Military operations

Military operations are the coordinated military actions of a state in response to a

developing situation. These actions are designed as a military plan to resolve the situation
in the state's favour. Operations may be of combat or non-combat types, and are referred
to by a code name for the purpose of security. Military operations are often known for
their more generally accepted common usage names then their actual operational
objectives.

Parallel to and reflecting this framework for operations are organized elements within the
armed forces which prepare for and conduct operations at various levels of war. While
there is a general correlation between the size of units, the area within which they
operate, and the scope of mission they perform, the correlation is not absolute. In fact, it
is ultimately the mission that a unit performs that determines the level of war within
which it operates.[1]

Military operations can be classified by the scale and scope of force employment, and
their impact on the wider conflict. The scope of military operations can be:

• Theatre: this describes an operation over a large, often continental area of

operation and represents a strategic national commitment to the conflict such as
Operation Barbarossa, with general goals that encompass areas of consideration
outside of the military such as the economic and political impacts.
• Campaign: this describes either a subset of the theatre operation, or a more limited
geographic and operational strategic commitment such as Battle of Britain, and
need not represent total national commitment to a conflict, or have broader goals
outside of the military impacts.
• Operational battle: this describes a subset of a campaign that will have specific
military goals and geographic objectives, as well as clearly defined use of forces
such as the Battle of Gallipoli, which operationally was a combined arms
operation originally known as the "Dardanelles landings" as part of the
Dardanelles Campaign, where about 480,000 Allied troops took part.
• Engagement: this describes a tactical combat event of contest for specific area or
objective by actions of distinct units. For example the Battle of Kursk, also known
from its German designation as Operation Citadel, included many separate
engagements, several of which were combined into the Battle of Prokhorovka.
The "Battle of Kursk" in addition to describing the initial German offensive
operation (or simply an offensive), also included two Soviet counter-offensive
operations Operation Kutuzov and Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev.

[edit] Operational level of war

The operational level of war occupies roughly the middle ground between the campaign's
strategic focus and the tactics of an engagement. It describes "a distinct intermediate level
of war between military strategy, governing war in general, and tactics, involving
individual battles."[2] For example during World War II the concept applied to use of
Soviet Tank Armies.[3]

Effects-Based Operations
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Effects-Based Operations (EBO) is a United States military concept which emerged

during the 1991 Gulf War for the planning and conduct of operations combining military
and non-military methods to achieve a particular effect. The doctrine was developed to
take advantage of advancements in weaponry and tactics, from an emerging
understanding that attacking a second-order target may have first order consequences for
a variety of objectives, wherein the Commander's intent can be satisfied with a minimum
of collateral damage or risk to his own forces.

EBO has been an emerging concept, with multiple views [1] on what it meant and how it
could be implemented. Most notably, military scientists at the Air Force Research Lab,
the Army Research Lab and DARPA engaged in research to develop automated tools to
annotate options and recommend courses of action. This is hard science and tools are
slow to be implemented. For air forces, it supported the ability for a single aircraft to
attack multiple targets, unlike tactics of previous wars, which used multiple aircraft to
attack single targets, usually to create destruction without thought of later re-use by allied
forces or friendly civilians.

EBO concepts emphasise the importance of technological sophistication in the

Information Age, arguing that casualties can be avoided on both sides by taking
advantage of the technological advances made since the end of the Cold War - for
example, by utilising precision munitions and UAV attack drones. EBO concepts
traditionally take a "systemic approach" to the enemy, arguing that the enemy's centre of
gravity can be disrupted by attacking the command and control "mainframe" and the
"support nodes" surrounding this central mainframe.

In 2008, Joint Forces Command, the caretaker of US Military Joint Warfighting doctrine,
noted the failure of US Army's EBO tool and issued memorandum and a guidance
documents from the commander, Marine General James Mattis, on Effects Based
Operations. In these documents dated 14 August 2008 Mattis says, "Effective
immediately, USJFCOM will no longer use, sponsor or export the terms and concepts
related to EBO...in our training, doctrine development and support of JPME (Joint
Professional Military Education)." Mattis went on to say, "...we must recognize that the
term "effects-based" is fundamentally flawed, has far too many interpretations and is at
odds with the very nature of war to the point it expands confusion and inflates a sense of
predictability far beyond that which it can be expected to deliver."[2]

Contents
[hide]

• 1 Definition
o 1.1 Batschelet's Seven attributes of EBO
o 1.2 Center of gravity
• 2 EBO in practice
• 3 See also

• 4 References

[edit] Definition
As defined by the United States military Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), effects-
based operations are "a process for obtaining a desired strategic outcome or effect on the
enemy through the synergistic and cumulative application of the full range of military
and nonmilitary capabilities at all levels of conflict." The intent and desired outcome of
an effects-based approach is to employ forces that paralyze the enemy forces and
minimize its ability to engage friendly forces in close combat. [3]

Rather than focusing specifically on causing casualties and physical destruction resulting
in the attrition or annihilation of enemy forces, effects-based operations emphasizes end-
state goals first, and then focuses on the means available to achieve those goals. For
instance, psychological operations, electronic warfare, logisitical disruptions and other
non-lethal means can be used to achieve the demoralization or defeat of an enemy force
while minimizing civilian casualties or avoiding the destruction of infrastructure. While
effects-based operations does not rule out lethal operations, it places them as options in a
series of operational choices for military commanders.

[edit] Batschelet's Seven attributes of EBO

JFCOM's description of the doctrine is quoted by LTC (now BG) Allen Batschelet,
author of the April 2002 study Effects-based operations: A New Operational Model?[4]
He was later appointed in 2004 as commander of the Fires Brigade, the newly-
reorganized 4th Infantry Division Artillery Brigade which deployed to Iraq to implement
such theories in practice.

According to Batschelet's paper, seven elements comprise and differentiate EBO[4]:

1. Focus on Decision Superiority

2. Applicability in Peace and War (Full-Spectrum Operations)
3. Focus Beyond Direct, Immediate First-Order Effects
4. Understanding of the Adversary’s Systems
5. Ability of Disciplined Adaptation
6. Application of the Elements of National Power
7. Ability of Decision-Making to Adapt Rules and Assumptions to Reality
[edit] Center of gravity

The core of the doctrine, to support superior decision-making and to understand the
enemy's systems, lies in determining and calculating the philosophical (not physical)
center of gravity (COG) of the combatants. "COGs are those characteristics, capabilities,
or localities from which a military derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will
to fight" (such as leadership, system essentials, infrastructure, population, and field
military). A similar modeling scheme refers to these as National Elements of Value
(NEV). A relative weighting is made as to which of the elements are most critical to be
targeted by operations.[5]

[edit] EBO in practice

Although it was not called EBO at the time, the strategic bombing of Nazi rail lines from
the manufacturing centers in Normandy to the interior of Germany disrupted critical
resupply channels, weakening Germany's ability to maintain an effective war effort.
Removing a few key bridges had the same effect as large-scale bombing.

The first examples of effects-based approach to the use of limited military actions to
create strategic effects with little collateral damage occurred when the US dropped CBU-
94B anti-electrical cluster bombs filled with 147 reels of fine conductive fiber. These
were employed on high-voltage electrical transmission lines leading to Serbia to short
them and "knock the lights out." On the first attack, these knocked out 70% of the
electrical power supply, crippling the enemy's command and control and air defense
networks.

During the first Gulf War in 1990 and 91, USAF LtCol (now Ret LtGen) Dave Deptula
argued against the dominant view of targeting for destruction, instead opting for alternate
and unconventional means to achieve desired effects. For example, as chief air power
planner, he chose to target the Iraqi air defenses first, removing opposition that would
have kept subsequent missions from creating effective precision attacks. This allowed
him to achieve desired effects with far fewer munitions, reserving those critical assets for
future missions. [6][7]

The January –February 2004 issue of Field Artillery magazine featured a report on the
implementation of Effects-Based Operations in Afghanistan "to help shape an
environment that enables the reconstruction of the country as a whole."[8] United States
policy objectives are to create a "government of Afghanistan committed to and capable of
preventing the re-emergence of terrorism on Afghan soil." All mission efforts are
undertaken with that end-state goal in mind. To coordinate endeavors, the US military
maintains a Joint Effects Coordination Board (JECB) chaired by the Director of the
Combined/Joint Staff (DCJS) which serves to select and synchronize targets and
determine desired effects across branches and operational units. Besides representatives
from combat maneuver organizations, staff also is drawn from the Staff Judge Advocate
(SJA), Psychological Operations (PSYOP) and Public Affairs (PA). Weekly Joint Effects
Working Group (JEWG) targeting team meetings provide recommendations and updates
to the JECB based on three priorities:

• Enable Afghan institutions

• Assist in removing the causes of instability
• Deny the enemy sanctuary and counter terrorism.

The result is a three-week-ahead planning window, or battle rhythm, to produce the

desired effects of the commanders, as defined in operations orders (OPORDs) every three
weeks and fragmentary orders (FRAGOs) each week to update the standing OPORDs.
Activities include both lethal and non-lethal missions, including civil-military, public
affairs, reconstruction, intelligence and psychological operations and feedback as well as
conventional combat and fire support missions.

An FA lieutenant, as an “Effects Support Team” (EST) leader, must understand how to

employ lethal and non-lethal assets to realize the maneuver company commander’s vision
of future operations. He must be able to work with civil affairs teams, special operations,
coalition and host-nation forces, as well as NGOs and OGAs.[8]

This requires a shift away from "hot steel" (artillery fire) as a solution to all problems,
and a focus on integration of multiple dimensions and methods to achieve desired results.

A recent study concluded that a contributing factor to the Israeli Defense Force's defeat in
the Israeli-Hezbollah Conflict in the Summer of 2006 was due in large part to an over
reliance on EBO concepts.[9]