NRMC 306 Respondent

NRMC-306
THIRD PROF. N.R. MADHAVA MERNON SAARC MOOTING COMPETITION, 2017-18 (INDIA
ROUNDS)
ON SUBMISSION TO THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF EDEN
UNDER ARTICLE 136 r/w 145(3) OF THE CONSTITUTION OF EDEN
In the Matter of :
People’s Cause and Others ..................................................................Petitioner
v.
The Government of Eden ..................................................................... Respondent
And
Mrs. K.....................................................................................................Petitioner
v.
Union of Eden and The Hon’ble Speaker of House of People .......... Respondent
And
Mr. X .....................................................................................................Petitioner
v.
Union of Eden and Another ................................................................. Respondent
WRIT PETITION NOS. ___/2017
CLUBBED WITH
WRIT PETITION NOS. ___/2017, ___/2017
MEMORIAL FOR THE RESPONDENT

ii
THIRD PROF. N.R. MADHAVA MENON SAARC MOOTING COMPETITION 2017-18: INDIA ROUNDS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES .............................................................................................................. iv-xiii
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION .................................................................................................... xiv
STATEMENT OF FACTS ................................................................................................................. xiv-xvi
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ................................................................................................................ xvii
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS ......................................................................................................... xvii-xviii
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED .............................................................................................................. 1-25
1. PRELIMINARY JURISDICTION FOR PETITIONS IS INADEQUATE ...................................... 1-5
1.1 Court Cannot Interfere in Legislative Proceedings ................................................................. 1-3
1.2 Alternative Relief has not been exhausted .............................................................................. 3-4
1.3 No case against Dr. ‘A’ for defamation .................................................................................. 4-5
2. ARTICLE 102 IS CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID AS IT RESTRICTS JUDICIAL REVIEW ........... 5-10
2.1 The three main organs of the government have to work separately in the federal form for
a strong and healthy democracy .................................................................................................... 6-8
2.2 The three main organs of the government have to work separately in the federal form for
a strong and healthy democracy .................................................................................................... 8-9
2.3 Arguendo, Federalism and Democracy would be in danger with tussle between judiciary
and legislature ............................................................................................................................... 9-10
3. DEFAMATION LAWS UNDER TORT CLAIMS ACT, 2016 ARE IN DIRECT CONFLICT WITH
FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXPRESSION ....................................................................................... 10-12
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3.1 Section 3 clause (1) and clause (2) be struck down on the grounds of over-breadth ............. 10-11
3.2 Applying the Doctrine of Severability, Sec. 2 Clause (c) should be struck down .................. 11-12
3.3. The Definition in Section 2 (k) needs amendment ................................................................ 12
4. RIGHT TO REPUTATION IS NOT AN ABSOLUTE RIGHT ....................................................... 13-20
4.1 Rights under Arts. 21 and 21 D are subject to reasonable restrictions .................................. 13-17
4.2 Absoluteness of reputation as a right harmful for society ...................................................... 17-20
5. RIGHT TO HEALTH NOT A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT; RIGHT TO ACCESS TO
HEALTHCARE SUBJECT TO BEING “PROVIDED BY LAW” AND NOT ABSOLUTE RIGHT ................ 20-25
5.1 Right to health cannot be elevated to the position of human right ......................................... 20-21
5.2 Right to access to health care has to be read with bio-medical researches ............................. 21-22
5.3 Duty of maintenance of health care is distributed and not concentrated one State ................ 23-24
5.4 Permission to companies was given “in principle” only ........................................................ 24
PRAYER ......................................................................................................................................... 25
iii
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
1. A. v. Norway, App. No. 28070/06 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Apr. 9, 2009) ........................................ 16
2.A.P. Dalit Mahasabha v. Govt. of A.P., (1993) 6 A.L.D. 63 ................................................ 22
3.Abeberry v. France (dec.), App. No. 58729/00 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Sept. 21, 2004) ................... 16
4.Akhil Bhartiya Soshit Karmachari Sangh (Railway) v. UOI, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 298 ............ 22
5.Alithia Publ’g Co. v. Cyprus, App. No. 17550/03 (Eur. Ct. H.R. May 22, 2008) ............... 16
6.Ashoka Kumar Thakur v. Union of India , 2008 (56) B.L.J.R. 1292.................................... 13
7.Ashoka Smokeless Coal India (P) Ltd. v. UOI, (2007) 2 S.C.C. 840 ................................... 23
8.Attorney General for Alberta v. Attorney General for Canada, 1947 AC 503 ..................... 11
9.Attorney-General v. Corporation of the City of Adelaide,(2013) 249 CLR 1 ...................... 11
10.Balwant Raj v. UOI, A.I.R. 1968 All. 14 ............................................................................. 22
11.Bandhuva Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, A.I.R 1984 S.C. 802 ...................................... 6
12.Bodrožić v. Serbia, App. No. 32550/05 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 23, 2009) .............................. 16
13.Booth v. Illinois, 1S4 U. S. 425, 22 Sup. Ct. 425, 46 L. Ed. 623 ......................................... 16
14.Bradlaugh v. Gosset, (1884) 12 QBD 271 ........................................................................... 2,8
15.Burdett v. Abbot, (1810) 14 East 1 ..................................................................................... 8
16.Champakam Dorairajan v. State of Madras, A.I.R. 1951 Mad. 120 .................................... 23
17.Chauvy v. France, 2004-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 211, 229 ............................................................. 16
18.Chhabildas Mehta, M.L.A. and ors. v. The Legislative Assembly, Gujarat State and ors.,
(1970)11GLR729 .............................................................................................................. 8
19.Constantineau and Board of Regents v. Roth , 408 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1972) ..................... 14
iv
20.Constantineau v. Grager, 302 F. Supp. 861, 864 (E.D. Wis. 1969) ..................................... 14
21.Cumpănă v. Romania [GC], 2004-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 69, 89 ................................................. 16
22.Delhi Development Authority, N.D. v. Joint Action Committee, A.I.R. 2008 S.C. 1343
........................................................................................................................................... 22
23.Dr. N.M. Prasad v. Director, Shri Jayaveda Institute of Cardioliogy, A.I.R. 1994 Kant.
309..................................................................................................................................... 22
24.Duport Steels Ltd. v. Sirs, [1980] 1 WLR 142 ..................................................................... 6
25.Europapress Holding D.O.O. v. Croatia, App. No. 25333/06 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 22,
2009) ................................................................................................................................ 16
26.Flux v. Moldova (no. 6), App. No. 22824/04 (Eur. Ct. H.R. July 29, 2008) ....................... 16
27.Gadadhan v. State of W.B., A.I.R. 1963 Cal. 565 ................................................................ 23
28.General Secretary, Linguistic Minorities Protection Committee v. State of Karnataka,
A.I.R. 1986 Kant. 226 ....................................................................................................... 23
29.Golaknath v. State of Punjab, A.I.R 1967 S.C. 1643 ........................................................... 6,23
30.Gulam Abbas and ors. v. State of U.P. and ors., A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 1268 ............................. 13
31.Hardwari Lal v. The Election Commission of India, I.L.R. (1977) 2 Punj 269 .................. 8
32.Harish Chandra Singh Rawat v. UOI, Writ Petition (M/S) No. 795 of 2016....................... 1
33.In re I.M.L. v. State of Utah, 61 P.3d 1038 (Utah 2002) ..................................................... 11
34.In re Krishnadas Mandal and ors., A.I.R 1981 Cal. 11 ........................................................ 22
35.In re M. Thomas, A.I.R. 1953 Mad. 31 ................................................................................ 23
36.In the Matter of: Under Article 143 of the Constitution of India , A.I.R.1965 S.C.745.. .... 8
37.Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain , A.I.R 1975 S.C. 2299 ................................................ 6
38.INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).................................................................................... 6
39.Ivanova v. Bulgaria, App. No. 36207/03 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 14, 2008) ............................. 16
40.Ivey v. Alabama, 821 So.2d 937 (Ala. 2001) ....................................................................... 11

v
41.Jackson v. Her Majesty’s Attorney General, [2005] UKHL 56 ........................................... 6
42.Jacqueline Okuta & another v Attorney General & others [2017] eKLR, Kenya Law
website. ............................................................................................................................. 11
43.Jayendra Vishnu Thakur v. State of Maharashtra and Anr., 2009 (II) O.L.R. 161 .............. 13
44.Justice K.S.Puttaswamy (Retd.) and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors., Writ Petition
(Civil) No.494 Of 2012. .................................................................................................... 13
45.K. Rajendran v. State of T.N., A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 1107 ......................................................... 23
46.K.A. Mathialagan v. P. Srinivasan, A.I.R. 1973 Mad. 371 .................................................. 1
47.K.T. Plantation Pvt. Ltd. and anr. v. State of Karnataka, (2011) 9 S.C.C. 1. ....................... 13
48.Kamal R. Khan v. State of Maharashtra, 2009 (4) Bom.C.R. 496 ....................................... 13
49.Karhuvaara v. Finland, 2004-X Eur. Ct. H.R. 263, 274 ....................................................... 16
50.Kesvananda Bharti v. State of Kerala, A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 1461 ............................................. 23
51.Kheybari Tea Co. Ltd. v. State of Assam, A.I.R. 1964 SC 925 ........................................... 11
52.Khurshed Sharfuddin and S. Hafiz Khadar Ibrahim v. IBP Co. Ltd, (2009) 5 M.L.J.
1350................................................................................................................................... 22
53.Kirloskar Brothers Ltd. v. Employees' State Insurance Corpn., A.I.R.1996 S.C. 3261
........................................................................................................................................... 20
54.Kishorkumar Prabhudas Tanna v. State of Gujarat, (2009) 1 G.L.R. 683 ........................... 23
55.Kuliś v. Poland, App. No. 15601/01 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Mar. 18, 2008) ................................... 16
56.Kwiecień v. Poland, App. No. 51744/99 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan. 9, 2007)................................. 16
57.Leempoel v. Belgium, App. No. 64772/01 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 9, 2006) ........................... 16
58.Leonard Hector v. Attorney General of Antiqua and Barbuda, (1990) 2 A.C. 312. ............ 11
59.Lily Thomas v. UOI, (2000) 2 A.L.D. (Cri.) 686 ................................................................. 23
60.M. S. M. Sharma v. Dr. Shree Krishna Sinha, A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 1186................................ 2
61.M.P.V. Sundaramier & Co. v. State of Andhra Pradesh, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 468. ................ 9
vi
62.M’Pherson v. Daniels (1829) 10 b & C 263 ........................................................................ 15
63.Magor and St. Mellons Rural District Council v. Newport Corporation, [1951] 2 All ER
839..................................................................................................................................... 6
64.Mahmudov v. Azerbaijan, App. No. 35877/04 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 18, 2008) ................... 16
65.Malisiewicz-Gasior v. Poland, App. No. 43797/98 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Apr. 6, 2006) .............. 16
66.Mallikarjuna v. State of Andhra Pradesh , A.I.R 1990 S.C. 1251........................................ 6
67.Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). ............................................................................. 6
68.Marwa Manghai v. Sangham Sampat, A.I.R. 1960 Punj. 35. Hindu Public v. Rajdhani
Puja Samithee, A.I.R. 1999 S.C. 964 ................................................................................ 23
69.McLoughlin v. O'Brian, [1983] 1 AC 410 ........................................................................... 6
70.Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990). .......................................................... 5
71.Minelli v. Switzerland (dec.), App. No. 14991/02 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 14, 2005) .............. 16
72.Minerva Mills v. UOI, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1789 ..................................................................... 22
73.Motilal v. Govt. of State of U.P., A.I.R. 1951 All. 257 ....................................................... 22
74.Mrs. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India , A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 597........................................... 13
75.Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 142. 24 L. Ed. 77 ........................................................................ 16
76.Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 18 How.272(1856) ........ 9
77.N.K. Doongaji &Co. v. State of M.P., A.I.R. 1975 M.P. 1 .................................................. 22
78.Namit Sharma v. Union of India, (2013) 1 SCC 745 ........................................................... 11
79.Nandlal Sharma v. State of Rajasthan, (1982) W.L.N 681 .................................................. 23
80.Narsimha Rao v. Govt. of A.P., A.I.R. 1977 A.P. 178......................................................... 22
81.National Federation of Blinds v. State of U.P., 2000 (2) A.W.C. 1234 ............................... 22
82.Nationwide News v. Wills, (1992) 177 CLR 1 .................................................................... 11
83.Naveen Chandra, Advocate v. UOI, 1999 (2) A.W.C. 1679 ................................................ 1
84.Noor Aga v. State of Punjab and Anr., 2008 (56) B.L.J.R. 2254 ......................................... 13
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85.Omprakash Dukhilal Yadav v. UOI, (2003) 3 S.L.J. 370 C.A.J. ......................................... 22
86.Oriental Gas Limited v. State of West Bengal, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 248 ................................. 23
87.Orissa Textile and Steel Ltd. v. State of Orissa, A.I.R. 2002 S.C. 708 ................................ 23
88.P. Annamalai v. The Collector of Ramanathapuram, (1988) 2 M.L.J. 398 ......................... 23
89.P.M. Ashwnathanarayana Setty v. State of Karnataka, A.I.R. 1989 S.C. 100 ..................... 23
90.P.V. Narsimha Rao v. State, 1998(4) S.C.C. 626. ................................................................ 5
91.Panama Refining Company v. Ryan, (1935) 293 U.S. 388(400) ......................................... 6
92.Pedersen v. Denmark, App. No. 49017/99 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 17, 2004) .......................... 16
93.People v. Warden of City Prison. 157 N. Y. 116 ................................................................. 16
94.Petrina v. Romania, App. No. 78060/01 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 14, 2008) .............................. 16
95.Pfeifer v. Austria, App. No. 12556/03 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 15, 2007) ................................ 16
96.R v. Secretary of State for Transport ex parte Factortame Ltd (No 2), [1990] 2 AC 85...... 6
97.R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1957 SC 628 ..................................... 11
98.Raj Narain Singh v. Atmaram Govind, A.I.R. 1954 All. 319 .............................................. 1
99.Raja Ram Pal v. Hon’ble Speaker, Lok Sabha, A.I.R 2007 S.C. (Supp) 1448 .................... 5
100.Rajendra Prasad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, A.I.R.1979SC916 ............................................ 13
101.Ram Jawaya Kapur v. State of Punjab, A.I.R 1955 S.C. 549 ............................................. 6
102.Rameshwar Prasad Kedarnath v. D.M., A.I.R. 1954 All. 144 ............................................ 22
103.Re Delhi Laws Act, A.I.R 1951 S.C. 332 ........................................................................... 6
104.Riolo v. Italy, App. No. 42211/07 (Eur. Ct. H.R. July 17, 2008) ...................................... 16
105.Romanenko v. Russia, App. No. 11751/03 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 8, 2009) ............................ 16
106.S. Devakadaksham v. Dist. Educational Officer, (2006) 4 M.L.J 1580 .............................. 22
107.S. K. Sinha v. Patna University, A.I.R. 1965 Pat. 253 ....................................................... 3
108.Saurashtra Safai Kamdar Vikas Samiti v. State of Gujarat, (2000) 2 G.L.R. 1476 ............ 23
109.Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, A.I.R. 2015 SC 1523 .................................................... 11

viii
110.Shri Manjit Singh v. Maharashtra Assembly, Maharshtra Legislative Assembly, 2006
(4) MhLJ 834 .................................................................................................................... 1
111.Shri Ramanjanyaswami Vidya Sanstha, Kumaloor v. State of Karnataka, I.L.R. 2000
Kar. 922............................................................................................................................. 23
112.Smt. Ujjambai v. State of U.P., (1963) 1 S.C.R. 778 .......................................................... 22
113.Sri Surendra Mohanty v. Sri Nabakrishna Choudhury, A.I.R. 1958 Ori. 168 .................... 8
114.Standard Verlags GmbH v. Austria (no. 2), App. No. 21277/05 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 4,
2009) ................................................................................................................................. 16
115.State of Bombay v. RMDC, A.I.R. 1956 Bom. 1 ................................................................ 22
116.State of Gujarat v. Mirzapur Moti Kureshi Kasab Jamat, (2005) 8 S.C.C 534 ................... 23
117.State of Karnatka v. Union of India, A.I.R 1978 S.C 68 .................................................... 19
118.State of U.P. v. Jeet S. Bisht, (2007) 6 S.C.C. 586 ............................................................. 23
119.State v. Turner, 864 N.W.2d 204 ........................................................................................ 11
120.Steel Authority of India Ltd. v. National Union Waterfront Workers, A.I.R 2001 S.C.
3527................................................................................................................................... 23
121.Stockdale v. Hansard, (1839) 9 Ad & E 1. .......................................................................... 2
122.Supreme Court Employees’ Welfare Association v. UOI , A.I.R 1990 S.C. 334 ............... 6,7
123.T. Devadesan v. UOI, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 179 ....................................................................... 22
124.T.P. Kunhiraman v. Official Assignee, Madras, A.I.R. 1983 Mad. 145 ............................. 23
125.Tasleem Murad v. Government of A.P., 2002 (5) A.L.D. 307 ........................................... 13
126.Tej Kiran Jain v Sanjeeva Reddy, (1971) S.C.R. (1) 612 .................................................. 9
127.Times Newspapers Ltd. v. The United Kingdom (nos. 1 and 2), App. Nos. 3002/03 &
23676/03 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Mar. 10, 2009) .......................................................................... 16
128.Tinsukhia Electric Supply Company Limited v. State of Assam , A.I.R. 1990 SC 123 ..... 12
129.U.B.S.E Board v. Hari Shankar, A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 65 ......................................................... 23

ix
130.United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1875). ....................................................................... 10
131.University of Calcutta v. Pritam Rooj, (2009) 1 CHN 795. ................................................ 12
132.Uren v. John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd (1966) 117 ClR 118 ................................................ 15
133.Vanga Seetharamamma v. Chitta Sambasiva Rao and Anr., A.I.R. 1964 A.P. 400. .......... 13
134.Wayman v. Southard,. 23 U.S. 10 Wheat. 1 1 (1825) ......................................................... 6
135.White v. Sweden, App. No. 42435/02 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Sept. 19, 2006) ............................... 16
STATUTES
1.Code of Civil Procedure....................................................................................................... 5
2.The Societies Registration Act, 1860................................................................................... 23
3.Tort Claims Act, 2016.......................................................................................................... 3,4,10
4.Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988..................................................................................... 5
CONSTITUTION
1.Constitution of Eden ............................................................................................................ 6,7,22
2.Constitution of India ............................................................................................................ 1,7,9,22
3.Constitution of U.S. ............................................................................................................. 5
ARTICLES
1.Barbara Armacost, Race and Reputation, 85 VA. L. REV. (1999) ...................................... 14
2.Daryl Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV.
(1999) ................................................................................................................................ 14
3.David L. Shapiro, Mr. Justice Rehnquist: A Preliminary View, 90 HARV. L. REV. (1976).
........................................................................................................................................... 14
4.Randolph J. Haines, Note, Reputation Stigma and Section 1983: The Lessons of Paul v.
Davis, 30 STAN. L. REV. (1977) ........................................................................................ 14
5.Edward L. Rubin, Due Process and the Administrative State, 72 CAL. L. REV. (1984) ......
x
........................................................................................................................................... 14
6.Eric J. Mitnick, Procedural Due Process and Reputational Harm: Liberty as Self-
Invention 43 (79) UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, DAVIS (2009). ........................................ 15
7.Henry Paul Monaghan, Of “Liberty” and “Property,” 62 CORNELL L. REV. (1977) ......... 14
8.Jack M. Beermann, Government Official Torts and the Takings Clause: Federalism and
State Sovereign Immunity, 68 B.U. L. REV. (1988) .......................................................... 14
9.Jack M. Beermann, Symposium on Section 1983 72 CHI.- KENT L. REV. (1988) ............... 14
10.James Griffin, Discrepancies between the Best Philosophical Account of Human
Rights and the International Law of Human Rights 101 (1) PROCEEDINGS OF THE
ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY (2001) ......................................................................................... 20
11.James Nickel, Human Rights in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ETHICS (L. Becker and C. Becker
eds., 1992). ........................................................................................................................ 20
12.John C. Jeffries, Jr., Disaggregating Constitutional Torts, 110 YALE L.J. (2000)............ 14
13.Philip Barlow, Health Care is not a Human Right 319 BRITISH MEDICAL JOURNAL,
(1999). ............................................................................................................................... 20
14.Ray Watterson, What is defamatory today? 67 ALJ 811, 812 (1993). .............................. 14
15.Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation and the
Constitution 74 (3) CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW (1986)...................................................... 13
16.Rodney A. Smolla, The Displacement of Federal Due Process Claims by State Tort
Remedies: Parratt v. Taylor and Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 1982 U. ILL. L.
REV. .................................................................................................................................. 14
17.Rodney Smolla, Let the Author Beware: The Rejuvenation of the American Law of
Libel, 132 U. PA. L. REV. (1983). .................................................................................... 14
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BOOKS
1.A. SAT OBIYAN & KUNLE AMUWO, NIGERIA'S DEMOCRATIC EXPERIENCE IN THE FOURTH
REPUBLIC SINCE 1999: POLICIES AND POLITICS (2013). ................................................... 7
2.A.V. DICEY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION
(1985). MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS (1748). ....................................................... 2
3.ALAN GEREWITH, HUMAN RIGHTS (1982) ........................................................................... 20
4.DR.K SIVACHITHAPPA, EQUALITY AND SUSTAINABLE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT - ISSUES
AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS (2014). ................................................................................... 21
5.E. L. NORMANTON, THE ACCOUNTABILITY AND AUDIT OF GOVERNMENTS: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY (1966) ........................................................................................... 19
6.E. RAYMOND BROWN, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION IN CANADA (2nd edn, 1994). ................ 15
7.HOOD PHILLIPS, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (3rd edn., 1995) ................ 1
8.IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (H.J. Paton ed. &
trans., Harper Torchbooks 3d ed., 1956). ......................................................................... 16
9.M.P.JAIN, INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 86 (2013). .......................................................... 7
10.S.N. CHAND, PUBLIC FINANCE (2008) ............................................................................... 19
11.SHASHISHEKHAR GOPAL DEOGAONKAR, PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM IN INDIA (1997) ....... 19
12.VERINDER GROVER, LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL IN STATE LEGISLATURES 108 (1989) ............ 7
MISCELLANEOUS
1.Article 2: Right to Life EHRC ............................................................................................. 17
2.INDIAN COUNCIL OF MEDICAL RESEARCH, ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR BIOMEDICAL
RESEARCH ON HUMAN PARTICIPANTS .............................................................................. 21,24
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3.JOHN BOUVIER, A LAW DICTIONARY, ADAPTED TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF
THE UNITED STATES (1856). .............................................................................................. 23
4.OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (Julia Elliott ed., 2006) ..................................................... 5
5.Right to Life and the Dignity of the Human Person, DIOCESE OF AUSTIN ........................... 15
6.RULES OF PROCEDURE AND CONDUCTS OF BUSINESS IN LOK SABHA .................................... 5
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court is competent to hear to the petition under Art. 136r/w 145(3) of the Constitution
of Eden. As the matter involved is a substantial questions of interpretation of Constitution,
the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Eden constituted a constitution bench to hear the matter which
has all the jurisdiction to hear it.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
THE BACKGROUND
Eden formerly a British colony, gained independence in 1947 and is governed by the
Constitution establishes it as the Union of States. The basic feature of its Constitution is
federalism, fundamental rights and a liberal democratic government. Replete with human and
natural resources the country showed a stable growth rate. The newly elected government of
the Eden Heritage Party, came in power in January, 2016 advocated the principle of
‘Minimum Government’ and ‘Maximum Governance’ with particular emphasis on health and
education.
THE CONNECTION OF SHCG AND MRS. ‘K’
SHCG being a nodal agency, received assistance from government and International Funds.
Mrs. K, the chief executive of a voluntary organization named Social Health Care Group
(hereinafter, SHCG), works to provide for reproductive assistance to infertile couples and
individuals. Mr. X, husband of Mrs. K is leader of opposition in the House of People. It
happens to be, the leader of opposition shall be ex officio Chairman of Public Accounts
xiv
Committee (hereinafter, PAC), which examines the revenue and expenditure of Government.
Its function extended to its wisdom, faithfulness and economy in cases of financial
irregularities. There were reports of financial irregularities by voluntary organization
(hereinafter, VO) and newspapers reported such misuse of funds along with influence of
political patronage.
THE ALLEGED MISAPPROPRIATION OF FUNDS
With the news of irregularities in fund appropriation by the VO’s, a Public Interest Litigation
(hereinafter, PIL) was filed by ‘People’s Cause’ regarding substantial funding to VO’s and
Non-Governmental Organization (hereinafter, NGO). The order of Supreme Court called for
initiation of civil and criminal action against the VO’s/NGO. The Government issued a
tentative test of VO’s for its ban or restriction. Meanwhile the political nexus of Mrs. K and
her exorbitant salary and travel expenses also caused media unrest.
THE SUB-COMMITTEE
In the backdrop of the above factual situation, a Sub-Committee was formed under the PAC
headed by Dr. A, which Mrs. K was invited by Sub-Committee to depose off before it in July
2016.The Sub-Committee did not compel her and as per principles of commission of Enquiry
Act, 2013 (hereinafter, Act of 2013). She was not under obligation to attend it. Although she
attended the proceedings, but complained of “unfair treatment” and “searching question”
without advance notice. She approached the Speaker of the House to declare the functioning
of Sub-Committee contrary to the law and in violation of the provisions of the Act of 2013.
THE DRUG TRIAL
Before all this in 2015, drugs manufacturing companies (hereinafter, the ‘Companies’)
approached SHCG for collaboration for experimentation of a drug/vaccine to cure infertility.

xv
To which the permission was granted by the government. The companies got the drugs
administered on females ranging between 15 and 32 years. No evidence of coercion or undue
influence was found however, serious adverse effects began to be communicated to the
Government. The terms of enquiry of sub-committee was enlarged. Mrs. K was re-invited by
the sub-committee to which she declined and reminded of the letter given to the Speaker.
However, the Sub-Committee sent a questionnaire to her along with a notice to companies
who visited the sub-committee.
THE REPORT
Dr. A submitted the report of Sub-Committee in Budget Session, but it was not tabled and a
press conference was called by Dr. A, was alleged to leak the findings of the report. After the
Session, Dr. A affirmed his on floor statements to media.
THE WRITS AND CONSOLIDATED HEARING
People’s Cause filled PIL for questioning the inaction of appropriate authority. The report
was the foundation of the petition and there was question of need for enactment of legislation.
Supreme Court issued limited notice and asked for expeditious completion of pleadings in
Monsoon Session. In the Session as questions were raised on Mr. X and his influence, so due
to his absence the session was adjourned sine die. The matter of Breach of Privilege was
raised. A writ petition was filled by Mr. X and made Hon’ble Speaker a party. Mr. ‘X’ filed
another petition for declaration to quash the report of the Sub-Committee. He soughs writ of
Mandamus to restrain any debate on report before the house. The petitions have been stated
for hearing by the Constitution Bench of Supreme Court.
xvi
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
[1] PRELIMINARY JURISDICTION IS INADEQUATE
[2] ARTICLE 102 IS CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID
[3] DEFAMATION LAWS UNDER TORT CLAIMS ACT, 2016 ARE IN DIRECT CONFLICT WITH
FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXPRESSION
[4] RIGHT TO REPUTATION IS A NOT FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT
[5] RIGHT TO HEALTH NOT A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT; RIGHT TO ACCESS TO HEALTHCARE
SUBJECT TO BEING “PROVIDED BY LAW” AND NOT ABSOLUTE RIGHT
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
[1] PRELIMINARY JURISDICTION IS INADEQUATE
It is humbly submitted by the Counsels before the Hon’ble Supreme Court that it is beyond
the jurisdiction of this court to entertain the preliminary issues involved as Article 32 C (3) of
the Constitution of Eden does not guarantees any express jurisdiction to the court. It is
further submitted that in the present case alternative relief has not been exhausted.
[2] ARTICLE 102 IS CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID
It is humbly submitted by the Counsels before the Hon’ble Supreme Court that Article 102 of
the Constitution of Eden is valid as it necessary to ensure separation of power among the
three organs of the government mandated by the constitution. The separation of power has to
be observed in the strictest sense as to ensure that there is no interference of one organ with
the other.
xvii
It is humbly submitted by the Counsels before the Hon’ble court that freedom of speech and
expression is the fundamental fabric of a democratic society. Therefore any law curtailing
such a freedom should be struck down. It is further submitted by the Counsels that
defamation laws under Tort Claims Act, 2016 are in direct conflict with freedom of speech
and expression and hence should be held ultra vires the Constitution of Eden.
[4] RIGHT TO REPUTATION IS A NOT FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT
It is humbly submitted by the Counsels before the Hon’ble Supreme Court that Right to
Reputation is a not fundamental right. It is further submitted by the Counsels that Right to
Reputation is subject to the reasonable restriction and should be exercised within the contours
of the Constitution of Eden.
It is humbly submitted by the Counsels before the Hon’ble Supreme Court that Health care is
not a human right. Such rights have a limited scope. Therefore Right to Access to Healthcare
as enshrined under Article 21 H of the Constitution of Eden is subject to being “provided by
law.
xviii
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
MOST HUMBLY SUBMITTED THAT:-
[1] PRELIMINARY JURISDICTION FOR PETITIONS IS INADEQUATE
[¶1] It is humbly submitted by the Counsels that the Court cannot interfere in legislative
proceedings [1.1] and that alternate relief has not been exhausted [1.2] and that there is no
case of defamation against Dr. ‘A’ [1.3].
[1.1] Court Cannot Interfere in Legislative Proceedings
[¶2] The validity of any proceedings in Parliament shall not be called in question on the
ground of any alleged irregularity of procedure.1
[¶3] The Counsels humbly cite Hood Phillips:
The Courts must presume that so august an Assembly as the House of Commons
discharges its function lawfully and properly. They will, therefore, not take
cognizance of matters arising within the walls of the Mouse, and they will accept
the interpretation put by the Commons upon a statute affecting their internal
proceedings.2
1
INDIA CONST., art. 122 cl.1.
2
HOOD PHILLIPS, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 184 (3rd edn., 1995); see also, Harish Chandra
Singh Rawat v. UOI, Writ Petition (M/S) No. 795 of 2016; K.A. Mathialagan v. P. Srinivasan, A.I.R. 1973
Mad. 371; Naveen Chandra, Advocate v. UOI, 1999 (2) A.W.C. 1679; Raj Narain Singh v. Atmaram Govind,
A.I.R. 1954 All. 319; Shri Manjit Singh v. Maharashtra Assembly, Maharshtra Legislative Assembly, 2006 (4)
MhLJ 834.
1
[¶4] The Counsels humbly cite Lord Denman where he remarked, “Whatever is done within
the walls of either assembly must pass without question in any other place.” 3 It is necessary
that the proceedings of each House of Parliament should be entirely free and unshackled that
whatever is said or done in either House should not be liable to examination elsewhere.4
[¶5] The judicial process does not lie where Parliament has exclusive Jurisdiction has been
recognised by decisions of the Courts.5 Mr. Justice Stephen in Bradlaugh v. Gossett,6
observed:
Examining the area of judicial control over the matters relating to the internal
procedure of the House of Commons, recognised that its privilege of regulating
its own internal proceedings invested it with a judicial character. No Court today
would seriously challenge that matters concerning the proceedings within either
House are to be discussed and adjudged in that House and not elsewhere.
[¶6] In Raj Narain v. Atmaram Govind7, the Allahabad High Court observed :“… this is
important the House is immune from scrutiny by Courts as to the manner in which it
interprets them. It follows from this that for such purposes the House can practically change
or supersede the law.”
[¶7] Finally, it would be apt to quote the Hon’ble Court’s observation in M. S. M. Sharma v.
Dr. Shree Krishna Sinha,8 the Supreme Court held that:
The validity of the proceedings inside the Legislature of a State cannot be called
in question on the allegation that the procedure laid down by the law had not been
strictly followed. No Court can go into those questions which are within the
special Jurisdiction of the Legislature itself, which has the power to conduct its
own business.
3
Stockdale v. Hansard, (1839) 9 Ad & E 1.
4
Id.
5
A.V. DICEY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION xliv (1985).
6
(1884) 12QBD 271.
7
A.I.R. 1954 All 319.
8
A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 1186.
2
[¶8] Basing their submissions on the above cited authorities and case decisions, the Counsels
humbly submit that the judicial review cannot be made wherein the business of Houses of
Parliament are involved. This is clear and evident from a bare reading of Art. 102 of the
Constitution of Eden which mandates for non-interference of the Courts in matters of review
of the reports of Committees which have yet not been discussed in the House. It is humbly
submitted that, in the light of the above restriction, the litigation by People’s Cause which is
solely based on the Report of the Sub-Committee cannot be reviewed by the Hon’ble Court
keeping intact the sanctity of the restriction under Art. 102.
[1.2] Alternative Relief has not been exhausted
[¶9] The Court will not issue a writ in favour of a person who has an adequate alternative
remedy. It is contended that Art 32 should be invoked as a last resort; after all other
alternative remedies have been exhaustive. These alternative remedies should provide an
equivalent relief to the infringement of the Fundamental Right of the petitioner.
[¶10] The alternative remedy is equal and efficacious. The alternative remedy should be
equally convenient, beneficial and effective. It should secure necessary relief and should not
be onerous or burdensome. In S. K. Sinha v. Patna University9 , the petition under Article 32
was denied on the ground that there existed an equal and efficacious remedy under the
University Act. Section 4 of the Tort Claims Act, 2016 also states that all claims seeking
remedies under this Act as also any claims in relation to reputation or privacy shall be
prosecuted “only before the designated court” and “not before any other court.”
[¶11] Having submitted that, it is important to view the idea of 'alternative remedies' in
practical light. The Supreme Court has a significantly large backlog of cases. In light of that,
9
A.I.R. 1965 Pat. 253.
3
it is submitted that the cases be filtered at the level of State Judiciary. Also, in most situations
the State Judiciary is in a better position to address the issues of infringement of Fundamental
Rights than the Supreme Court. Filing a case in the High Court is also less expensive in terms
of overall costs. The Supreme Court can reject a petition on the grounds that there exists an
alternative remedy and will not grant relief. Only where the petition raises important
questions of the interpretation of statutory provisions or rules which it is in the public interest
to decide speedily, where there is a failure of justice due to a misreading of the provisions of
an Act.
[¶12] The Counsels humbly submit that the mandates under Article 32 C (3) is to be read in
its strict sense. While the petitioners are before the Hon’ble Court originally for claiming
damages under Tort Claims Act, 2016, the Constitution puts a bar on the same to be
exercised in the Apex Court at first. The Constitution of Eden clearly raises this bar when it
mandates that any claim which involves monetary relief or remedies shall not be entertained
by Supreme Court and can only be sought in civil courts which are constituted in this regard.
The original writ by Mr. ‘X’ where he has sought for appropriate relief regarding injury
caused to his reputation due to defamatory statements outside the House has no waters. On
the other hand, this Hon’ble Constitution Bench has all the powers to adjudge the matters of
constitutional interpretation and the Bench below it can safely refuse to hear the petition on
grounds of non-maintainability.
[1.3] No case against Dr. ‘A’ for defamation
[¶13] As per Explanation to Section 2(c) of Tort Claims Act, 2016 the Act excludes three
statements from the defamation laws when they are exercising their functions viz.,statements
against public servants, persons receiving public grants or benefits or persons acting under
control and supervision of government with regard to some project. Furthermore, statements
4
made against negligence in the discharge of functions and statements made “after due
investigations or enquires,” attributing unethical or corrupt conduct shall not amount to
defamation.10
[¶14] In the instant case, the statement was made after inquiry by Sub-Committee and was
made against the public servant, Mr. ‘X’11and people who were receiving grants from
government i.e. SHCG.12Mr. ‘X’, being a Member of Parliament is a public servant. 13The
Counsels humbly submit that no case of defamation is constituted against Dr. ‘A’.
[¶15] Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court has said that a statement is an opinion that merits
protection when it is about a matter of public concern, expressed in a way that makes it hard
to prove whether it is true or false, and can't be reasonably interpreted to be a factual
statement about someone.14The statements of Dr. ‘A’ was in toto a matter of public concern
and it could not be interpreted to be a factual statement against Mr. ‘X’ as he did not repeat
the statements said in the House 15and refused to answer pin-pointed questions against him.16
[2] ARTICLE 102 IS CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID AS IT RESTRICTS JUDICIAL REVIEW
[¶16] Privilege refers to the “special right, advantage or immunity to the particular person.” It
is special benefit or honour”.17 Such immunity includes immunity from arrest.18 Hence it can
be inferred that the term privileges referred to the special rights and advantages that are
10
Part II, Page 2, CLARIFICATIONs, Prof. N.R. Madhava Menon SAARC Mooting Competition 2017-18.
11
¶ 33, Page 11, STATEMENT OF FACTS, Prof. N.R. Madhava Menon SAARC Mooting Competition 2017-18.
12
13
§ 2(c), PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT, 1988; see also, P.V. Narsimha Rao v. State, 1998(4) S.C.C. 626.
14
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990).
15
16
17
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 591 (Julia Elliott ed., 2006), see also, Raja Ram Pal v. Hon’ble Speaker, Lok
Sabha, A.I.R 2007 S.C. (Supp) 1448
18
U.S. CONST., art. I, § 6; CODE CIV. PROC., §135A; RULES OF PROCEDURE AND CONDUCTS OF BUSINESS IN LOK
SABHA, rr. 229&230 r/w r. 252, 269 &270.
5
enjoyed by the Members of Parliament over the citizen of Eden. 19 The Constitution of the
land provides for prohibition of discussion pertaining to the report prior to parliamentary
debate.20 It is, therefore, in the light of the provisions, submitted that Courts cannot interfere
with the Parliamentary Privileges [2.1], Article 102(ii) levies wide restrictions on judicial
review [2.2] and that Federalism and Democracy would be in danger with tussle between
judiciary and legislature [2.3].
[2.1] The three main organs of the government have to work separately in the federal
form for a strong and healthy democracy
[¶17] It is humbly submitted that the arena of working for Judiciary and Legislature are
separate and distinct. They, however, do not function in a water-tight compartment. Still,
their working fields are distinct. The Counsels humbly submit that there is a Separation of
power between judiciary and legislature [2.1.1], to maintain healthy relation with Legislature,
there should be no interference of Courts [2.1.2].
[2.1.1] Separation of power between judiciary and legislature
[¶18] There is a concept of separation of powers21 in India,22UK23 and U.S.24 The concept is a
model for the governance of democratic states.25 In Supreme Court Employees’ Welfare
19
EDEN CONST., art.102.
20
21
MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS (1748).
22
Ram Jawaya Kapur v. State of Punjab, A.I.R 1955 S.C. 549; Re Delhi Laws Act, A.I.R 1951 S.C. 332; Indira
Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain , A.I.R 1975 S.C. 2299; Golaknath v. State of Punjab, A.I.R 1967 S.C. 1643;
Bandhuva Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, A.I.R 1984 S.C. 802; Mallikarjuna v. State of Andhra Pradesh ,
A.I.R 1990 S.C. 1251; Supreme Court Employees’ Welfare Association v. Union of India , A.I.R 1990 S.C.
334.
23
Duport Steels Ltd. v. Sirs, [1980] 1 WLR 142; Magor and St. Mellons Rural District Council v. Newport
Corporation, [1951] 2 All ER 839; Jackson v. Her Majesty’s Attorney General, [2005] UKHL 56; McLoughlin
v. O'Brian, [1983] 1 AC 410, R v. Secretary of State for Transport ex parte Factortame Ltd (No 2), [1990] 2 AC
85.
24
Panama Refining Company v. Ryan, (1935) 293 U.S. 388(400); Wayman v. Southard,. 23 U.S. 10 Wheat. 1 1
(1825); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983); Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S.
18 How. 272 272 (1856); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
6
Association v. Union of India26 , it was held that no court can issue a direction to a legislature
to enact a particular law neither it can direct an executive authority to enact a law which it
has been empowered to do under the delegated legislative authority.
[¶19] No person is to be liable to any proceedings in any Court in respect of the publication of
any report, paper, votes or proceedings by or under the authority of a House of Parliament. 27
Thus, all persons connected with the publication of proceedings of a House are protected if
the same is made under the authority of the House itself.28 The publication of proceedings of
Parliament is subject to the control of the respective Houses. A reading of these authorities
and cases clearly etch out the scenario where the Judiciary and the Legislature are kept in
separate compartments, although not water-tight.
[¶20] The interference of Judiciary in the chores of Legislature is almost nil and the
provisions of Art. 102 (ii) also leans against the judicial review of reports prior to
determination of outcomes and measures by the House of People. The Supreme Court had
issued limited notice as the Parliament was about to debate or discuss the issues in the
forthcoming Monsoon Session and asked that the pleadings be completed expeditiously.29
This indicates that the outcomes of the measures by the House have not been determined. The
Counsels submit that the judicial review of the matter is not tenable.
25
A. SAT OBIYAN & KUNLE AMUWO, NIGERIA'S DEMOCRATIC EXPERIENCE IN THE FOURTH REPUBLIC SINCE
1999: POLICIES AND POLITICS 61 (2013).
26
A.I.R 1990 S.C. 334.
27
EDEN CONST., art. 102 cl. ii; see also, INDIA CONST., art. 122 r/w art. 105.
28
VERINDER GROVER, LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL IN STATE LEGISLATURES 108 (1989); see also, M.P.JAIN, INDIAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 86 (2013).
29
7
[2.1.2] No interference of Courts to maintain healthy relation with legislature
[¶21] The conflict between legislative privileges and the law courts came to be resolved by
Supreme Court in In the Matter of: Under Article 143 of the Constitution of India.30The
Court has evolved the proper doctrine to determine the privileges of the parliament that the
Indian parliament can adopt. In Hardwari Lal v. The Election Commission of India31 Court
explained the doctrine of pen, ink and the Indian rubber whereby one first writes something
entirely alien to the Constitution within it and the next moment proceeds to rub it off.
[¶22] Taking a reference of the “pen, ink and rubber” theory propounded by Sabarwal, J. , it
is humbly submitted on behalf of the Petitioners that the Constitutional provisions under Art.
102 call for a plain reading rather than adding something new and then erasing it. A plain
reading of Art. 102 (ii) calls for exclusion of Judicial review in cases of reports of
Committees and Sub-Committees before the determination of outcomes by the House. If,
however, there is adoption of a reading other than a plain one, it would lead to formation of
circulus inextricabilis.
[2.2] Article 102(ii) levies wide restrictions on judicial review
[¶23] It is well settled now that each House has the exclusive jurisdiction over its internal
proceedings.32No authority other than the House and its Presiding Officer has any say in the
matter relating to conduct of its proceedings.33 Accordingly, each House of Parliament has
30
A.I.R.1965 S.C.745, see also, Bradlaugh v. Gosset, (1884) 12 QBD 271; Chhabildas Mehta, M.L.A. and ors.
v. The Legislative Assembly, Gujarat State and ors., (1970)11GLR729; Raj Narain v. Atmaram Govind, A.I.R
1954 All 319.
31
I.L.R. (1977) 2 Punj 269.
32
See, Burdett v. Abbot, (1810) 14 East 1; see, also, Sri Surendra Mohanty v. Sri Nabakrishna Choudhury,
A.I.R. 1958 Ori. 168
33
Surendra Mohanty v. Nabakrishna Choudhury, A.I.R. 1958 Ori. 168.
8
been empowered to make rules for regulating its procedure and conduct of its business.34 The
Supreme Court in the case of Tej Kiran Jain v Sanjeeva Reddy35 held that “once it is proved
that parliament was sitting and its business was being transacted, anything said during the
course of that business was immune from proceeding in any court”.
[¶24] Validity of proceedings of Parliament cannot be questioned in any court of law for any
"alleged irregularity of procedure."36 An interference from outside would cause the
Parliament to refrain from discharging its functions with full zeal and enthusiasm. It would
not be able to discharge its functions with full vigour. The Counsels submit that for the
reasons submitted above, even a Judiciary enjoys no say in the matters of regulating the
internal procedure of the House of Parliament.
[2.3] Arguendo, Federalism and Democracy would be in danger with tussle between
judiciary and legislature
[¶25] This Court in M.P.V. Sundaramier & Co. v. State of Andhra Pradesh37had in a
categorical language observed that “the threads of our Constitution were no doubt taken from
other Federal Constitution but when they were woven into the fabric of our Constitution their
reach and their complexion underwent changes.” Great care should be taken in applying rules
of interpretation in the interpretation of our Constitution. Federalism, the base of which is
separation of power gives a seat to democracy. If this seat will be swinging in dangerous
waves, the democratic outset of Eden would be plunged into dark. The Counsels argumenti
causa and argumenti gratia submit that to rock the cradle of Federalism which is a home to
34
INDIA CONST., art. 118.
35
(1971) S.C.R. (1) 612
36
INDIA CONST., art. 122.
37
A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 468.
9
Democracy, peacefully, the interpretation of Constitution be carried on meticulously and such
interpretation call for a separation between the three wings of Government
[¶26] Section 3 (1)has a chilling effect on free speech and should, therefore, be struck down
on the grounds of over-breadth [3.1], applying The Doctrine of Severability, Sec. 2 Clause (c)
should be struck down [3.2] and that the Definition under Section 2 (k) needs amendment
[3.3].
[3.1] Section 3 clause (1) and clause (2) be struck down on the grounds of over-breadth
[¶27] ‘Defamation’ means anything spoken or written in any form whatsoever through any
medium whatsoever including materials conveyed through electronic medium and pictorial
representations, which directly or indirectly tend to affect the reputation of any person. 38 The
Constitution does not permit the legislature to set a net large enough to catch all possible
offenders and leave it to the Court to decide who could be rightfully detained and who should
be set at liberty.39
[¶28] The words which have been used in the provisions are “in any form whatsoever” cannot
be construed either ejusdem generis or noscitur a sociis. There is no such formation of a class
neither are the words which succeed taking colour from those which precede it. The words,
38
§ 2(c), TORT CLAIMS ACT, 2016.
39
United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1875).
10
on interpretation give out an ambiguity as to the forms through which defamation could take
place and broadens the arena so widely that every other act could be caught in the net which
would have a chilling effect on the free speech.
[¶29] Freedom of speech is a fundamental common law right. 40 The validity of a statute can
be challenged on grounds of contravention of fundamental rights,41 absence of legislative
competence or unreasonableness of the law.42 Over-breadth is a recognized ground to test the
vires of legislation on the touchstone of the Constitution.43 Provisions of legislation are likely
to be abused because of the over-breadth of the provision and should thus be struck down.44
[¶30] Defamation laws have been struck down as unconstitutional in Alabama 45, Utah46,
Kenya47 and Minnesota.48 The Counsels humbly submit that the laws in Eden are of the same
nature which strangulates free speech and thus, are fit to be struck down as unconstitutional
as they violate Art. 19 (1) (a).
[3.2] Applying the Doctrine of Severability, Sec. 2 Clause (c) should be struck down
[¶31] It is well settled that provisions which are invalid need not affect the validity of the
legislation as a whole.49 The impugned clause is not integral to the enactment of the
remaining provisions, and the other provisions can be enforced without making alterations
and modifications therein. In such circumstances, the doctrine of severability is applicable. 50
40
Nationwide News v. Wills, (1992) 177 CLR 1; Attorney-General (South Australia) v. Corporation of the City
of Adelaide, (2013) 249 CLR 1.
41
Kheybari Tea Co. Ltd. v. State of Assam, A.I.R. 1964 SC 925.
42
Namit Sharma v. Union of India, (2013) 1 SCC 745.
43
Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, A.I.R. 2015 SC 1523.
44
Leonard sinha v. Attorney General of Antiqua and Barbuda, (1990) 2 A.C. 312.
45
Ivey v. Alabama, 821 So.2d 937 (Ala. 2001)
46
In re I.M.L. v. State of Utah, 61 P.3d 1038 (Utah 2002)
47
Jacqueline Okuta & another v Attorney General & others [2017] eKLR, Kenya Law website.
48
State v. Turner, 864 N.W.2d 204
49
Attorney General for Alberta v. Attorney General for Canada, 1947 AC 503.
50
R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1957 SC 628.
11
[¶32] In the instant case, if not the whole section, then applying the doctrine of severability, at
least clause (c) of the Sec. 2 and clause (1) and (2) of Sec. 3 should be severed and struck
down as it endangers any form of free speech.
[3.3] The Definition in Section 2 (k) needs amendment
[¶33] Section 2 (k) gives a very broad meaning to Privacy. If it would “mean and include”
something, it would be of the nature of an exhaustive definition. Rather, in the definition
under clause (k), privacy is being levied with such wide a meaning that it would leave the
fundamental rights of free speech redundant and otiose.
[¶34] It is not the words of the law but the spirit and eternal sense of it that makes the law
meaningful.51 Legislature cannot be allowed to employ indirect methods to defeat the
constitutional provisions.52 The provisions of a statute must be so construed as to make it
effective and operative on the principle ut res magis valeat quam pereat. In Tinsukhia
Electric Supply Company Limited v. State of Assam53, the Supreme Court observed that the
Courts strongly lean against any construction which tends to reduce a statute to a futility.
[¶35] The Counsels submit humbly that “means and includes” be construed in strict sense and
not to include “all spheres of human being which are valuable to the person”. If at all, such
interpretation is given, it would render the free speech mandates otiose and dead letter as then
every other person would claim a breach of privacy on irrelevant circumstances.
51
University of Calcutta v. Pritam Rooj, (2009) 1 CHN 795.
52
Namit Sharma v. Union of India, (2013) 1 SCC 745.
53
A.I.R. 1990 SC 123.
12
[4] RIGHT TO REPUTATION IS NOT AN ABSOLUTE RIGHT
[¶36] The Counsels humbly submit that Rights under Arts. 21 and 21 D are subject to
reasonable restrictions [4.1], and that absoluteness of reputation as a right harmful for
democracy [4.2].
[4.1] Rights under Arts. 21 and 21 D are subject to reasonable restrictions
[¶37] Fundamental rights are not absolute rights54 but subject to law of reasonable
restrictions in the interest of the general public.55 The concept of natural inalienable rights
secures autonomy to human beings.56 But the autonomy is not absolute, for the simple reason
that, the concept of inalienable rights postulates that there are some rights which no human
being may alienate.57 While natural rights protect the right of the individual to choose and
preserve liberty, yet the autonomy of the individual is not absolute or total.58 The Counsels
submit that reputation is a higher standard than dignity [4.1.1] and Reputation is a secondary
element for dignified life [4.1.2].
[4.1.1] Reputation is a higher standard than dignity
[¶38] Reputation is ‘a mysterious thing’.59 The basic feature ‘reputation’ is the dependence of
an individual’s reputation on the recognition of others.60 Reputation tends to be associated
with personal characteristics, such as honesty and integrity, not with physical characteristics,
54
Gulam Abbas and ors. v. State of U.P. and ors., A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 1268; Mrs. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of
India , A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 597; Tasleem Murad v. Government of A.P., 2002 (5) A.L.D. 307; Rajendra Prasad v.
State of Uttar Pradesh, A.I.R.1979SC916; Ashoka Kumar Thakur v. Union of India , 2008 (56) B.L.J.R. 1292;
Jayendra Vishnu Thakur v. State of Maharashtra and Anr., 2009 (II) O.L.R. 161; Noor Aga v. State of Punjab
and Anr., 2008 (56) B.L.J.R. 2254; Kamal R. Khan v. State of Maharashtra, 2009 (4) Bom.C.R. 496; Vanga
Seetharamamma v. Chitta Sambasiva Rao and Anr., A.I.R. 1964 A.P. 400.
55
K.T. Plantation Pvt. Ltd. and anr. v. State of Karnataka, (2011) 9 S.C.C. 1.
56
Justice K.S.Puttaswamy (Retd.) and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors., Writ Petition (Civil) No.494 Of 2012.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation and the Constitution 74 (3)
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW 691, 692 (1986).
60
Id.
13
such as gender or ethnicity.61 Reputation is derived from the exhibition of these personal
characteristics in interactions with others. This reinforces its social nature. There is therefore
a social aspect to reputation. Regarding reputation Justice Black, also in dissent, claimed it
was “impossible . . . to believe that the Supreme Court of Wisconsin would uphold any such
boundless power over the lives and liberties of its citizens.”62
[¶39] The majority’s rationalization of Constantineau and Board of Regents v. Roth63
(Rehnquist J. largely ignores Jenkins J.)64 as “astonishing,” “puzzling,” and “perplexing”65;
“cavalier,” “wholly startling,” and “disturbing”66; “odious”67; “distressingly fast and loose,”
“disingenuous,” and “ill-conceived”68; an “affront [to] common sense”69; “muddled and
misleading”70; “peculiar” and “baroque”71; “incoherent”72; and “Iago-like.73”
[¶40] Basing their arguments upon the authorities cited above, the Counsels humbly submit
that to exclude stigmatic harm from the scope of due process liberty without subjecting the
federal system to a flood of unwarranted suits and overly extensive tort liability, reputation
61
Ray Watterson,What is defamatory today? 67 ALJ 811, 812 (1993).
62
Constantineau v. Grager, 302 F. Supp. 861, 864 (E.D. Wis. 1969).
63
408 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1972).
64
See Jack M. Beermann, Government Official Torts and the Takings Clause: Federalism and State Sovereign
Immunity, 68 B.U. L. REV. 277, 290 (1988); See, e.g., Henry Paul Monaghan, Of “Liberty” and “Property,” 62
CORNELL L. REV. 405, 424 (1977); Edward L. Rubin, Due Process and the Administrative State, 72 CAL. L.
REV. 1044, 1074 (1984); David L. Shapiro, Mr. Justice Rehnquist: A Preliminary View, 90 HARV. L. REV. 293,
325- 27 (1976); Randolph J. Haines, Note, Reputation Stigma and Section 1983: The Lessons of Paul v. Davis,
30 STAN. L. REV. 191, 221 (1977); Barbara Armacost, Race and Reputation: The Real Legacy of Paul v. Davis,
85 VA. L. REV. 569, 575 (1999); Jack M. Beermann, Symposium on Section 1983: Common Law Elements of
the Section 1983 Action, 72 CHI.- KENT L. REV. 695, 732-33 (1988); John C. Jeffries, Jr., Disaggregating
Constitutional Torts, 110 YALE L.J. 259, 277 (2000); Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial
Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857, 893 (1999); Rodney A. Smolla, The Displacement of Federal Due
Process Claims by State Tort Remedies: Parratt v. Taylor and Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 1982 U. ILL. L.
REV. 831, 836-41 (1982).
65
Armacost, supra note 64, at 576-79.
66
Monaghan, supra note 64, at 424.
67
Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Fundamental Property Rights, 85 GEO. L.J. 555, 602 (1997).
68
Smolla, supra note 64, at 840.
69
Id. at 845.
70
Id. at 846.
71
Rubin, supra note 64, at 1074.
72
Beermann, supra note 64, at 289.
73
Rodney Smolla, Let the Author Beware: The Rejuvenation of the American Law of Libel, 132 U. PA. L. REV.
1, 15 (1983).
14
has to be read not as an offspring of Art. 21, rather, as an unfortunate part of it which
stretches it too far to potentially break it.
[4.1.2] Reputation is a secondary element for dignified life
[¶41] According to Windeyer, J., ‘the law does not protect the reputation that a man has, but
only the reputation that he deserves.’74 The Counsels humbly cite Brown:
Reputation is a flawed value. It is only a snapshot of the plaintiff’s character,

quite often doctored to portray something that has little or no basis in reality. a
person may have a right to project an image of himself that does not exist; he
does not have a right to prevent others from exposing what is merely an illusion.75
[¶42] The Counsels submit most humbly that reputation, if taken as a standard to adjudge
parameters of dignified life, would cause a ruckus in the nation. A nation could not imagine
of a stage where every other person would be filing a writ basing his arguments over the
expansive interpretation of the term ‘life’. The judiciary would witness piles of writs filed
over petty acts. Article 21 guarantees right to life which includes dignity. The dignity of the
human person is the foundation of a moral vision for society.76
[¶43] Reputation as honour rests on an essentially illiberal and inegalitarian social system,
underscoring the extent to which legal institutions may constitute aspects of human social
identity.77 However, if it is to mean that right to reputation is inherent in right to life, it would
render so expansive a meaning to the term ‘life’ that every second day a person would move
the court with a writ, say, even if he is a criminal and his photograph is circulated with the
words ‘wanted’ beneath.
74
Uren v. John Fairfax & Sons Pty Ltd (1966) 117 ClR 118 at 150; see also M’Pherson v. Daniels (1829) 10 b
& C 263 at 272; 109 ER 448 at 451 per Littledale J.
75
E. RAYMOND BROWN, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION IN CANADA 8 (2nd edn, 1994).
76
Right to Life and the Dignity of the Human Person, DIOCESE OF AUSTIN, (May 17, 2017),
http://www.austindiocese.org/offices-ministries/offices/social-concerns-office/faithful-citizenship/right-life-and-
dignity-human.
77
Eric J. Mitnick, Procedural Due Process and Reputational Harm: Liberty as Self-Invention 43 (79)
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, DAVIS 79, 110 (2009).
15
[¶44] Liberty is what Kant called our freedom and rationality.78 Liberty is freedom;
exemption from extraneous control.79 Reputation as an absolute right strangulates free speech
as well.80Basing their submissions on the above cited authorities, the Counsels humbly
submit that Art. 21 D speaks of right to liberty and does not mention the term ‘reputation’. It
cannot be concluded that liberty and reputation are inter-linked. A person’s reputation is a
vague parameter to adjudge his liberty. It is not so that a person with established reputation
78
See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 116 (H.J. Paton ed. & trans., Harper
Torchbooks 3d ed., 1956).
79
See Booth v. Illinois, 1S4 U. S. 425, 22 Sup. Ct. 425, 46 L. Ed. 623 ; Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 142. 24 L. Ed.
77; People v. Warden of City Prison. 157 N. Y. 116, 51 N. E. 1006. 43 L. R. A. 264, 68 Am. St. Rep. 7i
80
See, e.g., Europapress Holding D.O.O. v. Croatia, App. No. 25333/06, ¶ 58 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 22, 2009)
(HUDOC Database); Romanenko v. Russia, App. No. 11751/03, ¶ 42 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 8, 2009) (HUDOC
Database); Bodrožić v. Serbia, App. No. 32550/05, ¶ 55 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 23, 2009) (HUDOC Database);
Standard Verlags GmbH v. Austria (no. 2), App. No. 21277/05, ¶¶ 46, 52 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 4, 2009) (HUDOC
Database); A. v. Norway, App. No. 28070/06, ¶¶ 65, 66 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Apr. 9, 2009) (HUDOC Database);
Times Newspapers Ltd. v. The United Kingdom (nos. 1 and 2), App. Nos. 3002/03 & 23676/03, ¶¶ 45-46 (Eur.
Ct. H.R. Mar. 10, 2009) (HUDOC Database); Mahmudov v. Azerbaijan, App. No. 35877/04, ¶ 49 (Eur. Ct. H.R.
Dec. 18, 2008) (HUDOC Database); Petrina v. Romania, App. No. 78060/01, ¶ 36 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 14, 2008)
(HUDOC Database); Pfeifer v. Austria, App. No. 12556/03, ¶¶ 38, 49 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 15, 2007) (HUDOC
Database); Leempoel v. Belgium, App. No. 64772/01, ¶¶ 67, 78 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 9, 2006) (HUDOC
Database); White v. Sweden, App. No. 42435/02, ¶¶ 21, 26 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Sept. 19, 2006) (HUDOC Database);
Malisiewicz-Gasior v. Poland, App. No. 43797/98, ¶ 60 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Apr. 6, 2006) (HUDOC Database);
Minelli v. Switzerland (dec.), App. No. 14991/02, ¶ 2 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 14, 2005) (HUDOC Database);
Pedersen v. Denmark, App. No. 49017/99, ¶ 91 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 17, 2004) (HUDOC Database); Cumpănă v.
Romania [GC], 2004-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 69, 89; Karhuvaara v. Finland, 2004-X Eur. Ct. H.R. 263, 274; Abeberry
v. France (dec.), App. No. 58729/00 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Sept. 21, 2004) (HUDOC Database); Chauvy v. France,
2004-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 211, 229; Kuliś v. Poland, App. No. 15601/01, ¶ 54 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Mar. 18, 2008)
(HUDOC Database); Kwiecień v. Poland, App. No. 51744/99, ¶ 52 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan. 9, 2007) (HUDOC
Database); Ivanova v. Bulgaria, App. No. 36207/03, ¶ 67 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 14, 2008) (HUDOC Database). See
generally Flux v. Moldova (no. 6), App. No. 22824/04 (Eur. Ct. H.R. July 29, 2008) (HUDOC Database); Riolo
v. Italy, App. No. 42211/07 (Eur. Ct. H.R. July 17, 2008) (HUDOC Database); Alithia Publ’g Co. v. Cyprus,
App. No. 17550/03 (Eur. Ct. H.R. May 22, 2008) (HUDOC Database); Europapress Holding D.O.O. v. Croatia,
App. No. 25333/06, ¶ 58 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 22, 2009) (HUDOC Database); Romanenko v. Russia, App. No.
11751/03, ¶ 42 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 8, 2009) (HUDOC Database); Bodrožić v. Serbia, App. No. 32550/05, ¶ 45
(Eur. Ct. H.R. June 23, 2009) (HUDOC Database); Standard Verlags GmbH v. Austria (no. 2), App. No.
21277/05, ¶¶ 46, 52 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 4, 2009) (HUDOC Database); Mahmudov v. Azerbaijan, App. No.
35877/04, ¶ 49 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 18, 2008) (HUDOC Database); Flux v. Moldova (no. 6), App. No. 22824/04,
¶ 25 (Eur. Ct. H.R. July 29, 2008) (HUDOC Database); Riolo v. Italy, App. No. 42211/07, ¶ 62 (Eur. Ct. H.R.
July 17, 2008) (HUDOC Database); Alithia Publ’g Co. v. Cyprus, App. No. 17550/03, ¶ 63 (Eur. Ct. H.R. May
22, 2008) (HUDOC Database); Kuliś v. Poland, App. No. 15601/01, ¶ 54 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Mar. 18, 2008)
(HUDOC Database); Times Newspapers Ltd. v. The United Kingdom (nos. 1 and 2), App. Nos. 3002/03 &
23676/03, ¶¶ 45-46 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Mar. 10, 2009) (HUDOC Database); Ivanova v. Bulgaria, App. No.
36207/03, ¶ 67 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 14, 2008) (HUDOC Database); Kwiecień v. Poland, App. No. 51744/99, ¶
52 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan. 9, 2007) (HUDOC Database); Leempoel v. Belgium, App. No. 64772/01, ¶¶ 67, 78 (Eur.
Ct. H.R. Nov. 9, 2006) (HUDOC Database); Malisiewicz-Gąsior v. Poland, App. No. 43797/98, ¶ 60 (Eur. Ct.
H.R. Apr. 6, 2006) (HUDOC Database); Pedersen v. Denmark, App. No. 49017/99, ¶ 91 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 17,
2004) (HUDOC Database); Cumpănă v. Romania [GC], 2004-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 69, 89; Karhuvaara v. Finland,
2004-X Eur. Ct. H.R. 263, 274; Abeberry v. France (dec.), App. No. 58729/00 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Sept. 21, 2004)
(HUDOC Database).
16
may go around swinging a loaded gun along the road. Reputation is vague because a person
may have an esteemed reputation in his eyes, on the other hand, he may be looked upon as
one with lower esteem by others. What may be reputation for one, may be not for other.
Where parameters of reputation are so distinct for classes of society, it could be said to
breach Right to Equality and no reasonable classification could justify this disparity in terms
of reputation for a rich and for a poor. The Counsels, thus, humbly submit that such a
parameter for adjudging right to life be shunned as it would potentially breach the basic
structure of fundamental rights of equality.
[4.2] Absoluteness of reputation as a right harmful for society
[¶45] The positive obligation on the state to protect a person’s life is not absolute.81 Due to
limited resources, the state might not always be able fulfil this obligation. The jural postulates
talk of right and duty as twins. So, the right to life also has some duty. “Your freedom ends
where my nose begins.” Under the guise of right to life, a person cannot extinguish the same
right of others. He cannot walk around killing everyone and then claim that it is his right to
lead his life in any way he wants. Rather, one must be bound by the jurisprudential norms
when assessing interests of individual and society. The Counsels humbly submit that Article
21 is wrapped with negativity [4.2.1] and that Procedure of Sub-Committee was fair enough
[4.2.2].
[4.2.1] Article 21 is wrapped with negativity
[¶46] When a person’s right comes in direct conflict with the interests of the society at large
and acts as a hindrance to social justice, the rights of such individual should be curtailed.
Every right has some boundaries, they are not absolute. These are the reasonable restrictions.
81
Article 2: Right to Life EHRC (Oct. 3, 2017, 12:00 A.M.) https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/en/human-
rights-act/article-2-right-life.
17
A person cannot surpass the limit of decency, morality, public tranquility etc. If a person has
right to live, it does not mean that he would roam about naked on public streets making a fun
of the fabric of decency. If a person has a right to express his views, it does not mean that he
will start to utter curse words or commit sedition.
[¶47] Although Article 21 has been interpreted in positive terms, it must not be ignored that
the provision itself is wrapped in a sense of negativity. It says that a person’s right can be
taken away by procedure established by law. Any person who breaks the law and attracts for
himself the wrath of punishment, may be deprived of his life by due process of law.
However, the term ‘life’ has been given so expansive an interpretation that the human rights
activists have gone to the extent of demanding abolition of death penalty. Such disastrous
interpretation is uncalled for because if there is no punishment, there would be no deterrence
and if there is no deterrence, people would freely breach law and there would be chaos and
disorder.
[¶48] In order to give a safe interpretation and calculated expansion to the term ‘life’ the
Courts would have to interpret it in the light of the negativity it carries. The march of Article
21 is never-ending. Its frontiers are ever-expanding and the Courts never shy away from
exploring newer dimensions of ‘life’. The almost inexhaustible concept of ‘dignified life’
should be handled cautiously and the journey of the expansion of term ‘life’ should be guided
by principles of justice, equity and good conscience and read under the light of social
interests and reasonable restrictions.
[4.2.2] Procedure of Sub-Committee was fair enough
[¶49] Drawing a relation with the facts of the instant case, it is submitted that the procedure
of Sub-Committee was fair enough and no review or quashing of the same is needed. The
18
functions of the Committee extend ‘beyond the formality of expenditure to its wisdom,
faithfulness and economy.82Principles of Natural justice were applied fairly as prior notices
were given.83
[¶50] If the Government decides to institute a commission of inquiry under Section 3 of the
Commission of Inquiry Act, 1952, the Commission is under Section 8B of the said Act duty
bound to afford to any person whose conduct it may inquire into or whose reputation is likely
to be affected prejudicially, an opportunity of being heard in the matter and to produce
evidence in his defence. The same rights were given to Mrs. ‘K’ and she was not under
obligation to attend the Committee.84
[¶51] The Counsels quote State of Karnatka v. Union of India85,
Allegations into the conduct of Ministers of a State Government is a matter of

public importance, which the Union Government would be competent to inquire
into, as the ‘appropriate Government’ under s. 3(1) of the Commission of Inquiry
Act, 1952. If so, in such a matter both the Union and State Governments would
be entitled to exercise the power under this Act, to appoint parallel Commissions.
Under s. 7(1) (a), the Government has the discretion to discontinue a Commission
if at any time it is of the opinion that the inquiry was necessary; and the court
cannot quash such order in the absence of malafides.
[¶52] Basing their submissions on the above cited authorities and case laws, the Counsels
humbly submit that there was no substantive procedural non-compliance in the proceedings
of the Sub-Committee and therefore, the proceedings and reports could not be quashed.
82
S.N. CHAND, PUBLIC FINANCE 569 (2008); E. L. NORMANTON, THE ACCOUNTABILITY AND AUDIT OF
GOVERNMENTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 108 (1966); SHASHISHEKHAR GOPAL DEOGAONKAR, PARLIAMENTARY
SYSTEM IN INDIA 128 (1997), see also ¶ 6, Page 3, STATEMENT OF FACTS, Prof. N.R. Madhava Menon SAARC
Mooting Competition 2017-18.
83
¶ 13 & 13A, Page 5-6, STATEMENT OF FACTS, Prof. N.R. Madhava Menon SAARC Mooting Competition
2017-18.
84
85
A.I.R 1978 S.C 68
19
[¶53] “Health is a state of complete physical, mental and social wellbeing and not merely the
absence of disease.”86 . It is humbly submitted by the Counsels that Health care is not a
human right [5.1], Right to access to health care has to be read with bio-medical researches
[5.2], Duty of maintenance of health care is distributed and not concentrated one State [5.3]
and that Permission to companies was given “in principle” only [5.4].
[5.1] Right to health cannot be elevated to the position of human right
[¶54] Health care is difficult to define. It encompasses preventive care, public health
measures, health promotion, and medical and surgical treatment of established illness.87
Fundamental rights and human rights are distinct. The former is an obligation on the State
while the latter is granted by the virtue of birth of a man.88 The Fundamental rights are
granted while human rights are guaranteed. A Statute cannot grant a human right. A man
brings it with him in this world.
[¶55] The Counsels submit that if the right under Art. 21 H is elevated to the position of a
human right, it would be a disastrous situation. It would be difficult to assess whether the
human right to health care includes restrictive arena like clean water and adequate food or it
expands its ambit and includes have a right to organ transplantation, cosmetic surgery,
infertility treatment, and the most expensive medicine. As long as this question is
unanswerable, the Counsels argue that it would be difficult to define health care and for
86
Kirloskar Brothers Ltd. v. Employees' State Insurance Corpn., A.I.R.1996 S.C. 3261.
87
Philip Barlow, Health Care is not a Human Right 319 (7205) BRITISH MEDICAL JOURNAL, 319-321 (1999).
88
James Griffin, Discrepancies between the Best Philosophical Account of Human Rights and the International
Law of Human Rights 101 (1) PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY 1-28 (2001); ALAN GEREWITH,
HUMAN RIGHTS 41 (1982); James Nickel, Human Rights in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ETHICS 561 (L. Becker and C.
Becker eds., 1992).
20
something to count as a human right the minimum requirement should surely be that the right
in question is capable of definition.
[5.2] Right to access to health care has to be read with bio-medical researches
[¶56] The Constitution directs the state to take measures to improve the condition of health
care of the people.89 This obligation on the part of State can be fulfilled by constant
revolutions in the fields of medicine and science. The Counsels submit that with the
stagnation of medical arena, there would be a stagnation of the standards of life even. With
the advancement of medicine and allied fields, there could be a situation of eradication of
diseases like AIDS etc. The obligation on State’s shoulders to improve health care condition
of people can never be realized without free and full-fledged research and development in the
arena of science. In this way, there may be failures or successes. But until and unless Eden
strives forward to build its own stance in the world medicinal arena, it would have to be
restricted only to generic medicines and that would exploit the citizens.
[¶57] The Counsels submit that the Eden Council of Medicinal Research also provides for
the guidelines in this regard.90 In the present time, when couples are forced to adopt some
untoward ways to procure a child, a research in the field of infertility would be a boon for
them. The Research carried on was under strict tutelage of the Eden Medical Research
Council and moreover, the cause of the Research was a noble one and there were no such
evidences of undue influence or coercion and the women subjected to the trial were mostly
literate. The Counsels humbly submit that the base of the petition by People’s Cause is shaky
89
DR.K SIVACHITHAPPA, EQUALITY AND SUSTAINABLE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT - ISSUES AND POLICY
IMPLICATIONS 316 (2014).
90
INDIAN COUNCIL OF MEDICAL RESEARCH, ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH ON HUMAN
PARTICIPANTS (2006).
21
and is tainted with false allegations against the trial which would give a new dimension to the
world of reproductive health care.
[5.3] Duty of maintenance of health care is distributed and not concentrated one State
[¶58] Article 21 H uses the words “The State shall by its own efforts, or through any form of
citizen endeavours or through any partnership.”91 The words qualify the expression “ensure
that all aspects of health care are provided for”. This clearly calls for interpretation of the two
expressions. The former calls for a literal interpretation whereby it can be assessed that the
duty over the State is limited not only to its own efforts but extends to “any form of citizen
endeavours or partnership”. The words “citizen endeavours” when read with “any form”
would lead to a very broad area of ventures where the primary functional wing is maintained
by citizens. Indian Constitution places this duty, as opposed to Eden constitution, in Directive
Principles of State Policies92, which are not justiciable in Court. 93
91
EDEN CONST., art. 21 H, cl.(b).
92
INDIA CONST., arts. 38, 39 cl. e, 41, 42, 47, 48A.
93
See, National Federation of Blinds v. State of U.P., 2000 (2) A.W.C. 1234; State of Bombay v. RMDC, A.I.R.
1956 Bom. 1; T. Devadesan v. UOI, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 179; N.K. Doongaji &Co. v. State of M.P., A.I.R. 1975
M.P. 1; P. Annamalai v. The Collector of Ramanathapuram, (1988) 2 M.L.J. 398; Dr. N.M. Prasad v. Director,
Shri Jayaveda Institute of Cardioliogy, A.I.R. 1994 Kant. 309; Narsimha Rao v. Govt. of A.P., A.I.R. 1977 A.P.
178; Minerva Mills v. UOI, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1789; Motilal v. Govt. of State of U.P., A.I.R. 1951 All. 257; Smt.
Ujjambai v. State of U.P., (1963) 1 S.C.R. 778; A.P. Dalit Mahasabha v. Govt. of A.P., (1993) 6 A.L.D. 63;
Akhil Bhartiya Soshit Karmachari Sangh (Railway) v. UOI, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 298; Delhi Development
Authority, N.D. v. Joint Action Committee, A.I.R. 2008 S.C. 1343; In re Krishnadas Mandal and ors., A.I.R
1981 Cal. 11; Khurshed Sharfuddin and S. Hafiz Khadar Ibrahim v. IBP Co. Ltd, (2009) 5 M.L.J. 1350;
Balwant Raj v. UOI, A.I.R. 1968 All. 14; S. Devakadaksham v. Dist. Educational Officer, (2006) 4 M.L.J 1580;
Rameshwar Prasad Kedarnath v. D.M., A.I.R. 1954 All. 144; Omprakash Dukhilal Yadav v. UOI, (2003) 3
S.L.J. 370 C.A.J.; Champakam Dorairajan v. State of Madras, A.I.R. 1951 Mad. 120; I.C. Golaknath v. State of
Punjab, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1643; Kesvananda Bharti v. State of Kerala, A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 1461; Saurashtra Safai
Kamdar Vikas Samiti v. State of Gujarat, (2000) 2 G.L.R. 1476; Lily Thomas v. UOI, (2000) 2 A.L.D. (Cri.)
686; General Secretary, Linguistic Minorities Protection Committee v. State of Karnataka, A.I.R. 1986 Kant.
226; Shri Ramanjanyaswami Vidya Sanstha, Kumaloor v. State of Karnataka, I.L.R. 2000 Kar. 922;
Kishorkumar Prabhudas Tanna v. State of Gujarat, (2009) 1 G.L.R. 683; Oriental Gas Limited v. State of West
Bengal, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 248; Nandlal Sharma v. State of Rajasthan, (1982) W.L.N 681; In re M. Thomas,
A.I.R. 1953 Mad. 31; Gadadhan v. State of W.B., A.I.R. 1963 Cal. 565; K. Rajendran v. State of T.N., A.I.R.
1982 S.C. 1107; T.P. Kunhiraman v. Official Assignee, Madras, A.I.R. 1983 Mad. 145; P.M.
Ashwnathanarayana Setty v. State of Karnataka, A.I.R. 1989 S.C. 100; U.B.S.E Board v. Hari Shankar, A.I.R.
1979 S.C. 65; Steel Authority of India Ltd. v. National Union Waterfront Workers, A.I.R 2001 S.C. 3527;
Orissa Textile and Steel Ltd. v. State of Orissa, A.I.R. 2002 S.C. 708; Ashoka Smokeless Coal India (P) Ltd. v.
22
Endeavour means “an attempt”.94 The Counsels humbly submit that NGOs and VOs are
citizen endeavours as they are registered society. Any seven or more persons associated for
any literary, scientific, or charitable purpose, or for any such purpose can get society
registered.95 Charitable purposes could be grouped into four heads, (i) relief of poverty, (ii)
education, (iii) advancement of religion and (iv) other purposes beneficial to the community
not coming under any of the preceding heads.96
[¶59] The last clause talks of other purposes beneficial to community and acts as a residuary
clause. This, the Counsels submit, includes SHCG which a registered society engaged in the
provision of social welfare/ healthcare facilities including reproductive assistance to infertile
couples/ individuals – who face difficulties in becoming a parent or in conceiving a child.97
The subject-matter of SHCG is itself so noble that it is clear from its agenda that it is a citizen
endeavour which strives to provide for access to health care.
[¶60] The Counsels also submit that the words “citizen endeavours” include NGOs and VOs.
It is an open option on the State that it can transfer its duty to these organisations. Even if not,
there is a duty on them to provide access to health care as they are always under the control
of State and its laws.
[¶61] Right to health as fundamental right cannot give remedy for ill person. It will only
create a situation where the State would try to prove that the illness was not caused by its
actions or inaction. Rather, the right to access to healthcare is a wider perspective. If a citizen
is ill, he can easily claim his right to access to health care and get immediate relief.
UOI, (2007) 2 S.C.C. 840; State of U.P. v. Jeet S. Bisht, (2007) 6 S.C.C. 586; State of Gujarat v. Mirzapur Moti
Kureshi Kasab Jamat, (2005) 8 S.C.C 534; Marwa Manghai v. Sangham Sampat, A.I.R. 1960 Punj. 35.
94
JOHN BOUVIER, A LAW DICTIONARY, ADAPTED TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES
(1856).
95
§1, THE SOCIETIES REGISTRATION ACT, 1860.
96
Hindu Public v. Rajdhani Puja Samithee, A.I.R. 1999 S.C. 964.
97
¶4, Page 2-3, STATEMENT OF FACTS, Prof. N.R. Madhava Menon SAARC Mooting Competition 2017-18.
23
Moreover, chances of illness would be reduced as when the State is obliged to provide access
to health care, it would expand its functions and provide the same via citizen endeavours also
thus increasing the outreach. There is no need of right to health for a person to be healthy. A
person should have health entitlements, medical aid, medical assistance which is provided by
States.
[5.4] Permission to companies was given “in principle” only
[¶62] The Counsels humbly submit that the permission was given by the then Government of
Eden and it was given in principle. The permission in principle has two stages: permission in
principle stage establishes whether a site is suitable in-principle for residential development
and the second (‘technical details consent’) stage is when the detailed development proposals
are assessed. Permission in principle granted only to work under supervision of Eden Council
of Medical Research. This involvement of SHCG with the experimentation process was not
publically known because of principles of privacy and confidentiality whereby the identity
and records of the human participants of the research or experiment are as far as possible kept
confidential.98
[¶63] The permission was given only for the experimentations to be carried on subject to
supervision of Eden Council of Medical Research. There was no recklessness on the part of
ruling party in capacity of the Government. The Counsels humbly submit that the Corporates
who were pioneers of A.R.T.99 raised such issue with mala fide intention to defame the drug
manufacturing companies in order to safeguard their positions.
98
INDIAN COUNCIL OF MEDICAL RESEARCH, ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH ON HUMAN
PARTICIPANTS 2(2006).
99
¶19, Page 7, STATEMENT OF FACTS, Prof. N.R. Madhava Menon SAARC Mooting Competition 2017-18.
24
PRAYER
Wherefore in the light of the issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited, it is
humbly prayed that this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to adjudge and declare:
1. That Article 102 is constitutionally valid.
2. That Defamation laws under Tort Claims Act, 2016 are in direct conflict with
freedom of speech and expression and are unconstitutional.
3. That Right to Reputation is not an absolute right.
4. That Right to Health is not a Fundamental Right.
5. That Right to Access to Healthcare is subject to being “provided by law” and is not
absolute right.
AND PASS ANY OTHER ORDER OR DIRECTION THAT THIS HON’BLE COURT MAY DEEM FIT IN
THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE, EQUITY AND GOOD CONSCIENCE.
ALL OF WHICH IS HUMBLY PRAYED,

NRMC-306
COUNSELS FOR THE RESPONDENT
25

NRMC 306 Respondent

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NRMC-306

ON SUBMISSION TO THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF EDEN

UNDER ARTICLE 136 r/w 145(3) OF THE CONSTITUTION OF EDEN

People’s Cause and Others ..................................................................Petitioner

The Government of Eden ..................................................................... Respondent

Union of Eden and Another ................................................................. Respondent

WRIT PETITION NOS. ___/2017

WRIT PETITION NOS. ___/2017, ___/2017

MEMORIAL FOR THE RESPONDENT

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES .............................................................................................................. iv-xiii

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION .................................................................................................... xiv

STATEMENT OF FACTS ................................................................................................................. xiv-xvi

STATEMENT OF ISSUES ................................................................................................................ xvii

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS ......................................................................................................... xvii-xviii

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED .............................................................................................................. 1-25

1. PRELIMINARY JURISDICTION FOR PETITIONS IS INADEQUATE ...................................... 1-5

1.1 Court Cannot Interfere in Legislative Proceedings ................................................................. 1-3

1.2 Alternative Relief has not been exhausted .............................................................................. 3-4

1.3 No case against Dr. ‘A’ for defamation .................................................................................. 4-5

2. ARTICLE 102 IS CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID AS IT RESTRICTS JUDICIAL REVIEW ........... 5-10

a strong and healthy democracy .................................................................................................... 6-8

a strong and healthy democracy .................................................................................................... 8-9

and legislature ............................................................................................................................... 9-10

FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXPRESSION ....................................................................................... 10-12

3.3. The Definition in Section 2 (k) needs amendment ................................................................ 12

4. RIGHT TO REPUTATION IS NOT AN ABSOLUTE RIGHT ....................................................... 13-20

4.2 Absoluteness of reputation as a right harmful for society ...................................................... 17-20

5. RIGHT TO HEALTH NOT A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT; RIGHT TO ACCESS TO

5.4 Permission to companies was given “in principle” only ........................................................ 24

2.A.P. Dalit Mahasabha v. Govt. of A.P., (1993) 6 A.L.D. 63 ................................................ 22

6.Ashoka Kumar Thakur v. Union of India , 2008 (56) B.L.J.R. 1292.................................... 13

9.Attorney-General v. Corporation of the City of Adelaide,(2013) 249 CLR 1 ...................... 11

10.Balwant Raj v. UOI, A.I.R. 1968 All. 14 ............................................................................. 22

14.Bradlaugh v. Gosset, (1884) 12 QBD 271 ........................................................................... 2,8

15.Burdett v. Abbot, (1810) 14 East 1 ..................................................................................... 8

16.Champakam Dorairajan v. State of Madras, A.I.R. 1951 Mad. 120 .................................... 23

17.Chauvy v. France, 2004-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 211, 229 ............................................................. 16

21.Cumpănă v. Romania [GC], 2004-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 69, 89 ................................................. 16

24.Duport Steels Ltd. v. Sirs, [1980] 1 WLR 142 ..................................................................... 6

27.Gadadhan v. State of W.B., A.I.R. 1963 Cal. 565 ................................................................ 23

28.General Secretary, Linguistic Minorities Protection Committee v. State of Karnataka,

A.I.R. 1986 Kant. 226 ....................................................................................................... 23

29.Golaknath v. State of Punjab, A.I.R 1967 S.C. 1643 ........................................................... 6,23

33.In re I.M.L. v. State of Utah, 61 P.3d 1038 (Utah 2002) ..................................................... 11

34.In re Krishnadas Mandal and ors., A.I.R 1981 Cal. 11 ........................................................ 22

35.In re M. Thomas, A.I.R. 1953 Mad. 31 ................................................................................ 23

38.INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).................................................................................... 6

40.Ivey v. Alabama, 821 So.2d 937 (Ala. 2001) ....................................................................... 11

41.Jackson v. Her Majesty’s Attorney General, [2005] UKHL 56 ........................................... 6

(Civil) No.494 Of 2012. .................................................................................................... 13

45.K. Rajendran v. State of T.N., A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 1107 ......................................................... 23

46.K.A. Mathialagan v. P. Srinivasan, A.I.R. 1973 Mad. 371 .................................................. 1

48.Kamal R. Khan v. State of Maharashtra, 2009 (4) Bom.C.R. 496 ....................................... 13

49.Karhuvaara v. Finland, 2004-X Eur. Ct. H.R. 263, 274 ....................................................... 16

50.Kesvananda Bharti v. State of Kerala, A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 1461 ............................................. 23

54.Kishorkumar Prabhudas Tanna v. State of Gujarat, (2009) 1 G.L.R. 683 ........................... 23

59.Lily Thomas v. UOI, (2000) 2 A.L.D. (Cri.) 686 ................................................................. 23

62.M’Pherson v. Daniels (1829) 10 b & C 263 ........................................................................ 15

66.Mallikarjuna v. State of Andhra Pradesh , A.I.R 1990 S.C. 1251........................................ 6

67.Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). ............................................................................. 6

Puja Samithee, A.I.R. 1999 S.C. 964 ................................................................................ 23

69.McLoughlin v. O'Brian, [1983] 1 AC 410 ........................................................................... 6

70.Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990). .......................................................... 5

WRIT PETITION NOS. _/2017, _/2017