NAGUIAT vs NLRC
SFNEI has nothing
Sergio Naguiat was the president of Clark Field Taxi, Inc. (CFTI) which
supplied taxi services to Clark Air Base. At the same time, Naguiat was a
director of the Sergio F. Naguiat Enterprises, Inc. (SFNEI), their family owned
corporation along with CFTI.
In 1991, CFTI had to close due to “great financial losses and lost business
opportunity” resulting from the phase-out of Clark Air Base brought about by
the Mt. Pinatubo eruption and the expiration of the RP-US military bases
agreement.
CFTI then came up with an agreement with the drivers that the latter be entitled
to a separation pay in the amount of P500.00 per every year of service. Most of
the drivers accepted this but some drivers did not. The drivers who refused to
accept the separation pay offered by CFTI instead sued the latter before the labor
arbiter.
The labor arbiter ruled in favor of the taxi drivers. The National Labor Relations
Commission affirmed the labor arbiter. It was established that when CFTI
closed, it was in profitable standing and was not incurring losses. It ruled that the
drivers are entitled to $120.00 per every year of service subject to exchange rates
prevailing that time.
The NLRC likewise ruled that SFNEI as well as CFTI’s president and vice
president Sergio Naguiat and Antolin Naguiat should be held jointly and
severally liable to pay the drivers. The NLRC ruled that SFNEI actively
managed CFTI and its business affairs hence it acted as the employer of the
drivers.
ISSUE: Whether or not the ruling of the NLRC is correct.
HELD: It is only partially correct.
1. It is correct when it ruled that the Sergio Naguiat is jointly and
severally liable to pay the drivers the award of separation pay in the
amount so determined. As president of CFTI, Sergio Naguiat is
considered an “employer” of the dismissed employees who is therefore
liable for the obligations of the corporation to its dismissed employees.
Moreover, CFTI, being a close family corporation, is liable for
corporate torts and stockholders thereof shall be personally liable for
corporate torts unless the corporation has obtained reasonably adequate
liability insurance (par. 5, Section 100, “Close Corporations”,
Corporation Code). Antolin Naguiat is absolved because there was
insufficient evidence as against him.
Page 1 of 53
2. SFNEI is not liable jointly or severally with CFTI.
to do with CFTI. There is no sufficient evidence to prove that it actively
managed CFTI especially so when even the drivers testified that their
employer is CFTI and that their payroll comes from CFTI. Further,
SFNEI was into trading business while CFTI was into taxi services.
Petitioner CFTI held a concessionaire's contract with the Army Air Force
Exchange Services ("AAFES") for the operation of taxi services within Clark
Air Base. Sergio F. Naguiat was CFTI's president, while Antolin T. Naguiat was
its vice-president. Like Sergio F. Naguiat Enterprises, Incorporated ("Naguiat
Enterprises"), a trading firm, it was a family-owned corporation.
Individual respondents were previously employed by CFTI as taxicab drivers.
During their employment, they were required to pay a daily "boundary fee" in
the amount of US$26.50 for those working from 1:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon, and
US$27.00 for those working from 12:00 noon to 12:00 midnight. All incidental
expenses for the maintenance of the vehicles they were driving were accounted
against them, including gasoline expenses.
The drivers worked at least three to four times a week, depending on the
availability of taxicabs. They earned not less than US$15.00 daily.
In excess of that amount, however, they were required to make cash deposits to
the company, which they could later withdraw every fifteen days.
Due to the phase-out of the US military bases in the Philippines, from which
Clark Air Base was not spared, the AAFES was dissolved, and the services of
individual respondents were officially terminated on November 26, 1991.
The AAFES Taxi Drivers Association ("drivers' union"), through its local
president, Eduardo Castillo, and CFTI held negotiations as regards separation
benefits that should be awarded in favor of the drivers. They arrived at an
agreement that the separated drivers will be given P500.00 for every year of
service as severance pay. Most of the drivers accepted said amount in December
1991 and January 1992. However, individual respondents herein refused to
accept theirs.
Instead, after disaffiliating themselves from the drivers' union, individual
respondents, through the National Organization of Workingmen ("NOWM"), a
labor organization which they subsequently joined, filed a complaint5against
"Sergio F. Naguiat doing business under the name and style Sergio F. Naguiat
Enterprises, Inc., Army-Air Force Exchange Services (AAFES) with Mark
Hooper as Area Service Manager, Pacific Region, and AAFES Taxi Drivers
Association with Eduardo Castillo as President," for payment of separation pay
due to termination/phase-out. Said complaint was later amended6 to include
additional taxi drivers who were similarly situated as complainants, and CFTI
with Antolin T. Naguiat as vice president and general manager, as party
respondent.
In their complaint, herein private respondents alleged that they were regular
employees of Naguiat Enterprises, although their individual applications for
employment were approved by CFTI. They claimed to have been assigned to
Naguiat Enterprises after having been hired by CFTI, and that the former thence
managed, controlled and supervised their employment. They averred further that
they were entitled to separation pay based on their latest daily earnings of
US$15.00 for working sixteen (16) days a month.
In their position paper submitted to the labor arbiter, herein petitioners claimed
that the cessation of business of CFTI on November 26, 1991, was due to "great
financial losses and lost business opportunity" resulting from the phase-out of
Clark Air Base brought about by the Mt. Pinatubo eruption and the expiration of
the RP-US military bases agreement. They admitted that CFTI had agreed with
the drivers' union, through its President Eduardo Castillo who claimed to have
had blanket authority to negotiate with CFTI in behalf of union members, to
grant its taxi driver-employees separation pay equivalent to P500.00 for every
year of service.
The labor arbiter, finding the individual complainants to be regular workers of
CFTI, ordered the latter to pay them P1,200.00 for every year of service "for
humanitarian consideration," setting aside the earlier agreement between CFTI
and the drivers' union of P500.00 for every year of service. The labor arbiter
rejected the allegation of CFTI that it was forced to close business due to "great
financial losses and lost business opportunity" since, at the time it ceased
operations, CFTI was profitably earning and the cessation of its business was
due to the untimely closure of Clark Air Base. In not awarding separation pay in
accordance with the Labor Code, the labor arbiter explained:
To allow respondents exemption from its (sic) obligation to pay separation pay
would be inhuman to complainants but to impose a monetary obligation to an
employer whose profitable business was abruptly shot (sic) down by force
majeure would be unfair and unjust to say the least.7
and thus, simply awarded an amount for "humanitarian consideration."
Herein individual private respondents appealed to the NLRC. In its Resolution,
the NLRC modified the decision of the labor arbiter by granting separation pay
Page 2 of 53
to the private respondents. The concluding paragraphs of the NLRC Resolution
read:
The contention of complainant is partly correct. One-half month salary should be
US$120.00 but this amount can not be paid to the complainant in U.S. Dollar
which is not the legal tender in the Philippines. Paras, in commenting on Art.
1249 of the New Civil Code, defines legal tender as "that which a debtor may
compel a creditor to accept in payment of the debt. The complainants who are
the creditors in this instance can be compelled to accept the Philippine peso
which is the legal tender, in which case, the table of conversion (exchange rate)
at the time of payment or satisfaction of the judgment should be used. However,
since the choice is left to the debtor, (respondents) they may choose to pay in US
dollar." (Phoenix Assurance Co. vs. Macondray & Co. Inc., L-25048, May 13,
1975)
In discharging the above obligations, Sergio F. Naguiat Enterprises, which is
headed by Sergio F. Naguiat and Antolin Naguiat, father and son at the same
time the President and Vice-President and General Manager, respectively, should
be joined as indispensable party whose liability is joint and several. (Sec. 7, Rule
3, Rules of Court)8
As mentioned earlier, the motion for reconsideration of herein petitioners was
denied by the NLRC. Hence, this petition with prayer for issuance of a
temporary restraining order. Upon posting by the petitioners of a surety bond, a
temporary restraining order9 was issued by this Court enjoining execution of the
assailed Resolutions.
VINZONS-CHATO vs FORTUNE
FACTS:
This is a case for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code filed by Fortune
against Liwayway as CIR.
On June 10, 1993, the legislature enacted RA 7654, which provided that locally
manufactured cigarettes which are currently classified and taxed at 55% shall be
charged an ad valorem tax of “55% provided that the maximum tax shall not be
less than Five Pesos per pack.” Prior to effectivity of RA 7654, Liwayway issued
a rule, reclassifying “Champion,” “Hope,” and “More” (all manufactured by
Fortune) as locally manufactured cigarettes bearing foreign brand subject to the
55% ad valorem tax. Thus, when RA 7654 was passed, these cigarette brands
were already covered.
In a case filed against Liwayway with the RTC, Fortune contended that the
issuance of the rule violated its constitutional right against deprivation of
property without due process of law and the right to equal protection of the laws.
For her part, Liwayway contended in her motion to dismiss that respondent has
no cause of action against her because she issued RMC 37-93 in the performance
of her official function and within the scope of her authority. She claimed that
she acted merely as an agent of the Republic and therefore the latter is the one
responsible for her acts. She also contended that the complaint states no cause of
action for lack of allegation of malice or bad faith.
The order denying the motion to dismiss was elevated to the CA, who dismissed
the case on the ground that under Article 32, liability may arise even if the
defendant did not act with malice or bad faith.
Hence this appeal.
ISSUES:
◦ Whether or not a public officer may be validly sued in his/her
private capacity for acts done in connection with the discharge of
the functions of his/her office
◦ Whether or not Article 32, NCC, should be applied instead of Sec.
38, Book I, Administrative Code
HELD:
On the first issue, the general rule is that a public officer is not liable for
damages which a person may suffer arising from the just performance of his
official duties and within the scope of his assigned tasks. An officer who acts
within his authority to administer the affairs of the office which he/she heads is
not liable for damages that may have been caused to another, as it would
virtually be a charge against the Republic, which is not amenable to judgment
for monetary claims without its consent. However, a public officer is by law not
immune from damages in his/her personal capacity for acts done in bad faith
which, being outside the scope of his authority, are no longer protected by the
mantle of immunity for official actions.
Specifically, under Sec. 38, Book I, Administrative Code, civil liability may arise
where there is bad faith, malice, or gross negligence on the part of a superior
public officer. And, under Sec. 39 of the same Book, civil liability may arise
where the subordinate public officer’s act is characterized by willfulness or
negligence. In Cojuangco, Jr. V. CA, a public officer who directly or indirectly
violates the constitutional rights of another, may be validly sued for damages
Page 3 of 53
under Article 32 of the Civil Code even if his acts were not so tainted with
malice or bad faith.
Thus, the rule in this jurisdiction is that a public officer may be validly sued in
his/her private capacity for acts done in the course of the performance of the
functions of the office, where said public officer: (1) acted with malice, bad
faith, or negligence; or (2) where the public officer violated a constitutional right
of the plaintiff.
On the second issue, SC ruled that the decisive provision is Article 32, it being a
special law, which prevails over a general law (the Administrative Code).
Article 32 was patterned after the “tort” in American law. A tort is a wrong, a
tortious act which has been defined as the commission or omission of an act by
one, without right, whereby another receives some injury, directly or indirectly,
in person, property or reputation. There are cases in which it has been stated that
civil liability in tort is determined by the conduct and not by the mental state of
the tortfeasor, and there are circumstances under which the motive of the
defendant has been rendered immaterial. The reason sometimes given for the
rule is that otherwise, the mental attitude of the alleged wrongdoer, and not the
act itself, would determine whether the act was wrongful. Presence of good
motive, or rather, the absence of an evil motive, does not render lawful an act
which is otherwise an invasion of another’s legal right; that is, liability in tort in
not precluded by the fact that defendant acted without evil intent.
Petitioner assails the May 7, 1999 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 47167, which affirmed the September 29, 1997 Order2 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Marikina, Branch 272, in Civil Case No. 97-341-MK,
denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss. The complaint filed by respondent
sought to recover damages for the alleged violation of its constitutional rights
arising from petitioner’s issuance of Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 37-93
(RMC 37-93), which the Court declared invalid in Commissioner of Internal
Revenue v. Court of Appeals.3
Petitioner Liwayway Vinzons-Chato was then the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue while respondent Fortune Tobacco Corporation is an entity engaged in
the manufacture of different brands of cigarettes, among which are "Champion,"
"Hope," and "More" cigarettes.
On June 10, 1993, the legislature enacted Republic Act No. 7654 (RA 7654),
which took effect on July 3, 1993. Prior to its effectivity, cigarette brands
‘Champion," "Hope," and "More" were considered local brands subjected to an
ad valorem tax at the rate of 20-45%. However, on July 1, 1993, or two days
before RA 7654 took effect, petitioner issued RMC 37-93 reclassifying
"Champion," "Hope," and "More" as locally manufactured cigarettes bearing a
foreign brand subject to the 55% ad valorem tax.4 RMC 37-93 in effect
subjected "Hope," "More," and "Champion" cigarettes to the provisions of RA
7654, specifically, to Sec. 142,5 (c)(1) on locally manufactured cigarettes which
are currently classified and taxed at 55%, and which imposes
an ad valorem tax of "55% provided that the minimum tax shall not be less than
Five Pesos (P5.00) per pack."6
On July 2, 1993, at about 5:50 p.m., BIR Deputy Commissioner Victor A.
Deoferio, Jr. sent via telefax a copy of RMC 37-93 to Fortune Tobacco but it was
addressed to no one in particular. On July 15, 1993, Fortune Tobacco received,
by ordinary mail, a certified xerox copy of RMC 37-93. On July 20, 1993,
respondent filed a motion for reconsideration requesting the recall of RMC
37-93, but was denied in a letter dated July 30, 1993.7 The same letter assessed
respondent for ad valorem tax deficiency amounting to P9,598,334.00
(computed on the basis of RMC 37-93) and demanded payment within 10 days
from receipt thereof.8 On August 3, 1993, respondent filed a petition for review
with the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), which on September 30, 1993, issued an
injunction enjoining the implementation of RMC 37-93.9 In its decision dated
August 10, 1994, the CTA ruled that RMC 37-93 is defective, invalid, and
unenforceable and further enjoined petitioner from collecting the deficiency tax
assessment issued pursuant to RMC No. 37-93. This ruling was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, and finally by this Court in Commissioner of Internal Revenue
v. Court of Appeals.10 It was held, among others, that RMC 37-93, has fallen
short of the requirements for a valid administrative issuance.
On April 10, 1997, respondent filed before the RTC a complaint11 for damages
against petitioner in her private capacity. Respondent contended that the latter
should be held liable for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code considering
that the issuance of RMC 37-93 violated its constitutional right against
deprivation of property without due process of law and the right to equal
protection of the laws.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss12 contending that: (1) respondent has no
cause of action against her because she issued RMC 37-93 in the performance of
her official function and within the scope of her authority. She claimed that she
acted merely as an agent of the Republic and therefore the latter is the one
responsible for her acts; (2) the complaint states no cause of action for lack of
allegation of malice or bad faith; and (3) the certification against forum shopping
was signed by respondent’s counsel in violation of the rule that it is the plaintiff
or the principal party who should sign the same.
On September 29, 1997, the RTC denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss holding
that to rule on the allegations of petitioner would be to prematurely decide the
merits of the case without allowing the parties to present evidence. It further held
Page 4 of 53
that the defect in the certification against forum shopping was cured by
respondent’s submission of the corporate secretary’s certificate authorizing its
counsel to execute the certification against forum shopping. The dispositive
portion thereof, states:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the motion to dismiss filed by
the defendant Liwayway Vinzons-Chato and the motion to strike out and
expunge from the record the said motion to dismiss filed by plaintiff Fortune
Tobacco Corporation are both denied on the grounds aforecited. The defendant is
ordered to file her answer to the complaint within ten (10) days from receipt of
this Order.
SO ORDERED.13
The case was elevated to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65. However, same was dismissed on the ground that under Article 32 of
the Civil Code, liability may arise even if the defendant did not act with malice
or bad faith. The appellate court ratiocinated that Section 38, Book I of the
Administrative Code is the general law on the civil liability of public officers
while Article 32 of the Civil Code is the special law that governs the instant
case. Consequently, malice or bad faith need not be alleged in the complaint for
damages. It also sustained the ruling of the RTC that the defect of the
certification against forum shopping was cured by the submission of the
corporate secretary’s certificate giving authority to its counsel to execute the
same.
Undaunted, petitioner filed the instant recourse contending that the suit is
grounded on her acts done in the performance of her functions as a public
officer, hence, it is Section 38, Book I of the Administrative Code which should
be applied. Under this provision, liability will attach only when there is a clear
showing of bad faith, malice, or gross negligence. She further averred that the
Civil Code, specifically, Article 32 which allows recovery of damages for
violation of constitutional rights, is a general law on the liability of public
officers; while Section 38, Book I of the Administrative Code is a special law on
the superior public officers’ liability, such that, if the complaint, as in the instant
case, does not allege bad faith, malice, or gross negligence, the same is
dismissible for failure to state a cause of action. As to the defect of the
certification against forum shopping, she urged the Court to strictly construe the
rules and to dismiss the complaint.
Conversely, respondent argued that Section 38 which treats in general the public
officers’ "acts" from which civil liability may arise, is a general law; while
Article 32 which deals specifically with the public officers’ violation of
constitutional rights, is a special provision which should determine whether the
complaint states a cause of action or not. Citing the case of Lim v. Ponce de
Leon,14 respondent alleged that under Article 32 of the Civil Code, it is enough
that there was a violation of the constitutional rights of the plaintiff and it is not
required that said public officer should have acted with malice or in bad faith.
Hence, it concluded that even granting that the complaint failed to allege bad
faith or malice, the motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action should
be denied inasmuch as bad faith or malice are not necessary to hold petitioner
liable.
The issues for resolution are as follows:
(1) May a public officer be validly sued in his/her private capacity for acts done
in connection with the discharge of the functions of his/her office?
(2) Which as between Article 32 of the Civil Code and Section 38, Book I of the
Administrative Code should govern in determining whether the instant
complaint states a cause of action?
(3) Should the complaint be dismissed for failure to comply with the rule on
certification against forum shopping?
(4) May petitioner be held liable for damages?
On the first issue, the general rule is that a public officer is not liable for
damages which a person may suffer arising from the just performance of his
official duties and within the scope of his assigned tasks.15 An officer who acts
within his authority to administer the affairs of the office which he/she heads is
not liable for damages that may have been caused to another, as it would
virtually be a charge against the Republic, which is not amenable to judgment
for monetary claims without its consent.16 However, a public officer is by law
not immune from damages in his/her personal capacity for acts done in bad faith
which, being outside the scope of his authority, are no longer protected by the
mantle of immunity for official actions.17
Specifically, under Section 38, Book I of the Administrative Code, civil liability
may arise where there is bad faith, malice, or gross negligence on the part of a
superior public officer. And, under Section 39 of the same Book, civil liability
may arise where the subordinate public officer’s act is characterized by
willfulness or negligence. Thus –
Sec. 38. Liability of Superior Officers. – (1) A public officer shall not be civilly
liable for acts done in the performance of his official duties, unless there is a
clear showing of bad faith, malice or gross negligence.
Page 5 of 53
xxxx
Section 39. Liability of Subordinate Officers. – No subordinate officer or
employee shall be civilly liable for acts done by him in good faith in the
performance of his duties. However, he shall be liable for willful or negligent
acts done by him which are contrary to law, morals, public policy and good
customs even if he acts under orders or instructions of his superior.
In addition, the Court held in Cojuangco, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,18 that a public
officer who directly or indirectly violates the constitutional rights of another,
may be validly sued for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code even if his
acts were not so tainted with malice or bad faith.
Thus, the rule in this jurisdiction is that a public officer may be validly sued in
his/her private capacity for acts done in the course of the performance of the
functions of the office, where said public officer: (1) acted with malice, bad
faith, or negligence; or (2) where the public officer violated a constitutional right
of the plaintiff.
Anent the second issue, we hold that the complaint filed by respondent stated a
cause of action and that the decisive provision thereon is Article 32 of the Civil
Code.
A general statute is one which embraces a class of subjects or places and does
not omit any subject or place naturally belonging to such class. A special statute,
as the term is generally understood, is one which relates to particular persons or
things of a class or to a particular portion or section of the state only.19
A general law and a special law on the same subject are statutes in pari
materia and should, accordingly, be read together and harmonized, if possible,
with a view to giving effect to both. The rule is that where there are two acts, one
of which is special and particular and the other general which, if standing alone,
would include the same matter and thus conflict with the special act, the special
law must prevail since it evinces the legislative intent more clearly than that of a
general statute and must not be taken as intended to affect the more particular
and specific provisions of the earlier act, unless it is absolutely necessary so to
construe it in order to give its words any meaning at all.20
The circumstance that the special law is passed before or after the general act
does not change the principle. Where the special law is later, it will be regarded
as an exception to, or a qualification of, the prior general act; and where the
general act is later, the special statute will be construed as remaining an
exception to its terms, unless repealed expressly or by necessary implication.21
Thus, in City of Manila v. Teotico,22 the Court held that Article 2189 of the Civil
Code which holds provinces, cities, and municipalities civilly liable for death or
injuries by reason of defective conditions of roads and other public works, is a
special provision and should prevail over Section 4 of Republic Act No. 409, the
Charter of Manila, in determining the liability for defective street conditions.
Under said Charter, the city shall not be held for damages or injuries arising
from the failure of the local officials to enforce the provision of the charter, law,
or ordinance, or from negligence while enforcing or attempting to enforce the
same. As explained by the Court:
Manila maintains that the former provision should prevail over the latter,
because Republic Act 409 is a special law, intended exclusively for the City of
Manila, whereas the Civil Code is a general law, applicable to the entire
Philippines.
The Court of Appeals, however, applied the Civil Code, and, we think, correctly.
It is true that, insofar as its territorial application is concerned, Republic Act No.
409 is a special law and the Civil Code a general legislation; but, as regards the
subject matter of the provisions above quoted, Section 4 of Republic Act 409
establishes a general rule regulating the liability of the City of Manila for
"damages or injury to persons or property arising from the failure of" city
officers "to enforce the provisions of" said Act "or any other law or ordinance, or
from negligence" of the city "Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officers while
enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions." Upon the other hand, Article
2189 of the Civil Code constitutes a particular prescription making "provinces,
cities and municipalities . . . liable for damages for the death of, or injury
suffered by, any person by reason" — specifically — "of the defective condition
of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their
control or supervision." In other words, said section 4 refers to liability
arising from negligence, in general, regardless of the object thereof, whereas
Article 2189 governs liability due to "defective streets," in particular. Since
the present action is based upon the alleged defective condition of a road,
said Article 2189 is decisive thereon.23
In the case of Bagatsing v. Ramirez,24
the issue was which law should govern the
publication of a tax ordinance, the City Charter of Manila, a special act which
treats ordinances in general and which requires their publication before
enactment and after approval, or the Tax Code, a general law, which deals in
particular with "ordinances levying or imposing taxes, fees or other charges,"
and which demands publication only after approval. In holding that it is the Tax
Code which should prevail, the Court elucidated that:
There is no question that the Revised Charter of the City of Manila is a special
act since it relates only to the City of Manila, whereas the Local Tax Code is a
Page 6 of 53
general law because it applies universally to all local governments. Blackstone
defines general law as a universal rule affecting the entire community and
special law as one relating to particular persons or things of a class. And the rule
commonly said is that a prior special law is not ordinarily repealed by a
subsequent general law. The fact that one is special and the other general creates
a presumption that the special is to be considered as remaining an exception of
the general, one as a general law of the land, the other as the law of a particular
case. However, the rule readily yields to a situation where the special statute
refers to a subject in general, which the general statute treats in particular.
Th[is] exactly is the circumstance obtaining in the case at bar. Section 17 of
the Revised Charter of the City of Manila speaks of "ordinance" in general,
i.e., irrespective of the nature and scope thereof, whereas, Section 43 of the
Local Tax Code relates to "ordinances levying or imposing taxes, fees or
other charges" in particular. In regard, therefore, to ordinances in general,
the Revised Charter of the City of Manila is doubtless dominant, but, that
dominant force loses its continuity when it approaches the realm of
"ordinances levying or imposing taxes, fees or other charges" in particular.
There, the Local Tax Code controls. Here, as always, a general provision must
give way to a particular provision. Special provision governs.
Let us examine the provisions involved in the case at bar. Article 32 of the Civil
Code provides:
ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly
or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates, or in any manner impedes or impairs
any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the
latter for damages:
xxxx
(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;
xxxx
(8) The right to the equal protection of the laws;
xxxx
The rationale for its enactment was explained by Dean Bocobo of the Code
Commission, as follows:
"DEAN BOCOBO. Article 32, regarding individual rights, Attorney Cirilo
Paredes proposes that Article 32 be so amended as to make a public official
liable for violation of another person’s constitutional rights only if the public
official acted maliciously or in bad faith. The Code Commission opposes this
suggestion for these reasons:
"The very nature of Article 32 is that the wrong may be civil or criminal. It is not
necessary therefore that there should be malice or bad faith. To make such a
requisite would defeat the main purpose of Article 32 which is the effective
protection of individual rights. Public officials in the past have abused their
powers on the pretext of justifiable motives or good faith in the performance of
their duties. Precisely, the object of the Article is to put an end to official abuse
by the plea of good faith. In the United States this remedy is in the nature of a
tort.
"Mr. Chairman, this article is firmly one of the fundamental articles introduced
in the New Civil Code to implement democracy. There is no real democracy if a
public official is abusing and we made the article so strong and so
comprehensive that it concludes an abuse of individual rights even if done in
good faith, that official is liable. As a matter of fact, we know that there are very
few public officials who openly and definitely abuse the individual rights of the
citizens. In most cases, the abuse is justified on a plea of desire to enforce the
law to comply with one’s duty. And so, if we should limit the scope of this
article, that would practically nullify the object of the article. Precisely, the
opening object of the article is to put an end to abuses which are justified by a
plea of good faith, which is in most cases the plea of officials abusing individual
rights."25
The Code Commission deemed it necessary to hold not only public officers but
also private individuals civilly liable for violation of the rights enumerated in
Article 32 of the Civil Code. It is not necessary that the defendant under this
Article should have acted with malice or bad faith, otherwise, it would defeat its
main purpose, which is the effective protection of individual rights. It suffices
that there is a violation of the constitutional right of the plaintiff.26
Article 32 was patterned after the "tort" in American law.27 A tort is a wrong, a
tortious act which has been defined as the commission or omission of an act by
one, without right, whereby another receives some injury, directly or indirectly,
in person, property, or reputation.28 There are cases in which it has been stated
that civil liability in tort is determined by the conduct and not by the mental state
of the tortfeasor, and there are circumstances under which the motive of the
defendant has been rendered immaterial. The reason sometimes given for the
rule is that otherwise, the mental attitude of the alleged wrongdoer, and not the
act itself, would determine whether the act was wrongful.29 Presence of good
motive, or rather, the absence of an evil motive, does not render lawful an act
Page 7 of 53
which is otherwise an invasion of another’s legal right; that is, liability in tort is
not precluded by the fact that defendant acted without evil intent.30
The clear intention therefore of the legislature was to create a distinct cause of
action in the nature of tort for violation of constitutional rights, irrespective of
the motive or intent of the defendant.31 This is a fundamental innovation in the
Civil Code, and in enacting the Administrative Code pursuant to the exercise of
legislative powers, then President Corazon C. Aquino, could not have intended
to obliterate this constitutional protection on civil liberties.
In Aberca v. Ver,32 it was held that with the enactment of Article 32, the principle
of accountability of public officials under the Constitution acquires added
meaning and assumes a larger dimension. No longer may a superior official relax
his vigilance or abdicate his duty to supervise his subordinates, secure in the
thought that he does not have to answer for the transgressions committed by the
latter against the constitutionally protected rights and liberties of the citizen. Part
of the factors that propelled people power in February 1986 was the widely held
perception that the government was callous or indifferent to, if not actually
responsible for, the rampant violations of human rights. While it would certainly
be too naive to expect that violators of human rights would easily be deterred by
the prospect of facing damage suits, it should nonetheless be made clear in no
uncertain terms that Article 32 of the Civil Code makes the persons who are
directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for the transgression, joint tortfeasors.
On the other hand, Sections 38 and 39, Book I of the Administrative Code, laid
down the rule on the civil liability of superior and subordinate public officers for
acts done in the performance of their duties. For both superior and subordinate
public officers, the presence of bad faith, malice, and negligence are vital
elements that will make them liable for damages. Note that while said provisions
deal in particular with the liability of government officials, the subject thereof is
general, i.e., "acts" done in the performance of official duties, without specifying
the action or omission that may give rise to a civil suit against the official
concerned.
Contrarily, Article 32 of the Civil Code specifies in clear and unequivocal terms
a particular specie of an "act" that may give rise to an action for damages against
a public officer, and that is, a tort for impairment of rights and liberties. Indeed,
Article 32 is the special provision that deals specifically with violation of
constitutional rights by public officers. All other actionable acts of public
officers are governed by Sections 38 and 39 of the Administrative Code. While
the Civil Code, specifically, the Chapter on Human Relations is a general law,
Article 32 of the same Chapter is a special and specific provision that holds a
public officer liable for and allows redress from a particular class of wrongful
acts that may be committed by public officers. Compared thus with Section 38 of
the Administrative Code, which broadly deals with civil liability arising from
errors in the performance of duties, Article 32 of the Civil Code is the specific
provision which must be applied in the instant case precisely filed to seek
damages for violation of constitutional rights.
The complaint in the instant case was brought under Article 32 of the Civil
Code. Considering that bad faith and malice are not necessary in an action based
on Article 32 of the Civil Code, the failure to specifically allege the same will
not amount to failure to state a cause of action. The courts below therefore
correctly denied the motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of
action, since it is enough that the complaint avers a violation of a constitutional
right of the plaintiff.
Anent the issue on non-compliance with the rule against forum shopping, the
subsequent submission of the secretary’s certificate authorizing the counsel to
sign and execute the certification against forum shopping cured the defect of
respondent’s complaint. Besides, the merits of the instant case justify the liberal
application of the rules.33
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 7, 1999 which affirmed the Order of
the Regional Trial Court of Marikina, Branch 272, denying petitioner’s motion
to dismiss, is AFFIRMED. The Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of
Marikina, Branch 272, is hereby DIRECTED to continue with the proceedings
in Civil Case No. 97-341-MK with dispatch.
GARCIA vs SALVADOR
This is a petition for review2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
February 27, 2004 Decision3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 58668
finding petitioner Orlando D. Garcia liable for gross negligence; and its June 16,
2005 Resolution4 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
On October 1, 1993, respondent Ranida D. Salvador started working as a trainee
in the Accounting Department of Limay Bulk Handling Terminal, Inc. (the
Company). As a prerequisite for regular employment, she underwent a medical
examination at the Community Diagnostic Center (CDC). Garcia who is a
medical technologist, conducted the HBs Ag (Hepatitis B Surface Antigen) test
and on October 22, 1993, CDC issued the test result5 indicating that Ranida was
"HBs Ag: Reactive." The result bore the name and signature of Garcia as
examiner and the rubber stamp signature of Castro as pathologist.
Page 8 of 53
When Ranida submitted the test result to Dr. Sto. Domingo, the Company
physician, the latter apprised her that the findings indicated that she is suffering
from Hepatitis B, a liver disease. Thus, based on the medical report6submitted by
Sto. Domingo, the Company terminated Ranida’s employment for failing the
physical examination.7
When Ranida informed her father, Ramon, about her ailment, the latter suffered
a heart attack and was confined at the Bataan Doctors Hospital. During Ramon’s
confinement, Ranida underwent another HBs Ag test at the said hospital and the
result8 indicated that she is non-reactive. She informed Sto. Domingo of this
development but was told that the test conducted by CDC was more reliable
because it used the Micro-Elisa Method.
Thus, Ranida went back to CDC for confirmatory testing, and this time, the
Anti-HBs test conducted on her indicated a "Negative" result.9
Ranida also underwent another HBs Ag test at the Bataan Doctors Hospital using
the Micro-Elisa Method. The result indicated that she was non-reactive.10
Ranida submitted the test results from Bataan Doctors Hospital and CDC to the
Executive Officer of the Company who requested her to undergo another similar
test before her re-employment would be considered. Thus, CDC conducted
another HBs Ag test on Ranida which indicated a "Negative" result.11 Ma. Ruby
G. Calderon, Med-Tech Officer-in-Charge of CDC, issued a Certification
correcting the initial result and explaining that the examining medical
technologist (Garcia) interpreted the delayed reaction as positive or reactive.12
Thereafter, the Company rehired Ranida.
On July 25, 1994, Ranida and Ramon filed a complaint13 for damages against
petitioner Garcia and a purportedly unknown pathologist of CDC, claiming that,
by reason of the erroneous interpretation of the results of Ranida’s examination,
she lost her job and suffered serious mental anxiety, trauma and sleepless nights,
while Ramon was hospitalized and lost business opportunities.
On September 26, 1994, respondents amended their complaint14 by naming
Castro as the "unknown pathologist."
Garcia denied the allegations of gross negligence and incompetence and
reiterated the scientific explanation for the "false positive" result of the first HBs
Ag test in his December 7, 1993 letter to the respondents.15
For his part, Castro claimed that as pathologist, he rarely went to CDC and only
when a case was referred to him; that he did not examine Ranida; and that the
test results bore only his rubber-stamp signature.
On September 1, 1997,16 the trial court dismissed the complaint for failure of the
respondents to present sufficient evidence to prove the liability of Garcia and
Castro. It held that respondents should have presented Sto. Domingo because he
was the one who interpreted the test result issued by CDC. Likewise,
respondents should have presented a medical expert to refute the testimonies of
Garcia and Castro regarding the medical explanation behind the conflicting test
results on Ranida.17
Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the trial court’s
findings, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and
another one entered ORDERING defendant-appellee Orlando D. Garcia, Jr. to
pay plaintiff-appellant Ranida D. Salvador moral damages in the amount of
P50,000.00, exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000.00 and attorney’s fees
in the amount of P25,000.00.
SO ORDERED.18
The appellate court found Garcia liable for damages for negligently issuing an
erroneous HBs Ag result. On the other hand, it exonerated Castro for lack of
participation in the issuance of the results.
After the denial of his motion for reconsideration, Garcia filed the instant
petition.
The main issue for resolution is whether the Court of Appeals, in reversing the
decision of the trial court, correctly found petitioner liable for damages to the
respondents for issuing an incorrect HBsAG test result.
Garcia maintains he is not negligent, thus not liable for damages, because he
followed the appropriate laboratory measures and procedures as dictated by his
training and experience; and that he did everything within his professional
competence to arrive at an objective, impartial and impersonal result.
At the outset, we note that the issues raised are factual in nature. Whether a
person is negligent or not is a question of fact which we cannot pass upon in a
petition for review on certiorari which is limited to reviewing errors of law.19
Page 9 of 53
Negligence is the failure to observe for the protection of the interest of another
person that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances
justly demand,20 whereby such other person suffers injury. For health care
providers, the test of the existence of negligence is: did the health care provider
either fail to do something which a reasonably prudent health care provider
would have done, or that he or she did something that a reasonably prudent
health care provider would not have done; and that failure or action caused
injury to the patient;21 if yes, then he is guilty of negligence.
Thus, the elements of an actionable conduct are: 1) duty, 2) breach, 3) injury, and
4) proximate causation.
All the elements are present in the case at bar.
Owners and operators of clinical laboratories have the duty to comply with
statutes, as well as rules and regulations, purposely promulgated to protect and
promote the health of the people by preventing the operation of substandard,
improperly managed and inadequately supported clinical laboratories and by
improving the quality of performance of clinical laboratory examinations.
22 Their business is impressed with public interest, as such, high standards of
performance are expected from them.
In F.F. Cruz and Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, we found the owner of a furniture
shop liable for the destruction of the plaintiff’s house in a fire which started in
his establishment in view of his failure to comply with an ordinance which
required the construction of a firewall. In Teague v. Fernandez, we stated that
where the very injury which was intended to be prevented by the ordinance has
happened, non-compliance with the ordinance was not only an act of negligence,
but also the proximate cause of the death.23
In fine, violation of a statutory duty is negligence. Where the law imposes upon
a person the duty to do something, his omission or non-performance will render
him liable to whoever may be injured thereby.
Section 2 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4688, otherwise known as The Clinical
Laboratory Law, provides:
Sec. 2. It shall be unlawful for any person to be professionally in-charge of a
registered clinical laboratory unless he is a licensed physician duly qualified in
laboratory medicine and authorized by the Secretary of Health, such
authorization to be renewed annually.
No license shall be granted or renewed by the Secretary of Health for the
operation and maintenance of a clinical laboratory unless such laboratory is
under the administration, direction and supervision of an authorized physician,
as provided for in the preceding paragraph.
Corollarily, Sections 9(9.1)(1), 11 and 25(25.1)(1) of the DOH Administrative
Order No. 49-B Series of 1988, otherwise known as the Revised Rules and
Regulations Governing the Registration, Operation and Maintenance of Clinical
Laboratories in the Philippines, read:
Sec. 9. Management of the Clinical Laboratory:
9.1 Head of the Clinical Laboratory: The head is that person who assumes
technical and administrative supervision and control of the activities in the
laboratory.
For all categories of clinical laboratories, the head shall be a licensed physician
certified by the Philippine Board of Pathology in either Anatomic or Clinical
Pathology or both provided that:
(1) This shall be mandatory for all categories of free-standing clinical
laboratories; all tertiary category hospital laboratories and for all secondary
category hospital laboratories located in areas with sufficient available
pathologist.
xxxx
Sec. 11. Reporting: All laboratory requests shall be considered as consultations
between the requesting physician and pathologist of the laboratory. As such all
laboratory reports on various examinations of human specimens shall be
construed as consultation report and shall bear the name of the pathologist or his
associate. No person in clinical laboratory shall issue a report, orally or in
writing, whole portions thereof without a directive from the pathologist or his
authorized associate and only to the requesting physician or his authorized
representative except in emergencies when the results may be released as
authorized by the pathologist.
xxxx
Sec. 25. Violations:
Page 10 of 53
25.1 The license to operate a clinical laboratory may be suspended or revoked by
the Undersecretary of Health for Standards and Regulation upon violation of
R.A. 4688 or the rules and regulations issued in pursuance thereto or the
commission of the following acts by the persons owning or operating a clinical
laboratory and the persons under their authority.
(1) Operation of a Clinical Laboratory without a certified pathologist or qualified
licensed physician authorized by the Undersecretary of Health or without
employing a registered medical technologist or a person not registered as a
medical technologist in such a position.
And Section 29(b) of R.A. No. 5527, otherwise known as The Philippine
Medical Technology Act of 1969, reads:
Section 29. Penal Provisions.- Without prejudice to the provision of the Medical
Act of 1959, as amended relating to illegal practice of Medicine, the following
shall be punished by a fine of not less than two thousand pesos nor more than
five thousand pesos, or imprisonment for not less than six months nor more than
two years, or both, in the discretion of the court:
xxxx
(b) Any medical technologist, even if duly registered, who shall practice medical
technology in the Philippines without the necessary supervision of a qualified
pathologist or physician authorized by the Department of Health;
From the foregoing laws and rules, it is clear that a clinical laboratory must be
administered, directed and supervised by a licensed physician authorized by the
Secretary of Health, like a pathologist who is specially trained in methods of
laboratory medicine; that the medical technologist must be under the supervision
of the pathologist or a licensed physician; and that the results of any examination
may be released only to the requesting physician or his authorized representative
upon the direction of the laboratory pathologist.
These rules are intended for the protection of the public by preventing
performance of substandard clinical examinations by laboratories whose
personnel are not properly supervised. The public demands no less than an
effective and efficient performance of clinical laboratory examinations through
compliance with the quality standards set by laws and regulations.
We find that petitioner Garcia failed to comply with these standards.
First, CDC is not administered, directed and supervised by a licensed physician
as required by law, but by Ma. Ruby C. Calderon, a licensed Medical
Technologist.24 In the License to Open and Operate a Clinical Laboratory for the
years 1993 and 1996 issued by Dr. Juan R. Nañagas, M.D., Undersecretary for
Health Facilities, Standards and Regulation, defendant-appellee Castro was
named as the head of CDC.25 However, in his Answer with Counterclaim, he
stated:
3. By way of affirmative and special defenses, defendant pathologist further
avers and plead as follows:
Defendant pathologist is not the owner of the Community Diagnostic Center nor
an employee of the same nor the employer of its employees. Defendant
pathologist comes to the Community Diagnostic Center when and where a
problem is referred to him. Its employees are licensed under the Medical
Technology Law (Republic Act No. 5527) and are certified by, and registered
with, the Professional Regulation Commission after having passed their Board
Examinations. They are competent within the sphere of their own profession in
so far as conducting laboratory examinations and are allowed to sign for and in
behalf of the clinical laboratory. The defendant pathologist, and all pathologists
in general, are hired by laboratories for purposes of complying with the rules and
regulations and orders issued by the Department of Health through the Bureau of
Research and Laboratories. Defendant pathologist does not stay that long period
of time at the Community Diagnostic Center but only periodically or whenever a
case is referred to him by the laboratory. Defendant pathologist does not appoint
or select the employees of the laboratory nor does he arrange or approve their
schedules of duty.26
Castro’s infrequent visit to the clinical laboratory barely qualifies as an effective
administrative supervision and control over the activities in the laboratory.
"Supervision and control" means the authority to act directly whenever a specific
function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate; direct the
performance of duty; restrain the commission of acts; review, approve, revise or
modify acts and decisions of subordinate officials or units.27
Second, Garcia conducted the HBsAG test of respondent Ranida without the
supervision of defendant-appellee Castro, who admitted that:
[He] does not know, and has never known or met, the plaintiff-patient even up to
this time nor has he personally examined any specimen, blood, urine or any
other tissue, from the plaintiff-patient otherwise his own handwritten signature
would have appeared in the result and not merely stamped as shown in Annex
"B" of the Amended Complaint.28
Page 11 of 53
Last, the disputed HBsAG test result was released to respondent Ranida without
the authorization of defendant-appellee Castro.29
Garcia may not have intended to cause the consequences which followed after
the release of the HBsAG test result. However, his failure to comply with the
laws and rules promulgated and issued for the protection of public safety and
interest is failure to observe that care which a reasonably prudent health care
provider would observe. Thus, his act or omission constitutes a breach of duty.
Indubitably, Ranida suffered injury as a direct consequence of Garcia’s failure to
comply with the mandate of the laws and rules aforequoted. She was terminated
from the service for failing the physical examination; suffered anxiety because
of the diagnosis; and was compelled to undergo several more tests. All these
could have been avoided had the proper safeguards been scrupulously followed
in conducting the clinical examination and releasing the clinical report.
Article 20 of the New Civil Code provides:
Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes
damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
The foregoing provision provides the legal basis for the award of damages to a
party who suffers damage whenever one commits an act in violation of some
legal provision.30 This was incorporated by the Code Commission to provide
relief to a person who suffers damage because another has violated some legal
provision.31
We find the Court of Appeals’ award of moral damages reasonable under the
circumstances bearing in mind the mental trauma suffered by respondent Ranida
who thought she was afflicted by Hepatitis B, making her "unfit or unsafe for
any type of employment."32 Having established her right to moral damages, we
see no reason to disturb the award of exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.
Exemplary damages are imposed, by way of example or correction for the public
good, in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages,
33 and attorney’s fees may be recovered when, as in the instant case, exemplary
damages are awarded.34
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 58668
dated February 27, 2004 finding petitioner Orlando D. Garcia, Jr. guilty of gross
negligence and liable to pay to respondents ₱50,000.00 as moral damages,
₱50,000.00 as exemplary damages, and ₱25,000.00 as attorney’s fees, is
AFFIRMED.
Ranida Salvador started working as a trainee in LBHT. She underwent a medical
exam @ CDC with Garcia (medtech) conducting the HBs Ag test. Her result was
REACTIVE. The company physician (Sto. Domingo) told her she is suffering
from HepaB, and based on the medical report SD submitted, LBHT terminated
her employment. Ranida told her father Ramon about her condition, then the
latter suffered a heart attack and was confined at Bataan Doctors Hospital.
Ranida took another HBs Ag test in BDH, and the result was NON-REACTIVE.
She told Dr. SD about it but the latter said the CDC test was more reliable, so
she took another test at CDC again, and the result this time was NON-
REACTIVE. She took the same test used in CDC @ BDH and the result was
NON-REACTIVE (four tests!). She submitted the results to the LBHT ExecOff
who requested her to undergo under test (WTF!) - result is NEGATIVE (5th test,
haha), so LBHT rehired her.
Ranida and Ramon filed a complaint for damages against medtech Garcia +
pathologist Castro, claiming that the erroneous interpretation led her to lose her
job, suffer mental anxiety, while Ramon was hospitalized + lost business
opportunities. Garcia denied the allegations of gross negligence and
incompetence; explained "false positive." Castro said he did not examine
Ranida, and that the results bore only his stamped signature.
RTC dismissed the Salvadors' complaint for failure to present sufficient
evidence. CA reversed this and ordered Garcia to pay moral damages (50k),
exemplary damages (50k), and atty's fees (25k). Castro was exonerated.
Issue and Holding
WON CA correctly found Garcia liable for damages. YES
1. WON a person is negligent is a question of fact -- petition for review on
certiorari limited to reviewing errors of law
1. Negligence - failure to observe for the protection of another's
interest that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which
circ demand, whereby the other suffers injury
1. ALL ELEMENTS OF AN ACTIONABLE
CONDUCT ARE PRESENT IN THIS CASE
1. Duty
2. Breach
3. Injury
4. Proximate causation
2. Negligence is a violation of statutory duty -- so many laws
were broken!
1. CDC is not administered, directed, supervised by
licensed physician but by a licensed medtech
1. Castro's infrequent visit barely qualifies as
an admin supervision and control
Page 12 of 53
2. Garcia conducted HBs Ag test of Ranida without
Castro's supervision
3. HBs Ag test result released to Ranida without Castro's
authorization
3. Garcia's failure to comply with laws, rules promulgated for the
protection of public safety and interest is failure to observe the
care which a reasonably prudent health care provider would
observe --> BREACH OF DUTY!
4. Injuries suffered by Ranida could have been avoided had
proper safeguards been followed
5. NCC 20 is the legal basis for award of damages to one who
suffers whenever another commits an act in violation of some
legal provision
Damages, fees upheld. Garcia guilty of gross negligence.
G.R. 178763 Peter Paul Patrick Lucas et al v. Dr. Prospero Ma. Tuano, April
2009
Facts:
Sometime in 1988, petitioner Peter Paul Patrick Lucas contracted "sore eyes" in
his right eye. Upon consultation with Dr. Tuano, Peter narrated that it has been 9
days since the problem with his right eye began, and that he was already
taking Maxitrol to address the eye problem. According to Dr. Tuano, he
performed "ocular routine examination" on Peter's eyes, wherein: 1. a cross
examination Peter's eyes and their surrounding area was made, and 2. Peter's
visual acuity were taken, 3. Peter's eyes were palpated to check the intraocular
pressure of each; 4. the mortility of Peter's eyes were observed, and 5. the
ophthalmoscopy on Peter's eyes was used.
On that particular consultation, Dr. Tuano diagnosed that Peter was suffering
from conjunctivitis or sore eyes. He then prescribed Spersacet C-eye drops for
Peter and told the latter to return for follow-up after one week.
As instructed, Peter returned and Dr. Tuano discovered that the right eye
developed Epidemic Kerato Conjunctivitis, EKC, a viral infection. To address
the problem, Dr. Tuano prescribed Maxitrol, for a dosage of 6 times a day.
However, the EKC was getting worse yet Dr. Tuano still continued on advising
the use of Maxittrol, despite Peter's discovery of the inscribed warning written in
its label.
Upon examination, Dr. Tuano noted the hardness in Peter's right eye and
discovered that the tension in Peter's right eye was 39.0 Hg. Since the tension
was way over the normal IOP which only ranged from 10.0 Hg to 21.0 Hg, Dr.
Tuano then ordered him to immediately discontinue the use of Maxitrol and
prescribed to the latter Diamox and Normoglaucon instead. He also required
Peter to go for a daily check-up in order for the former to closely monitor the
pressure of the latter' eyes.
During one of Peter's regular follow-ups, Dr. Tuano noted the recurrence of EKC
in Peter's right eye. Thus, he referred Peter to Dr. Manuel Agulto, M.D., another
opthalmologist specializing in glaucoma treatment.
Eventually, Peter, in claiming to have "steroid-induced glaucoma" and blaming
Dr. Tuano for the same, filed a civil complaint for damages against Dr. Tuano. In
their complaint, petitioners averred that as the direct consequence of Peter's
prolonged use of Maxitrol, he suffered from steroid-induced glaucoma which
caused the elevation of his intra-ocular pressure, which caused the impairment of
his vision which may lead to total blindness.
In rebutting petitioner's claim, Dr. Tuano asserted that the treatment made by
him more than three years ago has no causal connection to Peter's glaucoma. He
further explained that 'drug-induced glaucoma is temporary and curable, steroids
have the side effect of increasing intraocular pressure. Steroids are prescribed to
treat Epidemic Kerato Conjunctivitis or EKC which is an infiltration of the
cornea as a result of conjunctivitis or sore eyes'. Hence, the steroid treatment of
Peter's EKC caused the steroid-induced glaucoma.
RTC Ruling
The RTC dismissed the Civil Case for insufficiency of evidence, opining that
petitioners failed to prove by preponderance of evidence that Dr. Tuano was
negligent in his treatment of Peter's condition. The trial court reasoned hat the
recognized standards of the medical community has not been established in thiss
case, much less has causation been established to render Dr. Tuano liable.
Further, absence of any medical evidence to the contrary, the RTC ruled that it
cannot accept petitioner's claim that the use of steroid is the proximate cause of
the damage sustained by Peter's eye.
Court of Appeals Ruling
The CA faulted petitioners because they failed to present any medical expert to
testify that Dr. Tuano's prescription of Maxitrol and Blephamide for the
treatment of EKC on petiitioner's right eye was not proper and that his palpation
of Peter's right eye was not enough to detect adverse reaction to steroid.
During the trial in CA, Peter testified that Dr. Manuel Agulto told him that he
should not have used steroid for the treatment of EKC or that he should have
Page 13 of 53
used it only for two weeks, as EKC iss only a viral infection which will cure in
tself. However, Dr. Agulto was not presented by petitioners as a witness to
confirm what he allegedly told Peter and therefore, the latter's testimony is
hearsay. Under Rule 130, Section 36 of the Rules of Court, a witness can testify
only to those facts which he knows of and his own personal knowledge. Familiar
and fundamental is the rule that hearsay testimony is inadmissible as evidence.
Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was denied by resolution, hence, this
appeal.
Issue: Did the petitioners failed to prove by preponderance of evidence their
claim for damages against Dr. Tuano?
Court Ruling:
Only questions of law may be raised under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court as
this court is not a trier of facts.
The said issue constitutes a question of fact, as the Supreme Court is asked to
revisit anew the factual findings of the RTC and the CA. While this general rule
admits of certain exceptions, such as the circumstance when the finding of fact
of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence, but is
contradicted by the evidence on record.
The fact of want of competence or diligence is evidentiary in nature, the
veracity of which can best be passed upon after a full-blown trial for it is
virtually impossible to ascertain the merits of a medical negligence case
without extensive investigation, research, evaluation and consultation with the
medical experts.
Petitioner's position in sum is that Peter's glaucoma is the direct result of Dr.
Tuano's negligence in his improper administration of the drug Maxitrol. Clearly,
the present controversy is a classic illustration of a medical negligence case
against a physician based on the latter's professional negligence. In this type of
suit, the patient or his heirs, in order to prevail, is required to prove by is
required to prove by preponderance of evidence that the physician failed to
exercise that degree of skill, care and learning possessed by other persons in the
same profession; and that as a proximate result of such faiure, the patient or his
heirs suffered damages.
For lack of a specific law geared towards the type of negligence committed by
members of the medical profession, such claim for damages is almost always
anchored on the alleged violation of Article 2176 of the Civil Code which states
that "whoever by act or omission, causes damage to another, there being no fault
or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, is
there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties is called quasi-
delict.
In medical negligence cases, the four essential elements are the following: 1.
duty 2. breach 3. injury 4. proximate cause, which must be established by the
plaintiffs.
In order that there may be a recovery for an injury, it must be shown that the
injury for which the recovery is sought must be the legitimate consequence of
the wrong done, the connection between the negligence and the injury must be a
direct and natural sequence of events, unbroken by intervening efficient causes.
OCEAN BUILDERS and/or HAO vs. SPOUSES CUBACUB
G.R. No. 150898
April 13, 2011
FACTS: Bladimir Cubacub was employed as maintenance man by petitioner
Ocean Builders Construction Corp. at its office in Caloocan City.
Bladimir was afflicted with chicken pox. He was thus advised by petitioner
Hao, the company’s general manager, to rest for 3 days which he did at the
company’s “barracks.”
3 days later, Bladimir went about his usual chores. Later in the afternoon,
however, he asked a co-worker Silangga, to accompany him to his house in
Capas, Tarlac so he could rest. Informed by Silangga of Bladimir’s intention,
Hao gave Bladimir P1,000.00 and ordered Silangga to instead bring Bladimir to
the nearest hospital.
Along with co-workers Narding and Vergado, Silangga thus brought Bladimir to
the nearest Community Hospital, a primary-care hospital around 1 kilometer
away from the office of the company.
Page 14 of 53
The hospital did not allow Bladimir to leave the hospital. He was then confined.
The next day, Bladimir’s parents-respondent spouses Cubacub, with their
friend Dr. Frias, arrived at the Hospital and transferred Bladimir to the Quezon
City General Hospital where he was placed in the ICU and died the following
day.
Bladimir’s parents-herein respondents later filed before the Tarlac RTC at Capas
a complaint for damages against petitioners, alleging that Hao was guilty of
negligence which resulted in the deterioration of Bladimir’s condition leading to
his death.
The Tarlac RTC dismissed the complaint, holding that Hao was not negligent.
On respondents’ appeal, the CA eversed the trial court’s decision, holding that
by Hao’s failure to bring Bladimir to a better-equipped hospital, he violated
Article 161 of the Labor Code.
ISSUE: Is petitioner company and its co-petitioner manager Hao guilty of
negligence.
HELD: NO
Art. 161 of the Labor Code provides:
ART. 161. Assistance of employer. – It shall be the duty of any employer to
provide all the necessary assistance to ensure the adequate and immediate
medical and dental attendance and treatment to an injured or sick employee in
case of emergency.
The Implementing Rules of the Code do not enlighten what the phrase “adequate
and immediate” medical attendance means in relation to an “emergency.” It
would thus appear that the determination of what it means is left to the employer,
except when a full-time registered nurse or physician are available on-site as
required, also under the Labor Code, specifically Art. 157 which provides:
Article 157. Emergency Medical and Dental Services. ─ It shall be the duty of
every employer to furnish his employees in any locality with free medical and
dental attendance and facilities consisting of:
(a) The services of a full-time registered nurse when the number of employees
exceeds fifty (50) but not more than two hundred (200) except when the
employer does not maintain hazardous workplaces, in which case, the services of
a graduate first-aider shall be provided for the protection of workers, where no
registered nurse is available. The Secretary of Labor and Employment shall
provide by appropriate regulations, the services that shall be required where the
number of employees does not exceed fifty (50) and shall determine by
appropriate order, hazardous workplaces for purposes of this Article;
(b) The services of a full-time registered nurse, a part-time physician and dentist,
and an emergency clinic, when the number of employees exceeds two hundred
(200) but not more than three hundred (300); and
(c) The services of a full-time physician, dentist and a full-time registered nurse
as well as a dental clinic and an infirmary or emergency hospital with one bed
capacity for every one hundred (100) employees when the number of employees
exceeds three hundred (300).
In the present case, there is no allegation that the company premises are
hazardous. Neither is there any allegation on the number of employees the
company has. If Hao’s testimony would be believed, the company had only
seven regular employees and 20 contractual employees ─ still short of the
minimum 50 workers that an establishment must have for it to be required to
have a full-time registered nurse.
The Court can thus only determine whether the actions taken by petitioners
when Bladimir became ill amounted to the “necessary assistance” to ensure
“adequate and immediate medical . . . attendance” to Bladimir as required under
Art. 161 of the Labor Code.
As found by the trial court and borne by the records, petitioner Hao’s advice for
Bladimir to, as he did, take a 3-day rest and to later have him brought to the
Page 15 of 53
nearest hospital constituted “adequate and immediate medical” attendance that
he is mandated, under Art. 161, to provide to a sick employee in an emergency.
AT ALL EVENTS, the alleged negligence of Hao cannot be considered as the
proximate cause of the death of Bladimir. Proximate cause is that which, in
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient intervening cause,
produces injury, and without which, the result would not have occurred. An
injury or damage is proximately caused by an act or failure to act, whenever it
appears from the evidence in the case that the act or omission played a
substantial part in bringing about or actually causing the injury or damage, and
that the injury or damage was either a direct result or a reasonably probable
consequence of the act or omission
DISSENTING OPINION
BERSAMIN, J.:
I dissent.
I find myself unable to join my Honorable Brethren in the Third Division in the
result to be reached herein. My review of the records constrains me to travel the
lonely path, convinced to now forsake unanimity in order to urge giving just
solace to the aggrieved parents of a poor employee who died from the
complications of chicken pox after his employers forced him to continue on the
job despite his affliction that, in the first place, he had contracted in the
workplace from a co-employee. To me, his death was wrongful by reason of the
employers’ failure: (a) to isolate the co-worker to prevent the spread of chicken
pox; (b) to provide to him the legally mandated first aid treatment; and (c) to
extend adequate medical and other assistance for his affliction with chicken pox
and the expected complications of the affliction (like letting him off from work
in order to have complete rest).
Antecedents
This action concerns the damages claimed by the respondents, plaintiffs below,
arising from the untimely death of their son, Bladimir Cubacub, while employed
by Ocean Builders Construction Corporation (OBCC), then managed by
petitioner Dennis Hao. Bladimir had contracted chicken pox and a cough and
had later on collapsed in the workplace and rushed to the hospital. In its decision
dated April 14, 1997, the RTC absolved the petitioners of any liability, and
dismissed the complaint and the counterclaim, ruling that the proximate cause of
Bladimir’s death could not be attributed to the petitioners, particularly because
the death certificate issued by the Quezon City General Hospital (QCGH) did
not state chicken pox to be the cause of death, unlike the death certificate issued
by Dr. Hermes Frias. The RTC observed that Bladimir, being already of age, had
been responsible for his own act of reporting to work despite his illness; that
chicken pox was not a serious disease requiring hospitalization, but a self-
limiting one that would heal by itself if proper care of the patient was taken; and
that the petitioners as employers were not mandated by any law to send Bladimir
to a hospital.
The respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), which reversed the
RTC. The CA held that the respondents established the petitioners’ liability by
preponderant evidence, and, accordingly, found that Bladimir’s health had
deteriorated because he had been made to work despite his illness and because
Hao, as the manager of OBCC, had denied Bladimir’s request to take a vacation;
that prior to his collapse, Bladimir had been suffering from the complications of
chicken pox and had needed immediate medical treatment; and that the
petitioners did not extend the requisite assistance to Bladimir despite their
employer’s duty under Article 161 of the Labor Code to provide medical
attention and treatment to an injured or sick employee in times of emergency.
The CA then disposed thuswise:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Capas, Tarlac,
Branch 66 in Civil Case No. 349 dated dated April 14, 1997 is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one rendered holding the defendants
solidarily liable to plaintiffs-appellants for the following:
1. ₱50,000.00 for the life of Bladimir Cubacub;
2. ₱584,630.00 for loss of Bladimir's earning capacity;
3. ₱4,834.60 as reimbursement of expenses incurred at Quezon City General
Hospital as evidenced by Exhibit "E" to "E-14" inclusive;
4. ₱18,107.75 as reimbursement of expenses for the 5-day wake covered by
Exhibits "F" to "F-17";
5. ₱30,000.00 as funeral expenses at Prudential Funeral Homes covered by
Exhibit "I";
6. ₱6,700.00 for acquisition of memorial lot at Sto. Rosario Memorial Park
covered by Exhibit "J";
Page 16 of 53
7. ₱50,000.00 as moral damages;
8. ₱20,000.00 as exemplary damages;
9. ₱15,000.00 as attorney's fees; and
10. Cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.1
The petitioners sought reconsideration, but the CA rebuffed them.
Hence, this appeal, wherein the petitioners contend that the CA erred in
concluding that they had not exercised the diligence of a good father of a family
and in giving weight to the death certificate issued by Dr. Frias.
Submission
The appeal has no merit.
1.
CA must be upheld on its resolution because

the appeal involves essentially factual issues
The petitioners, conscious that they hereby raise issues essentially factual in
nature, submit that their appeal should be given due course as an exception
pursuant to Fuentes v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 109849, February 26, 1997,
268 SCRA 703) because the factual findings of the CA conflicted with those of
the RTC.
I am not persuaded that we should give due course to the appeal on that basis.
The mere variance between the factual findings of the trial and appellate courts
does not necessarily indicate that the CA’s ruling was erroneous, or less worthy
than the RTC’s. The petitioners’ burden was to present strong cogent reasons to
convince the Court to reverse the CA, but their reasons were weak and contrary
to the records. The CA, acting as the reviewing court vis-à-vis the RTC,
reasonably considered and appreciated the records of the trial; hence, its
appreciation and determination of the factual and legal issues are entitled to great
respect. Thus, the CA’s ruling should be affirmed, not reversed.
2.
 Petitioners were guilty for
 there is something before them to suggest or warn of danger. Could a
the wrongful death of Bladimir
The respondents have anchored their action for damages on the provisions of the
Civil Code on quasi-delict and human relations.
Under the concept of quasi-delict, whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.
2 To sustain a claim based on quasi-delict, the following requisites must concur:
(a) there must be damage caused to the plaintiff; (b) there must be negligence by
act or omission, of which the defendant or some other person for whose acts the
defendant must respond was guilty; and (c) there must be a connection of cause
and effect between such negligence and the damage.3
Negligence, according to Layugan v. Intermediate Appellate Court,4 is "the
omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those
considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do,
or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do,5 or
as Judge Cooley defines it,6 ‘(t)he failure to observe for the protection of the
interests of another person, that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which
the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.’"7
The test for the existence of negligence in a particular case has been aptly put
in Picart v. Smith,8 thuswise:
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case
may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act
use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person
would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of
negligence. The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied
by the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. The
existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the
personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers
what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary
intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that.
The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a
given situation must of course be always determined in the light of human
experience and in view of the facts involved in the particular case. Abstract
speculation cannot here be of much value but this much can be profitably
said: Reasonable men govern their conduct by the circumstances which are
before them or known to them. They are not, and are not supposed to be,
omniscient of the future. Hence they can be expected to take care only when
Page 17 of 53
prudent man, in the case under consideration, foresee harm as a result of the
course actually pursued? If so, it was the duty of the actor to take precautions to
guard against that harm. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the
ignoring of the suggestion born of this prevision, is always necessary before
negligence can be held to exist. Stated in these terms, the proper criterion for
determining the existence of negligence in a given case is this: Conduct is said
to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would
have foreseen that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable to
warrant his foregoing the conduct or guarding against its consequences.9
Negligence is a relative term, not an absolute one, because its application
depends upon the situation of the parties and the reasonable degree of care and
vigilance that the surrounding circumstances reasonably impose. Consequently,
when the danger is great, a high degree of care is required, and the failure to
observe such degree of care amounts to want of ordinary care.10
The essential linkage between the negligence or fault, on one hand, and the
injury or damage, on the other hand, must be credibly and sufficiently
established. An injury or damage is proximately caused by an act or a failure to
act whenever it appears from the evidence that the act or omission played a
substantial part in bringing about or actually causing the injury or damage; and
that the injury or damage was either a direct result or a reasonably probable
consequence of the act or omission.11
According to the petitioners, the following acts of Hao proved that they were not
negligent, namely: (a) it was at Hao’s instance that Bladimir was brought to the
Caybiga Community Hospital; (b) before leaving for Hongkong, Hao instructed
Ignacio Silangga, another employee, to attend to the needs of Bladimir who had
been admitted in the hospital; and (c) Hao advised Bladimir to take a rest for
three days.
The Majority hold that all that Article 161 of the Labor Code,12 upon which,
among others, the CA anchored its decision against the petitioners, required of
the petitioners as the employers of the ill Bladimir was to render "necessary
assistance" to ensure "adequate and immediate medical … attendance"; that
Hao’s advice to Bladimir to take a 3-day rest, which he did, and to later have
Bladimir brought to the nearest hospital constituted the adequate and immediate
medical attendance Article 161 mandated; and that given that chicken pox was
self-limiting, Hao, who did not appear to have a medical background, might not
be expected to have known that Bladimir needed to be brought to a hospital with
better facilities than the Caybiga Hospital.
The Majority further hold that the alleged negligence of Hao could not be the
proximate cause of the death of Bladimir, because whatever he did or did not do
played no substantial part in bring about or actually causing the injury or
damage; hence, the death of Bladimir was neither the direct result nor a
reasonably probable consequence of Hao’s act or omission; that there was
nothing in the records to show that Bladimir had contracted the chicken pox
from an afflicted co-worker whom Hao negligently did not bring to the nearest
physician, or did not isolate from his co-workers; that both lower courts did not
make any definite finding that Bladimir had contracted the chicken pox from a
co-worker; and that the only allusion to another employee being afflicted with
chicken pox was made by Hao when he testified that he had known that chicken
pox would heal within three days "as was the case of another worker, without
reference, however, as to when it happened."13
I cannot accept the Majority’s holding.
The Majority’s favoring the petitioners disregards the records, which
convincingly demonstrated and preponderantly established that Hao had failed to
exercise the degree of care and vigilance required under the circumstances.
Besides, the aforestated acts of Hao, objectively considered, did not warrant the
petitioners’ absolution from liability.
Let me elucidate.
2.a.
Petitioners violated the requirements of

the Labor Code and its implementing rules
It is good to start by unhesitatingly indicating that the petitioners as employers
committed violations of the minimum standards of care that the law erected for
the benefit of Bladimir and his co-workers.
The implementing rules of the Labor Code required OBCC to provide medical
and dental services and facilities to its employees. Specifically, under Section
4(a), Rule 1 of the Implementing Rules of Book IV, OBCC had the legal
obligation due to the number of its workers being at least 27 in number (that is,
seven regular employees and 20 contractual ones, according to Hao) to employ
at least a graduate first-aider, who might be one of the workers in the workplace;
such graduate first-aider must be afforded immediate access to the first-aid
medicines, equipment, and facilities.14 The term first-aider refers to a person
who has been trained and duly certified as qualified to administer first aid by the
Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) or any other organization accredited by
Page 18 of 53
the PNRC.15 The term first-aid treatment means adequate, immediate, and
necessary medical attention or remedy given in case of injury or sudden illness
suffered by a worker during employment, irrespective of whether or not such an
injury or illness is work-connected, before more extensive medical or dental
treatment can be secured; it does not include continued treatment or follow-up
treatment for any injury or illness.16
However, Hao admitted that OBCC did not have a clinic in the workplace, or a
nurse or other competent person who might assist an employee in an emergency,
or that OBCC had any agreement with a nearby hospital to attend to a sick
employee.17 The admitted failure to provide to the employees, in general, and to
Bladimir, in particular, any of the several free emergency medical and dental
services and facilities the Labor Code and the implementing rules and
regulations of the Department of Labor and Employment required removed the
foundation for absolving the petitioners from liability.
Chicken pox, or varicella, is a highly contagious disease of childhood, caused by
a large DNA virus and characterized by a well-defined incubation period, and a
vesicular rash that typically occurs in successive crops and most marked on the
trunk. In healthy children, the disease is usually mild with clinical symptoms
limited to the skin; but in immunosuppressed children and adults, life-
threatening illness caused by deep visceral involvement is not uncommon.
18 Among the known complications of varicella are: (a) secondary bacterial
infection; (b) varicella pneumonia; (c) dissemination to other viscera; (d) central
nervous system complications; (e) coagulation complications; and (f) rare
complications such as varicella infection of the cornea, edema, Reyes’
syndrome, or myocarditis.19
Chicken pox is a self-limiting disease that heals by itself when properly taken
care of by giving the patient sufficient time to rest and administering
symptomatic medications. Dr. Hermes Frias enlightened the trial court thereon:
COURT
Q: He contracted chicken pox?
A: Yes, your honor, which is a self limiting disease.
Q: What do you mean by that?
A: Meaning to say, your Honor, if it is properly taken care of, it will not reach to
the point of seriously affecting the patient and there is a certain period wherein
the chicken pox will heal.20
ATTY. SANTILLAN
Q: That is you said if taken care of at the initial?
A: Yes, sir.21
xxx
COURT
Q: Will you clarify. You said that the disease is self limiting disease.
A: Yes your honor.
Q: So more or less, even without any medicine or without any medical
attendance if it is self limiting disease, it will heal by itself, Isn’t it?
A: Yes, your Honor, if you would let me clarify on that thing, your Honor.
Chicken pox has no medicine, it is being treated symptomatically. What I mean
that it has no medicine. There are medicines that are being tested that claim to
have anti-viral activities but it cannot be positively claimed that there is a
medicine solely for chicken pox. So chicken pox, you, Honor, is being treated
symptomatically. If the patient having chicken pox will have fever, he will be
given anti-fever medicine and if the patient have pneumonia due to chicken pox,
that is when the appropriate antibiotics is given.
Q: If it is self limiting, doctor, can you not say you don’t even have to confine
him in the hospital?
A: Yes, your honor, but the patient should be confined in bed.22
Based on the foregoing testimony of Dr. Frias, it is imperative that the chicken
pox-afflicted patient should be confined in bed to rest during the initial stages of
the disease; otherwise, the complications of chicken pox, which are deadly, may
set in.
Dr. Frias explained the probability of the complications of chicken pox affecting
the patient, viz:
A: Among the complications of chicken pox especially in adults that contacted it
is pneumonia, then another complication is the brain, encephalitis, those are the
complications, sir.
Page 19 of 53
Q: In your medical opinion, doctor, when can these complications set in?
A: There is no specific time on when these complications set in; but if the patient
is properly taken care of during his illness having chicken pox, these
complications usually do not set in. The book states that complications of
pneumonia is around, if I am not mistaken, 20% to 30% of patients contacting
chicken pox.
Q: In your medical opinion also, doctor, if the patient who has chicken pox
do(es) not rest and continue(s) working and without medication, would your
answer still be the same as to the time when these complications will set in?
A: Without proper rest and medication, your Honor, the chances of complication
setting in is much higher than in a patient who is fully rested and receiving
symptomatic medications.23
With the records showing that OBCC did not have the graduate first aider or
clinic in the workplace, Bladimir received no first aid treatment from April 9,
1995 (when he contracted chicken pox) until April 12, 1995 (when he was
rushed to the community hospital after collapsing in the workplace). Also,
Bladimir was not allowed to have bed rest, considering that Hao instead required
him to continue on the job despite his affliction, denying the latter’s request to be
allowed to rest in his parents’ home in Capas, Tarlac, all because Hao was due to
leave for Hongkong for the Holy Week break and had no one else to remain in
the premises in his absence. Hao’s utter lack of concern and solicitude for the
welfare of Bladimir not only contravened the letter and spirit of the Labor Code
but also manifested a callous disregard of Bladimir’s weakened condition.
It is not to be lost sight of, too, that, even assuming that Hao really told Bladimir
to take a rest in the company barracks upon his affliction with chicken pox on
April 9, 1995, the petitioners should still answer for the wrongful death because
the barracks provided to Bladimir and others (free of charge, the Majority point
out) were unsuitable for any employee afflicted with chicken pox to have the
requisite complete rest. The barracks consisted of a small, cramped, and
guardhouse-like structure constructed of wood and plywood that even raised the
chances for chicken pox to spread. Under the circumstances, the petitioners’
neglect of the welfare of Bladimir became all the more pronounced.
2.b.
Bladimir succumbed to complications of chicken pox
after petitioners refused to let him have complete rest
There are two sides of whether or not Bladimir was afforded the sufficient time ATTY. S. SANTILLAN:
to rest. The first is Hao’s claim that Bladimir took a three-day rest, more
particularly, on April 9, 10 and 11, 1995. The second is the respondents’ Q: In what particular place you met Bladimir Cubacub on April 11, 1995 at 9:00
insistence that Hao still required Bladimir to remain on the job from April 9 to o'clock in the morning?
April 12, 1995 despite Bladimir’s several requests to be allowed to go to his
parents’ home in Capas, Tarlac to have the much needed rest, because Hao was
WITNESS
then set to travel to Hongkong during the Holy Week break and desired Bladimir
to man the premises in his absence.
A: At the guard house, sir.
The Majority adopts the first, despite Hao supporting his claim with only his
mere say-so, but I incline towards the respondents’ version, because of the Q: Guard house of what company if you know or what place?
objective confirmation of the version by two witnesses, who coincided in their
declarations that Bladimir was on the job on April 11, 1995 and April 12, 1995, A: Ocean Builders, sir.
contrary to Hao’s claim.
Q: What was Bladimir doing there at the guard house when you arrived?
The first objective witness was Ariel Taruc, who was presented by the
respondents. Taruc testified that he saw Bladimir working, cleaning the company A: He was assigned in that guard house, sir.
premises and vehicles, and manning the gate on April 11, 1995. Taruc stated, too,
that Bladimir, already looking weak and full of rashes in his body, wanted very
much to go home to Capas, Tarlac to rest during the Holy Week break but his Q: Can you tell this Honorable Court what you and Bladimir talked about during
manager (Hao) did not give him permission to do so. I excerpt Taruc’s relevant that meeting at 9:00 o'clock on April 11, 1995?
testimony, to wit:
A: I also invited Bladimir to go home on Holy Thursday, however, he informed
Q: Now on April 11, 1995, what time did you and Mr. Cubacub talk? me that he could not go home because he was not allowed by his manager to go
home as his manager was going somewhere, sir.
A: 9:00 o'clock in the morning, sir.
Q: Now, can you tell this Honorable Court also if you know what was the
physical condition of Bladimir at the time you are talking to him?
Q: Can you tell this Honorable Court why you went there on April 11, 1995?
A: At that time, sir, his face was full of chicken pox, sir, and he looks weak, sir.
A: I wanted to invite him to go home because that was a Holy Week, sir.
Q: Now, was that the only subject of conversation between you and Bladimir
COURT Cubacub at the time you visited him?

Holy Tuesday, you did not work on that day? A: I was inviting him to go home that week, however he did not want to go
home, in fact he showed his chicken pox in his stomach and he informed me that
WITNESS he will be going home when I come back for work, sir.

We did not have work on that day ma'am. Q: Will you tell the Court, you describe what those bulutong looks like?

COURT A: "Butil-butil" with pus and his face, both arms and his stomach were full of
chicken pox, and they look like boil (pigsa), mam.24
Alright, proceed.
Page 20 of 53
The second objective witness was Ignacio Silangga, an employee of OBCC Q: And, when Bladimir opened the gate for you on April 12, 1995, was he in his
whom the petitioners presented on their side. Like Taruc, Silangga saw Bladimir ordinary self or usual ordinary self?
working on April 11, 1995 by cleaning the company premises and vehicles, and
opening and closing the gate of the premises, as the following except of his A: Yes, sir.
testimony bears out:
Q: Alright, so, after opening the gate of Ocean Builders, do you remember what
Q: On April 11? happened next?

A: On April 11, I saw him, sir. A: Bladimir Cubacub calls me "Kuya", sir, and he told me, "Kuya, can you bring
me to Tarlac", sir.
Q: Also working in the premises?
Q: And, did Bladimir Cubacub tell you the reason why he wants to be brought to
A: He was cleaning the vehicle, sir. Tarlac?

Q: So aside from cleaning the premises, opening, closing the gate, you also see
him cleaning the vehicles of the corporation, is that what you mean?
A: Yes, sir, that is his duty or job.
COURT
A: He told me that he wants to take a rest, sir.
Q: And, did he also tell you the reason why he wanted to take a rest?
A: He did not tell me the reason, sir. He just told me that he wants to take a rest,
so, his brothers and sisters could take care of him, sir.

Q: Cleaning the vehicle is his job?
A: Yes, ma’am.25
In addition, Silangga attested that Bladimir continued on the job on April 12,
1995, instead of resting. In fact, Silangga recalled Bladimir requesting to bring
him home to Tarlac ("bring me to Tarlac") because he wanted his own brothers
and sisters to take care of him and to rest. The relevant excerpt of Silangga’s
testimony follows:
Q: Can you recall to us what date was that when you last saw him before you
saw him at the hospital?
Q: Did he not also tell you the reason why he wants his brothers and sisters to
take care of him?
A: What I know, he was suffering from chicken pox, sir.26
With the aforequoted testimonies definitely confirming that Bladimir worked
until April 12, 1995 (at least) despite his greatly weakened condition, I wonder
how and why the RTC still held that Bladimir was solely responsible for the fatal
consequence of his affliction, and why the Majority agrees with the RTC and
completely absolves the petitioners from responsibility and liability.
2.c.

A: On April 12, 1995, sir, I came from Manila because I secured the Plate Bladimir contracted chicken pox

Number of Mr. Dennis Hao, sir. from a co-employee

Q: And, from Manila, where did you go? Citing the lack of any finding to that effect in the decisions of both lower courts,
the Majority downplays the cause of Bladimir’s chicken pox and ignores that
A: Upon entering the gate of your company, Bladimir was there and he was the Bladimir contracted the chicken pox from a co-worker.
one who opened the gate for me, sir.

Page 21 of 53
I cannot go along with the Majority. It will be odd if the Court refuses to rectify
the omission of both lower courts in missing out on such an important detail as
the causation of the chicken pox and ignores the evidence to that effect. The
silence of the lower courts ought not to impede the rectification, for ours is the
foremost duty, as the ultimate dispenser of justice and fairness, to make judicial
decisions speak the truth.
Thus, I excerpt from Hao’s testimony the portion that incontrovertibly shows
that he well knew that Bladimir had contracted his chicken pox from a co-
worker, in order to show how Bladimir contracted the chicken pox from a co-
worker, viz:
Q: Personally, have you experience from chicken pox (sic), do you know
whether it is something serious or what kind disease?
A: Actually, before Bladimir Cubacub was afflicted with chicken pox from one
of his co-employee who is also residing in the barracks who was afflicted with
chicken pox, that is why I saw that chicken pox could ill in about three (3) days,
sir.27
Clearly, it was Hao who himself confirmed that Bladimir had contracted his
chicken pox from a co-worker.
2.d.
Hao’s acts after Bladimir collapsed
 Contrary to the Majority’s conclusion, Hao willfully disregarded Bladimir’s
and was rushed to the hospital
 deteriorating condition and prevented him from taking time off from his job to
were superficial, too little, and too late
It is true that Hao directed Silangga to bring Bladimir to the community hospital
after he collapsed in the workplace, giving ₱1,000.00 for Bladimir’s medical
bill. But Hao’s solicitude was superficial (if not feigned), too little, and too late.
Superficial (if not feigned), for, although Bladimir, as a stay-in employee of
OBCC under Hao’s supervision, was Hao’s responsibility, Hao had not earlier
done anything to prevent Bladimir from contracting chicken pox by isolating
Bladimir from contact with the afflicted co-worker. Instead, Bladimir and the
afflicted co-worker were forced to stay together in their crowded barracks. In
addition, Hao showed no further interest in seeing to the condition of Bladimir
and in ascertaining whether the community hospital to where Bladimir had been
rushed upon Hao’s directive had the adequate facilities and medical personnel to
attend to Bladimir. Obviously, the community hospital was not adequate,
Page 22 of 53
because Bladimir’s condition deteriorated until he fell into coma on April 13,
1995, the day following his admission.
Too little, because ₱1,000.00 was a mere pittance when compared with OBCC’s
undeserved savings from not complying with its legally mandated obligation to
provide first aid treatment to its employees, and from not doing more after
Bladimir had been rushed to the community hospital by Silangga.
Too late, because by the time of rushing him to the community hospital Bladimir
had already collapsed due to the irreversible effects of the deadly complications
of the 3-days old affliction.
2.e.
Conclusion
Unlike the Majority, I find a direct link between the petitioners’ acts and
omissions and Bladimir’s death. The chain of the events from the time when
Bladimir was exposed to the chicken pox afflicting his co-worker due to their
staying together in the cramped space of the workers’ barracks, to the time when
Hao directed Silangga to rush the collapsed Bladimir to the community hospital,
and until Bladimir succumbed in QCGH indicated a natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, demonstrating how their
gross neglect of their employee’s plight led to or caused the wrongful death.
have the much needed complete rest. Hao’s attitude enabled the complications of
chicken pox, like pneumonia, to set in to complicate Bladimir’s condition. Hao
did not need to have a medical background to realize Bladimir’s worsening
condition and the concomitant perils, for such condition was not concealed due
to Bladimir’s body notoriously bearing the signs of his affliction and general
debility. By the time Hao acted and had Bladimir brought to the community
hospital, the complications of the disease were already irreversible.
Undoubtedly, the petitioners did not use that reasonable care and caution that an
ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation.
3.
Dr. Frias’ death certificate was

more reliable on the cause of death
The Majority do not consider the later death certificate issued by Dr. Frias
(which included chicken pox among the causes of death) more reliable than the
death certificate issued on April 17, 1995 by the QCGH (which did not include
chicken pox among the causes of death), mainly because Dr. Frias could not be
considered as Bladimir’s attending physician, he having merely ordered
Bladimir’s transfer to the QCGH after seeing him at the Caybiga Community
Hospital; and because the QCGH death certificate was a public document whose
entries are presumed correct unless their inaccuracy is first shown by positive
evidence.
I disagree with the Majority.
Although, concededly, any competent health professional can confirm that death
has occurred, only a physician who attended the patient during his last illness
can execute a death certificate. Anent the task, the physician provides an opinion
on the cause of death and certifies to such cause of death, not to the fact of death.
The physician is not required to confirm that life is extinct; or to view the body
of the deceased; or to report the fact that death has occurred. The death
certificate is not a medical document, but a civil one intended to serve various
legal purposes.
Was Dr. Frias qualified to execute the second death certificate?
I answer in the affirmative.
I deem to be uncontroverted that Dr. Frias medically attended to Bladimir during
his last illness, considering that Dr. Frias was the physician who coordinated
Bladimir’s transfer to QCGH from the Caybiga Community Hospital based on
his professional assessment of the true medical condition of Bladimir and of the
urgent need for the transfer to another medical institution with better facilities.
In contrast, the physician who executed on April 17, 1995 the death certificate
for Bladimir in QCGH did not attend to Bladimir during his last illness. This fact
is unquestionably borne out in the death certificate itself, in which the physician
ticked the box denominated as Question No. 20 in the form for the death
certificate, thereby stating that he had not attended to the deceased.28
Moreover, Dr. Frias testified that the QCGH death certificate was prepared
principally to enable the transport of the remains of Bladimir from Quezon City
to Tarlac. Upon seeing the incompleteness of the QCGH death certificate on the
causes of death, however, Dr. Frias felt compelled to execute another death
certificate, as the following excerpt of his testimony reveals:
Page 23 of 53
Q: The Court would like to be clarified, Dr. Frias. Who is authorized to issue a
death certificate based on the rules and regulations of the Department of Health?
A: Attending physicians, your Honor, and any doctor who saw the patient.
COURT
Q: Could you reconcile why there are two (2) death certificates in this case, one
issued by the hospital where the patient died and one which you issued?
A: They can be reconciled your Honor...
Q: No, I'm not asking for reconciliation. I'm just asking why there are two death
certificates?
A: Yes, it was given to him so that the patient can be transported while I made
the other one to show how seriously ill the patient was at the time of his death,
anyway I initially saw the patient and I was with him all the way up to the time
he was transferred to the Quezon City General Hospital, your Honor.
Q: Did I hear you correctly when you said that you issued the certificate after
you saw the death certificate issued by the Quezon City General Hospital?
A: Yes, your Honor.
Q: The Court is asking why is there a need for another death certificate when in
fact you said there was already a death certificate that was already issued if it is
for transporting the corpse?
A: I made one, your Honor. The answer is I made one so to show the real cause
of death of the patient. I think in my opinion, the death certificate of the Quezon
City General Hospital is inadequate to show the real condition of the patient.29
Based on the foregoing, therefore, that Dr. Frias had the basic competence to
execute the second death certificate, and that such death certificate was the more
reliable on the causes of Bladimir’s death should be beyond debate.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to deny the petition for review on certiorari, and to
affirm the decision rendered on June 22, 2001 by the Court of Appeals.
BARREDO vs GARCIA
At about 1:30am on May 3, 1936, Fontanilla’s taxi collided with a “kalesa”
thereby killing the 16 year old Faustino Garcia. Faustino’s parents filed a
criminal suit against Fontanilla and reserved their right to file a separate civil
suit. Fontanilla was eventually convicted. After the criminal suit, Garcia filed a
civil suit against Barredo – the owner of the taxi (employer of Fontanilla). The
suit was based on Article 1903 of the civil code (negligence of employers in the
selection of their employees). Barredo assailed the suit arguing that his liability
is only subsidiary and that the separate civil suit should have been filed against
Fontanilla primarily and not him.
ISSUE: Whether or not Barredo is just subsidiarily liable.
HELD: No. He is primarily liable under Article 1903 which is a separate civil
action against negligent employers. Garcia is well within his rights in suing
Barredo. He reserved his right to file a separate civil action and this is more
expeditious because by the time of the SC judgment Fontanilla is already serving
his sentence and has no property. It was also proven that Barredo is negligent in
hiring his employees because it was shown that Fontanilla had had multiple
traffic infractions already before he hired him – something he failed to overcome
during hearing. Had Garcia not reserved his right to file a separate civil action,
Barredo would have only been subsidiarily liable. Further, Barredo is not being
sued for damages arising from a criminal act (his driver’s negligence) but rather
for his own negligence in selecting his employee (Article 1903).
This case comes up from the Court of Appeals which held the petitioner herein,
Fausto Barredo, liable in damages for the death of Faustino Garcia caused by the
negligence of Pedro Fontanilla, a taxi driver employed by said Fausto Barredo.
At about half past one in the morning of May 3, 1936, on the road between
Malabon and Navotas, Province of Rizal, there was a head-on collision between
a taxi of the Malate Taxicab driven by Pedro Fontanilla and a carretela guided by
Pedro Dimapalis. The carretela was overturned, and one of its passengers, 16-
year-old boy Faustino Garcia, suffered injuries from which he died two days
later. A criminal action was filed against Fontanilla in the Court of First Instance
of Rizal, and he was convicted and sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of
one year and one day to two years of prision correccional. The court in the
criminal case granted the petition that the right to bring a separate civil action be
reserved. The Court of Appeals affirmed the sentence of the lower court in the
criminal case. Severino Garcia and Timotea Almario, parents of the deceased on
March 7, 1939, brought an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila against
Fausto Barredo as the sole proprietor of the Malate Taxicab and employer of
Pedro Fontanilla. On July 8, 1939, the Court of First Instance of Manila awarded
damages in favor of the plaintiffs for P2,000 plus legal interest from the date of
Page 24 of 53
the complaint. This decision was modified by the Court of Appeals by reducing
the damages to P1,000 with legal interest from the time the action was instituted.
It is undisputed that Fontanilla 's negligence was the cause of the mishap, as he
was driving on the wrong side of the road, and at high speed. As to Barredo's
responsibility, the Court of Appeals found:
... It is admitted that defendant is Fontanilla's employer. There is proof that he
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. (See p.
22, appellant's brief.) In fact it is shown he was careless in employing Fontanilla
who had been caught several times for violation of the Automobile Law and
speeding (Exhibit A) — violation which appeared in the records of the Bureau of
Public Works available to be public and to himself. Therefore, he must
indemnify plaintiffs under the provisions of article 1903 of the Civil Code.
The main theory of the defense is that the liability of Fausto Barredo is governed
by the Revised Penal Code; hence, his liability is only subsidiary, and as there
has been no civil action against Pedro Fontanilla, the person criminally liable,
Barredo cannot be held responsible in the case. The petitioner's brief states on
page 10:
... The Court of Appeals holds that the petitioner is being sued for his failure to
exercise all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of Pedro Fontanilla to prevent damages suffered by the respondents.
In other words, The Court of Appeals insists on applying in the case article 1903
of the Civil Code. Article 1903 of the Civil Code is found in Chapter II, Title 16,
Book IV of the Civil Code. This fact makes said article to a civil liability arising
from a crime as in the case at bar simply because Chapter II of Title 16 of Book
IV of the Civil Code, in the precise words of article 1903 of the Civil Code itself,
is applicable only to "those (obligations) arising from wrongful or negligent acts
or commission not punishable by law.
The gist of the decision of the Court of Appeals is expressed thus:
... We cannot agree to the defendant's contention. The liability sought to be
imposed upon him in this action is not a civil obligation arising from a felony or
a misdemeanor (the crime of Pedro Fontanilla,), but an obligation imposed in
article 1903 of the Civil Code by reason of his negligence in the selection or
supervision of his servant or employee.
The pivotal question in this case is whether the plaintiffs may bring this separate
civil action against Fausto Barredo, thus making him primarily and directly,
responsible under article 1903 of the Civil Code as an employer of Pedro
Fontanilla. The defendant maintains that Fontanilla's negligence being
punishable by the Penal Code, his (defendant's) liability as an employer is only
subsidiary, according to said Penal code, but Fontanilla has not been sued in a
civil action and his property has not been exhausted. To decide the main issue,
we must cut through the tangle that has, in the minds of many confused and
jumbled together delitos and cuasi delitos, or crimes under the Penal Code and
fault or negligence under articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. This should be
done, because justice may be lost in a labyrinth, unless principles and remedies
are distinctly envisaged. Fortunately, we are aided in our inquiry by the luminous
presentation of the perplexing subject by renown jurists and we are likewise
guided by the decisions of this Court in previous cases as well as by the solemn
clarity of the consideration in several sentences of the Supreme Tribunal of
Spain.
Authorities support the proposition that a quasi-delict or "culpa aquiliana " is a
separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own,
and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from delict or crime.
Upon this principle and on the wording and spirit article 1903 of the Civil Code,
the primary and direct responsibility of employers may be safely anchored.
The pertinent provisions of the Civil Code and Revised Penal Code are as
follows:
CIVIL CODE
ART. 1089 Obligations arise from law, from contracts and quasi-contracts, and
from acts and omissions which are unlawful or in which any kind of fault or
negligence intervenes.
xxx xxx xxx
ART. 1903. The obligation imposed by the next preceding article is enforcible,
not only for personal acts and omissions, but also for those of persons for whom
another is responsible.
The father and in, case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are liable for any
damages caused by the minor children who live with them.
Guardians are liable for damages done by minors or incapacitated persons
subject to their authority and living with them.
Owners or directors of an establishment or business are equally liable for any
damages caused by their employees while engaged in the branch of the service
in which employed, or on occasion of the performance of their duties.
The State is subject to the same liability when it acts through a special agent, but
not if the damage shall have been caused by the official upon whom properly
devolved the duty of doing the act performed, in which case the provisions of the
next preceding article shall be applicable.
Finally, teachers or directors of arts trades are liable for any damages caused by
their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody.
The liability imposed by this article shall cease in case the persons mentioned
therein prove that they are exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family
to prevent the damage.
ART. 1904. Any person who pays for damage caused by his employees may
recover from the latter what he may have paid.

REVISED PENAL CODE

ART. 1092. Civil obligations arising from felonies or misdemeanors shall be
governed by the provisions of the Penal Code.
ART. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of felony. — Every person criminally
liable for a felony is also civilly liable.
ART. 1093. Those which are derived from acts or omissions in which fault or
negligence, not punishable by law, intervenes shall be subject to the provisions
of Chapter II, Title XVI of this book. ART. 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. — The exemption
from criminal liability established in subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 of article 12
and in subdivision 4 of article 11 of this Code does not include exemption from
xxx xxx xxx
civil liability, which shall be enforced to the following rules:
ART 1902. Any person who by an act or omission causes damage to another by
First. In cases of subdivision, 1, 2 and 3 of article 12 the civil liability for acts
his fault or negligence shall be liable for the damage so done.
committed by any imbecile or insane person, and by a person under nine years of
age, or by one over nine but under fifteen years of age, who has acted without

Page 25 of 53
discernment shall devolve upon those having such person under their legal
authority or control, unless it appears that there was no fault or negligence on
their part.
Should there be no person having such insane, imbecile or minor under his
authority, legal guardianship, or control, or if such person be insolvent, said
insane, imbecile, or minor shall respond with their own property, excepting
property exempt from execution, in accordance with the civil law.
Second. In cases falling within subdivision 4 of article 11, the person for whose
benefit the harm has been prevented shall be civilly liable in proportion to the
benefit which they may have received.
The courts shall determine, in their sound discretion, the proportionate amount
for which each one shall be liable.
When the respective shares can not be equitably determined, even
approximately, or when the liability also attaches to the Government, or to the
majority of the inhabitants of the town, and, in all events, whenever the damage
has been caused with the consent of the authorities or their agents,
indemnification shall be made in the manner prescribed by special laws or
regulations.
Third. In cases falling within subdivisions 5 and 6 of article 12, the persons
using violence or causing the fear shall be primarily liable and secondarily, or, if
there be no such persons, those doing the act shall be liable, saving always to the
latter that part of their property exempt from execution.
ART. 102. Subsidiary civil liability of innkeepers, tavern keepers and proprietors
of establishment. — In default of persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavern
keepers, and any other persons or corporation shall be civilly liable for crimes
committed in their establishments, in all cases where a violation of municipal
ordinances or some general or special police regulation shall have been
committed by them or their employees.
Innkeepers are also subsidiarily liable for the restitution of goods taken by
robbery or theft within their houses lodging therein, or the person, or for the
payment of the value thereof, provided that such guests shall have notified in
advance the innkeeper himself, or the person representing him, of the deposit of
such goods within the inn; and shall furthermore have followed the directions
which such innkeeper or his representative may have given them with respect to
the care of and vigilance over such goods. No liability shall attach in case of
Page 26 of 53
robbery with violence against or intimidation against or intimidation of persons
unless committed by the innkeeper's employees.
ART. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. — The subsidiary liability
established in the next preceding article shall also apply to employers, teachers,
persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies
committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the
discharge of their duties.
xxx xxx xxx
ART. 365. Imprudence and negligence. — Any person who, by reckless
imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been intentional, would
constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period; if it would have
constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and
medium periods shall be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act
which would otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty
of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods; if it would have
constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum
period shall be imposed."
It will thus be seen that while the terms of articles 1902 of the Civil Code seem
to be broad enough to cover the driver's negligence in the instant case,
nevertheless article 1093 limits cuasi-delitos to acts or omissions "not
punishable by law." But inasmuch as article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
punishes not only reckless but even simple imprudence or negligence, the fault
or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code has apparently been crowded
out. It is this overlapping that makes the "confusion worse confounded."
However, a closer study shows that such a concurrence of scope in regard to
negligent acts does not destroy the distinction between the civil liability arising
from a crime and the responsibility for cuasi-delitos or culpa extra-contractual.
The same negligent act causing damages may produce civil liability arising from
a crime under article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, or create an action
for cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual under articles 1902-1910 of the Civil
Code.
The individuality of cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual looms clear and
unmistakable. This legal institution is of ancient lineage, one of its early
ancestors being the Lex Aquilia in the Roman Law. In fact, in Spanish legal
terminology, this responsibility is often referred to as culpa aquiliana. The
Partidas also contributed to the genealogy of the present fault or negligence
under the Civil Code; for instance, Law 6, Title 15, of Partida 7, says: "Tenudo
es de fazer emienda, porque, como quier que el non fizo a sabiendas en daño al
otro, pero acaescio por su culpa."
The distinctive nature of cuasi-delitos survives in the Civil Code. According to
article 1089, one of the five sources of obligations is this legal institution
of cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual: "los actos . . . en que intervenga
cualquier genero de culpa o negligencia." Then article 1093 provides that this
kind of obligation shall be governed by Chapter II of Title XVI of Book IV,
meaning articles 1902-0910. This portion of the Civil Code is exclusively
devoted to the legal institution of culpa aquiliana.
Some of the differences between crimes under the Penal Code and the culpa
aquiliana or cuasi-delito under the Civil Code are:
1. That crimes affect the public interest, while cuasi-delitos are only of private
concern.
2. That, consequently, the Penal Code punishes or corrects the criminal act,
while the Civil Code, by means of indemnification, merely repairs the damage.
3. That delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts, because the former are punished
only if there is a penal law clearly covering them, while the latter, cuasi-delitos,
include all acts in which "any king of fault or negligence intervenes." However,
it should be noted that not all violations of the penal law produce civil
responsibility, such as begging in contravention of ordinances, violation of the
game laws, infraction of the rules of traffic when nobody is hurt. (See Colin and
Capitant, "Curso Elemental de Derecho Civil," Vol. 3, p. 728.)
Let us now ascertain what some jurists say on the separate existence of quasi-
delicts and the employer's primary and direct liability under article 1903 of the
Civil Code.
Dorado Montero in his essay on "Responsibilidad" in the "Enciclopedia Juridica
Española" (Vol. XXVII, p. 414) says:
El concepto juridico de la responsabilidad civil abarca diversos aspectos y
comprende a diferentes personas. Asi, existe una responsabilidad civil
propiamente dicha, que en ningun casl lleva aparejada responsabilidad criminal
alguna, y otra que es consecuencia indeclinable de la penal que nace de todo
delito o falta."
Page 27 of 53
The juridical concept of civil responsibility has various aspects and comprises
different persons. Thus, there is a civil responsibility, properly speaking, which
in no case carries with it any criminal responsibility, and another which is a
necessary consequence of the penal liability as a result of every felony or
misdemeanor."
Maura, an outstanding authority, was consulted on the following case: There had
been a collision between two trains belonging respectively to the Ferrocarril
Cantabrico and the Ferrocarril del Norte. An employee of the latter had been
prosecuted in a criminal case, in which the company had been made a party as
subsidiarily responsible in civil damages. The employee had been acquitted in
the criminal case, and the employer, the Ferrocarril del Norte, had also been
exonerated. The question asked was whether the Ferrocarril Cantabrico could
still bring a civil action for damages against the Ferrocarril del Norte. Maura's
opinion was in the affirmative, stating in part (Maura, Dictamenes, Vol. 6, pp.
511-513):
Quedando las cosas asi, a proposito de la realidad pura y neta de los hechos,
todavia menos parece sostenible que exista cosa juzgada acerca de la obligacion
civil de indemnizar los quebrantos y menoscabos inferidos por el choque de los
trenes. El titulo en que se funda la accion para demandar el resarcimiento, no
puede confundirse con las responsabilidades civiles nacidas de delito, siquiera
exista en este, sea el cual sea, una culpa rodeada de notas agravatorias que
motivan sanciones penales, mas o menos severas. La lesion causada por delito o
falta en los derechos civiles, requiere restituciones, reparaciones o
indemnizaciones, que cual la pena misma atañen al orden publico; por tal motivo
vienen encomendadas, de ordinario, al Ministerio Fiscal; y claro es que si por
esta via se enmiendan los quebrantos y menoscabos, el agraviado excusa
procurar el ya conseguido desagravio; pero esta eventual coincidencia de los
efectos, no borra la diversidad originaria de las acciones civiles para pedir
indemnizacion.
Estas, para el caso actual (prescindiendo de culpas contractuales, que no
vendrian a cuento y que tiene otro regimen), dimanan, segun el articulo 1902 del
Codigo Civil, de toda accion u omision, causante de daños o perjuicios, en que
intervenga culpa o negligencia. Es trivial que acciones semejantes son
ejercitadas ante los Tribunales de lo civil cotidianamente, sin que la Justicia
punitiva tenga que mezclarse en los asuntos. Los articulos 18 al 21 y 121 al 128
del Codigo Penal, atentos al espiritu y a los fines sociales y politicos del mismo,
desenvuelven y ordenan la materia de responsabilidades civiles nacidas de
delito, en terminos separados del regimen por ley comun de la culpa que se
denomina aquiliana, por alusion a precedentes legislativos del Corpus Juris.
Seria intempestivo un paralelo entre aquellas ordenaciones, y la de la obligacion
de indemnizar a titulo de culpa civil; pero viene al caso y es necesaria una de las
diferenciaciones que en el tal paralelo se notarian.
Los articulos 20 y 21 del Codigo Penal, despues de distribuir a su modo las
responsabilidades civiles, entre los que sean por diversos conceptos culpables
del delito o falta, las hacen extensivas a las empresas y los establecimientos al
servicio de los cuales estan los delincuentes; pero con caracter subsidiario, o sea,
segun el texto literal, en defecto de los que sean responsables criminalmente. No
coincide en ello el Codigo Civil, cuyo articulo 1903, dice; La obligacion que
impone el articulo anterior es exigible, no solo por los actos y omisiones
propios, sino por los de aquellas personas de quienes se debe responder;
personas en la enumeracion de las cuales figuran los dependientes y empleados
de los establecimientos o empresas, sea por actos del servicio, sea con ocasion
de sus funciones. Por esto acontece, y se observa en la jurisprudencia, que las
empresas, despues de intervenir en las causas criminales con el caracter
subsidiario de su responsabilidad civil por razon del delito, son demandadas y
condenadas directa y aisladamente, cuando se trata de la obligacion, ante los
tribunales civiles.
Siendo como se ve, diverso el titulo de esta obligacion, y formando verdadero
postulado de nuestro regimen judicial la separacion entre justicia punitiva y
tribunales de lo civil, de suerte que tienen unos y otros normas de fondo en
distintos cuerpos legales, y diferentes modos de proceder, habiendose, por
añadidura, abstenido de asistir al juicio criminal la Compañia del Ferrocarril
Cantabrico, que se reservo ejercitar sus acciones, parece innegable que la de
indemnizacion por los daños y perjuicios que le irrogo el choque, no estuvo sub
judice ante el Tribunal del Jurado, ni fue sentenciada, sino que permanecio
intacta, al pronunciarse el fallo de 21 de marzo. Aun cuando el veredicto no
hubiese sido de inculpabilidad, mostrose mas arriba, que tal accion quedaba
legitimamente reservada para despues del proceso; pero al declararse que no
existio delito, ni responsabilidad dimanada de delito, materia unica sobre que
tenian jurisdiccion aquellos juzgadores, se redobla el motivo para la obligacion
civil ex lege, y se patentiza mas y mas que la accion para pedir su cumplimiento
permanece incolume, extraña a la cosa juzgada.
As things are, apropos of the reality pure and simple of the facts, it seems less
tenable that there should be res judicata with regard to the civil obligation for
damages on account of the losses caused by the collision of the trains. The title
upon which the action for reparation is based cannot be confused with the civil
responsibilities born of a crime, because there exists in the latter, whatever each
nature, a culpa surrounded with aggravating aspects which give rise to penal
measures that are more or less severe. The injury caused by a felony or
misdemeanor upon civil rights requires restitutions, reparations, or
indemnifications which, like the penalty itself, affect public order; for this
Page 28 of 53
reason, they are ordinarily entrusted to the office of the prosecuting attorney; and
it is clear that if by this means the losses and damages are repaired, the injured
party no longer desires to seek another relief; but this coincidence of effects does
not eliminate the peculiar nature of civil actions to ask for indemnity.
Such civil actions in the present case (without referring to contractual faults
which are not pertinent and belong to another scope) are derived, according to
article 1902 of the Civil Code, from every act or omission causing losses and
damages in which culpa or negligence intervenes. It is unimportant that such
actions are every day filed before the civil courts without the criminal courts
interfering therewith. Articles 18 to 21 and 121 to 128 of the Penal Code,
bearing in mind the spirit and the social and political purposes of that Code,
develop and regulate the matter of civil responsibilities arising from a crime,
separately from the regime under common law, of culpa which is known
as aquiliana, in accordance with legislative precedent of the Corpus Juris. It
would be unwarranted to make a detailed comparison between the former
provisions and that regarding the obligation to indemnify on account of
civil culpa; but it is pertinent and necessary to point out to one of such
differences.
Articles 20 and 21 of the Penal Code, after distriburing in their own way the
civil responsibilities among those who, for different reasons, are guilty of felony
or misdemeanor, make such civil responsibilities applicable to enterprises and
establishments for which the guilty parties render service, but with subsidiary
character, that is to say, according to the wording of the Penal Code, in default of
those who are criminally responsible. In this regard, the Civil Code does not
coincide because article 1903 says: "The obligation imposed by the next
preceding article is demandable, not only for personal acts and omissions, but
also for those of persons for whom another is responsible." Among the persons
enumerated are the subordinates and employees of establishments or enterprises,
either for acts during their service or on the occasion of their functions. It is for
this reason that it happens, and it is so observed in judicial decisions, that the
companies or enterprises, after taking part in the criminal cases because of their
subsidiary civil responsibility by reason of the crime, are sued and
sentenced directly and separately with regard to the obligation, before the civil
courts.
Seeing that the title of this obligation is different, and the separation between
punitive justice and the civil courts being a true postulate of our judicial system,
so that they have different fundamental norms in different codes, as well as
different modes of procedure, and inasmuch as the Compaña del Ferrocarril
Cantabrico has abstained from taking part in the criminal case and has reserved
the right to exercise its actions, it seems undeniable that the action for
indemnification for the losses and damages caused to it by the collision was
not sub judice before the Tribunal del Jurado, nor was it the subject of a
sentence, but it remained intact when the decision of March 21 was rendered.
Even if the verdict had not been that of acquittal, it has already been shown that
such action had been legitimately reserved till after the criminal prosecution; but
because of the declaration of the non-existence of the felony and the non-
existence of the responsibility arising from the crime, which was the sole subject
matter upon which the Tribunal del Jurado had jurisdiction, there is greater
reason for the civil obligation ex lege, and it becomes clearer that the action for
its enforcement remain intact and is not res judicata.
Laurent, a jurist who has written a monumental work on the French Civil Code,
on which the Spanish Civil Code is largely based and whose provisions
on cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual are similar to those of the Spanish
Civil Code, says, referring to article 1384 of the French Civil Code which
corresponds to article 1903, Spanish Civil Code:
The action can be brought directly against the person responsible (for another),
without including the author of the act. The action against the principal is
accessory in the sense that it implies the existence of a prejudicial act committed
by the employee, but it is not subsidiary in the sense that it can not be instituted
till after the judgment against the author of the act or at least, that it is subsidiary
to the principal action; the action for responsibility (of the employer) is in itself a
principal action. (Laurent, Principles of French Civil Law, Spanish translation,
Vol. 20, pp. 734-735.)
Amandi, in his "Cuestionario del Codigo Civil Reformado" (Vol. 4, pp. 429,
430), declares that the responsibility of the employer is principal and not
subsidiary. He writes:
Question No. 1. Is the responsibility declared in article 1903 for the acts or
omissions of those persons for who one is responsible, subsidiary or principal?
In order to answer this question it is necessary to know, in the first place, on
what the legal provision is based. Is it true that there is a responsibility for the
fault of another person? It seems so at first sight; but such assertion would be
contrary to justice and to the universal maxim that all faults are personal, and
that everyone is liable for those faults that can be imputed to him. The
responsibility in question is imposed on the occasion of a crime or fault, but not
because of the same, but because of the cuasi-delito, that is to say, the
imprudence or negligence of the father, guardian, proprietor or manager of the
establishment, of the teacher, etc. Whenever anyone of the persons enumerated
in the article referred to (minors, incapacitated persons, employees, apprentices)
causes any damage, the law presumes that the father, guardian, teacher, etc. have
committed an act of negligence in not preventing or avoiding the damage. It is
this fault that is condemned by the law. It is, therefore, only apparent that there is
Page 29 of 53
a responsibility for the act of another; in reality the responsibility exacted is for
one's own act. The idea that such responsibility is subsidiary is, therefore,
completely inadmissible.
Oyuelos, in his "Digesto: Principios, Doctrina y Jurisprudencia, Referentes al
Codigo Civil Español," says in Vol. VII, p. 743:
That is to say, one is not responsible for the acts of others, because one is liable
only for his own faults, this being the doctrine of article 1902; but, by exception,
one is liable for the acts of those persons with whom there is a bond or tie which
gives rise to the responsibility. Is this responsibility direct or subsidiary? In the
order of the penal law, the Penal Code distinguishes between minors and
incapacitated persons on the one hand, and other persons on the other, declaring
that the responsibility for the former is direct (article 19), and for the latter,
subsidiary (articles 20 and 21); but in the scheme of the civil law, in the case of
article 1903, the responsibility should be understood as direct, according to the
tenor of that articles, for precisely it imposes responsibility "for the acts of those
persons for whom one should be responsible."
Coming now to the sentences of the Supreme Tribunal of Spain, that court has
upheld the principles above set forth: that a quasi-delict or culpa extra-
contractual is a separate and distinct legal institution, independent from the civil
responsibility arising from criminal liability, and that an employer is, under
article 1903 of the Civil Code, primarily and directly responsible for the
negligent acts of his employee.
One of the most important of those Spanish decisions is that of October 21,
1910. In that case, Ramon Lafuente died as the result of having been run over by
a street car owned by the "compañia Electric Madrileña de Traccion." The
conductor was prosecuted in a criminal case but he was acquitted. Thereupon,
the widow filed a civil action against the street car company, paying for damages
in the amount of 15,000 pesetas. The lower court awarded damages; so the
company appealed to the Supreme Tribunal, alleging violation of articles 1902
and 1903 of the Civil Code because by final judgment the non-existence of fault
or negligence had been declared. The Supreme Court of Spain dismissed the
appeal, saying:
Considering that the first ground of the appeal is based on the mistaken
supposition that the trial court, in sentencing the Compañia Madrileña to the
payment of the damage caused by the death of Ramon Lafuente Izquierdo,
disregards the value and juridical effects of the sentence of acquittal rendered in
the criminal case instituted on account of the same act, when it is a fact that the
two jurisdictions had taken cognizance of the same act in its different aspects,
and as the criminal jurisdiction declared within the limits of its authority that the
act in question did not constitute a felony because there was no grave
carelessness or negligence, and this being the only basis of acquittal, it does no
exclude the co-existence of fault or negligence which is not qualified, and is a
source of civil obligations according to article 1902 of the Civil Code, affecting,
in accordance with article 1903, among other persons, the managers of
establishments or enterprises by reason of the damages caused by employees
under certain conditions, it is manifest that the civil jurisdiccion in taking
cognizance of the same act in this latter aspect and in ordering the company,
appellant herein, to pay an indemnity for the damage caused by one of its
employees, far from violating said legal provisions, in relation with article 116 of
the Law of Criminal Procedure, strictly followed the same, without invading
attributes which are beyond its own jurisdiction, and without in any way
contradicting the decision in that cause. (Emphasis supplied.)
It will be noted, as to the case just cited:
First. That the conductor was not sued in a civil case, either separately or with
the street car company. This is precisely what happens in the present case: the
driver, Fontanilla, has not been sued in a civil action, either alone or with his
employer.
Second. That the conductor had been acquitted of grave criminal negligence, but
the Supreme Tribunal of Spain said that this did not exclude the co-existence of
fault or negligence, which is not qualified, on the part of the conductor, under
article 1902 of the Civil Code. In the present case, the taxi driver was found
guilty of criminal negligence, so that if he had even sued for his civil
responsibility arising from the crime, he would have been held primarily liable
for civil damages, and Barredo would have been held subsidiarily liable for the
same. But the plaintiffs are directly suing Barredo, on his primary responsibility
because of his own presumed negligence — which he did not overcome —
under article 1903. Thus, there were two liabilities of Barredo: first, the
subsidiary one because of the civil liability of the taxi driver arising from the
latter's criminal negligence; and, second, Barredo's primary liability as an
employer under article 1903. The plaintiffs were free to choose which course to
take, and they preferred the second remedy. In so doing, they were acting within
their rights. It might be observed in passing, that the plaintiff choose the more
expeditious and effective method of relief, because Fontanilla was either in
prison, or had just been released, and besides, he was probably without property
which might be seized in enforcing any judgment against him for damages.
Third. That inasmuch as in the above sentence of October 21, 1910, the
employer was held liable civilly, notwithstanding the acquittal of the employee
(the conductor) in a previous criminal case, with greater reason should Barredo,
the employer in the case at bar, be held liable for damages in a civil suit filed
Page 30 of 53
against him because his taxi driver had been convicted. The degree of negligence
of the conductor in the Spanish case cited was less than that of the taxi driver,
Fontanilla, because the former was acquitted in the previous criminal case while
the latter was found guilty of criminal negligence and was sentenced to an
indeterminate sentence of one year and one day to two years of prision
correccional.
(See also Sentence of February 19, 1902, which is similar to the one above
quoted.)
In the Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain, dated February 14, 1919, an
action was brought against a railroad company for damages because the station
agent, employed by the company, had unjustly and fraudulently, refused to
deliver certain articles consigned to the plaintiff. The Supreme Court of Spain
held that this action was properly under article 1902 of the Civil Code, the court
saying:
Considering that the sentence, in question recognizes, in virtue of the facts
which it declares, in relation to the evidence in the case: (1) that the invoice
issued by the railroad company in favor of the plaintiff contemplated that the
empty receptacles referred to in the complaint should be returned to the
consignors with wines and liquors; (2) that when the said merchandise reached
their destination, their delivery to the consignee was refused by the station agent
without justification and with fraudulent intent, and (3) that the lack of delivery
of these goods when they were demanded by the plaintiff caused him losses and
damages of considerable importance, as he was a wholesale vendor of wines and
liquors and he failed to realize the profits when he was unable to fill the orders
sent to him by the consignors of the receptacles:
Considering that upon this basis there is need of upholding the four assignments
of error, as the original complaint did not contain any cause of action arising
from non-fulfillment of a contract of transportation, because the action was not
based on the delay of the goods nor on any contractual relation between the
parties litigant and, therefore, article 371 of the Code of Commerce, on which
the decision appealed from is based, is not applicable; but it limits to asking for
reparation for losses and damages produced on the patrimony of the plaintiff on
account of the unjustified and fraudulent refusal of the carrier to deliver the
goods consigned to the plaintiff as stated by the sentence, and the carrier's
responsibility is clearly laid down in article 1902 of the Civil Code which binds,
in virtue of the next article, the defendant company, because the latter is
connected with the person who caused the damage by relations of economic
character and by administrative hierarchy. (Emphasis supplied.)
The above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act may come under
both the Penal Code and the Civil Code. In that case, the action of the agent was
unjustified and fraudulent and therefore could have been the subject of a
criminal action. And yet, it was held to be also a proper subject of a civil action
under article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is also to be noted that it was the
employer and not the employee who was being sued.
Let us now examine the cases previously decided by this Court.
In the leading case of Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil., 359,
362-365 [year 1907]), the trial court awarded damages to the plaintiff, a laborer
of the defendant, because the latter had negligently failed to repair a tramway in
consequence of which the rails slid off while iron was being transported, and
caught the plaintiff whose leg was broken. This Court held:
It is contended by the defendant, as its first defense to the action that the
necessary conclusion from these collated laws is that the remedy for injuries
through negligence lies only in a criminal action in which the official criminally
responsible must be made primarily liable and his employer held only
subsidiarily to him. According to this theory the plaintiff should have procured
the arrest of the representative of the company accountable for not repairing the
track, and on his prosecution a suitable fine should have been imposed, payable
primarily by him and secondarily by his employer.
This reasoning misconceived the plan of the Spanish codes upon this subject.
Article 1093 of the Civil Code makes obligations arising from faults or
negligence not punished by the law, subject to the provisions of Chapter II of
Title XVI. Section 1902 of that chapter reads:
"A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another when there is
fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done.
"SEC. 1903. The obligation imposed by the preceeding article is demandable,
not only for personal acts and omissions, but also for those of the persons for
whom they should be responsible.
"The father, and on his death or incapacity, the mother, is liable for the damages
caused by the minors who live with them.
xxx xxx xxx
Page 31 of 53
"Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally liable for the
damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the
latter may be employed or in the performance of their duties.
xxx xxx xxx
"The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned
therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
avoid the damage."
As an answer to the argument urged in this particular action it may be sufficient
to point out that nowhere in our general statutes is the employer penalized for
failure to provide or maintain safe appliances for his workmen. His obligation
therefore is one 'not punished by the laws' and falls under civil rather than
criminal jurisprudence. But the answer may be a broader one. We should be
reluctant, under any conditions, to adopt a forced construction of these scientific
codes, such as is proposed by the defendant, that would rob some of these
articles of effect, would shut out litigants against their will from the civil courts,
would make the assertion of their rights dependent upon the selection for
prosecution of the proper criminal offender, and render recovery doubtful by
reason of the strict rules of proof prevailing in criminal actions. Even if these
articles had always stood alone, such a construction would be unnecessary, but
clear light is thrown upon their meaning by the provisions of the Law of
Criminal Procedure of Spain (Ley de Enjuiciamiento Criminal), which, though
never in actual force in these Islands, was formerly given a suppletory or
explanatory effect. Under article 111 of this law, both classes of action, civil and
criminal, might be prosecuted jointly or separately, but while the penal action
was pending the civil was suspended. According to article 112, the penal action
once started, the civil remedy should be sought therewith, unless it had been
waived by the party injured or been expressly reserved by him for civil
proceedings for the future. If the civil action alone was prosecuted, arising out of
a crime that could be enforced only on private complaint, the penal action
thereunder should be extinguished. These provisions are in harmony with those
of articles 23 and 133 of our Penal Code on the same subject.
An examination of this topic might be carried much further, but the citation of
these articles suffices to show that the civil liability was not intended to be
merged in the criminal nor even to be suspended thereby, except as expressly
provided in the law. Where an individual is civilly liable for a negligent act or
omission, it is not required that the injured party should seek out a third person
criminally liable whose prosecution must be a condition precedent to the
enforcement of the civil right.
Under article 20 of the Penal Code the responsibility of an employer may be
regarded as subsidiary in respect of criminal actions against his employees only
while they are in process of prosecution, or in so far as they determine the
existence of the criminal act from which liability arises, and his obligation under
the civil law and its enforcement in the civil courts is not barred thereby unless
by the election of the injured person. Inasmuch as no criminal proceeding had
been instituted, growing our of the accident in question, the provisions of the
Penal Code can not affect this action. This construction renders it unnecessary to
finally determine here whether this subsidiary civil liability in penal actions has
survived the laws that fully regulated it or has been abrogated by the American
civil and criminal procedure now in force in the Philippines.
The difficulty in construing the articles of the code above cited in this case
appears from the briefs before us to have arisen from the interpretation of the
words of article 1093, "fault or negligence not punished by law," as applied to
the comprehensive definition of offenses in articles 568 and 590 of the Penal
Code. It has been shown that the liability of an employer arising out of his
relation to his employee who is the offender is not to be regarded as derived
from negligence punished by the law, within the meaning of articles 1902 and
1093. More than this, however, it cannot be said to fall within the class of acts
unpunished by the law, the consequence of which are regulated by articles 1902
and 1903 of the Civil Code. The acts to which these articles are applicable are
understood to be those not growing out of pre-existing duties of the parties to
one another. But where relations already formed give rise to duties, whether
springing from contract or quasi contract, then breaches of those duties are
subject to articles 1101, 1103, and 1104 of the same code. A typical application
of this distinction may be found in the consequences of a railway accident due to
defective machinery supplied by the employer. His liability to his employee
would arise out of the contract of employment, that to the passengers out of the
contract for passage, while that to the injured bystander would originate in the
negligent act itself.
In Manzanares vs. Moreta, 38 Phil., 821 (year 1918), the mother of the 8 of 9-
year-old child Salvador Bona brought a civil action against Moreta to recover
damages resulting from the death of the child, who had been run over by an
automobile driven and managed by the defendant. The trial court rendered
judgment requiring the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P1,000 as
indemnity: This Court in affirming the judgment, said in part:
If it were true that the defendant, in coming from the southern part of Solana
Street, had to stop his auto before crossing Real Street, because he had met
vehicles which were going along the latter street or were coming from the
opposite direction along Solana Street, it is to be believed that, when he again
started to run his auto across said Real Street and to continue its way along
Page 32 of 53
Solana Street northward, he should have adjusted the speed of the auto which he
was operating until he had fully crossed Real Street and had completely reached
a clear way on Solana Street. But, as the child was run over by the auto precisely
at the entrance of Solana Street, this accident could not have occurred if the auto
had been running at a slow speed, aside from the fact that the defendant, at the
moment of crossing Real Street and entering Solana Street, in a northward
direction, could have seen the child in the act of crossing the latter street from
the sidewalk on the right to that on the left, and if the accident had occurred in
such a way that after the automobile had run over the body of the child, and the
child's body had already been stretched out on the ground, the automobile still
moved along a distance of about 2 meters, this circumstance shows the fact that
the automobile entered Solana Street from Real Street, at a high speed without
the defendant having blown the horn. If these precautions had been taken by the
defendant, the deplorable accident which caused the death of the child would not
have occurred.
It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have been
prosecuted in a criminal case because his negligence causing the death of the
child was punishable by the Penal Code. Here is therefore a clear instance of the
same act of negligence being a proper subject-matter either of a criminal action
with its consequent civil liability arising from a crime or of an entirely separate
and independent civil action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the
Civil Code. Thus, in this jurisdiction, the separate individually of a cuasi-
delito or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code has been fully and clearly
recognized, even with regard to a negligent act for which the wrongdoer could
have been prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case and for which, after such
a conviction, he could have been sued for this civil liability arising from his
crime.
Years later (in 1930) this Court had another occasion to apply the same doctrine.
In Bernal and Enverso vs. House and Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd., 54
Phil., 327, the parents of the five-year-old child, Purificacion Bernal, brought a
civil action to recover damages for the child's death as a result of burns caused
by the fault and negligence of the defendants. On the evening of April 10, 1925,
the Good Friday procession was held in Tacloban, Leyte. Fortunata Enverso with
her daughter Purificacion Bernal had come from another municipality to attend
the same. After the procession the mother and the daughter with two others were
passing along Gran Capitan Street in front of the offices of the Tacloban Electric
& Ice Plant, Ltd., owned by defendants J. V. House, when an automobile
appeared from the opposite direction. The little girl, who was slightly ahead of
the rest, was so frightened by the automobile that she turned to run, but
unfortunately she fell into the street gutter where hot water from the electric
plant was flowing. The child died that same night from the burns. The trial
courts dismissed the action because of the contributory negligence of the
plaintiffs. But this Court held, on appeal, that there was no contributory
negligence, and allowed the parents P1,000 in damages from J. V. House who at
the time of the tragic occurrence was the holder of the franchise for the electric
plant. This Court said in part:
Although the trial judge made the findings of fact hereinbefore outlined, he
nevertheless was led to order the dismissal of the action because of the
contributory negligence of the plaintiffs. It is from this point that a majority of
the court depart from the stand taken by the trial judge. The mother and her child
had a perfect right to be on the principal street of Tacloban, Leyte, on the
evening when the religious procession was held. There was nothing abnormal in
allowing the child to run along a few paces in advance of the mother. No one
could foresee the coincidence of an automobile appearing and of a frightened
child running and falling into a ditch filled with hot water. The doctrine
announced in the much debated case of Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co.
([1907]), 7 Phil., 359), still rule. Article 1902 of the Civil Code must again be
enforced. The contributory negligence of the child and her mother, if any, does
not operate as a bar to recovery, but in its strictest sense could only result in
reduction of the damages.
It is most significant that in the case just cited, this Court specifically applied
article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is thus that although J. V. House could have
been criminally prosecuted for reckless or simple negligence and not only
punished but also made civilly liable because of his criminal negligence,
nevertheless this Court awarded damages in an independent civil action for fault
or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code.
In Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes (30 Phil., 624 [year 1915), the action was for
damages for the death of the plaintiff's daughter alleged to have been caused by
the negligence of the servant in driving an automobile over the child. It appeared
that the cause of the mishap was a defect in the steering gear. The defendant
Leynes had rented the automobile from the International Garage of Manila, to be
used by him in carrying passengers during the fiesta of Tuy, Batangas. Leynes
was ordered by the lower court to pay P1,000 as damages to the plaintiff. On
appeal this Court reversed the judgment as to Leynes on the ground that he had
shown that the exercised the care of a good father of a family, thus overcoming
the presumption of negligence under article 1903. This Court said:
As to selection, the defendant has clearly shown that he exercised the care and
diligence of a good father of a family. He obtained the machine from a reputable
garage and it was, so far as appeared, in good condition. The workmen were
likewise selected from a standard garage, were duly licensed by the Government
in their particular calling, and apparently thoroughly competent. The machine
had been used but a few hours when the accident occurred and it is clear from
Page 33 of 53
the evidence that the defendant had no notice, either actual or constructive, of
the defective condition of the steering gear.
The legal aspect of the case was discussed by this Court thus:
Article 1903 of the Civil Code not only establishes liability in cases of
negligence, but also provides when the liability shall cease. It says:
"The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned
therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
avoid the damage."
From this article two things are apparent: (1) That when an injury is caused by
the negligence of a servant or employee there instantly arises a presumption of
law that there was negligence on the part of the matter or employer either in the
selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after the
selection, or both; and (2) that presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de
jure, and consequently, may be rebutted. It follows necessarily that if the
employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in selection and supervision
he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family, the
presumption is overcome and he is relieve from liability.
This theory bases the responsibility of the master ultimately on his own
negligence and not on that of his servant.
The doctrine of the case just cited was followed by this Court in Cerf vs.
Medel (33 Phil., 37 [year 1915]). In the latter case, the complaint alleged that the
defendant's servant had so negligently driven an automobile, which was operated
by defendant as a public vehicle, that said automobile struck and damaged the
plaintiff's motorcycle. This Court, applying article 1903 and following the rule
in Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes, said in part (p. 41) that:
The master is liable for the negligent acts of his servant where he is the owner or
director of a business or enterprise and the negligent acts are committed while
the servant is engaged in his master's employment as such owner.
Another case which followed the decision in Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes was
Cuison vs. Norton & Harrison Co., 55 Phil., 18 (year 1930). The latter case was
an action for damages brought by Cuison for the death of his seven-year-old son
Moises. The little boy was on his way to school with his sister Marciana. Some
large pieces of lumber fell from a truck and pinned the boy underneath, instantly
killing him. Two youths, Telesforo Binoya and Francisco Bautista, who were
working for Ora, an employee of defendant Norton & Harrison Co., pleaded
guilty to the crime of homicide through reckless negligence and were sentenced
accordingly. This Court, applying articles 1902 and 1903, held:
The basis of civil law liability is not respondent superior but the relationship
of pater familias. This theory bases the liability of the master ultimately on his
own negligence and not on that of his servant. (Bahia vs.Litonjua and Leynes
[1915], 30 Phil., 624; Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co. [1918], 38 Phil., 768.)
In Walter A. Smith & Co. vs. Cadwallader Gibson Lumber Co., 55 Phil., 517
(year 1930) the plaintiff brought an action for damages for the demolition of its
wharf, which had been struck by the steamer Helen C belonging to the
defendant. This Court held (p. 526):
The evidence shows that Captain Lasa at the time the plaintiff's wharf collapsed
was a duly licensed captain, authorized to navigate and direct a vessel of any
tonnage, and that the appellee contracted his services because of his reputation
as a captain, according to F. C. Cadwallader. This being so, we are of the opinion
that the presumption of liability against the defendant has been overcome by the
exercise of the care and diligence of a good father of a family in selecting
Captain Lasa, in accordance with the doctrines laid down by this court in the
cases cited above, and the defendant is therefore absolved from all liability.
It is, therefore, seen that the defendant's theory about his secondary liability is
negatived by the six cases above set forth. He is, on the authority of these cases,
primarily and directly responsible in damages under article 1903, in relation to
article 1902, of the Civil Code.
Let us now take up the Philippine decisions relied upon by the defendant. We
study first, City of Manila vs. Manila Electric Co., 52 Phil., 586 (year 1928). A
collision between a truck of the City of Manila and a street car of the Manila
Electric Co. took place on June 8, 1925. The truck was damaged in the amount
of P1,788.27. Sixto Eustaquio, the motorman, was prosecuted for the crime of
damage to property and slight injuries through reckless imprudence. He was
found guilty and sentenced to pay a fine of P900, to indemnify the City of
Manila for P1,788.27, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
Unable to collect the indemnity from Eustaquio, the City of Manila filed an
action against the Manila Electric Company to obtain payment, claiming that the
defendant was subsidiarily liable. The main defense was that the defendant had
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. The
lower court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff. This Court held, in part,
that this case was governed by the Penal Code, saying:
Page 34 of 53
With this preliminary point out of the way, there is no escaping the conclusion
that the provisions of the Penal Code govern. The Penal Code in easily
understandable language authorizes the determination of subsidiary liability. The
Civil Code negatives its application by providing that civil obligations arising
from crimes or misdemeanors shall be governed by the provisions of the Penal
Code. The conviction of the motorman was a misdemeanor falling under article
604 of the Penal Code. The act of the motorman was not a wrongful or negligent
act or omission not punishable by law. Accordingly, the civil obligation
connected up with the Penal Code and not with article 1903 of the Civil Code. In
other words, the Penal Code affirms its jurisdiction while the Civil Code
negatives its jurisdiction. This is a case of criminal negligence out of which civil
liability arises and not a case of civil negligence.
xxx xxx xxx
Our deduction, therefore, is that the case relates to the Penal Code and not to the
Civil Code. Indeed, as pointed out by the trial judge, any different ruling would
permit the master to escape scot-free by simply alleging and proving that the
master had exercised all diligence in the selection and training of its servants to
prevent the damage. That would be a good defense to a strictly civil action, but
might or might not be to a civil action either as a part of or predicated on
conviction for a crime or misdemeanor. (By way of parenthesis, it may be said
further that the statements here made are offered to meet the argument advanced
during our deliberations to the effect that article 0902 of the Civil Code should
be disregarded and codal articles 1093 and 1903 applied.)
It is not clear how the above case could support the defendant's proposition,
because the Court of Appeals based its decision in the present case on the
defendant's primary responsibility under article 1903 of the Civil Code and not
on his subsidiary liability arising from Fontanilla's criminal negligence. In other
words, the case of City of Manila vs. Manila Electric Co., supra, is predicated on
an entirely different theory, which is the subsidiary liability of an employer
arising from a criminal act of his employee, whereas the foundation of the
decision of the Court of Appeals in the present case is the employer's primary
liability under article 1903 of the Civil Code. We have already seen that this is a
proper and independent remedy.
Arambulo vs. Manila Electric Co. (55 Phil., 75), is another case invoked by the
defendant. A motorman in the employ of the Manila Electric Company had been
convicted o homicide by simple negligence and sentenced, among other things,
to pay the heirs of the deceased the sum of P1,000. An action was then brought
to enforce the subsidiary liability of the defendant as employer under the Penal
Code. The defendant attempted to show that it had exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family in selecting the motorman, and therefore claimed
exemption from civil liability. But this Court held:
In view of the foregoing considerations, we are of opinion and so hold, (1) that
the exemption from civil liability established in article 1903 of the Civil Code
for all who have acted with the diligence of a good father of a family, is not
applicable to the subsidiary civil liability provided in article 20 of the Penal
Code.
The above case is also extraneous to the theory of the defendant in the instant
case, because the action there had for its purpose the enforcement of the
defendant's subsidiary liability under the Penal Code, while in the case at bar, the
plaintiff's cause of action is based on the defendant's primary and direct
responsibility under article 1903 of the Civil Code. In fact, the above case
destroys the defendant's contention because that decision illustrates the principle
that the employer's primary responsibility under article 1903 of the Civil Code is
different in character from his subsidiary liability under the Penal Code.
In trying to apply the two cases just referred to, counsel for the defendant has
failed to recognize the distinction between civil liability arising from a crime,
which is governed by the Penal Code, and the responsibility for cuasi-
delito or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code, and has likewise failed to give
the importance to the latter type of civil action.
The defendant-petitioner also cites Francisco vs. Onrubia (46 Phil., 327). That
case need not be set forth. Suffice it to say that the question involved was also
civil liability arising from a crime. Hence, it is as inapplicable as the two cases
above discussed.
The foregoing authorities clearly demonstrate the separate individuality of cuasi-
delitos or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code. Specifically they show that
there is a distinction between civil liability arising from criminal negligence
(governed by the Penal Code) and responsibility for fault or negligence under
articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code, and that the same negligent act may
produce either a civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or a
separate responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of the
Civil Code. Still more concretely, the authorities above cited render it
inescapable to conclude that the employer — in this case the defendant-
petitioner — is primarily and directly liable under article 1903 of the Civil Code.
The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked should ordinarily be
sufficient to dispose of this case. But inasmuch as we are announcing doctrines
Page 35 of 53
that have been little understood in the past, it might not be inappropriate to
indicate their foundations.
Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in article 365 punishes not only reckless but also
simple negligence. If we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil
Code refer only to fault or negligence not punished by law, according to the
literal import of article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution of culpa
aquiliana would have very little scope and application in actual life. Death or
injury to persons and damage to property through any degree of negligence —
even the slightest — would have to be indemnified only through the principle of
civil liability arising from a crime. In such a state of affairs, what sphere would
remain for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana? We are loath to impute to the
lawmaker any intention to bring about a situation so absurd and anomalous. Nor
are we, in the interpretation of the laws, disposed to uphold the letter that killeth
rather than the spirit that giveth life. We will not use the literal meaning of the
law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and
such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is
conserved and made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil
Code.
Secondly, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is
sufficient to make the defendant pay in damages. There are numerous cases of
criminal negligence which can not be shown beyond reasonable doubt, but can
be proved by a preponderance of evidence. In such cases, the defendant can and
should be made responsible in a civil action under articles 1902 to 1910 of the
Civil Code. Otherwise, there would be many instances of unvindicated civil
wrongs. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
Thirdly, to hold that there is only one way to make defendant's liability effective,
and that is, to sue the driver and exhaust his (the latter's) property first, would be
tantamount to compelling the plaintiff to follow a devious and cumbersome
method of obtaining relief. True, there is such a remedy under our laws, but there
is also a more expeditious way, which is based on the primary and direct
responsibility of the defendant under article 1903 of the Civil Code. Our view of
the law is more likely to facilitate remedy for civil wrongs, because the
procedure indicated by the defendant is wasteful and productive of delay, it
being a matter of common knowledge that professional drivers of taxis and
similar public conveyance usually do not have sufficient means with which to
pay damages. Why, then, should the plaintiff be required in all cases to go
through this roundabout, unnecessary, and probably useless procedure? In
construing the laws, courts have endeavored to shorten and facilitate the
pathways of right and justice.
At this juncture, it should be said that the primary and direct responsibility of In view of the foregoing, the judgment of the Court of Appeals should be and is
employers and their presumed negligence are principles calculated to protect hereby affirmed, with costs against the defendant-petitioner.
society. Workmen and employees should be carefully chosen and supervised in
order to avoid injury to the public. It is the masters or employers who principally Yulo, C.J., Moran, Ozaeta and Paras, JJ., concur.
reap the profits resulting from the services of these servants and employees. It is
but right that they should guarantee the latter's careful conduct for the personnel
CANGCO VS MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY G.R. L-12191 OCTOBER
and patrimonial safety of others. As Theilhard has said, "they should reproach
14, 1918
themselves, at least, some for their weakness, others for their poor selection and
all for their negligence." And according to Manresa, "It is much more equitable
FACTS:
and just that such responsibility should fall upon the principal or director who
could have chosen a careful and prudent employee, and not upon the injured
On January 20, 1915, Jose Cangco was riding the train of Manila Railroad
person who could not exercise such selection and who used such employee
Company where he was an employee. As the train drew near to his destination,
because of his confidence in the principal or director." (Vol. 12, p. 622, 2nd Ed.)
he arose from his seat. When he was about to alight from the train, Cangco
Many jurists also base this primary responsibility of the employer on the
accidentally stepped on a sack of watermelons which he failed to notice because
principle of representation of the principal by the agent. Thus, Oyuelos says in
it was already 7:00pm and it was dim when it happened. As a result, he slipped
the work already cited (Vol. 7, p. 747) that before third persons the employer and
and fell violently on the platform. His right arm was badly crushed and lacerated
employee "vienen a ser como una sola personalidad, por refundicion de la del
which was eventually amputated.
dependiente en la de quien le emplea y utiliza." ("become as one personality by
the merging of the person of the employee in that of him who employs and
Cangco sued Manila Railroad Company on the ground of negligence of its
utilizes him.") All these observations acquire a peculiar force and significance
employees placing the sacks of melons upon the platform and in leaving them so
when it comes to motor accidents, and there is need of stressing and accentuating
placed as to be a menace to the security of passenger alighting from the
the responsibility of owners of motor vehicles.
company’s trains.
Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal Code The company’s defense was that granting that its employees were negligent in
and the Civil Code on this subject, which has given rise to the overlapping or placing an obstruction upon the platform, the direct and proximate cause of the
concurrence of spheres already discussed, and for lack of understanding of the injury suffered by plaintiff was his own contributing negligence.
character and efficacy of the action for culpa aquiliana, there has grown up a
common practice to seek damages only by virtue of the civil responsibility ISSUE: Whether or not there was a contributing negligence on the part of the
arising from a crime, forgetting that there is another remedy, which is by plaintiff.
invoking articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. Although this habitual method is
allowed by our laws, it has nevertheless rendered practically useless and HELD: In determining the question of contributory negligence in performing
nugatory the more expeditious and effective remedy based on culpa such act – that is to say, whether the passenger acted prudently or recklessly –
aquiliana or culpa extra-contractual. In the present case, we are asked to help the age, sex, and physical condition of the passenger are circumstances
perpetuate this usual course. But we believe it is high time we pointed out to the necessarily affecting the safety of the passenger, and should be considered.
harm done by such practice and to restore the principle of responsibility for fault
or negligence under articles 1902 et seq. of the Civil Code to its full rigor. It is
high time we caused the stream of quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana to flow on its The place was perfectly familiar to the plaintiff as it was his daily custom to get
own natural channel, so that its waters may no longer be diverted into that of a on and off the train at the station. There could, therefore, be no uncertainty in his
crime under the Penal Code. This will, it is believed, make for the better mind with regard either to the length of the step which he was required to take or
safeguarding of private rights because it re-establishes an ancient and additional the character of the platform where he was alighting. The Supreme Court’s
remedy, and for the further reason that an independent civil action, not conclusion was that the conduct of the plaintiff in undertaking to alight while the
depending on the issues, limitations and results of a criminal prosecution, and train was yet slightly under way was not characterized by imprudence and that
entirely directed by the party wronged or his counsel, is more likely to secure therefore he was not guilty of contributory negligence.
adequate and efficacious redress.

Page 36 of 53
On January 20, 1915, Cangco was riding the train of Manila Railroad Co
(MRC). He was an employee of the latter and he was given a pass so that he
could ride the train for free. When he was nearing his destination at about 7pm,
he arose from his seat even though the train was not at full stop. When he was
about to alight from the train (which was still slightly moving) he accidentally
stepped on a sack of watermelons which he failed to notice due to the fact that it
was dim. This caused him to lose his balance at the door and he fell and his arm
was crushed by the train and he suffered other serious injuries. He was dragged a
few meters more as the train slowed down.
It was established that the employees of MRC were negligent in piling the sacks
of watermelons. MRC raised as a defense the fact that Cangco was also
negligent as he failed to exercise diligence in alighting from the train as he did
not wait for it to stop.
ISSUE: Whether or not Manila Railroad Co is liable for damages.
HELD: Yes. Alighting from a moving train while it is slowing down is a
common practice and a lot of people are doing so every day without suffering
injury. Cangco has the vigor and agility of young manhood, and it was by no
means so risky for him to get off while the train was yet moving as the same act
would have been in an aged or feeble person. He was also ignorant of the fact
that sacks of watermelons were there as there were no appropriate warnings and
the place was dimly lit.
The Court also elucidated on the distinction between the liability of employers
under Article 2180 and their liability for breach of contract [of carriage]:
NOTES: But, if the master has not been guilty of any negligence whatever in
the selection and direction of the servant, he is not liable for the acts of the latter,
Page 37 of 53
whatever done within the scope of his employment or not, if the damage done by
the servant does not amount to a breach of the contract between the master and
the person injured.
The liability arising from extra-contractual culpa is always based upon a
voluntary act or omission which, without willful intent, but by mere negligence
or inattention, has caused damage to another.
These two fields, figuratively speaking, concentric; that is to say, the mere fact
that a person is bound to another by contract does not relieve him from extra-
contractual liability to such person. When such a contractual relation exists the
obligor may break the contract under such conditions that the same act which
constitutes the source of an extra-contractual obligation had no contract existed
between the parties.
Manresa: Whether negligence occurs an incident in the course of the
performance of a contractual undertaking or in itself the source of an extra-
contractual undertaking obligation, its essential characteristics are identical.
Vinculum Juris: (def) It means “an obligation of law”, or the right of the
obligee to enforce a civil matter in a court of law.
At the time of the occurrence which gave rise to this litigation the plaintiff, Jose
Cangco, was in the employment of Manila Railroad Company in the capacity of
clerk, with a monthly wage of P25. He lived in the pueblo of San Mateo, in the
province of Rizal, which is located upon the line of the defendant railroad
company; and in coming daily by train to the company's office in the city of
Manila where he worked, he used a pass, supplied by the company, which
entitled him to ride upon the company's trains free of charge. Upon the occasion
in question, January 20, 1915, the plaintiff arose from his seat in the second
class-car where he was riding and, making, his exit through the door, took his
position upon the steps of the coach, seizing the upright guardrail with his right
hand for support.
On the side of the train where passengers alight at the San Mateo station there is
a cement platform which begins to rise with a moderate gradient some distance
away from the company's office and extends along in front of said office for a
distance sufficient to cover the length of several coaches. As the train slowed
down another passenger, named Emilio Zuñiga, also an employee of the railroad
company, got off the same car, alighting safely at the point where the platform
begins to rise from the level of the ground. When the train had proceeded a little
farther the plaintiff Jose Cangco stepped off also, but one or both of his feet
came in contact with a sack of watermelons with the result that his feet slipped
from under him and he fell violently on the platform. His body at once rolled
from the platform and was drawn under the moving car, where his right arm was
badly crushed and lacerated. It appears that after the plaintiff alighted from the
train the car moved forward possibly six meters before it came to a full stop.
The accident occurred between 7 and 8 o'clock on a dark night, and as the
railroad station was lighted dimly by a single light located some distance away,
objects on the platform where the accident occurred were difficult to discern
especially to a person emerging from a lighted car.
The explanation of the presence of a sack of melons on the platform where the
plaintiff alighted is found in the fact that it was the customary season for
harvesting these melons and a large lot had been brought to the station for the
shipment to the market. They were contained in numerous sacks which has been
piled on the platform in a row one upon another. The testimony shows that this
row of sacks was so placed of melons and the edge of platform; and it is clear
that the fall of the plaintiff was due to the fact that his foot alighted upon one of
these melons at the moment he stepped upon the platform. His statement that he
failed to see these objects in the darkness is readily to be credited.
The plaintiff was drawn from under the car in an unconscious condition, and it
appeared that the injuries which he had received were very serious. He was
therefore brought at once to a certain hospital in the city of Manila where an
examination was made and his arm was amputated. The result of this operation
was unsatisfactory, and the plaintiff was then carried to another hospital where a
second operation was performed and the member was again amputated higher up
near the shoulder. It appears in evidence that the plaintiff expended the sum of
P790.25 in the form of medical and surgical fees and for other expenses in
connection with the process of his curation.
Upon August 31, 1915, he instituted this proceeding in the Court of First
Instance of the city of Manila to recover damages of the defendant company,
founding his action upon the negligence of the servants and employees of the
defendant in placing the sacks of melons upon the platform and leaving them so
placed as to be a menace to the security of passenger alighting from the
company's trains. At the hearing in the Court of First Instance, his Honor, the
trial judge, found the facts substantially as above stated, and drew therefrom his
conclusion to the effect that, although negligence was attributable to the
defendant by reason of the fact that the sacks of melons were so placed as to
obstruct passengers passing to and from the cars, nevertheless, the plaintiff
himself had failed to use due caution in alighting from the coach and was
therefore precluded form recovering. Judgment was accordingly entered in favor
of the defendant company, and the plaintiff appealed.
It can not be doubted that the employees of the railroad company were guilty of
negligence in piling these sacks on the platform in the manner above stated; that
Page 38 of 53
their presence caused the plaintiff to fall as he alighted from the train; and that
they therefore constituted an effective legal cause of the injuries sustained by the
plaintiff. It necessarily follows that the defendant company is liable for the
damage thereby occasioned unless recovery is barred by the plaintiff's own
contributory negligence. In resolving this problem it is necessary that each of
these conceptions of liability, to-wit, the primary responsibility of the defendant
company and the contributory negligence of the plaintiff should be separately
examined.
It is important to note that the foundation of the legal liability of the defendant is
the contract of carriage, and that the obligation to respond for the damage which
plaintiff has suffered arises, if at all, from the breach of that contract by reason of
the failure of defendant to exercise due care in its performance. That is to say, its
liability is direct and immediate, differing essentially, in legal viewpoint from
that presumptive responsibility for the negligence of its servants, imposed by
article 1903 of the Civil Code, which can be rebutted by proof of the exercise of
due care in their selection and supervision. Article 1903 of the Civil Code is not
applicable to obligations arising ex contractu, but only to extra-contractual
obligations — or to use the technical form of expression, that article relates only
to culpa aquiliana and not to culpa contractual.
Manresa (vol. 8, p. 67) in his commentaries upon articles 1103 and 1104 of the
Civil Code, clearly points out this distinction, which was also recognized by this
Court in its decision in the case of Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. (7
Phil. rep., 359). In commenting upon article 1093 Manresa clearly points out the
difference between "culpa, substantive and independent, which of itself
constitutes the source of an obligation between persons not formerly connected
by any legal tie" and culpa considered as an accident in the performance of an
obligation already existing . . . ."
In the Rakes case (supra) the decision of this court was made to rest squarely
upon the proposition that article 1903 of the Civil Code is not applicable to acts
of negligence which constitute the breach of a contract.
Upon this point the Court said:
The acts to which these articles [1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code] are applicable
are understood to be those not growing out of pre-existing duties of the parties to
one another. But where relations already formed give rise to duties, whether
springing from contract or quasi-contract, then breaches of those duties are
subject to article 1101, 1103, and 1104 of the same code. (Rakes vs. Atlantic,
Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil. Rep., 359 at 365.)
This distinction is of the utmost importance. The liability, which, under the
Spanish law, is, in certain cases imposed upon employers with respect to
damages occasioned by the negligence of their employees to persons to whom
they are not bound by contract, is not based, as in the English Common Law,
upon the principle of respondeat superior — if it were, the master would be
liable in every case and unconditionally — but upon the principle announced in
article 1902 of the Civil Code, which imposes upon all persons who by their
fault or negligence, do injury to another, the obligation of making good the
damage caused. One who places a powerful automobile in the hands of a servant
whom he knows to be ignorant of the method of managing such a vehicle, is
himself guilty of an act of negligence which makes him liable for all the
consequences of his imprudence. The obligation to make good the damage arises
at the very instant that the unskillful servant, while acting within the scope of his
employment causes the injury. The liability of the master is personal and direct.
But, if the master has not been guilty of any negligence whatever in the selection
and direction of the servant, he is not liable for the acts of the latter, whatever
done within the scope of his employment or not, if the damage done by the
servant does not amount to a breach of the contract between the master and the
person injured.
It is not accurate to say that proof of diligence and care in the selection and
control of the servant relieves the master from liability for the latter's acts — on
the contrary, that proof shows that the responsibility has never existed. As
Manresa says (vol. 8, p. 68) the liability arising from extra-contractual culpa is
always based upon a voluntary act or omission which, without willful intent, but
by mere negligence or inattention, has caused damage to another. A master who
exercises all possible care in the selection of his servant, taking into
consideration the qualifications they should possess for the discharge of the
duties which it is his purpose to confide to them, and directs them with equal
diligence, thereby performs his duty to third persons to whom he is bound by no
contractual ties, and he incurs no liability whatever if, by reason of the
negligence of his servants, even within the scope of their employment, such third
person suffer damage. True it is that under article 1903 of the Civil Code the law
creates a presumption that he has been negligent in the selection or direction of
his servant, but the presumption is rebuttable and yield to proof of due care and
diligence in this respect.
The supreme court of Porto Rico, in interpreting identical provisions, as found in
the Porto Rico Code, has held that these articles are applicable to cases of extra-
contractual culpa exclusively. (Carmona vs. Cuesta, 20 Porto Rico Reports, 215.)
This distinction was again made patent by this Court in its decision in the case of
Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes, (30 Phil. rep., 624), which was an action brought
upon the theory of the extra-contractual liability of the defendant to respond for
Page 39 of 53
the damage caused by the carelessness of his employee while acting within the
scope of his employment. The Court, after citing the last paragraph of article
1903 of the Civil Code, said:
From this article two things are apparent: (1) That when an injury is caused by
the negligence of a servant or employee there instantly arises a presumption of
law that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in
selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after the
selection, or both; and (2) that that presumption is juris tantum and not juris et
de jure, and consequently, may be rebutted. It follows necessarily that if the
employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in selection and supervision
he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family, the
presumption is overcome and he is relieved from liability.
This theory bases the responsibility of the master ultimately on
his own negligence and not on that of his servant. This is the notable peculiarity
of the Spanish law of negligence. It is, of course, in striking contrast to the
American doctrine that, in relations with strangers, the negligence of the servant
in conclusively the negligence of the master.
The opinion there expressed by this Court, to the effect that in case of extra-
contractual culpa based upon negligence, it is necessary that there shall have
been some fault attributable to the defendant personally, and that the last
paragraph of article 1903 merely establishes a rebuttable presumption, is in
complete accord with the authoritative opinion of Manresa, who says (vol. 12, p.
611) that the liability created by article 1903 is imposed by reason of the breach
of the duties inherent in the special relations of authority or superiority existing
between the person called upon to repair the damage and the one who, by his act
or omission, was the cause of it.
On the other hand, the liability of masters and employers for the negligent acts
or omissions of their servants or agents, when such acts or omissions cause
damages which amount to the breach of a contact, is not based upon a mere
presumption of the master's negligence in their selection or control, and proof of
exercise of the utmost diligence and care in this regard does not relieve the
master of his liability for the breach of his contract.
Every legal obligation must of necessity be extra-contractual or contractual.
Extra-contractual obligation has its source in the breach or omission of those
mutual duties which civilized society imposes upon it members, or which arise
from these relations, other than contractual, of certain members of society to
others, generally embraced in the concept of status. The legal rights of each
member of society constitute the measure of the corresponding legal duties,
mainly negative in character, which the existence of those rights imposes upon
all other members of society. The breach of these general duties whether due to
willful intent or to mere inattention, if productive of injury, give rise to an
obligation to indemnify the injured party. The fundamental distinction between
obligations of this character and those which arise from contract, rests upon the
fact that in cases of non-contractual obligation it is the wrongful or negligent act
or omission itself which creates the vinculum juris, whereas in contractual
relations the vinculum exists independently of the breach of the voluntary duty
assumed by the parties when entering into the contractual relation.
With respect to extra-contractual obligation arising from negligence, whether of
act or omission, it is competent for the legislature to elect — and our Legislature
has so elected — whom such an obligation is imposed is morally culpable, or, on
the contrary, for reasons of public policy, to extend that liability, without regard
to the lack of moral culpability, so as to include responsibility for the negligence
of those person who acts or mission are imputable, by a legal fiction, to others
who are in a position to exercise an absolute or limited control over them. The
legislature which adopted our Civil Code has elected to limit extra-contractual
liability — with certain well-defined exceptions — to cases in which moral
culpability can be directly imputed to the persons to be charged. This moral
responsibility may consist in having failed to exercise due care in the selection
and control of one's agents or servants, or in the control of persons who, by
reason of their status, occupy a position of dependency with respect to the
person made liable for their conduct.
The position of a natural or juridical person who has undertaken by contract to
render service to another, is wholly different from that to which article 1903
relates. When the sources of the obligation upon which plaintiff's cause of action
depends is a negligent act or omission, the burden of proof rests upon plaintiff to
prove the negligence — if he does not his action fails. But when the facts
averred show a contractual undertaking by defendant for the benefit of plaintiff,
and it is alleged that plaintiff has failed or refused to perform the contract, it is
not necessary for plaintiff to specify in his pleadings whether the breach of the
contract is due to willful fault or to negligence on the part of the defendant, or of
his servants or agents. Proof of the contract and of its nonperformance is
sufficient prima facie to warrant a recovery.
As a general rule . . . it is logical that in case of extra-contractual culpa, a suing
creditor should assume the burden of proof of its existence, as the only fact upon
which his action is based; while on the contrary, in a case of negligence which
presupposes the existence of a contractual obligation, if the creditor shows that it
exists and that it has been broken, it is not necessary for him to prove
negligence. (Manresa, vol. 8, p. 71 [1907 ed., p. 76]).
Page 40 of 53
As it is not necessary for the plaintiff in an action for the breach of a contract to
show that the breach was due to the negligent conduct of defendant or of his
servants, even though such be in fact the actual cause of the breach, it is obvious
that proof on the part of defendant that the negligence or omission of his
servants or agents caused the breach of the contract would not constitute a
defense to the action. If the negligence of servants or agents could be invoked as
a means of discharging the liability arising from contract, the anomalous result
would be that person acting through the medium of agents or servants in the
performance of their contracts, would be in a better position than those acting in
person. If one delivers a valuable watch to watchmaker who contract to repair it,
and the bailee, by a personal negligent act causes its destruction, he is
unquestionably liable. Would it be logical to free him from his liability for the
breach of his contract, which involves the duty to exercise due care in the
preservation of the watch, if he shows that it was his servant whose negligence
caused the injury? If such a theory could be accepted, juridical persons would
enjoy practically complete immunity from damages arising from the breach of
their contracts if caused by negligent acts as such juridical persons can of
necessity only act through agents or servants, and it would no doubt be true in
most instances that reasonable care had been taken in selection and direction of
such servants. If one delivers securities to a banking corporation as collateral,
and they are lost by reason of the negligence of some clerk employed by the
bank, would it be just and reasonable to permit the bank to relieve itself of
liability for the breach of its contract to return the collateral upon the payment of
the debt by proving that due care had been exercised in the selection and
direction of the clerk?
This distinction between culpa aquiliana, as the source of an obligation,
and culpa contractual as a mere incident to the performance of a contract has
frequently been recognized by the supreme court of Spain. (Sentencias of June
27, 1894; November 20, 1896; and December 13, 1896.) In the decisions of
November 20, 1896, it appeared that plaintiff's action arose ex contractu, but that
defendant sought to avail himself of the provisions of article 1902 of the Civil
Code as a defense. The Spanish Supreme Court rejected defendant's contention,
saying:
These are not cases of injury caused, without any pre-existing obligation, by
fault or negligence, such as those to which article 1902 of the Civil Code relates,
but of damages caused by the defendant's failure to carry out the undertakings
imposed by the contracts . . . .
A brief review of the earlier decision of this court involving the liability of
employers for damage done by the negligent acts of their servants will show that
in no case has the court ever decided that the negligence of the defendant's
servants has been held to constitute a defense to an action for damages for
breach of contract.
In the case of Johnson vs. David (5 Phil. Rep., 663), the court held that the
owner of a carriage was not liable for the damages caused by the negligence of
his driver. In that case the court commented on the fact that no evidence had
been adduced in the trial court that the defendant had been negligent in the
employment of the driver, or that he had any knowledge of his lack of skill or
carefulness.
In the case of Baer Senior & Co's Successors vs. Compania Maritima (6 Phil.
Rep., 215), the plaintiff sued the defendant for damages caused by the loss of a
barge belonging to plaintiff which was allowed to get adrift by the negligence of
defendant's servants in the course of the performance of a contract of towage.
The court held, citing Manresa (vol. 8, pp. 29, 69) that if the "obligation of the
defendant grew out of a contract made between it and the plaintiff . . . we do not
think that the provisions of articles 1902 and 1903 are applicable to the case."
In the case of Chapman vs. Underwood (27 Phil. Rep., 374), plaintiff sued the
defendant to recover damages for the personal injuries caused by the negligence
of defendant's chauffeur while driving defendant's automobile in which
defendant was riding at the time. The court found that the damages were caused
by the negligence of the driver of the automobile, but held that the master was
not liable, although he was present at the time, saying:
. . . unless the negligent acts of the driver are continued for a length of time as to
give the owner a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct the driver
to desist therefrom. . . . The act complained of must be continued in the presence
of the owner for such length of time that the owner by his acquiescence, makes
the driver's acts his own.
In the case of Yamada vs. Manila Railroad Co. and Bachrach Garage & Taxicab
Co. (33 Phil. Rep., 8), it is true that the court rested its conclusion as to the
liability of the defendant upon article 1903, although the facts disclosed that the
injury complaint of by plaintiff constituted a breach of the duty to him arising
out of the contract of transportation. The express ground of the decision in this
case was that article 1903, in dealing with the liability of a master for the
negligent acts of his servants "makes the distinction between private individuals
and public enterprise;" that as to the latter the law creates a rebuttable
presumption of negligence in the selection or direction of servants; and that in
the particular case the presumption of negligence had not been overcome.
Page 41 of 53
It is evident, therefore that in its decision Yamada case, the court treated
plaintiff's action as though founded in tort rather than as based upon the breach
of the contract of carriage, and an examination of the pleadings and of the briefs
shows that the questions of law were in fact discussed upon this theory. Viewed
from the standpoint of the defendant the practical result must have been the same
in any event. The proof disclosed beyond doubt that the defendant's servant was
grossly negligent and that his negligence was the proximate cause of plaintiff's
injury. It also affirmatively appeared that defendant had been guilty of
negligence in its failure to exercise proper discretion in the direction of the
servant. Defendant was, therefore, liable for the injury suffered by plaintiff,
whether the breach of the duty were to be regarded as constituting culpa
aquiliana or culpa contractual. As Manresa points out (vol. 8, pp. 29 and 69)
whether negligence occurs an incident in the course of the performance of a
contractual undertaking or its itself the source of an extra-contractual
undertaking obligation, its essential characteristics are identical. There is always
an act or omission productive of damage due to carelessness or inattention on the
part of the defendant. Consequently, when the court holds that a defendant is
liable in damages for having failed to exercise due care, either directly, or in
failing to exercise proper care in the selection and direction of his servants, the
practical result is identical in either case. Therefore, it follows that it is not to be
inferred, because the court held in the Yamada case that defendant was liable for
the damages negligently caused by its servants to a person to whom it was bound
by contract, and made reference to the fact that the defendant was negligent in
the selection and control of its servants, that in such a case the court would have
held that it would have been a good defense to the action, if presented squarely
upon the theory of the breach of the contract, for defendant to have proved that it
did in fact exercise care in the selection and control of the servant.
The true explanation of such cases is to be found by directing the attention to the
relative spheres of contractual and extra-contractual obligations. The field of
non- contractual obligation is much more broader than that of contractual
obligations, comprising, as it does, the whole extent of juridical human relations.
These two fields, figuratively speaking, concentric; that is to say, the mere fact
that a person is bound to another by contract does not relieve him from extra-
contractual liability to such person. When such a contractual relation exists the
obligor may break the contract under such conditions that the same act which
constitutes the source of an extra-contractual obligation had no contract existed
between the parties.
The contract of defendant to transport plaintiff carried with it, by implication, the
duty to carry him in safety and to provide safe means of entering and leaving its
trains (civil code, article 1258). That duty, being contractual, was direct and
immediate, and its non-performance could not be excused by proof that the fault
was morally imputable to defendant's servants.
The railroad company's defense involves the assumption that even granting that
the negligent conduct of its servants in placing an obstruction upon the platform
was a breach of its contractual obligation to maintain safe means of approaching
and leaving its trains, the direct and proximate cause of the injury suffered by
plaintiff was his own contributory negligence in failing to wait until the train had
come to a complete stop before alighting. Under the doctrine of comparative
negligence announced in the Rakes case (supra), if the accident was caused by
plaintiff's own negligence, no liability is imposed upon defendant's negligence
and plaintiff's negligence merely contributed to his injury, the damages should be
apportioned. It is, therefore, important to ascertain if defendant was in fact guilty
of negligence.
It may be admitted that had plaintiff waited until the train had come to a full stop
before alighting, the particular injury suffered by him could not have occurred.
Defendant contends, and cites many authorities in support of the contention, that
it is negligence per se for a passenger to alight from a moving train. We are not
disposed to subscribe to this doctrine in its absolute form. We are of the opinion
that this proposition is too badly stated and is at variance with the experience of
every-day life. In this particular instance, that the train was barely moving when
plaintiff alighted is shown conclusively by the fact that it came to stop within six
meters from the place where he stepped from it. Thousands of person alight from
trains under these conditions every day of the year, and sustain no injury where
the company has kept its platform free from dangerous obstructions. There is no
reason to believe that plaintiff would have suffered any injury whatever in
alighting as he did had it not been for defendant's negligent failure to perform its
duty to provide a safe alighting place.
We are of the opinion that the correct doctrine relating to this subject is that
expressed in Thompson's work on Negligence (vol. 3, sec. 3010) as follows:
The test by which to determine whether the passenger has been guilty of
negligence in attempting to alight from a moving railway train, is that of
ordinary or reasonable care. It is to be considered whether an ordinarily prudent
person, of the age, sex and condition of the passenger, would have acted as the
passenger acted under the circumstances disclosed by the evidence. This care has
been defined to be, not the care which may or should be used by the prudent man
generally, but the care which a man of ordinary prudence would use under
similar circumstances, to avoid injury." (Thompson, Commentaries on
Negligence, vol. 3, sec. 3010.)
Or, it we prefer to adopt the mode of exposition used by this court in
Picart vs. Smith (37 Phil. rep., 809), we may say that the test is this; Was there
anything in the circumstances surrounding the plaintiff at the time he alighted
from the train which would have admonished a person of average prudence that
Page 42 of 53
to get off the train under the conditions then existing was dangerous? If so, the
plaintiff should have desisted from alighting; and his failure so to desist was
contributory negligence.1awph!l.net
As the case now before us presents itself, the only fact from which a conclusion
can be drawn to the effect that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence is
that he stepped off the car without being able to discern clearly the condition of
the platform and while the train was yet slowly moving. In considering the
situation thus presented, it should not be overlooked that the plaintiff was, as we
find, ignorant of the fact that the obstruction which was caused by the sacks of
melons piled on the platform existed; and as the defendant was bound by reason
of its duty as a public carrier to afford to its passengers facilities for safe egress
from its trains, the plaintiff had a right to assume, in the absence of some
circumstance to warn him to the contrary, that the platform was clear. The place,
as we have already stated, was dark, or dimly lighted, and this also is proof of a
failure upon the part of the defendant in the performance of a duty owing by it to
the plaintiff; for if it were by any possibility concede that it had right to pile
these sacks in the path of alighting passengers, the placing of them adequately so
that their presence would be revealed.
As pertinent to the question of contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff
in this case the following circumstances are to be noted: The company's platform
was constructed upon a level higher than that of the roadbed and the surrounding
ground. The distance from the steps of the car to the spot where the alighting
passenger would place his feet on the platform was thus reduced, thereby
decreasing the risk incident to stepping off. The nature of the platform,
constructed as it was of cement material, also assured to the passenger a stable
and even surface on which to alight. Furthermore, the plaintiff was possessed of
the vigor and agility of young manhood, and it was by no means so risky for him
to get off while the train was yet moving as the same act would have been in an
aged or feeble person. In determining the question of contributory negligence in
performing such act — that is to say, whether the passenger acted prudently or
recklessly — the age, sex, and physical condition of the passenger are
circumstances necessarily affecting the safety of the passenger, and should be
considered. Women, it has been observed, as a general rule are less capable than
men of alighting with safety under such conditions, as the nature of their
wearing apparel obstructs the free movement of the limbs. Again, it may be
noted that the place was perfectly familiar to the plaintiff as it was his daily
custom to get on and of the train at this station. There could, therefore, be no
uncertainty in his mind with regard either to the length of the step which he was
required to take or the character of the platform where he was alighting. Our
conclusion is that the conduct of the plaintiff in undertaking to alight while the
train was yet slightly under way was not characterized by imprudence and that
therefore he was not guilty of contributory negligence.
The evidence shows that the plaintiff, at the time of the accident, was earning
P25 a month as a copyist clerk, and that the injuries he has suffered have
permanently disabled him from continuing that employment. Defendant has not
shown that any other gainful occupation is open to plaintiff. His expectancy of
life, according to the standard mortality tables, is approximately thirty-three
years. We are of the opinion that a fair compensation for the damage suffered by
him for his permanent disability is the sum of P2,500, and that he is also entitled
to recover of defendant the additional sum of P790.25 for medical attention,
hospital services, and other incidental expenditures connected with the treatment
of his injuries.
The decision of lower court is reversed, and judgment is hereby rendered
plaintiff for the sum of P3,290.25, and for the costs of both instances. So
ordered.
ELCANO vs HILL
Reginald Hill, a minor, caused the death of Agapito (son of Elcano). Elcano filed
a criminal case against Reginald but Reginald was acquitted for “lack of intent
coupled with mistake.” Elcano then filed a civil action against Reginald and his
dad (Marvin Hill) for damages based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Hill
argued that the civil action is barred by his son’s acquittal in the criminal case;
and that if ever, his civil liability as a parent has been extinguished by the fact
that his son is already an emancipated minor by reason of his marriage.
ISSUE: Whether or not Marvin Hill may be held civilly liable under Article
2180.
HELD: Yes. The acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case does not bar the
filing of a separate civil action. A separate civil action lies against the offender in
a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or
acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if accused is actually
charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be
entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the
awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil
liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil
liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil
liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is
not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act
charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused. Briefly
stated, culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be
punishable by law.
While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the
child (Article 327, Civil Code), and under Article 397, emancipation takes place
Page 43 of 53
“by the marriage of the minor child”, it is, however, also clear that pursuant to
Article 399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute.
Thus “Emancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate
parental authority over the child’s person. It shall enable the minor to administer
his property as though he were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate
or encumber real property without the consent of his father or mother, or
guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his father,
mother or guardian.” Therefore, Article 2180 is applicable to Marvin Hill – the
SC however ruled since at the time of the decision, Reginald is already of age,
Marvin’s liability should be subsidiary only – as a matter of equity.
NATIVIDAD V. ANDAMO and EMMANUEL R. ANDAMO, petitioners, vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (First Civil Cases Division) and
MISSIONARIES OF OUR LADY OF LA SALETTE, INC., respondents.
[G.R. No. 74761 November 6, 1990]
FACTS:
-Petitioner spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo (Andamos for brevity) are
the owners of a parcel of land situated in Biga (Biluso) Silang, Cavite which is
adjacent to that of private respondent, Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette,
Inc., (Missionaries for brevity) a religious corporation.
-Within the land of Missionaries, waterpaths and contrivances, including an
artificial lake, were constructed, which allegedly inundated and eroded
Andamos' land, endangered the lives of Andamos and their laborers during rainy
and stormy seasons, and exposed plants and other improvements to destruction.
-Andamos then filed before the RTC of Cavite a criminal action against against
Efren Musngi, Orlando Sapuay and Rutillo Mallillin, officers and directors of
Missionaries, for destruction by means of inundation under Article 324 of the
Revised Penal Code.
-Another action was filed by Andamos against Missionaries, this time civil
action for damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction before the same court.
-Missionaries filed its answer to the complaint and opposition to the issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction
-Hearings were conducted including ocular inspections on the land.
-RTC granted the motion to dismiss or suspend the civil action by Missionaries
issued an order suspending further hearings in the civil action until after
judgment in the related criminal action on the ground that Section 3 (a), Rule III
of the Rules of Court which provides that"criminal and civil actions arising from
the same offense may be instituted separately, but after the criminal action has
been commenced the civil action cannot be instituted until final judgment has
been rendered in the criminal action."
-On appeal, IAC affirmed the decision of RTC
-IAC also denied MR filed by Andamos
ISSUE:
Whether a corporation, which has built through its agents, waterpaths, water
conductors and contrivances within its land, thereby causing inundation and
damage to an adjacent land, can be held civilly liable for damages under Articles
2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts such that the resulting civil
case can proceed independently of the criminal case.
HELD:
YES. All the elements of a quasi-delict are present, to wit: (a) damages suffered
by the plaintiff, (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for
whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect between
the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the
plaintiff.
Clearly, from petitioner's complaint, the waterpaths and contrivances built by
respondent corporation are alleged to have inundated the land of petitioners.
There is therefore, an assertion of a causal connection between the act of
building these waterpaths and the damage sustained by petitioners.
Indeed, the recitals of the complaint, the alleged presence of damage to the
petitioners, the act or omission of respondent corporation supposedly
constituting fault or negligence, and the causal connection between the act and
the damage, with no pre-existing contractual obligation between the parties
make a clear case of a quasi delict or culpa aquiliana.
It must be stressed that the use of one's property is not without limitations.
Article 431 of the Civil Code provides that "the owner of a thing cannot make
use thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights of a third person." SIC
UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON LAEDAS. Moreover, adjoining landowners
have mutual and reciprocal duties which require that each must use his own land
in a reasonable manner so as not to infringe upon the rights and interests of
others. Although we recognize the right of an owner to build structures on his
land, such structures must be so constructed and maintained using all reasonable
care so that they cannot be dangerous to adjoining landowners and can withstand
the usual and expected forces of nature. If the structures cause injury or damage
to an adjoining landowner or a third person, the latter can claim indemnification
for the injury or damage suffered.
Page 44 of 53
GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS
and MARILOU T. GONZALES, respondents.
G.R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993
FACTS: Private respondent Gonzales filed with the trial court a complaint for
damages against the petitioner for the alleged violation of their agreement to get
married.
Petitioner alleged in said complaint that she is lass of good moral character and
reputation duly respected in her community and that she was a virgin before she
began living with him as she never had a boyfriend before; petitioner Baksh, on
the other hand, is an Iranian citizen, and is an exchange student taking a medical
course at the Lyceum Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City.
Respondent courted and proposed to marry her; she accepted his love on the
condition that they would get married; they therefore agreed to get married after
the end of the school semester, which was in October of that year.
Petitioner then visited the private respondent's parents in Bañaga, Bugallon,
Pangasinan to secure their approval to the marriage. Plaintiff's parents agreed to
his proposal for him to marry their daughter, and they likewise allowed him to
stay in their house and sleep with plaintiff during the few days that they were in
Bugallon. By reason of that deceitful promise, private respondent and her
parents — in accordance with Filipino customs and traditions — made some
preparations for the wedding that was to be held at the end of October 1987 by
looking for pigs and chickens, inviting friends and relatives and contracting
sponsors.
Thereafter, the parties started to live together in defendant’s apartment. As a
result of this live-in relationship, plaintiff became pregnant, but defendant gave
her some medicine to abort the fetus. Petitioner's attitude towards her started to
change; he maltreated and threatened to kill her; as a result of such maltreatment,
she sustained injuries.
During a confrontation with a representative of the barangay captain of Guilig a
day before the filing of the complaint, petitioner repudiated their marriage
agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore and; the petitioner is
already married to someone living in Bacolod City.
Private respondent then prayed for judgment ordering the petitioner to pay her
damages.
Respondent’s father, a tricycle driver, also claimed that after petitioner-defendant
had informed them of his desire to marry Marilou, he already looked for
sponsors for the wedding, started preparing for the reception by looking for pigs
and chickens, and even already invited many relatives and friends to the
forthcoming wedding.
RTC of Pangasinan:
The RTC, applying Article 21 of the Civil Code, ruled in favor of the private
respondent. The petitioner was thus ordered to pay the latter damages and
attorney's fees.
Court of Appeals:
Petitioner appealed the trial court's decision to the respondent Court of Appeals.
Respondent Court promulgated the challenged decision affirming in toto the trial
court's ruling in favor of respondent Gonzales, holding that it was defendant-
appellant's fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and promise to
marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to
live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise,
and it was likewise this fraud and deception on appellant's part that made
plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their
supposed marriage. And as these acts of appellant are palpably and undoubtedly
against morals, good customs, and public policy, and are even gravely and
deeply derogatory and insulting to our women, coming as they do from a
foreigner who has been enjoying the hospitality of our people and taking
advantage of the opportunity to study in one of our institutions of learning,
defendant-appellant should indeed be made, under Art. 21 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines, to compensate for the moral damages and injury that he had
caused plaintiff, as the lower court ordered him to do in its decision in this case.
Hence, this petition for certiorari under Rule 45.
Petitioner argues that Article 21 is not applicable because he had not committed
any moral wrong or injury or violated any good custom or public policy; he has
not professed love or proposed marriage to the private respondent; and he has
never maltreated her. He criticizes the trial court for liberally invoking Filipino
customs, traditions and culture, and ignoring the fact that since he is a foreigner,
he is not conversant with such Filipino customs, traditions and culture. Petitioner
asseverates that even if it was to be assumed arguendo that he had professed his
love to the private respondent and had also promised to marry her, such acts
would not be actionable in view of the special circumstances of the case. The
mere breach of promise is not actionable.
ISSUE: W/N damages may be recovered for a breach of promise to marry on the
basis of Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
HELD: The court held that breach of promise to marry is not an actionable
wrong; however, damages may be recovered based on Article 21 due to
Page 45 of 53
respondent’s fraud and deceit and wilful injury to respondent’s honor and
reputation.
The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable
wrong.
However, the Civil Code contains a provision, Article 21, which is designed to
expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by granting
adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is
impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the
statute books.
The Code Commission states that there are countless gaps in the statutes, which
leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though they have actually
suffered material and moral injury, the Commission has deemed it necessary, in
the interest of justice, to incorporate in the proposed Civil Code the following
rule:
Art. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner
that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the
latter for the damage.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which defines a quasi-delict thus:
“Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-
delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.”
is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the notion of willfulness or
intent.
Quasi-delict, known in Spanish legal treatises as culpa aquiliana, is a civil law
concept, while torts is an Anglo-American or common law concept.
Torts is much broader than culpa aquiliana because it includes not only
negligence, but international criminal acts as well such as assault and battery,
false imprisonment and deceit. In the general scheme of the Philippine legal
system envisioned by the Commission responsible for drafting the New Civil
Code, intentional and malicious acts, with certain exceptions, are to be governed
by the Revised Penal Code while negligent acts or omissions are to be covered
by Article 2176 of the Civil Code. In between these opposite spectrums are
injurious acts which, in the absence of Article 21, would have been beyond
redress. Thus, Article 21 fills that vacuum. It is even postulated that together
with Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, Article 21 has greatly broadened the
scope of the law on civil wrongs; it has become much more supple and adaptable
than the Anglo-American law on torts.
In the line with the purpose of Article 21, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that
where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance
of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter
becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual
congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the
promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to
accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of
damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but
because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the wilful injury to her honor and
reputation which followed thereafter.
It is essential, however, that such injury should have been committed in a
manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.
In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's "fraudulent
and deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made
her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him on the
honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and it was likewise
these fraud and deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents agree
to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their supposed marriage."
In short, the private respondent surrendered her virginity, the cherished
possession of every single Filipina, not because of lust but because of moral
seduction — the kind illustrated by the Code Commission.
Instant petition is denied, with costs against petitioner
2) CINCO vs CANONOY
FACTS: Cinco filed a Complaint in the City Court of Mandaue City for the
recovery of damages on account of a vehicular accident because of the fault or
negligence of Hilot involving his automobile and Hilot's jeepney. After such, a
criminal case was filed against the driver arising from the same accident. At the
pre-trial in the civil case, counsel for private respondents moved to suspend the
civil action pending the final determination of the criminal suit, invoking Rule
111, Section 3 (b) of the Rules of Court, which provides:
(b) After a criminal action has been commenced. no civil action arising from the
same offense can be prosecuted, and the same shall be suspended, in whatever
stage it may be found, until final judgment in the criminal proceeding has been
rendered;
Judge Canonoy of City Court of Mandaue City ordered the suspension of the
civil case. Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration thereof was denied and he
elevated the matter on certiorari to the Court of First Instance of Cebu with the
allegation that the City Judge had acted with grave abuse of discretion in
suspending the civil action for being contrary to law and jurisprudence.
Page 46 of 53
CFI dismissed the Petition for certiorari on the following grounds:
a.) that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the City Court in
suspending the civil action inasmuch as damage to property is not one of the
instances when an independent civil action is proper
b.) that petitioner has another plain, speedy, and adequate remedy under the law,
which is to submit his claim for damages in the criminal case
c.) that the resolution of the City Court is interlocutory and, therefore, certiorari
is improper; d.) that the Petition is defective inasmuch as what petitioner actually
desires is a Writ of mandamus.
Cinco filed a Petition for Review in SC.
ISSUE: Whether or not there can be an independent civil action for damage to
property during the pendency of the criminal action.
HELD: The City Court erred in reliance on section 3 (b) of Rule 111 of the
Rules of Court. The civil action referred to in Secs. 3(a) and 3(b) of Rule 111 is
that arising from the criminal offense and not the civil action based on quasi-
delict
Art. 31 is more appropriate in this case.
Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act
or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed
independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the
latter.
It bears emphasizing that petitioner's cause of action is based on quasi-delict.
Respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in upholding the Decision of the
City Court of Mandaue City, Cebu, suspending the civil action based on a quasi-
delict until after the criminal case is finally terminated.
The Decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu is hereby set aside.
City Court of Mandaue City is hereby ordered to proceed with the hearing of
Civil Case No. 189
LG Foods v. Agraviador (2006
The Case Review on certiorari of a decision of the CA on 25 April 2003
affirming an order of Bacolod RTC, which in turn denied the petitioners’ motion
to dismiss an action for damages arising from a vehicular accident instituted by
the Vallejera spouses.
The Facts On February 26, 1996, Charles Vallereja, a 7-year old son of the
Vallejera spouses, was hit by a Ford Fiera van owned by LG Foods Corporation
(LG Foods) and driven by their employee, Vincent Norman Yeneza y Ferrer.
Charles died as a result of the accident. An information for reckless imprudence
resulting to homicide was filed against the driver before the Bacolod MTCC.
Before the trial could be concluded, however, the accused driver committed
suicide. The case was then dismissed. On June 23, 1999, the spouses Vallejera
filed a complaint for damages against LG Foods alleging that as employers, they
failed to exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of their
employees. In their defense, LG Foods denied liability by claiming to have
exercised such diligence and prayed for dismissal for lack of cause of action.
Also in their motion to dismiss, they argued that the complaint was a claim for
subsidiary liability against an employer under A1035, RPC and, as such, there
must first be a judgment of conviction against their driver to hold them liable.
Since such condition was not fulfilled due to the latter’s death, they argued, the
spouses had no cause of action. The trial court denied the motion for lack of
merit. Also, it denied the motion for reconsideration of the matter. LG Foods
then went on certiorari to the CA alleging grave abuse of discretion of the part of
the trial judge.
The CA, however, affirmed the RTC decision ruling that the complaint by the
spouses does not purport to be based on subsidiary liability since the basic
elements of such liability, such as conviction and insolvency of the accused
employee, were not even alleged in said complaint. It then said that the
complaint purports to exact responsibility for fault or negligence under A2176,
CC, which is entirely separate and distinct from civil liability arising from
negligence under the A103, RPC. Liability under A2180, CC is direct and
immediate, and not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent
employee or showing of insolvency.
The Issue Whether the cause of action of the Vallejera spouses is founded on CC
or RPC.
The Ruling The case is a negligence suit brought under A2176, CC to recover
damages primarily from LG Foods as employers responsible for their negligent
driver pursuant to A2180, CC. The obligation imposed by A2176 is demandable
not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom
one is responsible. Thus, the employer is liable for damages caused by his
employees. The Ratio First. Nothing in the allegations in the complaint suggests
that the LG Foods are being made to account for their subsidiary liability under
Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. Plus, the complaint did not even aver the
basic elements for the subsidiary liability of an employer under said provision.
Page 47 of 53
Second. While not explicitly stated that the suit was for damages based on quasi-
delict, it alleged gross fault and negligence on the part of the driver and the
failure of LG Foods, as employers, to exercise due diligence in the selection and
supervision of their employees. It was further alleged that LG Foods is civilly
liable for the negligence/imprudence of their driver since they failed to exercise
the necessary diligence required of a good father of the family in the selection
and supervision of their employees, which diligence, if exercised, could have
prevented the vehicular accident that resulted to the death of their 7-year old son.
Third. Section 2, Rule 2, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines cause of
action as the "act or omission by which a party violates the right of another."
Such act or omission gives rise to an obligation which may come from law,
contracts, quasi contracts, delicts or quasi-delicts. Corollarily, an act or omission
causing damage to another may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the
part of the offender, i.e., 1) civil liability ex delicto, and 2) independent civil
liabilities, such as those (a) not arising from an act or omission complained of as
felony (e.g., culpa contractual or obligations arising from law; the intentional
torts;14 and culpa aquiliana15); or (b) where the injured party is granted a right
to file an action independent and distinct from the criminal action. Either of
these two possible liabilities may be enforced against the offender. Stated
otherwise, victims of negligence or their heirs have a choice between an action
to enforce the civil liability arising from culpa criminal under Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code, and an action for quasi-delict (culpa aquiliana) under
Articles 2176 to 2194 of the Civil Code. This is illustrated in A1161, CC
providing that civil obligation arising from criminal offenses shall be governed
by penal laws subject to the provision of A2177 and of the pertinent provision of
Chapter 2, Preliminary Title on Human Relation, and of Title XVIII of this
Book, regulating damages. This means that A2177 provides an alternative
remedy for the plaintiff. The choice is with the plaintiff. Fourth. Under Article
2180 of the Civil Code, the liability of the employer is direct or immediate, not
conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior
showing of insolvency. This was the recourse of the spouses since there was no
conviction in the criminal case against the driver. Fifth. LG Foods has been
alleging that "they had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision
of [their] employees." This defense is an admission that indeed the petitioners
acknowledged the private respondents' cause of action as one for quasi-delict
under A2180, CC. Sixth. Since it is as if there was no criminal case to speak of
due to its premature termination, the fact that there was no prior reservation
made to institute a separate civil action is of no moment.
FGU INSURANCE CORPORATION vs. G.P.S TRUCKING CORPORATION
and LAMBERT M. EROLES
G.R.No. 141910 06August2002
FACTS OF THE CASE:
G.P. Sarmiento Trucking Corporation (GPS) undertook to deliver on 18 June
1994 thirty (30) units of Condura S.D. white refrigerators aboard one of its Isuzu
truck, driven by Lambert Eroles. While the truck was traversing the north
diversion road along McArthur highway in Barangay Anupol, Bamban, Tarlac, it
collided with an unidentified truck, causing it to fall into a deep canal, resulting
in damage to the cargoes.
FGU Insurance Corporation (FGU), an insurer of the shipment, paid to
Concepcion Industries, Inc., the value of the covered cargoes: P204, 450.00.
FGU, in turn, being the subrogee of the rights and interests of the insured sought
reimbursement of the amount, from GPS. Since GPS failed to heed the claim,
FGU filed a complaint for damages and breach of contract of carriage against
GPS and its driver with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, of Makati City. In
its answer, respondents asserted that GPS was the exclusive hauler only of
Concepcion Industries, Inc., since 1988, and it was not so engaged in business as
a common carrier. Respondents further claimed that the cause of damage was
purely accidental. GPS, instead of submitting its evidence, filed with leave of
court a motion to dismiss the complaint by way of demurrer to evidence on the
ground that petitioner had failed to prove that it was a common carrier. The RTC
and CA both ruled in favor of the Respondent.
ISSUES OF THE CASE:
WHETHER RESPONDENT GPS, EITHER AS A COMMON CARRIER OR A
PRIVATE CARRIER, MAY BE PRESUMED TO HAVE BEEN NEGLIGENT
WHEN THE GOODS IT UNDERTOOK TO TRANSPORT SAFELY WERE
SUBSEQUENTLY DAMAGED WHILE IN ITS PROTECTIVE CUSTODY
AND POSSESSION.
- In culpa contractual, upon which the action of petitioner rests as being the
subrogee of Concepcion Industries, Inc., the mere proof of the existence of the
contract and the failure of its compliance justify, prima facie, a corresponding
right of relief. Thus, FGU has a claim for the amount paid out.
- The law, recognizing the obligatory force of contracts, will not permit a party
to be set free from liability for any kind of misperformance of the contractual
undertaking or a contravention of the tenor thereof
- GPS recognizes the existence of a contract of carriage between it and
petitioner’s assured, and admits that the cargoes it has assumed to deliver have
been lost or damaged while in its custody. In such a situation, a default on, or
failure of compliance with, the obligation in this case, the delivery of the goods
in its custody to the place of destination - gives rise to a presumption of lack of
care and corresponding liability on the part of the contractual obligor the burden
being on him to establish otherwise. GPS has failed to do so.
HELD:
Page 48 of 53
The decision of the lower courts insofar as Lambert M. Eroles is concerned is
affirmed but assailed decision with regard to GPS trucking is reversed. It, is
hereby ordered to pay FGU Insurance Corporation the value of the damaged and
lost cargoes in the amount of P204, 450.00
Fores v. Miranda
Facts:
Respondent was one of the passengers of a jeepney driven by Eugenio Luga.
While the vehicle was descending the Sta. Mesa bridge at an excessive speed,
the driver lost control, and the jeepney swerved to the bridge wall. Serious
injuries were suffered by the defendant. The driver was charged with serious
physical injuries through reckless imprudence, and upon interposing a plea of
guilty was sentenced accordingly. Petitioner denies liability for breach of
contract of carriage, contending that a day before the accident, the jeepney was
sold to a certain Carmen Sackerman.
Issues:
(1) Is the approval of the Public Service Commission necessary for the sale of a
public service vehicle even without conveying therewith the authority to operate
the same?
(2) To what damages is the respondent entitled?
Held:
(1) Assuming the dubious sale to be a fact, the court of Appeals answered the
query in the affirmative. The ruling should be upheld. The provisions of the
statute are clear and prohibit the sale, alienation, lease, or encumbrance of the
property, franchise, certificate, privileges or rights, or any part thereof of the
owner or operator of the public service Commission. The law was designed
primarily for the protection of the public interest; and until the approval of the
public Service Commission is obtained the vehicle is, in contemplation of law,
still under the service of the owner or operator standing in the records of the
Commission which the public has a right to rely upon.
(2) The P10,000 actual damages awarded by the Court of First Instance of
Manila were reduced by the Court of Appeals to only P2,000, on the ground that
a review of the records failed to disclose a sufficient basis for the trial court's
appraisal, since the only evidence presented on this point consisted of
respondent's bare statement that his expenses and loss of income amounted to
P20,000. On the other hand, "it cannot be denied," the lower court said, "that
appellee (respondent) did incur expenses"' It is well to note further that
respondent was a painter by profession and a professor of Fine Arts, so that the
amount of P2,000 awarded cannot be said to be excessive. The attorney's fees in
the sum of P3,000 also awarded to the respondent are assailed on the ground that
the Court of First Instance did not provided for the same, and since no appeal
was interposed by said respondent, it was allegedly error for the Court of
Appeals to award them motu proprio. Petitioner fails to note that attorney's fees
are included in the concept of actual damages under the Civil Code and may be
awarded whenever the court deems it is just and equitable. We see no reason to
alter these awards.
Anent the moral damages ordered to be paid to the respondent, the same must be
discarded. We have repeatedly ruled that moral damages are not recoverable in
damage actions predicted on a breach of the contract of transportation. Where
the injured passenger does not die, moral damages are not recoverable unless it
is proved that the carrier was guilty of malice or bad faith. We think it is clear
that the mere carelessness of the carrier's driver does not per se constitute of
justify an inference of malice or bad faith on the part of the carrier; and in the
case at bar there is no other evidence of such malice to support the award of
moral damages by the Court of Appeals.
THE CONSOLIDATED BANK and TRUST CORPORATION vs. COURT
OF APPEALS and L.C. DIAZ and COMPANY, CPA’s
 savings account. The withdrawal slip for the P300,000 bore the signatures of the
G.R. No. 138569, Sep 11, 2003.
FACT:

Petitioner Solidbank is a domestic banking corporation organized and existing
under Philippine laws. Private respondent L.C. Diaz and Company, CPA’s, is a
professional partnership engaged in the practice of accounting.
In March 1976, L.C. Diaz opened a savings account with Solidbank. On 14
August 1991, L.C. Diaz through its cashier, Mercedes Macaraya, filled up a
savings (cash) deposit slip for P990 and a savings (checks) deposit slip for P50.
Macaraya instructed the messenger of L.C. Diaz, Ismael Calapre, to deposit the
money with Solidbank. Macaraya also gave Calapre the Solidbank passbook.
Calapre went to Solidbank and presented to Teller No. 6 the two deposit slips
and the passbook. The teller acknowledged the receipt of the deposit by
returning to Calapre the duplicate copies of the two deposit slips. Teller No. 6
stamped the deposit slips with the words “DUPLICATE” and “SAVING
TELLER 6 SOLIDBANK HEAD OFFICE.” Since the transaction took time and
Calapre had to make another deposit for L.C. Diaz with Allied Bank, he left the
passbook with Solidbank. Calapre then went to Allied Bank. When Calapre
returned to Solidbank to retrieve the passbook, Teller No. 6 informed him that
“somebody got the passbook.” Calapre went back to L.C. Diaz and reported the
incident to Macaraya.
Page 49 of 53
Macaraya immediately prepared a deposit slip in duplicate copies with a check
of P200,000. Macaraya and Calapre went to Solidbank and presented to Teller
No. 6 the deposit slip and check. The teller stamped the words “DUPLICATE”
and “SAVING TELLER 6 SOLIDBANK HEAD OFFICE” on the duplicate
copy of the deposit slip. When Macaraya asked for the passbook, Teller No. 6
told Macaraya that someone got the passbook but she could not remember to
whom she gave the passbook. When Macaraya asked Teller No. 6 if Calapre got
the passbook, Teller No. 6 answered that someone shorter than Calapre got the
passbook. Calapre was then standing beside Macaraya.
The following day L.C. Diaz learned of the unauthorized withdrawal the day
before (14 August 1991) of P300,000 from its

authorized signatories of L.C. Diaz, namely Diaz and Rustico L. Murillo. The
signatories, however, denied signing the withdrawal slip. A certain Noel Tamayo
received the P300,000.
L.C. Diaz demanded from Solidbank the return of its money. Solidbank refused.
L.C. Diaz filed a Complaint for Recovery of a Sum of Money against Solidbank.
The trial court absolved Solidbank. L.C. Diaz appealed to the CA. CA reversed
the ecision of the trial court. CA denied the motion for reconsideration of
Solidbank. But it modified its decision by deleting the award of exemplary
damages and attorney’s fees. Hence this petition.
ISSUE:

WON petitioner Solidbank is liable.
RULING:

Yes. Solidbank is liable for breach of contract due to negligence, or culpa
contractual.
The contract between the bank and its depositor is governed by the provisions of
the Civil Code on simple loan. Article 1980 of the Civil Code expressly provides
that “x x x savings x x x deposits of money in banks and similar institutions shall
be governed by the provisions concerning simple loan.” There is a debtor-
creditor relationship between the bank and its depositor. The bank is the debtor
and the depositor is the creditor. The depositor lends the bank money and the
bank agrees to pay the depositor on demand. The savings deposit agreement
between the bank and the depositor is the contract that determines the rights and
obligations of the parties.
The law imposes on banks high standards in view of the fiduciary nature of
banking. The bank is under obligation to treat the accounts of its depositors with
meticulous care, always having in mind the fiduciary nature of their relationship.
This fiduciary relationship means that the bank’s obligation to observe “high
standards of integrity and performance” is deemed written into every deposit
agreement between a bank and its depositor. The fiduciary nature of banking
requires banks to assume a degree of diligence higher than that of a good father
of a family. Article 1172 of the Civil Code states that the degree of diligence
required of an obligor is that prescribed by law or contract, and absent such
stipulation then the diligence of a good father of a family. Section 2 of RA 8791
prescribes the statutory diligence required from banks – that banks must observe
“high standards of integrity and performance” in servicing their depositors.
However, the fiduciary nature of a bank-depositor relationship does not convert
the contract between the bank and its depositors from a simple loan to a trust
agreement, whether express or implied. Failure by the bank to pay the depositor
is failure to pay a simple loan, and not a breach of trust. The law simply imposes
on the bank a higher standard of integrity and performance in complying with its
obligations under the contract of simple loan, beyond those required of non-bank
debtors under a similar contract of simple loan.
The fiduciary nature of banking does not convert a simple loan into a trust
agreement because banks do not accept deposits to enrich depositors but to earn
money for themselves.
Solidbank’s Breach of its Contractual Obligation
 required diligence in the selection and supervision of employees is not a
Article 1172 of the Civil Code provides that “responsibility arising from
negligence in the performance of every kind of obligation is demandable.” For
breach of the savings deposit agreement due to negligence, or culpa contractual,
the bank is liable to its depositor.
Page 50 of 53
Calapre left the passbook with Solidbank because the “transaction took time”
and he had to go to Allied Bank for another transaction. The passbook was still
in the hands of the employees of Solidbank for the processing of the deposit
when Calapre left Solidbank. When the passbook is in the possession of
Solidbank’s tellers during withdrawals, the law imposes on Solidbank and its
tellers an even higher degree of diligence in safeguarding the passbook.
Solidbank’s tellers must exercise a high degree of diligence in insuring that they
return the passbook only to the depositor or his authorized representative. For
failing to return the passbook to Calapre, the authorized representative of L.C.
Diaz, Solidbank and Teller No. 6 presumptively failed to observe such high
degree of diligence in safeguarding the passbook, and in insuring its return to the
party authorized to receive the same.
In culpa contractual, once the plaintiff proves a breach of contract, there is a
presumption that the defendant was at fault or negligent. The burden is on the
defendant to prove that he was not at fault or negligent. In contrast, in culpa
aquiliana the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the defendant was
negligent. In the present case, L.C. Diaz has established that Solidbank breached
its contractual obligation to return the passbook only to the authorized
representative of L.C. Diaz. There is thus a presumption that Solidbank was at
fault and its teller was negligent in not returning the passbook to Calapre. The
burden was on Solidbank to prove that there was no negligence on its part or its
employees. But Solidbank failed to discharge its burden. Solidbank did not
present to the trial court Teller No. 6, the teller with whom Calapre left the
passbook and who was supposed to return the passbook to him. Solidbank also
failed to adduce in evidence its standard procedure in verifying the identity of
the person retrieving the passbook, if there is such a procedure, and that Teller
No. 6 implemented this procedure in the present case.
Solidbank is bound by the negligence of its employees under the principle of
respondeat superior or command responsibility. The defense of exercising the
complete defense in culpa contractual, unlike in culpa aquiliana. The bank must
not only exercise “high standards of integrity and performance,” it must also
insure that its employees do likewise because this is the only way to insure that
the bank will comply with its fiduciary duty
Proximate Cause of the Unauthorized Withdrawal
 exercised the proper diligence in the selection and supervision of its employee,
Proximate cause is that cause which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury and without
which the result would not have occurred. Proximate cause is determined by the
facts of each case upon mixed considerations of logic, common sense, policy
and precedent.
L.C. Diaz was not at fault that the passbook landed in the hands of the impostor.
Solidbank was in possession of the passbook while it was processing the deposit.
After completion of the transaction, Solidbank had the contractual obligation to
return the passbook only to Calapre, the authorized representative of L.C. Diaz.
Solidbank failed to fulfill its contractual obligation because it gave the passbook
to another person.
Had the passbook not fallen into the hands of the impostor, the loss of P300,000
would not have happened. Thus, the proximate cause of the unauthorized
withdrawal was Solidbank’s negligence in not returning the passbook to Calapre.
Doctrine of Last Clear Chance

The doctrine of last clear chance states that where both parties are negligent but
the negligent act of one is appreciably later than that of the other, or where it is
impossible to determine whose fault or negligence caused the loss, the one who
had the last clear opportunity to avoid the loss but failed to do so, is chargeable
with the loss. The antecedent negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude him
from recovering damages caused by the supervening negligence of the
defendant, who had the last fair chance to prevent the impending harm by the
exercise of due diligence.
We do not apply the doctrine of last clear chance to the present case. This is a
case of culpa contractual, where neither the contributory negligence of the
plaintiff nor his last clear chance to avoid the loss, would exonerate the
defendant from liability. Such contributory negligence or last clear chance by the
plaintiff merely serves to reduce the recovery of damages by the plaintiff but
does not exculpate the defendant from his breach of contract
Mitigated Damages
 Court of Appeals.
Under Article 1172, “liability (for culpa contractual) may be regulated by the
courts, according to the circumstances.” This means that if the defendant
Page 51 of 53
or if the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence, then the courts may
reduce the award of damages. In this case, L.C. Diaz was guilty of contributory
negligence in allowing a withdrawal slip signed by its authorized signatories to
fall into the hands of an impostor. Thus, the liability of Solidbank should be
reduced.
In PBC v. CA where the Court held the depositor guilty of contributory
negligence, we allocated the damages between the depositor and the bank on a
40-60 ratio. Applying the same ruling to this case, we hold that L.C. Diaz must
shoulder 40% of the actual damages awarded by the appellate court. Solidbank
must pay the other 60% of the actual damages.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION.
AIRFRANCE vs CARRASCOSO
In March 1958, Rafael Carrascoso and several other Filipinos were tourists en
route to Rome from Manila. Carrascoso was issued a first class round trip ticket
by Air France. But during a stop-over in Bangkok, he was asked by the plane
manager of Air France to vacate his seat because a white man allegedly has a
“better right” than him. Carrascoso protested but when things got heated and
upon advise of other Filipinos on board, Carrascoso gave up his seat and was
transferred to the plane’s tourist class.
After their tourist trip when Carrascoso was already in the Philippines, he sued
Air France for damages for the embarrassment he suffered during his trip. In
court, Carrascoso testified, among others, that he when he was forced to take the
tourist class, he went to the plane’s pantry where he was approached by a plane
purser who told him that he noted in the plane’s journal the following:
First-class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and
that the captain refused to intervene
The said testimony was admitted in favor of Carrascoso. The trial court
eventually awarded damages in favor of Carrascoso. This was affirmed by the
Air France is assailing the decision of the trial court and the CA. It avers that the
issuance of a first class ticket to Carrascoso was not an assurance that he will be
seated in first class because allegedly in truth and in fact, that was not the true
intent between the parties.
Air France also questioned the admissibility of Carrascoso’s testimony regarding
the note made by the purser because the said note was never presented in court.
ISSUE 1: Whether or not Air France is liable for damages and on what basis.
ISSUE 2: Whether or not the testimony of Carrasoso regarding the note which
was not presented in court is admissible in evidence.
HELD 1: Yes. It appears that Air France’s liability is based on culpa-contractual
and on culpa aquiliana.
Culpa Contractual
There exists a contract of carriage between Air France and Carrascoso. There
was a contract to furnish Carrasocoso a first class passage; Second, That said
contract was breached when Air France failed to furnish first class transportation
at Bangkok; and Third, that there was bad faith when Air France’s employee
compelled Carrascoso to leave his first class accommodation berth “after he was
already, seated” and to take a seat in the tourist class, by reason of which he
suffered inconvenience, embarrassments and humiliations, thereby causing him
mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation,
resulting in moral damages.
The Supreme Court did not give credence to Air France’s claim that the issuance
of a first class ticket to a passenger is not an assurance that he will be given a
first class seat. Such claim is simply incredible.
Culpa Aquiliana
Here, the SC ruled, even though there is a contract of carriage between Air
France and Carrascoso, there is also a tortuous act based on culpa aquiliana.
Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be
treated by the carrier’s employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due
consideration. They are entitled to be protected against personal misconduct,
injurious language, indignities and abuses from such employees. So it is, that
any rule or discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger
gives the latter an action for damages against the carrier. Air France’s contract
with Carrascoso is one attended with public duty. The stress of Carrascoso’s
action is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public duty
by the Air France — a case of quasi-delict. Damages are proper.
HELD: 2: Yes. The testimony of Carrascoso must be admitted based on res
gestae. The subject of inquiry is not the entry, but the ouster incident. Testimony
Page 52 of 53
on the entry does not come within the proscription of the best evidence rule.
Such testimony is admissible. Besides, when the dialogue between Carrascoso
and the purser happened, the impact of the startling occurrence was still fresh
and continued to be felt. The excitement had not as yet died down. Statements
then, in this environment, are admissible as part of the res gestae. The utterance
of the purser regarding his entry in the notebook was spontaneous, and related to
the circumstances of the ouster incident. Its trustworthiness has been guaranteed.
It thus escapes the operation of the hearsay rule. It forms part of the res gestae.
Far East Bank and Trust Company, petitioner
vs Court of Appeals, Luisa Luna and Clarita Luna, respondents
Ponente: Vitug
Facts:
Luis Luna applied for a far east card issued by far east bank at its Pasig branch.
Upon his request, the bank also issued a supplemental card to private respondent
Clarita Luna. Then Clarita lost her credit card and submitted an affidavit of loss.
Later on October 6, 1988 in a restaurant, Luis' credit card was not honored.
Luis thru a counsel then demanded from far east to pay damages for the
humiliation he felt. The vice-president of the bank expressed bank's apologies to
Luis.
Still evidently feeling aggrieved, private respondents, on 05 December 1988,
filed a complaint for damages with the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Pasig
against FEBTC.
On 30 March 1990, the RTC of Pasig, given the foregoing factual settings,
rendered a decision ordering FEBTC to pay private respondents (a) P300,000.00
moral damages; (b) P50,000.00 exemplary damages; and (c) P20,000.00
attorney's fees.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the appellate court affirmed the decision of
the trial court.
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court, FEBTC
has come to this Court with this petition for review.
There is merit in this appeal.
In culpa contractual, moral damages may be recovered where the defendant is
shown to have acted in bad faith or with malice in the breach of the contract. The
Civil Code provides:
Art. 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral
damages if the court should find that, under the circumstances, such damages are
justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant
acted fraudulently or in bad faith.
Bad faith, in this context, includes gross, but not simple, negligence.
Exceptionally, in a contract of carriage, moral damages are also allowed in case
of death of a passenger attributable to the fault (which is presumed) of the
common carrier.

Held:
The Court has not in the process overlooked another rule that a quasi-delict can
be the cause for breaching a contract that might thereby permit the application of
applicable principles on tort 9 even where there is a pre-existing contract
between the plaintiff and the defendant. This doctrine, unfortunately, cannot
improve private respondents' case for it can aptly govern only where the act or
omission complained of would constitute an actionable tort independently of the
contract. The test (whether a quasi-delict can be deemed to underlie the breach
of a contract) can be stated thusly: Where, without a pre-existing contract
between two parties, an act or omission can nonetheless amount to an actionable
tort by itself, the fact that the parties are contractually bound is no bar to the
application of quasi-delict provisions to the case. Here, private respondents'
damage claim is predicated solely on their contractual relationship; without such
agreement, the act or omission complained of cannot by itself be held to stand as
a separate cause of action or as an independent actionable tort.

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