated with the penalty of
VERBAL WARNING.
If indeed complainant displayed a performance which is not acceptable by company

standards, why then did they not call his attention to such an alleged unacceptable performance in
2004? Why did they only process the disciplinary action of complainant in 2005 and why did they
immediately subject complainant to the penalty of dismissal without having the penalty graduate
as provided in their disciplinary process? To our mind the only logical reason why respondents
did not call the attention of complainant Pascua is that his performance in 2004, as evidenced by
the records, is acceptable. Why did they only process the alleged poor performance in 2005? The
answer is simple, they swapped the position of Ihrene Buelva and complainant Pascua and gave
the former a lower quota than the latter in 2005 so that complainant will be at the bottom of the
list of performance and when that happened in 2005 they immediately seized the opportunity and
slapped complainant with the supreme penalty of dismissal. These sequence of events would
make a reasonable man wonder why respondent did not subject Ihrene Buelva to the disciplinary
process in 2004 when she was the one at the bottom of the list of performers? Again, the answer
is simple, respondents were not really interested in disciplinary poor performances instead they
were only interested in singling out complaint designed to ensure his dismissal from company.
As to the totally irrelevant statement made by the respondents in paragraph 7 of their threatening
complainant Pascua with the filing of a criminal case for Estafa, suffice it to state that the same is a clear
manifestation on the part of the respondents of their desperate effort to create some sort of leverage with
respect to this case knowing fully well that complainant position in this Labor Case is more tenable ad
meritorious.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, premises considered it is most respectfully prayed unto this Honorable Office
that the relief prayed for in our Position Paper be granted.
Other relief just and equitable under the premises are likewise prayed for.
Paranaque City for Quezon City, august 11, 2006

Department of Labor and Employment
Quezon City
PAULINO M. PANOY
Complainant, NLRC NCR CASE No.00-03-02798-09

-versus-
FELIPE G. MARCELINO
Respondent
x________________________x
SURREJOINDER
I PAULINO M. PANOY, married of legal age with postal address at 1855 Dapitan St., Sampaloc,
Manila, after having been duly sworn in accordance with law do hereby depose and say:
1. After proclaiming with almost infallible conviction that he personally knows herein
undersigned as an illegitimate son of Bonifacio Panoy., respondent steps back and feigns good faith.
However, his prior vehement allegation of personal knowledge greatly revolts against the slightest hint of
good faith which he now grapples in palpable desperation. Respondent know deep within he has perjured
himself and could not look at his own handiwork of deceit and malice getting back at him in the eye;
2. Herein undersigned reiterates all the allegations facts and arguments he has clearly
laid down in his complaint and reply and incorporates the same in this Surrejoinder;
3. However herein undersigned intends to summarily and effectively answer and rebut
respondents allegation that the element of materiality is lacking in the present case. Contrary to what
respondent erroneously believes, a matter is material not only when it is directed to prove a fact in issue.
In prosecutions for perjury, a matter is material if it is the “main fact which was the subject of the inquiry,
or any circumstances which tends to prove that fact xxx:” (United State vs. Estraña 16 Phil. 520, 1910) if
the principal issue to be resolved is whether respondent deceived herein undersigned and as a result the
latter was robbed of his rightful share as true heir to his damage and prejudice (tantamount to saying
respondent committed estafa), then to say that herein undersigned is a bastard son (which is a deliberate
falsehood) is unmistakably material. Because if indeed it were true that herein undersigned is illegitimate
then there will be no basis for an accusation of estafa, for no damage or prejudice may be suffered by an
heir excluded by the law on intestate succession. ( And this is the whole point of respondents defense in
both the simulation of Birth and Estafa charges, for crying out loud!);
4. Respondents’ rejoinder affidavit again offers nothing but plain and ugly denial. “
Denial, like alibi, is inherently a weak defense and cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimony
of the prosecution witness that the accused committed the crime. ( People of the Philippines vs. Edwin
Belibet, manny Banoy and Ronnie Rosero G.R. No. 91260, July 25, 1991) to reiterate, suffice it to say
that respondents convenient defense of denial, as well as his feigned good faith, is evidentiary in nature, a
matter best threshed out in full blown trial.
5. There are four (4) elements of the crime of perjury to be taken into account in
determining whether there is a prima facie case, to wit: (a) that the accused made a statement under oath
or executed an affidavit upon a material matter; (b) that the statement of affidavit was made before a
competent officer, authorized to receive and administer oath; (c) that in that statement or affidavit, the
accused made a willful and deliberate assertion of a falsehood; and (d) that the sworn statement or
affidavit containing the falsity is required by law or made for a legal purpose. ( Honorio Saavedra, Jr. vs
DOJ, RTC Pasig, branch 67 and Gregorio M. Ramos G.R. No. 93173, September 15, 1993) all of these
elements are present in the present case;
6. “ There are two essential elements of proof of perjury: (1) the statement made by the
defendant must be proven false; and (2) it must be proven that the defendant did not believe those
statements to be true. Knowledge by the accused of the falsity of his statement is an integral act. It may be
proved by his admissions or by circumstantial evidence. The state of mind of the accused may be
determined by the things he says and does, from proof of motive to lie and of the objective falsity itself
and from other facts tending to show that the accused really know the things he claimed not to know.”
(Villanueva vs. Secretary of Justice. 475 SCRA 495) All the circumstances and proof that undersigned has
laid in his two complaint clearly reveals Felipe’s elaborate plan of deceit, cunning and manipulation
which is all but innocent in nature it s criminal as a matter of fact and law. They more than satisfy the
abovementioned elements of proof of perjury.
7. Finally, herein undersigned would like to reiterate that whatever issues respondent has
raised in his counter-affidavit and rejoinder-affidavit they are properly matters of defense the truth of
which are best ferreted out in a judicial proceeding. The complaint, reply as well as this surrejoinder has
briefly yet sufficiently alleged facts and circumstances that clearly establishes probable cause enough to
engender a well-founded belief that respondent should be place in trial for the crime ascribed to him;
8. That I am executing this Affidavit to attest to the truth of the foregoing and for the
purpose of charging Felipe G. Maecelino of violation of perjury under Article 183 of the Revised Penal
Code.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand on this 22 nd day of May 2008 at Manila,
Philippines.
PAULINO M. PANOY
Affiant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 22nd day of May 2008 in the city of Paranaque.

PROFESSIONAL REGULATIONS COMMISSION
CITY OF MANILA
MEMBERS OF THE SAMAHAN NG MGA NURSING

STUDENTS SA UST (SMNSU)
Plaintiff,
PRC CASE NO. 114723
versus FOR: DISQUALIFICATION OF NURSES
RODIS, SHIRLEY G.; GALVAN, RONALD B., MERCADO, JENNILYN M.

(MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF NURSING);
INGAL, GIANNE TRISHA; PIZARRO, ABIGAIL;

ESPEJO, MONA AMIRA; CO, ADRIAN; AND,
REYES, MYLA (STUDENTS OF EMILIO AGUINALDO COLLEGE)
Defendants.
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
COMPLAINT
Plaintiff avers that:
1.) They were the nursing students who took the Nursing Board Exam last July 2007
however failed the same;
2.) That Defendants-students of Emilio Aguinaldo College (EAC) also took the Nursing
Board Exam in July 2008 and passed the same with each and everyone of them obtaining
the unbelievable grade of 99.99%.
3.) That Defendants-Members of the Board of Nursing were all in conspiracy with herein
Defendants-students of EAC to surreptitiously distribute advance copies of the Board
questions prior to the examination date on 12 July 2008.
4.) That Defendants-students had complete knowledge of what the questions were hence
they took the exam to the great disadvantage of the other hopeful examinees;
5.) That despite having cheated in the examination, Defendants-students, now licensed
nurses, willfully, unlawfully and guiltlessly continue to work as nurses for different
hospitals and health centers.
PRAYER
Wherefore, it is prayed that after due notice and hearing a judgment be rendered ordering:
1. the Defendants-students to surrender their licenses to the Professional Regulatory

Commission (PRC) or in the alternative, the cancellation of licenses (as nurse) issued to
them;
2. the Defendants-Members of the Board of Nursing to vacate their positions as such;
3. the retaking of board exam of all nursing students who took the July 2008 Board; and
4. the perpetual disqualification of the herein Defendants-students of EAC to retake the
Nursing Board Exam;
Plaintiff further prays for such other reliefs as may be just and equitable in the premises.
City of Manila, (24 November 2009).

(Sgd.) Atty. Cheryl M. Santos
1440 Sta. Cruz, Manila
PTR NO. 723 issued in Manila on 14 Jan.2006
IPB OR No. 114723 at Manila
MCLE Compliance No.
VERIFICATION
We, under oath, aver that: a.) We are the plaintiff in the afore-entitled case; b.) We caused the
preparation of the Complaint; c.) We read it and its contents are true of our own knowledge.
(Sgd.) Individual Signature of Members of the

SNMNS sa UST
SUBCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 2nd day of December 2009 at Manila. I hereby
certify that I have examined the Complainants and that I am fully satisfied that they have
voluntarily executed and understood the contents of their Complaint.
(Sgd.) ATTY. LEO BRIGINO

Notary Public
My Commission expires on 31 December 2009
Under oath, the undersigned hereby certify that they have not earlier commenced a similar action
against the defendants for the same cause with any other court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency.
(Sgd.)
MEMBERS OF THE SAMAHAN
NG MGA NURSING STUDENTS
SA UST
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 2nd day of December 2009 at Manila. I hereby
certify that I have examined the Complainants and that I am fully satisfied that they have
voluntarily executed and understood the contents of their Complaint.

Notary Public

PROFESSIONAL REGULATIONS COMMISSION
CITY OF MANILA
MEMBERS OF THE SAMAHAN NG MGA NURSING

STUDENTS SA UST (SMNSU)
Plaintiff,
PRC CASE NO. 114723

versus FOR: DISQUALIFICATION OF NURSES
RODIS, SHIRLEY G.; GALVAN, RONALD B., MERCADO, JENNILYN M.

INGAL, GIANNE TRISHA; PIZARRO, ABIGAIL;

ESPEJO, MONA AMIRA; CO, ADRIAN; AND,
REYES, MYLA (STUDENTS OF EMILIO AGUINALDO COLLEGE)
Defendants.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
ANSWER
Now come the defendants, by the undersigned counsel, in the above0entitled case to this
Commission most respectfully allege:
1.) That Defendants admit averment in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the complaint;

2.) That Defendants specifically deny the allegation made in paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of the
complaint, the truth being that they were never in communication nor in contact with
each other;
3.) That the fact that each and every student of EAC who took the Nursing Board Exam
in July 2008, got the grade of 99.99% is not impossible- just a coincidence;
4.) Known for producing
5.) That the review center where the defendants-students had their review classes is
known for producing nurses usually included in the top ten.
6.) That the named students graduated from EAC with honors and that during their
school years at EAC, they had maintained exemplary grades;
7.) That their Board of Nursing implements strict of confidentiality of files especially
that of questionnaire prepared for the Nursing Board Examinees.
By way of counterclaim, defendant alleges:
That by virtue of this unwarranted and malicious act initiated by the plaintiff, defendants were
forced to engage counsel in the sum of P200,000.00.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the complaint be dismissed and defendants

be awarded the amount of two hundred pesos (P200,000.00).
Other equitable reliefs are likewise prayed for.

4 December 2009, City of Manila, Philippines
ATTY. NLSON DAVID

Attorney for Defendant
2330 Sta. Cruz, Manila

Philippines
` PTR No.: 67878; 23 February 1998,
Manila
IBP No. 67899; 4 April 1998, Manila
Serial No. of Commission:
HJY7877968LKJ
PROOF OF SERVICE
VERIFICATION
We, under oath, aver that: a.) We are the defendants in the afore-entitled case; b.) We caused the
preparation of the Answer; c.) We read it and its contents are true of our own knowledge.
` (Sgd.) RODIS, SHIRLEY G.; GALVAN,

RONALD B., MERCADO, JENNILYN M.
(Sgd.) INGAL, GIANNE TRISHA;

PIZARRO, ABIGAIL; ESPEJO,
MONA AMIRA; CO, ADRIAN; AND,
REYES, MYLA (STUDENTS OF EMILIO AGUINALDO
COLLEGE)
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 4th day of December 2009 at Manila. I hereby
certify that I have examined the Defendants and that I am fully satisfied that they have
voluntarily executed and understood the contents of their Answer.

Notary Public
My Commission expires on 31 December
2009
Professional Regulation Commission
Manila
MS. MARICAR AGUINALDO PRC CASE No. 11
Vs
JOSEPH IGNACIO
POSITION PAPER
After due consideration of the evidence presented by both parties, the sex scandal video
that circulated to the public had caused irreparable damages to my client Maricar Aguinaldo, It
caused a great humiliation from the society, she being an actress in the local showbiz industry.
Needless to say is that it was really Dr. Joseph Ignacio who recorded the video and also the one
who caused the proliferation of the sex video involving him and the complainant Maricar
Aguinaldo.
The acts of the respondent Dr. Joseph Ignacio, a member of the Medical Profession is
immoral, unethical and thus warrants revocation of his license as a Medical Practitioner. The
respondent’s action has tainted the reputable name of Medical Profession. The commission
should be vigilant of the actions and behaviour of its members, to do otherwise is to degrade the
high standard of professionalism and the medical profession.
Drastic actions to regulate the unworthy members would be of paramount importance for
the improvement of the standard in the admission of the members of the Medical Profession.
Indeed, the acts of Dr. Ignacio against Ms. Aguinaldo proved that he was not worthy to be a
member of the Profession for only those with moral ethical personality fits the profession.
It is respectfully prayed for, that this honourable commission revoke the license of Dr.
Joseph Ignacio on the ground of immorality and unethical practice.
November 25, 2009 ATTY. ARIEL CO

Counsel for the Complainant
ROLL No., 2633
IBP No. 1234

Professional Regulation Commission
Manila
MS. MARICAR AGUINALDO PRC CASE No. 11
Vs
DR. JOSEPH IGNACIO
PRE TRIAL BRIEF
Comes now unto this honourable commission, the complainant thru counsel respectfully
submits:
I
That the complainant Maricar Aguinaldo is willing to enter to an amicable settlement

with the respondent Joseph Ignacio, in the further interest of justice.
II
STIPULATION OF FACTS
That it is of common knowledge that a sex scandal involving the complainant Maricar
Aguinaldo and the respondent Dr. Joseph Ignacio has been circulating in the public. Needless to
say, those acts committed by Dr. Ignacio is an immoral act and was unethical for he was a
member of the Medical Profession.
The acts of Dr. Joseph Ignacio in committing in recording their sexual acts is a
manifestation that he is unfit to be a member of the Medical Profession, for to do such acts is an
indication of one’s the mental status or sanity.
The sex video causes great humiliation to the complainant Maricar Aguinaldo, a showbiz
personality. Revocation of License of the respondent would somehow lessen if not totally
compensate the damages incurred by the complainant from the ruthless act by the respondent Dr.
Joseph Ignacio.
III
EVIDENCE TO BE PRESENTED
1. PRC License of Dr. Ignacio

- To show that Dr. Joseph Ignacio is a License Medical Doctor in the Philippines
2. Copy of the Sex Video involving Maricar Aguinaldo and Dr. Joseph Ignacio.
- To show the honourable commission the immoral and unethical act of Dr. Joseph
Ignacio.
3. Affidavit of Ms. Maricar Aguinaldo
- To establish the claim of Maricar Aguinaldo that she was not aware that such
sexual acts are being recorded by the respondent Dr. Joseph Ignacio.
IV
WITNESSES TO BE PRESENTED
1. Dr. Vic del Carmen

- Common friend of the respondent, Dr. Joseph Ignacio and the complainant,
Maricar Aguinaldo.
2. Polly Tagakla
- Talent manager of Maricar Aguinaldo
3. Edmond Magsanoc
- Personal Driver of Maricar Aguinaldo
4. Randie Obra
- Personal Driver of Dr. Joseph Ignacio
5. Vicky Belly
- Former girlfriend of Dr. Joseph Ignacio
November 25, 2009 ATTY. ARIEL CO
ROLL No., 2633
IBP No. 1234

Office of the President
HOUSING AND LAND USE REGULATORY BOARD
NHA Compound, Kalyaan Avenue
Diliman, Quezon City
Juan Dela Cruz

Complainant
-versus- HLURB Case NO. _______
New San Jose Builders

Respondent
X-----------------------------------X
COMPLAINT
Complainant, through the undersigned counsel, unto this Honorable Board respectfully avers
that:
1. Complainant, Juan Dela Cruz, is of legal age, presently residing at 123 ABC Street, Quezon City.
For the purpose of this complaint, he can be served with orders, resolutions or decision and
other processes of this Honorable Board.
2. Respondent NEW SAN JOSE BUILDERS, INC. is a domestic corporation duly organized and existing
under the laws of the Philippines with office address at 234 ASD St. Quezon City where it can be
served with summons and other processes of this Honorable Board.
3. Respondent entered into a Project Agreement with the GSIS to develop and construct “GSIS
METRO HOMES”, a residential and commercial Condominium Project, located at 345 FGH St. Sta.
Mesa Manila, owned and operated by GSIS.
4. Under the agreement the respondent is authorized to receive and acknowledge the purchase
price of the Condominium unit sold on Cash Basis and to remit to the GSIS its share of the selling
price.
5. Complaint applied for a unit on the said project. However the complaint did not have sufficient
money to cover the whole amount of the GSIS approved selling price and the total cost of the
subject condominium unit of Php 500,000.00 so they requested the respondent to accept the
payment on staggered basis, which the latter allowed.
6. Thus the complainant paid Php 10,000 as reservation fee covered by official receipt. Eventually
the complainant was required to sign a pro-forma Memoradum of Agreement relative to the sale
of the Condominium Unit.
7. Subject to the MOA the complaint religiously paid and complied with its obligation and has fully
paid the purchase price including its interest of the Condominium Unit as early as Novemenber
1999.
8. Despite the full payment of the purchase price the respondent failed to comply with its
obligation notwithstanding repeated demands.
9. The complainant requested the assistance of the GSIS, as the owner of the Condominium
Project. It was affirmed that despite full payment the respondent did not coordinate with the
GSIS and not remitted the purchase price to the GSIS.
10. GSIS tried to communicate with the respondent but the latter still refused to comply with its
obligation.
11. The above mentioned acts or omissions of the respondent are clear violations of the mutual
covenant as provided by the Memorandum of Agreement executed by the parties.
12. To date, respondent, despite repeated demands verbal and written has failed to fulfill its
obligations, prompting the undersigned counsel upon the instruction of the complainant to
institute instant complaint. For his professional services, complainant is obliged to pay an
attorney’s fees of not less than Php 50,000, for which the respondent should be held liable.
13. As proximate result of the respondent above mentioned act or omissions complaint suffered
sleepless nights, mental anguish, serious anxiety, and besmirched reputation, wounded feeling,
moral shock, and social humiliation, for which the respondent should be made to pay damages
in the sum of not less than Php 200,000.
14. To serve as a lesson for having acted in bad faith, wanton and reckless disregard of the
complainant’s right and as reminder that economic power of the developer will never justify
reckless disregard of the rights of others, an exemplary damages should be awarded in the
amount of Php 10,000.
RELIEF
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Board that after due proceedings,
judgment be rendered in favor of the compliant and against the respondent as follows:
1. Ordering the respondent to coordinate with the GSIS as regards the subject condominium unit
and remit to GSIS the amount corresponding its share on the selling price of the subject
Condominium Unit;
2. Ordering the respondent to prepare the corresponding and final DEED of Absolute Sale for the
execution of the herein parties and GSIS, as owner of the GSIS METRO HOMES particularly the
subject Condominium Unit;
3. Cancelling the License to Sell previously issued by this Honorable Board to respondent NEW SAN
JOSE BUIlDERS, INC;
4. Ordering the respondent to pay herein complainant the following:
a. Moral Damages in the amount of Php 200,000
b. Exemplary Damages in the amount of Php 100,000
c. Attorney’s fees in the amount of Php 50,000
d. Cost of suit.
Other reliefs just and equitable under the premise are likewise prayed for.
Quezon City, August 10, 2009
Atty. Juan Castillo

123 FGH St. Quezon City
Roll No. 12345
PTR No. 12345 June 25, 1999, Quezon City
IBP No. 12345 June 25, 1999 Quezon City
VERIFCATION AND CERTIFICATION
I, JUAN DELA CRUZ, of legal age, single, Filipino citizen, resident of 123 ABC Street, Quezon City
after having been duly sworn at in accordance with the law, hereby depose and state:
1. I am the complainant in the above mentioned case

2. I have cause the preparation of the and filing before this Honorable Board of the foregoing
complaint and the contents thereof are true and correct of my own knowledge and belief
and based on records at hand;
3. I hereby certify under oath that complainant has not commenced any other action involving
the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and to the best of my
knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein;
4. Hereby undertake that if I should thereafter learn that same or similar action or claim has
been filed or pending before any court, tribunal, or quasi-judicial agency I shall report that
fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court or agency wherein the original pleading and
sworn certification contemplated herein have been filed.
IN WITNESS WHEROF, I have hereunto affixed my signature this day of August 10, 2010.
JUAN DELS CRUZ

Affiant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this August 10, 2009 affiant exhibiting to me is driver’s
license NO. 12345.
ATTY. JOHN CASTRO

Notary Public
PTR No. 12345 Quezon City Jan 25, 1999
Roll No. 12345
IBP No. 12345
123 ASD St. Quezon City
Doc. No.
Page No.
Book No.
Series of 2010
HOUSING LAND USE REGULATORY BOARD
Quezon City
Nobio Sardinas ,
Plaintiff
-versus-
Juanito Sarmiento
Defendant
ANSWER
COMES NOW THE defendant in the above entitled case through undersigned counsel and to this
Honorable Court respectfully alleges:
1. That he admits paragraph 1 and 2 of the complaint
2. That he denies the allegations in paragraph 3 of the complaint as he has no knowledge of the
condominium buyer.
AS COUNTERCLAIM
3. That due to the filing of the entirely baseless and unjustified complaint without any valid cause of
action, defendant’s reputation was destroyed causing him sleepless nights and mental stress,
suffering mental and mental damages in an amount to be assessed by the Honorable Court;
4. That the defendant in order to defend himself from the unfounded suit had to engage the services
of counsel in the amount of P 40, 000.00.
VERIFICATION
JUANITO SARMIENTO, of legal age, after having been duly sworn, deposes and says: That he
is the defendant in the above-entitled case; that he caused the preparation of the above answer; and
that he has read the allegations thereof and the same is true and correct of his own knowledge;
WITNESS my hand this 27th day of November, 2009

JUANITO SARMIENTO
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 27th day of November, 2009 at Quezon City,
affiant exhibiting to me this Residence Certificate No. 634219 issued in Quezon City on November
15, 2009.
ATTY. MICHAEL FABUNAN
Notary Public
Until Dec. 31, 2009
June 30. 2009 at Pasig
PTR No. 64180 issued on
January 15, 2009
Doc. No 30
Page No. 8
Book no.3
Series of 2009

NHA Compound, Kalyaan Avenue
Juan Dela Cruz

Complainant
-versus- HLURB Case NO. _______

Respondent
X---------------------------------------------------X

Third- Party Complainant
-versus-
Government Service Insurance System

Third-Party Respondent
REPLY
(TO THE ANSWER to the THIRD-PARTY Complaint with Counter Claim)
RESPONDENT AND THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINANT (NSJBI), through counsel most respectfully

states:
1. The baseless and desperate denial of GSIS to comply with what is being legally mandated of it
fell short of any reasonable and legal argument to support its claims.
2. The Project Agreement entered into between the NSJBI and GSIS which covers the subject
property in dispute, clearly grants NSJBI the power to sell and dispose of the units constructed
therein to interested and prospective buyers. The aforesaid power and authority is embedded in
the Article IV of the Project Agreement which reads in this wise:
ARTICLE IV – Selling cost of the Condominium Units

4.01 The DEVELOPER commits, as it does hereby commits, to sell and market completed
condominium units as its own expense and account, at the following approved selling prices, to
wit:
XXX XXX XXX
3. Pursuant to the above mentioned provision , NSJBI entered into a Contract of Sale with herein
complainant with the belief that GSIS will release the title thereof to the buyer. However, GSIS
anchors its refusal on two grounds: the Loan Agreement between GISSI and NSJBI and the
refusal on termination of the Project Agreement.
4. The loan Agreement allows NSJBI to continue to sell the units used as collaterals. Indubitably,
when GSIS authorized NSJBI to sell the units automatically binds itself to release the titles
thereof after payment of the corresponding price of the unit. Settled is the rule that in
interpreting a contract, the intention of the parties should be taken into account.
5. Verily, it is the intention of GSIS and NSJBI that notwithstanding the existence of a loan
agreement, NSJBI would continue to sell the units mortgaged with the reciprocal obligation on
the part of GSIS to release the title on the subject unit upon payment of the mortgage amount
corresponding to it. If such was not the intention of the parties, the authority to sell would be
ineffective and useless. More importantly third persons, the buyers in this case, would certainly
be prejudiced.
6. O the other hand the contention of the GSIS that the Project Agreement was supplemented and
amended and later on terminated due to non-compliance of NSJBI does not have anything to do
with the issue in this case.
7. For one, the amendments being raised by GSIS pertain only to extension and duration of time for
the construction of the buildings and condominium units. Nowhere in said amendments contain
that the authority of NSJBI to sell the properties was revoked by GSIS.
8. In the same vein, the termination of the Project Agreement and the Loan Agreement took place
after the subject unit was sold to the complainant.
9. Perforce, based on the legal and factual background of this case, it is undeniable, that it is GSIS
who has an obligation to the complainant and not NSJBI.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, respondent and third-party complainant NSJBI, most respectfully prays that
judgment be rendered dismissing the instant complaint against NSJBI for utter lack of merit.
Other just and equitable relief are likewise prayed for.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED
March 30, 2009, Quezon City
ATTY. JOSE SAN JUAN

123 GHJ St. Quezon City
Roll No. 12345
Explanation
The foregoing Reply was filed with this Honorable Office and served upon the other party
through registered mail due to the distance and lack of office personnel.
Copy Furnished:
Atty. Juan Castillo

Atty. Carlos de Jesus

Counsel for the Third-Party Defendant
GSIS Headquarters, Financial Center
Roxas Blvd. Pasay City.
HOUSING LAND USE REGULATORY BOARD
Quezon City
SPOUSES MARCIAL SANTOS and ELIZABETH SANTOS,
Complainant
-versus- Case No. ____

SPOUSES TED AND ROBINA CAMAT, SPOUSES BERNARDO AND TRUDIS GARCIA, and
SPOUSES RODOLFO and ROSARIO ESPEJO,
Respondent
POSITION PAPER
FOR THE RESPONDENT
RESPONDENTS, through counsel, to this Honorable Office, most respectfully states:
This is a complaint for specific performance, declaration of nullity of the mortgage contract, damages or
in the alternative for sum of money and damages filed by complainant spouses Marcial Santos and
Elizabeth Santos against the respondents.
1. The lot in question is a 54-square meter lot with a two-storey townhouse, designated as
Townhouse No.8.
2. Townhouse No. 8 is located at No. 65 General Lim Street, Heroes Hill, Quezon City and is on a
portion of the land covered by TCT No. 195187
3. Respondent spouses Ted and Robina Camat (spouses Camat) bought Townhouse No.8 from
Trans-American Sales and Exposition represented by its developer Bernardo Garcia (Garcia) on
August 6 1988
4. Respondent spouses Camat paid Garcia P850,000 as evidenced by contract of sale and
provisional receipt. According to spouses Camat, they took possessions of townhouse No. 8 upon
its completion of its construction.
RE: SPOUSES MARCIAL SANTOS AND ELIZABETH VARGAS
5. In December of 1988, Garcia bought from Marcial and Elizabeth Santos (spouses Santos) various
constructions materials. As payment to spouses Santos, Garcia executed an absolute DEED of
Sale over townhouse No. 12. However, on 1 March 1990, spouses Santos and Garcia executed
DEED of Exchange with Addendum whereby spouses Santos transferred to Garcia townhouse
No. 12 , in exchange Garcia transferred to spouses Santos townhouse No.8
6. The contracts executed by Garcia with spouses Camat and spouses Santos were not registered
with the Register of Deeds. This was because TCT No. 195187 was still being reconstituted and it
was only on 17 August 1989 that TCT 7285 was issued in its stead.
7. On 10 May 1990, Garcia and his wife Trudis (spouses Garcia ) executed a Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage over townhouse No.8 in favor of spouses Rodolfo and Rosario Angeles Espejo
(spouses Espejo) as security.
8. As spouses Garcia failed to pay their indebtedness, spouses Espejo foreclosed the mortgage on 12
October 1990. At the public auction, spouses Espejo were the highest bidder.
ISSUE
Whether or not the complainant has the right over the property.
ARGUMENTS AND DISCUSSION
As between spouses Camat and spouses Santos, spouses Camat have a better right to the property.
Neither of the sales were registered, spouses Camat have a better right being the first possessor in
good faith.
The registration of the mortgage cannot defeat the right of spouses Camat since the mortgage was
executed by one who was no longer owner of the property. Spouses Espejo failed to prove that they
were mortgagees in good faith.
The respondents contend that the HLURB has no jurisdiction over cases involving the declaration of
nullity of a mortgage contract filed against the mortgagee alone; and (2) Section 18 of Presidential
Decree No. 957 (PD 957) merely requires the project owner or developer to seek prior authority from
NHA before mortgaging the subdivision lot or condominium unit but the law does not grant the
HLURB the authority to invalidate the mortgage contract if the requisite authority from NHA is not
obtained.
Based on the foregoing factual statements, it is very clear that respondent have a better right over the
property as being the first possessor in good faith.
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that the instant complaint be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction.
Quezon City, November 26, 2009
by: ATTY. KAREN GAVINO
Counsel for Respondent

P.T.R. No. 6391/ issued at Quezon City
On February 6, 2009
IBP No. 93847/ February 6, 2009
Quezon City
VERIFICATION
TED AND ROBINA CAMAT, of legal age, after having been duly sworn, depose and say: That they are
the respondent in the above-entitled case; that they caused the preparation of the above position paper;
that the allegations are true and correct of their own knowledge;
WITNESS my hand this 26th day of November, 2009
TED AND ROBINA CAMAT
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 27 th day of November 2009 at Quezon City,
affiant exhibiting to me Residence Certificate No. 947267 issued in Quezon City on November 20, 2009.
ATTY. MICHELLE PAJE
Notary Public
Until Dec. 31, 2009
February 6, 2009 at Quezon City
PTR No. 6931 issued on
February 6 at Quezon City

Doc. No. 125
Page No. 3
Book No. 6
Series of 2009

Kalayaan Avenue Corner Mayaman Street


MALACAÑANG PALACE
MANILA
JUAN DELA CRUZ
Complainants,
-versus- HLURB CASE NO._______
NEW SAN JOSE BUILDERS, INC., Represented by its

President, REY VERGARA and the GOVERNMENT SERVICE
INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS),
Respondents.
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
NOTICE OF APPEAL
RESPONDENT GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS), by counsel, respectfully gives
notice that it is appealing to the Office of the President the Decision dated 30 July 2009 of the Third
Division, Board of Commissioners, Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) in HLURB Case
No.________ entitled “Juan dela Cruz vs. New San Jose Biulders Inc. represented by its President Rey
Vergara and the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS)”, denying the separate appeals filed by
respondent GSIS and respondent NSJBI.
A copy of the decision of the Third Division, Board of Commissioners, Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB) was received by respondent GSIS on 11 September 2009.
Pasay City for Manila, 14 September 2009.
Atty. Carlos de Jesus

Counsel for the Third-Party Defendant
GSIS Headquarters, Financial Center
Roxas Blvd. Pasay City.
Roll No. 12345
EXPLANATION
In compliance with Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, as amended, counsel respectfully
manifests that service of the foregoing Notice of Appeal was done by registered mail, personal service
not being practicable due to distance, time and personnel constraints.
COPY FURNISHED:
Atty. Juan Castillo

Atty. Jose San Juan

123 GHJ St. Quezon City
Ms. Editha U. Barrameda
Regional Officer, ENCRFO
HLURB, Kalayaan Ave., cor.
Mayaman St., Diliman
Quezon City

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Arellano University School of Law

JUDICIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE FORMS

Advanced Legal Writing Class

Mondays 4:30 – 7:30 PM

Atty. Porfirio DG Panganiban, Jr.

Justiniano G. Quiza, Jr.

For Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Damage to Property

For Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Serious Physical Injuries

Motion for Clarificatory Questions

 Motion For the Allowance to Post Bail

 Motion For Reconsideration (Prosecutor’s Resolution)

Pre Trial Brief

 For Specific Performance With Damages

 Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer and/or Responsive Pleading

 Answer with Affirmative Defenses

 Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim

Pre Trial Brief

Arbitration – Compromise Agreement

Motion for Written Interrogatories

Motion for Deposition of Witness

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS AND PROVISIONAL REMEDIES

1. Complaint for Interpleader

1. Petition for Habeas Corpus

NLRC Rules and Procedures

PROFESSIONAL REGULATORY COMMISSIONN PROCEEDINGS

PRC Rules of Procedure

HOUSING LAND USE REGULATORY BOARD PROCEEDINGS

HLURB Rules of Procedure

Manila, October 26, 2009.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me on October 27, 2009 affiant exhibiting to

Witness my hand and seal.

ATTY. ADORA MENDOZA

1. I am the respondent in the above-captioned case;

6. Finally, therefore, it cannot be said that I violated B.P. 22.

30 October 2009, Manila.

ATTY. ROSE ANGEL

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto affixed my signature this 10th day of

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 10 th day of November, 2009. I hereby

MARK ANTHONY D. SANTOS

- Versus - I.S. NO. 09-54225

3. Indeed, the Complainant approached me reminding me of the payment to the loan

20 November 2009, Manila.

MARK ANTHONY D. SANTOS

- Versus - I.S. No. 09-54225

Comes Now, COMPLAINANT KRISTEN REYES, unto this honourable office,

1. I am the complainant in the above-captioned case;

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto affix my signature this 25 th day of November,

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 25 th day of November, 2009 in Makati

MARK ANTHONY D. SANTOS

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

- Versus - CRIM. CASE NO. 12345

CHECK NO. : 05100610

MARK ANTHONY D. SANTOS

MARK ANTHONY D. SANTOS

BAIL NOT REQUIRED

6. I am executing this Complaint-affidavit for the purpose of filing a criminal case

MARIE ANTOINETTE CARPIO

Doc. No. ___________

8. That I am executing this counter-affidavit to deny the allegations pointing to my

MARIE ANTOINETTE CARPIO

Doc. No. ________;

1. That I am reiterating my allegation in my affidavit that JOSE DE JESUS deceived

MARIE ANTOINETTE CARPIO