ImprIsoned, humIlIated and dIscredIted

ImprIsoned,
humIlIated and
dIscredIted
by JoJJe olsson

Translation: Laura Crane-Åkerblom

 Published in cooperation with
Expressen and Norstedts

ISBN 978-91-983442-7-1
© Jojje Olsson, 2018
Swedish Publishers’ Association, Stockholm 2018
Original title: Fängslad, förnedrad och svartmålad
Translation: Laura Crane-Åkerblom, 2018
Printed by Livonia Print Ltd, Latvia 2018
 INTRODUCTION

In January this year, just before my book De

kidnappade Kinasvenskarna (The Swedes who
were Kidnapped by China) was published,
something slightly unbelievable happened. The
main character of the book, Gui Minhai, was
abducted by Chinese state security agents for
the second time. This time it happened while
Gui was on a train with two Swedish diplo-
mats, on their way to see a doctor in Beijing.
Gui has been in custody in China since
October 2015, when he was kidnapped by
Chinese security agents from his holiday home
in Thailand. The kidnapping was part of an
ambitious campaign to stop the publication of
dissident literature in Hong Kong. Literature
that Chinese tourists would often take back to
the mainland with them.
After a decade of hard work, both as an

5
author and as a publisher, Gui had become
the owner of the city’s largest publishing
house and one of the most important book-
stores for this type of literature. He was also a
Swedish citizen who had been kidnapped in a
third country. In other words, Gui was an ide-
al target. You could hardly have sent a clearer
signal that anyone who writes critically about
China’s regime is no longer safe in the for-
merly very free metropolis that is Hong Kong.
In October 2017, the Chinese authorities
suddenly announced that Gui Minhai was a
free man with complete freedom to travel as
he wished. This was after he had served a two-
year sentence for an alleged car accident in
2003. He was now said to have been relea-
sed from jail and living in an apartment near
his family, in his home town of Ningbo on
China’s east coast, just south of Shanghai.
While in custody, Gui had developed some
severe health problems. After assurances from
the Chinese, the Swedish embassy therefore
organised a medical examination for him. But

6
someone in the hazy Chinese chain of com-
mand managed to – quite literally – change
their mind on route. When Gui was physical-
ly taken away, only an hour remained of the
train ride to Beijing.
After a couple of weeks of complete and un-
pleasant silence, Gui Minhai surfaced again.
This time in custody, with a policeman on
either side, to deliver a forced televised con-
fession in which he criticized the Swedish
authorities. This was the third time Gui had
been disgraced on Chinese television, which is
a completely unique statistic, and not just for
a foreign prisoner either. There are not even
any Chinese activists who have been forced to
“confess” their crimes on national television
that many times.

Something that makes Sweden, in particular,

unique in this context is that two of our ci-
tizens have been kidnapped and disgraced
on Chinese television. The Swedes who were
Kidnapped by China describes in more detail

7
how not only Gui Minhai but also activist
Peter Dahlin was abducted and met with the
same fate. It may have taken the Swedish me-
dia and Swedish organisations a fair while to
comprehend the gravity of the situation, but
both cases had been attracting a lot of inter-
national attention from the very start.
And while Peter Dahlin was deported from
China in January 2016 (after three weeks in an
underground prison and a humiliating “con-
fession” on television), at the time of writing
Gui has been in prison for more than 1,000
days. During this time he has been refused le-
gal representation, consular visits and medical
examinations, despite a severely deteriorating
health.
Never before has China treated a foreign
political prisoner in this way. Which means
that Gui Minhai’s case marks uncharted ter-
ritory, even for China. The regime is testing
the waters: How far can it go in terms of ha-
rassment and violations of international law
before Sweden and the rest of the world takes

8
a real stand? How can it avoid criticism and
direct the attention elsewhere?

Over the past year, China has switched strategy,

from defending their own attacks to smearing
Gui Minhai’s character. An intense smear cam-
paign was launched by Gui Congyou, China’s
new ambassador in Stockholm. Ever since he
took office, the embassy has been contacting
the Swedish media and sending staff out to
various talks and events in the civil society
in order to circulate the communist party’s
narrative about Gui Minhai the fraudster.
Via email, post and telephone, the Chinese
embassy contacted Swedish newsrooms, jour-
nalists, academics, organisations and even po-
litical party leaders with the purpose of dis-
crediting Gui. He is described as a financial
fraudster whose illegal activities in Sweden re-
sulted in the death of two people. After which
he is alleged to have escaped justice by fleeing
the country and continuing to live the life of
a con artist in Hong Kong.

9
The purpose of this text is partly to follow up
on developments in the Gui Minhai case since
he was abducted from that train in January
this year, and partly to address the Chinese
smear campaign against him through, for ex-
ample, interviews with people who worked
alongside him in Sweden in the 1990s.
If the Chinese authorities get away with
attacks and manipulating the truth, then there
is a greater risk that not only will they conti-
nue, but that they will step up these activities.
The more time that passes, the greater the risk
that Gui Minhai will waste away behind bars
too. A fate suffered by an alarming number
of political prisoners in China in recent years.
 PA RT 1

A BDUC T ED, DIS gR ACED

ON T V A N D DIS CR EDI T ED
China’s impressive network of high-speed
trains is known as “the harmony express”. The
irony of its name could hardly have been clea-
rer when, on the afternoon of 20th January
2018, the G126 train rolled into Jinan, the
capital of the Shandong province, home to
around 100 million people. Aboard the train
was Gui Minhai who, after slightly more than
two years in captivity, had recently been diag-
nosed with motor neurone disease ALS by a
neurologist in his home town of Ningbo. This
neurological disorder gradually paralyses the
patient as it spreads to the brain and spinal
cord. On average, people with ALS have a life
expectancy of two to four years.
Accompanied by consul general Lisette
Lindahl and one of her colleagues, Gui was
therefore on his way to Beijing to receive

13
the best possible care. China’s ambassador
in Stockholm had given the foreign ministry
prior consent to take the publisher to the ca-
pital for a medical examination, which was
later confirmed by the Washington Post and
by Gui Minhai’s daughter, Angela Gui. How-
ever, this made absolutely no difference to the
ten or so plain-clothed security agents who, in
Jinan, stormed into one of the carriages and
dragged Gui off, right in front of the Swedish
diplomats.

Gui literally vanished without a trace after

that. Until 9th February, when he showed
up at a very last minute “press conference”,
to which only a handful of carefully selected
Chinese media representatives with close ties
to the authorities were invited. “The Swedish
authorities are to blame for my situation,”
said Gui, flanked by two policemen. He was
suggesting that Swedish diplomats had con-
vinced him to try and escape to the embassy
in Beijing, to subsequently flee the country.

14
 Gui then went on to complain about having
been used “like a chess piece” by Swedish po-
liticians who were out to score cheap points in
the lead up to the forthcoming general elec-
tion. He was now asking the Swedish autho-
rities to leave him alone, and for Sweden to
stop “hyping up” his case. He also maintained
that he had not developed ALS, despite his
daughter Angela having confirmed on several
occasions that her father had told her about
the diagnosis. He also used the opportunity
to turn down the Prix Voltaire he had just
been awarded by the International Publishers
Association for his courage in continuing with
publishing despite the major risks involved.
During the appearance Gui was missing a
tooth and, according to Angela, Gui looked
“swollen”. Had Gui been tortured? The Scrip-
ted and Staged report that was released by
rights activist group Safeguard Defenders in
April this year reviewed 45 cases of the forced
public confessions that, in so many ways, are
reminiscent of Cultural Revolution China and

15
which made a comeback under President Xi
Jinping. Interviews with the victims confirm
that all of them were subjected to abuse, stress
positions, isolation, humiliation, threats to re-
latives, sleep and food deprivation or other
similar methods of physical and psychological
torture.

Gui appeared on Chinese state television as

early as January 2016, to explain that he had
not been kidnapped at all, but that he had
in fact voluntarily handed himself over to the
police in a wave of remorse for a car accident
back in 2003 that he suddenly now wanted to
atone for. Just one month after the first “con-
fession”, it was time once again. This time
Gui and three of his colleagues denounced
their former business operation as illegal,
particularly as they had smuggled thousands
of books across the border to customers on
mainland China.
New for the third appearance was that Gui’s
family was also being dragged into it. His sis-

16
ter, who lives in Ningbo, now dismissed her
brother in front of the Chinese journalists as
naive and deranged. She also criticised the
Swedish embassy for having tricked him, and
issued a warning for Angela that she not allow
herself to be used in the same way.

17
 EUROPE IS SOlIDly BEhIND
gUI MINhAI

A foreign citizen being disgraced on Chinese

television is very unusual in itself. The fact
that it has happened three times is unparal-
leled. Not just among foreigners, but among
Chinese activists and dissidents too. And yet
it took the Swedish authorities 829 days to
openly criticise China for their treatment of
Gui Minhai. And only then in the form of a
brief statement from Margot Wallström via
the government’s website, where she expres-
sed her “expectation” that Gui would be re-
leased. Which only happened after he had
been abducted from a high-speed train in the
company of Sweden’s consul general and her
colleague in January this year.
After Gui had been in custody for 842 days,
Margot Wallström mentioned him, also for the

18
first time, on her otherwise very active Twitter
account with more than 100,000 followers.
Sources I have spoken to in Beijing confirm
that diplomats from other EU countries have
long been trying to get Sweden to issue shar-
per public criticism of China. But the Swedish
authorities have resisted. One not particularly
wild guess is that the hesitation is a result of
the ambitious measures the government has
taken to increase the economic cooperation
between the two countries.

A lot of people within the European Com-

munity see Gui Minhai not just as a Swedish
case, but as a case for the entire European
Union. If China can get away with kidnap-
ping and locking up a Swedish political priso-
ner today, then perhaps the same might hap-
pen to a German or a French citizen tomor-
row. At the same time, Sweden’s reluctance to
openly confront China has made it difficult
for other countries to make demands. The glo-
bal support for Gui Minhai became, however,

19
apparent after Margot Wallström’s first public
statement at the end of January.
Almost immediately, the EU ambassador in
China, Hans Dietmar Schweisgut, repeated
Wallström’s appeal for the release of Gui and
stated that EU “fully supported” Sweden’s ef-
forts to secure his release. Within a couple of
days, the German embassy and the US De-
partment of Foreign Affairs expressed their
support for his complete release and for him
to be permitted to leave China.
At the beginning of February, Germany’s
Chinese ambassador Michael Clauss spoke
up and made an even stronger personal state-
ment when he said the following to the Süd-
deutsche Zeitung newspaper: “The fact that
China’s authorities are treating an EU citizen
in this way is unprecedented. There is wides-
pread fear that these violations of internatio-
nal law, as well as the refusal to permit con-
sular aid, could also affect other EU citizens
in the future.” Clauss also emphasized the fact
that all European countries with a presence

20
in China are standing behind Sweden on this
matter.
Despite growing criticism from several direc-
tions, Gui Minhai was not permitted to see
doctors or diplomats after the train drama in
January. This is not just a violation of inter-
national regulations, it also conflicts with the
assurances China made. At the beginning of
March, for example, a visiting Swedish doctor
was refused permission to see Gui. Something
which, in a press release, Wallström felt “vio-
lated prior assurances that our citizen would
have the opportunity to see a Swedish doctor.”
Wallström’s relatively cautious statement
sent China’s foreign ministry reeling. During
a press conference, its spokesman Geng
Shuang announced that the Swedish doctor
arrived without an invitation, but that they
had been kind enough to inform Gui Min-
hai about his arrival. Gui did not, however,
wish to see the doctor. Geng went on to say
that the medical examinations which had
been carried out by the Chinese, by the way,

21
showed that he was in fine physical and men-
tal health. He called the criticism unfounded
and unacceptable.

22
 OPER ATION
SMEAR CAMPAIgN

It was clear that China was troubled by the

growing criticism and attention towards Gui
Minhai’s case. Which is why efforts to dis-
seminate the communist party’s narrative were
stepped up. In August 2017, the Chinese em-
bassy in Stockholm’s Djurgården district wel-
comed a new ambassador by the name of Gui
Congyou. The appointment seemed extraordi-
nary in that Gui Congyou acknowledged in an
interview with the Chinese media that, prior
to this post, he had never set foot in Sweden,
nor had he ever even made the acquaintance
of a Swedish person.
Instead, Gui Congyou’s career has focused
entirely on Eastern Europe and Central Asia –
and propaganda. His resume includes a posi-
tion at the Chinese embassy in Moscow, where

23
he worked for more than a decade. He also
rushed to Russia’s defence after the annexa-
tion of Crimea in 2014. “China is in principle
opposed to referendums on independence,”
Gui Congyou said after Russian tanks had
thundered into Ukraine. “But that doesn’t
apply to Crimea.”
Prior to that, his career in the communist
party began in 1991 where he worked for an
institution within the party’s central commit-
tee that shapes ideologies and political theo-
ries. We’re talking about two years after the
Tiananmen Square massacre. At the time, it
was crucial for the party’s survival to create
the narrative that protesters killed by tanks
and machine guns were in fact criminals who
had been manipulated by foreign powers.
Simply put, Gui Congyou is some sort of
antidemocratic old-school theorist who was
now going to try and implement his tried and
tested methods in Sweden. Rather than know-
ledge about or connections with Sweden, the
evidence suggests that Gui Congyou was

24
appointed with the goal of using various
methods to change the overall perception of
Gui Minhai’s case in our public debate.
In November, the embassy sent their poli-
tical secretary and an interpreter to a panel
debate at the ABF building in Stockholm. A
debate which the ABF had arranged in coope-
ration with FokusKina (formerly the Swedish-
Chinese Association). During a round of ques-
tions, the embassy secretary took the floor so-
lely to deliver a protracted monologue about
China’s “alternative view” of human rights and
our ignorance about the Gui Minhai case. The
speech has been described as “offensive” and
“aggressive” by people who were there and
who I contacted after the event. One mem-
ber of the audience felt the monologue was
“threatening” and compared the embassy’s
attendance to a watchful eye.
But more importantly, Gui Congyou had
begun contacting the Swedish media, in par-
ticular those reporting about China and Gui
Minhai. This strategy became clear at the be-

25
ginning of June, when a radio programme on
Swedish public service radio station P1 aired
a long interview with the ambassador. He had
contacted the programme (Konflikt) about an
earlier segment on China, which the embassy
told them was unacceptable and riddled with
factual errors. Purely out of “good will and
kindness” they now wished to give an inter-
view to put things right.
The most startling segments of the interview
that the ambassador now bestowed upon P1
were, unsurprisingly, about Gui Minhai and
Peter Dahlin. Any “Swedish friends” who
wished to comment on the case, Gui Congyou
suggested, should first get in touch with the
Chinese embassy for the facts. When asked
why Gui Minhai was currently in prison, af-
ter he had been declared free in October 2017,
the ambassador hesitated and then referred to
the forced confession, which also included the
fact that Gui was about to reveal a number of
undefined state secrets.
The ambassador then went on to suggest

26
they had permitted Gui Minhai to hold this
press conference – i.e. the forced confession
– which he had requested, in order to protect
his human rights. Gui Minhai has apparent-
ly done the right thing in contemplating his
crimes, and the ambassador now urged the
Swedish authorities to do the same.
The programme’s host Ivar Ekman then
asked, somewhat rhetorically, why we should
believe that Gui was speaking from his heart
when, after his deportation from China, Peter
Dahlin declared that his similar “confession”
on Chinese television only happened after he
was subjected to torture in the form of sleep
deprivation and threats towards his girlfriend,
who had also been arrested. And if that weren’t
enough, Dahlin had also been given a script
he was told to read from.
Gui Congyou replied that Dahlin was a dis-
honest person. “Why has Peter Dahlin said
something that he didn’t want to or didn’t
mean?” the ambassador asked, subsequently
adding that he himself was an honest person

27
who refuses to speak against his will or say
anything he does not mean, regardless of the
circumstances. A poorly disguised threat was
also delivered to our government: Chinese
authorities do not want Sweden to pressure
China with their views on Gui Minhai. If the
Swedish authorities persist in doing so, then
according to Gui Congyou, it would “severely
harm the bilateral relations.”
During the segment, Ivar Ekman said that
the ambassador also dedicated “a lot of time
to trying to discredit” Gui Minhai, using anec-
dotes from China as well as his former life in
Sweden. Konflikt chose not to air these parts
of the interview, however, as they cannot be
confirmed and Gui cannot speak for himself
as he is locked up.

It soon became clear, however, what these at-

tempts to discredit him were all about. At the
beginning of June, two and a half years after
Gui Minhai was first kidnapped, an appeal de-
manding that Gui be released was published

28
in 37 Swedish newspapers. It was signed by
45 sinologists, academics, authors, cultural
professionals and leaders in commerce, trade
and industry, as well as the Left Party’s Jo-
nas Sjöstedt. Of these, more than two thirds
would be soon contacted via email, post, text
message or telephone by the Chinese embassy.
Even several journalists who had not signed
the appeal received the same material.
This material claimed that, in 1995, Gui
Minhai had registered a private company by
the name of the Gothenburg International
Institute (GII) with SEK 50,000 in capital.
Gui was accused of, together with two Swe-
dish professors and without the university’s
authorisation, having lied that GII was part of
the University of Gothenburg and lured more
than a hundred Chinese students to Sweden
with promises of a desirable degree and then
cheated them out of their money.
According to the embassy, this in turn led to
the Chinese students landing heavily in debt
and being forced to resort to off the books

29
work, theft and prostitution. Two of them
committed suicide in their despair. When the
scandal emerged, only SEK 28,000 could be
repaid to each student, as Gui Minhai and his
colleagues had embezzled the rest. After this,
Gui could no longer remain in Sweden and
fled to China to escape the long arm of the
law.
 PA RT 2

l IE S A N D OPPR E S SION
For the purpose of this text, several people
who knew and worked with Gui Minhai
during his time in Sweden have been inter-
viewed. Among them are Claes-Göran Alvstam
and Jens Allwood, two professors from the
University of Gothenburg (GU) who founded
the Gothenburg International Institute (GII).
The third founder, Thommy Svensson, who
later served as chairman for GII from a new
post in Copenhagen, also acted as a mentor
to Gui Minhai for a few years while he was
working on his master’s thesis and doctoral
dissertation.
Gui came to Gothenburg for the first time
in 1988, together with his wife, to study. The
following year the Tiananmen Square Massa-
cre happened, after which all Chinese intel-
lectuals were put in immediate danger. Gui

33
was therefore issued a residence permit and in
1992 he became a Swedish citizen. Opinions
are divided about who had the idea or took
the initiative for GII, which was founded in
1995. Even if Gui Minhai was the institute’s
director for a while, it is clear that he – at the
time a penniless post-graduate student – did
not contribute any funds when it was being
set up. It is also clear that Gui Minhai “was
not involved in the responsibility for the edu-
cation,” as one of the people I interviewed
put it.
In addition, it was the three founders who
were legally responsible for the project. Con-
sequently, it was also these three academics
who found themselves in the crossfire, in the
media as well as the investigations, when pe-
ople began asking questions. In the University
of Gothenburg’s internal audit report about
GII from 1999, Gui Minhai’s name is not men-
tioned anywhere. Nor is he named in any of
the many articles published by the Göteborgs-
Posten newspaper on the subject.

34
 One of the founders explains how Gui Min-
hai was recruited by GII to be their CEO with
the task of acting as a link to China. His re-
sponsibilities included selecting Chinese stu-
dents as well as practicalities like board and
lodging during their studies in Sweden. Gui,
therefore, had nothing to do with whether or
not the course GII was offering was legitimate.

When GII was founded, it was not permit-

ted for Swedish universities to charge foreign
students for tuition. This procedure was not
introduced on a national scale until autumn
2011. But by the mid 1990s, the ruling conser-
vative government at the time had already gi-
ven the impression that it was something that
should be tested, recalls one of the professors.
It was also something being encouraged by
the university’s principal Jan Ling, whereupon
GII was established as a kind of pilot project.
The institute would handle the recruitment of
Chinese students and charge them tuition fees.
The money would then be transferred to the

35
University of Gothenburg which, according to
the university’s own internal audit, also hap-
pened. Contrary to the Chinese embassy’s
claims, the university was well aware of the
project and supported it. Lectures and gradu-
ation ceremonies alike were held on university
property. On one occasion, principal Jan Ling
even welcomed GII’s students during an as-
sembly in the university’s auditorium.
Everyone involved, however, recalls that the
recruitment from China which Gui was in
charge of turned out to be problematic. But
that was for completely different reasons than
financial ones. A lot of the students who came
to GII, it turned out, could not understand,
speak or read English. Those involved de-
scribed it as a “shock” when the first of the
two year groups arrived.
During the recruitment process they were
supposed to have passed an international test
for English skills, such as IELTS and TOEFL,
which had been held in China. The accepted
students had good test results, which made

36
at least one of the interviewed founders later
consider the possibility of falsified results or
bribes, which was rife in the Chinese educa-
tional system at the time.
Regardless, only half of the exactly 60 stu-
dents in total – i.e. not “over a hundred” as
the embassy claims – from the two year groups
who studied at the University of Gothenburg
passed. The circumstances according to the
Chinese embassy, therefore, are supposed to
have led to two of the students taking their
own lives. The two deaths did indeed occur,
but only one of them was suicide. And even
then, it was not related to their educational si-
tuation. The resulting police investigation di-
rected absolutely no accusations towards GII
who, in addition, were in contact with the re-
latives in China with no animosity whatsoever.
The case was primarily, as one of the foun-
ders said, “a tragic situation” that in all likeli-
hood was down to personal reasons. And the
other case was not suicide, it was an accident.
At the time of the accident, the student was

37
no longer a member of the group, but had in
fact already left the programme. The Chinese
embassy has quite simply, for the purpose of
their own propaganda, named and exploited
two people who under unfortunate circum-
stances died in Sweden.

In 1998, Sweden changed governments and

the Social Democrats took to power. In ad-
dition, just before this event, the University
of Gothenburg had also appointed a new
principal, Bo Samuelsson. One of GII’s foun-
ders recalls how the authorities as well as the
university’s new administration were no longer
as sympathetic to charging foreign students
for tuition. Principal Samuelsson turned to
the Ministry of Education and Research and,
in 1999, the National Agency for Higher Edu-
cation ruled that it was wrong to make the
Chinese students pay for their education.
Following this, GII was not only forced to
shut down, but they were also forced to re-
imburse the students. This happened imme-

38
diately, but by the University of Gothenburg,
who had already received the money from
GII. Even students who had completed their
education and already graduated demanded
and received reimbursement. The amount of
SEK 28,000 referred to by the Chinese em-
bassy is correct, it was the actual tuition fee
after costs for board and hotel lodging had
been deducted.
Regardless, Gui had already left GII and
was out of the picture when the decision about
reimbursement was made. After a divorce, Gui
had returned to China in 1999 to work with the
import and export of environmental technolo-
gy, an area where opportunities were growing
fast as China’s economy flourished. It was not
until the mid-2000s that Gui Minhai began
writing political literature, became a member
of the Chinese arm of PEN International and
become involved in freedom of speech issues.
In December 1999, law firm Lagerlöf & Le-
man presented their independent investiga-
tion of GII. It showed that none of the people

39
involved or employed could be suspected of
having committed any crime or even any
misconduct. This is because the university’s
administration at that time supported the pro-
ject and approved its design and implemen-
tation. Furthermore, auditors Ernst & Young
had the task of reviewing the finances prior
to the reimbursements. Although they found
obvious flaws in the accounting, they did not
find any evidence of financial crimes.

40
 AN AT TEMPT TO ShIf T
ThE fOCUS

More importantly, everyone I speak to about

GII emphasizes how odd it is that this is only
being raised now. “The Chinese authorities
have had 20 years, why are they playing this
card now?” one of the people involved asks
rhetorically. He was never accused of any ir-
regularities relating to GII whatsoever after
all of the above investigations were presented,
despite his role as co-founder and board mem-
ber. On the contrary, he had no difficulty on
subsequent occasions maintaining professio-
nal academic contacts with China.
Furthermore, the smear campaign contains
several contradictions. The most obvious be-
ing that when Gui Minhai was abducted from
the high-speed train, he was accused of having
tried to flee China with the help of the Swe-

41
dish authorities. But in the new defamation
campaign, they are also claiming that Gui
Minhai permanently left Sweden to escape
justice.
The narrative that the Chinese embassy is
now attempting to create is a text book ex-
ample of an art form that the Chinese com-
munist party have mastered to perfection: cha-
racter assassination. They pick up a story that
has a grain of truth. Then they twist it, inflate
it, lie, add to it and repeat it until everyone
else grows sick of it or is scared off.
But ultimately the defamation of Gui Minhai
constitutes an attempt to shift the focus away
from China’s own abuse, and instead get the
discussion to revolve around Gui Minhai’s
character. Because regardless how much mo-
ney Gui Minhai may have embezzled for him-
self in Sweden 20 years ago, it definitely does
not justify the Chinese authorities’ current
treatment of him. Even if those responsible
for GII had actually been convicted by law
firms or internal audits, that still would not

42
have worked as an excuse for kidnapping Gui
in Thailand, shutting down his bookshop in
Hong Kong and keeping him locked up for
more than 1,000 days without a trial.

Now it may well be unclear whether Gui

Minhai was primarily driven by a desire to
protect free speech. A lot of the literature
he published in Hong Kong contains sordid
stories about individual politicians or the
power struggles in China’s murky political
world. The defamatory literature was not al-
ways based on thorough research, but rather
it represented exactly the type of story that an
increasing number of tourists from mainland
China wanted to read.
“His interest in business turned out to be
stronger than his interest in academia,” noted
someone I interviewed who was close to Gui
during his time at the University of Gothen-
burg. The evidence suggests that the financial
reward – and perhaps even the thrill of it –
was just as much a driving force as the moral

43
aspect behind the publishing business that
Gui and his colleagues were running in Hong
Kong. But that of course does not matter.
You should not be imprisoned for publishing
in Hong Kong, where the constitution still
guarantees freedom of speech and the press,
regardless. Particularly since Gui Minhai held
only a Swedish citizenship and not a Chinese
one, as China does not permit dual citizen-
ship. His daughter Angela Gui has also said
that he did not even have any local identifica-
tion documentation in Hong Kong.
It is essential that we not be fooled by the
Chinese authorities, who have a wealth of
experience in smear campaigns and misinfor-
mation. If we allow the debate to shift focus
towards Gui’s background, then the Chinese
ambassador has already won – even if he is
proved wrong.

The smear campaign however was not terribly

effective. Among the recipients of the mis-
information about Gui Minhai who I have

44
spoken with, irritation and surprise are two
of the most common reactions. The Chinese
embassy then doubled down by attacking and
discrediting the media and journalists who
have been drawing attention to Gui’s fate or
China’s general lack of freedom of press.
At the beginning of July, news coverage
from Expressen, Dagens Nyheter and news
agency TT among others, was criticised in se-
veral separate press releases on the embassy’s
website. Their reports about the above topics
were said to be “unacceptable” and proof of
Swedish “media tyranny”. The embassy also
sent protest letters to each of the editorial
offices.
I soon became one of the targets in the
campaign myself, which is perfectly natu-
ral considering the book and many articles
I have written on the subject. In one of the
press releases I was mentioned by name and
referred to as “misleading” and “shameless”.
The embassy suggested that anyone with the
“slightest sense and ability to make their own

45
assessment” could easily see how my false ar-
ticles merely intend to discredit China, a coun-
try which I furthermore did not understand.
According to the Association of Taiwan Jour-
nalists – I have been living in Taiwan since I
was denied a Chinese visa in 2016 due to my
work – this attack was unprecedented. Taiwan
may well be the one country in this world that
is most affected by China. Nevertheless, Ian
Chen who is chairman of Taiwan’s Journalists’
Association had never heard of an individual
journalist being discredited on an embassy
website like that before. The attack was also
criticised by the International Federation of
Journalists (IFJ) and Reporters Without Bor-
ders. Even the Swedish foreign ministry said
that they had been in contact with the Chi-
nese embassy about the attacks.

46
 “hAVE yOU EVER BEEN
TO ChINA?”

How the Chinese embassy’s mentality ne-

vertheless remained unchanged was clearly
evident in an interview with Expressen that
was published at the end of July. After having
been invited, the newspaper sent reporter Arne
Lapidus to the embassy, where they proceeded
to introduce him to a number of classic tricks
straight out of the manual for the Communist
Party’s dissemination of propaganda.
“The majority of journalists have a very
friendly attitude towards China, they try to
promote friendship and cooperation between
our countries. Only a very few have some cri-
ticisms,” said Gui Congyou after Lapidus was
greeted, seated in a comfortable armchair and
served a cup of Chinese tea. He complained
again that the embassy’s “reminders” that this

47
type of criticism was wrong if one wished to
preserve the cooperation and bilateral friend-
ship, had not had the effect that the embassy
had hoped for.
“Which is why,” said Gui Congyou, “these
kinds of journalists’ hostilities towards China
must be pointed out.” Because the hostilities
could “harm the friendship between our pe-
ople and countries.” In other words, they were
trying to portray the journalists who were
drawing attention to Gui Minhai or China’s
non-existent freedom of press as some kind of
rowdy minority.
When Lapidus then quoted reports from
organisations like IFJ or Reporters Without
Borders – who ranked China 176th of 180
countries when it comes to freedom of press –
the ambassador said he was not familiar with
these: “I have never heard anyone say that
the media climate in China is getting worse
every year.” Instead he tried, once again, to
push the narrative about the rowdy minority:
“A few Swedish and foreign journalists claim

48
that China’s media climate is getting worse.
They should have a think about how they
themselves act first.”
The ambassador completely disregarded the
above-mentioned reports, which are based on
interviews with hundreds of foreign repor-
ters in China, and instead said to Lapidus:
“I hope you are going to visit China and ask
these journalists what they think, and whether
their opinion is consistent with that of these
so-called organisations.”

If you are familiar with Chinese propaganda

you will clearly recognise the pattern. Anyone
with opinions about the Communist Party’s
inability to comply with China’s constitution
– which guarantees, for example, freedom of
press and freedom of speech – belongs to a mi-
nority which, if permitted to continue, could
potentially jeopardize any economic coopera-
tion agreements that small nations have with
China. In addition, they are either “ignorant”
or “have prejudices” towards China.

49
 “Have you ever been to China?” hissed fo-
reign minister Wang Yi during a press confe-
rence in Canada in the summer of 2016, when
a Canadian reporter asked her own foreign
minister about the state of human rights in
China. After the Canadian foreign minister
had replied evasively, Wang Yi spoke up, visi-
bly upset by the journalist’s question.
He scolded the reporter and implied her
question was full of arrogance and prejudices
against China. Did she not know that protec-
tion and promotion of human rights is guaran-
teed in China’s constitution? “Only Chinese
people should comment on the human rights
situation in China,” emphasized Wang. Mean-
while, hundreds of human rights lawyers and
activists had been abducted and imprisoned
the previous summer in the so-called “709
crackdown”, which was one of the biggest at-
tacks on China’s civilians in modern history.

When Gui Minhai was mentioned during

Arne Lapidus’ interview in the armchairs at

50
the Chinese embassy, the ambassador replied
that he meets up with his Swedish colleagues
at the Swedish foreign ministry every week to
discuss the matter. He even said that the case
could contribute positively to the bilateral re-
lations, provided it is handled in accordance
with the law and with mutual respect (!).
Then the outright lying began: “We have
always had a positive approach towards
Sweden’s request to send Swedish doctors
and diplomats to him.” This claim came six
months after Gui Minhai was kidnapped in
the company of two Swedish diplomats, and
four months after the doctor sent to China by
the Swedish foreign ministry was turned away
at the door. During the Almedalen week-long
political event in July, Wallström continued
that they had “really expressed again and
again and again” their desire to send diplo-
matic staff and doctors to visit Gui.”
During the Arne Lapidus interview, Gui
Congyou also went on to discredit me and
blatantly lie about the fact that the embassy

51
had allegedly warned me about my visa situa-
tion before I was suddenly banned from en-
tering China in 2016. The interview was then
posted on the Chinese embassy’s website in
both English and Chinese. In the Chinese
version, however, funnily enough everything
about Gui Minhai had been omitted.

Much about China’s actions suggests an

unshakable reluctance to release Gui Minhai,
despite his four colleagues already having
been released. In recent times, very few people
– native activists included – have been impri-
soned without trial for as long as Gui has. It
is difficult to know exactly why it has happe-
ned to him specifically. Perhaps the reason is
personal. There are rumours that Gui’s publis-
hers was getting ready to publish a book that
contained details about President Xi Jinping’s
private life and love life just before Gui was
kidnapped in Thailand in October 2015.

52
 ChINA PREfERS qUIET
DIPlOMACy

If Gui Minhai was released now he would be

able to talk about his ordeals, such as torture
and threats prior to his forced televised con-
fessions. The longer Gui remains imprisoned
the less likely he is to get out alive. Unfortu-
nately this wording is not as exaggerated as
it might seem. Ever since Xi Jinping became
President, several activists and dissidents have
died in prison, either suddenly or of illnesses
that developed behind bars.
The most notable example of this is Nobel
Laureate Liu Xiaobo, who died of cancer last
summer. He had been in prison since 2009,
but it was not until a couple of weeks before
Liu’s death that it was suddenly announced
he was suffering from such advanced stage li-
ver cancer that he had been moved from the

53
prison to a hospital. Liu, however, was refused
the best possible care for his cancer abroad,
or even in Beijing. Instead the Nobel Peace
Prize recipient died in a hospital in northeast
China’s rust belt that had been cordoned off
by the police.
Liu’s suffering became known outside Chi-
na, thanks to his celebrity status. It is, how-
ever, important to remember that he is just
one of several political prisoners who have
met with the same fate in China over the past
five years. But despite the darkness, there is
hope. Without ever having been suspected of
a crime, Liu’s widow Liu Xia had been impri-
soned in the harshest of house arrests since
her husband was awarded the Nobel Peace
Prize in 2010. But in July this year, Liu Xia
was finally permitted to leave China and move
to Germany.
Katrin Kinzelbach, vice chairman of the Glo-
bal Public Policy Institute in Berlin, said after
the release to the South China Morning Post
that China always insists on these problems

54
being resolved through quiet diplomacy. As
long as the other side remains quiet in public,
the Chinese side promises to be cooperative.
But Kinzelbach emphasized that in order for
quiet diplomacy to work, it also has to involve
concrete actions.
German diplomats persistently visited Liu
Xia’s home on several occasions, in often fu-
tile attempts to meet her or deliver books. The
case was discussed behind closed doors, while
people like ambassador Michael Class did not
hesitate to raise the subject in public. They
even got the White House and the US em-
bassy to cooperate with Germany. “You really
do have to demonstrate that you are willing
and able to step things up,” stated Kinzel-
bach, adding that without pressure there are
no incentives for the Chinese authorities to
take action.
Because we all know that China is extremely
sensitive to international critique. Otherwise
they would not have put so much time and
energy into preventing this, or have civil ser-

55
vants like Gui Congyou to constantly circulate
the party’s narrative. China’s regime is trying
to make the country out to be a responsible
superpower using various methods to spread
culture and “soft power”. Constantly being
scrutinized for regular attacks against the
most fundamental of human rights is there-
fore highly inconvenient.

The Swedish authorities have, to a large de-

gree, heeded Beijing’s requests to remain si-
lent. Margot Wallström did not even mention
Gui Minhai when, on 14 February, she presen-
ted the government’s foreign policy statement.
When she was asked about this in an inter-
view on Swedish public service radio station
P1 later that day, the foreign minister replied
that Sweden was working with “a lot of con-
sular cases” and wondered why therefore only
one or two of these would be highlighted.
Despite the fact that it relates to a political
prisoner who was kidnapped in a third coun-
try, the foreign ministry still refers to Gui

56
Minhai as a consular case rather than a po-
litical one. Even worse than that, during the
same radio interview Wallström said that it
would be “the wrong approach” to put pres-
sure on China over Gui Minhai, as Sweden
is a “minor player” whose actions would not
have much of an impact on China.
Her words were in fact almost an exact
replica of how the situation was described in
the Chinese state media that same week. They
also came just over a week after Geng Shuang,
spokesman for the foreign ministry, described
in a statement Wallström’s demand for release
as “irresponsible” and encouraged Sweden to
“recognise the gravity” of the situation.
As I explain in more detail in The Swedes
who were Kidnapped by China, the way this
case is being handled differs considerably to,
for example, the case in which journalists
Martin Schibbye and Johan Persson were kid-
napped and imprisoned in Ethiopia in 2011.
That case escalated from a consular matter to a
major political issue within just a few months

57
and the 2012 foreign policy statement deman-
ded that they both be released. After which, it
was revealed that Sweden’s having sought sup-
port from the EU and the US, who regularly
pressured Ethiopia about the two Swedes, had
been crucial for the outcome. The statements
from ambassadors Hans Dietmar Schweisgut
and Michael Clauss clearly demonstrate that
the same support is available when it comes
to Gui Minhai.
But then there is the matter of economics.
Last year, exports to China were up by 27
percent and the government has a clear-cut
strategy to attract Chinese investors to Swe-
den. Export statistics and direct investments
are both expected to set new records this
year. Considering the direct threats that pe-
ople like Gui Congyou have made about how
Gui Minhai could have an impact on bilateral
relations, it is perhaps understandable that the
government is not making a lot of noise.
Angela has spoken about her father at places
like the American Congress, British Parliament

58
and the UN Human Rights Council. No invi-
tation, however, has been forthcoming from
the Swedish Parliament or any other Swedish
authority. The media and the rest of society
also took their time. “The Gothenburg Book
Fair feels like an insult to my father,” wrote
Angela in Expressen when the agenda for the
2017 event only contained one item relating to
her father despite him actually having lived in
Gothenburg!
In stark contrast to the Schibbye and
Persson case, the Swedish foreign ministry has
kept Angela at arm’s length. She was told very
early on not to contact the embassy in Beijing
and, despite several enquiries, Margot Wall-
ström has not even wanted to talk to Angela
on the phone. It was not until after the train
incident in January this year that Wallström
reluctantly gave her a call.
“I hope that the Swedish and other authori-
ties will make as much noise as possible,” said
Angela after her father was abducted from the
train, and called for concrete actions rather

59
than constantly repeating the comment about
how “unacceptable” the treatment of her father
is. This attitude is probably making her a bit
of an inconvenience for the Swedish foreign
ministry. Earlier this year, Swedish authorities
had no problem deporting a Russian diplomat
after the attempted murder of double agent
Sergej Skripal in the UK, but refuse to act in
a similar manner as China puts the life of one
of our citizens at risk.

In mid-August, when the final sentences of

this book were being written, the Swedish
foreign ministry were able to announce that
a Swedish doctor had been permitted to visit
Gui Minhai. Margot Wallström gave no speci-
fic details, as “ongoing discussions are subject
to confidentiality.” The extent of the medical
examination is also unclear, even less so how
Gui is actually feeling.
It is also unclear what prompted them to
allow the visit at all. Should it require 1,000
days of quiet diplomacy for a doctor to finally

60
be allowed to visit a political prisoner? Or was
it more to do with the increase in media at-
tention and public interest that the case has
been generating throughout 2018? We can
only speculate. At the time of the doctor’s
visit, Margot Wallström nevertheless repeated
for the first time since March the demand that
Gui Minhai must be released and reunited
with his family.

A lot about the Gui Minhai case is uncharted

territory even for China. Never before has a
foreign political prisoner been treated in this
way. When you do not know what you can get
away with, you push bit by bit. Cédric Alviani,
director of Reporters Without Borders’ Asia
division said over the summer that Gui Min-
hai represents “a test” on China’s part to deter-
mine whether Europe is willing to speak up.
Was it the Swedish authorities’ relative silen-
ce and inaction about Gui Minhai that gave
the Chinese embassy the courage to conduct
a smear campaign against the Swedish media?

61
Whatever the reason, it is important to make
a stand in good time. Otherwise this kind of
activity will not only continue, it will escalate.
Similarly, it is important to make sure the
Chinese authorities understand that we will
neither accept nor believe the narrative they
are currently trying to circulate about Gui
Minhai and his character. Otherwise there will
be less chance of him ever being released and
a greater chance of this kind of thing happe-
ning to more foreign citizens in future.