Historical evolution of referenda and applications in

contemporary democracy1
by
Fotios Fitsilis Head of Department for Scientific Documentation and
Supervision, Scientific Service, Hellenic Parliament
and
Haralambis Kyrkos Head of Department for Parliamentary History, Scientific
Service, Hellenic Parliament

Abstract
Referenda and popular legislative initiatives constitute the main institutions of direct
democracy worldwide. By gradually creating a fertile environment for citizens’
political maturation and by triggering co-responsibility at the level of decision making,
these institutions do not annul nor substitute the representative system of
contemporary democracies but operate on a supplementary basis to it, given that they
temporarily return the primary power to its origin, the people. The paper will first
present an analysis of several types of referenda in EU Member States, followed by a
more detailed presentation of historic and recent referenda in Greece. The
effectiveness of referenda as policy tools will be discussed as well as several questions
related to their contribution to democracy and the strengthening of popular
sovereignty.

1. Introduction
Referenda and popular legislative initiatives constitute worldwide the main
institutions of direct democracy. As such, they do not negate or replace the
representative system but they complement it, as they return, temporarily, the
primary power to its origin, the people. In the Greek case, given that the Greek
Constitution does not foresee a popular legislative initiative, the electorate
exceptionally participates in the decision on state matters through referenda. Indeed,
people's decision on specific issues draws its origin from ancient Greece, where
decision-making took place within the popular assembly, the “agora”.
(Dimitropoulos, 1997) presents a thorough analysis of the different types of referenda.
Generally, referenda are separated into "genuine", which are devoted to the choice
between two specific solutions and "personal", in Latin "plebiscitum", which relate to
specific persons and intend to obtain the people’s confirmation. Subsequently,
depending on their legal consequences, "genuine" referenda are separated into
"decisive", when the will of the electorate produces a rule of law, and "consultative",
when the electorate simply express an opinion on the decision taken by another state
organ. "Decisive" referenda may be further divided into "constitutional" and

1
This working paper has been presented at the PADEMIA annual conference in Brussels, 19-20 May
2016.
1

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"legislative". This basic distinction between the different types of referenda in
visualized in Figure 1. Eventually, both "decisive" and "consultative" referenda may be
considered "mandatory", when they are necessary for the completion of the process
issued for, or "optional".

constitutional
decisive
genuine legislative
referenda consultative
personal

Figure 1: Basic types of referenda

EU Member States hold referenda for a multitude of reasons and purposes (see
chapter 2). EU enlargement was one pivotal reason to hold referenda. In (Albi, 2005)
an overview of the referenda related to the EU enlargement is presented, while (Doyle
and Fidrmuc, 2006) investigates the determinants of support for EU membership in
candidate countries. In the third chapter of this paper the constitutional referenda in
Greek history will be discussed. In Greece, referenda are constitutionally
acknowledged as institutions of direct democracy. However, it could be argued that,
instead of having a rather “exploratory” character, in reality they affirmed already
initiated or ongoing historic and political developments. To this assessment it should
be added that since 1974 democratic transition only once, in 2015, a referendum has
been conducted. Chapter 4 contains the conclusions of the present discussion. This
paper is based on the research presented in (Kyrkos and Makropoulou, 2014). The
original sample was enriched and post-analysis of the results was conducted. Overall,
there seem to be no EU-wide standards for holding referenda. Their legal background
as well as the process of implementation display significant differences.

2. Referenda in EU Member States

In EU Member States the institution of referendum is widely acknowledged. With the
exception of Belgium, where the compatibility of this form of direct democracy with
the representative form of government is strongly disputed and therefore the
possibility of holding referenda does not exist, all other EU countries have more or less
experienced a referendum at a national or federal level, especially on EU accession
matters (Best, Augustyn and Lambermont 2011). In the present chapter a short review
of the function of referenda in EU countries will be presented in order to discern
common principles regulating this institution, review the relative practice followed,
and discuss on the existing scepticism regarding the role of referendum in the future.
Regional referenda, e.g. on the Scottish independence (2014), even though they
present facets that are of a European-wide interest, will not be discussed in the
present context. The Greek case will be examined in more detail in chapter 3.

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2.1. Legal framework
The legal basis for holding a referendum is mostly provided in the Constitution and
further regulated in special laws. It is worth noticing that referenda are not always
established through constitutional provisions, e.g. in Cyprus, while in the UK no
generic rules on referenda seem to be present (UK Electoral Commission 2011, p. 23-
24). The proposal to hold a referendum is either made by the Government, the
Parliament, the President of the Republic or the King. An additional option exists,
when a referendum in initiated upon request from a certain percentage of the
electorate e.g. 200.000 citizens in Hungary. In cases when it is compulsory for the
competent state organs to conduct a referendum, the mandatory character is often
the consequence of a request by the parliamentarian minority or the second
parliamentary Chamber. The following table (Table 1: Legal framework of referenda
in the EU) summarizes the legal framework for referenda in 19 EU Member States,
which appear in alphabetic order. The table also contains information on their nature
and prohibited topics as well as on the institution that proposes the referendum.
2.1.1. Topics of referenda
Referenda usually regard matters of public interest or of particular importance to the
State. However, there are also other reasons to call for a referendum. The most
significant ones are the following:
a. On matters of national interest;
b. To enact or to cease legislation, e.g. in Denmark, France, Latvia, Italy, Croatia
and Slovenia;
c. On issues of sovereignty or to ratify international treaties, e.g. in Croatia,
Denmark, Lithuania2, Slovakia, Poland and Slovenia;
d. To amend constitutional provisions, e.g. in Italy, Slovenia, Austria, Denmark,
Croatia, France, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Malta, Poland, Romania,
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and
e. To elect the President of a Republic or to depose the President after a
parliamentary request, e.g. in Austria, Romania and Slovakia.
For instance, referenda related to the EU accession belong to the first point (a.) and
are presented in section 2.2.1, while policy issues belong to the second one (b.) and
are discussed further below, in section 2.2.3. These types of classification are purely
indicative and cannot have absolute character, i.e. as a referendum may be legislative
or constitutional depending on the state it is implemented.

2
Alteration in the constitutional provision establishing the form of government can be achieved
through referendum if not less than 3/4 of the citizens with electoral right vote in favor thereof
(Constitution art. 148).

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EU MS Legal provisions Proposal by Prohibited Binding/ Comments
topics non-binding
Austria Federal Constitutional Law art. 4, 43, Parliament n/a Binding Every enactment of the National Council may be subject
48 of a referendum
Bulgaria Direct Citizen Participation in Parliament Taxation, budget, n/a Referendum on local issues: 1/10 of municipal councils or
Government Act art. 14 (1) 1, 3, 4 People parliament, declaration of 150.000 voters
war, state crisis, judges National referendum: >300.000 voters
Croatia Constitution art. 87 Parliament n/a Binding The Parliament calls a referendum upon request of 10% of
People the electorate

Cyprus Law 206/1989 Government n/a Non-binding On issues of public interest

through
Parliament
Czechia Constitution art. 10a, 62 President n/a Binding Referenda on international agreements for transfer of
state powers to international organizations, e.g. the EU
Denmark No generic rule for consultative Loans, pensions, salaries Both options Parliament may decide at all times to hold referenda of a
referenda. consultative nature
Danish Constitutional Act Section 42 Parliament A bill may be subject of a referendum (1/3 of MPs needed)
Subsection 1 for legislative referenda
France Constitution art. 11, 88-5(1) President n/a n/a Legislative referendum upon request of 1/5 of MPs or
Parliament 1/10 of the electors
People Accession of a state to the European Union
Hungary Fundamental law art. 8 (1), 9 (3) President Taxation, state budget, Binding Possibility of holding referendum upon request of
People parliament, international >200.000 electors
obligations, state crisis war
declaration, pensions,
amnesty, elections
Italy Constitution art. 75, 87, 138 President Taxation, budget, treaty Binding A referendum shall be held to abrogate a law or a measure
People ratification, amnesty upon request of 500.000 voters or 5 Regional Councils

Latvia Constitution art. 48, 50, 68, 72 President Taxation, state budget, Binding On the dissolution of the Saeima
ratification of treaties, On substantial changes in the EU membership terms
Parliament
declaration of war, state 1/3 of MPs to initiate a referendum to suspend a law
crisis

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EU MS Legal provisions Proposal by Prohibited Binding/ Comments
topics non-binding
Lithuania Constitution art. 9 People n/a Both options Consultative referenda on issues of utmost importance to
Law on Referendum art. 4, 5, 50 State and People upon request of 300.000 citizens with
electoral rights

Netherlands No generic rule n/a n/a No constitutional provisions forbidding holding of non-
binding referenda
Poland Constitution art. 125 par. 1 & 2 Parliament n/a Both options On State matters of particular importance
President The Polish Sejm may hold a referendum upon a motion of
> 500.000 voters
Portugal Constitution art. 115, 134, 161, 197, Government Taxation, state budget, n/a On issues of national interest, EU matters
245 Parliament amendments to Referenda may also be held on the initiative of citizens
constitution who submit a request to the Assembly of the Republic
Romania Constitution art. 90 & Law 3/2000 art. President n/a Both options On matters of national interest
12
Slovakia Constitution art. 86c, 93, art. 102(1)n Parliament State budget, basic rights Both options The President may call for a referendum if so requested
President by a petition signed by a minimum of 350.000 citizens

Slovenia Constitution art. 3a, 90, 97 Parliament n/a Both options Mandatory and consultative referenda may be called by
the National Assembly on issues of wider importance to
citizens
A legislative referendum may be called upon request of
1/3 of MPs or 40.000 voters
Spain Constitution Section 62c, 92 par. 1 King n/a n/a On political decisions of special importance
UK No generic rule Government n/a Non-binding Additional legislation needed
through
Parliament

Table 1: Legal framework of referenda in the EU

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2.1.2. Issues excluded from referenda
Not every policy issue may by subject of a referendum (see Table 1: Legal framework
of referenda in the EU). Most commonly prohibitions regard the following issues:
a. taxation (Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Portugal,
Slovakia),
b. state budget (Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Portugal, Slovakia)
c. Parliamentary operation (Bulgaria and Hungary),
d. ratification of international treaties (Italy, Estonia, Latvia) or obligations
arising from international agreements (Hungary), declaration of a state of war
(Bulgaria, Latvia, Hungary),
e. national defense or participation in military operations (Estonia, Hungary,
Latvia),
f. declaration or termination of a state of emergency/national crisis (Bulgaria,
Estonia, Latvia, Hungary),
g. amendments to the Constitution (Portugal),
h. basic rights and freedoms (Slovakia),
i. granting of amnesty or pardons (Hungary, Italy),
j. electoral issues (Hungary),
k. pensions (Hungary, Denmark),
l. government loan, civil servants, salaries, naturalization and expropriation bills
(Denmark) and
m. election of Supreme Court judges or heads of independent authorities
(Bulgaria).
2.1.3. Validity requirements
While usually a fraction of voters or parliamentarian minority is necessary to call a
referendum, the requirements for its validity are much higher. For instance, in
Hungary, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia (in regard to constitutional
amendments) and Latvia (in regard to adopted and suspended legislation), at least
half of the electors need to cast their votes3.
In Denmark, the majority of the electors who voted at the referendum and not less
than 30% of all persons who are entitled to vote must vote against the bill in order to
reject it (Constitution Section 41 subsection 5). For the same issue, in Sweden, the
majority of those taking part in the referendum must vote against it and the number

3
For Latvia it is half of the number of electors as participated in the previous Saeima election.

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of those voting against has to exceed half the number of those casted a valid vote in
previous elections (Instrument of Government, chapter 8 art. 15).
The result of an Italian "abrogative referendum" is only valid if it fulfills the following
participation quorum: to be legally binding, a particular proposition must receive not
only a majority of the valid votes cast, but also a majority of those eligible to vote (i.e.
more than 50% of the total electorate). A national referendum in Bulgaria is valid and
binding if the electoral turnout is at least as high as during the last general
parliamentary elections (Best, Augustyn and Lambermont 2011, p.25).
It is worth noticing that the Venice Commission has taken a general stand against the
forms of quorums in referenda: “a turn-out quorum tends to foster abstention,
whereas in case of an approval quorum the majority might feel that they have been
deprived of victory without an adequate reason”, (Venice Commission 2014, p. 31).
2.1.4. Legal consequences
The results of referenda maybe of decisive or of consultative nature, e.g. legally
binding or non-binding. These two possibilities for the EU Member States in focus are
presented below, while there are also countries where both options are possible (also
to be found in Table 1):
Binding referenda: Austria, Czechia, Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, and
Ireland, Italy.
Non-binding referenda: Cyprus, UK, Finland.
Both options: Slovenia, Lithuania, Spain, Poland, Romania, Denmark, Slovakia,
Sweden.
As for the countries where both options aply, it depends on the issue that is tackled
whether a referendum will be legaly binding or not. For instance, in Poland, a
referendum is binding when it refers to constitutional reforms or if more than 50% of
the electorate has voted. In Romania, a referendum is binding when referring to the
suspension from office of the President of State. In Denmark, a binding referendum is
the case when referring to sovereignty issues in connection with international treaties,
constitutional amendments and certain electoral issues, e.g. altering the voting age or
certain procedural provisions. In Slovakia, a binding referendum is the result of
participation by the absolute majority of eligible voters and the issue has been decided
by an absolute majority of votes. In Sweden, in order to change the Constitution, a
referendum may be arranged at the same time as the general election. This type of
referendum can be considered as a popular veto, since the result is only binding when
it is negative.

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2.2. Implementation
2.2.1. Referenda on EU matters
Several constitutions have distinct provisions regarding EU matters or, in the case of
newer EU Member States, the EU accession procedure. For instance, a referendum on
EU matters is foreseen in France [art. 88-5(1)], where any bill authorizing the
ratification of a treaty pertaining to the accession of a state to the European Union is
submitted to referendum by the President of the Republic. A description of the
Maastricht referenda in France, Denmark and Ireland is presented by (Franklin, Van
der Eijk and Marsh, 1995).
EU MS Date Turnout (%) In favour (%)
Austria 12.6.1994 82.3 66.6
Croatia 22.1.2012 43.5 66.3
Czechia 13/14.6.2003 55.2 77.3
Denmark 2.10.1972 90.1 63.3
Estonia 14.9.2003 64.0 66.8
Finland 16.10.1994 70.8 56.9
Hungary 12.4.2003 46.0 83.8
Ireland 10.5.1972 70.9 83.1
Latvia 20.9.2003 71.5 67.5
Lithuania 10/11.5.2003 63.4 91.1
Malta 8.3.2003 90.9 53.6
Poland 7/8.6.2003 58.6 77.6
Slovakia 16-17.5.2003 52.1 93.7
Slovenia 23.3.20034 60.2 89.6
Sweden 13.11.19945 83.3 52.3
UK 5.6.1975 64.0 67.0

Table 2: Referenda on EU accession

In another example, in Czech Republic6, the President of the Czech Republic is
competent to announce a referendum concerning the accession of the Czech Republic
to the European Union and its result (Constitution art. 62). Indeed, a constitutional act
(no. 515/2002 Coll.) on a referendum on EU accession of the Czech Republic was
adopted in 2002. In Latvia, according to its Constitution, a referendum is taking place
in case of substantial changes in the terms regarding the membership of Latvia in the
European Union, if requested by at least one-half of the members of the Saeima (art.

4
Regarding also NATO membership.
5
Also on 14.9.2003 on the introduction of Euro as national currency (turnout: 82.6%, rejected by
57.1%).
6
Renamed to Czechia in April 2016.

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68). Furthermore, in Portugal, the 7th constitutional revision passed in 2005 allowed
the holding of referenda on the approval of treaties aimed at the construction and
deepening of the European Union (article 295 - Referendum on European Treaty).
As a result, a referendum was held in most EU Member States in relation to their
accession to the EU, e.g. in Austria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark Estonia, Finland,
Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, and the
UK. Table 2 contains specific data (date, turnout and result in favor) for the EU
accession referenda for the above Member States. From these data we calculate an
average turnout of 66.7% and an average voting in favor of the EU accession of 72.3%.
In Ireland, in the framework of constitutional referendum, additional referenda were
held on the Single European Act (on 26.5.1987, turnout 44.1%, 69.9% in favour),
Maastricht Treaty (on 18.6.1992, turnout of 57.3%, 69.1% in favour), Amsterdam
Treaty (on 22.5.1998, turnout of 56.2%, 61.7% in favour), Treaty of Nice (on
19.10.2002, turnout of 49.5%, 62.9% in favour), Treaty of Lisbon (on 2.10.2009,
turnout 59%, 67.1% in favour) and the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and
Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (on 31.5.2012, turnout 50,6%, 60,
3% in favor). In needs to be pointed out that the Treaty of Nice and the Lisbon Treaty
were initially rejected in referenda in 2001 and 2008 by 53.9% and 53.4% of the voters
in a turnout of 34.8% and 53.1%, respectively.
In Denmark, the following EU related referenda were held:
a. on the Maastricht Treaty, on 2.6.1992, with a turnout of 83.1% (rejected by
50.7% of voters) and on 18.5.1993, with a turnout of 86.5% (56.7% in favor);
b. on joining the Euro, on 28.9.2000, with a turnout of 87.6% (rejected by 53.2%
of voters);
c. on the Single European Act, on 27.2.1986, with a turnout of 75.4% (56.2% in
favor) and
d. on the Amsterdam Treaty, on 28.5.1998, with a turnout of 76.2% (55.1% in
favor).
In France referenda were held on the following occasions:
a. on the enlargement of the European Economic Community, on 23.4.1972, with
a turnout of 60.2% (68.3% in favor);
b. on the Maastricht Treaty, on 20.9.1992, with a turnout of 69.7% (51% in favor)
and
c. on the EU Constitution Treaty, on 29.5.2005, with a turnout of 69% (rejected
by 55% of the voters).
In view of the ratification of the EU Constitution Treaty referenda were also held in
Luxembourg (on 10.7.2005, with a turnout of 90,4% and 56,5% in favor), Netherlands
(on 1.6.2005, with a turnout of 62.8% and 61.5% against) and Spain (on 20.2.2005,
with a turnout of 41.8% and 81.8% in favor). In Italy a consultative referendum on

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conferring to the European Parliament constituent powers and to create an EU
constitution took place on 18.6.1989, with a turnout of 80.7% and 88% in favor.
For the total of the 28 EU Member States, 21 of them have proceeded so far to
implement EU related referenda, in some cases even though not specifically imposed
by their constitution. Ultimately, as a result of EU wide political implications following
the Dutch and French referenda which rejected the EU Constitutional Treaty, a new
treaty, that of Lisbon, was created. Ireland, due to constitutional requirements, was
the sole Member State to hold a referendum on this treaty.
2.2.2. Constitutional referenda
Constitutional amendments offer a significant ground for holding referenda. Nine (9)
different EU Member States have experienced so far constitutional referenda, e.g.
Croatia, Denmark, Estonia, France, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania and Romania.
Ireland is leading this special list of countries having implemented 35 popular
referenda to initiate amendments regarding a variety of issues to the 1937
Constitution, of which 28 were approved and 7 not (The Taoiseach webpage 2015).
As it was typical in newer EU Member States from Eastern Europe, in Estonia and
Lithuania, a referendum on the new constitution was held. The following table
presents the constitutional issues that were tackled through referenda in the above
countries focusing on the turnout of the popular process.
From the values contained in Table 3 the average turnout for constitutional referenda
in the mentioned EU Member States can be calculated to 54.2%. Comparable analysis
of referenda related results is not always recommendable, since a common ground
for comparison is not always easy to be found. However, the finding that the average
turnout of referenda on EU accession (66.7%) is significantly higher than turnout for
constitutional referenda by at least 10 percentage points, is of no surprise, given the
significance of this political choice for the vast majority of citizens.
Further analysis of the results shows that the turnout of both the EU accession and
constitutional referenda seems also to be higher by a comfortable margin compared
to other cases, e.g. referenda on policy issues, where the average turnout is calculated
to 45.7% (see also the following section).

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 EU MS Date or Year Constitutional issue (s) Turnout (%)
Croatia 1.12.2013 Marriage 37.9
Denmark 28.5.1953 Constitutional amendments and 59.1
Voting age 57.1
7.6.2009 Royal succession 58.3
Estonia 28.6.1992 New Constitution 66.8
Suffrage extension 66.7
France 24.9.2000 President’s mandate 30.2
27.4.1969 Government decentralization and 80.1
changes to the Senate
28.10.1962 Direct election of the President 77.0
Ireland7 1939 - to date Voting rights (1972, 1984), EU Accumulated
accession (1972) and related treaties results
(1992, 2002, 2009), recognition of
religions (1972), adoption (1979), [min-max]
election of Members of Seanad 28.6 – 70.9
Éireann (1979), rights of the unborn
(1983), refusal to bail (1996), cabinet [Average]
confidentiality (1997), British-Irish 52.0
Agreement (1998), local government
(1999), death penalty (2001),
International Criminal Court (2001),
citizenship (2004), judges’
Remuneration (2011), children’s
rights (2012), Court of Appeal (2013),
marriage (2015)
Italy 2001 increase of decentralization of 34.0
2006 regional powers, Parliament, 52.3
Judiciary etc.
Latvia 2.8.2008 Referendum to dissolve Parliament 41.5
18.2.2012 Official/working language 71.1
Lithuania 20.10.1996 The Seimas (Parliament) 52.1
10.11.1996 Sovereignty issues 39.7
Romania 8.12.1991 New Constitution 67.3
18/19.10.2003 Changes for EU accession, 55.7
parliamentary and judicial reform

Table 3: Results of constitutional referenda

2.2.3. Referenda on policy issues
Apart from constitutional issues, referenda are also frequently used to determine
conduct in distinct policy areas, such as the use on nuclear power, privatizations or
other institutional issues that are not subject of constitutional provisions, e.g.
electoral reform, international agreements, pensions, parliamentary issues and many
more. Table 4 presents referenda on several significant policy issues, the EU MS in

7
In the case of Ireland there have been 35 referenda on amendments to the Constitution. The most
significant changes appear here. The turnouts varied between 28,6 (on adoption) – 70,9% (on EU
accession), on average 52,0%.

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which they were held, the year when they were implemented as well as their turnout.
In some cases, e.g. referenda are held with multiple questions, e.g. the twelve-part
referendum in Italy (1995), thus making classification by topic challenging. Hence, the
same referendum may appear more than once.

Topic EU MS Year Turnout (%)

Austria 1978 64.1
Sweden 1980 75.7
Italy 1987 and 2011 65.1 and 54.8
Energy and
Bulgaria 2013 20.2
nuclear power
Lithuania 2008 and 2012 48.4 and 52.5
Slovenia 1999 27.3
Slovakia 1997 9.5
UK 2011 42.2
Romania 2007 26.5
Electoral reform
Slovenia 1996 37.9
Italy 1991 and 2009 62.5 and 23.3
Austria 2013 52,4
France 1988 and 1962 36.9 and 75.3
Hungary 1997 49.2
National defense
Spain 1986 59.4
& security and
Latvia 2007 22.7
sovereignty
Lithuania 1992 76.1
issues
Slovakia 1997 9.5
Slovenia 2010 42.7
Cyprus 2004 88.7
Sweden 1957 72.4
Employment,
Latvia 2008 and 1999 23.2 and 22.9
unions, wages &
Italy 1985 and 1995 77.9 and 56.9
pensions
Slovenia 2011 33.9
Malta 2011 87.7
Marriage, family
Slovenia 2001 and 2012 35.7 and 30.3
& divorce
Italy 2005 25.7
Romania 2009 50.9
Political, Italy 1978 and 1993 81,2 and 77,1
institutional & Latvia 2011 44.7
parliamentary Slovakia 2000, 2004 and 20,0, 35,9 and
issues 2010 22.8
Lithuania 1992 59.,2
Impeachment Romania 2007 and 2012 44.4 and 46.2
Slovakia 1994 and 1998 20.0 and 44.1
Privatizations Slovenia 2003 and 2007 31.1 and 57.9
Lithuania 1994 and 1996 36.9 and 52.5
Italy 1995 and 1997 57.2 and 30.0
Media and Slovenia 2005 and 2010 30.7 and 14.7
Journalism Italy 1997 30.0
Slovakia 2010 22.8
Denmark 1963 83.5
Regional
Italy 2003 25.5
government, land
Slovenia 2008 10.9
law & property
Portugal 1998 48.1
Table 4: Referenda on policy issues

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The table does not pretend to be fully representative. It presents a total of 57 unique
referenda in 10 distinct policy areas/sectors. Nevertheless, some interesting results
can be deducted from a thorough analysis of its contents. The average turnout of the
abovementioned referenda on policy issues is 45.7%. Each referendum is counted
once, in order for referenda with multiple questions no to be overrepresented. As also
discussed previously, there seems to be a steady decrease in the peoples interest (as
expressed in the relevant turnout) among referenda related to the EU accession,
referenda related to constitutional amendments and referenda related to policy
issues, i.e. 66.7% > 54.2% > 45.7% respectively. From the table above we also deduct
that most referenda (9) have been conducted a. in the Energy sector and b. in the
National defense, security and sovereignty sector.

60,0
Average turnover (%)

50,0
49,0 51,3
40,0 46,4 47,9
44,9 45,3
40,5 42,0
38,5
30,0
30,9
20,0

10,0

0,0

Figure 2: Average turnover per policy sector

Figure 2 shows the average turnover for referenda related to the 10 policy sectors that
are referred to in Table 4. The sectors appear in this figure in increasing order, from
the lower (left) to the higher (right) turnover value. Participation in referenda for the
media sector (30.9%) is at the lower side of the value spectrum, whereas participation
in referenda related to national defense, security and sovereignty issues is more than
20 percentage points higher (51.3%).
Based on the data presented in Table 4, Figure 3 presents the EU Member States that
organized at least 4 referenda, as well as the number of referenda conducted. Italy
and Slovenia, with 12 and 11 referenda, respectively, belong to the countries that
make frequent use of this popular policy tool. In regard to the average participation
(turnout) per country, Lithuania and Italy appear to have the highest average turnout
with 54.3% and 53.1%, respectively.

13

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 Latvia; 4
Italy; 12 Romania; 4

Slovakia; 6

Slovenia; 11 Lithuania; 6

Figure 3: EU Member States with frequent use of referenda on policy issues

On the other hand, Latvia and Slovenia are at the lower end with 28.4% and 25.4%
average turnout, respectively. These significant deviations in citizen participation per
country are not obvious and need to be studied in more detail in subsequent research.
One possible reason could be fatigue due to the high frequency of use, e.g. in Slovenia
(25.4%) with 11 referenda between 1996 and 2012. In comparison, Italy (53.1%)
conducted 12 referenda in the period from 1978 until 2009. The next chapter presents
in more detail referenda in the context of modern and contemporary Greek history.

3. Referenda in Greece
A total of 10 referenda were held in the Republic of Greece since its foundation in
1830. Table 5 offers an overview on these referenda with a brief description and
additional information on its type and the result. In the following section, the content
of each referendum will be presented, with particular emphasis on the latest, which
was conducted just a year ago, in 2015.

Results %
Year Description Type
(pro/contra)
1862 To confirm a choice on the King personal ~ 99 / 1
1920 Return of the King personal ~ 99 / 1
1924 Republic vs. crowned Democracy genuine 69.9 / 30.1
1926 Election of dictator Pangalos personal n/a
1935 Restoration of King George II personal 97.9 / 2.1
1946 Restoration of King George II personal 68.4 / 31.6
1968 Approval of a dictatorial “Constitution” constitutional 91.9 / 8.1
1973 Constitutional change and election of constitutional/
78.4 / 21.6
persons in high office personal
1974 Form of government constitutional 69.2 / 30.8
2015 Acceptance of bailout conditions genuine 61.3 / 38.7

Table 5: Referenda in modern Greece

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3.1. Cases of referenda in modern and contemporary Greek history
 1862
It was on November 1862, when, during the interregnum that followed the
dethronement of King Otto, the Provisional Government conducted a referendum to
elect a king. This was a personal referendum to confirm a decision already taken on
grounds of diplomatic expediency to maintain a historical and political balance.
Ultimately, this referendum was a mean of relief of the democratic morale of the
people after the Ottoman period, since it was not repeated a few months later after
the enthronement of George I. Therefore, the first referendum in the Greek political
history, as to its typical features as well as to its feasibility, has not contributed to the
development of the institution.
 1920
There was a period of almost sixty years of turbulent domestic and international
historical and political life, until the next use of the popular verdict and the second
referendum on 22 November 1920. Already, since May 1917, at the climax of the, so
called, "National Division" and the confrontation between prime minister Eleftherios
Venizelos and King Constantine I, the latter along with the Crown Prince George were
forced to leave Greece. His son, Alexander, was appointed as his successor, but died
under tragic circumstances, in October 1920. In the elections that followed, on
November 1, 1920, the anti-Venizelist parties prevailed and a referendum was
announced in order for Constantine to return. Consequently, this referendum, having
marked the return of the exiled King to the Greek throne, is directly connected with
the royal institution, as the procedure of King’s return was not necessitated by any
constitutional provision. Eventually, the lack of a constitutional provision and the fact
that 99% of voters voted for the return of the King, contributed to the deformation of
the institution of referendum.
 1924
The third referendum on April 13, 1924, differs significantly from the previous ones.
After the Asia Minor Catastrophe and the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 elections were
held in December 1923. As the royalist parties abstained from the elections, the anti-
monarchists gained the majority in the new parliament. Consequently, the Fourth
Constituent Assembly decided to change the constitution from monarchy to republic,
subject to people’s approval. Eventually, 69.9 % voted for the Republic and 30.1 % for
the crowned Democracy. This referendum undoubtedly recorded the existence of a
strong royalist movement. Amid a tense and suspicious political environment, all
royalist parties immediately recognized the result, while the largest party of anti-
Venizelists accepted in 1932 the constitutional transformation of Greece.

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  1926
After the dissolution of the Fourth National Assembly in September 1925, general
Theodoros Pangalos, on January 1926, imposed a dictatorship, thus forcing the
legitimate President of the Republic, Pavlos Koundouriotis, to resign. Despite
suspicions of fraud, the subsequent procedure of the election of Pangalos as President
of the Republic is usually ranked among referenda. In fact, it was an unopposed
election with common points with a personal referendum.
 1935
The Constitution of 1927 was the first Greek Constitution that established the
institution of the referendum. This Constitution included additional provisions for
reviewing the non-fundamental constitutional provisions through a referendum.
However, the next referendum on November 3, 1935 was held again to decide on the
form of government. The referendum, which was conducted within an environment
of political instability, ratified with a pro vote of 97.88 % the restoration of King George
II. In this case, however, there was a differentiation from the referendum of 1924 as
crowned democracy was not subsequently declared, also due to the marginal
conditions under which the referendum was conducted.
 1946
After the liberation of Greece from the German occupation and the free elections of
March 31, 1946, a new referendum was held. However, the choice was not between
monarchy and a republic, since monarchy had already been settled, but had to do with
the restoration to the throne or not of King George II. In essence, it was a personal
referendum that was concealing the essential goal to determine crowned democracy
as the form of government. As to the result, it was of no surprise. King George II
returned with a pro vote of 68.4 %.
 1968
On April 21, 1967 a military coup established a dictatorial government. The
dictatorship in its efforts to define itself in the democratic framework announced
almost immediately the draft of a new “Constitution” in order to restore political
normality. As a substitute of democratic procedures, a “referendum” was called to
ask for the approval of the Greek people. The obvious purpose here was to obtain a
democratic mantle and popular support for the dictatorial government. Ultimately,
the "Constitution" was approved by 91.87 %.
 1973
During the period of dictatorship (1967-1974) there was a second "referendum" on
July 29, 1973. This referendum essentially ratified the constitutional change from
crowned democracy into presidential parliamentary republic. Also, by applying
transitional provisions, two dictatorship leaders were appointed interim president and

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vice president of the "republic", respectively. As for its type, it may be considered as
constitutional and personal at the same time. Technically, the goal of the dictatorial
government was to popularly validate decisions already taken under the state of
absolute authoritarian rule.
 1974
After the overthrow of the dictatorship, on July 23/24, 1974, a government of national
unity was formed. The provisory government set the constitutional status of the state
on temporary basis, until the final determination of government and the drafting of a
new Constitution. The Parliament that emerged from the elections of November 17,
1974 was called "The Fifth Revisionary Parliament" and took over the drafting of the
new Constitution. The day after the election the Government initiated the referendum
process. The referendum of 8 December 1974 was a constitutional one. People were
asked to decide in principle about what the revisionary Parliament was about to
particularize. The result was in favor of a republic by 69.18 %.
 2015
The Greek referendum of 2015 was announced by the Greek government on 28 June
2015 and held on July 5 of the same year, just a week later. It was the first referendum
since the republic referendum of 1974, and the only one in Modern Greek history not
to concern the form of government. The question was whether Greece was to accept
the bailout conditions for the country's debt crisis proposed jointly by the European
Commission (EC), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Central
Bank (ECB). These conditions were contained in two documents, titled "Reforms for
the completion of the current program and beyond" and "Preliminary debt
sustainability analysis". Voters were asked whether they approve the above proposal.
The possible answers were stated as "Not approved/No" and "Approved/Yes".
The Opposition supported the “Yes” position, suggesting that the proposed
referendum would be unconstitutional, since the Greek Constitution does not allow
for referenda on fiscal matters8. The government argued that the referendum was in
accordance with the constitutional order, since it is related to crucial national matters.
Greece's supreme administrative court, the Council of State, ruled on the legality of
the referendum two days before it was due to be held on a relevant citizen claim and
argued that the referendum could be violating the Constitution by posing a question
regarding "public finances". However, the court's decision was that the referendum is
within the jurisdiction of the government and that the court has no authority to judge
on the issue. As a result, the referendum was held regularly. Citizens rejected the
bailout conditions by voting “Not approved/No" by a majority of 61,3% with a turnout
of 62,5%.

8
Art. 44, section 2 of the Greek Constitution provides for referendum procedures in case of a. „crucial
national matters” and b. „Bills passed by the Parliament regulating important social matters, with the
exception of the fiscal ones”.

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3.2. Discussion of Greek referenda
The Constitution of 1975 is the second Greek Constitution, after the 1927 one, which
refers to the institution of referendum. However, it is the first one that contains
provisions establishing a legislative referendum (art. 44 par. 2). Here, the legislative
referendum is clearly of the “genuine” type, which is when the electorate is asked to
choose between two alternatives.
It should be noted that there is no constitutional provision as to the nature or type of
the referendum. According to the majority of scientific views, the referendum of the
Greek Constitution is consultative because it lacks legal consequences. There is also
an opposite view, particularly after the revision of 1986, which considers it as decisive.
It arguments that while before the first constitutional revision of 1986 the initiative
belonged to the President without any ministerial endorsement, according to the
current Constitution the initiative -along with the responsibility- belongs to the
Government and the House.
In the light of the above, it is of no surprise that only once, in 2015, the Government
called for a referendum. This is because a referendum would imply a delegation of
power on a key political issue. There is no doubt, that such a proposal by the
Government would be test of its parliamentary strength and a test for its relationship
with the electorate. In this sense, a referendum with any possible outcome may lead
as a political development to the dissolution of the Parliament (art. 38 par. 1 and art.
41. Par. 2 Constitution). The decisive nature of the referendum could also result from
the procedure itself. In the case of a referendum that regulates a critical national issue,
the involvement of the electorate cannot just be considered as purely advisory
producing only political commitments and no legal consequences. In the case of a
legislative referendum, the referendum is a part of the legislative process and ratifies
the bill in discussion as long as the outcome is in its favor. Thus, participation of the
electorate in legislative processes reserved for the Government and the Parliament
renders this type of referendum as decisive.
Law 4023 of 2011 on the implementation of the referendum refers to the term
"binding" in order to determine the validity of the result and sets minimum
participation rates: 40 % of registered voters for a critical national issue and 50 % for
a bill that regulates a serious social issue. Regarding the outcome of the referendum,
these rates may be legally irrelevant, in case of adoption of the consultative character
for the referendum.
The study of referenda in modern and contemporary Greek history reveals that, with
the exceptions of the 1974 and 2015 ones, these abstained from the nature and
character of a genuine referendum. This is because a referendum, particularly those
related to the definition of constitutional state, must have exploratory rather than
confirmatory character. In the latter case, the aim is to extract the instantaneous and

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coincidently expressed will of the people in order to commit the nation for the future
period. As a consequence, the referendum here ceases to be an institution of direct
democracy.

4. Conclusions
A common principle deriving from the above is that in most countries, important
national issues, especially with regard to EU integration, were dealt with at some stage
with referenda. Italy with legally binding, citizen-initiated law-making at the country
level referenda is considered to have, after Lichtenstein and Switzerland, the most
extensive experience in holding referenda model among EU Member States (Erne
2006). So far, only Germany has not held any referendum, maybe due to the lack of
special legislation specifying the underlying procedure.
However, it seems that the constitutions in new EU Member States contain a more
progressive framework regarding the institution of referendum, e.g. detailed
provisions for referenda with binding effects, on a variety of subject matters, and the
possibility to hold referenda by popular initiative or in connection to parliamentary
minority rights (IILHR 2009), p.3). It may be further noticed that newer EU Member
States seem more willing to put crucial matters to the citizens’ judgment, sometimes
so often that it may cause saturation effects.
The reasons for this could be found not only into the traditional community mentality
that prevailed in the Eastern European countries for centuries, but also into the
significant and unique active role civil society movements have played during
transition into the post-communist period. This involvement of rather non-
institutionalized players (NGOs, civil society etc.) is apparent in other constitutional
provisions in these countries as well.
Analysis of referenda on a European level reveals that there is no EU-wide standard in
their legal background and implementation. However, “old” EU Member States can
certainly learn a lot from the condensed experience of the new, which evidently had
to undergo within a very short period a series of severe social, economic and political
adjustments, particularly regarding transparency and openness to public.
Nevertheless, the question remains open, whether frequent use of referenda can
simply “wash-away” strategic and operational responsibilities of the Executive.
In regard to the Greek referenda, it can be concluded that the Executive in the
motherland of direct democracy, always hesitated to recourse to the people’s opinion
on crucial and highly disputable issues that entail large scale or unpredictable effects
to the lives of citizens e.g. targeted reforms, deepening of EU integration, adoption of
international loan agreements under terms of radical reorganization in the structure
and orientation of the national economy. In the contrary, and taking into account the
historical experience, it should be noted that the personal referenda were usually
conducted under some form of coercion.

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Moreover, the fact that the majority of referenda were not provided constitutionally,
clearly delineates their utility as a component of historical and political context and
puts them in a different perspective. It is of significance that all Greek referenda have
fully met the expectations of their initiators. Thus, with the decisions of the leaders
were already taken and the outcome already known, referenda had rather popular
self-regulating character and were not used to determine but to confirm and to
provide institutional and popular prestige on developments already underway.
The study of referenda does not provide scientific conclusions isolated from the
operation of other constitutional institutions. Their study is closely linked to the study
of governmental operation and it is interwoven with the study of democracy itself.
Therefore, the question whether the referendum promotes democracy and
strengthens popular sovereignty remains in essence unanswered.

5. References
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Kyrkos, H. and Makropoulou, G., 2014. Referendum: A challenge for democratic self
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