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9/11/2018 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 463
652 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Larrañaga
*
G.R. Nos. 138874-75. July 21, 2005.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

FRANCISCO JUAN LARRAÑAGA alias “PACO”; JOSMAN
AZNAR; ROWEN ADLAWAN alias “WESLEY”; ALBERTO
CAÑO alias “ALLAN PAHAK”; ARIEL BALANSAG,
DAVIDSON VALIENTE RUSIA alias “TISOY TAGALOG”;
JAMES ANTHONY UY alias “WANGWANG”; and JAMES
ANDREW UY alias “MM”, accused-appellants.
Motions for Reconsideration; The filing of a motion for reconsideration

does not impose on the Supreme Court the obligation to discuss and rule
again on the grounds relied upon by the movant which are mere reiteration
of the issues previously raised and thoroughly determined and evaluated in
the Court’s Decision being questioned.—At the inception, let it be
emphasized that the filing of a motion for reconsideration does not impose
on us the obligation to discuss and rule again on the grounds relied upon by
the movant which are mere reiteration of the issues previously raised and
thoroughly determined and evaluated in our Decision being questioned. In
Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership vs. Velasco, we ruled that, “this
would be a useless formality of ritual invariably involving merely a
reiteration of the reasons already set forth in the judgment or final order for
rejecting the arguments advanced by the movant.”
Criminal Law; In deciding a criminal case, the policy of the courts is
always to look at the case in its entirety.—In deciding a criminal case, the
policy of the courts is always to look at the case in
_______________
* EN BANC.
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its entirety. The totality of the evidence presented by both the prosecution
and the defense are weighed, thus, averting general conclusions from
isolated pieces of evidence. This means that an appeal of a criminal case
opens its entire records for review.
Same; Evidence; Physical evidence is one of the highest degrees of
proof—it speaks more eloquently than all witnesses put together.—We
reiterate our pronouncement in our Decision that what makes Rusia’s
testimony worthy of belief is its striking compatibility with the physical
evidence. Physical evidence is one of the highest degrees of proof. It speaks
more eloquently than all witnesses put together. The presence of Marijoy’s
ravished body in a deep ravine at Tan-awan, Carcar with tape on her
mouth and handcuffs on her wrists certainly bolstered Rusia’s
testimony on what actually took place from Ayala Center to Tan-awan.
Indeed, the details he supplied to the trial court are of such nature and
quality that only a witness who actually saw the commission of the crimes
could furnish. Reinforcing his testimony is its corroboration by several other
witnesses who saw incidents of what he narrated. Rolando Dacillo and
Mario Minoza witnessed Jacqueline’s two failed attempts to escape from
appellants near Ayala Center. Benjamin Molina and Miguel Vergara
recognized Rowen as the person who inquired from them where he could
find a vehicle for hire on the evening of July 16, 1997. Alfredo Duarte saw
Rowen when he bought barbeque and Tanduay at Nene’s Store while the
white van, driven by Caño, was waiting on the side of the road and he heard
voices of “quarreling male and female” emanating from the van. And lastly,
Manuel Camingao and Rosendo Rio testified on the presence of
Larrañaga and Josman at Tan-awan, Carcar at dawn of July 17, 1997. All
these bits and pieces of story form part of Rusia’s narration. Now, with such
strong anchorage on the physical evidence and the testimonies of
disinterested witnesses, why should we not accord credence to Rusia’s
testimony? Even assuming that his testimony standing alone might indeed
be unworthy of belief in view of his character, it is not so when considered
with the other evidence presented by the prosecution.
Same; Alibi; Settled is the rule that the defense of alibi is inherently
weak and crumbles in the light of positive declarations of truthful witnesses
who testified on affirmative matters.—Appellants likewise claimed that we
should have not sustained the trial court’s
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rejection of their alibi. Settled is the rule that the defense of alibi is
inherently weak and crumbles in the light of positive declarations of truthful
witnesses who testified on affirmative matters. Being evidence that is
negative in nature and self-serving, it cannot attain more credibility than the
testimonies of prosecution witnesses who testify on clear and positive
evidence. On top of its inherent weakness, alibi becomes less plausible as a
defense when it is corroborated only by relatives or close friends of the
accused. This case presents to us a balance scale whereby perched on one
end is appellants’ alibi supported by witnesses who were either their
relatives, friends or classmates, while on the other end is the positive
identification of the herein appellants by the prosecution witnesses who
were not, in any way, related to the victims. With the above jurisprudence as
guide, we are certain that the balance must tilt in favor of the latter.
MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION of a decision of the

Supreme Court.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Arroyo, Chua, Caedo & Coronel and Sedfrey Ordoñez for F.
Juan Larrañaga.
Chavez, Miranda, Aseoche Law Offices for Josman Aznar.
Eric S. Carin for James Andrew S. Uy and James Anthony S.
Uy.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
At bar are four (4) motions for reconsideration separately filed by

appellants (1) Francisco Juan Larrañaga, (2) Josman Aznar, (3)
Rowen Adlawan, Alberto Caño and Ariel Balansag, and (4) James
Anthony Uy and James Andrew Uy, assailing our Decision dated
February 3, 2004 convicting them of the crimes of (a) special
complex crime of kidnapping and serious
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VOL. 463, JULY 21, 2005 655

illegal detention and (b) simple kidnapping and serious illegal

detention, the dispositive portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Cebu

City in Criminal Cases Nos. CBU-45303 and 45304 is AFFIRMED with
the following MODIFICATIONS:
(1) In Criminal Case No. CBU-45303, appellants FRANCISCO

JUAN LARRAÑAGA alias ‘PACO;’ JOSMAN AZNAR;
ROWEN ADLAWAN alias ‘WESLEY;’ ALBERTO CAÑO alias
‘ALLAN PAHAK;’ ARIEL BALANSAG; and JAMES
ANDREW UY alias ‘MM,’ are found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious
illegal detention with homicide and rape and are sentenced to suffer
the penalty of DEATH by lethal injection;
(2) In Criminal Case No. CBU-45304, appellants FRANCISCO
JUAN LARRAÑAGA alias ‘PACO;’ JOSMAN AZNAR;
ROWEN ADLAWAN alias ‘WESLEY;’ ALBERTO CAÑO alias
‘ALLAN PAHAK;’ ARIEL BALANSAG; and JAMES
ANDREW UY alias ‘MM,’ are found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of simple kidnapping and serious illegal
detention and are sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA;
(3) In Criminal Case No. CBU-45303, appellant JAMES ANTHONY
UY, who was a minor at the time the crime was committed, is
likewise found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special
complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with
homicide and rape and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
RECLUSION PERPETUA; in Criminal Case No. CBU-45304, he
is declared guilty of simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention
and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of TWELVE (12) years of
prision mayor in its maximum period, as MINIMUM, to seventeen
(17) years of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as
MAXIMUM;
(4) Appellants are ordered to pay jointly and severally the heirs of
Marijoy and Jacqueline, in each case, the amounts of (a)
P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, (b) P25,000.00 as temperate
damages, (c) P150,000.00 as moral damages, and (d) P100,000.00
as exemplary damages.
Three (3) Justices of the Court maintain their position that RA 7659 is
unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the death penalty;
656

nevertheless, they submit to the ruling of the majority that the law is
constitutional and the death penalty can be lawfully imposed in the case at
bar.
In accordance with Article 83 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended
by Section 25 of RA No. 7659, upon the finality of this Decision, let the
records of this case be forthwith forwarded to the Office of the President for
the possible exercise of Her Excellency’s pardoning power.
SO ORDERED.”
Appellants anchor their motions on the following grounds:
A. LARRAÑAGA
“I
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN BARRING LARRAÑAGA AND THE

NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (NBI) REGIONAL DIRECTOR
FLORENCIO VILLARIN FROM TESTIFYING;
II
THE POLICE PLANTED EVIDENCE ON APPELLANTS;
III
LARRAÑAGA SUFFICIENTLY PROVED HIS ALIBI;
IV
THE TRIAL COURT PREVENTED THE INTRODUCTION OF KEY

DEFENSE EVIDENCE;
THE CORPSE FOUND IN THE RAVINE WAS NOT THAT OF MARIJOY;

AND
VI
1
PROSECUTION WITNESS RUSIA WAS A COACHED WITNESS.”
_______________
1 As summarized by the Solicitor General, Rollo at p. 1881. It was filed on March 4, 2004.
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VOL. 463, JULY 21, 2005 657

B. AZNAR
“I
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT

DID NOT VIOLATE THE RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED TO DUE PROCESS OF
LAW.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN (A) DISCHARGING DAVID RUSSIA

AS STATE WITNESS; AND (B) CONVICTING THE APPELLANTS MAINLY
ON THE BASIS OF THE TESTIMONY OF RUSIA.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN REJECTING THE DEFENSE OF

APPELLANT AZNAR.
IV
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING THE DEATH PENALTY

2
ON THE APPELLANTS.”
C. ADLAWAN, BALANSAG, CAÑO
“I
PROSECUTION WITNESS RUSIA IS NOT QUALIFIED TO BE A STATE

WITNESS UNDER PARAGRAPHS (D) AND (E), SECTION 17 OF THE
REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE.
II
RUSIA’S TESTIMONY AND THAT OF THE OTHER PROSECUTION

WITNESSES WERE INCREDIBLE, INCONSISTENT, AND UNWORTHY OF
BELIEF.
III
BIAS AND PREJUDICE AGAINST THE DEFENSE WERE GLARINGLY

DISPLAYED BY THE COURT A QUO WHICH GREATLY AFFECTED THE
OUTCOME OF THE CASE.
_______________
2 Rollo at p. 1517. It was filed on March 5, 2004.
658

IV
THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS FOR THE CRIME CHARGED

3
HAS NOT BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.”
D. JAMES ANDREW AND JAMES ANTHONY UY
“I
ACCUSED JAMES ANDREW S. UY WAS, LIKE HIS YOUNGER BROTHER

JAMES ANTHONY S. UY, A MINOR AT THE TIME THE OFFENSES AT BAR
ALLEGEDLY HAPPENED LAST JULY 16, 1997;
II
THE IDENTITY OF THE DEAD BODY OF THE WOMAN FOUND IN TAN-

AWAN, CARCAR, CEBU LAST JULY 18, 1997 WAS NEVER CONCLUSIVELY
ESTABLISHED THUS THE NEED FOR ITS EXHUMATION FOR DNA
4
TESTING;”
In his supplemental motion for reconsideration dated March 25, 2004,

Larrañaga submitted a separate study of Dr. Racquel Del Rosario-Fortun,
Forensic Pathologist, to show that the examination conducted by the
prosecution expert witnesses on the body found in Tan-awan, Carcar is
inadequate.
5
In a similar supplemental motion for reconsideration, Aznar submitted
to this Court the Affidavit dated February 27, 2004 of Atty. Florencio
Villarin, Regional Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, Central
Visayas, to show that: (1) the police investigation of this case was flawed;
(2) he (Aznar) was arrested in 1997 not because of his involvement in this
case but because he had in his possession a pack of
_______________
3 Id., at p. 1480. It was filed on March 3, 2004.

4 Id., at p. 1789. It was filed on March 23, 2004.
5 Dated May 5, 2004, Id., at pp. 1841-1845.
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VOL. 463, JULY 21, 2005 659

shabu and firearms; and (3) David Rusia is not a credible witness.
6
On July 15, 2004, the Solicitor General filed a consolidated comment
praying that the four (4) motions for reconsideration be denied with finality,
there being no new argument raised. He responded to appellants’
assignments of errors by exhaustively quoting portions of our challenged
Decision.
7
In his consolidated comment to Aznar’s supplemental motion for
reconsideration, the Solicitor General enumerated the grounds why Atty.
Villarin’s Affidavit should not be given consideration. On February 15,
2005, Aznar filed a reply alleging that the Solicitor General “read out of
context” certain portions of the Affidavit. He argued that the Affidavit only
exposes the flawed investigation of the Chiong case and that, at the time of
his arrest, there was no evidence against him. On March 4, 2005, the
Solicitor General filed a rejoinder stating that Aznar’s reply “actually
supports the undersigned counsel’s (Solicitor General’s) position that Atty.
Villarin’s Affidavit is utterly inadequate to prove his innocence or at least
even acquit them on reasonable doubt,” thus, “it would be useless to call for
new trial on the basis of such Affidavit.” On March 29, 2005, Aznar filed a
sur-rejoinder insisting that the Affidavit should be given due consideration.
Except for the motion filed by appellants Uy brothers with respect to
James Andrew’s alleged minority, we find all the motions bereft of merit.
At the inception, let it be emphasized that the filing of a motion for
reconsideration does not impose on us the obligation to discuss and rule
again on the grounds relied upon by the movant which are mere reiteration
of the issues previously raised and thoroughly determined and evaluated in
our Decision being questioned. In Ortigas and Company Limited
_______________
6 Id., at pp. 1879-1924.

7 It was filed on January 12, 2005.
660

8
Partnership vs. Velasco, we ruled that, “this would be a useless formality of
ritual invariably involving merely a reiteration of the reasons already set
forth in the judgment or final order for rejecting the arguments advanced by
the movant.”
The foregoing principle applies squarely to the motions filed by
appellants Larrañaga, Aznar, Adlawan, Caño and Balansag, it being
apparent that the points raised therein are not neoteric matters demanding
new judicial determination. They are mere rehash of the arguments set forth
in their respective briefs which we already considered, weighed and
resolved before we rendered the Decision sought to be reconsidered.
However, in view of the severity of the penalties for the crimes charged,
we deem it necessary to stress once more our basis in convicting appellants.
The following is a prècis of the issues submitted by appellants in their
motions:
This Court erred—
first, in according credence to Rusia’s testimony;
second, in rejecting appellants’ alibi;
third, in holding that the trial court did not violate their right to due
process when it excluded the testimony of other defense witnesses; and
fourth, in holding that the body found in Tan-awan, Carcar was not that
of Marijoy.
In deciding a criminal case, the policy of the courts is always to look at
the case in its entirety. The totality of the evidence presented by both the
prosecution and the defense are weighed, thus, averting general conclusions
from isolated
_______________
8 G.R. No. 109645, March 4, 1996, 254 SCRA 234.
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VOL. 463, JULY 21, 2005 661

pieces of evidence. This means that an appeal of a criminal case opens its
9
entire records for review.
Appellants vigorously contend that we should not have sustained Rusia’s

testimony hook, line and sinker, owing to his tainted record and reputation.
However, it must be stressed that Rusia’s testimony was not viewed in
isolation. In giving credence to Rusia’s testimony, the trial court took into
consideration the physical evidence and the corroborative testimonies of
other witnesses. Thus, we find no reason why we should not uphold the trial
court’s findings.
We reiterate our pronouncement in our Decision that what makes Rusia’s
testimony worthy of belief is its striking compatibility with the physical
evidence. Physical evidence is one of the highest degrees of proof. It speaks
10
more eloquently than all witnesses put together. The presence of Marijoy’s
ravished body in a deep ravine at Tan-awan, Carcar with tape on her mouth
and handcuffs on her wrists certainly bolstered Rusia’s testimony on what
actually took place from Ayala Center to Tan-awan. Indeed, the details he
supplied to the trial court are of such nature and quality that only a witness
who actually saw the commission of the crimes could furnish. Reinforcing
his testimony is its corroboration by several other witnesses who saw
incidents of what he narrated. Rolando Dacillo and Mario Minoza witnessed
Jacqueline’s two failed attempts to escape from appellants near Ayala
Center. Benjamin Molina and Miguel Vergara recognized Rowen as the
person who inquired from them where he could find a vehicle
_______________
9 Obosa v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 114350, January 16, 1997, 266 SCRA 281.
10 People. v. Bardaje, G.R. No. L-29271; August 29, 1980, 99 SCRA 3881; People v.
Bermas, G.R. Nos. 76416 and 94312, July 5, 1999, 309 SCRA 741; People v. Sacabin, G.R.
No. L-36638, June 28, 1974, 57 SCRA 707; People v. Demeterio, G.R. No. L-48255,
September 30, 1983, 124 SCRA 914.
662

for hire on the evening of July 16, 1997. Alfredo Duarte saw Rowen when
he bought barbeque and Tanduay at Nene’s Store while the white van,
driven by Caño, was waiting on the side of the road and he heard voices of
“quarreling male and female” emanating from the van. And lastly, Manuel
Camingao and Rosendo Rio testified on the presence of Larrañaga and
Josman at Tan-awan, Carcar at dawn of July 17, 1997. All these bits and
pieces of story form part of Rusia’s narration. Now, with such strong
anchorage on the physical evidence and the testimonies of disinterested
witnesses, why should we not accord credence to Rusia’s testimony? Even
assuming that his testimony standing alone might indeed be unworthy of
belief in view of his character, it is not so when considered with the other
evidence presented by the prosecution.
II
Appellants likewise claimed that we should have not sustained the trial
court’s rejection of their alibi. Settled is the rule that the defense of alibi is
inherently weak and crumbles in the light of positive declarations of truthful
11
witnesses who testified on affirmative matters. Being evidence that is
negative in nature and self-serving, it cannot attain more credibility than the
testimonies of prosecution witnesses who testify on clear and positive
12
evidence. On top of its inherent weakness, alibi becomes less plausible as
a defense when it is corroborated only by relatives or close friends of the
13
accused.
This case presents to us a balance scale whereby perched on one end is
appellants’ alibi supported by witnesses who
_______________
11 People vs. Rollon, G.R. No. 131915, September 3, 2003, 410 SCRA 295.
12 Ibid.
13 People v. Datingginoo, G.R. No. 95539, June 14, 1993, 223 SCRA 331; People v.
Abatayo, G.R. No. 139456, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 562.
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VOL. 463, JULY 21, 2005 663

were either their relatives, friends or classmates, while on the other end is
the positive identification of the herein appellants by the prosecution
witnesses who were not, in any way, related to the victims. With the above
jurisprudence as guide, we are certain that the balance must tilt in favor of
the latter.
Besides, a thorough examination of the evidence for the prosecution
shows that the appellants failed to meet the requirements of alibi, i.e., the
14
requirements of time and place. They failed to establish by clear and
convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for them to be at the
Ayala Center, Cebu City when the Chiong sisters were abducted. What is
clear from the evidence is that Rowen, Josman, Ariel, Alberto, James
Anthony and James Andrew were all within the vicinity of Cebu City on
July 16, 1997.
Not even Larrañaga who claimed to be in Quezon City satisfied the
required proof of physical impossibility. During the hearing, it was shown
that it takes only one (1) hour to travel by plane from Manila to Cebu and
that there are four (4) airline companies plying the route. One of the defense
witnesses admitted that there are several flights from Manila to Cebu each
morning, afternoon and evening. Indeed, Larrañaga’s presence in Cebu City
on July 16, 1997 was proved to be not only a possibility but a reality. Four
(4) witnesses identified Larrañaga as one of the two men talking to Marijoy
and Jacqueline on the night of July 16, 1997. Shiela Singson testified that on
July 16, 1997, at around 7:20 in the evening, she saw Larrañaga approach
Marijoy and Jacqueline at the West Entry of Ayala Center. The incident
reminded her of Jacqueline’s prior story that he was Marijoy’s admirer.
Shiela confirmed that she knows Larrañaga since she had seen him on five
(5) occasions. Analie Konahap also testified that on the same evening of July
16, 1997, at about 8:00 o’clock, she saw Marijoy and Jacqueline talking to
two (2) men at the West
_______________
14 People vs. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 108180, February 8, 1994, 229 SCRA 754.
664

Entry of Ayala Center. She recognized the two (2) men as Larrañaga and
Josman, having seen them several times at Glicos, a game zone, located
across her office at the third level of Ayala Center. Williard Redobles, the
security guard then assigned at Ayala Center, corroborated the foregoing
testimonies of Shiela and Analie. In addition, Rosendo Rio, a businessman
from Cogon, Carcar, declared that he saw Larrañaga at Tan-awan at about
3:30 in the morning of July 17, 1997. The latter was leaning against the
15
hood of a white van. And over and above all, Rusia categorically identified
Larrañaga as one of the participes criminis.
Taking the individual testimonies of the above witnesses in relation with
that of Rusia, we are convinced that Larrañaga was indeed in Cebu City at
the time of the commission of the crimes and was one of the principal
perpetrators thereof.
At this juncture, it bears mentioning that this case is not the first time that
Larrañaga was charged with or complained of pruriently assaulting young
female students in Cebu. Months before the abduction of Marijoy and
Jackie, the parents of a certain Rochelle Virtucio, complained about
Larrañaga’s attempt to snatch their young daughter and drag her in a black,
stylish Honda Civic. It happened just near the gate of Rochelle’s school,
thus, showing his impudence. We quote a portion of the transcript of
stenographic notes dated September 23, 1998, thus:
“ATTY. HERMOSISIMA:
Your Honor please, this is a . . . . Inspector Era handed to this representation a

copy of a Letter dated September 25, 1996, addressed to the Student Affairs Office,
University of San Carlos, P. del Rosario Street, Cebu City, and this is signed by Leo
Abayan and Alexander Virtucio and noted by Mrs. Aurora Pacho, Principal,
University of San Carlos, Girls High School, and for the record, I will read the
content:
_______________
15 TSN, September 15, 1998 at pp. 26-47.
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VOL. 463, JULY 21, 2005 665

TO WHOM THIS MAY CONCERN:
We the parents and guardians of Rochelle Virtucio, a first year high school
student of your University of San Carlos-Girls High School, are writing your
good office about an untoward incident involving our daughter and another
student of your school.
x x x x x x
That last Monday at around 5:00 PM, Rochelle and other classmates,
Michelle Amadar and Keizaneth Mondejar, while on their way to get a ride
home near the school campus, a black Honda Civic with five young male
teenagers including the driver, suddenly stopped beside them, and
simultaneously one of them, which was later identified as FRANCISCO JUAN
LARRAÑAGA, a BSHRM I student of your school, grabbed Rochelle by her
hand to try to get Rochelle to their vehicle. She resisted and got away from him.
Sensing some people were watching what they were doing, they hurriedly sped
away.
We are very concerned about Rochelle’s safety. Still now, she is suffering the
shock and tension that she is not supposed to experience in her young life. It is
16
very hard for us parents to think about what she’d been through.”
The presence of such complaint in the record of this case certainly does not
enhance Larrañaga’s chance of securing an acquittal.
III
Larrañaga and Aznar bewail our refusal to overturn the trial court’s
exclusion of Professor Jerome Bailen and Atty. Florencio Villarin, NBI,
Regional Director, as defense witnesses. Professor Bailen was properly
excluded. First, he is not a finger-print expert but an archaeologist. And
second,his
_______________
16 At pp. 43-46.
666

report consists merely of the results of his visual inspection of the exhibits
already several months old. Anent Atty. Villarin’s failure to testify before
the trial court, suffice it to say that his belated Affidavit, which Aznar
submitted via his supplemental motion for reconsideration dated May 5,
2004, raises nothing to change our findings and conclusions. What clearly
appears in said Affidavit is a man trying to impress people that he was the
one responsible for solving the Chiong case and for that, he deserves a
promotion. The trial court, at the onset, must have seen such immateriality
in his intended testimony. Indeed, we agree with the Solicitor General’s
observation that such Affidavit “is neither helpful nor encouraging to
Aznar’s cause.” We quote his keen reflection on the matter:
“x x x x x x
Third. Atty. Villarin’s affidavit, in paragraphs 19 and 20 thereof, acknowledged
that the body found in the Carcar ravine was that of Marijoy. This assertion
immediately conflicts with accused-appellant Aznar’s claim in his Motion for
Reconsideration that the corpse was not Marijoy’s. Surely, something is amiss in
accused-appellant Aznar’s recollection of his defense.
Fourth. Atty. Villarin confirmed in paragraph 24 of his affidavit that accused-
appellant Francisco Larrañaga was a suspect in the subject crimes. Evidently, this
statement completely supports this Honorable Court’s findings in its Decision dated
February 3, 2004.
Fifth. In paragraph 30 of Atty. Villarin’s affidavit, he stated that: ‘The arrest of
Juzman Aznar was the major breakthrough in the investigation of the case
because witnesses came out and identified Juzman Aznar as one of those
allegedly seen talking to the victims on the night they disappeared.’ Hence,
accused-appellant Aznar was in the beginning already a first-grade suspect in the
Chiong sisters’ celebrated abduction and killing.
Sixth. Atty. Villarin admitted in paragraph 36 of his affidavit that: ‘x x x I did not
take this against [Supt. Labra] for preempting our next move to get Juzman
Aznar as we were already placing him under surveillance because I knew [Supt.
Labra] did it in his honest desire to help solve the
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VOL. 463, JULY 21, 2005 667

crime x x x.’ Clearly, this statement is not an indictment of the investigation that the
police undertook in the subject crimes.
Seventh. Paragraphs 37 to 40 are nothing but personal tirades against alleged
influence peddling by Mrs. Thelma Chiong, mother of the victims, and the
purportedly undue promotions of the lawyers and police officers who unearthed the
evidence against accused-appellants and successfully prosecuted the latter. In
executing the affidavit, it appears that Atty. Villarin would want to impress that
he, rather than those promoted, deserved the promotion.
Eighth. Atty. Villarin’s inability to testify in the criminal cases was not due solely
to the prosecution’s action. Whether he ought to testify or not was an argument
openly discussed in court. Hence, for the resulting inability, Atty. Villarin has no one
to blame but the defense lawyers who did everything to make a mockery of the
criminal proceedings.
And lastly, there is nothing in Atty. Villarin’s affidavit of the quality of a
“smoking gun” that would acquit accused-appellants of the crimes they have been
convicted. For he did not finish the police investigation of the subject crimes; this is
the long and short of his miniscule role in the instant case. Indeed, judging by the
substance of his affidavit, he would not be testifying in case a new trial is held
on anything that has not been said and rejected heretofore, except his own
unsubstantiated opinions (i.e. not facts as required by evidentiary rules), his
self-congratulatory remarks, and his unmitigated frustration over failing to get
17
a promotion when almost everyone else did.”
Neither can we entertain at this late stage Dr. Fortun’s separate study to
show that the examination conducted on the body found in Tan-awan,
Carcar is inadequate. Such study cannot be classified as newly-discovered
evidence warranting belated reception. Obviously, Larrañaga could have
produced it during trial had he wished to.
_______________
17 Consolidated Comment of the Office of the Solicitor General, at pp. 2-4.
668

IV
Knowing that the prosecution’s theory highly rests on the truth of Rusia’
testimony, appellants endeavor to destroy it by claiming that the body found
at the foot of a deep ravine in Tan-awan, Carcar was not that of Marijoy. We
must reiterate the reasons why we cannot give our assent to such argument.
18
First, Inspector Edgardo Lenizo, a fingerprint expert, testified that the
19
fingerprints of the corpse match those of Marijoy. Second, the packaging
tape and the handcuff found on the dead body were the same items placed
20
on Marijoy and Jacqueline while they were being detained. Third, the body
21
had the same clothes worn by Marijoy on the day she was abducted. And
fourth, the members of the Chiong family personally identified the corpse to
22
be that of Marijoy which they eventually buried. They erected
commemorative markers at the ravine, cemetery and every place which
mattered to Marijoy. As a matter of fact, at this very moment, appellants still

fail to bring to the attention of this Court any person laying a claim on the
said body. Surely, if the body was not that of Marijoy, other families who
had lost someone of similar age and gender as Marijoy would have surfaced
and claimed the body. The above circumstances only bolster Rusia’s
narration that Rowen and Ariel pushed Marijoy into the deep ravine,
following Josman’s instruction “to get rid” of her.
_______________
18 Inspector Lenizo finished Law and Criminology. He worked for the crime laboratory of
the Philippine National Police where he was trained in finger-print examination and where he
conducted around 500 finger-print examinations, 30 of which involved dead persons. At the
time he testified, Inspector Lenizo was head of the Fingerprint Identification Branch of the PNP
Crime Laboratory, Region 7.
19 TSN, September 22, 1998 at pp. 31-40.
20 See also TSN, September 23, 1998 at pp. 13, 20.
21 TSN, August 18, 1998 at p. 62; August 19, 1998 at p. 115; September 23, 1998 at pp. 13,
20.
22 TSN, August 18, 1998 at p. 62; August 19, 1998 at pp. 57, 60.
669
VOL. 463, JULY 21, 2005 669

On the issue raised by appellants Uy brothers that James Andrew was only
seventeen (17) years and two hundred sixty two (262) days old at the time
the crimes were committed, the records bear that on March 1, 1999, James
Andrew’s birth certificate was submitted to the trial court as part of the
23
Formal Offer of Additional Evidence, with the statement that he was
eighteen (18) years old. On March 18, 1999, appellants filed a Manifestation
of Erratum correcting in part the Formal Offer of Additional Evidence by
24
alleging that James Andrew was only seventeen (17) years old.
Now, James Andrew begs leave and prays that this Court admits at this
stage of the proceedings his (1) Certificate of Live Birth issued by the
National Statistics Office, and (2) Baptismal Certificate. He prays that his
penalty be reduced, as in the case of his brother James Anthony.
The entry of James Andrew’s birth in the Birth Certificate is not legible,
thus it is extremely difficult for us to determine the veracity of his claim.
However, considering that minority is a significant factor in the imposition
of penalty, we find it proper to require the Solicitor General (a) to secure
from the Local Civil Registrar of Cotobato City, as well as the National
Statistics Office, a clear and legible copy of James Andrew’s Birth
Certificate, and thereafter, (b) to file an extensive comment on the motion for
reconsideration filed by James Andrew and James Anthony Uy, solely on
James Andrews’ claim of minority.
Insofar as James Anthony is concerned, we maintain his conviction and
penalty, there being nothing in his motion which warrants a reconsideration
of our Decision.
In resolving the instant motions, we have embarked on this painstaking
task of evaluating every piece and specie of evidence presented before the
trial court in response to appellants’ plea for the reversal of their conviction.
But, even the
_______________
23 Rollo, at p. 1894.
24 Id., at p. 1948.
670

element of reasonable doubt so seriously sought by appellants is an ignis

fatuus which has eluded any intelligent ratiocination of their submissions.
Verily, our conscience can rest easy on our affirmance of the verdict of the
trial court, in light of appellants’ clear culpability which demands
retribution.
WHEREFORE, the motions for reconsideration filed by appellants
Francisco Juan Larrañaga, Josman Aznar, Rowen Adlawan, Alberto Caño
and Ariel Balansag are hereby DENIED. The Solicitor General is
DIRECTED (a) to secure from the Local Civil Registrar of Cotobato City,
as well as the National Statistics Office, a clear and legible copy of James
Andrew’s Birth Certificate, and (b) within ten (10) days therefrom, to file an
extensive comment on the motion for reconsideration filed by James
Andrew and James Anthony Uy, solely on James Andrews’ claim of
minority. The motion is likewise DENIED insofar as James Anthony Uy is
concerned.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-

Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr.,
Tinga, Chico-Nazario and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr. (C.J.), No Part (Victims related to Mrs. Davide).
Azcuna, J., I take no part (former partner of counsel).
Motions of Francisco Juan Larrañaga, Josman Aznar, Rowen Adlawan,

Alberto Caño, Ariel Balansag and James Anthony Uy denied. Solicitor
General directed to secure copy of James Andrew Uy’s Birth Certificate
from Local Civil Registrar of Cotabato City and National Statistics Office.
Notes.—That something improbable can happen is always possible.

(People vs. Madera, 415 SCRA 16 [2003])
671
VOL. 463, JULY 21, 2005 671

Vda. de Gualberto vs. Go
In a rape case, the physical evidence showing use of force speaks louder
than words. (People vs. Dagami, 415 SCRA 482 [2003])
——o0o——
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9/11/2018 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 463

652 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

Motions for Reconsideration; The ﬁling of a motion for reconsideration

VOL. 463, JULY 21, 2005 653

654 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Larrañaga

MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION of a decision of the

The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.

At bar are four (4) motions for reconsideration separately ﬁled by

VOL. 463, JULY 21, 2005 655

illegal detention and (b) simple kidnapping and serious illegal

“WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Cebu

(1) In Criminal Case No. CBU-45303, appellants FRANCISCO

656 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Appellants anchor their motions on the following grounds:

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN BARRING LARRAÑAGA AND THE

THE POLICE PLANTED EVIDENCE ON APPELLANTS;

LARRAÑAGA SUFFICIENTLY PROVED HIS ALIBI;

THE TRIAL COURT PREVENTED THE INTRODUCTION OF KEY

THE CORPSE FOUND IN THE RAVINE WAS NOT THAT OF MARIJOY;

VOL. 463, JULY 21, 2005 657

THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT

THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN (A) DISCHARGING DAVID RUSSIA

THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN REJECTING THE DEFENSE OF

THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING THE DEATH PENALTY

C. ADLAWAN, BALANSAG, CAÑO

PROSECUTION WITNESS RUSIA IS NOT QUALIFIED TO BE A STATE

RUSIA’S TESTIMONY AND THAT OF THE OTHER PROSECUTION

BIAS AND PREJUDICE AGAINST THE DEFENSE WERE GLARINGLY

2 Rollo at p. 1517. It was ﬁled on March 5, 2004.

658 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS FOR THE CRIME CHARGED

D. JAMES ANDREW AND JAMES ANTHONY UY

ACCUSED JAMES ANDREW S. UY WAS, LIKE HIS YOUNGER BROTHER

THE IDENTITY OF THE DEAD BODY OF THE WOMAN FOUND IN TAN-

In his supplemental motion for reconsideration dated March 25, 2004,

3 Id., at p. 1480. It was ﬁled on March 3, 2004.

VOL. 463, JULY 21, 2005 659

6 Id., at pp. 1879-1924.

660 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

VOL. 463, JULY 21, 2005 661

Appellants vigorously contend that we should not have sustained Rusia’s

662 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

VOL. 463, JULY 21, 2005 663

664 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Your Honor please, this is a . . . . Inspector Era handed to this representation a

15 TSN, September 15, 1998 at pp. 26-47.

VOL. 463, JULY 21, 2005 665

TO WHOM THIS MAY CONCERN:

666 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

VOL. 463, JULY 21, 2005 667

17 Consolidated Comment of the Ofﬁce of the Solicitor General, at pp. 2-4.

668 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

mattered to Marijoy. As a matter of fact, at this very moment, appellants still

VOL. 463, JULY 21, 2005 669

670 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

element of reasonable doubt so seriously sought by appellants is an ignis

Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-

Motions of Francisco Juan Larrañaga, Josman Aznar, Rowen Adlawan,

Notes.—That something improbable can happen is always possible.

VOL. 463, JULY 21, 2005 671

Vda. de Gualberto vs. Go