Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Court of Appeals
Bessie Decker
9/17/2018 11:59 AM
respectfully submits this Answer to the Petition for Writ of Certiorari of Petitioner Harford
County, Maryland (the “County”), and asks this Court to deny the petition.
I. INTRODUCTION
The jury in this case decided that the County effectuated an unconstitutional regulatory
taking of MRA’s Property under the seminal U.S. Supreme Court case, Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), and awarded just compensation in
the amount of $45.4 million. The Penn Central analysis required the jury to engage in fact-
intensive balancing of the well-established factors for a regulatory taking and to evaluate expert
testimony to determine the appropriate award. The verdict was based, in part, on overwhelming
and largely uncontradicted evidence that, although (1) MRA had obtained zoning and site plan
approval; (2) was in the Solid Waste Management Plan (“SWM Plan”); (3) and obtained a permit
from the Maryland Department of the Environment (“MDE”) to operate a rubblefill on the
Gravel Hill Road property (the “Property”), the County embarked on a 20 year crusade to
destroy MRA’s property rights and its reasonable investment-backed expectations. This
included the passage of four laws intended to prevent the operation of the rubblefill – two of
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which were declared illegal – coupled with the County’s interference with MRA’s permit
application at the MDE. All of this was summarized in a County memorandum signed by all of
the members of the County Council instructing County employees to make the interference
appear as “business as usual.” The just compensation award was supported by expert testimony,
the financial projections of accountants with extensive experience with other rubblefills in
Maryland, and the testimony of MRA’s President, Richard Schafer, who had specialized
knowledge of the Property and had entertained several offers to purchase the Property.
And although the only issue tried to the jury was a Penn Central takings claim,
conspicuously absent from the County’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari (“Petition”) are two
words: Penn Central. Rather than confront the central issue presented at trial, the Petition
focuses on a range of zoning issues that are no longer part of this case. Despite the County’s best
efforts to confuse the issues, this case is not about zoning. For that reason, the decisions of this
Court at earlier stages of this litigation — which pertained primarily to the validity of the
County’s zoning process — bear no relation to the issues that were tried in this case. No reason
exists for this Court to bypass the Court of Special Appeals (“CSA”). The CSA is well-equipped
to evaluate the record and to narrow any potential issues that may merit further review.
Examining each of the Petition’s four questions presented, they were correctly decided or
First, the County improperly invokes the “vested rights” doctrine, which has no relevance
to this takings claim. The County’s Petition hopelessly conflates the narrow state-law doctrine
of “vested rights,” which protects property owners against changes in zoning ordinances in
specific circumstances, MRA v. Harford Cty., 414 Md. 1, 44-45 (2010) (“MRA IV ”), and the
broader constitutional requirements for a regulatory takings claim under Penn Central. See Penn
2
Central, 438 U.S. at 124; see also Rucklehaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1000-01 (1984);
Neifert v. Dep’t. of Env’t, 395 Md. 486, 517 (2006). Those two inquiries are entirely distinct.
As a result, the Court’s prior decision in MRA IV, which held that MRA lacked a “vested right”
in the County’s zoning approval, does not govern the separate takings analysis determined at
trial.
Second, this Court’s review is not warranted to consider whether the operation of MRA’s
rubblefill would constitute a nuisance. That issue was not presented to the jury or decided at trial
because the circuit court ruled, as an evidentiary matter, that the County’s nuisance evidence was
inadmissible. The Petition, however, does not challenge that evidentiary ruling. And in any
event, the MDE permit expressly prohibited MRA from operating a rubblefill in a manner that
would constitute a nuisance. This Court should not grant a writ of certiorari to review a question
Third, the County is wrong that the statute of limitations barred MRA’s takings claim. In
an action like this, a Penn Central takings claim accrues “when the regulations underlying
appellant’s claim were ‘finally determined to be effective.’” Millison v. Wilzack, 77 Md. App.
676, 689 (1989). Here, MRA’s claim did not accrue when MRA’s variance was denied, as the
County suggests. Rather, the claim accrued after this Court’s March 11, 2010 decision in MRA
IV, which upheld the validity of the applicable zoning law, Bill 91-10, and affirmed the denial of
variances from that law. That decision provided the final determination that Bill 91-10 is valid
and that MRA would not be permitted to operate a rubblefill on the Property. The present
lawsuit was timely filed within three years of that final decision.
Finally, the jury’s award properly accounted for MRA’s unique property. Yancey v.
United States, 915 F.2d 1534, 1542 (Fed. Cir. 1990). The County is incorrect that MRA’s expert
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improperly considered the “capitalized valuation of projected profits” from the rubblefill’s
operation to determine the value of the Property. Petition, at 14. Rather, the very decisions cited
by the County make clear that the land’s “productive capacity,” including “gross sales” and the
land’s “proper use and purposes” are appropriate considerations for the jury. See Brinsfield v.
City of Baltimore, 236 Md. 66, 70 (1964); State Roads Comm’n v. Novosel, 203 Md. 619, 623-24
(1954); see also Dodson v. Anne Arundel County, 294 Md. 490, 495-96 (1982).
Accordingly, this Court should deny the County’s Petition for a Writ of Certiorari.
II. FACTS
In 1989, Mr. Schafer sought to purchase the Property with the intention of using the
Property’s unique topography to build and operate a rubble landfill. (Exhibit A, 4-5-2018 AM
Trial Tr. at 101:21-102:22). Extensive mining of the Property left it resembling a moonscape
Mr. Schafer knew that the County had a policy at that time of permitting the operation of
private rubblefills to encourage reclamation of mined land, and Mr. Schafer saw an ideal
business opportunity: MRA would operate a rubblefill on the Property, thereby generating
substantial income for the company, and when the Property was fully reclaimed, MRA would
donate the reclaimed land to the County for use as a park, thereby making beneficial use of
otherwise unusable land. (Exhibit A, 4-5-2018 AM Trial Tr. at 100:9-24; Exhibit B, 4-5-2018
In 1989 and 1990, Mr. Schafer and MRA undertook all the steps a reasonable landowner
would take in order to build and operate a rubblefill on the Property, including: (1) addressing
zoning issues with the County; (2) obtaining inclusion in the County’s SWM Plan by agreeing to
twenty-seven conditions imposed by the County; (3) obtaining County Council approval of
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MRA’s site plan; (4) purchasing the Property; and (5) taking steps to obtain its MDE permit.
(PX 14, PX 47, PX 105, PX 128). MRA ultimately invested more than $4 million in pursuit of
its plans to operate a rubblefill on the Property. (PX 68, PX 100, PX 115).
But then the political winds shifted. After the County Council approved MRA’s site plan
and included MRA’s proposed rubblefill in the SWM Plan, an election changed the makeup of
the County Council. (PX 128 ¶ 41). The new County Councilmembers sought to prevent MRA
from building and operating a rubble landfill on the Property by passing four separate pieces of
legislation (two of which were ultimately deemed illegal by the CSA and circuit court). (PX 60,
77, 78, 88). Meanwhile, the County interfered with MRA’s application for an MDE permit to
stall the permit’s issuance until the County could alter the zoning regulations to prohibit MRA’s
rubblefill. All the while, the County attempted to make its actions appear like “business as
usual.” (PX 61, PX 80, PX 80A). MRA fought back against the County for over twenty years,
but ultimately, on March 11, 2010, this Court upheld Bill 91-10, which prevented MRA from
ever building and operating a rubble landfill on the Property. (PX 191).
Due to its extreme topography, there is no other economically viable use MRA can make
of the Property other than to operate a rubblefill. (Exhibit C, 4-11-2018 PM Trial Tr. at 71:8-24;
Exhibit D, 4-10-2018 AM Trial Tr. at 65:4-15; Exhibit E, 4-6-2018 AM Trial Tr. at 45:6-9). The
County’s actions destroyed the Property’s value and effectuated a taking of the Property without
providing just compensation to MRA. (Exhibit F, 4-6-2018 PM Trial Tr. at 7:18-8:12; Exhibit
C, 4-11-2018 PM Trial Tr. at 80:10-82:11). MRA brought the present lawsuit against the County
to recover the just compensation owed. Following a two week trial, on April 17, 2018, a six-
person jury found that the County’s actions resulted in a taking of MRA’s Property and awarded
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Now on appeal, the County has set forth four questions that it urges this Court to hear
III. ARGUMENT
A. The County’s Petition Does Not Meet the Standards For Certiorari.
Maryland law provides that this Court, in its discretion, may grant certiorari if a case is
“desirable and in the public interest.” Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 12-203 (2006). The issues, as
presented in the County’s Petition, do not rise to that standard. First, the Petition ignores Penn
Central, which was the only issue determined by the jury. Any challenge to that verdict involves
substantial and fact-bound determinations requiring a review of the sufficiency of the evidence.
That review can and should be performed, in the first instance by the CSA. Second, the County
is incorrect that this case is governed by this Court’s prior rulings at earlier stages of this dispute.
This case arises following a two-week jury trial that determined that the County had taken
MRA’s Property and the amount of just compensation. The prior rulings of this Court had
nothing to do with a takings claim and involve separate and distinct legal issues not presented in
the Petition.
1. The Verdict In This Regulatory Takings Action Required The Jury To Make
Factbound Determinations That Do Not Warrant Bypass Review.
This Court should not bypass the CSA to review the jury’s verdict, which was decided
under the Penn Central test for regulatory takings. A Penn Central claim requires that the
factfinder balance three factors: (1) the extent to which the regulation has interfered with a
party’s reasonable investment-backed expectations; (2) the economic impact on the property; and
(3) the nature and character of the County’s actions. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124. The jury
was properly instructed on the applicable Penn Central test—indeed, the County’s Petition does
not challenge the jury instructions or other legal rulings at trial. The U.S. Supreme Court has
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expressly recognized that factual determinations predominate the Penn Central analysis. See
City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 720 (1999) (“[W]e have
inquiries,’ requiring ‘complex factual assessments of the purposes and economic effects of
government actions.’”) (internal citations omitted).1 The Petition attempts to circumvent that
factual determination by seeking review of issues not presented to or decided by the jury.
Although the County fails to acknowledge it, MRA filed a conditional cross-appeal,
asking the CSA to determine whether the trial court erred by granting Harford County’s motion
for summary judgment on MRA’s claim that the County had effectuated a complete regulatory
taking under Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 103 (1992). That question
should have been submitted to the jury, as there was a dispute of fact whether the County’s
misconduct had deprived the Property of all economically viable use. See City of Monterey, 526
U.S. at 720-21 (“[W]hether a landowner has been deprived of all economically viable use of his
property is a predominantly factual question . . . this question is for the jury.”). The issues
raised in the cross-appeal present a significant, alternative basis for the County’s liability under
Lucas. MRA, however, does not seek or desire a writ of certiorari on its cross-appeal at this
time. Granting the Petition would improperly bifurcate the case and ignore MRA’s alternative
1
See also Ghinger & Ghinger, A Contemporary Appraisal of Condemnation in Maryland, 30
Md. L. Rev. 301, 323 (1970) (“It was undoubtedly contemplated by the framers of article III
section 40 [of the Maryland Constitution] that the best method for protecting the property owner
was to entrust the final decision as to the value of the condemned property to twelve good men
and true.”).
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3. The Issues in This Case Are Distinct from Those Decided in MRA II-IV
Although this case has been before this Court on three prior occasions,2 those prior cases
do not inform this stage of the litigation. Thus the fact that this Court previously granted
certiorari in MRA II-IV does not require the same result now. See Petition, at 2. Rather, the
Petition ignores the striking differences in legal and procedural posture between this case and
MRA II-IV.
Those prior cases involved challenges to the validity of the zoning ordinances and Bills
91-10 and 91-16, as applied to the Property. See MRA II, 342 Md. at 486; MRA III, 382 Md. at
350. This Court, in MRA IV, ultimately upheld the County’s authority to enact Bill 91-10 and the
denial of a variance. 414 Md. at 64-65. And importantly, in that case, this Court evaluated a due
process challenge to a zoning ordinance – a distinctly different standard than that applied to a
takings case. In those prior decisions, this Court did not address whether the County’s actions
constituted a taking, which is the central issue decided by the jury in this lawsuit.
For this and the other reasons in this Answer, the Petition should be denied.
The County’s assertion that vested rights are germane to a takings analysis contravenes
Maryland law and is contradicted by its own Petition. See Petition, at 10-12. The state-law
doctrine of vested rights narrowly applies in zoning estoppel cases and protects property owners
from retroactive application of statutes affecting their property. See MRA IV, 414 Md. at 44-45.
To establish a “vested right” under that doctrine, a property owner must obtain a valid permit,
“make a substantial beginning” towards “committing the land to the permitted use before the
2
MRA v. Harford Cty., 342 Md. 476 (1996) (“MRA II”); MRA v. Harford Cty., 382 Md. 348
(2004) (“MRA III”); MRA IV, 414 Md. 1 (2010).
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change in the zoning ordinance has occurred.” Id. at 45. This Court held in MRA IV, that MRA
did not establish a “vested right” to a zoning rule that permitted the operation of the rubblefill.
Id. But MRA IV determined only that the zoning rule applied to MRA’s Property; it did not
The regulatory takings analysis serves a distinct purpose and is determined by a different
legal standard than “vested rights.” See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124; see also Rucklehaus, 467
interest.” See Neifert, 395 Md. at 522. Ownership of real property is the quintessential example
of such an interest, and was plainly established by MRA’s ownership of the Property. 4 The
County, however confuses that basic constitutional requirement with the wholly unrelated
“vested rights” doctrine. See Petition, at 4. In addition, the vested rights test is distinct from the
Penn Central factors: the “reasonable investment-backed expectation” of the property owner,
the economic impact on the property, and the nature and character of the County’s actions. Penn
Central, 438 U.S. at 124. This Court should not review the Petition’s “vested rights” theory, as it
The nuisance doctrine also does not apply and was not presented to the jury. The County
argues that MRA did not suffer a taking when it prohibited the operation of the rubblefill because
3
The County’s reliance on Grassland Plantation, Inc. v. Frizz-King Enterprises, LLC, 410 Md.
191 (2009) and McHael v. DCW Dutchship Island, LLC, 415 Md. 145 (2010), is misplaced,
because these cases are not takings cases. Those cases relate to the whether a zoning law applies
retroactively or prospectively – an issue that has already been determined by this Court in MRA
IV and was not litigated in this case.
4
While the Court in MRA II found that MRA was not denied of a constitutionally protected
property interest without due process of law, the Court did not opine on whether MRA had a
constitutionally protected property interest. 342 Md. at 499.
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a rubblefill is a “common law nuisance.” Petition, at 4-5. The County did not present evidence
of nuisance at trial because the trial court precluded it from doing so on evidentiary grounds.
The County does not contest that evidentiary ruling in its Petition and points to no other rulings
from the present litigation related to nuisance. Further, in its Petition, the County does not cite to
The County also incorrectly contends that this Court determined in MRA IV that the
operation of rubblefill on the Property constituted a nuisance. In MRA IV, this Court held that
the Board of Appeals had sufficient evidence to deny MRA’s variances on the grounds that a
rubblefill would be “detrimental to adjacent properties.” 414 Md. at 25-26. It did not address
whether that constituted a common-law nuisance. The undisputed testimony at trial was, had
there been a nuisance on the Property, the rubblefill would have been shut down under the terms
This Court has made clear that the three-year statute of limitations for an inverse
condemnation action does not begin until the taking is complete. See Litz v. MDE, 434 Md. 623,
654 (2013). Where, as here, MRA challenged the validity of the County’s zoning rules, the
taking was not complete until “the regulations underlying appellant’s claim were ‘finally
The County therefore is plainly incorrect that the taking of MRA’s Property accrued
when the Board of Appeals denied MRA’s requests for variances from the provisions of Bill 91-
10. Thereafter, MRA appealed the denial of those variances, and similarly appealed a prior
Board of Appeals’ decision that Bill 91-10 applied to the Property. MRA IV, 414 Md. at 23. The
claim did not accrue until this Court decided MRA IV, and, affirmed both the denial of variances
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and the application of Bill 91-10 to MRA’s Property. Id. The decision in MRA IV provided final
confirmation that MRA would not be permitted to construct and operate a rubble landfill on the
Property. The present lawsuit was timely filed within three years that final decision.
The County’s reliance on Arroyo v. Bd. of Ed. for Howard County, 381 Md. 646 (2004) is
misplaced. Arroyo was not a takings case but a wrongful termination case in which the plaintiff
was required to exhaust his administrative remedies with the State Board of Education before
seeking court intervention. Id. at 649. This Court found that the statute of limitations for the
plaintiff’s tort claim accrued on the date of the State Board of Education’s determination. Id. at
671. The accrual of the claim in Arroyo does not apply to this takings claim, which did not
accrue until the regulation promulgated by the County was finally determined to apply to MRA’s
3. The Jury Award Was Properly Based On The Value Of MRA’s Unique Property.
The jury’s award properly considered the profitability of operating a rubblefill on the
Property in determining just compensation. Contrary to the County’s suggestion, the jury’s
damages verdict does not “contravene settled Maryland law” by resting on testimony about the
“capitalized valuation of projected profits.” Petition, at 14. Rather, the very decisions cited by
the County make clear that the land’s “productive capacity,” including “gross sales” and the
land’s “proper use and purposes” are appropriate considerations. See Brinsfield, 236 Md. at 70;
Novosel, 203 Md. at 623-24; see also Dodson, 294 Md. at 495-96.5
In Novosel, for example, this Court recognized that the land’s “productive capacity . . .
5
The just compensation award is further supported by additional evidence, including the
contemporaneous financial projections prepared by MRA’s accountants, Coughlin & Mann, the
County’s auditors, who had extensive experience projecting the performance of other Maryland
rubblefills. Mr. Schafer also testified to the Property’s fair market value based on his specialized
knowledge of the Property and his review of other offers to purchase it.
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has an important bearing on value,” and therefore recognized “[a]s a practical matter, a
prospective purchaser would hardly fail to consider whether or not the business conducted on the
premises had proved profitable.” Novosel, 203 Md. at 623-24. The Court left the “precise
weight to be accorded to this factor” to the jury. Id. Similarly, in Brinsfield, this Court affirmed
the lower court’s admission of expert testimony considering gross sales to value property in a
takings case. 236 Md. at 70; see also Dodson, 294 Md. at 495-96 (“[T]he value of the land, with
The nature of the Property makes the profitability of the rubblefill all the more relevant.
The Property is a former sand and gravel mine, resembling a moonscape, and the testimony at
trial established that a rubblefill is its only valuable use. In takings cases where “profits derived
from its use are the chief source of its value, evidence of such profits is admissible as a criterion
of the property’s value.” 4 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 12B.09 (2016) (emphasis added);
see also Yancey, 915 F.2d at 1542 (holding valuation “can include an assessment of the
property’s capacity to produce future income if a reasonable buyer would consider that capacity
in negotiating a fair price for the property.”).6 No error was presented in the jury’s property
valuation.
6
Moreover, where the operation of a particular business is dependent on the unique nature of the
property, the property owner may recover business losses. Dep’t of Transp. v. Kendricks, 148
Ga. App. 242, 246-47 (Ga. Ct. App. 1978); see also City of St. Louis v. Union Quarry & Constr.
Co., 394 S.W. 2d 300, 305-06 (Mo. 1965), (where “the land is devoted to the only apparent use
to which it could be most advantageously and profitably applied . . . evidence of such profits was
properly admitted and is relevant as a criterion of the value of the property”).
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5. MRA Presented Overwhelming Evidence That The County Effectuated an
Unconstitutional Taking of MRA’s Property
prove a regulatory taking under the three Penn Central factors. The jury verdict was fully
expectation that it would be permitted to operate a rubblefill on the Property. The evidence
showed that the County had a longstanding policy of permitting the reclamation of mined-out
sand and gravel pits through the operation of private rubblefills, and that the County was initially
in favor of MRA’s rubblefill. (PX 128, ¶¶ 18, 67). Moreover, MRA took steps to ensure its
venture would be lucrative, by having its accountants periodically prepare reports to project
MRA’s income from its rubblefill, which demonstrated that the planned rubblefill would have
generated tens of millions of dollars in net income for MRA. (PX 68, PX 100, PX 115).
MRA further presented evidence of the steps it took to develop and use the Property as a
rubblefill. Before MRA purchased the Property, it had (1) addressed potential zoning issues and
had been assured that it complied with existing zoning regulations, including specific assurances
that it satisfied the County’s 200-foot buffer zone requirement; (2) obtained inclusion in the
County’s SWM Plan, subject to 27 conditions set forth by the County Council; (3) obtained
County Council approval of MRA’s site plan; (4) purchased the property; and (5) received its
MDE permit. All in all MRA spent more than $4 million developing the Property as a rubblefill.
The evidence therefore established a reasonable, investment-backed expectation that the Property
could be used for the planned rubblefill. (PX 14, PX 34, PX 47, PX 105, PX 128 ¶ 28, PX 191)
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ii) The County’s Actions Had a Severe Economic Impact on MRA’s Property
MRA presented substantial evidence that demonstrated that Bill 91-10 not only severely
impacted the value of the Property, but indeed deprived it of any viable, economic use. MRA’s
witnesses testified that, because of the unique topography of the Property, it could not be used
for any other business or economically viable business, other than the planned rubblefill.
Exhibit E, 4-6-2018 AM Trial Tr. at 45:6-9). A rubblefill is the “chief source” of the value of the
Property. (Exhibit C, 4-11-2018 PM Trial Tr. at 78:1-9). In addition, the accounting reports
prepared by MRA’s accountants demonstrated that the planned rubblefill would have generated
tens of millions of dollars in net income for MRA. (PX 68, 100, 115). This evidence
demonstrates that the County’s actions, which prevented MRA from building and operating a
rubblefill on the Property, had a severe economic impact on MRA. To date, the Property
remains a giant hole in the ground that appears as a moonscape. The evidence shows that the
The trial evidence also demonstrated that the County acted in bad faith. The County
instituted a 20-year legislative assault against MRA, passing four pieces of legislation to prevent
MRA from operating a rubblefill. This started with Resolution 4-90. Introduced on February 13,
1990—four days after MRA closed on the Property—and passed on May 8, 1990, Resolution 4-
90 was “[a] RESOLUTION amending the Harford County Solid Waste Management Plan to
delete the Gravel Hill Road Rubble Landfill.” (PX 60). The day after it passed this Resolution
(which would later be declared illegal), the County Council sent a letter to the MDE explaining
that the Gravel Hill Road site had been deleted from the SWM Plan. (PX 61). That letter
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resulted in an eight-month delay in MDE’s review of MRA’s application for a permit, which
otherwise would have been issued in late 1990. (Exhibit H, 4-10-2018 PM Trial Tr. at 12:8-13).
Although the Circuit Court for Harford County invalidated Resolution 4-90, the eight-
month delay in review of MRA’s permit gave the County time to develop the following scheme
to prevent MRA from operating a rubblefill: (1) Bill 91-10, introduced “as an emergency
measure so that it could take affect [sic] before MDE issued a permit to MRA” (PX128, Par. 72),
changed the zoning requirements for rubblefills that did not have an MDE permit by February
12, 1991; (2) Bill 91-16, introduced as emergency legislation, authorized the County Council to
remove a property if it did not have its MDE permit within 18 months of being placed in the
SWM Plan; and (3) Resolution 15-91, deleted MRA’s property from the SWM Plan because it
did not have its MDE permit within 18 months. (PX 77, PX 78, PX 88). Of course, the only
reason MRA did not have its MDE permit in time was because the County passed and used an
illegal resolution to interfere with MRA’s permit application – thereby delaying the issuance of
the permit long enough to ensure that the rubblefill could never comply with the new zoning
requirements.
IV. CONCLUSION
The County’s Petition fails to meet the standards for granting a writ of certiorari prior to
the CSA’s review. Accordingly, this Court should deny its Petition.
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Respectfully submitted,
16
CERTIFICATION OF WORD COUNT AND
COMPLIANCE WITH MARYLAND RULE 8-112
1. This Answer contains 4,770 words, excluding the parts exempted from the word
2. This Answer complies with the font, spacing, and type size requirements stated in
/s/Nicole M. Kozlowski
Nicole M. Kozlowski
17
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 17th day of September, 2018, a copy of the foregoing
Answer to Petition for Certiorari was delivered via MDEC and First Class Mail to:
Andrew H. Baida
Benjamin Rosenberg
Jamar Brown
Rosenberg Martin Greenberg LLP
25 South Charles Street, 21st Floor
Baltimore, MD 21201
abaida@rosenbergmartin.com
brosenberg@rosenbergmartin.com
jbrown@rosenbergmartin.com
/s/Nicole M. Kozlowski_________
Nicole M. Kozlowski