CONTINENTAL MARBLE CORP. and FELIPE DAVIDvs.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS

COMMISSION (NLRC); ARBITRATOR JOSE T. COLLADO and RODITO NASAYAOG.R. No. L-43825
May 9, 1988By Richard Troy A. Colmenares
USA College of LawStart: 6/28/14 7:19:45 PMFinish6/28/14 8:16:26 PM
Nature of the Case
A petition for mandamus, prohibition and certiorari with preliminary injunction seeking to annul NLRC’s d
ecision dismissing appeal ofpetitioners.
Facts
Nasayao claims to have been employed as plant manager with a monthly income equivalent of P 3,000 or
25% net monthly income ofContinental Marble (Continental) [whichever is greater] which he alleged to have
failed his three months income sometime in 1974, thussought from the NLRC recovery of such unpaid
salary. Continental denies such employment status and insists that the relationship is that ofa joint venture
and clarified further that the agreement to pay Nasayao’s share in the net income is limited if there is any
income, and duringthose three months, Continental had no such profits to speak of to give Nasayao his
share. When the matter was submitted for voluntaryarbitration, Continental challenged the capacity of the
arbitrator, but arbitrator refused and rendered judgment awarding money claims toNasayao. Petitioner
appealed citing labor arbiter for grave abuse of discretion and that the resulting judgment was not supported
byevidence. Nasayao filed a motion to dismiss citing that the Labor Arbiter’s decision is final [subject to
exhaustion of administrative remedies]and thereafter filed a motion for writ of execution. NLRC dismissed
the appeal and ordered petitioners to comply with the earlier decision.
Issue(s)
(1). Can the Court review decisions of voluntary arbitrators?(2). Is Nasayao an employee?
Held
(1). No, subject to exceptions.The proper venue is through NLRC, except when a question of law is involved
or where a showing of abuse of authority ordiscretion in their official acts is properly raised in petitions for
certiorari.On the other hand, Nasayao’s contention on exhausting administrative remedies is inapplicable
to the case. The Court may reviewthe decisions warrants jurisdiction or rendered with grave abuse of
discretion. Further, his contention that only questions of law andnot findings of fact are cognizable by the
Court is unacceptable.(2). No.The Court accords respect and finality to the decisions of quasi-judicial
agencies, but when the same is not supported bysubstantial evidence, the Court will intervene. In this case,
the finding of Nasayao as an employee of Continental by the Voluntary Arbitrator is not supported by
substantial evidence: (1) It was impossible for Continental Marble to hire a plant manager on accountof its
business reverses at the time; (2) he was not included in the payroll nor in the list of employees submitted
by the Continentalto SSS; (3) the element of control is wanting for: (a) Nasayao was free to conduct
performance of his work; (b) at his own time; (c)was compensated as a result of his own efforts. And since
there was no employment relationship between Continental Marble andNasayao, there is no basis for the
award of unpaid wages or salaries.

Bernardo vs NLRC DIGEST

DECEMBER 20, 2016 ~ VBDIAZ

Bernardo vs NLRC

GR 122917 07/03/99

Facts:
Petitioners numbering 43 are deaf–mutes who were hired on various periods from 1988 to 1993 by respondent Far

East Bank and Trust Co. as Money Sorters and Counters through a uniformly worded agreement called ‘Employment

Contract for Handicapped Workers. Subsequently, they are dismissed.

Petitioners maintain that they should be considered regular employees, because their task as money sorters and

counters was necessary and desirable to the business of respondent bank. They further allege that their contracts

served merely to preclude the application of Article 280 and to bar them from becoming regular employees.

Private respondent, on the other hand, submits that petitioners were hired only as “special workers and should not in

any way be considered as part of the regular complement of the Bank.”[12] Rather, they were “special” workers under

Article 80 of the Labor Code.

Issue: WON petitioners have become regular employees.

Held:

The uniform employment contracts of the petitioners stipulated that they shall be trained for a period of one month,

after which the employer shall determine whether or not they should be allowed to finish the 6-month term of the

contract. Furthermore, the employer may terminate the contract at any time for a just and reasonable cause. Unless

renewed in writing by the employer, the contract shall automatically expire at the end of the term.

Respondent bank entered into the aforesaid contract with a total of 56 handicapped workers and renewed the contracts

of 37 of them. In fact, two of them worked from 1988 to 1993. Verily, the renewal of the contracts of the handicapped

workers and the hiring of others lead to the conclusion that their tasks were beneficial and necessary to the bank. More

important, these facts show that they were qualified to perform the responsibilities of their positions. In other

words, their disability did not render them unqualified or unfit for the tasks assigned to them.

In this light, the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons mandates that a qualified disabled employee should be given the

same terms and conditions of employment as a qualified able-bodied person. Section 5 of the Magna Carta provides:

“Section 5. Equal Opportunity for Employment.—No disabled person shall be denied access to opportunities for

suitable employment. A qualified disabled employee shall be subject to the same terms and conditions of employment

and the same compensation, privileges, benefits, fringe benefits, incentives or allowances as a qualified able bodied

person.”

The fact that the employees were qualified disabled persons necessarily removes the employment contracts from the

ambit of Article 80. Since the Magna Carta accords them the rights of qualified able-bodied persons, they are thus

covered by Article 280 of the Labor Code, which provides:

“ART. 280. Regular and Casual Employment. — The provisions of written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding

and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee

has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the

employer, x x x”

“The primary standard, therefore, of determining regular employment is the reasonable connection between the

particular activity performed by the employee in relation to the usual trade or business of the employer. The test is

whether the former is usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer. The connection

can be determined by considering the nature of the work performed and its relation to the scheme of the particular

business or trade in its entirety. Also if the employee has been performing the job for at least one year, even if the

performance is not continuous and merely intermittent, the law deems repeated and continuing need for its

performance as sufficient evidence of the necessity if not indispensability of that activity to the business. Hence, the

employment is considered regular, but only with respect to such activity, and while such activity exists.”

Respondent bank entered into the aforesaid contract with a total of 56 handicapped workers and renewed the contracts

of 37 of them. In fact, two of them worked from 1988 to 1993. Verily, the renewal of the contracts of the handicapped

workers and the hiring of others lead to the conclusion that their tasks were beneficial and necessary to the bank. More

important, these facts show that they were qualified to perform the responsibilities of their positions. In other words,

their disability did not render them unqualified or unfit for the tasks assigned to them.

Without a doubt, the task of counting and sorting bills is necessary and desirable to the business of respondent

bank. With the exception of sixteen of them, petitioners performed these tasks for more than six months.

Petition granted

Brotherhood Labor Unity Movement of the Phil. v. Zamora

Facts:

The petitioners are workers who have been employed at the San Miguel Parola Glass Factory as
“pahinantes” or “kargadors” for almost seven years. They worked exclusively at the SMC plant, never
having been assigned to other companies or departments of San Miguel Corp, even when the volume of
work was at its minimum. Their work was neither regular nor continuous, depending on the volume of bottles
to be loaded and unloaded, as well as the business activity of the company. However, work exceeded the
eight-hour day and sometimes, necessitated work on Sundays and holidays. -for this, they were neither
paid overtime nor compensation.

Sometime in 1969, the workers organized and affiliated themselves with Brotherhood Labor Unity
Movement (BLUM). They wanted to be paid to overtime and holiday pay. They pressed the SMC
management to hear their grievances. BLUM filed a notice of strike with the Bureau of Labor Relations in
connection with the dismissal of some of its members. San Miguel refused to bargain with the union alleging
 that the workers are not their employees but the employees of an independent labor contracting firm,
Guaranteed Labor Contractor.

The workers were then dismissed from their jobs and denied entrance to the glass factory despite their
regularly reporting for work. A complaint was filed for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practices.

Issue:

Whether or not there was employer-employee (ER-EE)relationship between the workers and San Miguel
Corp.

Held:

YES. In determining if there is an existence of the (ER-EE) relationship, the four-fold test was used by the
Supreme Court. These are:

 The selection and engagement of the employee

 Payment of wages

 Power of dismissal

 Control Test- the employer’s power to control the employee with respect to the means and methods by
which work is to be accomplished

In the case, the records fail to show that San Miguel entered into mere oral agreements of employment with
the workers. Considering the length of time that the petitioners have worked with the company, there is
justification to conclude that they were engaged to perform activities necessary in the usual business or
trade. Despite past shutdowns of the glass plant, the workers promptly returned to their jobs. The term of
the petitioner’s employment appears indefinite and the continuity and habituality of the petitioner’s work
bolsters the claim of an employee status.

As for the payment of the workers’ wages, the contention that the independent contractors were paid a
lump sum representing only the salaries the workers where entitled to have no merit. The amount paid by
San Miguel to the contracting firm is no business expense or capital outlay of the latter. What the contractor
receives is a percentage from the total earnings of all the workers plus an additional amount from the
earnings of each individual worker.

The power of dismissal by the employer was evident when the petitioners had already been refused entry
to the premises. It is apparent that the closure of the warehouse was a ploy to get rid of the petitioners, who
were then agitating the company for reforms and benefits.

The inter-office memoranda submitted in evidence prove the company’s control over the workers. That San
Miguel has the power to recommend penalties or dismissal is the strongest indication of the company’s
right of control over the workers as direct employer.

*SC ordered San Miguel to reinstate the petitioners with 3 years backwages.

Sevilla vs. CAFACTS:

A contract by and between Noguera and Tourist World Service (TWS), represented by Canilao, wherein TWSleased the
premises belonging to Noguera as branch office of TWS. When the branch office was opened, it was runby
appellant Sevilla payable to TWS by any airline for any fare brought in on the efforts of Mrs. Sevilla, 4%
was togo to Sevilla and 3% was to be withheld by the TWS.Later, TWS was informed that Sevilla
was connected with rival firm, and since the branch office was losing, TWS considered closing down its
office.On January 3, 1962, the contract with appellee for the use of the branch office premises was
terminatedand while the effectivity thereof was January 31, 1962, the appellees no longer used it. Because
of this, Canilao, thesecretar y of TW S, went over to the branch office, and finding the premises
locked, he padlocked the premises.W hen neither appellant Sevilla nor any of his employees
could enter, a complaint was filed by the appellantsagainst the appellees. TWS insisted that Sevilla
was a mere employee, being the “branch manager” of its branch office and thatshe had no say on the lease
executed with the private respondent, Noguera.
ISSUE:
W/N ER-EE relationship exists between Sevilla and TWS
HELD:
The records show that petitioner, Sevilla, was not subject to control by the private respondent TWS. In
thef i r s t p l a c e , u n d e r t h e contract of lease, she
h a d b o u n d h e r s e l f i n s o l i d u m a s a n d f o r r e n t a l p a y m e n t s , a n arrangement that would belie
claims of a master-servant relationship. That does not make her an employee of TWS,since a true employee cannot
be made to part with his own money in pursuance of his employer’s business, orotherwise,
assume any liability thereof.In the second place, when the branch office was opened, the same was run by the
appellant Sevilla payableto TWS by any airline for any fare brought in on the effort of Sevilla. Thus, it cannot
be said that Sevilla was underthe control of TWS. Sevilla in pursuing the business, relied on her own capabilities.It is
further admitted that Sevilla was not in the company’s payroll. For her efforts, she retained
4% incommissions from airline bookings, the remaining 3% going to TWS. Unlike an employee, who earns
a fixed salary,she earned compensation in fluctuating amount depending on her booking successes. The
fact that Sevilla had been designated “branch manager” does not make her a TW S employee.
Itappears that Sevilla is a bona fide travel agent herself, and she acquired an interest in the business
entrusted toher. She also had assumed personal obligation for the operation thereof, holding
herself solidar y liable for thepayment of rentals.Wherefore, TWS and Canilao are jointly and severally liable to
indemnify the petitioner, Sevilla.

INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE V. NLRC AND MELECIO BASIAO (G.R. NO. 84484)

Facts:
Petitioner Insular Life entered into a contract with respondent Basiao where the latter is authorized to solicit for
insurance policies. Sometime later, the parties entered into another contract which caused Basiao to organize an agency
in order to fulfill its terms. The contract being subsequently terminated by petitioner, Basiao sued the latter which
prompted also for the termination of their engagement under the first contract. Basiao thus filed before the Ministry
of Labor seeking to recover alleged unpaid commissions. Petitioner contends that Basiao is not an employee but an
independent contractor for which they have no obligation to pay said commissions. The Labor Arbiter found for Basiao
ruling that there exists employer-employee relationship between him and petitioner. NLRC affirmed.
Issue:
Whether or not employer-employee relationship existed between petitioner and Basiao.
Ruling: NO.
In determining the existence of employer-employee relationship, the following elements are generally considered,
namely: (1) the selection and engagement of the employee; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the power of dismissal; and
(4) the power to control the employees’ conduct — although the latter is the most important element. It should,
however, be obvious that not every form of control that the hiring party reserves to himself over the conduct of the
party hired in relation to the services rendered may be accorded the effect of establishing an employer-employee
relationship between them in the legal or technical sense of the term.
Rules and regulations governing the conduct of the business are provided for in the Insurance Code and enforced by
the Insurance Commissioner. It is, therefore, usual and expected for an insurance company to promulgate a set of rules
to guide its commission agents in selling its policies that they may not run afoul of the law and what it requires or
prohibits. None of these really invades the agent’s contractual prerogative to adopt his own selling methods or to sell
insurance at his own time and convenience, hence cannot justifiably be said to establish an employer-employee
relationship between him and the company.
The Court, therefore, rules that under the contract invoked by him, Basiao was not an employee of the petitioner, but
a commission agent, an independent contractor whose claim for unpaid commissions should have been litigated in an
ordinary civil action.

JARDIN V. NLRC (G.R. NO. 119268)

Facts:
Petitioners were drivers of private respondent’s taxicabs under the boundary system whose earnings were regularly
deducted washing fee for the taxi units. Petitioners decided to form a labor union to protect their rights and interests
on the belief that the deductions made were illegal. Upon learning, respondent refused to let petitioners drive their
taxicabs when they reported for work. Aggrieved, petitioners filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the Labor
Arbiter but the latter dismissed said complaint. On appeal, the NLRC tribunal declared that petitioners are employees
of private respondent. On reconsideration however, the decision was reversed by the NLRC tribunal and held that no
employer-employee relationship between the parties exists.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner taxi drivers are employees of respondent company.
Ruling: YES.
In a number of cases decided by this Court, we ruled that the relationship between jeepney owners/operators on one
hand and jeepney drivers on the other under the boundary system is that of employer-employee and not of lessor-
lessee. In the case of jeepney owners/operators and jeepney drivers, the former exercise supervision and control over
the latter. The management of the business is in the owner’s hands. The owner as holder of the certificate of public
convenience must see to it that the driver follows the route prescribed by the franchising authority and the rules
promulgated as regards its operation. Now, the fact that the drivers do not receive fixed wages but get only that in
excess of the so-called “boundary” they pay to the owner/operator is not sufficient to withdraw the relationship
between them from that of employer and employee. We have applied by analogy the doctrine to the relationships
between bus owner/operator and bus conductor, auto-calesa owner/operator and driver, and recently between taxi
owners/operators and taxi drivers. Hence, petitioners are undoubtedly employees of private respondent because as taxi
drivers they perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of their employer.

MANILA GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB V. IAC AND FERMIN LLAMAR (G.R. NO. 64948)

Facts:
Respondent Fermin Llamar and his fellow caddies filed with the Social Security Commission for coverage and
availment of benefits under the Social Security Act. Subsequently, all but 2 of the original 17 petitioners withdrew
their claim for social security coverage. The case continued and was adjudicated by the SSC only as regards the 2
holdouts dismissing their petition and stating that the caddies were never employees of petitioner. An appeal was taken
to the IAC but the other caddy’s appeal was dismissed at his instance, leaving respondent Llamar the lone appellant.
The IAC found for Llamar finding employer-employee relationship between him and petitioner.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Llamar is an employee of petitioner.
Ruling: NO.
The various matters of conduct, dress, language, etc. covered by the petitioner’s regulations, does not, in the mind of
the Court, so circumscribe the actions or judgment of the caddies concerned as to leave them little or no freedom of
choice whatsoever in the manner of carrying out their services.
The Court agrees with petitioner that the group rotation system so-called, is less a measure of employer control than
an assurance that the work is fairly distributed, a caddy who is absent when his turn number is called simply losing
his turn to serve and being assigned instead the last number for the day.
In the final analysis, petitioner has no way of compelling the presence of the caddies as they are not required to render
a definite number of hours of work on a single day. Even the group rotation of caddies is not absolute because a player
is at liberty to choose a caddy of his preference regardless of the caddy’s order in the rotation. It can happen that a
caddy who has rendered services to a player on one day may still find sufficient time to work elsewhere. Under such
circumstances, he may then leave the premises of petitioner and go to such other place of work that he wishes. Or a
caddy who is on call for a particular day may deliberately absent himself if he has more profitable caddying, or another,
engagement in some other place. These are things beyond petitioner’s control and for which it imposes no direct
sanctions on the caddies.

Dy Keh Beng vs. Int’l Labor and Maritime UnionFACTS:

A charge of unfair labor practice was filed against Dy Keh Beng, a proprietor of a
basket factory, bydismissing Solano and Tudla for their union activities.Dy Keh Beng contended
that he did not know Tudla and Solano was not his employee because the lattercame to the
establishment only when there was work which he did on pakiaw basis.Dy Keh Beng
countered with a special defense of simple extortion committed by the head of
the laborunion.
ISSUE:
W/N there existed an employee-employer relation between petitioner and respondents
HELD:
Yes. Evidence showed that the work of Solano and Tudla was continuous except
in the event of illness,although their services were compensated on piece basis. The
control test calls for the existence of the right tocontrol the manner of doing the work, not
the actual exercise of the right considering that Dy Keh Beng is engagedin the manufacture
of baskets known as “kaing”, those working under Dy would be subject to Dy’s
specificationssuch as the size and quality of the “kaing”. And since the laborers are
done at Dy’s establishments, it could beinferred that Dy could easily exercise control upon
them.As to the contention that Solano was not an employee because he worked on piece basis,
the court ruledthat it should be determined that if indeed payment by piece is just a method of
compensation and does not definethe essence of the relation. Payment cannot be construed
by piece where work is done in such establishment so asto put the worker completely at
liberty to turn him out and take it another at pleasure Justice Perfecto also contended that
pakyaw system is a labor contract between employers and employeesbetween capitalists and
laborers.Wherefore, the award of backwages is modified to an award of backwages
for 3 years at the rated of compensation the employees were receiving at the time
of dismissal.

SONZA vs. ABS-CBN DIGEST

DECEMBER 19, 2016 ~ VBDIAZ

Sonza vs. ABS-CBN

GR 138051

Facts:
In May 1994, respondent ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation (“ABS-CBN”) signed an Agreement (“Agreement”)

with the Mel and Jay Management and Development Corporation (“MJMDC”). ABS-CBN was represented by its

corporate officers while MJMDC was represented by SONZA, as President and General Manager, and Carmela

Tiangco (“TIANGCO”), as EVP and Treasurer. Referred to in the Agreement as “AGENT,” MJMDC agreed to

provide SONZA’s services exclusively to ABS-CBN as talent for radio and television.

On 1 April 1996, SONZA wrote a letter to ABS-CBN’s President, Eugenio Lopez III about the recent event

concerning his program and career, and that the said violation of the company has breached the agreement, thus, the

notice of rescission of the Agreement was sent.

On 30 April 1996, SONZA filed a complaint against ABS-CBN before the Department of Labor and Employment,

National Capital Region in Quezon City. SONZA complained that ABS-CBN did not pay his salaries, separation

pay, service incentive leave pay, 13th month pay, signing bonus, travel allowance and amounts due under the

Employees Stock Option Plan (“ESOP”).

On 10 July 1996, ABS-CBN filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that no employer-employee relationship

existed between the parties. SONZA filed an Opposition to the motion on 19 July 1996.

Issue: Whether Sonza was an employee or independent contractor.

Held:

Applying the control test to the present case, we find that SONZA is not an employee but an independent

contractor.

First, SONZA contends that ABS-CBN exercised control over the means and methods of his work.

SONZA’s argument is misplaced. ABS-CBN engaged SONZA’s services specifically to co-host the “Mel & Jay”

programs. ABS-CBN did not assign any other work to SONZA. To perform his work, SONZA only needed his

skills and talent. How SONZA delivered his lines, appeared on television, and sounded on radio were outside ABS-

CBN’s control. SONZA did not have to render eight hours of work per day. The Agreement required SONZA to

attend only rehearsals and tapings of the shows, as well as pre- and post-production staff meetings. ABS-CBN could

not dictate the contents of SONZA’s script. However, the Agreement prohibited SONZA from criticizing in his

shows ABS-CBN or its interests. The clear implication is that SONZA had a free hand on what to say or discuss in

his shows provided he did not attack ABS-CBN or its interests.

SONZA protests the Labor Arbiter’s finding that he is a talent of MJMDC, which contracted out his services to

ABS-CBN. The Labor Arbiter ruled that as a talent of MJMDC, SONZA is not an employee of ABS-CBN. SONZA

insists that MJMDC is a “labor-only” contractor and ABS-CBN is his employer.

In a labor-only contract, there are three parties involved: (1) the “labor-only” contractor; (2) the employee who is

ostensibly under the employ of the “labor-only” contractor; and (3) the principal who is deemed the real

employer. Under this scheme, the “labor-only” contractor is the agent of the principal. The law makes the

principal responsible to the employees of the “labor-only contractor” as if the principal itself directly hired or

employed the employees. These circumstances are not present in this case.

There are essentially only two parties involved under the Agreement, namely, SONZA and ABS-CBN. MJMDC

merely acted as SONZA’s agent. The Agreement expressly states that MJMDC acted as the “AGENT” of SONZA.

The records do not show that MJMDC acted as ABS-CBN’s agent. MJMDC, which stands for Mel and Jay

Management and Development Corporation, is a corporation organized and owned by SONZA and TIANGCO. The

President and General Manager of MJMDC is SONZA himself. It is absurd to hold that MJMDC, which is owned,

controlled, headed and managed by SONZA, acted as agent of ABS-CBN in entering into the Agreement with

SONZA, who himself is represented by MJMDC. That would make MJMDC the agent of both ABS-CBN and

SONZA.

Petition denied.

Investment Planning v. SSSFACTS:

Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in business management and sale of
securities. It has 2classes of agents selling investment plans: 1) salaried employees who have fixed
hours of work under the control of the company; 2) registered representatives are on commission basis.Petitioner
applied to SSS for exemption of coverage of these registered representatives. However, it wasdenied on
the ground that these registered employees are employees of the petitioner.
ISSUE:
W/N petitioner’s registered representatives are employees
HELD:
No. These representatives are in reality commission agents. They
are not required to report for workanytime. They shoulder their own selling expenses as well as
transportation and they are paid with commissionbased on a certain percentage of their sales.Where
there is no element of control and where a person who works for another is not subject to definitehours of
work and in turn compensated according to the result of his efforts and not the amount thereof, there is
noemployer-employee relationship.

INVESTMENT PLANNING CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner vs.SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM,

respondent !ppe""ee# G . R . N o . L $ % $ & ' N o v e ( ) e r $ * , $ % + -
FACTS: Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in business management and sale ofsecurities. It has two classes of
agents who sell its investment plans: !. Salaried emplo"eeswho #eep definite hours and wor# under control and supervision
of the compan"$ and %!.&egisterd representatives who wor# on commission basis. In '()$ the petitioner applied to theSocial
Securit" S"stem$ the respondent$ for e*emption of the registered representatives fromthe compulsor" coverage of the Social
Securit" Act but later denied.ISS+E: ,hether or not the petitioner-s$ registered representatives are emplo"ees within themeaning
of the Social Securit" Act &+/I01: 02. ,herefore the emplo"ee was defined b" the Social Securit" Act as:
Any personwho performs services for an employer in which either or both mental and physical efforts areused and who
receives compensation for such services, where there is an employer-employeerelationship: Provided, That a self-employed
professional shall be both employee and employerat the same time. (As amended by Sec. 4, .A. !"#$ and Sec. !, P.%. &o. '" ",
S-')*)+
The representatives are in realit" commission agents. The" cannot be considered emplo"eesfor the" were 3ust paid not b" the
investor but in a form of a commission$ their services ma" beterminated at an" certain time$ and there is no element of control
for the" do not devote theirtime e*clusivel" to or solel" for the petitioner4 the time and the effort the" spend in their wor#depend
upon entirel" upon their own will and initiative.

National Sugar Refineries Corp v. NLRC

Chester Cabalza recommends his visitors to please read the original & full text of the case cited.
Xie xie!

G.R. No. 101761 March 24, 1993

NATIONAL SUGAR REFINERIES CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS

COMMISSION and NBSR SUPERVISORY UNION, (PACIWU) TUCP, respondents.

Facts:

Petitioner National Sugar Refineries Corporation (NASUREFCO), a corporation which is fully owned and
controlled by the Government, operates three (3) sugar refineries located at Bukidnon, Iloilo and
Batangas. Private respondent union represents the former supervisors of the NASUREFCO Batangas
Sugar Refinery.

In 1988, petitioner implemented a Job Evaluation (JE) Program affecting all employees, from rank-and-file
to department heads. We glean from the records that for about ten years prior to the JE Program, the
members of respondent union were treated in the same manner as rank-and file employees. As such,
they used to be paid overtime, rest day and holiday pay pursuant to the provisions of Articles 87, 93 and
94 of the Labor Code as amended.

With the implementation of the JE Program, members of respondent union were re-classified under levels
S-5 to S-8 which are considered managerial staff for purposes of compensation and benefits.

In May 1990, petitioner NASUREFCO recognized herein respondent union, which was organized
pursuant to Republic Act NO. 6715 allowing supervisory employees to form their own unions, as the
bargaining representative of all the supervisory employees at the NASUREFCO Batangas Sugar
Refinery.

In June 1990, the members of herein respondent union filed a complainant with the executive labor
arbiter for non-payment of overtime, rest day and holiday pay allegedly in violation of Article 100 of the
Labor Code.

In 1991, Executive Labor Arbiter Pido directed NASUREFCO to pay for the wages complained of.

On appeal, in a decision promulgated on July 1991, respondent National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) affirmed the decision of the labor arbiter on the ground that the members of respondent union are
not managerial employees, and, therefore, they are entitled to overtime, rest day and holiday pay.
Respondent NLRC declared that these supervisory employees are merely exercising recommendatory
powers subject to the evaluation, review and final action by their department heads.

Issue:

W/N the Supervisors are considered Managerial Employees and should no longer receive overtime, rest
day and holiday pay.

Ruling:

Yes

Ratio:

"Art. 82 Coverage. — The provisions of this title shall apply to employees in all establishments and
undertakings whether for profit or not, but not to government employees, managerial employees, field
personnel, members of the family of the employer who are dependent on him for support, domestic
helpers, persons in the personal service of another, and workers who are paid by results as determined
by the Secretary of Labor in Appropriate regulations.

"As used herein, 'managerial employees' refer to those whose primary duty consists of the management
of the establishment in which they are employed or of a department or subdivision thereof, and to other
officers or members of the managerial staff." (Emphasis supplied.)

It is the submission of petitioner that while the members of respondent union, as supervisors, may not be
occupying managerial positions, they are clearly officers or members of the managerial staff because
they meet all the conditions prescribed by law and, hence, they are not entitled to overtime, rest day.

Quintessentially, with the promotion of the union members, they are no longer entitled to the benefits
which attach and pertain exclusively to their positions. Entitlement to the benefits provided for by law
requires prior compliance with the conditions set forth therein. With the promotion of the members of
respondent union, they occupied positions which no longer met the requirements imposed by law. Their
assumption of these positions removed them from the coverage of the law, ergo, their exemption
therefrom.

As correctly pointed out by petitioner, if the union members really wanted to continue receiving the
benefits which attach to their former positions, there was nothing to prevent them from refusing to accept
their promotions and their corresponding benefits. As the saying goes by, they could not, as a simple
matter of law and fairness, get the best of both worlds at the expense of NASUREFCO.

Promotion of its employees is one of the jurisprudentially-recognized exclusive prerogatives of

management, provided it is done in good faith. In the case at bar, private respondent union has miserably
failed to convince this Court that the petitioner acted implementing the JE Program. There is no showing
that the JE Program was intended to circumvent the law and deprive the members of respondent union of
the benefits they used to receive.

Auto Bus Transport vs Bautista DIGEST

DECEMBER 20, 2016 ~ VBDIAZ

Auto Bus Transport vs Bautista

G.R. No. 156367. May 16, 2005

Facts:

Bautista, a driver-conductor of the Autobus transport, was dismissed after his failure to pay an amount demanded by

the company for the repair of the bus damaged in an accident caused by him.
He receives compensation by way of commission per travel.

Bautista complained for illegal dismissal with money claims for nonpayment of 13th month pay and service

incentive leave pay against Autobus.

Auto Bus’ Defenses:

1. Bautista’s employment was replete with offenses involving reckless imprudence, gross negligence, and

dishonesty supported with copies of letters, memos, irregularity reports, warrants of arrest;

2. In the exercise of management prerogative, Bautista was terminated only after providing for an opportunity to

explain:

Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint however awarded Bautista his 13thmonth pay and service incentive leave

pay.

Auto Bus appealed. NLRC deleted the 13th month pay award. In the CA, NLRC’s decision was affirmed.

Issue: Whether or not respondent is entitled to service incentive leave pay.

Held: Yes.

Under Article 95 of the Labor Code, every employee who has rendered at least one year or service shall be entitled

to a yearly service incentive leave of five days with pay. In Section 1, Rule V, Book III of the Implementing Rules

and Regulations of the Labor Code, the rule shall apply to all, except… (d) Field personnel and other employees

whose performance is unsupervised by the employer including those who are engaged on task or contract basis,

purely commission basis, or those who are paid in a fixed amount for performing work irrespective of the time

consumed in the performance thereof.

Petitioner’s contention that Bautista is not entitled to service incentive leave because he is paid on a purely

commission basis must fail. The phrase following “Field personnel” should not be construed as a separate

classification of employees but is merely an amplification of the definition of field personnel defined under the

Labor Code.

Bautista neither falls under the category field personnel. As defined, field personnel are those whose performance of

service is unsupervised by the employer, the workplace being away from the principal place of business and whose

hours and days of work cannot be determined with reasonable certainty. Bus companies have ways of determining

the hours worked by their drivers and conductors with reasonable certainty. The courts have taken judicial notice of

the following:

1. Along the routes traveled, there are inspectors assigned at strategic places who board the bus to inspect the

passengers, the punched tickets, and the conductor’s reports;

2. There is a mandatory once-a week car barn or shop day, where the bus is regularly checked;
3. The drivers and conductors must be at specified place and time, as they observe prompt departure and arrival;

4. At every depot, there is always a dispatcher whose function is to see to it that the bus and crew leaves and

arrives at the estimated proper time.

By these reasons, drivers and conductors are therefore under constant supervision while in the performance of their

work.

San Juan de Dios Hospital Employees Association-AFW vs. NLRC Case Digest
San Juan de Dios Hospital Employees Association-AFW vs. NLRC

282 SCRA 316 (1997)

Facts: Petitioners, the rank-and-file employee-union officers and members of San Juan De Dios Hospital
Employees Association sent a four (4)-page letter with attached support signatures requesting and pleading
for the expeditious implementation and payment by respondent Juan De Dios Hospital of the 40 HOURS/5-
DAY WORKWEEK with compensable weekly two (2) days off provided for by Republic Act 5901 as clarified
for enforcement by the Secretary of Labor’s Policy Instructions No. 54 dated April 12, 1988.”

Respondent hospital failed to give a favorable response; thus, petitioners filed a complaint regarding their
claims for statutory benefits under the above-cited law and policy issuance. On February 26, 1992, the
Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint. Petitioners appealed before public respondent National Labor
Relations Commission which affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s decision.

Issue: Whether Policy Instructions No. 54 issued by then Labor Secretary (now Senator) Franklin M. Drilon
is valid or not.

Ruling: The policy instruction is not valid. This issuance clarifies the enforcement policy of this Department
on the working hours and compensation of personnel employed by hospital/clinics with a bed capacity of
100 or more and those located in cities and municipalities with a population of one million or more.

Reliance on Republic Act No. 5901, however, is misplaced for the said statute, as correctly ruled by
respondent NLRC, and has long been repealed with the passage of the Labor Code on May 1, 1974. Article
302 of which explicitly provide: “All labor laws not adopted as part of this Code either directly or by reference
are hereby repealed. All provisions of existing laws, orders, decrees, rules and regulations inconsistent
herewith are likewise repealed.” Accordingly, only Article 83 of the Labor Code which appears to have
substantially incorporated or reproduced the basic provisions of Republic Act No. 5901 may support Policy
Instructions No. 54 on which the latter’s validity may be gauged. Article 83 of the Labor Code states: Normal
Hours of Work. -- The normal hours of work of any employee shall not exceed eight (8) hours a day.

“Health personnel in cities and municipalities with a population of at least one million (1,000,000) or in
hospitals and clinics with a bed capacity of at least one hundred (100) shall hold regular office hours for
eight (8) hours a day, for five (5) days a week, exclusive of time for meals, except where the exigencies of
the service require that such personnel work for six (6) days or forty-eight (48) hours, in which case they
shall be entitled to an additional compensation of at least thirty per cent (30%) of their regular wage for
work on the sixth day. For purposes of this Article, “health personnel” shall include: resident physicians,
nurses, nutritionists, dietitians, pharmacists, social workers, laboratory technicians, paramedical
technicians, psychologists, midwives, attendants and all other hospital or clinic personnel.”

A cursory reading of Article 83 of the Labor Code betrays petitioners’ position that “hospital employees” are
entitled to “a full weekly salary with paid two (2) days’ off if they have completed the 40-hour/5-day
workweek”. What Article 83 merely provides are: (1) the regular office hour of eight hours a day, five days
per week for health personnel, and (2) where the exigencies of service require that health personnel work
for six days or forty-eight hours then such health personnel shall be entitled to an additional compensation
of at least thirty percent of their regular wage for work on the sixth day. There is nothing in the law that
supports then Secretary of Labor’s assertion that “personnel in subject hospitals and clinics are entitled to
a full weekly wage for seven (7) days if they have completed the 40-hour/5-day workweek in any given
workweek”. Needless to say, the Secretary of Labor exceeded his authority by including a two days off with
pay in contravention of the clear mandate of the statute. Administrative interpretation of the law is at best
merely advisory, and the Court will not hesitate to strike down an administrative interpretation that deviates
from the provision of the statute.

Pedro Gayon v. ilvestre GayonG.R. !o. "-#$%9&' !ovem(er #)' 19*+Ponente, hief ustice
oncepcionFacts,/ppeal (y plaintiff from F0 0loilo dismissal of his case. n uly %1' 19)*' Pedro
complained against defendantspouses ilvestre and Genoveva de Gayon' alleging that on
cto(er 1' 192#' spouses sold to Pedro Gelera' for P2++.++' a parcel of unregistered land in
Guim(al' 0loilo' including improvements thereon' su(3ect to redemption4ithin 2years or not later 192*5
that said right not e6ercised (y them' or any of their heirs or successors' despite period e6piration5 that
Gelera sold the land on 7arch #1' 19)1' to Pedro. Pedro had' since 19)1' introduced thereonimprovements5
that he had fully paid ta6es on said property up to 19)*5 ! 1)+) and 1)1) re8uire a 3udicial decreefor the
consolidation of the title in and to a land ac8uired through a conditional sale' and' accordingly' praying
thatan order (e issued in plaintiff s favor for the consolidation of o4nership in and to the
aforementioned property.Genoveva said her hus(and died on anuary )' 192&' long (efore the
institution of the case' that the deed 4here theysold property to Gelera 4as fa:e' her signature forged' and
they never e6ecuted such document' and that complaintis malicious and em(arrassed her and her children'
for they had to employ counsel. /nd that (eing (rother of thedeceased ilvestre Gayon' plaintiff ;did not
e6ert efforts for the amica(le settlement of the case; (efore filing hiscomplaint. he prayed' therefore' that
the same (e dismissed and that plaintiff (e sentenced to pay damages. n eptem(er 19' 19)*' dismissed for
ilvestre 4as dead <a(solute o4ner' 4ife nothing to do 4ith it=.0ssue,>hether or not such dismissal 4as
valid.?eld, !o. >ife has something to do 4ith property' (eing 4ido4' she is a compulsory heir' interested' and
her motion 4asnecessary so that other successors in interest instead of deceased could (e made parties to
the case. 0f heirs includedas defendants' they cannot (e sued as representatives of decedent' (ut
rather as o4ners an ali8uot interest in the property in 8uestion' even if the precise e6tent of
their interest may still (e undetermined and they have derived itfrom the decent. ?ence' they may (e sued
4ithout a previous declaration of heirship' provided there is no pendingspecial proceeding for the settlement
of the estate of the decedent. oncerning F 121 <compromise efforts= appliesto suits ;filed or maintained
(et4een mem(ers of the same family.; @his phrase' ;mem(ers of the same family';should' ho4ever' (e
construed in the light of /rt. #1* of the same ode' pursuant to 4hich, <1= Aet4een hus(andand 4ife5 <#=
Aet4een parent and child5 <%= /mong other ascendants and their descendants5 <&= /mong (rothers
andsisters. Genoveva is plaintiffBs sister-in-la4' not part of enumeration' so failure to see: compromise
(efore filing of complaint does not (ar. Remanded to lo4er court of administrator as defendant' or heirs if
in a(sence.
SIME DARBY PILIPINAS, INC. petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (2ND DIVISION)
and SIME DARBY SALARIED EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (ALU-
TUCP), respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:

FACTS:

Sime Darby Pilipinas, Inc., petitioner, is engaged in the manufacture of automotive

tires, tubes and other rubber products. Sime Darby Salaried Employees Association
(ALU-TUCP), private respondent, is an association of monthly salaried employees of
petitioner at its Marikina factory. Prior to the present controversy, all
company factory workers in Marikina including members of private respondent
union worked from 7:45 a.m. to 3:45 p.m. with a 30-minute paid “on
call” lunch break.
Petitioner issued a memorandum to all factory-based employees advising all its
monthly salaried employees in its Marikina Tire Plant, except those in the Warehouse
and Quality Assurance Department working on shifts, a change in work schedule
effective 14 September 1992 thus —
TO: ALL FACTORY-BASED EMPLOYEES
RE: NEW WORK SCHEDULE
Effective Monday, September 14, 1992, the new work schedule of the factory office
will be as follows:
7:45 A.M. — 4:45 P.M. (Monday to Friday)
7:45 A.M. — 11:45 A.M. (Saturday).
Coffee break time will be ten minutes only anytime between:
9:30 A.M. — 10:30 A.M. and
2:30 P.M. — 3:30 P.M.
Lunch break will be between:
12:00 NN — 1:00 P.M. (Monday to Friday).
Since private respondent felt affected adversely by the change in the work schedule
and discontinuance of the 30-minute paid “on call” lunch break, it
filed on behalf of its members a complaint with the Labor Arbiter for
unfair labor practice, discrimination and evasion of liability
pursuant to the resolution of this Court in Sime Darby
International Tire Co., Inc. v. NLRC. 2However, the Labor Arbiter
dismissed the complaint on the ground that the change in the work
schedule and the elimination of the 30-minute paid lunch break of
the factory workers constituted a valid exercise of management
prerogative and that the new work schedule, break time and one-hour lunch break
did not have the effect of diminishing the benefits granted to factory workers as the
working time did not exceed eight (8) hours.
Private respondent appealed to respondent National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) which sustained the Labor Arbiter and
dismissed the appeal. 4 However, upon motion for reconsideration by private
respondent, the NLRC, this time with two (2) new commissioners replacing those who
earlier retired, reversed its earlier decision as well as the decision of the Labor
Arbiter. 5 The NLRC considered the decision of this Court in the Sime
Darby case of 1990 as the law of the case wherein petitioner was
ordered to pay “the money value of these covered employees
deprived of lunch and/or working time breaks.” The public respondent
declared that the new work schedule deprived the employees of the benefits of a time-
honored company practice of providing its employees a 30-minute paid lunch break
resulting in an unjust diminution of company privileges prohibited by Art. 100 of the
Labor Code, as amended.
Hence, this petition alleging that public respondent committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The Office of the Solicitor General filed in a lieu of comment a manifestation
and motion recommending that the petitioner be granted, alleging that the
memorandum which contained the new work schedule was not
discriminatory of the union members nor did it constitute unfair
labor practice on the part of petitioner.
ISSUE:

Whether or Not the act of management in revising the work

schedule of its employees and discarding their paid lunch break
constitutes unfair labor practice.

RULING:

We agree, hence, we sustain petitioner. The right to fix the work

schedules of the employees rests principally on their employer. In
the instant case petitioner, as the employer, cites as reason for the adjustment the
efficient conduct of its business operations and its improved production. 6 It
rationalizes that while the old work schedule included a 30-minute
paid lunch break, the employees could be called upon to do jobs
during that period as they were “on call.” Even if denominated as
lunch break, this period could very well be considered as working
time because the factory employees were required to work if
necessary and were paid accordingly for working. Since the employees
are no longer required to work during this one-hour lunch break, there is no more
need for them to be compensated for this period. We agree with the
Labor Arbiter that the new work schedule fully complies with the daily work period of
eight (8) hours without violating the Labor Code.
It was grave abuse of discretion for public respondent to equate the earlier Sime
Darby case 9 with the facts obtaining in this case. That ruling in the former
case is not applicable here. The issue in that case involved the matter of
granting lunch breaks to certain employees while depriving the
other employees of such breaks. This Court affirmed in that case
the NLRC’s finding that such act of management was
discriminatory and constituted unfair labor practice.
Further, management retains the prerogative, whenever exigencies of
the service so require, to change the working hours of its
employees. So long as such prerogative is exercised in good faith for the
advancement of the employer’s interest and not for the purpose of defeating or
circumventing the rights of the employees under special laws or under valid
agreements, this Court will uphold such exercise. 12
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the National Labor
Relations Commission is SET ASIDE and the decision of the Labor Arbiter
dated dismissing the complaint against petitioner for unfair labor
practice isAFFIRMED.

Luzon Stevedoring Corporation vs. CA Case Digest

Luzon Stevedoring Corporation vs. Court of Appeals
(156 SCRA 169)

Facts: A maritime collision occurred between the tanker CAVITE owned by LSCO and MV Fernando
Escano (a passenger ship) owned by Escano, as a result the passenger ship sunk. An action in
admiralty was filed by Escano against Luzon. The trial court held that LSCO Cavite was solely to blame
for the collision and held that Luzon’s claim that its liability should be limited under Article 837 of the
Code of Commerce has not been established. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. The SC
also affirmed the CA. Upon two motions for reconsideration, the Supreme Court gave course to the
petition.

Issue: Whether or not in order to claim limited liability under Article 837 of the Code of Commerce, it
is necessary that the owner abandon the vessel

Held: Yes, abandonment is necessary to claim the limited liability wherein it shall be limited to the
value of the vessel with all the appurtenances and freightage earned in the voyage. However, if the
injury was due to the ship owner’s fault, the ship owner may not avail of his right to avail of limited
liability by abandoning the vessel.

The real nature of the liability of the ship owner or agent is embodied in the Code of Commerce.
Articles 587, 590 and 837 are intended to limit the liability of the ship owner, provided that the owner
or agent abandons the vessel. Although Article 837 does not specifically provide that in case of
collision there should be abandonment, to enjoy such limited liability, said article is a mere amplification
of the provisions of Articles 587 and 590 which makes it a mere superfluity.

The exception to this rule in Article 837 is when the vessel is totally lost in which case there is no
vessel to abandon, thus abandonment is not required. Because of such loss, the liability of the owner
or agent is extinguished. However, they are still personally liable for claims under the Workmen’s
Compensation Act and for repairs on the vessel prior to its loss.

In case of illegal or tortious acts of the captain, the liability of the owner and agent is subsidiary. In
such cases, the owner or agent may avail of Article 837 by abandoning the vessel. But if the injury is
caused by the owner’s fault as where he engages the services of an inexperienced captain or
engineer, he cannot avail of the provisions of Article 837 by abandoning the vessel. He is personally
liable for such damages.

In this case, the Court held that the petitioner is a t fault and since he did not abandon the vessel, he
cannot invoke the benefit of Article 837 to limit his liability to the value of the vessel, all appurtenances
and freightage earned during the voyage.

MERCIDAR FISHING CORP vs. NLRC AND AGAO

G.R. No. 112574

October 8, 1998

FACTS: This case originated from a complaint filed by Agao against petitioner for
illegal dismissal, violation of P.D. No. 851, and non-payment of five days SIL. Private
respondent had been employed as a “bodegero” or ship’s quartermaster. He
complained that he had been constructively dismissed by petitioner when the latter
refused him assignments aboard its boats. Private respondent alleged that he had been
sick and thus allowed to go on leave without pay for one month but that when he
reported to work at the end of such period with a health clearance, he was told to
come back another time as he could not be reinstated immediately. Thereafter,
petitioner refused to give him work.
Petitioner, on the other hand, alleged that it was private respondent who actually
abandoned his work. It claimed that the latter failed to report for work after his leave
had expired and was, in fact, absent without leave for three months .
Labor Arbiter Amansec rendered a decision ordering respondents to
reinstate complainant with backwages, pay him his 13th month pay and incentive
leave pay.
Petitioner appealed to the NLRC which dismissed the appeal for lack of merit. The
NLRC dismissed petitioner’s claim that it cannot be held liable for SIL pay by
fishermen in its employ as the latter supposedly are “field personnel” and thus
not entitled to such pay under the Labor Code.
ISSUE: is Agao a field employee, hence not entitled to SIL pay?
HELD: WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED
NO; Agao is NOT a field employee, he is entitled to SIL pay

Art. 82 of the Labor Code provides:

Art. 82. Coverage. — The provisions of this Title [Working Conditions and Rest
Periods] shall apply to employees in all establishments and undertakings whether
for profit or not, but not to government employees, field personnel, members of
the family of the employer who are dependent on him for support, domestic helpers,
persons in the personal service of another, and workers who are paid by results as
determined by the Secretary of Labor in appropriate regulations.
xxx xxx xxx
“Field personnel” shall refer to non-agricultural employees who regularly perform
their duties away from the principal place of business or branch office of the employer
and whose actual hours of work in the field cannot be determined
with reasonable certainty.
Petitioner argues essentially that since the work of private respondent is performed
away from its principal place of business, it has no way of verifying his actual hours
of work on the vessel. It contends that private respondent and other fishermen in its
employ should be classified as “field personnel” who have no statutory right to SIL
pay.
In the case of Union of Pilipro Employees (UFE) v. Vicar, this Court
explained the meaning of the phrase “whose actual hours of work in the field cannot
be determined with reasonable certainty” in Art. 82 of the Labor Code, as follows:
Moreover, the requirement that “actual hours of work in the field cannot be
determined with reasonable certainty” must be read in conjunction with Rule IV,
Book III of the Implementing Rules which provides:
Rule IV Holidays with Pay
Sec. 1. Coverage — This rule shall apply to all employees except:
xxx xxx xxx
(e) Field personnel and other employees whose time and performance
is unsupervised by the employer . . . (Emphasis supplied).
Petitioner in said case is contending that such rule added another element not found in
the law. Contrary to the contention of the petitioner, the Court finds that the
aforementioned rule did not add another element to the Labor Code definition of
field personnel. The clause “whose time and performance is
unsupervised by the employer” did not amplify but merely
interpreted and expounded the clause “whose actual hours of work
in the field cannot be determined with reasonable certainty.” The
former clause is still within the scope and purview of Article 82 which defines field
personnel. Hence, in deciding whether or not an employee’s actual
working hours in the field can be determined with reasonable
certainty, query must be made as to whether or not such
employee’s time and performance is constantly supervised by the
employer
In the case at bar, during the entire course of their fishing voyage, fishermen
employed by petitioner have no choice but to remain on board its vessel. Although
they perform non-agricultural work away from petitioner’s business offices, the fact
remains that throughout the duration of their work they are under the
effective control and supervision of petitioner through the vessel’s
patron or master as the NLRC correctly held.

Manuel Lara vs Petronilo Del

Rosario, Jr.
Manuel Lara et al were former taxi drivers of Petronilo Del Rosario, Jr. In September 1950,
Del Rosario sold some of his vehicles which led to Lara et al not being needed anymore.
Eventually, their services were terminated. Because their employer did not give them their
one month’s salary in lieu of the notice required in Article 302 of the Code of Commerce, Lara
et al sued Del Rosario.
However, Del Rosario contended that the Code of Commerce was already repealed hence
Lara et al have no legal basis. Del Rosario contends that the New Civil Code took effect in
August 1950 or a year after release for publication.
ISSUE: When did the New Civil Code took effect?
HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that Lara et al has no legal basis for their claims since the
provision of the COde of Commerce they are relying on was already repealed by the New
Civil Code. Their alleged dismissal from service without notice took place in September 1950
after the New Civil Code took effect.
The Supreme Court also clarified that, in an obiter dictum, that the new Civil Code of the
Philippines took effect on August 30, 1950. This date is exactly one year after the Official
Gazette publishing the Code was released for circulation, the said release having been made
on August 30, 1949.

San Miguel Brewery Union vs

Ople
In 1979, SMC implemented its “Complementary Distribution System” (CDS) whereby
wholesalers can directly get beer products from any SMC offices. The SMB Union assailed
this program because it violates the CBA particularly the established scheme whereby route
salesmen have been given specific territories to sell beer products. The CDS scheme would
then lower the take home pay of the route salesmen. SMB Union then sued SMC for unfair
labor practices.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CDS is a violation of the CBA.
HELD: No. The SC ruled that the CDS is an exercise of management prerogatives whereby
the management can implement schemes to optimize their profit. Further, the CDS provides
for a compensation clause as well for salesmen. San Miguel Corporation’s offer to
compensate the members of its sales force who will be adversely affected by the
implementation of the CDS by paying them a so-called “back adjustment commission” to
make up for the commissions they might lose as a result of the CDS proves the company’s
good faith and lack of intention to bust their union.