Editorial: 11th Issue October 29th 2018

Blog: http://michaelrdjames.org/

Journal site https://www.aletheiaeducation.eu/

https://joom.ag/SgQa

The first lecture is entitled “The Sixth Centrepiece lecture on The Philosophy of
Education” and it is the Sixth lecture given by Jude Sutton, one of the main
characters in the recently published Philosophical/educational novel “The
World Explored, the World Suffered: The Exeter lectures”.

The lecture explores Science and Theory of Knowledge from the point of view
of the philosophy of education in partly Aristotelian and partly Kantian terms.
Sutton claims Science is concerned with many things but its pretensions exceed
its achievements in the realms of explanation and understanding:.

“Let me say right away for those of you who have heard firstly, my ethical criticisms of some
forms of science and, secondly, my criticisms of those scientists who believe that science is
more concerned with exploration and experimentation than explanation and understanding,
that I believe the pretensions of this subject exceed its achievements especially when it
concerns the understanding of the human sphere of existence. I, of course, acknowledge the
considerable achievement of scientists in the realm of physics, chemistry and biology and am
keenly awaiting the general unified theory of all regions of Science, which is lacking at
present.

Sutton points out that whilst ethics is concerned with understanding the good to
be aimed at via action and its role in the constrution of a flourishing life,
mathematics is concerned with converting the reality of an infinite continuum
into finite entities which then can be manipulated in mathematical formulae and
demonstrations. The mathematical scientist as a consequence of embracing
mathematics concerns herself with the measurement of motion.

A game of billiards is used as the scenario for the integration of different areas
of knowledge:

The human billiard player is not caused to move by outside forces as he would be if he fell off
a cliff, but rather causes himself to move by amongst other things his tactical and strategic
thoughts concerning which ball to play and how to position his white after the play in order to
pot as many balls as possible and win the game. His actions occur in the field of physical
causes and these can be investigated by the sciences mentioned above. The billiard ball of
course is an artifact and has therefore a mixed theoretical and practical history that would take
us outside the immediate theatre of the game of billiards. The same is true of the agent who is
a composite of causes of different kinds. We have referred in earlier lectures to the
importance of Aristotelian hylomorphism in our explanations of such diverse kinds of
phenomena. In a complex human situation such as the game of billiards all 4 causes or kinds
of explanation will be needed for a complete explanation and understanding of all of the
phenomena involved. Two kinds of explanation will be needed for the material involved in
the motion and the immediate proximal causes of the bringing about of motion in the game.
Two of the causes or kinds of explanations will refer to the intentions, tactics and strategies
tied up with the agents involved in the game and also perhaps to life projects and plans
extending beyond the space-time continuum of the game. These latter two types of
explanation will combine what Aristotle called the formal and final causes. All 4 causes are
interwoven.”

Sutton then turns to Aristotle to combat the modern scientists tendency to divide
logical wholes into physical parts :

Let me conclude by distancing myself from the flat world of the billiard table, where the
event of one billiard ball impacting another encourages the idea that we are witnessing two
events happening and not just one holistic change. Aristotle takes us to the building- site to
reflect upon such matters: houses are built on building sites, and, according to Aristotle there
is only one activity going on and that is the builder building the house. One change is
occurring. The divided whole, namely, the builder building and the finished house are
theoretically possible at a descriptive level. But we should not then proceed from this
theoretical possibility to ask about the practical relation between the two events. Answers
will necessarily be two-dimensional and appeal to billiard- ball kinds of mechanisms linking
these two “imaginative hypotheticals”. This process of the house being built is teleological.
The process is conceptualized in terms of the end of the activity, or the good being brought
about by the activity. Proceeding in the opposite direction in search of a linear regression and
asking about the event preceding the part of the activity one is currently perceiving will cut
the whole process into unrecognizable ribbons. One terminus of such a scientific regression
could end somewhat paradoxically in Platonism. Here the search may end up at an idea of the
house in the builders mind. Another possible outcome of this scientific regression is that the
process is broken into so many fragments that no principle uniting them into a whole activity
can be thought of or imagined. In the attempt to frantically re-introduce the whole into the
fragments, mereological fallacies are committed such as “the brain understands language”:
which a number of brain researchers believe to be true. A brain is a part of a man but only a
man understands language. You can try, as some have, to avoid the issue by placing
“understand” in quotation marks but that will not help matters. You will also need to make
highly artificial stipulations to the effect that “by “understand” I mean that such and such
brain circuits will jump into operation. Neural circuits of course jump into operation when I
perceive a cat, or move a muscle or eat my food or when I am pricked by a pin. When this is
pointed out the neural scientist then sets out to find differences between neural circuits. That
is, he tries to find an Aristotelian form embedded in the neural circuits. The whole
investigation at this point has become so convoluted that the philosopher does not have the
heart to tell the scientist he is looking in the wrong place
Lecture numbers 4, 5 and 6 of Smiths lecture series on the Cosmonova site
discuss Plato’s Republic and in particular the parts of the soul and the
construction of the just city from the necessery activities of citizens who aim to
provide the city with everything needed to become self sufficient in the name of
justice. Socrates in fact on the basis of the soul regulated by reason, constructs
two cities,the so called “healthy” and “fevered” cities the latter being probably
the city of luxury which requires philosophers as rulers in order to regulate the
unruly desires of the citizens. The Kantian criticism of this position attempts to
maintain the idealism but in the name of holism views the person more like a
university possessed of faculties and the city-state as a consequence is
transformed into a Republic without kings or emperors:

Another  form  of  this  brand  of  idealism,  Kant’s  Stoical  duty-­‐based  theory,  would  argue  
that  the  soul  should  not  be  divided  Platonically  into  Reason,  Spirit,  and  Appetites,  on  the  
grounds  that  if  the  soul  is  a  non-­‐material  principle  it  does  not  make  sense  to  talk  of  parts  
or  divisions.  The  soul  disappears  as  a  theoretical  entity  and  Kant  talks  more  holistically  
in  terms  of  the  person  or  the  man  who  is  metaphysically  constituted  of  what  happens  to  
him  and  what  he  causes  to  happen  in  accordance  with  certain  categories  of  the  
understanding  and  ideas  of  reason.  The  person  becomes  more  like  a  university  for  Kant  
with  a  number  of  faculties  performing  different  functions.  The  Sensibility,  the  
Understanding,  and  Reason(Theoretical  and  Practical)  constitute  these  faculties  of  the  
person  and  this,  of  course,  is  a  very  theoretical  abstract  picture  of  the  whole  of  man.  
Perhaps  judgment  is  also  another  faculty  of  the  Stoic  man  that  is  used  for  life  in  the  polis  
and  perhaps  the  harmony  of  these  faculties  constitutes  the  areté  of  this  great-­‐souled  
man  as  perhaps  Aristotle  might  call  him.  For  Kant  political  judgment  must  fall  into  the  
realm  of  the  hypothetical  imperative,  the  world  of  prudential  reasoning  where  here  
perhaps  we  can  only  expect  to  see  really  statesmanlike  behaviour  in  a  kingdom  of  ends  
where  the  rule  of  law  is  isomorphic  with  the  moral  law  of  our  minds.  Here  Kant  and  
Aristotle  may  agree  that  Politics  aims  at  the  good  in  a  very  uncertain  manner  and  
certainty  therefore  cannot  be  demanded  in  the  same  way  it  can  in  other  domains.  One  
essential  difference  between  Plato  and  Aristotle  and  Kant  is  that  the  two  former  
philosophers  believe  in  monarchy  as  a  form  of  government  whereas  Kant  favours  the  
Republic  form  of  government  and  specifically  criticises  Kings  for  the  money  that  was  
spent  on  wars  instead  of  education  and  indirectly  he,  as  we  know,  also  criticised  an  
Emperor  for  forbidding  him  to  write  about  Religion.

The third lecture is part four of Aristotle in the Introduction to Philosophy

series. The issues discussed are “political”. The leture begins with the following:

“Every state is a community of some kind and every community is established with a view to some good, for
everyone always acts in order to obtain that which they think good. But, if all communities aim at some good,
the state or political community, which is the highest of all, and which embraces all the rest, aims at good in a
greater degree than any other, and at the highest good.”
The city state is then resolved into its historical/practical/developmental parts of
the family striving to become self sufficient and together with other families
with the same aim forming a village and the village subsequently also aiming at
self sufficiency strives to form a greater unit of a city state. This process is both
hylomorphic and organic:

The  interesting  philosophical  question  to  pose  is  “What  is  the  motivation  for  claiming  
that  the  household  contains  the  forms  of  rule  which  will  then  manifest  themselves  at  the  
higher  level  of  city  states?”  To  understand  this  one  must  really  appreciate  the  extent  to  
which  Aristotle  means  what  he  says  when  he  speaks  of  the  naturalness  of  the  formation  
of  the  city-­‐state.  By  “natural”  is  meant  “biological”  in  the  sense  in  which  biology  as  a  
discipline  aims  at  an  account  of  life  forms.  Now  another  interesting  question  to  pose  is  
“Can  a  city  state  be  regarded  as  an  advanced  form  of  life?”  or  is  it  as  is  sometimes  viewed  
through  our  modern  lenses  merely  an  artificial  concrete  jungle  of  asphalt  streets  and  
buildings.  A  city  is  clearly  partly  conceived  thus  but  even  this  conception  requires  some  
reference  to  the  living  “builders”  of  this  so  -­‐called  “jungle”.  
A  city  is  alive  in  the  sense  Aristotle  intended.  This  life  has  been  transmitted  over  
manifolds  of  generations  through  the  elements  of  the  household  and  the  village  in  
accordance  with  actualisation  processes  and  conditions.  
The  city  is  certainly  the  place  in  which  external  goods,  the  goods  of  the  body  and  the  
goods  of  the  soul  are  best  catered  for.  It  is  certainly,  in  many  senses  more  alive  than  the  
village  that  in  comparison  is  often  designated  as  “sleepy”.  The  metaphysical  principles  of  
“that  which  a  thing  changes  from”,  “that  which  a  thing  changes  to”  and  “that  which  
endures  throughout  the  change”  is  certainly  operating  in  the  transformation  of  
households  into  villages  and  villages  into  city-­‐states.  Constitutional  rule  is  obviously  the  
telos  of  this  process  much  as  the  frog  is  the  telos  of  the  tadpole.  One  should  not  be  
misled  by  physical  dissimilarities  that  disguise  the  underlying  formative  processes.  
 
Aristotle’s  thoughts  raise  the  question  of  the  ideal  size  of    the    state  one  should  live  in  
and  in  relation  to  this  issue    the  lecture  ends  with  a  reference  to  Hannah  Arendt’s  
criticisms  of    the  nation  state:  
 
Hannah  Arendt,  too,  was  a  critic  of  the  nation  state.  In  her  earlier  works  she  claimed  that  
the  terrible  events  of  the  terrible  20th  century  point  to  the  conclusion  that  the  nation  
state  has  failed.  Clearly,  our  educational  institutions  have  not  been  able  to  bear  the  
Aristotelian  responsibility  that  has  been  placed  upon  them.  In  Aristotelian  terms  our  
educational  systems  ought  to  have  been  concentrating  their  attention  on  the  liberal  and  
humanistic  virtues,  developing  both  our  theoretical  and  practical  reasoning  capacities  to  
such  an  extent  that  political  participation  at  high  levels  are  regarded  as  obligations  to  
the  constitution  of  the  state.  By  “participation”  in  this  representative  context  is  probably  
meant  “acquisition  of  knowledge”  and  informed  debate  using  that  knowledge,  perhaps  
also  close  contact  with  ones  representative  over  the  issues  of  the  day  and  of  course  an  
obligation  to  vote.  The  word  “obligation”  shall  here  be  construed  not  in  its  modern  sense  
in  terms  of  social  contract  theory  where  the  relation  between  the  rulers  and  the  ruled  is  
conceived  to  be  a  significantly  artificial,  conventional,  non-­‐organic  affair.  For  Aristotle,  
the  “obligation”  of  the  rulers  and  the  ruled  would  be  to  ensure  the  common  good  
prevailed  for  the  whole  city  rather  than  the  limited  goods  that  are  conferred  upon  two  
contracting  parties  where  freedom  is  bartered  for  security.  The  idea  of  giving  up  ones  
freedom(an  essential  part  of  ones  human  nature,  according  to  Kant)  so  that  a  
“policeman  state”  can  regulate  the  hustle  and  bustle  of  city  life  is  a  very  un-­‐Aristotelian  
position.  For  him  modern  men  ought  to  regulate  themselves  socially  and  individually  by  
developing  capacities  into  virtuous  dispositions  with  the  assistance  of  the  polis  and  its  
provision  of  public  education.  There  is  state  regulation  but  of  a  liberal  humanistic  and  
academic  kind.  On  this  model  there  is  no  need  for  a  “contract”  to  be  used  in  a  tribunal  in  
case  one  of  the  parties  to  the  contract  reneges  on  “the  deal”.  Aristotle’s  citizens  and  
rulers  trust  each  other:  they  are  “friends”.  If  the  size  of  a  nation  state  is  such  that  
virtuous  dispositions  cannot  be  the  result  of  education,  then  this,  for  Aristotle,  would  be  
an  argument  against  communities  which  are  too  large  for  such  ventures.