Telus Sept. 14, 2018 Reply

BEFORE THE CANADIAN RADIO-TELEVISION AND
TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
TELUS COMMUNICATIONS INC.
Telecom and Broadcasting Notice of Consultation CRTC 2018-246
Report regarding the retail sales practices of Canada’s large telecommunications carriers
Reply of TELUS
ABRIDGED
September 14, 2018

TELUS Communications Inc. ABRIDGED TBNC 2018-246
September 14, 2018 TELUS Reply
Table of Contents
1.0 Introduction and Executive Summary ................................................................................. 1

2.0 The record does not reveal a systemic problem with sales practices ................................... 4
3.0 Flawed evidence should not form the basis of conclusions ................................................. 6
3.1 Surveys and questionnaires cannot be used to draw general conclusions........................ 6
3.2 Many general comments do not apply to TELUS ............................................................ 9
4.0 Failure to assert exclusive federal jurisdiction over regulation of telecommunications
undertakings causes consumer confusion ..................................................................................... 11
4.1 Provincial regulation of the provision of telecommunications services is
unconstitutional ......................................................................................................................... 12
4.2 Confusion about applicable regulation causes consumer frustration ............................. 14
4.3 The Commission should clarify that jurisdiction over telecommunications, including the
offering and provision of telecommunications services, is exclusively federal ....................... 16
5.0 New substantive obligations are not necessary.................................................................. 19
5.1 New regulations, if any, should be narrowly targeted to concerns and backed by
evidence .................................................................................................................................... 19
5.2 Substantive regulations proposed by some intervenors are not needed ......................... 21
5.2.1 Suitability obligations are disproportionate, unworkable and unfriendly to
consumers ............................................................................................................................. 21
5.2.2 Broad fibre deployment requires door-to-door customer engagement ................... 23
5.2.3 Regulating compensation or discipline of sales agents and third parties is not
necessary and is beyond the power of the Commission ....................................................... 26
5.2.4 TELUS has the tools to ensure that employees of third parties it works with do not
engage in poor sales practices ............................................................................................... 29
5.2.5 Modifications to Unsolicited Telecommunications Rules improper in this
proceeding ............................................................................................................................. 32
6.0 Consumer Education and Redress ..................................................................................... 32
6.1 The need to raise awareness of the CCTS ...................................................................... 32
6.2 New institutions are not needed ..................................................................................... 34
7.0 Conclusion ......................................................................................................................... 35
1.0 Introduction and Executive Summary
1. TELUS Communications Inc. (“TELUS” or the “Company”) files its reply in accordance
with the procedures set out in Telecom and Broadcasting Notice of Consultation CRTC
2018-246 (“TBNC 2018-246”). In this reply, TELUS responds to a number of parties and
intervenors and makes comments on some of the proposals that have been made. Given the
volume of interventions, failure by TELUS to respond to a given intervention should not
be viewed as agreement with its contents. TELUS replies in the following five respects.
2. First, the interventions to this proceeding from individuals across the country are of
assistance both to the Commission and to providers, but must be considered in context.
While some providers in Canada may have engaged in misleading or aggressive sales
practices, there is no evidence of a systemic problem across all providers in Canada.
Indeed, the over 1,200 individuals who submitted interventions reflect a very small
percentage of the tens of millions of Canadian telecommunications services subscribers.
There is therefore no basis for the Commission to conclude, on this record, that Canadian
telecommunications providers systematically engage in aggressive or misleading sales
practices.
3. Second, much of the evidence submitted is deeply flawed because it is either untrue or
suffers from fatal methodological flaws. For example, Unifor makes a number of
comments of general application about the industry, but no TELUS employee is a Unifor
member. Similarly, the Consumers’ Council of Canada submits as evidence the results of
focus groups and surveys, only to concede that its methodologies have flaws. The
Commission should not rely on surveys, focus groups or other sampling strategies that are
not statistically valid and should not accept general comments about the industry as
evidence. As noted in TELUS’ intervention, the Commission should make specific
findings, positive and negative, about specific players based only on reliable evidence.
4. Third, a number of intervenors argue that consumers can rely upon provincial consumer
protection statutes and regulations. The Government of Quebec goes so far as to argue that
the Commission is constrained by provincial laws when regulating telecommunications.
This is not true: provincial telecommunications regulation is a constitutional oxymoron and
only Parliament—and the Commission as its delegate—can regulate the offering and
provision of telecommunications services (including rates, terms and conditions for
service). This is true whether provinces are regulating these matters directly via
telecommunications legislation (as is the case with Ontario’s Wireless Services Agreement
Act) or indirectly via laws of general application governing contracting or other practices.
If, as proposed by TELUS, the Commission determines that a CISC working group should
prepare a code concerning sales of telecommunications services, the Commission should
state clearly that it intends its rules to be binding, exclusive (meaning its rule will operate
to the exclusion of provincial regulation), and national in scope. This is consistent with the
constitutional fact of exclusive federal jurisdiction over communications and will ensure
that Canadians across the country have access to the same recourse and are subject to the
same protections. It will also greatly assist in educating consumers about their rights and
improving access to redress. Indeed, a number of intervenors have noted a confusing
latticework of ostensibly applicable provincial regulations and regulators. A strong
statement from the Commission that it intends its rules to be binding, exclusive (meaning
its rule will operate to the exclusion of provincial regulation), and national in scope, will
clarify to Canadians that they all have equal rights, under the same rules, and can enforce
them equally across the country.
5. Fourth, it remains the case that a new code of conduct should codify and clarify existing
regulation and legislation in order to improve the ability for consumers to seek redress, but
that no new substantive obligations are necessary. The allegations of aggressive and
misleading sales practices set out in interventions are already contrary to one or more of
the Wireless Code, Television Service Provider Code, Competition Act,
Telecommunications Act or other rules. The CCTS has confirmed in its intervention that it
already arbitrates many complaints similar to those raised by the intervenors. Furthermore,
some of the proposals for new substantive regulation would be so unworkable that they
would actually have a negative effect on consumer welfare. In particular, importing
suitability obligations from securities regulation, as proposed by the Fair Communications
Sales Coalition (“FCSC”), is unnecessary and disproportionate for this industry,
inconsistent with existing regulation, and would lead to a cumbersome and unfriendly sales
2
process. Some parties have also proposed regulating compensation or discipline of sales
agents and/or third parties, which is not needed, unprecedented and outside of the powers
of the Commission. Some intervenors also proposed limits on door-to-door sales. If door-
to-door sales were unavailable, consumers would lose the convenience of having an expert
at their house describe the technology and, in the case of TELUS fibre-to-the-premises
deployment, being offered a no-obligation installation of a fibre connection directly to their
homes. As explained in TELUS’ intervention, door-to-door in-person sales are
fundamental to the deployment of fibre-to-the-premises technology. Without the capacity
to engage customers at the door, TELUS will not be able to expand its fibre footprint at
nearly the same scope. As a result, there will be less investment in Canadian fibre facilities
and existing and future investments in Digital Canada initiatives will be undermined.
6. Fifth and finally, TELUS understands the suggestion made by a number of intervenors that
consumers lack awareness of redress options. As noted in its intervention, consumer
education and outreach can be undertaken by the Commission, the Competition Bureau,
the CCTS and other bodies to ensure that consumers know where to turn if they have a
concern with sales practices employed by a Canadian telecommunications provider. While
new institutions, such as the “Telecommunications Consumer Organization” proposed by
Democracy Watch are unnecessary given the existence of CCTS and various consumer
advocacy groups, existing institutions can do more in their consumer outreach efforts. As
noted above and explained further below, a big part of ending consumer confusion about
where to seek redress is ensuring that there is one consistent set of rules that applies
nationwide.
7. The rest of this reply is divided into the following sections. Section 2 sets out the state of
the record and questions whether a systemic issue requiring regulatory intervention has
been raised. Section 3 addresses the flaws in some of the evidence in this proceeding and
reiterates that general findings or comments about the industry in the Commission’s report
would be incorrect based on the evidence and unfair to the parties. Section 4 discusses the
need for certainty that federal rules regarding telecommunications sales apply to the
exclusion of provincial rules. Section 5 explains that new substantive rules are not
3
necessary and points out that some of the rules proposed by consumer groups will have
serious negative consequences. Lastly, Section 6 discusses the evidence that points to a
need for greater consumer education and outreach.
2.0 The record does not reveal a systemic problem with sales practices
8. The record of this proceeding, particularly the number of individual intervenors when
considered as a percentage of telecommunications services users in Canada, does not reveal
any systemic problems. In response to its Notice of Consultation, the Commission has
received over 1,200 individual interventions. At least some of those interventions were not
relevant to the questions asked by the Commission, and instead contained comments about
the general price of services,1 perceived state of competition,2 technical issues3 or other
comments that have no relation to sales practices. Some individual interventions also
contained positive commentary.4
9. As of December 2017, 31.5 million Canadians subscribe to wireless services, representing

approximately 90% of Canada’s population.5 The number of individual intervenors in this
proceeding – assuming that all interventions are relevant and negative, which is not the
case – represents less than 0.004 percent of Canadian wireless subscribers. If wireline
subscribers who do not use mobile services are added, that percentage becomes even
smaller.
10. OpenMedia submitted an intervention containing 1,074 individual comments submitted

through its website. Many of the comments collected by OpenMedia are not relevant to
this proceeding. However, even if all OpenMedia comments and individual interventions
are added, assumed to be relevant and negative, and there is no overlap between
commentators on OpenMedia and intervenors in this proceeding, that number is still
approximately 0.0074 percent of Canadian wireless subscribers. If wireline subscribers
1
See, for example, interventions of Ryan Elzen and Nadia Alexan.
2
See, for example, Interventions of John Price and Mike Chow.
3
See, for example, interventions of Randy Wright and Kaleb Wheaton-Blatkewicz.
4
See, for example, intervention of Lise LeBlanc.
5
CWTA Facts and Figures, online: https://www.cwta.ca/facts-figures/.
4
who do not use mobile services are added, that percentage becomes even smaller. Once
irrelevant and positive comments are removed, the percentage becomes smaller still.
11. Out of over 1,200 individual interventions, only approximately 80 interventions mentioned
TELUS. This is approximately 6.3 percent of the total number of individual interventions
received. TELUS has more than 13 million customer connections,6 meaning that TELUS-
specific interventions amounted to 0.0006 percent of its total number of subscriptions.
Again, some of the comments were positive or not relevant to this proceeding. At least one
former TELUS employee intervened and noted that “we were trained to be helpful and
fair”, that “[t]here was no trying to mislead to squeeze out extra money” and that she is
“not surprised [TELUS is] not receiving as many complaints as Bell and Rogers.”7
Customers similarly intervened to say that “TELUS and KOODO are the only 2 providers
that to me has the best customer service”8 and that “Telus sets the bar on Good Customer
Service.”9 In addition, consumer groups such as the Union des consommateurs and the
Manitoba Coalition mentioned TELUS sparingly or not at all. Even the FCSC (consisting
of Public Interest Advocacy Centre, ACORN Canada, National Pensioners Federation and
Canadian Association of Retired Persons) acknowledged that
[i]t is clear that the majority of comments are from employees of the
largest carriers. This is to be expected given their large customer
base, large marketing and sales budgets and wide geographic (in
some cases, nationwide, such as in wireless) markets. Nonetheless
the majority of sales agents’ stories relate to Bell, Rogers and to a
much lesser extent TELUS, roughly in that order of magnitude.10
(Emphasis added)
The relatively low levels of intervention by its customers, support from former employees
and direct and indirect positive acknowledgements from consumer groups is a results of a
6
TELUS Q2 2018 report shows that TELUS has 13,124,000 active connections. Online:
https://assets.ctfassets.net/rz9m1rynx8pv/5ZyfysyDteeGCyWUAu2cQ0/b4d80f9b5da230b5c80f128b3adcc
a1c/TELUS_Q2_2018_Investor_Supplemental.pdf, p. 2.
7
Intervention of Lise LeBlanc.
8
Intervention of Kim Minunt
9
Intervention of Andre Lai.
10
Intervention of the Fair Communications Sales Coalition, para. 129.
5
focus on the customer and its Customers First program described in detail in its
intervention.
12. Given the publicity of this hearing and the relatively small amount of individual
interventions received, there is no reliable evidence on which the Commission can find a
systemic problem. While no company is perfect and mistakes do happen, the number of
participants in this proceeding relative to number of users of telecommunications services
suggest that problems with telecommunications sales are one-off occurrences that can be
addressed by the companies themselves or by CCTS.
13. In addition, there may be reason to doubt the authenticity and credibility of some
interventions. For example, Ben Segel-Brown, who was until very recently counsel to the
Public Interest Advocacy Centre (“PIAC”),11 the primary member of the FCSC, filed an
intervention in his own name criticizing certain sales practices, and failed to disclose his
professional interest in this proceeding.12 As PIAC is an intervenor (as member of the
FCSC) and in this proceeding, Mr. Segel-Brown’s intervention is an example of
astroturfing and should be disregarded.
3.0 Flawed evidence should not form the basis of conclusions
3.1 Surveys and questionnaires cannot be used to draw general conclusions
14. In general, surveys presented in this proceeding fail to use accepted survey methodologies
that permit broadly generalizable conclusions. Among other flaws, the surveys before the
Commission suffer from a very small sample size, narrow distribution, and a strong
selection bias.
15. Many organizations that conducted surveys, questionnaires or focus groups concede their
limitations. For example, ACORN Canada (part of the FCSC) conducted a survey that was
11
PIAC Lawyers and Staff, online: https://www.piac.ca/about-us/lawyers-and-staff/. Mr. Segel-Brown recently
announced via Twitter that he is terminating his counsel relationship with PIAC, online:
https://twitter.com/SegelBrown/status/1036246878159945729. However, Mr. Segel-Brown was counsel to
PIAC at all or most relevant times, and indeed is still listed as counsel on PIAC’s website.
12
Intervention of Ben Segal-Brown.
6
limited to its members and received only 38 responses.13 ACORN rightly concedes a
number of limitations in its survey:
Limitations of the survey include that it was self-selecting. In

addition, as it was only distributed online, it does not include
responses by those who do not have access to the internet, for
example extremely low-income families who cannot afford home-
internet.14
16. The Consumers Council of Canada sent a questionnaire to its Public Interest Network
members and was also forthcoming about the limitations on use of the data it collected:
The Council does not suggest that the responses are necessarily
representative of the Canadian population or any specific
demographic group. It does know that the responses are commonly
carefully considered and come from individuals with an interest or
stake in the issues queried, including general consumer protection.15
(Emphasis added)
Consumers Council of Canada also admits that the wording of the survey questions could
have influenced responses:
Surprisingly, only one response was positive about bundles,

although the poor showing could have been influenced by the
wording of the questions, asking specifically if bundles are
confusing.16
17. In its intervention, the Aging, Communication, Technologies project similarly admits that
it conducted interviews and focus groups with only 53 individuals in very limited
geographic areas,17 a very narrow sample given the number of Canadian
telecommunications subscribers.
13
Intervention of the Fair Communications Sales Coalition, Appendices 1 and 2.
14
Intervention of the Fair Communications Sales Coalition, Appendix 2.
15
Intervention of the Canadian Consumers Council, para. 7.
16
Ibid, para. 26.
17
Intervention of Ageing, Communication, Technologies, section 2.3.
7
18. Perhaps most egregiously, OpenMedia invited Canadians only to provide negative
comments, rather than asking for their opinions with an open mind. Its website soliciting
comments from Canadians had the following statements:
Big Telecom has taken advantage of us for too long. Now is your
chance to tell your horror stories to the CRTC and ensure they have
to take action.
Submit your comments above, and we’ll send them straight through
to the CRTC’s consultation. To give your letter far more impact,
please personalize it with your own words, thoughts and
experiences.
Some things you could include to make sure your message is heard
are:
 If you’ve been sold Internet speeds much faster than you are
actually receiving.
 If you were told your rates were guaranteed, but your

provider has since changed the prices.
 If you have been sold Internet, home phone, or mobile

services that you do not need, in order to receive a discount
on your “bundle.”
 If you were not told about activation fees, or installation fees,

for your home Internet, TV, or cell phone.
 If you were not told about the fine print in your contract.
 If you’ve had a telecom company sell you services you do

not need.18
These statements appear designed to encourage negative comments about TSPs rather than
objective evidence regarding sales practices; in fact, OpenMedia blatantly suggested issues
that people should complain about. Even the URL of OpenMedia’s website dedicated to
this topic is a prompt for negative comments:
18
OpenMedia, online: https://act.openmedia.org/BigBadSalesPractices.
8
https://act.openmedia.org/BigBadSalesPractices
19. With this kind of wording of its questions, it is no surprise that OpenMedia received
comments that were generally critical of Canadian TSPs, although many of the comments
were not actually relevant to this proceeding. Unlike ACORN and Consumers’ Council of
Canada, OpenMedia made no efforts to identify the bias inherent in its call for comments.
The Commission should take all of this into account if it decides to give any weight to the
comments in OpenMedia’s intervention, and not use the overall negative tone of the
comments to draw general conclusions.
20. In general, in respect of surveys and questionnaires, TELUS does not suggest that
experiences respondents disclose are invalid. However, the Commission should be cautious
not to draw any general or systemic conclusions based on surveys and questionnaires that
were not designed – and cannot be used – for such extrapolation.
3.2 Many general comments do not apply to TELUS
21. Some intervenors have made general comments that may give the impression that they
apply to all players in the telecommunications industry when they, in fact, do not apply to
TELUS.
22. For example, labour union Unifor states that it “represents more than 26,000 workers in
the telecommunications sector, who are employed by private and public service providers
in most regions of the country”,19 and goes on to make numerous serious allegations and
comments about the industry as a whole. However, Unifor only collected information from
its members, and Unifor does not represent any TELUS employees.20 Unifor’s evidence,
allegations and comments therefore simply cannot apply to TELUS and cannot form the
basis of any findings against the industry as a whole.
23. Similarly, the Conseil provincial du secteur des communications (CPSC) of the Canadian
Union of Public Employees alleges that “[l]es pratiques de vente sont très semblables d’une
19
Intervention of Unifor, para. 1.
20
Ibid, para. 16.
9
entreprise à l’autre. Aucun des centres de service à la clientèle syndiqués de Cogeco,

Vidéotron et TELUS, au Québec, n’a de lignes directrices ou de procédures de vente
écrites.”21 In TELUS’ case, this general statement is demonstrably false. TELUS produced
its written policies, codes of conduct, training and other material as part of its Response to
Request for Information TELUS(CRTC)16Jul18-25. To reiterate, TELUS’ call centre
agents and door-to-door representatives have written sales scripts, guidelines and sales
procedures that they are expected to follow and compliance with these written documents
is monitored as explained in TELUS’ intervention.
24. CPSC’s further allegation that “[l]es personnes qui ne sont pas retenues par les grandes
entreprises de services de télécommunication au terme de la formation initiale se retrouvent
fréquemment chez leurs sous-traitants”22 is also not true. To the best of TELUS’
knowledge, no employee who has been terminated or failed to complete training works for
TELUS third party call centre contractors. If TELUS becomes aware that someone who
has previously been terminated is identified, TELUS will request that the third party not
use that employee for TELUS activities.
25. As the above examples demonstrate, general comments about the industry are invalid and
dangerous as they do not apply to all providers equally and may not apply to TELUS at all.
For this reason, TELUS requests that the Commission disregard general statements about
the industry that are made by intervenors, and focus instead on evidence about particular
companies. Requests for broad findings about the industry, such as the one made by the
Manitoba Coalition,23 should also be disregarded.
21
Intervention of SCFP-CPSC at para. 14.
22
Ibid, para. 15.
23
See intervention of the Manitoba Coalition, para. 51, Preliminary Recommendation 1, in which the Manitoba
Coalition asks the Commission to “find that there are ongoing and pressing challenges in the retail sales
marketplace that materially impair the ability of many consumers, including vulnerable consumers, to make
informed decisions with regard to telecommunications services and undermine their ability to enjoy fair
treatment in their relationships with carriers”
10
4.0 Failure to assert exclusive federal jurisdiction over regulation of

telecommunications undertakings causes consumer confusion
26. The record discloses a lot of uncertainty and confusion about whether provincial
regulations apply to govern sales practices in the industry. As noted by a number of
intervenors, this uncertainty leads to consumer frustration as they do not know where to
turn when they face a dispute with their provider. For example, a consumer in Ontario who
has a dispute with a telecommunications company is presented with a confusing number
of remedial paths, including under the Wireless Code (CCTS) and redress under the
Wireless Services Agreements Act.
27. This uncertainty and confusion is unnecessary as the answer is clear: provincial regulation
of telecommunications is unconstitutional and only Parliament (and the Commission acting
pursuant to its enabling statute, which was passed by Parliament) can legally regulate in
this area. Provincial regulations governing the provision of telecommunications services
are constitutionally invalid. Even where a province validly enacts general legislation
pursuant to its jurisdiction over property and civil rights, that legislation is inapplicable
where it impairs the core of a federal power—and there can be no doubt that the provision
of telecommunications services, including the charging of rates, is a core federal power.
28. The Commission has contributed this uncertainty by failing to assert that it intends its
regulations to be the sole national binding standards for the regulation of the provision of
telecommunications services, and instead choosing to accommodate patchwork provincial
legislation and to dilute its own authority. For example, by endorsing the application of
provincial rules to wireless services in the Wireless Code, the Commission has caused
confusion for consumers and fed the impression among provincial governments that
wireless regulation and telecommunications regulation more generally is a legitimate
provincial activity. As explained below, it is not.
29. For the reasons that follow and as set out in TELUS’ intervention, the Commission should
address this uncertainty and confusion once and for all by making a clear statement that
11
a. Jurisdiction over telecommunications, including the offering and provision of

telecommunications services is a matter of exclusive federal jurisdiction;
b. It intends its rules to be binding, exclusive (meaning its rule will operate to the
exclusion of provincial regulation), and national in scope; and that
c. Any new code will operate to the exclusion of provincial regulation.
4.1 Provincial regulation of the provision of telecommunications services is

unconstitutional
30. A number of intervenors, including Cogeco,24 Eastlink,25 Quebecor,26 SaskTel27 and others
argue that consumers can rely upon provincial consumer protection statutes and
regulations.
31. The Quebec government (the Ministère de la culture et des communications and Office de
la protection du consommateur) goes further and argues, without any justification or even
reference to the Constitution Act, 1867, that the regulation of the provision of
telecommunications services under the Quebec Consumer Protection Act is a matter of
exclusive provincial jurisdiction:
[E]n ce qui concerne l’encadrement des contrats conclus avec les

consommateurs québécois et des pratiques de commerce des
fournisseurs qui commercialisent des services auprès de tels
consommateurs, peu importe les décisions qui seront prises par le
CRTC, le gouvernement du Québec entend maintenir et continuer
d’appliquer l’ensemble des règles qui sont prévues dans sa
législation de façon à ce que le consommateur québécoise puisse
bénéficier de l’ensemble des protections que le législateur québécois
a soigneusement mis en place au cours des quarante dernières
années.
Ces protections sont le résultat de l’exercice par le Québec de sa

compétence constitutionnelle exclusive en matière de droits civils.
24
Intervention of Cogeco, para. 19.
25
Intervention of Eastlink, para. 12.
26
Intervention of Quebecor, para. 19.
27
Intervention of SaskTel, paras. 4-5, 16-22.
12
À cet égard, le Québec tient à réitérer qu’il revient au Parlement du

Québec de décider des règles applicables aux consommateurs
québécois dans leurs relations contractuelles. Le CRTC se doit, par
conséquent, de s’abstenir d’intervenir d’une façon qui constituerait
un empiètement ou une atteinte à cet exercice légitime d’être
respectueux des décisions prises par le Parlement du Québec dans
l’intérêt des consommateurs québécois.28 (Emphasis added)
32. These intervenors are wrong: as set out in TELUS’ intervention, the regulation of the
provision of a telecommunications service is ultra vires a provincial legislature. Subsection
92(10) of the Constitution Act, 1867 grants Parliament exclusive jurisdiction over the
regulation of telecommunications and radiocommunication undertakings.29 By using
consumer protection legislation to regulate telecommunications undertakings, provinces
such as Quebec have adopted regulatory regimes that are (1) constitutionally invalid
because the pith and substance of the legislation is about a matter that is within the
exclusive jurisdiction of Parliament; (2) inapplicable by way of the doctrine of
interjurisdictional immunity, and (3) inoperative as a result of the federal paramountcy
doctrine for reasons discussed above and in TELUS’ intervention.30
33. The Quebec government’s argument that a province can regulate the provision of a
telecommunications service by virtue of its power to legislate on matters of property and
civil rights under the Constitution Act, 1867 is particularly insidious and is contrary to
nearly a century of jurisprudence on the matter from Canada’s highest courts. In fact, the
primary manner through which that Parliament exercises its power over communications
is by regulating the contractual relationship between service providers and their customers.
Thus, section 25 of the Telecommunications Act provides that “no Canadian carrier shall
28
Intervention of Office de la protection du consommateur, paras. 54-55.
29
Constitution Act, 1867¸s. 92(10)(a). This has been addressed repeatedly in courts throughout the country.
See, for example, Alberta Government Telephones v. (Canada) Canadian Radio-television and
Telecommunications Commission, [1989] 2 SCR 225 at para. 66; Rogers Communications Inc. v.
Châteauguay (City), 2016 SCC 23, par. 42 [“Châteauguay”]; In re Regulation and Control of Radio
Communication in Canada, [1932] A.C. 304; Capital Cities Communications Inc. v. CRTC, [1978] 2 S.C.R.
141, 160-161; Toronto Corporation v. Bell Telephone Co. of Canada, [1905] A.C. 52; and Québec
(Procureur général) c. Québec (Régie des télécommunications), 1992 CanLII 3743 (QC CA), conf. by [1994]
1 S.C.R.. 878.
30
For more details, see paragraphs 165-189 of TELUS’ intervention.
13
provide a telecommunications service except in accordance with a tariff filed with and
approved by the Commission that specifies the rate or the maximum or minimum rate, or
both, to be charged for the service.” To be clear: a tariff is a contract between a carrier and
its customers, prescribed by regulation. Where the Commission has forborne from the
exercise of its section 25 power, it has generally retained its powers under section 24, which
provides that “[t]he offering and provision of any telecommunications service by a
Canadian carrier are subject to any conditions imposed by the Commission or included in
a tariff approved by the Commission.” The Commission also generally retains its powers
under section 27, which requires that rates be “just and reasonable” and non-
discriminatory. The Supreme Court of Canada has in turn held that “[…] the power to
regulate rates and the availability and quality of services such as telephone services or
railway services…fall within the exclusive classes of subject represented by such federal
undertakings.”31
34. Thus, even if provincial legislation that directly regulates the manner in which a
telecommunications provider offers telecommunications services were validly enacted, it
would remain inapplicable by virtue of the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity,
because the contractual relationship between a telecommunications provider and its
customers is at the core of federal authority over telecommunications, and any such
legislation would necessarily impair that core.32
4.2 Confusion about applicable regulation causes consumer frustration
35. Of course, the unconstitutionality of provincial legislation is not just a matter of

constitutional theory; it also directly affects customers. A number of intervenors have
31
Bell Canada v. Québec (Commission de santé et de la sécurité du travail du Québec), [1988] 1 S.C.R. 749
at 839-40 [“Bell 1988”] (emphasis added). See also Commission du Salaire Minimum v. Bell Telephone
Company of Canada, [1966] S.C.R. 767 at 772 [“Bell 1966”]: “[i]t was not disputed in argument that the
regulation of the rates to be paid by the respondent's customers is a matter for federal legislation.”
32
Bell 1988 at 839-40 (emphasis added); Bell 1966 at 772; Châteauguay at para. 68; Téléphone Guèvremont
Inc. v. Québec (Régie des télécommunications), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 878 and Québec (Procureur général) v.
Québec (Régie des télécommunications), 1992 CanLII 3743 (QC CA)); Alberta Government Telephones v.
(Canada) CRTC, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 225; Saskatchewan Power Corporation et al c. TransCanada Pipelines
Ltd., [1979] 1 S.C.R. 297, pp. 306-307; Re Public Utilities Commission and Victoria Cablevision Ltd., (1965)
1965 CanLII 498 (BC CA); Vidéotron v. Gatineau (City), 2017 QCCS 3571, para. 179 (appeal pending).
14
pointed out that the lack of clarity around applicable regulations frustrates and confuses
consumers. One consumer advocacy group described the current regulatory state as “a
bewildering maze of federal and provincial rules and institutions”33 that needs to be
navigated by consumers who have a complaint about their provider. This should be
corrected by the Commission in this proceeding.
36. For example, the Consumers Council of Canada received comments including the
following:
If one launches a complaint some items go to CRTC. Some go to

Competition Bureau. Some go to Commission for Complaints for
Telecom-television Services (CCTS). There is an Office of
Consumer Affairs federally and in each province. This is so
confusing where to start a complaint!34
37. The Manitoba Coalition notes in its intervention that
Perhaps reflective of the complex and opaque federal and provincial

oversight of telecommunication retail sales practices, these
“Manitoba Voices” make very few references to the CRTC and no
reference to the Wireless Code, to the Commission for Complaints
for Telecom-Television Services (CCTS) or to the Competition
Bureau.35
The Manitoba Coalition goes on to say:
At the federal level, the Manitoba Coalition is aware of the

consumer protections available under The Wireless Code, The
Deposit and Disconnection Code, The Competition Act, the Privacy
and the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents
Act. It generally understands the difference between the roles of the
CCTS, the Competition Bureau and Advertising Standards Canada.
The Manitoba Coalition also is aware of provincial consumer

protection legislation dealing specifically with consumer cell phone
contracts in jurisdictions such as Manitoba, Newfoundland and
33
Intervention of the Manitoba Coalition, para. 44.
34
Intervention of Consumers Council of Canada, para. 39.
35
15
Labrador, Nova Scotia and Ontario and of the efforts by the Office
of Consumer Affairs to set out a roadmap to navigate this
bewildering maze of federal and provincial rules and institutions.36
Recognizing this problem, the Manitoba Coalition goes on to recommend “a single uniform
code of consumer rights in communications.”37 This proposal is substantially similar to
what TELUS proposes.
4.3 The Commission should clarify that jurisdiction over telecommunications,

including the offering and provision of telecommunications services, is exclusively
federal
38. Commission decisions have contributed to the consumer and constitutional confusion by
refusing to displace provincial regulations and indeed by establishing a framework in the
Wireless Code that is intended to be expressly concurrent with provincial regulations unless
there is a “direct conflict.”38 The Commission reiterated four years later that the Wireless
Code takes precedence “if direct conflict with provincial legislation should arise.”39 As
noted in TELUS’ intervention,40 these statements are incorrect articulations of Canadian
constitutional law. They create consumer confusion as to governing rules and means of
redress.
39. The Commission can remedy this confusion by affirming that jurisdiction over
telecommunications, including the offering and provision of services, is exclusively
federal. If, as proposed by TELUS, the Commission determines that a CISC working group
should prepare a code concerning sales of telecommunications services, the Commission
should state clearly that the code will be binding, exclusive (operating to the exclusion of
provincial regulation) and national in scope.
40. Such a statement will ensure that Canadians across the country have access to the same
recourse and are subject to the same protections and will greatly assist in educating
36
Ibid, paras. 43-44.
37
Ibid, para. 9. See also Preliminary Recommendation 2 on p. 15.
38
The Wireless Code, Telecom Regulatory Policy CRTC 2013-271 at para. 26
39
Review of the Wireless Code, Telecom Regulatory Policy CRTC 2017-200, para. 60.
40
Intervention of TELUS, paras. 171-173.
16
consumers about their rights and improving access to redress. A clear statement from the
Commission as to the exclusive jurisdiction of Parliament will also clarify to Canadians
that they all have equal rights and can enforce them evenly across the country. This will
replace the current “bewildering maze” that confuses and frustrates consumers with a direct
path to the CCTS, which can quickly and cost-effectively address consumer complaints
based on a defined code of conduct.
41. Such a statement is squarely within the jurisdiction of the Commission. Administrative
tribunals such as the Commission have the power to render declaratory decisions on
questions of law where their enabling statutes allows it specifically or implicitly:
Rather, one must ask whether the empowering legislation implicitly

or explicitly grants to the tribunal the jurisdiction to interpret or
decide any question of law. If it does, then the tribunal will be
presumed to have the concomitant jurisdiction to interpret or decide
that question in light of the Charter, unless the legislator has
removed that power from the tribunal. Thus, an administrative
tribunal that has the power to decide questions of law arising under
a particular legislative provision will be presumed to have the power
to determine the constitutional validity of that provision. In other
words, the power to decide a question of law is the power to decide
by applying only valid laws.41
Sections 48 and 52 of the Telecommunications Act expressly grant such powers to the
Commission.
42. A statement that the jurisdiction over telecommunication is exclusively federal and that
any new code will operate to the exclusion of provincial regulation will also protect the
power of the Commission. This statement will prevent the result that was reached in Irwin
Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), where the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that
provincial legislation purporting to apply to broadcasting (an exclusive area of federal
jurisdiction) was valid in part because statements by the Commission at the time did not
41
Nova Scotia (Workers' Compensation Board) v. Martin; Nova Scotia (Workers' Compensation Board) v.
Laseur, 2003 SCC 54, at para. 36.
17
“claim to exercise any mandatory control” for the conduct in question.42 By stating that the
Commission intends to exercise full and mandatory control over sales practices used by
telecommunications providers, it protects its powers from provincial encroachment.
43. To be clear, TELUS does not propose that the Commission attempt to issue a general
declaration of invalidity of a provincial statute, because it has no jurisdiction to do so. But
administrative tribunals do have jurisdiction to interpret legislation, including relevant
legislation outside their home statute. Thus, the Supreme Court of Canada has held with
respect to the supremacy clause in subsection 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, that if
an administrative actor “is endowed with the power to consider questions of law relating
to a provision, that power will normally extend to assessing the constitutional validity of
that provision.”43 On this basis, the Supreme Court of Canada went on to hold as follows:
A provincially constituted board cannot respect the division of

powers under the Constitution Act, 1867 if it is unable to take into
account the boundary between provincial and federal powers …
Indeed, a multitude of administrative tribunals, both provincial and
federal, routinely make determinations respecting matters within the
competence of the other legislator. Provincial boards may have an
express statutory mandate to pronounce upon federal legislation.
Alternatively, the necessity to consider a question of constitutional
or federal law may simply arise in the course of a primary
determination. In short, in applying their enabling legislation,
boards must take into account all applicable legal rules, both federal
and provincial.44
44. In this case, given that the Quebec government, TELUS and other intervenors have put the
constitutionality of provincial regulation squarely in play, the Commission must address
the issue and state that jurisdiction over telecommunications, including the offering and
provision of telecommunications services, is a matter of exclusive federal jurisdiction; that
42
Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] 1 SCR 927 at 963-64.
43
Nova Scotia (Workers' Compensation Board) v. Martin; Nova Scotia (Workers' Compensation Board) v.
Laseur, 2003 SCC 54 at para. 28.
44
Paul v. British Columbia (Forest Appeals Commission), 2003 SCC 55 at para. 23. See also Burnaby (City)
v. Trans Mountain Pipeline ULC, 2017 BCCA 132 at paras. 30-34, citing Paul and confirming that the
National Energy Board has jurisdiction to rule on the constitutionality of laws other than its enabling statute.
18
it intends its rules to be binding, exclusive (meaning its rule will operate to the exclusion
of provincial regulation), and national in scope; and that any new code will operate to the
exclusion of provincial regulation.
5.0 New substantive obligations are not necessary
45. If the Commission determines that the record justifies taking regulatory action, TELUS has
proposed that a CISC working group develop a new code of conduct that would codify and
clarify existing rules in order to improve the ability for consumers to seek redress. New
substantive rules beyond those that already exist are not necessary because, as TELUS
explained in its intervention, aggressive and misleading sales practices are already illegal.
As explained further below, some intervenors propose substantive and onerous regulations
that would be unworkable, beyond the power of the Commission to enact and would lead
to negative implications for consumers, industry and future investment in
telecommunications infrastructure.
5.1 New regulations, if any, should be narrowly targeted to concerns and backed by
evidence
46. As noted above, the record does not disclose a systemic problem that needs to be addressed
by regulation. To the extent that the Commission determines that regulation is necessary,
it should be narrowly targeted, backed by the evidence, proportionate to the issues raised
and regularly reviewed. TELUS’ proposal that a CISC working group develop a new code
of conduct that would codify and clarify existing rules fits these criteria and ensures that
new regulation does not distort the competitive market, cause harm to consumers or have
an impact on investment in Digital Canada initiatives.
47. In its intervention, the Competition Bureau points out that the Competition Act contains
both civil and criminal provisions prohibiting false and misleading representations.45
Contravention of these provisions is subject to an order to cease such conduct,
administrative monetary penalties, restitution, criminal fines or imprisonment. The
Competition Bureau also confirms that “[t]he targeting of vulnerable populations may
45
Intervention of the Competition Bureau, para. 8.
19
inform the seriousness of a contravention in determining whether a matter should be

pursued under the civil or criminal provisions of the Competition Act.”46
48. Given the existing rules, the Competition Bureau urges caution in enacting new
regulations: “regulation should be used only where market forces will not achieve policy
objectives and, even then, only to the extent necessary to address those objectives. This
perspective recognizes that regulation can place limits on the role of competition in
determining marketplace outcomes.”47 The Competition Bureau goes on to set out four
principles based on international best practices that can be applied to balancing the role of
legitimate regulatory rules with the operation of market forces:
a. Regulation should be no broader than necessary;
b. Regulation should be based on the best available evidence;
c. Regulation should be proportionate to harm; and
d. Regulation should be regularly reviewed to reflect market conditions.48
49. These principles are consistent with the Policy Direction, which requires the Commission
to rely on market forces to the maximum extent feasible as the means of achieving the
telecommunications policy objectives and when relying on regulation, use measures that
are efficient and proportionate to their purpose and that interfere with the operation of
competitive market forces to the minimum extent necessary to meet the policy objectives.49
50. All of these criteria point to the conclusion that no new substantive rules are needed or in
some cases even permissible under the Policy Direction. With respect to regulation being
no broader than necessary, the Competition Bureau states “the CRTC should determine, as
a threshold question, whether the use of aggressive sales practices is harming consumers
46
Ibid, paras. 12-15.
47
Ibid, para. 25.
48
Ibid, paras. 26-37.
49
Order Issuing a Direction to the CRTC on Implementing the Canadian Telecommunications Policy
Objectives SOR/2006-355, s. 1(a).
20
or competition in the telecommunications industry. If there is little evidence of harm, it

may not be appropriate to put in place a regulatory framework governing the use of such
practices.”50 As noted above, the evidence in this proceeding does not show that consumers
or competition are being systemically harmed.
51. Any issues apparent in the evidence can be addressed with an industry code that makes
existing rules clearer for consumers and sets out where consumers should seek redress.
This is sufficiently narrow not to distort the competitive telecommunications market, the
only action that the evidence on the record can justify, and it is proportionate to the
concerns of the intervenors because it would give individual aggrieved consumers access
to redress. As suggested by the Competition Bureau, any new code as well as the role of
CCTS can be regularly reviewed to make sure that it is achieving its goals and remains
relevant.
5.2 Substantive regulations proposed by some intervenors are not needed
52. Some consumer groups, including the FCSC, make proposals for new substantive
regulation that are unworkable, will lead to numerous negative side effects for consumers
and may impact investment in Digital Canada initiatives. These unjustified and unworkable
proposals include importing “suitability” obligations from securities law, regulating the
relationship between telecommunications providers and their sales agents and putting new
regulations on door-to-door engagement.
5.2.1 Suitability obligations are disproportionate, unworkable and unfriendly to

consumers
53. The FCSC proposes “that service providers should be held to a “suitability standard.” In
FCSC’s view, this standard would “require sales representatives to offer only the products
and services that suit the customer’s needs, rather than products and services that are more
than what the customer wishes to, or can be convinced to, purchase.”51 As explained by the
FCSC in its intervention, this standard is used securities regulation.52 It applies to
50
Ibid, para. 28.
51
Intervention of the Fair Communications Sales Coalition, para. 111.
52
Ibid, paras. 137-140.
21
investment brokers and dealers and works to ensure that investments recommended and
strategies pursued by investment advisors – who often manage their clients’ life savings or
a significant portion of their assets – are suitable to those clients’ objectives, risk tolerances,
financial needs and unique circumstances.
54. Importing suitability obligations from securities regulation, is unjustified, disproportionate

to the harm the Commission seeks to address, and would lead to a cumbersome and
unfriendly sales process.
55. Compliance with suitability rules often requires lengthy meetings between investment
advisors and their clients, disclosure by clients of highly sensitive personal information
including their financial situation, income, net worth and risk tolerance, evaluation of the
client’s investment knowledge. This process entails multi-page forms that the client needs
to fill out when the advisor recommends an investment or changes the investment
strategy.53
56. For numerous reasons, this standard is both unnecessary and unworkable for
telecommunications sales. First, the kind of protections that apply to managing people’s
life savings are designed because of the long term impact and the financial risks inherent
in investing. This is in stark contrast to a regular consumer transaction such as buying a
cell phone, subscribing to an internet service or buying a package of television channels.
These are unitary commoditized products and services that greatly differ from the bespoke
solutions that are routinely offered to customers by securities dealers. There is a reason that
suitability obligations do not apply to every product or service purchased by consumers:
such obligations require a lengthy and cumbersome process that is only required when
individuals may be risking a large part of their assets or savings. Suitability obligations are
not placed on sellers of cars, household furniture and appliances, furnaces, computers,
televisions and other products that often cost much more than telecommunications services.
53
Opening your retail account – what your investment dealer needs from you and why, Investment Industry
Regulatory Organization of Canada (IIROC), online: http://www.iiroc.ca/industry/member-
resources/Documents/RetailAccountBrochure_en.pdf
22
Telecommunications services bears no resemblance to investment advice and should not

be singled out for onerous standards like suitability.
57. Second, the information collection process required to comply (and demonstrate
compliance) with suitability obligations would be cumbersome, unfriendly to customers
and contrary to existing obligations including those set out in the Wireless Code. Existing
obligations require service providers to communicate in plain language and ensure that
written contracts and related documents present information in a way that is clear and easy
for customers to read and understand.54 A suitability requirement would result in the
customers having to fill out lengthy forms and disclose a lot of personal financial
information. This is not consistent with the requirement to communicate clearly and have
easily understandable written documents. A suitability obligation would increase costs for
service providers because the sales process will be far more onerous and time consuming
and would be inconvenient and frustrating for customers who do not want to spend this
much advisory time with their telecommunications company.
58. Finally, given that there is little that securities have in common with telecommunications,
if the Commission is prepared to consider imposing some variation of the suitability
standard, it should consult with the Canadian Securities Administrators and various
securities commissions to seek feedback on how the suitability process works and whether
it could be even be tailored to the communications industry. It should also seek input from
industry players to ensure that any new such regulation is workable and consumer-friendly.
This would require a separate proceeding for a standard that TELUS has demonstrated is
unjustified.
5.2.2 Broad fibre deployment requires door-to-door customer engagement
59. Door-to-door engagement is required when new technologies are launched. Customers
need to be educated on their benefit and how deployment may impact them. In the case of
fibre-to-the-premises, agents simply cannot provide the same information in store or by
telephone as can be provided at the door: customers need someone to come to their house
54
Review of the Wireless Code, Telecom Regulatory Policy CRTC 2017-200, para. 125.
23
to explain and point out where a trench will be dug, where the fibre will enter the house
and how the property will be remediated. These kinds of conversations are difficult to have
in a place other than the customer’s home because the agent will not be able to visually
explain the work.
60. As explained in TELUS’ intervention, restrictions on door-to-door engagement are not

needed and may result in certain communities being left out of fibre build plans because it
would be economically unfeasible to build fibre without a certain number of customers
signing up for services. This would have significant negative impacts on those
communities, including reduced innovation and access to services. In general, it would be
inconsistent with promoting the vision of a Digital Canada.
61. The FCSC proposes replicating the protections in Ontario’s Consumer Protection Act in
respect of door-to-door sales. That act requires that consumers be given (1) a written
contract and (2) the right to cancel a contract without any reason within a 10-day cooling-
off period, beginning the day a written copy of the agreement is received.55 There is also a
general ability to cancel the agreement, regardless of its value, up to one year after it was
entered into if a false or misleading statement about the contract was made.56 This reply
focuses on FCSC’s proposal, but applies to similar proposals made by other intervenors as
well.
62. FCSC’s proposed protection already exist for consumers of TELUS services. TELUS
clients receive clear and concise contracts as well as “cooling off” periods, whether through
existing regulation or TELUS’ corporate policies. False or misleading representations are
prohibited by the Competition Act. Furthermore, customer complaints that arise out of such
representations, which occur because customers do not believe that that are obtaining the
services that they thought there were supposed to get, are already addressed by the CCTS.57
As CCTS states in its intervention, while it does not address claims of false or misleading
55
Consumer Protection Act, 2002, S.O. 2002, c30, Sched A, ss. 42, 43.
56
Ibid, s. 18.
57
Intervention of the Commission for Complaints for Telecom-television Services Inc., paras. 16, 20-22, 31,
51-53, 63-67.
24
advertising made generally, it will “accept and consider complaints where a customer is
directly affected by false or misleading advertising where the alleged false or misleading
advertising results in (i) the customer entering into an agreement for service that was not
presented completely and accurately upon subscription; or (ii) where there is a billing
dispute based on allegations of what the service provider promised to the customer.”58
63. In its intervention, TELUS proposed that a CISC working group create a code consisting
of these and other existing rules. This would address the FCSC’s proposal and would make
the rights of consumers clear and consistent. Consumers are adequately protected under
these existing rules. A CISC-developed code proposed by TELUS – coupled with a strong
statement from the Commission that it applies to the exclusion of provincial law – would
give consumers clarity in how to seek redress.
64. The FCSC also makes a vague proposal of “limits on or even a ban of door-to-door sales
of any kind of communications service.”59 Limits that do not currently exist, and
particularly a ban on door-to-door engagement, are disproportionate, not needed based on
the evidence in the record and, as explained in TELUS’ intervention, would result in lower
investment in next generation technologies and compromise TELUS’ ability to deliver on
the promise of a digital Canada.60 They would also deprive Canadians of a fast and
convenient means of receiving information about the benefits of new technologies. It is
therefore not consistent with the internationally accepted framework for regulation that is
set out in the intervention of the Competition Bureau. More importantly, the negative
consequences of such limits include communities being left out of fibre deployment plans
and individuals, businesses and organizations being impacted by unavailability of next-
generation high speed internet. Limitations on door-to-door engagement and these
significant and their far-reaching consequences for Canadians are simply not a
proportionate solution to complaints received from approximately 0.004 percent of
subscribers of telecommunications services.
58
Ibid, para. 51.
59
Intervention of the Fair Communication Sales Coalition, para. 264.3.
60
Intervention of TELUS, para. 80.
25
65. Partly as a result of the ability to educate customers on the benefits of fibre-to-the-premises,
Canada fares well in fibre deployment when compared to other jurisdictions. For example,
as of January 2018, 1.2 million residences in the U.K, a country with a population of 65
million people and a much smaller geographic area than Canada, were able to receive fibre-
to-the-premises service.61 By comparison, with the capability to serve more than #
# with its fibre-to-the-premises network, TELUS alone has connected more
premises in Alberta, British Columbia and Eastern Quebec than all U.K.
telecommunications providers combined. This would not have been possible without the
ability to engage potential customers at the door. In a very real sense, the value chain for
the achievement of a Digital Canada must include the ability to offer services on a door-
to-door basis.
5.2.3 Regulating compensation or discipline of sales agents and third parties is not
necessary and is beyond the power of the Commission
66. Some parties, including the FCSC62 and the Ageing, Communication, Technologies
project63 have proposed regulating compensation structure and discipline of sales agents
and/or third parties. Regulation of employment and commercial contracts is not needed.
Furthermore, it is not clear that the Commission has the power to enact such regulations.
67. Regulation of compensation of employees and third parties is not needed because the vast
majority of sales agents behave ethically and act with customers’ interests in mind. TELUS
has controls in place that flow from legal and regulatory requirements as well as good
business practices to ensure that customers are not impacted by the unethical decisions of
a very small number of agents.
68. New regulation of compensation and discipline will also be damaging to consumers and to
the competitive process. #
61
Connected Nations Update, Spring 2018, Ofcom, para. 1.10. Online:
https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0017/113543/Connected-Nations-update-Spring-
2018.pdf.
62
Intervention of Fair Communications Sales Coalition, para. 264.3.
63
Intervention of the Ageoin, Communication, Technologies project, recommendations A and B, p. 17.
26
# Commissioned sales staff therefore have incentives to find out

what customers need, and work to find the TELUS products and services that meet the
customer’s desires within their price range. As a result, commissions motivate sales staff
to find the right set of services for each customer. If incentives such as commissions were
to be removed by regulation, service providers would have few direct compensatory ways
of motivating employees to work with customers to identify products and services that are
right for them. The result would be that customers get less information from their sales
representative and might end up signing up for services that are not right for them, the exact
opposite of what FCSC’s proposal is intended to accomplish. Limits on compensation will
also take away incentives for agents to try to sign up customers currently receiving services
from competitor companies. This would lead to more people staying with their provider,
restricting promotional communications and putting up a barrier to competition. As the
Competition Bureau notes in its intervention, such regulation needs to be approached
cautiously as it would place “limits on the role of competition in determining marketplace
outcomes.”64
69. FCSC’s proposal to regulate compensation and discipline of employees and third parties
as conditions of service65 (presumably under section 24 of the Telecommunications Act) is
also unprecedented and goes well beyond the issues commonly addressed by section 24
(such as consumer service) and seeks to regulate activities that would normally be
regarded, even in a regulated environment, as prerogative of the management of a private
enterprise.
70. The Supreme Court of Canada has repeatedly held that clauses granting broad jurisdiction
(“basket clauses”) cannot be interpreted as unlimited grants of power:
The Board’s seemingly broad powers to make any order and to

impose any additional conditions that are necessary in the public
interest has to be interpreted within the entire context of the statutes
64
Intervention of the Competition Bureau, para. 25.
65
Intervention of Fair Communications Sales Coalition, para. 264.3.
27
which are meant to balance the need to protect consumers as well as

the property rights retained by owners, as recognized in a free
market economy. The limits of the powers of the Board are
grounded in its main function of fixing just and reasonable rates
(“rate setting”) and in protecting the integrity and dependability of
the supply system.66
[…]
The intended meaning of these two provisions, however, is lost

when the provisions are simply read in isolation as proposed by the
City. These provisions on their own are vague and open-ended. It
would be absurd to allow the Board an unfettered discretion to attach
any condition it wishes to an order it makes. Furthermore, the
concept of “public interest” found in s. 15(3) is very wide and
elastic; the Board cannot be given total discretion over its
limitations.67 [Emphasis added]
71. In the context of a provision in the Broadcasting Act similar to section 24, the Supreme
Court of Canada held:
A broadly drafted basket clause, such as s. 10(1)(k), or an open-

ended power to insert “such terms and conditions as the [regulatory
body] deems appropriate” (s. 9(1)(h)) cannot be read in isolation.
Rather, “[t]he content of a provision ‘is enriched by the rest of the
section in which it is found . . .’”68 [internal citations omitted.]
72. The Supreme Court of Canada requires that a basket clause be interpreted consistently with
the Act in its entire context.69 Section 24 must therefore take its colour from the other
provisions of the Telecommunications Act, none of which give the Commission power to
regulate internal affairs of the company, including employee and third party compensation
and discipline.
66
ATCO Gas & Pipelines Ltd. v. Alberta (Energy & Utilities Board), [2006] 1 SCR 140, 2006 SCC 4, para. 7.
67
Ibid, para. 46.
68
Reference re Broadcasting Regulatory Policy CRTC 2010-167 and Broadcasting Order CRTC 2010-168,
[2012] 3 SCR 489, 2012 SCC 68, para. 29.
69
I bid, para. 32.
28
73. The proposal by the FCSC to regulate employee and third party compensation and
discipline – aside from not being necessary and having negative effects on consumers – is
unprecedented, beyond the power of the Commission and should be rejected.
5.2.4 TELUS has the tools to ensure that employees of third parties it works with do
not engage in poor sales practices
74. At paragraphs 177-178 of its intervention, FCSC questions TELUS’ ability to control
conduct by third party sales agents, stating:
TELUS says (TELUS(CRTC)16Jul18-1) that it trains its employees

and third party “team” members on the same “Customers First”
approach, that it provides a measure of compensation based on this
program goals and monitors and audits this approach. However, we
note that TELUS, like the others, has less control over compliance
of third parties with the program, compliance, audit and training
provided. In TELUS(CRTC)16Jul18-25, TELUS notes in its answer
under “TELUS and Customers First” a number of “empowerments”
of “TELUS employees who deal with the general public, be it in a
storefront, call centre or door to door”. [Emphasis added.] The
subsequent recitations of encouragement of sales to follow the
Customers First program are limited to employees. This is explicitly
mentioned in a section entitled “Training agents to live the
Customers First culture”. Again, all of the described training
programs are delivered only to employees; employees alone are
“bound by” the “Customer Experience Code of Conduct” (redacted
as confidential). Likewise, the “Customer Experience Blueprint”
appears only to be delivered to employees. While it appears the
“Confident Conversations” (attachments confidential) may be
shared with third party sales, TELUS finishes this description of
safeguards by noting “employees are subject to TELUS’ Code of
Ethics and Conduct”. TELUS appears to claim that third party door
to door agents are also required to abide by the “Code of Ethics and
Conduct” (see TELUS(CRTC)16Jul18- 25 at p. 7. However, that
same document confirms only that the third party door to door sales
agent abide by three redacted documents:
29
• Termination without Notice – Appendix E – Attachment 31-2

• Confidential Information – Appendix F – Attachment 31-3
• Unacceptable Conduct Policy – TELUS – Attachment 31-4 178.
It is not clear to FCSC that the “Code of Ethics and Conduct”, and
in particular the section on appropriate “needs-based” sales is
incorporated in some or all of these documents. The CRTC should
confirm this with TELUS before assuming that third parties are
indeed held contractually to this standard. In any case, TELUS has
far fewer levers to pull on third parties to enforce compliance to this
policy, even if TELUS believes it applies to third parties. This is
because, unless these contracts have specific wording allowing
TELUS to discipline (or TELUS to require the contractor to
discipline) third party sales agents, then likely the only remedy is
termination of the agreement. This is unlikely for individual
incidents. This may encourage some considerable tolerance of
violations short of cancelling the contract, which could be costly and
inconvenient to TELUS as it searched for another contractor.
75. TELUS has many ways of ensuring that third parties act in the interests of TELUS
customers. TELUS(CRTC)16Jul18-20 notes that third parties are subject to TELUS’
Supplier Code of Conduct which is public and contains the following provision: “our
suppliers are expected to maintain high standards of courtesy, professionalism, ethics and
honesty in all their interactions with customers … and comply with all applicable federal,
provincial, state and local laws.”70
76. #
70
TELUS Supplier Code of Conduct, s. A.1, online: http://www.telus.com/suppliercodeofconduct.
30
77. #
#
The FCSC’s concerns about TELUS’ ability to prevent misconduct by individuals
employed by third parties are therefore not warranted.
31
5.2.5 Modifications to Unsolicited Telecommunications Rules improper in this

proceeding
78. The FCSC states there need to be additional regulations controlling the volume of calls
pursuant to the “existing business relationship” exemption of the CRTC Unsolicited
Telecommunications Rules (“UTRs”).71 This would require a change to the UTRs, which
would require notice and consultation with entities that are not parties to this proceeding.
It is therefore procedurally improper for the Commission to address FCSC’s proposal at
this time.
6.0 Consumer Education and Redress
79. Multiple consumer groups have pointed out that Canadians do not know where to seek
redress when they have a dispute with their telecommunications services provider. Some
of the confusion is caused by the multiplicity of federal and provincial regulation described
above. It is also clear that many individuals are not aware of the existence and role of the
CCTS. Rather than creating or funding more groups or institutions as proposed by
intervenors such as Democracy Watch and FCSC, resources should be spent on consumer
education and promoting the role and function of CCTS. Once Canadians become aware
of the CCTS, they will be able to resolve their disputes with telecommunications
companies in an efficient and cost-effective manner. Having a central body for dispute
resolution will also ensure that accurate statistics are collected and trends requiring further
regulatory action are identified.
6.1 The need to raise awareness of the CCTS
80. Many interventions point to the need to raise awareness of role of CCTS. It is clear that
some Canadians who participated in this proceeding through the surveys and
questionnaires conducted by some intervenors are not familiar with CCTS and do not know
how it can help them. For example, the Consumers Council of Canada notes:
71
Intervention of the Fair Communications Sales Coalition, paras. 54-59; Canadian Radio-television and
Telecommunications Commission Unsolicited Telecommunications Rules at Part II: National DNCL Rules,
online: https://crtc.gc.ca/eng/trules-reglest.htm.
32
Respondents did not refer to specific provincial consumer protection

legislation nor did they refer to any of the Codes set out by the
CRTC. Respondents were typically of the view that consumer
protections were inadequate. The areas of issue were lack of
enforcement and unawareness of consumers of what constituted
those consumer protections, a lack of an Ombudsperson, and a lack
of competition.72
81. The Consumers Council of Canada also cited examples of individuals who appear to have
concerns that CCTS could address, but do not know about the existence of that body. For
example, one person commented:
The CRTC is of course at the heart of regulation, along with

appropriate federal government departments. Consumer groups
such as the CCC should be provided a role to independently monitor
the success of policy and implementation, as well as offering an
independent environment to collect complaints and disputes.73
82. The Manitoba Coalition similarly points to a lack of awareness on the part of at least some
consumers. Relying on research done by the University of Ottawa, the Manitoba Coalition
notes that “[n]ot a single individual among twenty-two participants in our first two focus
groups, indicated any awareness of the Wireless Code nor of any specific rights described
therein. You cannot use information you do not know exists.”74
83. The Ageing, Communication, Technologies project also noted that “…the seniors we
interviewed were generally not aware of the CCTS and its mandate.”75 It expressly
recommended “[raising] the profile of the CCTS among the general public through public
awareness campaigns, using both digital and non-digital methods of communication.”76
84. The solution is for the Commission and the CCTS to take action on raising consumer
awareness of their rights and available avenues of redress. As noted above, ensuring that
rules and regulations are consistent across Canada will go a long way to eliminating
72
Intervention of the Consumers Council of Canada, para. 36.
73
Ibid, para. 47.
74
75
Intervention of the Ageing, Communication, Technologies project, p. 11.
76
Ibid, Recommendation D, p. 17.
33
consumer confusion. To support this goal, the Commission should expressly state that any
new code covering sales practices would apply to the exclusion of provincial regulation.
TELUS’ proposal to implement a code of conduct formalizing the CCTS’ mandate with
respect to aggressive and misleading sales practices will also help bridge the awareness
gap.
6.2 New institutions are not needed
85. As the CCTS noted in its intervention, it hears and resolves many consumer complaints
resulting from misleading and aggressive sales practices.77 Its core function is “to facilitate
dispute resolution between customers and their communications service providers.”78 The
CCTS routinely deals with contract disputes, billing, service delivery and credit
management,79 any of which can arise as a result of misleading or aggressive sales
practices.
86. As noted earlier in this reply, the CCTS states that it will “accept and consider complaints
where a customer is directly affected by false or misleading advertising where the alleged
false or misleading advertising results in (i) the customer entering into an agreement for
service that was not presented completely and accurately upon subscription; or (ii) where
there is a billing dispute based on allegations of what the service provider promised to the
customer.”80
87. Since the CCTS is capable of addressing these issues and consumer groups exist and
regularly intervene in proceedings, new institutions such as the Telecommunications
Consumer Organization proposed by Democracy Watch81 and several other intervenors82
is not necessary. Furthermore, having complaints centralized within CCTS will allow it
collect statistics which can be used to identify trends requiring further regulatory
77
Intervention of the Commission for Complaints for Telecom-television Services Inc., paras. 16, 20-22, 31,
51-53, 63-67.
78
Ibid, para. 6.
79
Ibid, para. 7.
80
Ibid, para. 51.
81
Intervention of Democracy Watch, p. 3.
82
For example, see intervention of the Fair Communications Sales Coalition, para. 264.4.
34
intervention. This would not be possible if customer complaints were spread across
multiple institutions.
7.0 Conclusion
88. The record of this proceeding does not disclose systemic problems with
telecommunications sales in Canada. While there are interventions from unsatisfied
customers on the record, it is important to keep these interventions in their proper context.
Similarly, given the flawed methodologies of surveys, questionnaires and focus groups put
into the record by consumer advocacy organizations, their results cannot be taken as
anything more than the views of the individuals who participated in them. A very small
number of Canadian telecommunications services subscribers intervened or participated in
this proceeding in any way. While the experience of these individuals should not be
discounted, it simply cannot support a conclusion of systemic problems. In fact, the record
of this proceeding provides evidence that millions of Canadians who subscribe to
communications products and services obtained them in a positive and beneficial sales
environment. TELUS takes care to ensure that its customer interactions are based on its
Customers First principles, so that a satisfied customer today will recommend TELUS to
friends and family, thereby generating new customers for TELUS tomorrow.
89. To the extent that the Commission decides to take action, its focus should be on access to
redress, clarity of the rules and education of consumers. The main issue is not the lack of
substantive rules, but confusion about how aggrieved consumers can enforce their rights
under the rules that exist and a lack of a fast and cost-efficient enforcement mechanism for
some consumers’ claims. In addition, at least some consumers report being confused by
the “bewildering maze” of federal and provincial rules and institutions that purport to
govern telecommunications. To help with this, the Commission can request that a CISC
working group develop a binding, exclusive and national code covering misleading and
aggressive sales practices that would be applied and administered by the CCTS. New
substantive rules are not necessary and would have serious unintended consequences and
new institutions would only add to consumer confusion.
35
90. To ensure that consumers are aware of their redress options, the Commission and the CCTS
should engage in consumer outreach. If consumers are aware of their rights and remedies
when a dispute arises, there is likely to be less consumer frustration and more satisfaction
with Canadian telecommunications service providers.
**** End of Document ****
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BEFORE THE CANADIAN RADIO-TELEVISION AND

TELUS COMMUNICATIONS INC.

Telecom and Broadcasting Notice of Consultation CRTC 2018-246

September 14, 2018

1.0 Introduction and Executive Summary ................................................................................. 1

1.0 Introduction and Executive Summary

9. As of December 2017, 31.5 million Canadians subscribe to wireless services, representing

10. OpenMedia submitted an intervention containing 1,074 individual comments submitted

3.0 Flawed evidence should not form the basis of conclusions

3.1 Surveys and questionnaires cannot be used to draw general conclusions

Limitations of the survey include that it was self-selecting. In

Surprisingly, only one response was positive about bundles,

 If you were told your rates were guaranteed, but your

 If you have been sold Internet, home phone, or mobile

 If you were not told about activation fees, or installation fees,

 If you’ve had a telecom company sell you services you do

3.2 Many general comments do not apply to TELUS

entreprise à l’autre. Aucun des centres de service à la clientèle syndiqués de Cogeco,

4.0 Failure to assert exclusive federal jurisdiction over regulation of

a. Jurisdiction over telecommunications, including the offering and provision of

c. Any new code will operate to the exclusion of provincial regulation.

4.1 Provincial regulation of the provision of telecommunications services is

[E]n ce qui concerne l’encadrement des contrats conclus avec les

Ces protections sont le résultat de l’exercice par le Québec de sa

À cet égard, le Québec tient à réitérer qu’il revient au Parlement du

4.2 Confusion about applicable regulation causes consumer frustration

35. Of course, the unconstitutionality of provincial legislation is not just a matter of

If one launches a complaint some items go to CRTC. Some go to

37. The Manitoba Coalition notes in its intervention that

Perhaps reflective of the complex and opaque federal and provincial

The Manitoba Coalition goes on to say:

At the federal level, the Manitoba Coalition is aware of the

The Manitoba Coalition also is aware of provincial consumer

4.3 The Commission should clarify that jurisdiction over telecommunications,

Rather, one must ask whether the empowering legislation implicitly

A provincially constituted board cannot respect the division of

5.0 New substantive obligations are not necessary

inform the seriousness of a contravention in determining whether a matter should be

a. Regulation should be no broader than necessary;

b. Regulation should be based on the best available evidence;

c. Regulation should be proportionate to harm; and

d. Regulation should be regularly reviewed to reflect market conditions.48

or competition in the telecommunications industry. If there is little evidence of harm, it

5.2 Substantive regulations proposed by some intervenors are not needed

5.2.1 Suitability obligations are disproportionate, unworkable and unfriendly to

54. Importing suitability obligations from securities regulation, is unjustified, disproportionate

Telecommunications services bears no resemblance to investment advice and should not

5.2.2 Broad fibre deployment requires door-to-door customer engagement

60. As explained in TELUS’ intervention, restrictions on door-to-door engagement are not

# Commissioned sales staff therefore have incentives to find out

The Board’s seemingly broad powers to make any order and to

which are meant to balance the need to protect consumers as well as

The intended meaning of these two provisions, however, is lost

A broadly drafted basket clause, such as s. 10(1)(k), or an open-

TELUS says (TELUS(CRTC)16Jul18-1) that it trains its employees

• Termination without Notice – Appendix E – Attachment 31-2

5.2.5 Modifications to Unsolicited Telecommunications Rules improper in this

6.0 Consumer Education and Redress

6.1 The need to raise awareness of the CCTS

Respondents did not refer to specific provincial consumer protection

The CRTC is of course at the heart of regulation, along with

6.2 New institutions are not needed

**** End of Document ****

End of Document