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7
Personality and Persuasion
Mark Hamilton and Paul Mineo
This chapter examines the role of individual difference variables in persuasion. Two
main topics are considered. The first topic is the role of personality in persuasion. The second
topic is the role of receiver gender in persuasion.

Belief Systems Theory

Belief Systems Theory (Hamilton & Mineo, 1996; Rokeach, 1960, 1968) claims that
beliefs are structured along a central-peripheral dimension based on their structural
interconnectedness in the belief system, depicted in Figure 7.1.

---------- Insert Figure 7.1 about here ----------

Beliefs fall within three regions along this continuum, characterized by their degree
connectedness. The most connected beliefs fall in what Rokeach calls a central region. These
are the beliefs associated with personality. Their connections with other parts of the belief
system give these beliefs influence that permeates the belief system, and their pervasiveness
generates inertia that gives the impression that certain aspects of the person are persistent over
time. The Intermediate Region consists of justification processes that allow the derivation of
beliefs from personality. Figure 7.2 shows the Central Region associated with personality, the
Intermediate Region associated with justification processes, and the Peripheral Region associated
with derived beliefs and attitudes.

---------- Insert Figure 7.2 about here ----------

Personality consists of primitive beliefs -- those that serve as primitives for the rest of the
belief system.

Personality
Personality as defined by the Central Region consists of primitive beliefs formed by an
individual's interaction with the environment. Belief Systems Theory (BST) describes a
progressive development of personality in which the secondary primitives of self-concept follow
from the primary primitives that are the cognitive competencies, and the tertiary primitives of
generalized other beliefs follow from the self-concept beliefs. This developmental progression
of beliefs is shown in Figure 7.3.

---------- Insert Figure 7.3 about here ----------

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The developmental foundation of personality should continue to constrain the

organization of beliefs in adults. That is, more central beliefs exert a “top-down” influence on
more peripheral beliefs that acts as inertia against attempts to change the more peripheral beliefs
as shown in Figure 7.4.

---------- Insert Figure 7.4 about here ----------

We can deconstruct the hierarchical structure shown in Figure 7.4 to better illustrate how
that structure develops over time, as depicted in Figure 7.5. The longer that cognitive practices
initiated during childhood (primary primitives) continue, the more firmly anchored they become.
This allows the primary primitives to exert a continuous and systematic effect on the self-concept
(secondary primitives) and the concept of the generalized other (tertiary primitives). These
developmental processes are depicted in Figure 7.5.

---------- Insert Figure 7.5 about here ----------

Cognitive competencies and their effects

The most central of the primitives, the primary primitives related to cognitive
competence, are related to the person's management of the physical world. These primitives are
related to the cognitive dimensions of aptitude, motivation, and activity. Cognitive aptitude is
conceptualized as intellect (measured as scores on intelligence and mental ability tests) and
analytic ability. Motivation is conceptualized as Need for Cognition (NC) and curiosity.
Activity is conceptualized as cognitive differentiation (measured as contrast reactivity, field
independence, person and object differentiation, and equivalence range), cognitive integration
(measured as schematizing, tolerance for unrealistic experiences), and the reflective control over
impulses (measured as scanning and color-word interference).
Cognitive activity. Cognitive control (Klein, 1954) can be thought of as an intervening
variable, a hypothetical process that directs the expression of need in socially acceptable ways, as
required by the situation. In this sense it is similar to Freud's concept of the ego. We prefer the
term cognitive activity to cognitive control as a rubric under which the following dimensions can
be placed:

1. tolerance for unrealistic experiences: this is a person's ability to accept and report experiences
at variance with conventional reality

2. conceptual differentiation: this is the extent to which an individual is consistent in their

perception of what is similar or identical in a variety of adaptive tasks. It can also be thought of
as the degree of differentiation in a person's experience of similarity and difference. In the free-
sorting measure of differentiation, a highly differentiated person would use many categories into
which objects would be classified, whereas a person with low differentiation would use few
categories.

3. consticted-flexible control: this dimension can be represented by the continuum below.

Constricted Flexible
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compulsiveness values
meticulous information
value order
hate disorder
easily distracted

4. Leveling-sharpening: in the assimilation process, memory traces interact with new

perceptions, such that the more memory traces affect perception of new stimuli, the greater the
assimilation. This dimension can be represented by the continuum below.

Leveling Sharpening

Simple cognitive field Complex cognitive field

High degree of assimilation Low degree of assimilation

5. Scanning: the extent to which people attempt to verify the judgments they make

6. Contrast reactivity: a person’s reactivity reaction to differences between similar stimuli

7. Field articulation: a person’s ability to selectively attend to relevant rather than compellingly
irrelevant stimuli.

Relationships among cognitive competencies. Intelligence seems to have a moderately

strong positive effect on a person’s Need for Cognition (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982, Study 3). In
addition to Need for Cognition, we expect that intelligence should enhance differentiation,
integration, and reflectiveness. Intelligence would do this in by increasing a person’s motivation
(in particular Need for Cognition). The magnitude of these positive correlations are consistent
with a model in which intelligence increases Need for Cognition, and Need for Cognition
increases differentiation, integration, and reflectiveness. It is unclear the extent to which
intelligence might increase differentiation, integration, and reflectiveness without mediation
from NC.

Impact of cognitive competencies on the self-concept. The progression model proposed

by BST shown in Figure 7.3 predicts that aptitude and motivation will have positive effects on
self-worth. We tentatively expect that aptitude and activity would have positive effects on
variables in the identity cluster and reality testing cluster shown in Figure 7.6. We also
tentatively expect that variables in the identity cluster and reality testing cluster would have
negative effects on the fear and anger clusters. Given the tentative nature of our expectations,
we opted to simplify the model tested in the studies to follow by ignoring the mediating effect of
the variables in the identity and reality testing clusters.
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---------- Insert Figure 7.6 about here ----------

Intelligence should increase self-esteem in several respects. First, greater aptitude should
increase cognitive motivation and subsequent cognitive activity. Second, greater aptitude should
lead to greater achievement. As shown in Figure 7.6, achievement can be used as an indicator of
self-worth. A central tenet of BST is that stronger cognitive ability and motivation improves
self-worth, and that greater self-worth inhibits the authoritarian justification of beliefs.
Intelligence and Need for Cognition should have negative effects on anxiety. Suppose
that Need for Cognition has a positive effect on self-esteem and a negative effect on anxiety.
This would explain at least a portion of the negative correlation between self-esteem and anxiety
observed in the literature. The progression model proposed by BST shown in Figure 7.3 predicts
that variables such as self-esteem, anxiety, and suspiciousness will mediate the effect of
intelligence on authoritarian justification. We will show that intelligence does have a small
negative effect on dogmatism. By comparison, Need for Cognition will be shown to have a
somewhat larger negative correlation with dogmatism than intelligence. Given that the
correlation between intelligence and dogmatism is approximately the same as the average
correlation between Need for Cognition and dogmatism reported in these studies, it appears that
Need for Cognition does not completely mediate the effect of intelligence on dogmatism.
The model in Figure 7.6 proposes that the effect of cognitive competency (primary
primitives) variables on authoritarian justification is mediated by variables in the self-worth
cluster such as self-esteem, achievement, adjustment (e.g., neuroticism, depression) and
generalized other primitives (e.g., anxiety). Study 1 allowed us to test the supposition that
intelligence and NC predispose a person to high self-worth, and that a sense of high self-worth
inhibits dogmatic tendencies. In fact, Rokeach and Fruchter (1956) had supposed that low self-
esteem is a component of the dogmatic personality.

The self concept beliefs and their effects

The next most central beliefs are the secondary primitives -- those related to the self-
concept. These primitives enable the orienting of the self in physical space, the identity and
worth of the self, and self-sufficiency (Rokeach, 1960). The secondary primitives consist of
subsidiary clusters of beliefs tied to identity, self-worth, and reality testing (Hamilton & Mineo,
1996). The identity cluster consists of the sexual and physical identity variables, gender or sex-
role orientation, and body image. The self-worth cluster consists of achievement, adjustment,
and self-esteem. Achievement is measured as scores on standardized verbal and mathematical
tests, or Grade Point Average (GPA). Adjustment is often measured conversely, as a form of
maladjustment. The two most common types of maladjustment linked with dogmatism in the
literature are depression and neuroticism. The reality-testing cluster consists of superstition and
external locus of control. There should be positive correlations between self-esteem, identity,
and reality testing. Trait anxiety is a chronic, unfocused state of fear. BST predicts that self-
esteem and adjustment are positively correlated, and that adjustment and self-esteem will
decrease anxiety. Study 1 allowed us to estimate the unique contributions of self-esteem and NC
to anxiety.
Dogmatism correlates negatively with the self-worth cluster, specifically self-esteem and
achievement. The effect of the self-worth cluster on dogmatism is substantially larger than the
effect of intelligence on dogmatism, but not the effect of NC on dogmatism. This implies a
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model in which there is a negative path from Need for Cognition to dogmatism that is not
mediated by self-esteem. The studies reviewed in the previous section proposed a model in
which intelligence increases Need for Cognition, with both intelligence and Need for Cognition
increasing self-esteem. Self-esteem, in turn, inhibits dogmatism. The inhibiting effect of Need
for Cognition and self-esteem on dogmatism is in part mediated by anxiety. Yet it was unclear
as to whether the positive effect of anxiety on dogmatism observed by Hamilton and Mineo
(1996) was spurious or indicative of a causal relationship. We now address this issue.

Generalized other beliefs and their effects

The tertiary and least central of the primitives are related to the concept of the
generalized other. The primitives related to the individual's concept of generalized other allow
anticipation of how the self is likely to be treated by other people, whether others can be trusted,
and whether they are friendly or hostile. Responses to others include cognitive elaboration on
basic emotional reactions, where fear is transformed into anxiety, anger into hostility, sadness
into longing. Within the fear cluster are beliefs about trait anxiety and specific fears such as the
dread of social isolation. Within the anger cluster are beliefs about suspiciousness, resentment,
irritability, negativity, and possibly guilt. BST, like APT, posits that both anxiety and hostility
are key antecedents to authoritarian thought. As shown in Figure 7.6, anxiety increases hostility.
It is unclear the degree to which hostility and anxiety directly increase dogmatism, and how
much of their effects are mediated by the other variable.
Frenkel-Brunswik (1949) proposed that anxiety occurs in children when they observe
flaws in one or both parents but are unable to express their ambivalence toward the flawed
parent. The child who cannot express ambivalence toward the parent experiences inhibited
hostility, which leads to anxiety. In order to cope with the anxiety, the child develops an
authoritarian outlook on life. As we will show, the positive correlation between anxiety and
dogmatism is larger than the negative correlation of self-esteem with anxiety, and larger than the
negative correlation of self-esteem with dogmatism. This implies that anxiety has a positive
effect on dogmatism that is not spurious.

Justification Processes
In their effort to expand the Intermediate Region beyond that described by Rokeach
(1960), Hamilton and Mineo (1996) identify three types of ethno-logics that people use to derive
peripheral beliefs: authoritarian, critical, and emotional justification. They refer to these
justification processes as informal, personal logics or ethno-logics. This is because the
individual uses these logics for belief justification because they have learned to reason this way,
not necessarily because they represent “good” logic in a formal sense. It seems likely that
patterns of justification that philosophers regard as fallacious would be learned in the same way
as those that philosophers regard as logically correct.
An ethno-logic is conceived as a competency acquired in the practice of evaluating and
justifying beliefs, so that there are likely to be individual differences in justification patterns, just
as there are with respect to any acquired competency. Nevertheless, since belief evaluation and
justification most often occur in the social contexts of persuasion and argumentation, it seems
likely that speakers in a language community would acquire and employ similar ethno-logics in
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order to facilitate communication. Thus, it is assumed that there might be cultural and sub-
cultural differences in ethno-logics. We assume that there will be individual differences in the
complexity and diversity of argument types employed. Argument complexity and diversity will
depend on general linguistic competence, level of education, and expertise on a given topic. One
of the key assumptions of BST is that differences in the Central Region acquired in the
progressive development of personality lead to corresponding differences in the Intermediate
Region manifested as different patterns of justification. The divergent patterns of justification, in
turn, have consequences on beliefs in the Peripheral Region, beliefs related to ethnocentrism and
political conservatism.

The nature of authoritarian justification

Authoritarian justification is based on three clusters of beliefs: authoritarian submission,

authoritarian aggression, and conventionalism (Altemyer, 1988). We believe authoritarian
submission is the manifestation of anxiety in authoritarian thought, whereas authoritarian
aggression is the manifestation of hostility in authoritarian thought. In the British data
reanalyzed by Hamilton and Mineo, dogmatism increased authoritarianism, and the effect was
quite massive. This strong relationship is due in part to item content common to both the
Dogmatism (D) Scale (Rokeach, 1960) and the Authoritarianism (F) Scale (Sanford, et al.,
1950). It is the unshared item content that differentiates the D and F Scales. Hamilton and
Mineo calculated the effect that this shared content would have on the correlation between D and
F Scale scores, and determined that it inflated the correlation between the two scales by only .05.
Kerlinger and Rokeach (1966) factor analyzed items on the 40 item D Scale and the 29 item F
Scale. The factors unique to the D Scale were belief in one cause, belief in one truth, isolation-
alienation, and self-proselytization. These three subdimensions of dogmatism reflect the
tendency to be highly involved with one's own belief system and distant from the belief systems
of others. We suspect that it is the communality of these three factors that mediates the effect of
suspiciousness on authoritarian aggression.
The factors unique to the F Scale were projectivity, superstition, and impulse control.
BST proposes that impulse control (reflectiveness), superstition, and projectivity
(suspiciousness) are primary, secondary, and tertiary primitives, respectively. Yet these three F
Scale subdimensions accounted for only six items of the 29 (21%) items on the F Scale. They
represent primitive beliefs that are antecedent to authoritarian justification rather than
subdimensions of it. The presence of the reflectiveness, superstition, and suspiciousness items
inflate the correlation between other scales measuring these constructs and scores on the F Scale.
Kerlinger and Rokeach found two factors that contained items from both the D and F Scales:
virtuous self-denial and authoritarian submission. The items on the virtuous self-denial factor
represent a particular kind of authoritarian submission.
Development of the F Scale. Research on authoritarian justification began with a group
of individuals known as the Berkeley group, who were interested in prejudice. Within the
Berkeley group, Else Frenkel-Brunswik had lived in Vienna during Hitler's rise to power. She
had witnessed the spread of Nazism first hand. Frenkel-Brunswik, Daniel Levinson and Sanford
wanted to know why some Germans collaborated with Nazis during World War II, and some
Germans refused. They wanted to know the extent to which people were by nature Fascistic.
The answer for Sanford, et al. rested in a personality factor called authoritarianism. Levinson
had begun the search by looking at personality correlates of anti-Semitism. He constructed an
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Anti-Semitism (A-S) Scale that consisted of 52 Likert items measuring five themes:
offensiveness, perceived threat, intent to discriminate, seclusiveness and intrusiveness.
The A-S scale was found to correlate with prejudice against other ethnic groups. Sumner
(1906) had coined the term ethnocentrism to describe a tendency to accept the culturally similar
and reject the culturally different. Thus, it appeared that the AS scale was tapping into a larger
personality variable, ethnocentrism. Research on the A-S scale was controversial. The Anti-
Defamation League claimed that using the A-S scale perpetuated anti-Semitism. Others objected
that the line of research was pro-Semitic. Controversy plus empirical support for a more general
personality factor called ethnocentrism shifted attention away from the A-S scale towards the
study of ethnocentrism. Levinson developed an ethnocentrism (E) scale that measured attitudes
toward minorities and patriotism, using 20 items and three subscales.
In an effort to determine the personality antecedents to ethnocentrism and prejudice,
Sanford, et al. developed the concept of authoritarianism -- a personality trait that leads to a
preference for antidemocratic tendencies (Sanford, et al., 1950). Frenkle-Brunswick did more
research than the other members of the Berkeley group on the causes of authoritarianism. She
found that high authoritarians are more impressed with themselves than low authoritarians, and
are more concerned with what is proper and conventional, and are more status conscious. These
tendencies lead authoritarians to be stricter in the training of their children, and this causes
children to repress thoughts about the faults and shortcomings of their parents. At the very least
the children are afraid to express such thoughts. This leads to hostility towards the parents, and
this hostility dare not be expressed. The repressed hostility is then displaced onto weaker
minority group members.
The Fascism (F) Scale was designed to measure prejudice without appearing to do so.
Items on the scale were based on fascist writing, speeches of anti-Semitic agitators, and the in-
depth interviews with people they considered to be high and low authoritarians. There were
several different forms of the F Scale, but the best known is Form 40/45.

Development of the Dogmatism Scale. Milton Rokeach, who had worked under the
Berkley group, and had performed many of their analyses, constructed the Dogmatism Scale
(Rokeach, 1960) to measure the dimension of open-closed mindedness. He believed that both
Fascists and communists show indications of being dogmatic or closed-minded. Thus, he argued
that dogmatism was a structural feature of the mind that is unrelated to ideological content.
Nonetheless, dogmatics glorify any authority who supports their belief system, and they are
generally intolerant of those who express opposing beliefs. As a consequence, their belief
system is polarized into sharply distinguished beliefs and disbeliefs.
Rokeach measured dogmatism with 40 Likert items, with the objective of attaining a
scale that ideologically neutral. Critics of the F Scale argued that it was ideologically biased, and
that the correlation between political-economic conservatism and authoritarianism was
misleading. He included three major themes in his D Scale: degree of separation of belief and
disbelief subsystems, organization of the central-peripheral dimension of the belief system, and
the person’s time-perspective. With respect to the second of these themes, he explored the
primitive beliefs of dogmatics, including their sense of self-adequacy, their certainty of the
future, and their judgments of the friendliness of the world. On the second theme Rokeach also
explored the relationship between authoritarianism and intolerance, how dogmatics view
authority as absolute, and their intolerant view of those who would disagree with them. Finally
on the second theme, he explored content-oriented beliefs and disbeliefs that emanate from
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positive and negative authority. With respect to the third theme, Rokeach looked at dogmatics’
conception of the past and the future, and how these are valued as more important than the
present.

The nature of rational justification

Rational justification is the systematic processing of reasoning and evidence during

argument evaluation. This type of justification would involve the consideration of argument
coherence and veracity (the internal consistency of arguments and their consistency with
previous knowledge), quality and quantity of evidence, awareness of the consequences of
ambiguity and clarity of arguments. At a broader level, critical justification may prompt the
individual to question established norms of fallacious reasoning. Rational justification has
typically been measured as its obverse, irrationality. That is, if correlations between irrationality
and other variables are reverse coded, we will have an indicator of the relationship between
rationality and the variable in question.

The nature of emotional justification

Emotional justification is unreflective processing that involves the evaluation of feelings.

A person who engages in emotional justification uses personal emotional responses to issues or
arguments as a means of judging belief acceptability. We are not arguing that emotion is
exclusive to this ethno-logical type. A person who enjoys, indulges, or revels in emotions is not
thereby using emotion as a means of justifying beliefs. Hence, the key measure of emotional
justification is emotionalism rather than emotionality or emotional expressiveness.

The effect of justification processes derived beliefs. Dogmatism has been found to
increase stereotypic attitudes. For example, Hood (1974) found that dogmatism led to much
more stereotypically negative attitudes toward the mentally ill. In the British data reanalyzed by
Hamilton and Mineo, authoritarianism powerfully increased ethnocentrism and had a moderately
strong positive effect on political conservatism. Interestingly, the size of the positive effects of
authoritarianism on attitude toward the mentally ill and minority groups as represented by scores
on the E Scale are approximately the same, suggesting that authoritarians may view the mentally
ill as a low-power minority. Political conservatism in Rokeach's British data was measured with
the Right Opinionation (RO) Scale. Authoritarian justification may be the basis for other types
of conservatism, such as economic, theological, or marital conservatism. But the existence of
critical and emotional justification raises the possibility that some of the effects of personality on
peripheral beliefs may be mediated by justification processes other than authoritarian thought,
represented by either the rationality or emotionalism measures as shown in Figure 2.3. Hamilton
and Mineo (1996) discovered paths from primitive beliefs to peripheral beliefs that were not
mediated by authority beliefs. This important finding implies the existence of non-authoritarian
modes of belief justification.
We expect that there will be negative correlations between the three types of justification
process (see Figure 7.6), because the three classes of ethno-logic are alternative strategies for
deriving beliefs. That is, cognitive processing that deploys a particular type of ethno-logic
reduces the cognitive capacity available for processing other types of ethno-logic. In addition,
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however, there may be causal relationships among the three kinds of ethno-logic. For example,
critical justification could entail the rejection of reliance on authority and reliance on emotional
reaction in the evaluation of beliefs. Conversely, those who rely on authority may reject critical
justification as impious. Our expectations concerning causal relationships between emotional
and authoritarian justification are less clear. It is conceivable that an authoritarian individual
might accept emotional reactions as bolstering accepted beliefs if those responses are consistent
with beliefs derived from authority, but repress responses that are inconsistent with beliefs
derived from authority.

Derived Beliefs and Attitudes

The Peripheral Region contains beliefs derived by means of authoritarian, critical, and
emotional justification, plus beliefs related to aesthetic preference (Hamilton & Mineo, 1996).
Rokeach (1968) argued that aesthetic beliefs were unrelated to such authoritarian justification
processes as dogmatism. We presume that aesthetic beliefs are peripheral but are a consequence
of critical and emotional justification processes. The derived beliefs most often used in
traditional studies of BST are those associated with social, political, and economic issues. This
cluster of beliefs is scaled on a left (liberal) to right (conservative) continuum. Levinson (1950c)
asserted that political and economic beliefs are highly correlated, which led to the development
of his Political-Economic Conservatism (PEC) Scale. Rokeach (1960) followed suit, developing
his RO Scale to measure political and economic conservatism. Inspection of the items on the
PEC and RO Scales, however, reveals that they contain quite differentiable content. The PEC
Scale consists almost entirely of items concerned with economic beliefs, whereas the RO Scale
consists almost entirely of items concerned with political beliefs. For this reason, we will
henceforth refer to the PEC Scale as a measure of economic conservatism (EC), and the RO
Scale as a measure of political conservatism (PC).

The cultural conservatism hypothesis

As proposed by Hamilton and Mineo (1996) BST claims that social beliefs influence
political-economic beliefs. This claim, rooted in theories of political culture (Pye, 1985), holds
that social beliefs develop independently of political-economic structures, and that both social
beliefs and political-economic structures influence political and economic beliefs. In fact,
Hamilton and Mineo (1996) found that in Rokeach's British samples, ethnocentrism strongly
increased political conservatism. They tested a model in which political conservatism was
antecedent to ethnocentrism, but found that such a model had extremely poor fit. The British
data indicate that social beliefs strongly influence political and economic beliefs, and not the
other way around (Hamilton & Mineo, 1996).

The structural conservatism hypothesis

The predicted relationship between authoritarian and economic beliefs differs in

Authoritarian Personality Theory and BST. Authoritarian Personality Theory contends that
economic structure is antecedent to economic and political beliefs such as party affiliation, and
that these economic-political beliefs are antecedent to social beliefs such as ethnocentrism. In
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the Berkeley studies, the correlation between ethnocentrism and economic conservatism is larger
than the correlation between authoritarianism and economic conservatism. Hence, the E-EC
correlation is not simply the spurious consequence of strong effects of F on E and F on EC.
Rather, it would appear that either economic conservatism increases ethnocentrism, or
ethnocentrism increases economic conservatism. Yet the Berkeley studies report a massive
correlation between authoritarianism and ethnocentrism. Hamilton and Mineo used statistical
procedures to determine that conservatism is most likely a consequence of ethnocentrism, and
not the other way around.

The resistance to change hypothesis

Rokeach (1960, Ch. 9) distinguishes dogmatism (the resistance that systems of belief
have to change) from rigidity (the resistance that single beliefs have to change). Rigidity, he
argues, is the difficulty in overcoming single sets or habits encountered in solving particular
tasks or problems. Dogmatism, by contrast, is the structuring of beliefs into a relatively closed
system. On the basis of his content analysis of items on the Gough-Sanford (1952) Rigidity
Scale, Rokeach concluded that the rigidity items measure beliefs about specific tasks or habits.
Within BST, this means that rigidity should be a characteristic of the Peripheral Region. As
such, dogmatism should increase rigidity.

The Effect of Personality on Belief Change

For many years, researchers were on a quest for the Holy Grail of persuasion -- a general
personality factor called persuasibility. This general personality factor was thought to explain
the tendency of some people to be more easily persuaded than others. Gradually, researchers
gave up on the search for a general personality factor, and turned to specific personality variables
that render people more or less susceptible to persuasion. Most of the research has focussed on
variables such as self-esteem, the manic-depression dimension, anxiety, and hostility. The Yale
School researchers examined self-esteem and anxiety, as discussed in Chapter 3. Hostility has
been studied as a precursor to counterarguing. Research on the manic-depression dimension has
looked at the personality trait of depression as well as drugs such as stimulants and depressants
that influence overall arousal during message reception and yielding.
Belief Systems Theory (BST) suggests that self-esteem is the variable that determines
how depression, anxiety, and hostility relate to attitude change. We re-analyzed the results of
two studies by Anne Norris and found support for the BST interpretation of how people cope
with traumatic events such as being victimized. In Figure 7.7, we show the impact of being the
victim of a violent crime.

---------- Insert Figure 7.7 about here ----------

In Figure 7.8, we show the impact of being the victim of a hurricane.

---------- Insert Figure 7.8 about here ----------

Recently, Rhodes and Wood (1992) proposed a curvilinear relationship between self-
esteem and attitude change, in the shape of an inverted-U. This finding is consistent with the
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predictions of information processing theory, as described in Chapter 3. Using meta-analysis,

they concluded that that people with moderate self-esteem are more easily persuaded than people
with low self-esteem, and that people with moderate self-esteem were more easily persuaded
than people with high self-esteem.
Theorists who study conflict distinguish between hostility and aggression (Zilmann).
Hostility is an inner state that is characterized by resentment, irritability, and suspiciousness
toward others (Buss & Durkee). Guilt, by contrast, can be though of as animosity toward self.
Aggression is a behavior directed against an external object such as another person, a dog, a bug,
or a chair. Aggression displays can take the form of verbal aggression, indirect aggression,
relational negativity, and physical assault (Buss & Durkee). In general, the social psychological
literature shows that hostility increases aggression. BST predicts that self-esteem decreases
depression, depression decreases anxiety, and anxiety decreases hostility, as shown in Figure 7.9.
Hostility, in turn, increases aggressiveness. The model shown in Figure 7.9 also predicts that
depression will inhibit aggressiveness by increasing guilt. That is depression increases guilt, and
guilt decreases aggressiveness.

---------- Insert Figure 7.9 about here ----------

Men are more likely to be aggressive than women for two reasons. First, male gender
should increase competitiveness, with competitiveness increasing hostility. Hostility, in turn,
increases aggressiveness. Second, male gender should increase physical strength, and physical
strength should increase aggressiveness. These two gender processes are shown in Figure 7.9.
A meta-analysis was conducted to examine the effects of male gender and depression on
hostility, guilt, and aggression. The results of this meta-analysis appear in Figure 7.10. The
results generally support the BST predictions. The results indicate a hierarchical relationship
among the forms of hostility, where resentment increases both irritability and suspiciousness.
The results also indicate a hierarchical relationship among the forms of aggression, where verbal
aggressiveness increases indirect aggression, relational negativity, and physical assault.

---------- Insert Figure 7.10 about here ----------

Depression increased resentment, irritability (both direct, and indirectly through

resentment), and suspiciousness (both direct, and indirectly through resentment). Depression
also increased guilt, as predicted. There were four distinct ways in which hostility increased
aggression. First, resentment increased verbal aggressiveness. Most likely verbal aggression is
directed against the resented other, although it may also be directed against innocents. Second,
suspiciousness increased relational negativity. This effect represents the decay of trust in
relationships. Third, irritability increased verbal aggression. Verbal aggression stemming from
irritability may take the form of petty bickering. Fourth, irritability increased indirect
aggression. Rather than express hostility directly, irritation is manifest as silence, damaging
inanimate objects, etc.
Men were found to be more resentful (ρ = .11) and suspicious than women (r = .07).
However, men were found to be less irritable than women (ρ = -.16). The effects of male gender
on these three forms of hostility were all rather small, however. Male gender did have a
somewhat larger direct positive effect on physical assault. We presumed that this effect was
mediated by physical strength, such that men are physically stronger, and this strength advantage
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increases the odds they will physically assault another person. Thus, men tend to be more
resentful, suspicious, and physically violent, whereas women tend to be more irritable.

The Effect of Gender on Belief Change

Past reviews of the social influence literature (Becker, 1986; Eagly, 1978; Eagly & Carli,
1981) have concluded that women are generally more susceptible to influence than men. One
group of researchers hypothesizes that the findings are due to a main effect for receiver gender
on attitude change. That is, the results of review articles are taken as evidence that the
relationship between gender and susceptibility to influence does not depend on the environment
in which the influence attempt occurs. Linn (1986) notes that some of those who adhere to the
main effect perspective assume that women are biologically inferior, rendering them inherently
more susceptible to influence. An extension of the view that women are frail and vulnerable
receivers would be to assume that men are more capable sources than are women. That is, if
women are less able to generate counterarguments against persuasive messages, this could reflect
a general deficit in ability to produce arguments. If women suffer from a deficit in
argumentation skill, then this would presumably also limit their ability to influence others. We
will refer to this cluster of assumptions as the male dominion perspective. If the female
susceptibility effect can be shown to exist across contexts, with the size of that effect varying
slightly by context, then it would be appropriate to interpret the main effect for receiver gender.
Likewise, if male sources are generally more persuasive than female sources, then it would be
appropriate to interpret the main effect for source gender.
In contrast to the male dominion perspective, a second research group argues that
receiver gender explains only a small portion of the variance in results across social influence
studies. This group points to heterogeneity in the results across studies as evidence that the
effect of receiver gender on attitude change is moderated by other variables. The interactionist
perspective assumes that differences in persuasibility based on biological sex are trivial, and that
variables such as accumulated information that may be correlated with receiver gender for
particular topics are much better predictors of susceptibility to influence than receiver gender.
An extension of the view that individual differences in ability matters much more than gender
would be to assume that there should be little variance in the ability of male and female sources
to influence receivers. Suppose that women are more susceptible to influence than men in some
contexts, but not in other contexts. It would be inappropriate to claim a main effect for female
susceptibility because the effect is qualified by an interaction effect. Likewise, suppose that men
are more persuasive than women, but only under certain conditions. It would be inappropriate to
claim a main effect for source gender because the effect is qualified by an interaction effect.
Many studies have addressed the question of whether women are more easily influenced
than men, and there is a general pattern of a small main effect for gender (Eagly, 1986). There
is, however, a problem with the susceptibility to influence literature that has gone largely
unnoticed. The number of studies investigating whether women or men are more susceptible to
influence far outnumbers those that address the question of whether men are more influential
than are women -- by a factor of nine to one. In fact, so few attitude change studies have
employed female sources that the literature on social influence would be more accurately
described as the literature on male social influence. Even fewer studies have varied source
gender while controlling other factors in the design.
There are many reasons male speakers might be able to exert substantially more influence
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on women than on men. Yet a main effect might be a consequence of gender relations rather than
biological frailty. In principle, the same social process responsible for the success of male
sources with women could operate for female sources with men. That is, there could be
circumstances in which female sources might exert more influence on men than on women. Yet
so few studies have been conducted with female speakers that a pattern of small cross-gender
effects would be difficult to detect with a simple narrative review of the literature. Meta-analysis
provides a more powerful method to detect such a pattern (Hunter & Schmidt, 1990).

The Main Effect of Receiver Gender on Attitude Change

In her narrative review of gender-linked social influence studies, Eagly (1978) concluded
that the results for conformity and persuasion studies differed. That is, there was no single main
effect for gender susceptibility. In conformity studies, male sources were more influential than
female sources for female receivers but not for male receivers. In persuasion studies, male
sources were no more influential than female sources, and this was true for both male and female
receivers. Her findings suggested that female susceptibility to influence is limited to situations
in which receivers are subjected to pressure to conform. But as we noted, narrative reviews are
not the most powerful method of detecting small effects.
Two major meta-analyses have been conducted to determine the effect of gender on
susceptibility to influence. In order to compare the results of the two prior meta-analyses to
those from the current meta-analyses, the results from the prior studies were converted from d-
values to r-values. Eagly and Carli (1981) meta-analyzed the same set of studies as Eagly
(1978), but reached a stronger conclusion. The overall average correlation between female
receiver gender and attitude change in the Eagly and Carli meta-analysis was .13 (SDr = .03)
across the 90 studies on which effect sizes could be calculated. Given that the susceptibility
effect was moderated by type of pressure exerted on receivers, this main effect finding must be
interpreted with caution. Among persuasion studies, the average susceptibility effect was .08
(SDr = .03). Among conformity studies, the average effect size was .16 (SDr = .03) in studies
that exerted group pressure, and .14 (SDr = .06) in studies that exerted source pressure. A graph
of the results from the Eagly and Carli analysis appears in Figure 7.11.

---------- Insert Figure 7.11 about here ----------

We compared the size of the mean effect in the persuasion studies, the source-pressure
studies, and the group-pressure studies relative to the amount of variance present in each of the
three categories. Effect sizes for the source-pressure studies were much larger than effect sizes
for persuasion studies (r = .55). Effect sizes for the group-pressure studies were substantially
larger than effect sizes for persuasion studies (r = .80). Finally, effect sizes for group-pressure
studies showed somewhat larger effect sizes than the source-pressure studies (r = .22). The
Eagly and Carli results indicate a small (r = .08) baseline female susceptibility to influence in
persuasion studies. Group pressure to conform approximately doubles the size of this
susceptibility effect. The source-pressure conformity studies show a modest susceptibility effect
(r = .14), presumably because these studies allow receivers who are vulnerable to authoritarian
appeals to buckle under the weight of speaker demands. Group-pressure conformity studies
show a larger susceptibility effect (r = .16), presumably because these studies allow receivers
who are vulnerable to authoritarian appeals to bow to the weight of demands from multiple
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speakers.

The Becker Re-Analysis

The studies cited by Eagly and Carli were in turn re-analyzed in a meta-analysis by
Becker (1986). In Becker’s meta-analysis, the overall correlation between female receiver
gender and belief change was .08 (SDρ = .09). Again, because susceptibility was moderated by
type of pressure to conform, this main effect finding must be interpreted with caution. In
persuasion studies, the average effect size was .06 (SDr = .07). In group-pressure conformity
studies, the average effect size was .14 (SDr = .11). In source-pressure conformity studies, the
average effect size was .06 (SDr = .12). A graph of the results from the Becker analysis appears
in Figure 7.12.

---------- Insert Figure 7.12 about here ----------

As with the Eagly and Carli meta-analysis, we compared the mean effect size for the
persuasion studies, source-pressure studies, and group-pressure studies. The group-pressure
studies showed a larger effect size than persuasion studies (r = .40) in the Becker data, although
the magnitude of this difference is only half of that we found in the Eagly and Carli data. The
group-pressure studies show a somewhat larger effect size than the source-pressure studies (r =
.33), as in the Eagly and Carli data. However, the source-pressure studies showed no more
attitude change than persuasion studies (r = .00). This last finding for the Becker data is at odds
with the finding for the Eagly and Carli data. In general, the Becker data yield smaller effect size
estimates than the Eagly and Carli data. The effect sizes were .02 smaller for the persuasion and
group-pressure conformity studies in the Becker data, and the standard deviations are much
larger in her data than in the Eagly and Carli data. In the Becker analysis, sampling error
explained only about half the variance in the persuasion and group-pressure studies.

Summary of the Meta-analytic Findings

Despite the discrepancies in parameter values between the two sets of results, both meta-
analyses reached the same conclusion on five main points. First, female receiver gender
increases susceptibility to influence in persuasion studies (.06 < r < .08). Second, female
receiver gender increases susceptibility to influence in group-pressure studies (.14 < r < .16).
Third, female receiver gender increases susceptibility to influence in source-pressure studies (.06
< r < .14). The last two points concern the differences between the three types of studies.
Fourth, the effect of female receiver gender on susceptibility to influence is twice as large in
group-pressure studies than persuasion studies (r = .60, ± .20). Fifth, the effect of female
receiver gender on susceptibility to influence is somewhat larger in group-pressure studies than
source-pressure studies (r = .28 ± .06). The graphing of the differences in Figures 7.11 and 7.12
suggests a near-linear impact of pressure to conform on female susceptibility to influence.
The slight deviation from linearity shown in the two graphs is most likely due to the
source-pressure conformity studies. As can be seen in the two figures, the variance within the
source-pressure studies was larger than it was for the other two types of studies. This
contributed to the interpretation problem for the source-pressure studies; the results conflicted as
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to whether source-pressure increased the size of the susceptibility effect as compared to

persuasion studies. We wanted to avoid the estimation challenges posed by the source-pressure
studies, and to obtain the greatest possible contrast in what we suspected to be the underlying
pressure to conform variable. We therefore focused our search for moderator variables on the
persuasion studies and the group-pressure conformity studies.

Male Authors and the Effect of Receiver Gender on Attitude Change

Of the several variables that have been identified as moderators of the impact of female
receiver gender on attitude change, the gender of the study’s author is the most prominent. Eagly
and Carli found that attitude change for women increased with percentage of male authors on the
various studies -- in both persuasion studies (r = .43) and group-pressure studies (r = .27). In
persuasion studies, the size of the female susceptibility effect also increased with male interest in
the topic (r = .31), but was reduced by publication date (r = -.24). Eagly and Carli noted that the
effect of percentage of male authors on female susceptibility to influence remained even after
publication date and male interest in topic were partialled out. We suspect that male interest in
topic is spuriously correlated with female susceptibility. That is, percentage of male authors
increases female susceptibility and the choice of topics of interest to males. The finding that
women have become less easily persuaded over time suggests that they are now more willing to
counterargue than they were in the past.
We re-analyzed Becker’s data to see if the percentage of male authors finding would
replicate. Our analysis found that attitude change for women increased with percentage of male
authors -- in both persuasion studies (r = .45) and group-pressure studies (r = .35). Attitude
change for women also increased with inclusion of a pretest in the design for persuasion studies
(r = .48) and to a much lesser extent for group-pressure studies (r = .08). Finally, attitude change
for women increased with susceptibility to American values for persuasion studies (r = .36) and
to a lesser extent for group-pressure studies (r = .10). The effect of male authors on female
susceptibility to influence remained after the variables inclusion of pretest and susceptibility to
American values were partialled out.
The two meta-analyses found that percentage of male authors increases female
susceptibility to influence in persuasion studies (.43 < r .45) and group-pressure studies (.27 < r
< .35) regardless of other study features. This finding is consistent with the Ward, et al. (1985)
claim that female susceptibility is a function of whether the source used in a study is male or
female. In support of their cross-sex influence hypothesis, Ward, et al. found that female
receivers were more susceptible to influence than male receivers when the source was male, but
not when the source was female. Ward, et al. claimed that gender differences in susceptibility to
influence is a consequence of status-linked role expectations. Their findings indicate, however,
that the compliance of female receivers is temporary, suggesting that receivers did not internalize
the information contained in the persuasive message.
One explanation for heterogeneity in the correlation between source gender and attitude
change is that the compliance of female receivers occurs if the male source can monitor receiver
compliance (Ward, et al., 1985, p. 276). The effect of MSG on attitude change was smaller in
those studies that did not allow source surveillance of the receiver (Eagly & Carli, 1981, p. 10).
If male authors tend to employ male confederates as sources in their experiments, then this might
explain why percentage of male authors increased female attitude change in the two meta-
analyses. Suppose that men are more persuasive than are women, particularly for female
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receivers. This supposition would be consistent with the male dominion perspective.

The Effect of Source Gender on Receiver Evaluations of Source

If there were a main effect for source gender on attitude change, such that men were
found to be more persuasive than women, this would imply that both male and female receivers
are evaluating male sources more favorably than female sources. Information processing theory
(McGuire, 1969) proposed that attitude change is a function of source competence,
trustworthiness, or liking, where the relative influence of each of these variables on attitude
change depends on the context. A second set of meta-analyses therefore explored the effect of
source gender on receiver evaluations of source competence, trustworthiness, and liking. These
effects, in turn, could be correlated with the effect of source gender on attitude change.

Source Evaluation Sequences

Information processing theory claims that receivers possess a source evaluation sequence
that allows them to store information about source performances in memory (Hamilton, 1997).
Although the phases in this sequence are supposed to be situation invariant, the relative emphasis
that receivers place on source or message, and the processing of internal or external arguments
does vary with the situation. In particular, the presence of vocal cues has been shown to alter
this source evaluation process (Hamilton & Thompson, 1994). Thus, vocal cues should have a
substantial impact on how receivers orient toward message and source.
The source evaluation sequence begins with schema for particular kinds of sources
(Hamilton, 1998), including gender-role expectations. For both premessage and postmessage
evaluations of source, the criterion variables are competence, trustworthiness, and liking, with
dynamism acting as the mediating variable. Thus, source schema such as gender or ethnic
stereotypes should influence premessage expected source dynamism. Once initiated, the
sequence proceeds with dynamism increasing premessage source competence; competence then
increases expected source trustworthiness, and trust increases expected source liking (Hamilton
& Thompson, 1994). This same charisma sequence is overlaid on incoming messages (Hamilton
& Stewart, 1993). If a premessage charisma sequence triggered by source gender were to affect
receivers’ premessage attitude toward topic, the resulting attitude change would be due to gender
role effects.
When this sequence is driven by gender roles expectations, as shown in Figure 7.13, we
will refer to it as the model of gender stereotyping effects. The effect of a postmessage charisma
sequence on attitude change can, however, be due as much to source performance as to
premessage expectations, such as those linked to source gender schema. A more positive
premessage attitude toward topic (the extent to which receivers agree with the source) improves
assessed argument quality (Hamilton, 1998). Depending on the context, attitude change may be
influenced by competence, trustworthiness, or liking (Hamilton, et al., 1993; Hunter, et al.,
1984). Yet a more dynamic delivery might make the source appear better composed, which
would lead to higher competence ratings regardless of argument quality. Thus, there may be a
positive effect of dynamism on competence that is not mediated by message clarity.

---------- Insert Figure 7.13 about here ----------

The role of vocal cues in moderating the impact of source gender on evaluations by an audience
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can be found in Figure 7.14.

---------- Insert Figure 7.14 about here ----------
 95

Notes

1. BST proposes that these ethno-logics can be distinguished from their antecedent primitives,
even though scales measuring the various types of justification typically contain sets of items
measuring antecedent personality traits. Traditional measures of authoritarian justification
such as the D Scale that assesses dogmatism (Rokeach, 1960) or the F Scale that assesses
authoritarianism (Sanford, Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, & Levinson, 1950) were designed to
measure the personality correlates of individuals who would engage in authoritarian thought.
Similarly, traditional measures of critical justification such as the Rational Belief Inventory
(Himle, Himle, & Thyer, 1989) were designed to measure the personality correlates of
individuals who would engage in irrational thought.